This chapter provides recommendations to strengthen Thailand’s strategic approach to public integrity. Thailand shows its commitment to public integrity through continuity of its national strategies. However, their impact could be enhanced through increased monitoring and evaluation to ensure they are achieving their objectives and promote public accountability. An inter-institutional co-ordination mechanism could facilitate this and drive implementation of the strategic policies. Several recommendations from the 2018 Integrity Review have not been addressed, including streamlining and clarifying overlapping institutional mandates; reinforcing Anti-Corruption Operation Centres to enhance public integrity in line ministries and public authorities; strengthening meritocracy in anti-corruption agencies; and promoting stakeholder engagement throughout all stages of the policy cycle.
Advancing Public Integrity in Thailand
2. Encouraging a comprehensive and co-ordinated integrity system in Thailand
Copy link to 2. Encouraging a comprehensive and co-ordinated integrity system in ThailandAbstract
A comprehensive and co-ordinated public integrity system is one of the pillars of a coherent public integrity framework (OECD, 2020[1]). This includes ensuring that the public integrity system is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework along with the appropriate legislative and institutional frameworks to enable public officials and organisations to effectively manage the integrity of their activities. Integral to a robust and proactive public integrity system is setting strategic objectives and priorities to mitigate violations of public integrity standards using an evidence- and risk-based approach. It is also key to establish clear responsibilities at the relevant levels for designing, leading and implementing the elements of the integrity system for the public sector, assuring the appropriate mandates and capacity for those responsible to fulfil their duties, and promoting mechanisms for horizontal and vertical co‑operation that support coherence and avoid overlap and gaps (OECD, 2017[2]).
Chapter 2 of the 2018 Integrity Review (herein “Integrity Review”) found that Thailand’s national anti-corruption strategy, the National Strategy for Prevention and Suppression of Corruption 2017-2021 (herein “NACS 2017-2021”), was developed using a consultative approach via the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) Working Group. Although the NACC Working Group developed a manual to guide its implementation, institutional roles and expectations were not clearly defined and the manual lacked sufficient guidance for implementing agencies.
Recommendations for Thailand to strengthen the development, implementation and monitoring of the NACS 2017-2021 included developing an implementation roadmap with specific indicators and objectives for each component of the strategy to monitor and evaluate implementation. It also included integrating the Integrity and Transparency Assessment (ITA) in the strategy to strengthen the measurement framework through objective data and link it with the indicators and objectives of the strategy. The ITA could also serve as a monitoring instrument for anti-corruption and integrity policy, which would require formal integration as a strategic policy objective.
Regarding institutional responsibilities, the Integrity Review found that the overlapping mandates and activities of the NACC, the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) and the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) led to duplicate functions or ad hoc activities without durable results or impact. Among this crowded institutional set-up, it found that the Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) were an under-utilised resource for corruption prevention, including promoting institutional learning. Furthermore, the selection process for NACC Commissioners lacked sufficient safeguards to protect the organisation against undue political influence. Research initiatives on anti-corruption were conducted independently of relevant agencies with no overarching co-ordination mechanism, and civil society organisations (CSOs) were insufficiently involved in the policymaking process.
The Integrity Review therefore recommended that Thailand clarify overlapping institutional mandates of NACC, PACC and OCSC to improve co-ordination. This included centralising public integrity responsibilities in the executive branch under PACC and mandating NACC to coordinate all criminal investigations related to corruption. ACOCs could take a leading role in mainstreaming anti-corruption and integrity policies across public authorities. Thailand was also encouraged to strengthen stakeholder consultation and knowledge management of public integrity issues.
The present chapter takes stock of the implementation of the recommendations as initially set out in the Integrity Review, grouping previous recommendations where necessary, and makes proposals for further action.
Effective public integrity system
Copy link to Effective public integrity systemThe Integrity Review analysed Thailand’s institutional arrangements for public integrity at the central level of government. It found that achieving the full impact of Thailand’s national anti-corruption strategy was limited through insufficient development, implementation and monitoring. It recommended to streamline overlapping mandates between public integrity and anti-corruption authorities to clarify institutional responsibilities and co-ordination. Stakeholder consultation and knowledge management in public integrity could also be strengthened to promote effectiveness of anti-corruption policy (OECD, 2018[3]).
