Albeit with significant country-specific differences, this report finds incumbent platforms to have strong leading positions in their jurisdiction, with a significant degree of concentration in the market for core general online marketplaces, and in particular a reduced level of effective competition on the seller side of core general online marketplaces. This situation arises due to a combination of structural features and strategic conduct, which have made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult. As a result, future market contestability is reduced, and there are increased risks that the market position of the leading platforms may become entrenched. Such market dynamics have led to significant imbalances in the relationships between sellers and the main incumbent platforms. These factors give rise to a situation where outcomes for consumers and sellers are worse off than may be the case in a more competitive market.
Competition Market Study of Online Marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania
9. Summary of findings
Copy link to 9. Summary of findingsAbstract
This chapter brings together the key findings of the market study, forming the basis for the recommendations’ proposal. It summarises the most relevant market outcomes, identified issues and potential risks emerging from the OECD’s analysis of competition in online marketplaces in the three countries under review.
The report finds incumbent platforms to have strong leading positions in their jurisdiction, with a significant degree of concentration in the market for core general online marketplaces, and in particular a reduced level of effective competition on the seller side of core general online marketplaces – to a different degree in each jurisdiction. While other general online marketplaces can provide an alternative for certain categories of consumers and sellers, their business model and related features, products and services, do not constitute a close substitute to core marketplaces. This situation arises due to a combination of structural features and strategic conduct, which have made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult. As a result, future market contestability is reduced, and there are increased risks that the market position of the leading platforms may become entrenched. Further, this has led to significant imbalances in the relationships between sellers and the leading incumbent platforms. These factors, separately and together, give rise to a situation where outcomes for consumers and sellers are worse off than could be the case in a more competitive market. Concerns also remain as to the future state of competition, with any potential expansion of the incumbent platforms in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, threatening to further reduce contestability. Together, this suggests a durable competitive advantage for the incumbent platforms that is difficult for new entrants to overcome, especially on the seller side.
Online marketplaces are multi-sided platforms, serving two distinct user groups: sellers, who use online marketplaces to offer and sell goods to consumers and consumers, who use these platforms to find and purchase goods from sellers. Consistent with the approaches of various competition authorities, this report takes a two‑sided approach and distinguishes between the consumer side and the seller side of online marketplaces. This is because the competitive constraints and relevant dynamics are different on each side, even though there are interdependencies between them.
Consistent with other consumer-facing markets, competition between online marketplaces on the consumer side can be expected to drive various outcomes, such as higher quality goods and services, broader choice, lower prices and innovation.
On the consumer side, the OECD’s analysis focusses on core general online marketplaces which provide a “one‑stop-shop” for consumers to transact across many retail categories (in terms of product type, quality and price range), operating nationally in each of the three jurisdictions. These services are considered closely substitutable. Other general online marketplaces focus primarily on the low-cost end of the market or operate with an otherwise different business model. While they provide some degree of competitive constraint in certain circumstances, the evidence shows that consumers use these platforms in a different way to the core general online marketplaces described above and, as such, they compete less closely.
Turning to the seller side, it is worth noting explicitly why competition on this side of the market is important for consumers downstream. In the same way as more competition on the consumer side can be expected to improve outcomes for consumers, more competition on the seller side of online marketplaces can be expected to lead to a better offering for sellers. This, in turn, may translate into lower prices for consumers but, more broadly, also drive improved choice and/or quality by supporting a situation in which more sellers are likely to enter, expand and/or improve their retail offerings.
Conversely, ineffective competition on the seller side can affect sellers’ ability and incentives to innovate. For instance, if online marketplaces are able to use their superior bargaining position to increase sellers’ costs of doing business, in turn eroding their profitability, this can result in sellers reducing their pace of innovation, quality or exiting altogether. Further, online marketplaces with bargaining power may be able to use their position to transfer risks onto sellers. The resulting inefficient allocation of risk can lead to an overall increase in costs and a reduction in economic efficiency, further inhibiting consumers access to innovative and diverse products.
