The institutionalisation of anticipation within governments involves embedding futures thinking across culture, training, and organisational structures. Traditional centralised versus decentralised models often result in institutional mimicry without contextual adaptation. To address this, the OECD introduced a practical three-stage framework—framing, designing, and optioning—and applied it in Lithuania, Italy, and Malta. Framing assesses governance contexts; designing identifies enablers, barriers, and strategic pathways; and optioning offers a modular approach to selecting functions and structures. This framework avoids one-size-fits-all solutions and encourages tailored institutional strategic foresight capacity.
Building Anticipatory Capacity with Strategic Foresight in Government
Lessons from Lithuania, Italy, and Malta
Abstract
The institutionalisation of anticipation is a complex concept, including efforts ranging from embedding a futures mindset within an organisation’s culture to providing individual training in strategic foresight methods. Traditional approaches to institutionalisation tend to centre on the “centralised vs. decentralised” debate, often referencing a small number of well-known global cases.
This can lead to a tendency for institutional mimicry (Collao Jul, 2023[1]), where governments copy structures and functions from other administrations without adequate adaptation to their own context. While these well-known cases provide valuable examples to encourage government peers to build their own capability, it can be problematic if units are not intentionally adapted to the local context.
While numerous frameworks exist to guide the institutionalisation of strategic foresight, public managers often struggle with their practical application. Many frameworks lack concrete guidance on developing structures and functions that align with a given administration’s legacy systems, legal constraints, and organisational culture. This section introduces a new framework to address these gaps, offering a structured yet adaptable approach to institutionalisation. It presents a three-stage framework comprising framing, designing, and optioning. Framing involves understanding and diagnosing the anticipatory governance landscape, designing focuses on identifying institutional pathways based on barriers, enablers, and organisational needs, and optioning applies a modular, action-oriented framework to establish concrete structures and functions.
This section provides both theoretical insight and practical tools, drawing on research conducted in Lithuania, Italy, and Malta, where the framework was applied in the context of the LIMinal project to develop specific action plans, as presented in Section 4.3.
Traditional institutionalisation models have contributed valuable insights into how governments can embed strategic foresight. Existing models can be organised into three layers, depending on the level of granularity of analysis: framing, designing, and optioning.
Framing involves analysing the existing governance, cultural, and societal contexts in which strategic foresight practices operate. It serves to identify the overarching purpose of government anticipation and how foresight practices can be meaningfully integrated into broader policy structures. This stage requires governments to assess their current level of foresight maturity, existing institutional arrangements, and key external influences that shape their anticipatory needs. This can ensure that efforts align with national priorities, political and policy cycles, and governance traditions. Framing provides guiding principles and guidance for the design of foresight structures and helps clarify the strategic value that foresight brings to public governance, avoiding misalignment between ambitions and institutional realities.
Institutional foresight efforts must be tailored to the specific needs and structures of different governments. Designing focuses on taking a strategic direction by identifying the barriers, enablers, and design criteria for successful institutionalisation. At this stage, governments must define how foresight capabilities will be developed, structured, and operationalised in their administrative context. This can include assessing the capacity of institutions to absorb foresight practices, including legal frameworks, political will, and human resource capabilities. Identifying potential roadblocks, such as resistance to change or lack of institutional incentives, allows policymakers to formulate strategies that address these challenges proactively. Additionally, the designing stage includes setting up pathways for new foresight capacity, ensuring that institutionalisation is not a one-time effort but a continuous process of refinement and adaptation.
Few example frameworks exist for a structured yet flexible approach for the organisational institutionalisation of foresight, or optioning. The proposed framework, developed through the LIMinal project, addresses this gap by offering a modular, action-oriented methodology. It has seven functional categories, including intelligence provision, network convening, and oversight, as well as six structural types, such as a centre-of-government unit, agency, and network. A decision-making matrix allows governments to select the most appropriate options based on their context. The framework was applied in Lithuania, Italy, and Malta to develop tailored action plans for foresight institutionalisation.
4.1.1. Framing – practical applications of frameworks
School of International Futures Ecosystem Approach
The School of International Futures (SOIF), in collaboration with the UK Government Office for Science (GOS), published a report examining how governments around the world have integrated foresight systemically into policymaking. The report also provides an evidence-based assessment to the GOS for improving the existing system in the UK. SOIF presents an analytical framework (see Figure 4.1) designed to establish resilient and sustainable foresight ecosystems across four layers: the socio-cultural context, government context, foresight ecosystem, and capability features.
