This chapter provides an introduction into the main legal and institutional developments for managing conflict of interest. In particular, it describes steps taken to improve co-ordination and sanctioning of conflict-of-interest situations. Furthermore, it provides recommendations on the use of a risk-based approach in reviewing and analysing interest and asset declarations.
Advancing Public Integrity in Thailand
Recent Progress and Priorities for Reform
Abstract
A “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official. When conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and may lead to corruption in the public sector and private sector alike (OECD, 2004[2]). Conflicts of interest have become a major matter of public concern worldwide. Furthermore, a public sector that increasingly works closely with the business and non-profit sectors gives rise to new forms of conflict between the private interests of public officials and their public duties. When prevention mechanisms fail and a conflict of interest becomes corruption, the reputation of democratic institutions is put to the test and trust in government is undermined. In the private sector too, conflicts of interest have been identified as a major cause behind corporate governance shortcomings (OECD, 2004[2]). Therefore, having a strong and consolidated framework, where management and prevention of conflict-of-interest situations are effective, is key to safeguarding democratic achievements. Of essential importance are the understanding and recognition that everybody has interests; interests cannot be prohibited but rather must be properly managed.
Chapter 4 of the 2018 Integrity Review found that Thailand required consolidating the mandate for managing conflicts of interest of all civil servants within the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) and developing more detailed measures, such as specific guidance for categories of public officials who may be at greatest risk, as well as a monitoring system for the cooling-off period. The review also pointed to expanding the scope of asset disclosure to include senior public officials and other at-risk officials, while strengthening the auditing capacity of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Finally, the review highlighted that Thailand could also consider making asset disclosure forms publicly accessible for public scrutiny gradually and progressively (OECD, 2018[1]).
Overall, Thailand’s conflict of interest (COI) regime is relatively complex: it is governed by multiple laws, regulations, and institutional practices. As it related to the legal framework, no major changes have been made since the 2018 Integrity Review. The Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2561 (2018) provides the legal framework for managing conflicts of interest (Articles 126 to 129). The legal framework is complemented by the Cabinet Resolution of 2001, B.E. 2544, which also provides complementary provisions for managing conflicts of interest in the public sector. The Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2561 (2018) explicitly addresses “conflict of interest between personal interest and public interest” and establishes such conduct as an offense. No definition of real, apparent or perceived conflict of interest is included in regulations. In case of violations of said provisions, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has the power to investigate such COI cases. Additionally, legislation covers some forms of post-employment restrictions, with a 2-year debarment period for public officials in companies that they previously supervised or had influence over.
The 2021 Code of Professional Ethics for Civil Servants (an update version of the 2009 Code) contains further guidance. In particular, the Code contains a directive that civil servants must “refrain from seeking personal gain in undue manner from using his/her office and shall not commit any act in conflict between personal gain and public interest.” However, as stated in the 2018 Integrity Review of Thailand, the Code’s definition of "conflict of interest" is quite conceptual and lacks detailed guidance on specific scenarios. Considering this, the following section takes stock of recent developments in implementing the 2018 recommendations for prevention and management of conflicts of interest.
In Thailand, there isn’t a single, unified conflict of interest authority covering all branches of government and constitutional institutions; instead, responsibility is shared across several bodies under the constitutional and legal framework.
As stated, at the national level, the National Anti‑Corruption Commission (NACC) is the principal constitutional agency mandated to compile and analyse asset declarations as well as investigate corruption and related misconduct by high-ranking officials, politicians, judges of the Constitutional Court, and members of independent constitutional bodies. This includes inquiries into asset disclosures and breaches of ethical standards under the Organic Act on Counter Corruption. The NACC has authority over conflicts of interest for holders of political and public offices as defined in the anti-corruption law.
In Parliament, conflict of interest issues for members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are generally addressed through internal parliamentary rules and ethical committees as well as through the NACC’s oversight when allegations rise to the level of corruption or ethical violations. While there is no dedicated standalone parliament conflict of interest body, the House Ethics Committee and NACC’s mandate interact in practice.
The judiciary, including courts such as the Constitutional Court of Thailand, is formally independent and judges are expected to comply with constitutional standards of conduct. Allegations of conflict, corruption, or ethical breaches by judges can be investigated by the NACC where they fall within its statutory anti‑corruption remit.
Other constitutional bodies (e.g., the Election Commission of Thailand, the National Human Rights Commission, Ombudsmen) have their own internal codes of conduct and are subject to asset-declaration and ethical oversight provisions under the Constitution and organic laws. Serious breaches of integrity or conflict of interest that constitute corruption or malfeasance may be subject to investigation by the NACC.
In summary, conflict of interest issues in Thai governance are managed through a combination of constitutional independent agencies (especially the NACC), internal institutional ethics mechanisms (e.g., parliamentary ethics committees and judicial conduct rules), and complaint-based oversight (e.g., Ombudsman), with the NACC playing the central enforcement role for serious COI-related corruption allegations across Parliament, the judiciary, and other constitutional bodies. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on the oversight role in conflict of interest and asset declarations of NACC, as the main body overseeing the issue in the Thai context, and as developed by the 2018 Integrity Review.
While the adoption of the Ethical Standards Act increases co-ordination among relevant agencies, Thailand could consider taking further steps to increase co-ordination, including by assigning PACC the role of centralising and streamlining conflict of interest management
Thailand could consider consolidating the mandate for public sector integrity, making PACC the agency responsible for conflict-of-interest policies for all civil servants.
Thailand may consider developing a more structured approach to raise awareness of conflicts of interest.