At the time of the Integrity Review, Thailand was implementing the NACS 2017-2021, which had been developed within the framework of the 20-year National Strategy Act B.E. 2560 (2017) (for the years 2018‑2037) (herein “National Strategy 2018-2037”). The Thai government urged all agencies and institutions to act against corruption by adopting and implementing anti-corruption guidelines and measures under the NACS 2017-2021. Government bodies were also instructed to include these actions and measures in their four-year State Administration Plans and their annual action plans (OECD, 2018[3]).
The National Strategy 2018–2037 is Thailand's first long-term framework to promote security, economic and social prosperity, and sustainability. It is a first-level framework that consists of six strategies, each overseen by a dedicated Drafting Committee. It was developed by the National Strategy Committee, which is placed under the strategic responsibility of the Prime Minister. Strategy 6, "Public Sector Rebalancing and Development," is the primary pillar for public integrity, mandating transparency and zero tolerance for corruption in the public sector. Achievement of this strategy is evaluated using indicators, such as perception-based indicators and an organisation-level integrity index, to assess transparency levels, as well as tracking complaints and percentage reduction in total corruption cases, and measuring public satisfaction with public services via surveys. Implementation of the National Strategy 2018-2037 is overseen by 23 Master Plans, which are second-level plans that cover various topics. Master Plan 21 on Corruption and Misconduct (herein “Master Plan”) is dedicated to public integrity and anti-corruption (NESDC, 2023[4]) (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Sub-strategies and indicators of the National Strategy 2018-2037
Copy link to Table 2.1. Sub-strategies and indicators of the National Strategy 2018-2037|
Sub-strategies |
Indicators |
|---|---|
|
National security |
Well-being |
|
Competitiveness |
Economic growth |
|
Human capital |
Human capital |
|
Social cohesion |
Social equality |
|
Eco-friendly development |
Sustainable business |
|
Public sector rebalancing and development |
Government efficiency and access to resources |
Source: NESDC (2018[5]), National Strategy Summary, https://bic.moe.go.th/images/stories/pdf/National_Strategy_Summary.pdf.
Since the expiration of the NACS 2017-2021, Thailand has continued to reinforce its public integrity system through implementation of the Master Plan, which is the first of Thailand’s two new anti-corruption strategic frameworks. The Master Plan contains two sub-plans: i) prevention of corruption through building a culture of integrity and honesty among citizens and public officials, and ii) improved and increased use of legal and disciplinary measures to control and punish corruption. The Master Plan is overseen by the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC), which acts as the secretariat of the National Strategy Committee. Co-ordination and implementation of the Master Plan is centralised by NACC, which has furthermore developed the Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Action Plan (Phase 2, 2023‑2027) to support public organisations implement activities. NACC has also created four committees to drive implementation of the Master Plan:
Committee for the Implementation of the Master Plan under the National Strategy on Anti-Corruption and Misconduct (2018–2037).
Sub-committee for Driving the Master Plan: Prevention Pillar.
Sub-committee for Driving the Master Plan: Suppression Pillar.
Provincial Committees for Driving the Master Plan.
The second new strategic framework is the Strategy on Ethical Standards and Promotion of Public Sector Ethics (2022-2027) (herein “Ethics Strategy”), which is under the responsibility of the Ethics Promotion Centre in the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC). It aims to create an ethical culture in the public sector based on five strategic issues and is designed to support the Ethical Standards Act B.E. 2562 (2019), as well as additional reform plans in Thailand (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Objectives of the Strategy for Ethical Standards and Promotion of Public Sector Ethics
Copy link to Figure 2.1. Objectives of the Strategy for Ethical Standards and Promotion of Public Sector Ethics
Source: OCSC (2022[6]), Strategy for Ethical Standards and Promotion of Public Sector Ethics (2022-2027), Office of the Civil Service Commission.