Source: School of International Futures (2021).
According to SOIF, a healthy ecosystem must fulfil three main functions: create demand for foresight, maintain a supply of high-quality foresight, and build capacity to curate and nurture the ecosystem for long-term resilience. In this framework, the foresight ecosystem incorporates four key capability features to create lasting impact for futures work (SOIF, 2021[2]). The ecosystem approach also emphasises connectivity of socio-cultural and government contexts, which is supported by the following capability features:
Culture and behaviour: This feature focuses on creating commitment, engaging policymakers in foresight, aligning short-term priorities with long-term perspectives, and generating shared ownership and buy-in. An example is Singapore’s Strategic Futures Network, which engages policymakers and co-ordinates futures across government units and ministries.
Processes: This feature includes the different mechanisms with which governments incorporate long-term thinking into policymaking to ensure legitimacy, continuity, and sustained commitment. Examples include New Zealand’s Public Service Act (2020) and Wales’s Well-being of Future Generations Act (2015), which mandate consideration of long-term impacts in public policy. Institutionalising futures methods that survive past electoral cycles is also fundamental. Examples include the UK Ministry of Defence’s “Global Strategic Trends” and Finland’s “Government Report on the Future”, which provide frameworks for continuous foresight and strategic alignment.
Structures: This feature introduces the importance of investing in foresight units and organisational structures. Based on case studies in the report, these units are often located at the “heart of government” or at “arm’s length” from decision-making arenas. Additionally, structures include the capacity to build foresight competencies in departments and agencies, convene networks, and to involve high-level officials to provide the incentives to play roles that include auditing, oversight, and evaluation.
People: This feature focuses on the system’s ability to identify and harness the “right knowledge”, skills, and expertise. It emphasises the role of champions in building foresight ecosystems, offering skills development opportunities through Schools of Government or universities, and drawing on diverse expertise to facilitate comprehensive futures thinking.
Each of these capability features evolves according to the unique political and social contexts of individual countries. For instance, Finland integrates foresight across all government bodies, guided by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Committee for the Future. In contrast, Malaysia leverages foresight through independent entities such as the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT).
Challenges for institutionalising foresight tend to arise as a result of short-term political priorities, a lack of knowledge of foresight methods, and siloed governance, which inhibits cross-sectoral knowledge exchange. The issue of silos and departmental boundaries is particularly significant in Germany, as illustrated in a study by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft for the Federal Chancellery (Warnke, Priebe and Veit, 2022[3]) (Warnke, Priebe, & Veit 2021). While there is broad support in Germany’s public administration for institutionalising foresight, a silo mentality limits co-ordination between administrative units. Additionally, a significant gap persists between generating futures knowledge and embedding it in policy, due to insufficient interaction between management and operational units.
Priebe, Veit, and Warnke – four dimensions of institutionalisation
In the German context, Priebe, Veit, and Warnke (2024[4]) introduced a conceptual and analytical framework for the institutionalisation of strategic foresight. The authors argue that solely relying on the establishment of foresight units and the allocation of resources for foresight work “does not necessarily lead to proactive and forward-looking policymaking” (p. 10). They use this term “loose ends” or “loose coupling” to describe the misalignment between foresight processes and policymaking structures. Based on practices in the German federal government, they emphasise that the effectiveness of strategic foresight in influencing public policy depends on its institutionalisation across four dimensions: organisational, regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive (see Figure 4.2).
Source: Priebe, Veit and Warnke (2024[4]).
In reference to the creation of dedicated foresight units, think tanks and policy labs across government, the study indicates that “there is no single uniform model of organisational institutionalisation in the German Federal Government” (Priebe, Veit and Warnke, 2024, p. 6[4]). Implementation of these structures varies across ministries, driven by differing functional priorities and capabilities. Some ministries, for example, prioritise developing internal foresight capabilities, while others opt to engage external providers for foresight services.
Formal procedures and legal instruments are identified as catalysts for regulative institutionalisation of strategic foresight. Mandates and rulings can compel governments to adopt more futures-oriented approaches, such as incorporating plans, roadmaps, and scenarios, and while also incentivising rigor in applying and evaluating foresight processes. Some progress has been made, with mentions of foresight in coalition agreements. This has led to the creation of foresight units and new processes, but Germany lacks binding regulative frameworks to ensure the systematic application of foresight across all ministries.