As stated, under the current setting in Thailand, Sections 126-129 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption, B.E. 2542, lists the situations that state officials should avoid in order to manage conflict of interest. NACC is responsible for implementing the conflict-of-interest policies governed under the Act and also provides a guideline with practical examples to inform the public officials. The 2018 Integrity Review stated that while NACC’s leadership in providing manuals and online application to ensure proper understanding of conflict of interest is in line with good practices of many OECD countries, analysis and recommendations highlighted the value of streamlining the mandate for public sector integrity within PACC (OECD, 2018[1]). Indeed, managing conflict of interest can be quite a different task than that related to verifying asset declarations or investigating and sanctioning incompatibilities.
Prevention and management of conflict of interest should be a separate task than that related to the investigation of potential violations. Prioritising the public duty over personal interest ensures that policies are designed and implemented in a fair and unbiased way, and can strengthen the public’s trust in its policymakers, as well as the legitimacy and credibility of public policies (OECD, 2020[2]). All public officials can have legitimate private interests. Conflicts of interest (COI) therefore cannot be avoided but can become problematic if they are not properly identified and managed. The purpose of a strong policy framework on COI is not to prohibit interests but rather manage them. To this end, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[3]) calls on adherents to set high standards of conduct for public officials through:
Setting clear and proportionate procedures to help prevent violations of public integrity standards and to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of interest situations.
Averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of interest situations.
Similarly, managing conflicts of interest is closely linked to the new Code of Ethics for Civil Servants developed in 2021 by the Office of the OCSC (see Chapter 3). As stated in the 2018 Integrity Review, considering the link to the Code overseen by OCSC, as well as the link with PACC, ethical training for civil servants, and the direct involvement and co-operation of PACC, would thus be more cost-effective and efficient. To this end, PACC, in consultation with NACC, could be the leading agency for maintaining and raising awareness of conflict of-interest policies for all the civil servants in the public sector. Officials interviewed for this report were of the view that centralising such function in PACC would provide coherence and a much-needed separation between the prevention and investigation of conflict of interest. Thailand could potentially consider legally assigning PACC with the task of expanding existing regulations and guidance, while investigation and enforcement remain at NACC.
Regardless of institutional responsibilities, Thailand has undertaken several activities and measures to raise awareness and promote understanding on measures to prevent conflicts of interest for public officials. As of 2025, NACC and OPDC have been at the forefront of these efforts. The 2018 Integrity Review summarise some of these efforts, in particular, the introductory package for newly recruited staff as well as ad hoc training courses on the subject.
More recently, Thailand has undertaken actions to address both legislative and practical challenges. More outstanding, a draft bill was prepared to strengthen their conflict-of-interest system. Amongst others, it mandated that head of government agencies issue regulations or criteria for the use of government assets. However, ultimately, the relevant provisions were incorporated as amendments to the Organic Act on Anti‑Corruption, B.E. 2561 (2018). NACC has also been raising awareness among government agencies and encourages the adoption of such measures to prevent conflicts of interest. Similarly, NACC has recently set-up an “Integrity and Ethics Advocacy Project for the Prevention of Conflict-of-Interest Misconduct”.
In terms of practice and awareness raising, some significant advances have been made. As stated, Thailand has enacted a new Code of Ethics for Civil Servants in 2021. However, the new Code outlines general ethical principles that civil servants are expected to uphold, such as prioritising the public interest over personal gain, demonstrating selflessness and a public-minded attitude, separating personal matters from official responsibilities, and refraining from any actions or involvement in activities that may give rise to conflicts between personal and public interests. Thailand has also taken steps to develop a detailed CoI handbook for all levels of government, as per the 2018 recommendation. The handbook provides COI typologies as well as instructions on managing post-employment restrictions (Table 4.1). Notable progress has been made by including the definitions of personal interest, public interest, and conflict of interest, as per the recommendation made in the 2018 Integrity Review.
Source: NACC (2025[4]), Conflicts of interest and corrupt conduct: A guide for public officials , https://www.nacc.go.th/files/article/attachments/2699404fa3f820a9a684901eccb93c66fb69144.pdf?csrt=3896929314492646561.
Similarly, other awareness raising and training activities have been undertaken by the NACC in the last few years:
Development of the “Course on Prevention of Conflicts of Interest”: This course is available for public officials. It covers principles and legal provisions, forms of misconduct related to conflicts of interest, relevant case studies, and guidelines for proper conduct and caution in the performance of duties as a public official.
Campaign to Promote Ethics and Integrity: This campaign aims to enhance the knowledge and awareness of public officials and the general public about the consequences of misconduct related to conflicts of interest. It seeks to foster understanding and awareness of the importance of preventing such conflicts.
While considering all these actions and activities as major milestones, Thailand has not fully complied with the full scope of the 2018 recommendations.
The 2021 Ethics Code, which is applicable to all institutions, remains mostly the same as in 2009. In particular, the Code’s conflict-of-interest language is quite broad and not very operational, nor it includes the different types of CoI. Thailand could consider using some OECD definitions in future amendments (Box 4.1).
Recognising that countries have different historical, legal and public service traditions, which may impact on the way conflict-of-interest situations have been understood, the OECD Guidelines developed a definition of “conflict of interests” which is intended to be simple and practical, to assist effective identification and management of conflict situations:
A “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official’s private-capacity interests could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities.
On this basis, a “conflict of interest” involves a situation or relationship which can be current or may have occurred in the past. Defined in this way, “conflict of interest” has the same meaning as real conflict of interest.
By contrast, a perceived conflict of interest exists where it appears that an official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties, but this is not in fact the case.
A potential conflict of interest occurs where a public official holds a private interest which would constitute a conflict of interest if the relevant circumstances were to change in the future.
It is important to note that this definitional approach is necessary to be consistent with the policy position which recognises that conflicts of interest will arise and must be managed and resolved appropriately.
Source: OECD (2004[5]), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264104938-en.