Both the Master Plan and the Ethics Strategy (OCSC, 2022[6]; NESDC, 2023[4]) outline similar objectives, including:
Promote ethical and honest behaviour among citizens and youth.
Promote transparency and integrity of civil servants and public officials.
Create a modern and responsive public sector with a transparent and fair public administration.
Strengthen whistleblower protection.
Promote ethical leadership, recruitment and HRM policies.
Develop technical solutions to reduce discretion in policymaking.
Since expiration of the previous anti-corruption strategy and its Sub-Committee for Strategy Implementation, Thailand could enhance and track implementation of the current strategic documents by establishing robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Thailand could also strengthen inter-institutional co-ordination and ensure greater coherence in implementing the strategic framework by tasking the National Strategy Committee with overseeing and aligning actions across public authorities.
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationThailand could reinforce the National Anti-Corruption Strategy by expanding the secretariat function of the NACC Sub-Commission for Strategy Implementation.
As outlined in the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, an effective public integrity system defines, supports, controls and enforces public integrity, and is integrated into the wider public management and governance framework. It requires clear institutional responsibilities for designing, leading and implementing the system, where all actors have the appropriate mandate and capacity to fulfil their responsibilities. To support policy coherence and avoid overlaps and gaps, a whole-of-society approach can support developing and implementing mechanisms for collaboration and co-operation. Underpinning the public integrity system is a risk-based strategic approach to public integrity that considers factors that contribute to effective public integrity policies. Among other areas, this includes gathering credible and relevant data on the level of implementation, performance and overall effectiveness of the public integrity system (OECD, 2017[2]).
The 2018 Integrity Review found that the NACC Sub-Commission for Strategy Implementation was instrumental in co-ordinating with various institutional partners within and beyond the government that contributed to developing the NACS 2017-2021. This included government agencies, experts, academics, the private sector non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and independent organisations. However, there was a lack of clarity as to the roles, responsibilities and expectations of implementing partners. The Integrity Review recommended clarifying these roles and reinforcing the Sub-Commission’s role to provide a knowledge-sharing platform for stakeholders and improve oversight of the Strategy’s implementation through a roadmap of indicators and objectives.
The NACC Sub-Commission for Strategy Implementation has ceased operations following expiry of the NACS 2017-2021. NACC however remains responsible for implementation of the Master Plan, whereby experiences and lessons learned from the previous strategy’s iteration could inform the current strategic cycle (further outlined below). Based on Thailand’s assessment in the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII), an evaluation report of the previous Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Action Plan (phase 2020 – 2022) was developed and used to inform the current Action Plan under the Master Plan (phase 2023 – 2027). However, the report was not provided to the OECD and only a short summary was available online.
According to the PII assessment of the new strategic documents, both the Master Plan and Ethics Strategy were developed based on a general situation analysis. They are evidence-based, drawing on multiple data sources of information related to public integrity, including indicators from international organisations and research institutions, government and citizen surveys, as well as Thailand’s national Integrity and Transparency Assessment (ITA) for public organisations. Their respective action plans are in force, which include objectives with dedicated outcome-level indicators, baseline targets and a list of activities. As the Ethics Strategy is based on the proposal of the Ethics Standards Committee, a newly established committee under the Ethical Standards Act, there are no evaluation reports on previous iterations upon which to base the strategy’s development (see Figure 2.2).
The Master Plan and Ethics Strategy represent significant progress in continuing to prioritise public integrity and anti-corruption in Thailand. However, further efforts are needed to promote implementation and accountability of the strategic policies. Monitoring and evaluation of the strategic framework needs to be reinforced, as the PII assessment shows that both strategic documents currently lack comprehensive monitoring and evaluation reporting cycles and documents.
Although NACC is responsible for implementation of the Action Plan of the Master Plan and OCSC is responsible regards the Ethics Strategy, it is unclear how they effectively do this in practice. NACC states that NESDC oversees government authorities’ quarterly reporting of their implementation results, which are sent through the Electronic Monitoring and Evaluation System of National Strategy and Country Reform (eMENSCR), although no reports or data were provided to the OECD. There are no monitoring reports for the Ethics Strategy and similarly no data was provided about implementation rates.