Normative institutionalisation addresses the social and collaborative expectations for integrating foresight into government. This includes building a shared sense of responsibility, commitment, and informal networks among civil servants and policymakers. It is critical to move beyond dependence on formal gatherings, such as the interdepartmental working group at the Chancellery. Capacity-building initiatives and foresight training seminars also play an essential role in cultivating informal networks, providing officials the skills and knowledge they need to value and implement foresight effectively.
Despite these efforts, Germany’s public administration still demonstrates considerable resistance to innovative and experimental approaches. As noted by Priebe, Veit, and Warnke (2024[4]), “Foresight is not regarded as an inherent component of German policymaking” (p. 9). This underscores the challenges of cultural-cognitive institutionalisation, the level of attention paid to strategic foresight processes, and the extent of shared understanding of its potential to complement embedded organisational logic and practices.
The authors note that the framework and recommendations presented in their study are specific to the German context and may not be directly applicable to other settings. However, the framework provides a valuable tool for framing the institutionalisation of foresight in other governments and public administrations.
OECD Anticipatory Governance Guidelines for Public Sector Organisations
The OECD developed initial Anticipatory Governance Guidelines for Public Sector Organisations through a working group set up through the National Contact Points of the OECD Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OECD, forthcoming[5]). This framework draws on high-level guidance from the working group on anticipatory governance, as well as analysis from the most relevant OECD legal instruments in this domain, prior OECD analytical work, and scholarly and expert commentaries. The principles are described by the acronym FIELD/SCOPES. FIELD denotes the benefits of anticipatory governance, while SCOPES describes the mechanisms to build good anticipatory governance in the public sector (see Box 4.1 below for a description of each of the guidelines).
FIELD: Benefits of anticipatory governance
Future-readiness: Policies take into account and proactively address possible future scenarios and events, rather than being reactive to unexpected events.
Innovation: Policies provide room for coming up with and introducing new solutions rather than replicating what is existing.
Endurance: Policies are resilient against future challenges and able to withstand unexpected changes, rather than only responding to immediate needs.
Long-term perspective: Policies and visions for the future reflect long-term perspectives and consider the needs of societies across time and policy siloes, beyond the current agenda and electoral cycle, to ensure intergenerational fairness.
Direction: It is clear what type of futures public organisations are committed towards. Policies are oriented around these visions for the future developed by multiple actors, increasing policy coherence and legitimacy, rather than being captured by the interests of narrow circles.
SCOPES: Mechanisms of anticipatory governance
Support from leadership: Commitment from political and civil service leaders.
Competencies: Sustained development of anticipatory capabilities and skills across the public service.
Observation of trends and signals: Coordinated systems for gathering intelligence.
Participatory processes: Active involvement of citizens and stakeholders in inclusive sense-making to enhance the robustness and legitimacy of futures knowledge and decision making.
Exchange of intelligence and good practices across countries: Sharing of practices and intelligence across governments to improve anticipatory governance.
Structures and procedures: Sustainable institutional frameworks to enable, embed and improve anticipatory governance and enable collaborations across different sectors.
Source: (OECD, forthcoming[5]).
4.1.2. Designing – practical applications of frameworks
The Anticipatory Innovation Governance model in Finland
One critical aspect for sustainable practice of strategic foresight in governments is the need for a strategic and cultural shift across government. This shift can entail moving from short-term thinking to a focus on long-term requirements and continuity of processes. It is also imperative for governments to establish anticipatory governance mechanisms (Tõnurist and Hanson, 2020[6]) and work on building a sustainable foresight ecosystem (SOIF, 2021[2]; Monteiro and Dal Borgo, 2023[7]) to ensure the continued implementation of strategies and plans initiated by previous administrations.
In 2020-2021, the OECD carried out an assessment of Finland’s governance system, specifically focused on assets, preconditions, and gaps in the wider public-sector policymaking and steering system. The goal was to identify which issues might stand in the way and which could help implement an anticipatory innovation approach in the Finnish context. The work outlined the need for changes in regulatory, legislative, strategic, budgetary, and procurement functions of government and defined new functions in government planning and transition management. A primary recommendation underscored the importance of developing a government transition function. This is intended to facilitate a smooth transition from one political term to the next, while maintaining consistency in the implementation of long-term reforms. One example is to “establish a knowledge repository around long-term reforms and anticipatory issues encouraging learnings from one government to another, but also between public officials and politicians and the wider ecosystems connected to policy problems” (OECD, 2022[8]). Before elections, the public administration in Finland prepares future reviews, prepared by civil servants and accessible to all parties, and long-term policy issues and challenges are carried forward to the next term.