Thailand could also further elaborate to help clarify and guide public officials when it comes to managing these different types of conflict of interest by including concrete examples, while emphasising that this is not an exhaustive list of situations. For example, Canada has moved towards defining real, potential, and apparent conflicts of interest (Box 4.2).
Furthermore, Thailand did not report whether guidance materials, including the handbook, contain checklists and mandatory recusal forms, as per the recommendation given in 2018. It is also unclear if the handbook is binding or its use encouraged through the entire public administration, both at the national and sub-national level. NACC has also reported activities to raise awareness and campaigned for all sectors to be aware of and prevent conflict of interest situations, but specific information, at sector level, was not provided.
The Treasury Board in Canada provides concrete definitions and guidance on real, potential, and apparent conflict of interest as part of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. It is emphasised that “preserving the appearance of integrity in government is as important as actual integrity” and that public servants therefore are required to avoid apparent conflicts of interests as much as actual or potential ones.
The guidance provides the following definitions:
A "real" conflict of interest is where a public servant's private interests are sufficient to influence the exercise of his or her public duties. A "potential" conflict of interest is where such a situation could arise in the future. An "apparent" conflict of interest, however, is where it appears to members of the public that a public servant's private interests could improperly influence the performance of his or her duties. "Private interests" are not limited to financial interests.
As apparent conflicts of interests can be particularly difficult to understand and identify, further guidance is provided, emphasising for example:
In determining apparent conflicts of interest, the appearance of a public servant's actions to the public is the key, not the public servant's integrity or good faith. Public servants can be found to be in apparent conflict of interest even if they are not aware that their actions create an apparent conflict of interest. Public servants - and their managers – are required to think beyond the scope of their own perceptions and motives, and to consider how the public may perceive their actions.
An apparent conflict of interest is determined by the perception of “a reasonable person” (a hypothetical member of the public) who is "reasonably well-informed".
Such a person is to have a "reasonable perception" that a conflict of interest exists, even if the conflict of interest is not a major one.
The onus is on public servants to anticipate apparent conflicts of interest arising from their actions, and to take steps to comply with the rules.
This onus on public servants is ongoing, as apparent conflicts of interest may arise at any time, if their personal affairs or official duties change. This onus extends to disclosing items about which there is doubt and continues after filing a disclosure report.
Whether a conflict of interest is apparent or potential or real, the consequences are the same. The conflict must be remedied. Efforts should therefore focus on determining appropriate methods of compliance, rather than making definitive classifications on the type of conflict of interest.
Source: Government of Canada (2015[6]), Apparent Conflict of Interest, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/values-ethics/conflict-interest-post-employment/apparent-conflict-interest.html#d1.
As previously noted, there’s also limited practical guidance for many real-world situations. When it comes to addressing the situation at the sub-national level, Thailand has not taken steps towards co‑ordinating efforts between NACC, PACC and Anti-Corruption Operation Centres to increase understanding of managing conflicts of interest in the public sector. Nor have engaged individual government agencies in developing systematic procedures in which training, education and guidance are provided to all public officials at different stages of their career. In addition, officers in each Anti-Corruption Operation Centre have not been trained for their role in dissemination and advice on conflict of interest.
Targeted training for public officials could also be considered, on how to disclose such situations, to whom and when and consider relying on technological self-assessment tools, as a first filter (Box 4.3). This could be complemented by a compilation of case law or practical guidance establishing the standard of the application of such situations in the past, as well as case examples of recusals and flagrant violations of the regime.
To provide specific guidance and orientation on conflict-of-interest situations, the Anti-corruption Office of Argentina (Oficina Anticorrupción, OA) implemented an online conflict-of-interest simulator. Through the selection of answers to certain questions, public officials receive an assessment of whether they are in a situation of current or potential conflict of interest and orientation about what to do. The simulator is available for future, current and past public officials. By asking the public official various questions throughout the simulation, the simulator determines if the official is in a conflict-of-interest situation based on the legal framework. If a potential conflict of interest is detected, the simulator informs the official of the violated norm of the Public Ethics Law and advises the public official to seek more specific guidance of the OA. The simulator is a useful tool to enable officials to clarify any doubts they might have over a situation.
Source: OECD (2019[7]), OECD Integrity Review of Argentina: Achieving Systemic and Sustained Change, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g98ec3-en.
Besides clarification and training for the public official, Thailand could also consider providing awareness raising and training to those who manage or could potentially manage conflict of interest situations in an institution (supervisors, HR and special units). This would allow symmetry in the treatment of similar cases across sectors as well as ensure due process when providing advice for different categories of officials, who may otherwise receive a different treatment when confronted with similar situations. Overall, the recommendation to improve its management system of conflict of interest remains relevant, including by providing more detailed CoI definitions, whilst also considering centralising and disseminating awareness of conflicts of interest at PACC and increase dissemination through the entire public administration (at both national and sub-national levels).
Progress has been made to develop practical guidance on conflict of interest; Thailand could take steps further towards developing more specific guidance, considering risk factors and positions
Thailand could consider developing specific guidance for categories of public officials who are at risk due to the nature of their work.
As briefly stated in the previous recommendation as well as in the 2018 Integrity Review, the role of ensuring clear guidance also involves considering the specific risks associated with the administrative functions and sectors most exposed to corruption. As different organisations face different contexts, and as the nature of their work varies, they may also be faced with distinctive ethical dilemmas and specific conflict-of-interest situations. In the 2018 Integrity Review, Thailand had reported a few initiatives to develop sector specific guidelines. For example, NACC, set up an ad hoc subcommittee to prepare an operation manual for state officials who work in some at-risk areas (such as health, accounting and infrastructure). However, the 2018 Integrity Review found that guidelines were not well developed in other government agencies and areas. As explained, the Office of the NACC plays a role in campaigning to promote virtue and ethics in all sectors to prevent misconduct related to conflicts of interest and to disseminate knowledge and understanding about conflicts of interest (OECD, 2018[1]).