Figure 2.2. Thailand’s public integrity strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2.2. Thailand’s public integrity strategic framework
Note: Data unavailable for “Implementation rate” and “financial sustainability”.
Source: OECD (2025[7]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/ (accessed on 16 February 2026).
Without systematic and continuous monitoring of policy implementation through collecting information, public organisations cannot objectively assess how well, if at all, their activities are leading to their stated objectives, nor can they identify ineffective implementation practices. Monitoring enables public authorities to base their assessment of implementation on evidence and to identify the progress and success or otherwise of anti-corruption activities, providing a feedback mechanism that can inform and improve future action plans and indicate the strengths and weaknesses of implementing actors.
While monitoring is constant, evaluations typically occur at the end of a policy cycle to explore mid- and long-term outcomes. Evaluation reports complement monitoring reports by providing an objective assessment of a strategy and whether it has been effective in reaching its intended aims. The PII assessment shows there is no end-of-term evaluation plan included in the Ethics Strategy, while this is listed as an activity in the Action Plan of the Master Plan. Although the strategies are based on broad sources of information, non-state actors were not directly involved in the strategy development or implementation phases. This reduces opportunities to promote a whole-of-society approach to the strategy and communicate results to the different stakeholders involved, including the public.
Given Thailand’s multi-layered architecture of responsible public integrity and anti-corruption bodies, a co‑ordination and communication mechanism would provide a formal structure for the systematic transfer of knowledge, capacity and strategic aims across and within strategies. Each approved and implemented strategy should build on the lessons learned from its predecessor.
Thailand could consider developing a dedicated inter-institutional co-ordination mechanism to support implementation of the Master Plan and Ethics Strategy. Given the National Strategy Committee has a leading role in overseeing national reform efforts and determining participation in drafting and reporting of strategic documents, it could be tasked to raise both documents’ strategic quality and increase opportunities for concrete, long-term impact development. The National Strategy Committee could organise a sub-committee, council or commission, involving relevant public authorities who are responsible for implementing, monitoring and evaluating the respective actions plans, such as NACC (including the four Master Plan committees), PACC (including its Anti-Corruption Operation Centres), OCSC, OPDC and relevant ministries (for example, education, justice). This would enable respective authorities to develop common and coherent priorities and collectively work toward Thailand’s long-term vision of achieving strategic anti-corruption objectives by 2037, including to:
Discuss a framework to monitor strategy implementation (noting the Ethics Strategy will end in 2027) and establish an end-of-term evaluation.
This could inform the eventual Phase 3 of NACC’s Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Action Plan to support the Master Plan.
Prepare and discuss an evaluation report of the Ethics Strategy and of the Master Plan before the current strategic implementation cycle ends (the Ethics Strategy and NACC’s Phase 2 of the Master Plan both end in 2027).
This could inform the eventual Phase 3 of NACC’s Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Action Plan to support the Master Plan, including any revisions that look to integrate monitoring and evaluation reporting or further integration of the respective strategies, with a subsequent view to revising the Master Plan if necessary.
Discuss a framework for revising strategic objectives for the next implementation round based on evidence from the monitoring and evaluation reports, with a view to possibly integrating strategic objectives for public ethics in the Master Plan, following the planned expiry of the Ethics Strategy in 2027.
This could serve as an inter-institutional analytical report on systemic public integrity risks with recommendations and priorities for the future implementation rounds of the Master Plan.
Ensuring implementing agencies track and communicate the results of implementation is essential to support policy coherence and work towards a commonly understood and shared objective to ensure the impact of integrity policies (OECD, 2020[1]). Non-state actors should also be provided with opportunities to participate in both the drafting and monitoring and evaluation phases to promote an inclusive approach to the strategic framework. Evaluation results should be communicated publicly to inform citizens of both the progress and challenges in implementation and reflect the transparency and accountability that the strategies wish to drive in Thai society.
Thailand could conduct a corruption risk assessment to ensure the strategic framework reflects identified corruption risks. Thailand could also consider establishing regular and dedicated funding sources to increase the efficiency, coherence and sustainability of anti-corruption initiatives to address public integrity risks.