Futures committees have also been set up to maintain focus on long-term policy issues and emerging challenges (The Finnish Parliament, 2022[9]). However, they frequently suffer from policy cycles and limited mandates and are deprioritised or shut down after a period of work, as in the case of the KOMET committee in Sweden, which operated from 2018-2020.
Designing institutional pathways – lessons from LIMinal countries
The LIMinal project identified three pathways for the design of institutional structures supporting strategic foresight. Lithuania exemplifies a demand and mandate-driven approach by the development of a national foresight centre as part of the LT2050 strategy. Italy has adopted a capacity-building and culture-shifting approach by integrating foresight training into the National School of Administration (SNA). Malta has taken a proof-of-concept and piloting approach, establishing a foresight unit in the Office of the Prime Minister. These pathways are not mutually exclusive, and many governments adopt a hybrid approach.
The following pathways are informed by the proposals and AIG strategies of Lithuania, Italy, and Malta, the three LIMinal countries, and reflect a range of institutional contexts and design criteria. These are not exclusive, however, and illustrate the predominant pathways each country is taking to institutionalise strategic foresight, while acknowledging overlaps.
For instance, Lithuania exemplifies a demand and mandate pathway in its work on the White Book, which aims to integrate AIG mechanisms into existing institutional mandates and to establish a unit to serve as a national foresight centre. This centre would be tasked with supporting evidence-informed policymaking and co-ordinating activities across government. This pathway also seeks to align strategic foresight with the approved LT2050 strategy, its implementation, and national priorities, while pursuing legal justification to legitimise the role of foresight. At the same time, Lithuania has also participated in broad-based capacity-building efforts, facilitated by the collaboration with STRATA.
Italy, through the Italian National School of Administration (SNA), demonstrates a broad-based capacity pathway that focuses on building strategic foresight capabilities in the public administration and creating a wide-ranging futures-thinking culture. This aligns with SNA’s role as a central body for training civil servants and reflects Italy’s commitment to disseminating foresight practices at all levels of governance.
Malta, represented by the Office of the Prime Minister and the Institute for the Public Services, exemplifies an action-oriented or proof-of-concept pathway. This focuses on piloting foresight interventions in ministries and key government structures to showcase their value. For example, during the pilot cases conducted with the Ministry for Social Policy and Children’s Rights (MSPC) and the Ministry for Education, Sport, Youth, Research and Innovation (MEYR), MEYR set up a foresight unit, showing how a proof-of-concept pathway can also help build institutional capacity. Like Lithuania and Italy, Malta has also made broader-capacity efforts demonstrating how interconnected the pathways are. See 4.3 for how institutionalisation pathways fit into an overall framework for assessing, optioning, and mobilising new or transformed capabilities for government strategic foresight.
Source: OECD
OECD lessons in effective foresight institutionalisation
While specific pathways may predominate, countries often adopt a combination of approaches tailored to their unique institutional needs. This reflects the cross-cutting themes identified by the OECD (2021[10]), which offers a guide for designing foresight systems. The lessons are drawn from countries with advanced foresight systems and underscore the importance of leveraging a mix of institutional strategies informed by identifying enablers and barriers (see Box 4.2).
Based on research conducted with countries worldwide, the OECD identified nine lessons for the successful institutionalisation of foresight (Prítyi, Docherty and Lavery, 2021[11]).
1. The need for the national foresight ecosystem to have a context-specific set-up, e.g. a decentralised system as opposed to a centralised system.
2. The need for buy-in among high-level decision makers.
3. The need to preserve the challenge function of foresight, which involves making assumptions about the future explicit, by ensuring that foresight groups maintain a reasonable degree of independence in their work.
4. The need for inclusive processes incorporating diverse perspectives and disciplines.
5. Widespread participation, through societal inclusion, can also increase the legitimacy of foresight processes.
6. The need for adequate resourcing for dedicated foresight researchers and practitioners, and foresight teams.
7. The need for public servants to receive training and support in developing foresight capacity.
8. The need to demonstrate and evaluate the impact of foresight through ongoing political discussions, parliamentary debates, and national audits.