Since then, Thailand, and in particular NACC, have shown progress in this area by developing guidelines for “Best Practices for Person Holding a Political Position to Prevent Conflicts of Interest”. These guidelines are intended to raise awareness among political office holders, including the Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of the House of Representatives, and Senators, about performing their duties while taking into consideration potential conflicts of interest. As explained by Thailand in the follow-up questionnaire for this Review, the examples emphasise the need for actions to be in the public interest, the adherence to ethical mandates, and consideration of post-employment restrictions.
Similarly, the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), as the central personnel administration agency for civil servants, has the mandate over the Civil Service Code of Ethics to serve as a guideline for conduct and to maintain the virtues that civil servants must adhere to in their duties. Section 20 of the Ethical Standards Act, B.E. 2562 (2019), requires each central personnel administration agency to oversee the implementation of the ethics maintenance process and the evaluation of adherence to the code of ethics. Therefore, this recommendation is considered fully implemented and converted to address the need to consider risk factors and positions.
Thailand could consider using the National Anticorruption Strategy to mainstreaming central level policies into concrete actions at sector level. For example, at-risk sectors are yet to develop a solid and explicit diagnosis of integrity problems, taking into account corruption risks as well as actual cases of corruption, in their respective sectors. This exemplifies how at-risk sectors are also underutilising integrity tools. Therefore, Thailand could consider a risk analyses of common conflict-of-interest situations in each sector, implementing ex ante procurement controls, and systematically analysing declarations of interests to identify and address alleged misconduct.
Thailand could consider developing a mechanism to monitor the effectiveness of conflict-of-interest policies.
An emerging issue for many countries is to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the existing conflict-of-interest policies. The 2018 integrity Review found that in Thailand, no major research has been initiated to determine how familiar public officials are with conflict-of-interest policies. The absence of measurements related to the degree of familiarisation with the principles and values made it difficult to monitor whether the conflict-of-interest policies are implemented and respected (OECD, 2018[1]). Thailand reported that the Integrity & Transparency Assessment (ITA), does perform a systematic review of the implementation of the code of ethics in public agencies including by monitoring whether the code of ethics has been implemented in the organisation. Sub-national governments must present, the code of ethics for local administrators, the code of ethics for local council members, and the announcement of the local personnel administration standards committee on the code of ethics for local government employees. Institutions must also disclose information showing the results of enhancing ethical standards. This includes information on the team answering ethical questions, dos & don’ts guidelines on ethical behaviour and training that integrates ethical content in ethics trainings carried out by the agency.
The 2018 Integrity Review recommendation had focused on how, PACC, in consultation and co‑operation with NACC, provides guidance on conflict-of-interest policies and monitor implementation of the policies through surveys and statistical data. Considering that ITA does monitor the implementation of the Code of Ethics and that said code explicitly refers to CoI policies and training, this recommendation is deemed implemented.
While legislation has been introduced to establish a cooling-off period, enforcement of these provisions is quite low. Therefore, Thailand could benefit from a more staggered approach to strengthen its system, by introducing risk-based cooling-off periods and ensuring effective enforcement of post-employment provisions
Thailand could consider a mechanism to monitor its cooling-off period, especially for high-ranking public officials and at-risk officials, as well as developing pre-public employment policies.
As stipulated in the Practical Guideline for public officials for Sections 127 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption, in Thailand, a cooling-off period of two years is mandated for all public officials, including state and local officials, the Prime Minister and Ministers, regardless of the scope of functions or risks. In particular, those holding a political position or a high-ranking position, are prohibited from holding interests as directors, advisors, representatives, employees, or workers in private businesses that are supervised, overseen, controlled, or audited by the state agency to which the public official is affiliated or in which they serve in their capacity as a public official). Previous drafting included the 'local officials', but section 127 has been changed to remove said reference. Considering the importance of establishing integrity safeguards at the sub-national level, Thailand could consider re-introducing this provision in upcoming legislative changes.
The 2018, Integrity Review stated that while the need for a cooling-off period is clearly stated, there appears to be no mechanism for monitoring and ensuring that public officials follow this rule on leaving their public positions. Furthermore, the review stated that several measures can improve the implementation of this mechanism, including institutional responsibility. NACC should continue monitoring the post-public employment of the Prime Minister, Ministers, parliamentarians and other politically appointed or elected officials, whilst PACC would be in a better position to conduct the monitoring for other civil servants in the public sector. another option could include that a centralised body (NACC) was responsible for high-level/high-risk officials while monitoring for lower-level officials was decentralised within the employing entities themselves. This is also consistent with the arrangements in place in many OECD countries (OECD, 2025[8]). Other recommendations focused on time limits to be tailored to the level of public officials and specific groups or a particular risk area as well as legislating and establishing pre-public employment checkups (restrictions take place during the recruitment process, when the applicants’ previous employment is assessed for potential conflicts of interest) (OECD, 2018[1]). In contrast to post-public employment, there is no explicit restriction on pre-public employment in Thailand.
While Thailand reports a few activities related to post-employment, such as the reporting of potential violations of post-employment by citizens, the overall information provided by Thailand focuses mostly on blank prohibitions for the 2-year cooling-off period rather than the specific recommendations to improve the overall system. Several measures can improve the implementation of this mechanism. As stated previously, PACC could be given the role to follow-up on restrictions for all other public officials not covered by NACC. Other OECD countries have move towards a more stringent system for tracking office holders, at least in the sectors that they formally regulated (Table 4.2). Furthermore, exit interviews with PACC or NACC (depending on the category of public officials) to examine possible conflicts of interest, and, if necessary, to determine the appropriate means of remedying them could be of great help for officials in doubt on the applicability of current regulations. Finally, to enable effective monitoring of post-public employment activities, NACC and PACC could co-operate to improve data interoperability so that they could cross-check information from public officials’ post-public employment declarations with tax and labour databases.
