The OECD makes several recommendations to address concerns arising from the combination of structural and behavioural factors that reduce effective competition in core general online marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. While characteristics across the three national markets under review vary to some extent, there are some common risk factors that should be addressed in order to foster a more competitive environment in the short term and to ensure these markets remain competitive in the long term. As such, the OECD recommends three main packages aimed at improving competition in online marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, namely: measures to address platforms’ market power by enhancing enforcement, market monitoring and compliance, as well as measures to ensure fair marketplace trading practices. This chapter sets out the OECD’s recommendations in detail, including expanding on the prioritisation and interconnections between these proposals.
Competition Market Study of Online Marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania
10. Recommendations
Copy link to 10. RecommendationsAbstract
The findings of this study highlight how a combination of structural and behavioural factors reduce the effectiveness of competition in online marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. As detailed in previous chapters, this is especially the case for core general online marketplaces and on the seller side of the market. While the three national markets show different degrees of concentration and levels of contestability, the report highlights common risk factors that should be addressed in order to foster a more competitive environment in the short term and to ensure these markets remain competitive in the long term.
The OECD’s recommendations, which focus on national markets and thus relate to national rules and enforcement activities, are grouped into two main packages. These aim at improving competition in online marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, through different means, namely: measures to address platforms’ market power by enhancing enforcement, market monitoring and compliance, as well as measures to ensure fair marketplace trading practices.
Notwithstanding the national differences carefully underlined throughout the report, the OECD considers that the packages of recommendations set out below are, on the whole, relevant for all three jurisdictions. This reflects the similarities at the core of the identified concerns, which often pertain to structural characteristics of the market and the specific features of the relationship between incumbent platforms and sellers. Where specific measures are aimed primarily at a selected country or should be implemented with greater urgency in one or more jurisdictions, this will be clarified in the text.
The OECD recognises that some of the recommended measures will be easier and quicker to implement than others, which may require broader reforms and/or additional resources. Further, while some recommendations focus on improving current market conditions, to the benefit of consumers and business users, others aim at setting up an improved framework to prevent competitive harm in the long term. As such, all recommendations are broadly complementary in order to achieve the desired outcome.
However, in light of the structural features and degree of concentration of these markets, albeit with different degrees in the three jurisdictions, as well as the opacity around some of the incumbents’ practices and the related risks, the OECD considers enhancing market monitoring and enforcement (measures 10.1 below) to be the most critical element to promote effective competition in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. This intensified effort would mirror the increasing market complexities and asymmetry of resources vis-à-vis large platforms, thus better allowing enforcers and policymakers to deal with challenges in digital markets, and in online marketplaces in particular, on a more equal footing.
10.1. Measures to address platforms’ market power by enhancing enforcement, market monitoring and compliance
Copy link to 10.1. Measures to address platforms’ market power by enhancing enforcement, market monitoring and complianceIn light of the characteristics of competition in online marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the current level of concentration, the positions of incumbent platforms and the risks of further entrenchment of such positions, competition enforcement should be considered to address concerns in the sector. As well as investigating current practices, it is important that competitive conditions remain closely monitored, allowing competition authorities to follow any developments in a timely manner and intervene as appropriate to maintain, enhance and/or restore competition through their competition law enforcement powers.
The measures in this package aim at reinforcing scrutiny over incumbents’ positions and specific behaviours which may result in the strengthening of market power (in both the core market and ancillary segments), further reducing contestability. In order to do so, the OECD recommends strengthening the role of the national competition authorities in each jurisdiction, as detailed below, in particular with respect to their work in digital markets. Further, the OECD proposes to complement these measures with recommendations directly aimed at incumbent platforms, that can contribute to the effective functioning of the market by increasing compliance and preventing certain potential risks linked to their practices.
10.1.1. Investigate where necessary to tackle existing risks of anticompetitive conduct
This measure aims at promptly addressing existing conduct by incumbent platforms which have the potential to constitute a breach of competition law. Competition enforcement is a key pillar of economic policy to promote and preserve competition and competition authorities’ most effective instrument to address harmful practices. As such, the OECD recommends the competition authorities in the three countries give attention to whether breaches of the law have occurred. These recommendations are made on the basis of the OECD’s understanding of current public investigations, aware of the possibility that some investigations might already be ongoing. If a recommended investigation were already taking place, the OECD recommends that it continue. In particular, in relation to the findings of Chapter 8, the OECD recommends to the competition authority in Poland to:
Consider the full extent as to whether Allegro’s contractual policies could give rise to price parity conditions (i.e. MFNs clauses), for example within the context of the Allegro Prices Program, in breach of competition law.