9. The need to produce timely, relevant, and practical products that are useful to decision makers.
Strategic foresight set-up schemes in Ireland
In prior work, the OECD (2021[12]) identified established practices in the Irish foresight system, such as scenario planning for National Risk Assessment and horizon scanning in the Department of Agriculture, Food, and the Marine (DAFM). However, there have been shortcomings in connecting the policymaking and strategic planning processes with strategic foresight. Arguably, one of the reasons for this impact gap is not having established learning loops, with the consequence that foresight interventions tend to become a one-off project and are not disseminated to a broader audience for reassessment. Foresight activities in Ireland are considered “to be a ‘side of the desk activity’ which makes it difficult to translate challenges and opportunities into strategic plans or actions” (OECD, 2021, p. 26[12]). The challenges involved in embedding strategic foresight in policymaking were connected to skills, cultural, cognitive, corporate, perception, and information barriers (Figure 4.3). To address these issues, a pilot programme was designed incorporating research on the type of strategic foresight governance model best suited for the government of Ireland, with capacity building, community of practice, and demonstration cases.
Source: (OECD, 2021[12]).
The OECD worked with experts from the Irish public sector to delineate different set-up schemes for supporting the strategic foresight function in the government of Ireland. In May 2022, a hybrid workshop on embedding strategic foresight into policymaking was held. Based on insights from the workshops and OECD’s desktop analysis, three different set-up schemes for co-ordinating the strategic foresight system were proposed (Box 4.3).
Strategic foresight ‘alongside’
A minimum viable set-up, consisting of an ad hoc futures practice that nonetheless aims for successful impact and opens the gateway for future expansion, with the following features:
Resourcing: one or two dedicated part- or full-time staff at the centre of the public service, co-ordinating the community of practice and the strategic foresight module of the policy development toolkit. When necessary, these experts give advice to departments and agencies on the use of strategic foresight tools and methods, but do not participate in projects.
Community of practice (CoP): centred on sharing learning across the system and meeting at least every quarter.
Capacity building: general strategic foresight curricula for senior decision makers and policymakers; opt-in course for strategic foresight practitioners based on interest and not tied to particular units/jobs in public sector organisations.
Source: OECD.
These types of strategic foresight systems in the EU are most common for small countries (including Latvia, Iceland, and the Slovak Republic) with strong sectoral examples of strategic foresight use, but low capacity across the system. This is mostly due to lack of human resources with the appropriate skills and capacity. In other small states, most notably Singapore, this has been solved through rotation of strategic foresight experts and dedicated strategic foresight networks.
Strategic foresight on demand
A regular foresight function that can be readily drawn upon to inform work and promote a certain degree of cross-departmental collaboration, with the following features:
Resourcing: three to four dedicated part- or full-time staff at the centre of the public service, with at least one expert co-ordinator of strategic foresight work across the public service. In addition to co-ordinating the community of practice, the centre of excellence produces cross-government strategic foresight products and reviews the use of strategic foresight in policymaking (in long- to medium-term strategic documents, policy stress-testing, in development and renewal of programme risk registries, etc.).
Community of practice (CoP): utilised for sharing learning, but also to produce government-wide strategic foresight products when deemed necessary at the centre of government. CoP meets quarterly, and working groups on specific topics meet on demand.
Capacity building: general strategic foresight curricula for senior decision makers and policymakers; opt-in course for strategic foresight practitioners based on interest not tied to particular units/jobs in public sector organisations (as in the previous model).
Source: OECD.
This system does not require departments and agencies to invest in strategic foresight, at least initially. It relies on strong co-ordinating and support capacity from the centre. Strategic foresight experts at the centre of government can support line departments and agencies methodologically in their strategic foresight work and produce government-wide products (horizon scanning on megatrends and cross-cutting topics such as climate change). This model is most akin to those of the UK government, the Netherlands, Japan, and Norway, where the centre of government often lacks the ability to steer policy development, given the strength of different departments and the decentralised nature of government.
Strategic foresight built in
This is a systematically embedded set of practices throughout the public service that regularly generates the vital knowledge consistently used in decision making, with the following features:
Resourcing: two or three dedicated part- or full-time staff at the centre of government, with at least one expert co-ordinator of strategic foresight work across the public service (the central resource requirement is less than in the prior model, as departments are expected to develop their own strategic foresight focal points and internal capacity in a systematic manner).
Community of practice (CoP): utilised to gather assigned focal points of strategic foresight across departments to share learnings, conduct reviews, and produce joint products. CoP meets once a month with a specific agenda for common work.
Capacity building: general strategic foresight curricula for senior decision makers and policymakers; dedicated course on strategic foresight, tailored to strategic foresight focal points in public organisations.
Source: OECD.