How to read: In Greece, post-employment integrity is not tracked for ministers or for top-officials. There are regulations stating mandatory cooling-off periods for public officials.
Source: OECD (2025[9]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
Monitoring should go beyond checking for violations and include public information. Spain and France could be models that serve inspiration. The French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) has a commission that follows-up on post-employment restrictions and publishes their findings (Box 4.4). Japan also has an Employment Surveillance Commission within the Cabinet Office. In both cases, civil servants above certain grades must report to the commission on their re-employment status, and the commission updates and publishes the list. The list includes such information as the name of the public official, the name of the new employer, and the position offered to the public official. PACC, in consultation with NACC, could consider introducing a similar reporting mechanism for public officials to ensure their compliance with cooling-off periods.
France
The High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) is responsible for pre- and post-public employment, monitoring asset and interest declarations and supervising lobbying activities. Various checks have been established within the French system to ensure adherence to ethical standards after individuals hold public office. In line with Article 23 of Law 907/2013 relating to transparency in public life, the HATVP controls high-level public officials’ (ministers, mayors of large cities, heads of regulatory agencies, high-level civil servants) post-public employment activities and assesses potential ethical and criminal risks. Since the enactment of Law N°2024-850 of 25 July 2024, aimed at preventing foreign interference in France, the HATVP controls the risk of foreign influence for former members of government, members of autonomous admirative authority and head of certain local executive. When carried out in the light of this potential risk, the control is extended to a 5 years period. With the Law no. 2019-828 of 6 August 2019 on civil service reform, the missions of the HATVP have been extended to other civil servants. The referral is optional and subsidiary and occurs only if the hierarchical authority has serious doubts about the project in question, even after referring it to the ethics officer The scope of activities subject to approval includes self-employment and paid activities within a company or public or private interest group engaged in commercial or industrial relations with the state. The HATVP begins its investigation either after being notified by the person pursuing the activity or discovering that a given individual is carrying out an unauthorised activity and must give an opinion within two months. The individual under investigation can present evidence during the inquiry. The investigation may result in individuals receiving a compatibility opinion, a compatibility opinion with reservations applicable for three years or an incompatibility opinion that prohibits them from performing the activity for three years. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the HATVP notifies its opinion to the concerned individual, the hierarchical authority and the entity the individual is willing to join. In the event of an incompatibility opinion, the individual concerned must not start the activity and any contracts concluded in violation of this opinion are rendered null and void. Incompatibility opinions and reservations are binding on both the administration and the public official. If a former public official continues to perform an activity in violation of an incompatibility opinion, they might be considered as to be in a position of illegal-taking of interest and be subject to criminal sanctions. These can include imprisonment for three years and a fine of EUR 200 000. It can also lead to specific sanctions (article L. 124-20 of public servant code) such as disciplinary sanctions and deduction on pensions for retired civil servants.
Spain
In Spain, public officials must seek approval for their post-public employment activities. Article 15 of Law 3/2015 regulating the exercise of the high office of the General Administration of the State prohibits high-level officials from providing services to private entities affected by decisions in which they have participated for two years after leaving office. Paragraph 6 of this article requires senior officials to declare their planned post-public employment activities to the Conflict-of-Interest Office before starting them. Within one month of receiving the declaration, the office must issue a ruling on the compatibility of the planned activities with the law and notify both the former official and the relevant private entity of their ruling. Under Article 16, the official must then declare these activities to the Registry of Activities of Senior Officials and this obligation extends to any new activities taken up for two years after leaving office. While the Conflict-of-Interest Office only verifies information in the registry at the end of officials’ mandates (Article 23), the sanctions outlined in Title IV and other sanctions apply to legal entities hiring these officials.
Sources: Law no. 2013-907 of 11 October 2013, relating to transparency in public life, Act-no.-2013-907-dated-11-October-2013-on-transparency-in-public-life.pdf, Law 3/2015 regulating the exercise of the high office of the General Administration of the State.
Similarly, Thailand does not appear to have considered legislative reforms as it comes to time limits tailored to the level of public officials and specific groups or a particular risk area. For example, in Canada, a one-year time limit is imposed on public officials in executive positions, whereas for ministers, a two-year period is applied. In Croatia, France, Greece, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom high-ranking political officials are not necessarily under blank prohibitions but required to obtain approval for their post-public employment activities. In this sense, Thailand might consider conducting consultation with relevant government stakeholders and introducing a risk-based approach when determining cooling-off periods, by for example, establishing different times and rules for those at a higher risk. While not possible in all scenarios, allowing public officials to request a form of “gardening leave” to reduce or eliminate their cooling-off period could reduce the number of cases where the state must expend resources on monitoring and/or compensation once the official leaves office. In the United Kingdom, officials can already be placed on general gardening leave once they have handed in their notice (OECD, 2025[8]).
Recognising that many of these measures are difficult to implement, countries may risk discouraging talented individuals from accepting public sector positions when regimes do not consider flexible arrangements. In devising its regime, a country should keep in mind that revolving door restrictions should protect governmental processes from abuse but should not be so onerous that the public sector can no longer attract the highly talented individuals needed for certain positions. This requires a balance of competing public interests (World Bank/OECD/UNODC, 2020[10]). In some cases, blanket prohibitions, such as limiting post-employment equally for all types of officials in a defined number of years, may not work (Figure 4.1).