The OECD recommends to the competition authorities in Latvia and Lithuania to:
Consider investigating whether Pigu’s use of a price ceiling clause in its terms and conditions could be giving rise to anticompetitive effects by creating de facto price parity conditions and therefore possibly in breach of competition law (see also recommendation on co‑operation at 10.1.3 below).
The OECD also recommends to all three competition authorities to:
Consider investigating, or at least actively monitoring, other areas where the incumbents’ conduct may constitute a competition law infringement (see Section 10.1.2).1 For example, this might be the case for Pigu’s and Allegro’s potential tying practices vis-à-vis sellers, where if the use of platform-controlled logistics and fulfilment services is tied to marketplace participation in a manner that impacts competition and restricts sellers’ commercial freedom, this may breach competition law.
Finally, with the goal of strengthening antitrust enforcement and its effectiveness, the OECD recommends to all three competition authorities to:
Enhance the use of interim measures when deemed necessary, in light of the risks identified in this study, including the potential risk of tipping.
10.1.2. Establish dedicated ongoing monitoring mechanisms for digital markets
In addition to specific types of potentially anticompetitive practices that might require intervention, covered under recommendation 10.1.1 above, this study highlights further areas of concern which require ongoing surveillance.
Given the risk of further entrenchment in these markets that would be exacerbated by breaches of competition law, this measure aims to support competition authorities’ effective enforcement and promotion of competition in digital markets, ensuring potential concerns (including, but not limited to, breaches of the law) are identified in a timely manner through an ongoing mechanism and dedicated staff, and action to resolve and/or prevent competitive harm can take place more effectively.
This mechanism can be carried out in various ways, for example, through concentrating these functions in the hands of a specialised team. While the skills, resources and initiatives of this team can constitute a cross-cutting mechanism for digital markets more broadly, evolving over time as needed, this report identifies online marketplaces and ancillary markets as an initial area of focus.
Box 10.1. Digital markets monitoring: international experience
Copy link to Box 10.1. Digital markets monitoring: international experienceA growing number of competition authorities, including in smaller jurisdictions, have developed dedicated capabilities for monitoring digital markets. While approaches vary, the common thread is the recognition that digital markets require specialised expertise and tools able to support and complement traditional enforcement. In addition to the well-established practice at the European Commission level, or in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom or France, other relevant examples include:
Singapore (CCCS): The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore established a dedicated Data and Digital (D2) Division in 2023, staffed with economists and technical specialists. The D2 Division harnesses data analytics to inform enforcement decisions, institutionalises knowledge in digital markets, and monitors market and regulatory developments to flag emerging areas for further study. These capabilities feed into the CCCS’s horizon-scanning processes for detecting unnotified mergers and identifying anticompetitive behaviour, and support case investigations alongside the legal, enforcement and economics teams. The CCCS has used these capabilities to intervene in the online food delivery and ride‑hailing sectors, including issuing interim measures against a potential merger between Grab and Delivery Hero in 2024.
Portugal (AdC): The Portuguese Competition Authority set up a cross-departmental digital task force in 2020, following its 2019 Issues Paper on Digital Ecosystems, Big Data and Algorithms. The AdC uses web scraping and data analysis tools to monitor online markets, and conducts structured market consultations and surveys to collect evidence on barriers to entry, exclusion strategies and the prevalence of pricing algorithms. These monitoring efforts have led to the analysis of around 20 complaints in the digital sector, resulting in an investigation into Google’s digital advertising practices (later taken over by the European Commission) and the sanctioning of resale price maintenance in e‑commerce.
Chile (FNE): Chile’s Fiscalía Nacional Económica uses its market study powers to monitor digital markets, having conducted ten market studies to date with an increasing focus on digital sectors. In its studies, the FNE gathers and analyses market data through interviews with stakeholders across the value chain – marketplaces, suppliers, logistics providers and consumers – and examines practices such as MFN clauses, self-preferencing, contractual tying and the use of algorithms or AI that could facilitate collusion.