On the seller side, the OECD’s analysis focusses on core general online marketplaces platforms, which offer a specific set of services to a broad range of sellers as well as a degree of autonomy in terms of pricing and branding, open to locally based sellers. All other general online marketplaces operating under different business models might offer an alternative to specific categories of sellers in some circumstances, but cannot be considered as closely substitutable to core marketplaces. In general, sellers are more limited in the alternative options which are available to them, as compared to consumers. Moreover, where sellers do operate across multiple channels, these may be considered as complementary due to the need for sellers to use core general online marketplaces to reach consumers who transact primarily through these channels.
9.1. Incumbent online marketplaces have limited competitive constraints in all three jurisdictions
Copy link to 9.1. Incumbent online marketplaces have limited competitive constraints in all three jurisdictionsAll three jurisdictions are characterised by the presence of a large incumbent platform, with substantial market share and few close competitors.
All three jurisdictions are characterised by the presence of a large incumbent platform in core general online marketplaces, with substantial market share and few close competitors. The environment for core general online marketplaces, which provide the ability to transact across many retail categories (in terms of product type, quality and price range), is generally concentrated. This is particularly the case on the seller side, with the leading platforms in each country, Allegro and Pigu (pigu.lt and 220.lv), representing the main viable pathway for sellers to reach consumers within the relevant geographic boundaries. Other online marketplaces players like Temu, which operate with a substantially different business model, are growing in popularity amongst consumers, but remain differentiated from core general online marketplaces on both the consumer and seller side.
On the consumer side, in Poland Allegro has an 81% share of traffic for core general online marketplaces, in contrast to smaller players such as Empik and Amazon Poland with a share of traffic of 8% and 6% respectively. Allegro maintains a strong traffic share when taking a broader view across general online marketplaces, including those which focus primarily at the low-cost end of the market, like Temu and AliExpress or which operate with a different business model, like eBay. In this scenario, Allegro has an 64% share of traffic, followed by Temu at 12% and Aliexpress at 7%. In every scenario, Allegro’s market position is strong and has persisted for at least the past few years and appears unlikely to change in the short to medium term.
In Lithuania, Pigu holds to a share of traffic of 56% for core general online marketplaces, with the second-largest player being its domestic rival Varle with a 27% share. Expanding the view to include other general online marketplaces, Pigu (25%) is close in size to AliExpress at 28% and Temu at 22% and Varle again at 12%, although AliExpress and Temu remain substantially differentiated from Pigu’s product and service offering and might represent an alternative only for specific categories of consumers and purchases.
In Latvia, 220.lv (Pigu) takes a 72% share of traffic for core general online marketplaces, with few other alternatives present. Looking more broadly at all general online marketplaces, 220.lv (Pigu) has a 29% share of traffic, alongside Temu and Aliexpress (25% and 23% respectively). While Temu in particular has experienced significant growth recently, it does not compete closely with 220.lv across the board, as it does not enable consumers to transact across many retail categories (in terms of product type, quality and price range).
The seller side for core general online marketplaces is highly concentrated in each jurisdiction. Allegro and Pigu (pigu.lt and 220.lv) represent the main viable pathway for sellers to reach consumers within the relevant geographic boundaries. In Poland, Allegro’s share of traffic varies between 60% and 81% depending on the scenario considered. Similar to the consumer side, its market position is strong and appears unlikely to change in the short to medium term.
In Lithuania, competitive pressure on Pigu is limited on the seller side, where it has a 68% share of traffic in 2025, followed by Varle at 32%. Considering all other general online marketplaces for the period November 2025-February 2026, following Temu’s entry its share is 42%, followed by Pigu at 32% and Varle with 18% of the market. In Latvia, 220.lv’s share of traffic for core general online marketplaces is high at 100%. Looking more generally at all other online marketplaces, since Temu’s entry in late 2025 its share is 36% while 220.lv holds approximately 50% of the market. As for Lithuania, this scenario is offered mainly for completeness, given the current low degree of substitutability between the two types of platforms.
In all cases, the leading platforms’ high traffic shares in core general online marketplaces have persisted over time. The incumbents’ positions are unlikely to be challenged in the presence of structural features and ecosystem expansion, which impacts competition and creates high barriers to entry.
Across all three jurisdictions, the combination of structural features of online marketplaces and strategic conduct by the leading platforms, described above, have created high barriers to entry and made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult.