Source: OECD (2025[9]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
Therefore, Thailand may consider enacting legislation to cover pre-employment restrictions as well as establishing in a clear way, the scope of officials and activities covered by the post-employment restrictions and the length of the cooling-off period with a risk-based approach. Thailand may also consider more targeted initiatives, per category of official. First, legislation could create a distinction between civil servants on a general level and high-level officials such as ministers and parliamentarians, which are exposed to higher risks. The cooling-off period varies between public officials based on the seniority and the nature of the post as it is the case in Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States. During the cooling off period, only some categories of public officials in Austria, Israel, Norway, Portugal and Spain receive compensation. For instance, in Spain, public officials receive 80% of their basic salaries as compensation and in Norway, compensation is awarded only for prohibitions on taking up a specific appointment, the level of which is equivalent to the salary received at the time of the public official left public office (OECD, 2015[11]). Therefore, in sectors where salaries are high, Thailand could consider introducing remuneration for public officials where any income earned during the cooling-off period is subtracted from the amount they receive. Remuneration could even be contingent on the official proving their inability to find employment in their field to a relevant authority, such as NACC or PACC. This could reduce the need to remunerate former public officials in practice to a limited number of cases. It could also be prudent to base the overall post-public employment measures on data on salaries in relevant industries to ensure the employment prospects of former public officials are not restricted to the point that they require remuneration (OECD, 2025[8]).
Furthermore, Thailand could consider longer periods for at-risk positions, as well as compensation measures for those unable to be employed for a longer period of time. Overall, Thailand needs to strengthen their post-employment restrictions in legislation to include clear and adjusted durations, detail covered activities and enforce penalties.
In Thailand, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2560, requires persons holding political positions, chief justices of the Constitutional Court, persons holding positions in independent organs, the Auditor-General and state officials to submit an account showing to the NACC particulars of their assets and liabilities. Sections 102-110 of the Organic Act on Counter Corruption, provides provisions that state officials make a declaration of the assets and liabilities. The Act requires high-ranking public officials, including the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Prosecutor-General, the Election Commissioner and Ombudsman to disclose their assets and liabilities and those of their spouses and dependent children upon taking office, and every three years while they are in office and on vacating office.
As it relates to the obligation to declare, the law also gives the NACC the power to designate additional state-official positions (beyond the predefined ones) that must declare their assets. In addition, public officials at the PACC are required to submit an asset declaration form to the Secretary-General of the PACC. However, at the time of the review, many public-sector posts (mid-level civil servants, bureaucrats, etc.) remain outside the mandatory reporting scope, which undermines effectiveness and transparency of the regime.
On 5 June 2025, the amended Organic Act on Anti-Corruption (No. 2), B.E. 2568, was published and took effect. The 2025 reform also came alongside contested efforts by the NACC to widen the pool of officials required to declare assets, including certain positions in public organisations, state enterprises, and even university councils. Senior officials of independent agencies, some state enterprises, or other public organisations as designated by NACC Notification were added.
As it relates to compilation and verification, the NACC has the authority to inspect and verify the declared assets and can order further investigation if there is suspicion of “unusual wealth” — which may trigger confiscation or other legal consequences. The NACC uses a risk-based methodology to select asset declarations for verification. Section 110 of the Organic Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption the NACC carries out a routine desk review (type 1), targeted verification based on discrepancies or reasonable suspicion (type 2) and an in-depth examination which is triggered by red flags including unexplained wealth or false statements. Type 2 and 3 constitute a formal risk-based verification methodology. Overall, the process can be described in three different stages (Box 4.5).
Type 1: Regular examination
Examination of assets and liabilities based on the asset and liability declaration and supporting documents submitted by the liable declarant.
Type 2: Verification
Examination of assets and liabilities to verify that the information concerning the assets and liabilities is accurate and genuinely exists as declared, or to verify any particular item(s) for which circumstances indicate, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect, that such items may not have been declared accurately or completely, contain discrepancies, or exhibit other characteristics as specified by the NACC.
Type 3: In-depth examination
Examination of assets and liabilities where circumstances indicate that the declarant intentionally failed to submit an asset and liability declaration and its supporting documents or intentionally submitted a declaration and supporting documents containing false statements or concealing material facts that should have been disclosed.
This also includes circumstances giving reasonable grounds to believe that the declarant intended not to disclose the source of assets or liabilities, or where there is suspicion concerning the illegitimate acquisition of any asset or liability. It further includes circumstances indicating potential transfer, concealment, transformation, or placement of assets under another person’s name, raising reasonable suspicion of unusual wealth or an unusual increase in assets, or other characteristics as prescribed by the NACC.
Source: OECD (2024[12]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators: Thailand, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/countries/tha/indicators/1000097/.
As previously stated, disclosure forms help create and maintain a sound integrity system. However, the content of these declarations as well as their objective can vary. Therefore, it is important to have clarity with respect to the objectives, the information requested and its subsequent use. When filling out a form as part of a conflict-of-interest management regime, an official must take stock of his or her interests and the interests of his or her family members, evaluate these interests in light of the duties performed and decide whether any additional steps need to be taken to manage any conflicts of interest. This initial self‑identification and evaluation process can and should generate requests for assistance to those who provide advice and guidance on managing conflicts of interest and help supplement the advice and guidance provided based simply on a subsequent official review (OECD, 2005[13]).
Separating interest and asset declaration helps identify aims and objectives in an integrity system. For example, interests’ declarations may come into conflict in an “ad-hoc” manner, whereas assets change less often. On the other hand, asset declarations may often be a tool used to identify illicit enrichment by contrasting financial information and would rarely be used to prevent a conflict of interest in a decision-making process. Therefore, separating declarations may keep the focus of the asset declaration on illicit wealth monitoring, while simultaneously building a better understanding amongst elected officials about the “natural” occurrence of conflicts of interest. Even while asset declarations can serve to identify some potential conflicts of interest, they cannot replace the management of conflicts of interest, which needs to be done differently.