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo increase the efficiency, coherence and sustainability of anti-corruption initiatives, Thailand could establish a programmatic, multi-year approach to the budget allocation process for measures and activities underpinning the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
An effective public integrity system is underpinned by a strategic approach that aims to mitigate public integrity risks. Stakeholders in the public integrity system should also ensure they have the appropriate mandate and capacity to fulfil their responsibilities (OECD, 2017[2]).
Drawing on its experience of anti-corruption strategies, Thailand has made significant progress in reinforcing various elements of its public integrity system. Besides ensuring continuity with the NACS 2017‑2021, the strategic framework could also explicitly work toward mitigating identified corruption and integrity risks in society. Currently, both strategies lack sector-specific objectives, for example, in infrastructure, health, taxation or customs, among others, which leaves (high-risk) sectors vulnerable to integrity risks. The documents also do not provide sufficient information on the allocation of funding sources to support implementing authorities in mitigating these risks. Thailand could strengthen its public integrity system by:
Identifying systemic corruption risks across the public administration, including understanding common types of corruption, sector-specific vulnerabilities and the actors involved.
Clearly allocating financial resources to ensure the action plan can be realised by implementing authorities.
Identify corruption risks through a detailed problem analysis
A comprehensive problem analysis involves taking stock of all possible integrity breaches and their causes, understanding the types of corruption prevalent in society, the sectors where the highest risks of corruption lie, the expected likelihood and impact if those risks arise, the range of actors involved and the mitigation measures. Developing an in-depth problem analysis is key to help public authorities diagnose and address the most crucial integrity risks and provide the necessary evidence for the interventions that are most cost-effective and likely to have the greatest impact (OECD, 2020[1]).
The Master Plan and Ethics Strategy were developed based on a general situation analysis that broadly identified corruption and public integrity risks in Thailand. The Ethics Strategy was further based on a SWOT analysis, case studies from other countries and a behavioural analysis. PACC has also developed summary reports on public authorities’ fraud risk assessments. Although these evidence-based elements are useful to identify broad notions of the general corruption situation in Thailand, they do not constitute a formal assessment of integrity risks. Such an assessment serves as a diagnostic tool that identifies and analyses the integrity risks that are most harmful to public integrity. Drawing inspiration from corruption risk management, a corruption risk assessment includes:
Risk identification – identifying types of integrity risks (bribery, nepotism, absenteeism, conflict-of-interest violations, procurement fraud, etc.) in each process or system.
Risk analysis – estimating the likelihood and impact of each risk.
Risk mitigation – based on the results of the risk analysis, implement measures to treat the risk and monitor and evaluate the measures (OECD, 2020[1]).
In addition, according to the PII assessment, neither the Master Plan nor the Ethics Strategy establish strategic objectives in other key areas of public integrity risk management, including public procurement, public financial management, internal control and risk management or with regard to the private sector and public-private partnerships.
NACC and PACC could undertake an inclusive and rigorous process of the problem analysis and corruption risk assessment in view of implementation of the next phase of the Master Plan to prioritise strategic objectives that are meaningful to government, citizens and businesses in Thailand. Considering the strategic level of these national frameworks and their anticipated long-term impact, a thorough corruption risk assessment could enable improved quantification and prioritisation of risks and opportunities, and clarify the connection between the current situation and areas for action, including across vulnerable sectors.
Provide a stable, predictable and streamlined source of funding to facilitate implementation of anti-corruption activities, and track common proposals for funding to inform the risk assessment
An effective integrity strategy and action plan not only lay out a comprehensive set of substantive reforms but also indicate the means for ensuring its implementation (OECD, 2020[1]). Having a well-defined budget ensures efficient resource allocation, enhances transparency, and facilitates strategic planning, all of which are crucial for effectively combatting corruption and implementing anti-corruption measures (OECD, 2022[8]). An ill-defined budget can lead to several challenges, including difficulty determining impact on resources; competing and possibly conflicting workloads between existing work and new anti-corruption activities; weak incentives to explore integrity risks or implement activities due to high costs; and inaccurate monitoring of policy implementation to track progress and inform future decisions (OECD, 2025[9]).