First, the presence of strong network effects, particularly indirect network effects, which are reinforcing over time, raises barriers to entry for alternative providers, given the need to successfully enter concurrently, attracting both consumers and sellers. Network effects are generally considered to be a core aspect of the business model of online marketplaces, consistent with stakeholder feedback across all three jurisdictions that such network effects have played a role in underpinning the market position of the leading platforms. In particular, the substantial concentration of consumers on these platforms is a key driver of take‑up by sellers. Allegro and Pigu’s access to unique consumer demand is evidently a key competitive advantage and positions them as the primary “must have” channel for sellers to reach local consumers.
Second, significant economies of scale have also strengthened the competitive positions of the large incumbent platforms and acted as a barrier to entry or expansion for smaller or new marketplace operators. In the context of online marketplaces, economies of scale may manifest through the spreading of high fixed costs over a greater volume of transactions, as well as reducing consumer and seller acquisition costs. As platforms with a well-established brand and larger user base, Allegro and Pigu benefit from greater visibility and user trust, which is then reinforced by the presence of network effects. Platforms also benefit from scale in their logistics services, as higher volumes drive significant efficiencies. In Poland, potential new entrants would require such a significant initial scale of “mass” switching to their platform to build the scale required in order to challenge Allegro, which would be very challenging in light of Allegro’s advantages. In the context of small national markets, as is particularly the case in Lithuania and Latvia, incumbents may have reached a degree of scale sufficient to deter new entrants, particularly those without a clear path to achieving similar efficiencies.
Third, the extent of competition between online marketplaces can be highly affected by the presence of switching costs and barriers to multi-homing. On the consumer side, the costs of switching or multi-homing may be relatively low in an online environment. However, OECD analysis and evidence from stakeholders highlights that the use of these leading platforms is part of consumers’ habitual shopping behaviour in light of their high brand trust, comprehensive product offerings and localisation strategies. Switching costs are also heightened by the loyalty programmes and other related services offered by the platforms.
On the seller side, sellers face barriers to multi-homing and switching arising from the well-recognised costs involved in integrating across multiple platforms. In addition to the costs associated with integrating with multiple platforms in a technical and operational sense, it can also be very costly and complex for sellers to maintain the multiple logistics chains required to supply different online marketplaces. If competing platforms are unable to provide sellers with access to new groups of consumers, or deliver lower sales volumes or thinner margins due to weaker consumer reach, then the expected commercial benefits of multi-homing are unlikely to offset the costs. Relatedly, the presence of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses (discussed further below) may further constrain sellers’ freedom when multi-homing across platforms, increasing barriers to entry. In practice, most sellers remain highly concentrated on the incumbent platforms Allegro and Pigu, possibly reflecting their need to remain active on the incumbent platform to reach the broadest consumer audience, while some degree of multi-homing exists for a proportion of sellers active on alternative platforms. The presence of AliExpress and the entry of Temu, has not changed this situation thus far, as both have focussed on direct cross-border sales. While since the end of 2025 Temu has started operations to establish a local seller ecosystem, in light of its different business model and the other factors highlighted, it is too soon to establish how this will affect sellers’ behaviour.
Fourth, Allegro and Pigu’s positions as the leading online marketplaces operating in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, have been reinforced by their expansions into other activities across multiple vertical or conglomerate dimensions (to different degrees depending on the national market at stake). In this way, Allegro and Pigu’s strength does not derive solely from their position in online marketplaces but from the way that position is shielded and reinforced through expansion into complementary functions, including in the future. This has the effect of raising entry barriers in online marketplace services, as potential entrants need to match the platforms’ full-service offerings in order to compete effectively. It also creates the conditions under which Allegro and Pigu have the ability to leverage their strong position in online marketplaces into the ancillary markets where they have expanded their ecosystems – and can further do so in the future – giving rise to foreclosure risks for potential competitors and raising barriers to entry. These effects can be observed in relation to a range of different services.