Netherlands (ACM): The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets has designated the digital economy as a priority enforcement area for five consecutive years since 2021. The ACM conducts broad market investigations – even absent a suspected violation – into areas such as algorithmic consumer pricing and digital platform practices, using stakeholder consultations, formal information requests, and interviews with businesses and data scientists. Further, it proactively monitors dark patterns, fake reviews, and misleading countdown timers on online platforms, and checks whether platforms comply with transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act. The ACM also chairs the Digital Regulation Co‑operation Platform, bringing together 12 Dutch regulators for co‑ordinated digital oversight.
Sources: OECD (2024[1]) Artificial Intelligence, Data and Competition – Note by Singapore, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2024)41/en/pdf; Singapore: Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore – Global Competition Review, https://globalcompetitionreview.com/insight/enforcer-hub/2023/organization-profile/singapore-competition-and-consumer-commission-of-singapore; Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, Announcements and Media Releases, https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/; Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2025, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/merger-control-laws-and-regulations/singapore/; Portuguese Competition Authority (2022) Portuguese Competition Authority’s Google investigation moves to the European, https://www.concorrencia.pt/en/articles/portuguese-competition-authoritys-google-investigation-moves-european-commission; In review: licensing and antitrust issues in Portugal – Lexology, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3c9577e5-7576-4844-b895-549d55a2a984; Defence of Competition in the Digital Sector in Portugal, https://www.concorrencia.pt/sites/default/files/documentos/estudosrelatorios/Defence%20of%20Competition%20in%20the%20Digital%20Sector%20in%20Portugal.pdf; Autoridade da Concorrência (2021) Call for information: Digital ecosystems, Big Data and algorithms, https://www.concorrencia.pt/en/articles/call-information-digital-ecosystems-big-data-and-algorithms; Chilean Competition Authority (2024) FNE Launches Market Study on E‑Commerce, https://www.fne.gob.cl/en/fne‑inicia‑estudio-de‑mercado-sobre‑comercio‑electronico/; Baker McKenzie (2025) Algorithms, Data and Antitrust – Latin America’s Response to AI in Markets, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2025/10/latin-americas-response-to-artificial-intelligence; Kluwer Competition Law Blog (2025) Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2024 – Chile | Kluwer Competition Law Blog; https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/competition-blog/main-developments-in-competition-law-and-policy-2024-chile/; Dutch Authority for Consumer and Markets website, National co‑operation, https://www.acm.nl/en/about-acm/organization/cooperation/national-cooperation, Dutch Authority for Consumer and Markets (2025) Focus areas of ACM’s oversight over the digital economy in 2025, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/focus-areas-acms-oversight-over-digital-economy-2025, ACM: taking action against fake‑review sellers marks a new phase in fight against online deception, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-taking-action-against-fake-review-sellers-marks-new-phase-fight-against-online-deception; ACM’s activities in 2023; https://www.acm.nl/system/files/documents/acm-activities-in-2023.pdf.
The OECD recommends to the three national competition authorities in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, with the relevant support of policymakers, to:
Consider the feasibility of establishing within the competition authority a specialised team responsible for continuous market monitoring, in order to maintain up to date knowledge of and track developments in concentration trends, factors affecting tipping risk, and strategic conduct affecting the conditions of entry and/or expansion. If a dedicated team is created it should have sufficient resources to operate effectively, with the size being proportional to the size of the agency, and reflect the variety of skills needed to support a deeper understanding of practices and technologies. In any event, the OECD also recommends that policymakers ensure that the competition authority has the necessary resources to establish staff with the necessary skills to assess these issues.
Monitor developments in critical areas, highlighted throughout the report, such as incumbents’ practices focussing on the accumulation of users’ data and their combination across services (see also 10.1.3 below), use of parity clauses, tying of ancillary services, ability and incentives to favour related services within the platform’s ecosystem (e.g. logistics, price comparison services), and third-parties access conditions to sufficient parcel delivery and locker capacity, including any exclusivity arrangements. Effective monitoring can be carried out by:
Ensuring the dedicated team receives regular training to maintain a skillset apt to the specificities and complexities of digital markets, including the use of computational tools
Making use of regular targeted information requests and survey to relevant stakeholders
To the extent not undertaken currently, conduct background desk research and regular reviews of companies’ public information (e.g. terms and conditions) to identify priorities and actions
Reinforcing dialogue with the industry, including through public consultation, to leverage stakeholders’ knowledge and foster trust
Capitalise on the information gathered through the monitoring mechanism for digital markets to support prompt intervention:
Via the opening of antitrust proceedings, ensuring co‑operation between the case team and the new specialised team throughout the investigation.
Via the opening of market inquiries, in selected digital markets which might warrant further in-depth assessment.