The Integrity Review recommended that Thailand replace its yearly selection and budget allocation process for anti-corruption initiatives with a budget earmarked for the four-year operational work plans. Challenges of the yearly budget selection included an annual approval process that did not align with the four-year cycle of the NACS 2017-2021, institutional partners unable to plan multi-year activities and prioritising one-off proposals, overlap and potential competition between institutions in proposing plans and the requirement of significant resources overall (OECD, 2018[3]).
Despite the original recommendation, anti-corruption activities continue to be governed by the annual budget cycle, with agencies required to submit proposals each year to the Integrated Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Budget Plan that is overseen by the Bureau of Budget. Since 2020, NACC operates a National Anti-Corruption Fund (NACF), established under the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption, B.E. 2561 (2018) (Section 162, Chapter 10) to support and promote anti-corruption activities. This initiative aims to address timing gaps or missed deadlines in the national budgeting process. The PII assessment found that while the Master Plan outlines sources of funds, an overall cost estimate and a cost estimate for each objective and activity in each fiscal year, no sources of funding are indicated for the Ethics Strategy. NACC states that proposed projects must align with the targets of the Master Plan but did not clarify whether expenses were aligned with the cost estimate foreseen in the Master Plan.
In the fiscal year 2024, the NACF funded 178 project proposals, witness protection for 2 individuals and legal defence to 1 individual. However, agencies that do not receive state or NACC funds for anti-corruption activities must rely on their own budget. NACC stated that it does not disaggregate data on disbursed funds according to requesting agencies and types of project proposals.
Thailand is encouraged to recall the original recommendation to streamline and co-ordinate a budget mechanism to support anti-corruption activities and to increase the predictability of funding. While the new adjustments expand access to funding, the system remains fragmented and does not resolve the absence of a stable, co-ordinated multi-year financing framework for anti-corruption efforts. The long-term sustainability of the NACF is also unclear. Furthermore, NACC could disaggregate data on the amount of funding, recipients and the categories of projects that receive NACF funding. This could help in the corruption risk assessment phase by identifying common sectors or activities prone to integrity violations through an evidence-based approach, which could be integrated as objectives in the anti-corruption strategy.
Thailand has included evidence-based indicators, such as the ITA, to strengthen the measurement framework for anti-corruption policies, but could continue to broaden the use of objective indicators, including, for example, the OECD PIIs
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo counter the public perception of corruption, Thailand could strengthen the measurement framework for anti-corruption policies by using policy indicators.
The Integrity Review found that the sole target indicator of the NACS 2017-2021 was an increased score on Transparency International’s (T.I.) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and recommended that Thailand include a balanced set of indicators to measure progress of the anti-corruption policy. It suggested building on Thailand’s Integrity and Transparency Assessment (ITA), which could serve as a monitoring and evaluation framework for Thailand’s public integrity policies (see below). The Review recommended that indicators could be used to measure transparency, integrity and efficiency across thematic policy areas and sectors, such as public procurement, budget, health, tax, customs and licensing (OECD, 2018[3]).
The ITA is an annual assessment of integrity and transparency in public organisations at the national and provincial levels in Thailand. Both PACC and NACC are responsible for implementing the ITA across public organisations. The scores of the ITA survey are combined in an index and published online. The methodology provides a time series of government institutions’ scores over time, enabling analysis and comparison of the integrity and transparency levels of public entities across the government (OECD, 2018[3]).
Thailand has included improving the average ITA score as an indicator in the Master Plan, showing progress toward integrating more evidence-based indicators in the national strategy. However, improving T.I.’s CPI score and showing progression over time remains the primary driver of anti-corruption reform in Thailand (see Table 2.2). The Master Plan outlines mechanisms for corruption prevention in relation to the CPI, including linking the ITA with an increased CPI score; enhancing knowledge of the CPI; and developing projects through the anti-corruption budget to increase the score (NACC, 2023[10]). The Ethics Strategy mentions the CPI in the broader narrative of anti-corruption in Thailand, but it is not an explicit indicator or objective.