Looking at logistics, access to sufficient parcel delivery and locker capacity is essential for online marketplaces to be able to compete and meet consumer preferences for convenient and fast delivery options. Allegro and Pigu both operate their integrated delivery services, as well as partnering with key players in their respective jurisdictions (see also Chapter 2). Concerns may arise if access to sufficient parcel delivery and locker capacity is tied up by incumbents via existing partnerships or exclusivity agreements, denying rivals the scale necessary to meet their users’ needs. Further, Allegro and Pigu can use a range of levers to incentivise sellers to rely on their seller-side logistics services (e.g. preferential pricing or rankings), tying their marketplace and logistics services. This can increase sellers’ costs of switching and multi-homing, raising barriers to entry for rival marketplaces and giving rise to foreclosure risks in downstream logistics markets by potentially depriving rival logistics providers of the scale necessary to compete.
Allegro also raises switching costs for sellers through its expansion into financial services for sellers, while Allegro and Pigu’s consumer-facing financial services give rise to increased risks of user lock-in and dependency for consumers who value the seamless integration between the platform and its financial services. Allegro’s ownership of other consumer-facing services, particularly the CSS Ceneo, creates the potential for self-preferencing, to the extent that Ceneo has market power and can direct traffic to Allegro, at the expense of rival online marketplaces and e‑commerce businesses, or exclude its rivals from the platform, distorting competition on the merits. This is particularly relevant in light of the relative price sensitivity of consumers in the region, highlighted consistently by stakeholders, that are known to use CSS platforms to a greater extent than consumers in other jurisdictions. Ceneo also provides a rich source of consumer data for Allegro, alongside Allegro’s acquisition of online ticketing platform eBilet. These services provide Allegro with additional channels to increase consumer engagement, cross-sell and gather behavioural data on user preferences and purchase patterns.
More generally, available information suggests that Allegro and Pigu collect a wide range of user data through their e‑commerce platforms and ecosystems. However, limited public information is available about the extent to which this data is shared internally across business units or used to inform competitive decision making. Across Allegro and Pigu’s ecosystems, data feedback loops deepen their competitive advantage: the more users interact with the platform’s ecosystem, the more valuable and predictive the data becomes, which in turn enables further optimisation and user acquisition. Over time, this creates a self-reinforcing cycle that increases user and seller dependency, raising barriers for competing marketplaces that lack access to similarly diversified data inputs.
Allegro and Pigu have also prioritised expanding their operations across borders, with Allegro expanding into Central and Eastern Europe, and Pigu’s operations extending across the Baltic and Finland. Such expansions enhance the scale of each group, potential generating enhanced bargaining power and significant efficiencies in their operations, raising entry barriers for rivals who may struggle to match such scale advantages.
Taken together, the evidence in this report points to a situation where there is a risk of tipping, whereby future market contestability is substantially limited. For avoidance of doubt, tipping does not entail the presence of anticompetitive conduct, as it is primarily a structural outcome that may occur even in the absence of unlawful behaviour. However, concerns may arise as tipping typically results in the development of a market with limited constraints on the incumbent platforms, especially where competitive pressure is not sustained by market entry or expansion. It can also increase the risks of such dominance being sustained through exclusionary practices.
In the Polish case, Allegro holds an entrenched position as the leading online marketplace, which has endured over time. Pigu, as the leading general online marketplace in Lithuania and Latvia, has also adopted strategies that heighten the risks of its market position becoming entrenched. Moreover, based on the evidence considered in this report, it is possible that tipping has occurred in Poland, and could potentially occur in Lithuania and Latvia in the future.
In Poland, Allegro’s persistently high market shares, strong network effects, significant economies of scale, and limited competitive constraint from rivals indicates that, unless significant structural changes occur, its position is unlikely to be challenged in the short to medium term. On the seller side, its position as the primary channel for reaching Polish consumers, its vertically integrated service offering and high switching costs hinder effective competition. On the consumer side, Allegro’s localisation strategy and brand trust ensure Allegro’s position as the default platform for consumers. Allegro’s strong position is not simply a function of early market entry, but the result of structural features and strategic conduct that have created high barriers to entry and made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult. While the entry of Temu on the consumer side is notable, it remains highly differentiated from Allegro’s full service offering, and has not meaningful challenged Allegro’s dominance.