This system requires a central call to develop strategic foresight across different departments and agencies, with dedicated strategic foresight focal points in organisations. The role of the centre of government is to support the focal points, build their capacity and organise them to produce comparable strategic foresight processes and products across the system. Finland and Singapore, , where strategic foresight is part of day-to-day policymaking practice, have models closest to this. In Finland, ministries develop yearly future reviews and contribute the knowledge to their internal risk registries, but the focal points also jointly produce future reviews for the whole government. Singapore rotates strategic foresight knowledge across government and commissions the networks to produce strategic foresight products in key policy development areas. The buiIt-in model is the only one that allows for fast, cross-government scenario responses in crises, depending on need.
Source: OECD.
The set-up schemes developed were discussed with senior leaders in the project steering group in September and November 2022. It was decided that in the pilot phase (from January to May 2023) a strategic foresight action plan inspired by the on-demand and built-in option schemes would be adopted, to steer the system towards a fully built-in model. The goal for the pilot period was that a central team at the Department of Public Expenditure, NDP Delivery and Reform, with the OECD and other departments, demonstrate the use of strategic foresight in policymaking and co-ordinate a community of practice based on shared learning and capacity building. The next step would be moving on to an option where strategic foresight capabilities could be developed across the system.
4.1.3. Optioning – a new framework to fill a practical gap
In its review of existing frameworks, the OECD did not specify examples of practical organisational frameworks for developing specific structures and functions in governments to support anticipation and strategic foresight practices. This may be because few frameworks can be easily translated into different government contexts. Lithuania, Italy, and Malta, however, each requested assistance in setting up anticipatory capacity. The project team developed a tool for use in a workshop setting, for optioning, generating, and prioritising specific options for organisational structures and functions suited to the organisational context. The resulting framework and a case example from the LIMinal project are described in Section 4.2.
As part of the LIMinal project, the OECD conducted a scan and analysis of the current institutionalisation of anticipatory innovation and strategic foresight units in governments. It also collated insights and case studies from international peers, conducting desktop research, interviews, and workshops. This research was essential in understanding how governments globally are preparing for future challenges and opportunities. The OECD research recognised the wide diversity in government anticipation functions, ranging from small strategic foresight centres in a single ministry to large networks of synchronised units, reflecting the unique needs and capacity of different governments.
In its approach, the OECD not only examined the structural aspects of government foresight and anticipatory innovation units, such as their (de)centralisation and specific functions, but also considered the contextual dynamics unique to each country. This includes, among other things, cultural characteristics, social needs, political and governance landscapes, legal frameworks, and financial capabilities.
Acknowledging that there is no universal model for successful institutionalisation of strategic foresight at the organisational level, the OECD developed a modular framework to guide countries in making strategic, context-tailored decisions towards institutionalisation and embeddedness of capabilities. The framework aims to:
1. Inventory existing governance and institutional structures that serve or could serve anticipation capacity
2. Evaluate relevant structures against anticipatory governance needs and purposes
3. Map current anticipatory functions and identify where there is potential for development.
The framework and method are intended for use in a group workshop setting, to uncover insights, support strategic dialogue, and prioritise specific options that are contextually sensitive. One prerequisite for the method is general consensus among participants on the needs and purposes of anticipation and strategic foresight in their own context. If this has not already been established, other models (see models for Framing, Designing) may be more suitable.
The following sections provide a framework for optioning the main anticipatory functions and structures in a specific context. No single model can fit all contexts, but a practical need to start with tangible options is called for. The OECD identified 27 specific anticipatory organisational functions derived from research into existing government units (see Annex B for detailed global examples). These can be grouped into seven main types of functions (see Table 4.3). The specific functions aim to strike a balance in the level of granularity between being too broad to be useful for practical guidance (e.g. centralised unit) or too specific to be adaptable to a new context (e.g. an exact replica of Policy Horizons Canada).
Whereas too intense a focus on the structure of a new institutional capability can be counter-productive, too much focus on specific capabilities may overlook how these can be arranged institutionally to function most effectively in a given context. In practice, they should be considered concurrently, to inspire thought and discussion about what each could look like in the participants’ own context.
This approach:
Avoids institutional mimicry, the tendency to attempt to create an exact duplicate institution based on successful examples elsewhere
Avoids closing in on one structure or function, when a plurality of approaches might be needed
Avoids the cognitive load of considering dozens of options and availability bias of recalling the most recently viewed options
Allows for structures and functions to be considered together, as well as individually.
1. See OECD (2024[13]), “Framework for Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 165, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0248ead5-en.