The OECD notes that if created and relevant, authorities may wish to consider capitalising on the specialisation and resources of any new unit for monitoring companies’ compliance with a Sectoral Code of Competitive Conduct (see 10.2 below).
10.1.3. Ensure data use is not restricting competition
The accumulation, combination and use of data by incumbent platforms can raise barriers to entry in online marketplaces and in ancillary markets. In light of the effects on competition and the implications for the entrenchment of platforms’ market positions, as well as their potential expansion, the OECD recommends increasing the transparency and scrutiny of data use by platforms (see also recommendation 10.1.5 below on market actors’ compliance). In particular:
Competition authorities, potentially in collaboration with other regulators such as the data privacy one (see also recommendation 10.1.4 below on co‑operation), should closely monitor (see also related measure 10.1.2) the accumulation, combination and use of user data by the incumbent platforms, and evaluate whether such practices are in breach of the law. This exercise, and any related investigations, should particularly focus on the extent to which such data is combined across different services and business units, and whether such conduct has the effect of artificially raising barriers to entry or foreclosing rivals, including in ancillary markets. Such investigations should involve:
The use of compulsory information gathering powers to gain detailed and specific insights into the use of data in practice by the incumbent platforms.
An assessment of the relevant practices against the applicable laws.
Depending on the extent of harms identified, there may be grounds to impose stronger transparency requirements and/or restrictions on the extent to which platforms can combine consumers’ data across services – carefully balanced against the benefits to users and/or efficiencies supported by these practices.
10.1.4. Strengthen the institutional framework to enhance antitrust enforcement
This measure, targeted at a number of national bodies including policymakers, competition authorities and other relevant regulators, aims at improving the conditions in which competition authorities operate to increase their ability to keep pace with developments in digital markets, including by reducing the asymmetry (in terms of both resources and information) vis-à-vis large platforms. In particular, co‑operation between relevant national regulators can facilitate a systematic approach to digital markets, bringing together respective expertise. This would allow for cross-learnings between regulators, which could improve detection while reducing the risk of duplications, leading to a stronger response to the developments and complexities of these markets. The OECD acknowledges that national institutional arrangements and market contexts may shape how such co‑operation is organised and implemented in practice.
The suggested actions apply to the three countries that are the focus of this study. However, the OECD considers the implementation of these measures would be particularly relevant in the case of Poland, given the specific market conditions linked to the role of Allegro and the related risks.
Assess whether competition authorities are sufficiently resourced, including in terms of variety and relevance of skills, to carry out timely enforcement actions, proactive market monitoring (see also recommendation 10.1.3 above), and complex investigations in markets where companies’ use of data is a critical factor.
Enhance effective co‑operation and collaboration between relevant national regulators, such as the competition authority, consumer protection authority and data privacy regulator. Such co‑operation should not be treated as an end in itself but rather as a practical and flexible means to reciprocally increase knowledge and understanding of evolving business models in these markets, share information and ultimately jointly oversee platform conduct where needed. This can be done, possibly, by creating a joint standing forum.
Consider whether co‑operation and collaboration between competition authorities facing similar concerns vis-à-vis the same online marketplaces could be enhanced in order to determine common approaches and share knowledge. This is particularly relevant for jurisdictions confronted with the same market actors, such as Latvia and Lithuania, where collaborative monitoring and/or enforcement action could be considered.
10.1.5. Reduce barriers to entry and expansion by increasing compliance
This report finds that various structural features of online marketplaces, alongside strategic conduct by the leading platforms, have contributed to the presence of barriers to entry, making market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult and reducing future contestability. This situation is unlikely to change without concerted action, from enforcers, policymakers and market actors, to lower barriers to entry and expansion.
As such, to complement the enforcement and monitoring related measures introduced above, the OECD recommends a range of measures aimed directly at market actors, but supported by the active engagement of competition authorities if necessary.
Reduce switching costs for sellers
While, in the context of two‑sided platforms, there is a need to ensure entry barriers, including switching costs, are sufficiently low on both sides of the market, the report finds that the costs associated with switching between or integrating across multiple platforms can be substantially high on the seller side (as compared to the consumer side). While this is not necessarily the result of competition law infringements, conduct by market actors can constitute a contributing factor and might lead to scrutiny in the future. As such, additional attention from market participants might be warranted.