The combination of relatively high market shares, limited alternatives especially on the sellers side, and the presence of barriers to entry and expansion in the core online marketplaces market suggests that competitive pressure on Pigu is limited in both Lithuania and Latvia. While looking more broadly at all other general marketplaces AliExpress and Temu have a sizable presence in each jurisdiction, the extent to which they closely compete with Pigu is limited. In this context, Pigu’s advantages include its integrated suite of services, its logistics infrastructure, and its alignment with national consumer and seller preferences. The presence of high barriers to entry and expansion for rival platforms, on the sellers side in particular, and limitations to the effective substitutability of alternative options on both sides indicate a market that may not be sufficiently contestable, even in the presence of nominal cross-border alternatives.
As such, this points to a reduced level effective competition in core online marketplaces in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, to different degrees, suggesting a durable competitive advantage for Allegro and Pigu that might be difficult for new entrants to overcome.
9.2. The leading incumbent players hold substantial power vis-à-vis sellers
Copy link to 9.2. The leading incumbent players hold substantial power <em>vis-à-vis</em> sellersThe structural relationship between online marketplaces and sellers is characterised by three interrelated features which create persistent imbalances in these markets and could give rise to competition concerns under certain conditions. Notably, these features reinforce one another, amplifying their impact on the platform‑seller relationship.
First, hybrid business models may create conflicts of interest. Allegro and Pigu’s business models combine intermediation services for third-party sellers with their own retail operations. This dual role embeds an inherent potential conflict of interest, as platforms may have both the incentive and the ability to privilege their own offers over those of independent sellers. Even where such conduct is not observed, the mere coexistence of intermediation and retail activities within the same entity may undermine confidence in platform neutrality and may facilitate discriminatory outcomes.
The concern is structural, as it arises from the platform’s simultaneous roles as both marketplace operator and market participant. This configuration allows platforms to influence the competitive process through control over visibility, data access, and ranking algorithms, creating scope for subtle forms of self-preferencing or strategic design choices that may tilt competition in their favour. Where such hybrid platforms hold significant market power or act as critical gateways to consumers, these risks can translate into tangible competitive distortions, weakening sellers’ ability to compete on equal terms.
Second, sellers’ strong reliance on dominant platforms reduces commercial autonomy. For many sellers, especially SMEs, the ability to sell via online marketplaces has become indispensable to reach consumers at scale. The structural factors described previously, including a high degree of concentration, strong indirect network effects and highly integrated platform ecosystems, mean that sellers see participation in these sales channels as unavoidable. This strong reliance may limit sellers’ capacity to multi-home or to develop independent sales channels, raising switching costs and reinforcing lock-in effects.
Over time, such reliance can entrench a structural imbalance of bargaining power between platforms and sellers, enabling incumbent platforms to set unilateral terms and extract higher commissions or mandate the use of ancillary services. Beyond reducing commercial autonomy, this dependency may also weaken competitive dynamics in downstream markets, as sellers’ incentives and ability to differentiate or switch become progressively limited.
Third, informational and logistical asymmetries reinforce platform control. Platforms enjoy privileged access to detailed consumer and transaction data, control over algorithms that determine visibility and sales outcomes and discretion over integrated fulfilment systems. By contrast, sellers typically have access only to partial or selectively curated data and must adapt to standardised, non-negotiable contractual terms.
These asymmetries confer a structural advantage on platforms, enabling them to shape both competitive conditions and trading outcomes within their ecosystems. Control over data flows and algorithmic processes allows platforms to determine which products are seen, promoted or prioritised, while exclusive management of fulfilment and related services further deepens seller dependence. In hybrid models, these dynamics are compounded by the platform’s own retail activity, as privileged data access and algorithmic discretion can facilitate self-preferencing or discriminatory treatment. Over time, the combination of informational opacity and logistical control entrenches the platform’s dominant position and limits sellers’ capacity to compete, innovate or negotiate on equal terms.
These structural features create fertile ground for harmful practices, though their form varies by market. In Poland, UOKiK has previously found that Allegro gave its retail arm privileged promotional access. OECD analysis shows that Allegro’s “Prices Program” can operate as a de facto price‑parity mechanism while, in Lithuania and Latvia, Pigu’s ability to impose unilateral maximum prices similarly limits sellers’ pricing freedom. Across all three markets, the integration of fulfilment, logistics, and payment services reinforces dependency and can foreclose rival providers. Together, these dynamics can enable both exclusionary conduct (such as self-preferencing and tying) and exploitative terms (including MFN-type restraints), reducing sellers’ autonomy and weakening competitive pressure.