Thailand has chosen a single declaration for the reporting of both assets and interests of elected officials. This is done by way of a single unified and centralised form. For public officials, the law is pretty broad about what counts as a reportable “interest”. The goal is to surface anything that could influence (or appear to influence) how an official performs their duties. Furthermore, in the system, interests are rarely verified through a pre-employment check-up, and no information exists on the use of reporting mechanisms for ad-hoc conflicts. Overall, the information contained in the asset declaration is used for the sole purpose of identifying patrimonial increases.
Considering this, the following section takes stock of recent developments in the implementation of the asset disclosure recommendations set out in the 2018 Integrity Review.
Recognising that NACC has strengthened the Thai asset declaration system by making reporting mandatory for some senior civil service officials, Thailand should address remaining major loopholes in the system, including interest declarations as well as the scope of reporting officials
Thailand could consider introducing an asset disclosure system for senior public officials and other officials at risk.
As stated, the NACC has expanded the categories of reporting individuals. However, legislation still only makes mandatory the disclosure of top-level positions (e.g. Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of Parliament / Senate). For other categories (some state officials, lower-rank civil servants or non-statutory posts), disclosure is not automatic and the law allows disclosure only in certain circumstances (e.g. if requested by court, State Audit Commission, or consent by declarant). More concerning, Section 102 only requires the chief justices in the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Courts to submit declarations, other high-ranking judges are therefore not obliged to declare.
However, as stated in the 2018 Integrity Review, other senior public officials and at-risk public officials such as procurement officials are also exposed to corruption and not considered in the expanded categories. Therefore, NACC could consider a legal reform that mandates introducing an asset disclosure system for senior public officials and other at-risk officials, as well as developing a risk model to determine whom should be included in those categories. This may include a methodology to assess at-risk positions based on decision-making power and involvement in budgetary or procurement decisions of certain categories of officials.
Most OECD countries apply a risk-based approach to their financial and interest disclosure system. A risk-based approach is needed in the definition of declarants, in so far as it does not require all public officials to declare their assets but only obliges those that face a higher risk of corruption due to their position. The narrowed-down, focused approach is in line with the majority of OECD countries (Figure 4.2). Given their decision-making powers, elected officials but also senior civil servants are more influential and are at greater risk for capture or corruption. The focus on elected officials and senior public officials in all branches makes the best use of the capacities of the responsible bodies by not overburdening with the sheer quantity of declarations without appropriate human and financial resources.
Note: Data for regulations is based on criteria values for “Any member of government / member of parliament / member of the highest bodies of the judiciary must submit an interest declaration, as a minimum upon entry and any renewal or change in public office” and “Any newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servant of the executive branch must submit an interest declaration”. Data for monitoring and practice are based on statistics collected to calculate the criteria values for “The submission rate of interest declarations from: members of the Government is 100% for the past six years / members of parliament is at least 90% for the past six years / members of the highest bodies of the judiciary is at least 80% for the past four years / newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants of the executive branch is at least 80% for the past four years.”
How to read: In OECD Member countries, members of government (Ministers) are legally required to disclose private interests in 97% of OECD Member countries. Among these 97% of countries, the disclosure of private interests is fully monitored in 82% of countries. Among these 82% of countries, the average submission rate of interest disclosures by members of government is 100%. In OECD partner countries members of government (Ministers) are legally required to disclose private interests in 96% of OECD partner countries. Among these 96% of countries, the disclosure of private interests is fully monitored in 33% of countries. Among these 33% of countries, the average submission rate of interest disclosures by members of government is 97%.
Source: OECD (2025[9]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
Finally, Thailand may consider separating their asset and interest declarations and assigning these functions to NACC and PACC, respectively. While NACC could continue the review of patrimonial declarations, PACC could have a role in identifying and managing interest declarations, including by providing guidance to individual institutions on the management of ad-hoc cases of conflict of interest. Having separate declarations for interests and assets recognises the different nature of such diverse goals as wealth monitoring and preventing and managing conflict of interest. Separate processes may also provide a more tailor-made approach to the needs of the verification agency considering that verification of assets requires yearly declarations and a contrast method against other relevant financial information.
Amendments to its asset declaration system, including the establishment of the Online Declaration System, have become major milestones in accountability and transparency Thailand is encouraged to maintain this momentum and to consider expanding the category of officials whose declarations are published and fully automatise the declaration system
Thailand could consider making asset disclosure forms publicly accessible for scrutiny by the media and the citizens.
Thailand could consider developing an online management system of asset disclosure, to facilitate reviewing, auditing and publication by the NACC.
As it was the case in the 2018 Integrity Review, in Thailand, persons holding the position of Prime Minister, Minister, Member of the House of Representatives and Senator can be disclosed to the public, while other positions are not disclosed mandatorily. Disclosed documents are kept at the Office of the NACC for the public and media for inspection during office hours and are made available on the NACC website. Applying a wider publication policy to high-ranking civil servants will increase the level of accountability and transparency (OECD, 2018[1]).
According to information on the NACC webpage, declarations submitted by top-level public officeholders are published. This includes persons holding “political positions” such as Ministers, Members of the House of Representatives, Members of the Senate, as well Justices of the highest courts, heads of independent agencies and other key “high-ranking” officials. One major change refers to local-level senior public-office holders in certain categories: local administrators, their deputies/assistants, local assembly members, which were previously not included.
In any case, Thailand could move towards considering the publishing of declarations of other at-risk categories of officials, including directors at public institutions as well as those working on public procurement processes. Therefore, the recommendation is deemed not fully implemented.