4.2.1. Main anticipatory functions and structures
Main functions
The following options outline a range of anticipatory government functions that can be institutionalised in government structures. These functions are not mutually exclusive and should be tailored to fit the specific governance context, including the existing legal framework, administrative norms, and historical precedents. By adapting these functions to the unique context of each government, it is possible to build capability that aligns with institutional needs, precedents, constraints, purposes, and priorities, encouraging a proactive and resilient approach to policy development and implementation.
Source: OECD
Network convening and public engagement involves active participation and input from experts and stakeholders, engaging in futures dialogues to uncover values and narratives about the future, detecting weak and strong signals of change, and building legitimacy and consensus for decision making, policy development, and strategic planning. This function can include facilitating public forums and workshops, engaging with civil society and industry leaders, and co-ordinating internal or external communities of practice or foresight ecosystems.
Experimentation and alternatives exploration involves the testing of alternative policy approaches, development and testing of policy alternatives, conducting pilot projects and simulations, and encouraging innovation and experimentation in public policy and public administration, especially in cases of high uncertainty and complexity, where traditional policy approaches may no longer provide relevant options. Additionally, it can involve scenario planning and stress-testing of policies, and integrating citizen science and anticipatory intelligence.
Oversight and evaluation focus on assessing the future horizons of government programmes, promoting review and oversight of impacts on the well-being of future generations or long-term policy goals, and monitoring progress on long-term policy topics. This function can include conducting audits and reviews, tracking global trends and systematically applying their implications for national policies, and establishing metrics for long-term success and sustainability.
The advice and direction function involves producing expert advice based on strategic foresight knowledge to senior decision makers and policymakers for governance steering, offering strategic counsel or formal decisions on emerging global and national issues, and developing long-term vision and strategic priorities. It also facilitates cross-departmental and inter-agency collaboration and supports evidence-informed policymaking with foresight insights.
Methodological support helps policymakers choose and apply foresight methods, provides specialised methodological support (e.g. horizon scanning), and develops and maintains a repository of foresight tools and techniques. This can include training officials in foresight methodologies, creating guidelines and templates for best practices, and facilitating the integration of foresight into regular policy cycles.
Intelligence provision involves providing analysis support and strategic foresight knowledge products for policy development and service delivery, signal detection and sense-making, gathering and synthesising foresight intelligence (e.g. megatrend analysis), and producing regular reports and briefs for policymakers. It can also involve maintaining networks for intelligence sharing and collaboration.
Capability building focuses on individual and team skill and capability development for public officials and support for the practice of anticipatory innovation and strategic foresight. It can include action research and demonstration cases, change management, co-ordinating and setting standards for foresight competencies across government units, offering continuous professional development, and building a culture of strategic thinking and long-term planning. This function also encourages mentorship and knowledge transfer within the internal and external foresight communities.
Main structures
The OECD’s analysis of government foresight units highlights examples of each structural option, offering a menu of choices that can be adapted to the governance structure, existing capabilities, and the priority purposes of foresight in the public sector. In some public administrations, only one of these may exist or be suitable; in others, all could be represented or included as a comprehensive anticipatory governance system.
Note: The main types of structures observed in global analysis of government strategic foresight capabilities are A: Centre of government unit; B: Sectoral unit; C: Regional unit; D: Government agency; E: Council; F: Network.
Source: OECD.
One option is the Centre of Government Unit, which centralises foresight activities, often at a high level, ensuring alignment with overall government strategies and priorities. Another possibility is a Sectoral Unit, which embeds foresight in specific sectors or ministries (i.e. health, defence, etc.), allowing for a specialised, focused, and practical approach. Additionally, a Regional Unit can localise these efforts, addressing more granular and unique local challenges and opportunities. Establishing a dedicated Government Agency can provide an independent and focused entity responsible for anticipation across various policy areas. A Council can bring together diverse stakeholders, encouraging collaborative foresight activities and inclusive governance and decision-making. Finally, a Network can leverage a decentralised approach, connecting various units and experts to share insights and best practices across the public administration. Each of these options offers distinct advantages and can be tailored to the specific needs and context of the administration. These are presented as a menu of options, and a government could include all these structures.
The framework described in Figure 4.2 was based on extensive analysis of existing government strategic foresight units and deployed as a practical tool in Italy, Lithuania, and Malta. Its goal was to convert ambitions into specific action plans for reforming organisations to support government anticipation. This section includes case examples of the framework’s deployment in these countries and lessons for its application elsewhere.