Consistent with these findings, the OECD recommends the proactive involvement of incumbent platforms to lower sellers’ switching costs and increase market contestability. In particular:
Incumbent platforms should minimise the competition risk related to their conduct by considering whether it could have the effect of tying their marketplace and logistics services, or otherwise self-preferencing their own logistics services over those of third parties. In considering the effects of their conduct, incumbent platforms should have regard to whether third-party services are treated on an equal basis in terms of rankings, promotions and presentation of offers on the website. Providers may also wish to consider providing access to the necessary platform APIs and other infrastructure required to integrate with the platform. Otherwise, their conduct may warrant scrutiny by the national competition authority. This recommendation aims to lower switching costs for sellers and address the competition concerns arising when incumbent platforms incentivise sellers to rely on their own fulfilment services.
Incumbent platforms should minimise the competition risk related to their conduct by considering whether it might unreasonably impede seller’s ability to port their data (e.g. product catalogues, sales and analytics data and reviews and ratings) to third parties. This recommendation aims to lower costs for sellers to switch to rival services, and, as such, to reduce seller lock-in to the incumbent platform. It may also increase access to data for new entrants, helping to lower the data-related entry barriers discussed in 10.3.2 below. If this recommendation is not implemented, the incumbent platforms’ conduct may warrant scrutiny by the national competition authority.
Ensure data use is not restricting competition
In order to complement recommendation 10.1.3 above, the OECD recommends the proactive involvement of incumbent platforms to promote a pro‑competitive use of data in their operations and vis-à-vis sellers, and thus minimise the risk of anti-competitive effects. In particular:
Incumbent platforms should minimise the competition risk related to their conduct by considering the competitive effects of sharing non-public seller data internally across business units or using such data to inform decision making in downstream retail markets where the platform competes directly with those sellers. Failure to give effect to this measure may warrant scrutiny by the national competition authority.
10.1.6. Facilitate cross border competition and promote the EU single market
In line with existing studies and investigations in online marketplaces, this report finds that the geographic scope of competition currently remains largely confined to national markets. Facilitating and promoting cross border competition amongst platforms, towards a broader EU market, could help enhance competition in online marketplaces while pursuing the European Single Market objectives.
This measure seeks to propose future work in this direction, identifying, assessing and removing, any undesirable barriers to cross border competition. It is important to note how a number of hindering factors may be strictly linked to companies’ internal strategies, choices and business models, such as localisation and language support. However, creating a regulatory environment more conducive to EU-wide competition would most likely have an impact on such factors as well.
The OECD recommends that a well-suited institution with relevant expertise, such as national regulators or policymakers, the European Commission or third parties such as the OECD, should:
Conduct further studies at the Member State or EU level to:
Identify factors that may, in actual or potential terms, hinder cross-border competition between online marketplaces within the EU Single Market. Such factors may pertain to logistics and delivery (including the ability for these services to expand across borders), local presence and taxation requirements, transfers and payments and onboarding rules for sellers.
Assess the nature and objective of the potential barriers identified, with a focus on regulatory barriers (in line with the OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit’s principles).
Where appropriate, intervene – or provide recommendations to intervene – to remove and/or simplify any form of requirement, law or regulation which unduly and unnecessarily restricts competition in pursuit of the European Single Market.
10.2. Measures to ensure pro‑competitive marketplace trading practices
Copy link to 10.2. Measures to ensure pro‑competitive marketplace trading practicesThis study finds that sellers exhibit a high degree of dependence on incumbent marketplaces. This constrains their bargaining power and exposes them to conduct by platforms that can leverage their position to the detriment of competitive market dynamics. In particular, these structural features can give rise to exclusionary or exploitative behaviours, distorting competition, limiting innovation, and ultimately harm consumers through reduced choice, higher prices or lower quality.
The persistent imbalance between incumbent online marketplaces and their business users highlights how specific structural issues in online marketplaces, and related competitive harms, might not be fully solvable in the short term with competition enforcement. Thus, the OECD recommends considering the potential need for a clear, proportionate and effective framework, complementary to competition law, to address the more subtle and often opaque ways in which structural conflicts of interest can shape competitive outcomes to the platform’s advantage, including through unfair trading conditions and exploitation.
International experience shows that some jurisdictions have introduced additional legal tools that could address similar concerns. For example, regimes prohibiting abuse of superior bargaining position or broader unfair trading practices in countries such as Japan (Yamada, 2022[2]), France and Germany (Vande Walle, 2024[3]) allow intervention even in the absence of dominance findings, specifically targeting economic dependency and unfair contractual practices. However, comparable economy-wide frameworks addressing economic dependency or superior bargaining power do not currently exist in Lithuania, Latvia or Poland.