Setting clear and proportionate procedures to manage assets declarations is key for the success of the system. As is the case in other countries, an electronic system simplifies the submission process by making the declaration form more user-friendly, reduces the number of mistakes made in the forms, facilitates further analysis and verification of declarations, and improves data management and security (OECD, 2005[13]; OECD, 2023[14]).
Electronic filing (e-filing) may help raise the level of compliance with submission requirements. In addition, electronic submission also allows for an effective automated risk analysis. This analysis would certainly depend on external factors, like access to external sources of information through automated data exchange. There are also challenges of data quality and availability (Kotlyar and Pop, 2019[15]). These issues create a complex process involving various legal, technological, financial, and institutional aspects.
Thailand has reported that their current system is fully managed electronically. The following elements were reported as being now electronically filled (Table 2.1).
Indeed, The NACC has an “Online Declaration System (ODS)” for filing asset and liability declarations. Those required to declare, including many high-ranking officials, political officeholders, judges, senior civil servants, are allowed to submit via the ODS. The ODS requires login credentials and a one-time password (OTP) via mobile for security. Supporting documents and the declaration itself, submitted via ODS, are treated as legally “signed” under the amended rules (UNODC, 2023[16]). Thus, for a substantial and intended to be growing set of public officials, the submission of declarations can be done entirely online and for this reason the recommendation is deemed fully implemented and transformed, to include next steps for the completeness of the electronic system. This might include amending the existing legal framework that still allows paper submission when the electronic platform is not fully functional and clarifying cases added via the later expansion of categories considered by NACC.
Institutional framework and policy consolidation
Consolidate the public-sector integrity mandate, assigning PACC as the lead agency for conflict of interest prevention, guidance, awareness, and training.
Separate the prevention and awareness functions from investigation and sanctioning, which remain with NACC.
Enhance co-ordination for conflict-of-interest management and awareness raising between NACC, PACC, and Anti-Corruption Operation Centres, including at the sub-national level.
Conflict-of-interest guidance and awareness
Develop clear and operational definitions of conflict of interest, including real, apparent, and potential conflicts, using OECD and international best-practice standards.
Provide concrete examples in guidance materials, handbooks, and case studies to support public officials in practical decision-making.
Expand training programmes and awareness campaigns, targeting both public officials and those who manage conflict of interest cases (e.g. supervisors, HR, ethics officers).
Consider technological tools, such as online simulators or self-assessment tools, to help officials identify conflict of interest situations.
Tailor guidance for high-risk categories of public officials based on their duties, exposure, and sector-specific risks.
Asset declarations
Expand mandatory asset and liability disclosures to cover all senior public officials and other at-risk officials, using a risk-based approach.
Gradually move towards publishing declarations for broader categories of officials (e.g. procurement officials, directors of public institutions) to enhance transparency.
Maintain a fully electronic filing and verification system (e.g. NACC’s Online Declaration System) while clarifying legal coverage for newly added categories.
Consider separating their asset and interest declarations and assigning these functions to NACC and PACC, respectively.
Cooling-off periods/post-employment restrictions
Introduce cooling-off periods tailored to officials’ level, role, and risk exposure.
Clarify the scope of activities and officials covered by Thailand’s legal framework.
Consider compensation schemes for officials affected by post-employment restrictions.
Implement a monitoring and reporting mechanism for compliance with cooling-off periods, possibly publishing findings publicly
Introduce pre-employment checks to prevent conflicts arising from prior private sector positions.
Monitoring, evaluation and risk-based approaches
Develop mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of conflict of interest policies, including surveys, audits, and statistical reviews.
Conduct risk analyses at sectoral and institutional levels to identify common conflict of interest situations and implement targeted preventive measures.
Regularly assess compliance with conflict of interest and cooling-off rules, including cross-checks with tax and labour data for post-public employment activities.
References
[6] Government of Canada (2015), Apparent Conflict of Interest, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/values-ethics/conflict-interest-post-employment/apparent-conflict-interest.html#d1.
[15] Kotlyar, D. and L. Pop (2019), E-filing Asset Declarations Benefits and Challenges, World Bank, Washington, DC, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/448191561650076794/pdf/E-filing-Asset-Declarations-Benefits-and-Challenges.pdf.
[4] NACC (2025), Conflicts of interest and corrupt conduct: A guide for public officials, National Anti-Corruption Commission, https://www.nacc.go.th/files/article/attachments/2699404fa3f820a9a684901eccb93c66fb69144.pdf?csrt=3896929314492646561.
[9] OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, OECD, Paris, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
[8] OECD (2025), Strengthening the Framework on Pre- and Post-Public Employment in Romania, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/24381cc1-en.
[12] OECD (2024), OECD Public Integrity Indicators: Thailand, OECD, Paris, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/countries/tha/indicators/1000097/.
[14] OECD (2023), “Review of the Asset and Interest Declaration System in Malta: Recommendations to improve collection and verification of asset and interest declarations for elected and appointed officials”, OECD, Paris, https://one.oecd.org/document/GOV/PGC/INT(2023)12/FINAL/en/pdf.
[2] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[7] OECD (2019), OECD Integrity Review of Argentina: Achieving Systemic and Sustained Change, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g98ec3-en.
[1] OECD (2018), OECD Integrity Review of Thailand: Towards Coherent and Effective Integrity Policies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264291928-en.
[3] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD/LEGAL/0435, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[11] OECD (2015), Government at a Glance 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2015-en.
[13] OECD (2005), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector: A Toolkit, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264018242-en.
[5] OECD (2004), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264104938-en.
[16] UNODC (2023), Thailand, Information on Good Practices and Challenges with respect to the Establishment of Effective Financial Disclosure Systems, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
[10] World Bank/OECD/UNODC (2020), Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector: Good Practices Guide, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/Preventing-and-Managing-Conflicts-of-Interest-in-the-Public-Sector-Good-Practices-Guide.pdf.