4.3.1. Presentation and application of the framework with LIMinal countries
While the process of institutionalising strategic foresight, like any new practice, will necessarily require a careful assessment of existing context, governance, norms, culture, and the demand and mandate for futures thinking. If the purpose(s) of applying strategic foresight have been made clear and once a decision has been made to break from the past, there is a need to consider options for the structures and functions supporting strategic foresight practice. This can happen at any level and as an individual or group exercise. Once options have been considered, the plan must be mobilised through carefully designed integration pathways (see Section 4.1.2) to adapt or build upon existing practices, eventually leading to new or transformed capabilities can be created (see Figure 4.7). This framework was used in the three LIMinal countries to consider institutionalisation setup options based on the specific situation in each country.
Institutionalising strategic foresight is shaped by the unique context of each country, as well as the structure and functioning of its government and public administration. These factors determine how the governance process will be implemented, whether through centralised or decentralised systems. The experience of the three LIMinal countries provides insights in this regard. Lithuania, for instance, is pursuing an ecosystem approach to foresight institutionalisation, while Malta is adopting a more centralised strategy by establishing a strategic foresight unit at the centre of government to serve as a foundation for capacity building. Malta’s centralised strategy aims to create the conditions for ministries and other organisations to subsequently work independently with foresight methods and practices.
The OECD facilitated three focus group discussions to identify the necessary structures, functions, and capabilities needed to integrate foresight in the public administration of the three countries and to develop action plans to put these in place.
The sessions brought together civil servants dedicated to developing a strategic foresight system in their countries. The focus groups sought to evaluate existing models and practices, drawing on insights from the current approaches to strategic foresight in Lithuania, Italy, and Malta (see Box 4.4). The overall objective was to reflect on each country’s anticipatory governance ambitions, map out the ecosystem, and identify ways to infuse foresight practices into the organisational dynamics of government institutions.
The participants in these sessions played a variety of roles in the public administration. Some evaluated opportunities to create a foresight ecosystem, and some were responsible for assessing the scope for foresight in government and the qualifications required to establish or enhance institutional structures for foresight.
The OECD gave the participants an overview of the importance of institutional structures and their functions in the context of strategic foresight, and introduced examples of strategic foresight units, councils, and organisations that illustrate best practices and models.
The strategic dialogue was structured around four main activities, each designed to diagnose and question different aspects of anticipatory governance:
Activity 1: Understanding existing anticipatory structures: What are the existing structures supporting anticipation, and where are they located in the current governance system? Which of the structures are least and most relevant for anticipation in the current context?
Activity 2: Understanding where relevant functions already exist: Which and where are the main functions currently carried out?
Activity 3: Mapping relevant capabilities: Where are there existing capabilities or know-how in the ecosystem? Which specific functions are more or less regularly practised in the ecosystem (although not necessarily for anticipation)?
Activity 4: Identifying potential impact: What level of impact (more vs. less) might each specific function have in strengthening anticipatory capacity or in leveraging strategic foresight toward overall strategic goals?
Activity 5: Selecting options: Building a portfolio of options for building or institutionalising specific functions for anticipation within the governance system.
Lithuania
For Lithuania, the considerations emerged from an action-planning session with a dedicated working group focused on preparing and supporting the development of a strategic foresight White Book. This collaboration emphasised priority areas and actionable steps for weaving foresight activities into national policy planning and operationalisation of the public administration.
Italy
In Italy, insights were shaped through a workshop held in Rome, with stakeholders from key ministries, including the SNA, Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI). This engagement identified relevant institutional entry points and underscored strategic directions tailored to Italy’s policy and foresight landscape.
Malta
For Malta, discussions with the OECD and the Co-ordination and Implementation Division of the Office of the Prime Minister generated specific considerations, drawing attention to Malta’s unique context and the options for strengthening foresight capabilities in its governance structures. These considerations are illustrated through concrete proposed foresight structures at the centre of government and ministerial levels.
For more information on the findings from the workshops and applying the framework with each LIMinal country, see Annex D.
4.3.2. Guidance for further use of the framework
The institutionalisation of strategic foresight requires more than just high-level frameworks – it demands practical, adaptable methodologies that align with real-world governance constraints. This chapter has introduced a three-stage framework comprising framing, designing, and optioning, which organises existing approaches to foresight institutionalisation and contributes practical experience in capacity building from the LIMinal project. By applying this structured yet flexible approach, governments can move beyond institutional mimicry and build foresight capabilities that are contextually relevant, strategically integrated, and practically actionable. The framework’s application in Lithuania, Italy, and Malta provides a roadmap for other countries seeking to institutionalise strategic foresight effectively.
References
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