In this context, sector-specific instruments tailored to online marketplaces may represent a viable policy option. At EU level, the Platform-to-Business (P2B) Regulation2 currently constitutes the main horizontal instrument aimed at improving fairness and transparency in relations between online platforms and business users. Pending any developments linked to the European Commission’s proposed Digital Omnibus Package (see Box 3.2), the Regulation has the potential to mitigate some identified competition concerns that could arise from platforms’ superior bargaining power over business users, by increasing transparency around ranking parameters, changes to terms and conditions, and dispute resolution mechanisms to promote a level playing field for competition in the market. It also explicitly foresees the development of codes of conduct as a complementary tool to promote fair commercial practices in platform ecosystems.
Evidence collected in this study suggests that the degree to which the P2B Regulation is used in practice varies across the three countries under review, likely reflecting differences in institutional arrangements, enforcement experience and awareness among business users. At this stage, it remains difficult to determine whether observed concerns primarily stem from limited compliance with P2B obligations, limited awareness and use of the Regulation by sellers or conduct falling outside its current scope. Moreover, while P2B addresses certain manifestations of unfairness, it does not directly tackle several structural concerns identified in this report, including conflicts of interest inherent to hybrid platforms or practices that may subtly distort competitive outcomes without clearly violating transparency obligations.
Against this background, the OECD recommends a tiered and evidence‑based policy path, grounded in an assessment of the costs and benefits of each potential intervention.
In the short term, priority should be given to ensuring each jurisdiction is fully leveraging the enforcement of existing frameworks – notably competition law where appropriate and the P2B Regulation. This includes ensuring enforcement authorities have adequate resources and expertise, promoting consistent enforcement approaches and increasing awareness among business users of their rights under P2B. This step is essential both to address potential infringements and to generate evidence on how existing tools perform in practice.
In the medium to longer term, if persistent imbalances and unfair marketplace practices continue to be observed – and in the absence of other applicable EU-level regulatory regimes, notably where major platforms operating nationally are not designated under the Digital Markets Act – policymakers may consider additional targeted instruments. In the specific context of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, a mandatory code of conduct for online marketplaces could represent a proportionate and operationally feasible option. This instrument is expressly envisaged by the P2B Regulation,3 which provides in Article 17 for the development of codes of conduct to promote fair and transparent business practices in platform-to-business relations. Such a code, detailed further below, could provide more detailed behavioural guidance tailored to the structural features of online marketplaces and the related concerns, while remaining flexible in scope.
This staged approach seeks to avoid regulatory duplication and unnecessary complexity by first making full use of existing instruments, while preserving the option of incremental regulatory reinforcement if evidence of persistent harm remains. This appears even more relevant in light of the potential evolution of the current legislative framework. Should the P2B regulation be repealed in the coming years (see also Box 3.2), with no other comparable provisions applicable to the incumbent platforms identified in this report, alternative instruments would have to be envisaged to address the risk of harm to competition.
The approach also supports efficient allocation of public resources by sequencing intervention based on demonstrated need rather than ex ante assumptions, thereby providing a pragmatic foundation for progressively strengthening protections for business users and promoting fair trading conditions in online marketplace ecosystems.
Box 10.2. The use of sectoral codes of conduct
Copy link to Box 10.2. The use of sectoral codes of conductCodes of conduct have traditionally been used to address marked imbalances of bargaining power in several sectors. For example, the United Kingdom (Governent of the United Kingdom, 2009[4]), New Zealand (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - New Zealand, 2022[5]) and Australia (ACCC, n.d.[6]) have long-standing grocery-sector frameworks that share two broad features. First, they aim to make relationships between large retailers and their suppliers fairer and more transparent – for instance, by setting clear rules on how suppliers are listed or delisted, how promotions are handled, and how and when payments must be made. Second, they include mechanisms to ensure that these rules are respected in practice, such as statutory backing, reporting and monitoring requirements, and accessible dispute‑resolution procedures that can be triggered quickly when problems arise. Together, these measures help to rebalance negotiations where suppliers would otherwise have little leverage and to provide more predictable and accountable commercial behaviour.
A similar logic is beginning to appear in digital markets. Authorities and policy studies are increasingly recommending – and in some cases piloting – voluntary or statutory codes tailored to platform – seller relations. Notably, the Singapore competition authority (GCR, 2025[7]) has introduced a voluntary code of conduct for online marketplaces, setting expectations on transparency, fairness and communication with sellers. Likewise, the recent South African market studies (Competition Commission South Africa, 2023[8]) has recommended that an enforceable code of conduct be considered as a tool to address structural imbalances between platforms and business users. Similarly, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has proposed mandatory codes of conduct to apply to certain digital platforms, with the ACCC to undertake ongoing monitoring to identify whether certain services, including online marketplaces, should be covered in future (ACCC, 2025[9]). These developments suggest that the code‑of-conduct model, long used in sectors such as groceries, is now being adapted to the specific governance challenges of online marketplaces, where similar asymmetries of bargaining power are emerging.
Experiences from these jurisdictions illustrate how codes can function as practical governance tools in platform environments. Grocery-sector codes show that making implicit norms explicit – for example, through clear rules on delisting, payment timelines or risk-shifting – reduces uncertainty and stabilises suppliers’ ability to plan and invest. Their enforcement structures, such as the UK’s Groceries Code Adjudicator, demonstrate that credible monitoring and accessible dispute‑resolution can significantly improve compliance among powerful intermediaries. Transposed to online marketplaces, such mechanisms can help address platforms’ control over ranking, visibility and data access – areas where sellers currently face opaque processes and limited recourse. Likewise, voluntary initiatives such as Singapore’s code highlight the value of setting baseline expectations on communication, transparency and fair treatment even without immediate statutory backing, while the South African and Australian proposals show that codes can evolve into enforceable regimes when structural concerns persist. Taken together, these examples illustrate that codes of conduct offer a flexible yet effective tool to promote fair dealing, reduce uncertainty for business users and improve accountability in platform – seller relations.
10.2.1. Evaluate the effective implementation and enforcement of the P2B Regulation
As suggested above, in the shorter term, and pending any legislative reforms, improving competitive outcomes for the sellers’ side of the market (and thus for competition and final consumers, as detailed in Chapters 6 and 8) requires robust enforcement of the P2B Regulation, alongside effective implementation of its respective procedural and institutional framework. While the P2B Regulation provides a common legal framework, its practical impact depends on the extent to which it is actively enforced and complemented by supporting measures at national level. At the same time, even with full and effective enforcement, the P2B framework is designed to address specific forms of unfairness in platform-to-business relations and may therefore alleviate, rather than entirely resolve, the broader structural issues identified in Chapter 8 of this report.
Moreover, it is worth considering that enhanced efforts to fully leverage the potential of the P2B Regulation should include targeted advocacy and awareness-raising efforts aimed at business users. Many sellers, in particular SMEs, may lack sufficient knowledge of their rights or the capacity to assert them individually vis-à-vis large platforms. Supporting collective awareness initiatives, including through associations of SMEs and seller organisations, could help mitigate information asymmetries and modestly rebalance bargaining power, without imposing additional regulatory burdens on platforms.
In parallel, effective implementation would benefit from the availability of accessible and safe reporting channels. The establishment of direct and anonymous complaint mechanisms could facilitate the detection of problematic conduct, particularly where sellers may be reluctant to raise concerns due to fear of retaliation, discriminatory treatment or delisting. Such mechanisms may also improve authorities’ ability to monitor marketplace practices in a timely and evidence‑based manner.
Therefore, the OECD therefore recommends to policymakers and competent authorities4 in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia to:
Ensure active and effective enforcement of the P2B Regulation, including by initiating supervisory and enforcement actions where potential breaches are identified, in order to address imbalances between incumbent marketplaces and business users.
In Poland, where enforcement action relating the P2B Regulation has been limited to date, assess institutional engagement and enforcement activity, including ensuring clear supervisory responsibilities, allocating adequate resources to competent authorities and initiating targeted supervisory actions in relation to online marketplaces.
In Latvia and Lithuania, build on existing enforcement by continuing and deepening systematic supervision of online marketplaces, including through periodic sector-specific reviews and follow-up enforcement where necessary.
Complement enforcement with advocacy and awareness-raising measures aimed at sellers, in particular SMEs, including through co‑operation with SME associations and seller organisations to improve knowledge of rights under the P2B Regulation.
Establish accessible and secure reporting channels, including where appropriate anonymous complaint mechanisms, to facilitate the reporting of potential infringements and support evidence‑based monitoring of marketplace practices.
10.2.2. Exploring a code of conduct for online marketplaces
Against this background, it is appropriate to consider whether additional sector-specific measures may be warranted in a subsequent stage, should persistent imbalances and unfair practices continue to arise. This is because, insofar as platforms maintain superior bargaining power over business users, the absence of prompt and precisely calibrated measures supporting pro‑competitive platform practices, may distort the competitive process to such a degree that the restoration of effective competition in the short term becomes unattainable.
In this context, the OECD considers that more structured sector-specific approaches, such as a code of conduct for online marketplaces, may be considered, subject to an assessment of necessity and proportionality. The OECD expects that, should action be deemed appropriate, the specificities of such a code and the accompanying legislative framework would be determined at national level, taking into account national institutional arrangements and market conditions. Further, while the code could initially be introduced as voluntary, a mandatory code could be more effective in addressing the identified concerns. If a voluntary code is chosen, this would imply a higher level of risk and its effectiveness should be closely monitored.
Therefore, the OECD recommends that, if a code of conduct for online marketplaces is introduced at national level in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, should be considered that it:
Provides a targeted, forward-looking and behaviour-focussed framework to guide pro‑competitive interactions between large online marketplaces and their business users, building on the legal basis foreseen in the P2B Regulation.
Establishes clearer parameters for acceptable marketplace conduct towards sellers, including in relation to practices that may not meet the threshold for formal enforcement action under competition law but nonetheless risk entrenching dependency and distorting competitive conditions.
Applies only to a limited subset of online marketplaces identified on the basis of objective criteria reflecting their intermediation power and market position.
Sets boundaries for conduct related to search and ranking neutrality, access and visibility conditions for independent sellers, use and cross-use of seller data, contractual terms imposed on business users, and restrictions affecting sellers’ ability to multi-home or use alternative service providers.
Is accompanied by appropriate enforcement arrangements, including external oversight by a competent authority, accessible complaint channels for sellers with safeguards against retaliation and proportionate sanctions for non-compliance.
Provides for a degree of flexibility to allow the framework to adapt to evolving market practices and technologies.
Includes dedicated and secure complaint mechanisms enabling business users to report potential non-compliance, including, where appropriate, the possibility to submit concerns confidentially or anonymously to mitigate risks of retaliation.
References
[9] ACCC (2025), Digital platform services inquiry: Final report, https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/digital-platform-services-inquiry-final-report-march2025.pdf.
[6] ACCC (n.d.), Food and Grocery Code of Conduct, https://www.accc.gov.au/business/industry-codes/food-and-grocery-code-of-conduct.
[8] Competition Commission South Africa (2023), Online intermediation platforms market inquiry: Final report and decision, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Final-Report.pdf.
[7] GCR (2025), Singapore to “experiment” with voluntary code for e-marketplaces, https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/singapore-experiment-voluntary-code-e-marketplaces.
[4] Governent of the United Kingdom (2009), Guidance: Groceries Supply Code of Practice, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice.
[5] Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - New Zealand (2022), Grocery Code of Conduct, https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/grocery-code-of-conduct.
[1] OECD (2024), Artificial Intelligence, Data and Competition - Note by Singapore, OECD Competition Committee. OECD Unclassified document,, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2024)41/en/pdf.
[3] Vande Walle, S. (2024), Exploitative Abuses in EU, German and French Competition Law, Elsevier BV, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5027352.
[2] Yamada, A. (2022), “Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position in Japan – Its Development and Current Position”, Competition Policy International, https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/abuse-of-superior-bargaining-position-in-japan-its-development-and-current-position/.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. In February 2026 UOKiK carried out a dawn raid at Allegro’s offices in Warsaw and Poznań. According to the press release, at the time of finalisation of this report, “UOKiK is conducting an investigation concerning possible favouring of Allegro’s own logistics services, including deliveries to Allegro One Box parcel lockers and services rendered by entrepreneurs belonging to the Allegro Delivery programme, on the allegro.pl e-commerce platform. The suspected actions may at the same time put courier companies not belonging to that programme at a disadvantage”. https://uokik.gov.pl/en/does-allegro-restrict-competition-search-conducted-by-uokik.
← 2. Regulation (EU) 2019/1 150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services.
← 3. Regulation (EU) 2019/1 150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (Platform-to-Business Regulation), Article 17.
← 4. Namely, as of February 2026, the Ministry of Development and Technology for Poland, the Competition Council for Lithuania, the Consumer Rights Protection Centre for Latvia.