PACC produced a draft Five-Year Operational Plan for Enhancing the Corruption Perceptions Index Score (2023–2027) within the framework of the Master Plan and National Strategy 2018-2037. In 2025, PACC held a series of activities with public-private stakeholders with the aim of accelerating so-called “quick wins” to boost Thailand’s score on the CPI (PACC, 2025[11]) (see https://www.nesdc.go.th/nscr/report-nscr/, Table 2.3).
Accordingly, changes in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) cannot be straightforwardly attributed to the impact of specific policy measures. A country may implement effective anti-corruption reforms and achieve tangible reductions in corrupt practices yet still register persistently high levels of perceived corruption. This may occur for various reasons, including heightened public awareness resulting from improved detection and prosecution efforts, or increased media visibility of corruption cases. Conversely, improvements in perceived corruption may, in some instances, occur without corresponding structural reforms that address underlying governance risks. As the CPI score is a composite index combining at least three data sources per country, the confidence intervals are relatively large and cross-country variability raises questions about the precision of comparative rankings. Therefore, minor shifts in position do not necessarily reflect meaningful changes in actual conditions. Lastly, the CPI score is a national score and does not reflect regional or sectoral trends and developments.
Table 2.2. Issue-level objectives – Master Plan 21, Phase 2 (2023-2027)
Copy link to Table 2.2. Issue-level objectives – Master Plan 21, Phase 2 (2023-2027)|
Target name |
Indicators |
Target value 2027 |
Status |
Baseline |
2023 data |
2024 data |
Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Thailand is free from corruption and malfeasance |
Thailand's Corruption Perception Index (Rank/Score by 2027/2032/2037) |
Not more than 43 / Not less than 57 |
On track |
Rank 110 / 35 pts (2021) |
Rank 101 / 36 pts (2022) |
Rank 108 / 35 pts (2023) |
Transparency International |
|
Thailand is free from corruption and malfeasance |
Average score in integrity and transparency assessment of all government agencies |
Not less than 89 |
On track |
87.57 pts (2022) |
90.19 pts (2023) |
93.05 pts (2024) |
NACC |
Source: NESDC (2024[12]), Data on the Progress of the Master Plan under the National Strategy (Excel file), https://www.nesdc.go.th/nscr/report-nscr/.
Table 2.3. Thailand’s target CPI indicators from 2018-2037
Copy link to Table 2.3. Thailand’s target CPI indicators from 2018-2037|
2018-2022 |
2023-2027 |
2028-2032 |
2033-2037 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Thailand’s ranking on the Corruption Perception Index |
Ranked 1st among 54 and/or score no less than 50 points |
Ranked 1st among 43 and/or score no less than 57 points |
Ranked 1st among 32 and/or score no less than 62 points |
Ranked 1st among 20 and/or score no less than 73 points |
Source: NACC (2023[13]), “NACC Holds Internal Meeting to Boost Organizational CPI Efficiency for Fiscal Year 2024”, https://www.nacc.go.th/categorydetail/2019122712514151207005112EK12853/20230919113434?.
Thailand is therefore encouraged to consider the original recommendation. Embedding evidence-based data into Thailand’s national anti-corruption strategic policies would enable Thailand to assess the strength of its public integrity system to corruption risks and where safeguards against such risks need to be reinforced. As the CPI cannot provide an objective assessment of how well a country is tackling corruption, seeking to improve a country’s CPI score can undermine the understanding of corruption as a systemic problem that requires a shift in societal attitudes and integrity efforts, as countries seek to improve the symptoms of corruption but may overlook the root causes. Thailand’s participation in the Public Integrity Indicators provides an objective data point for public authorities to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the public integrity system and develop appropriate mechanisms to strengthen the system, rather than as an output indicator to increase a score (see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1. OECD Public Integrity Indicators
Copy link to Box 2.1. OECD Public Integrity IndicatorsThe OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity provides policy makers with a vision for a public integrity and anti-corruption strategy. It shifts the focus from ad hoc integrity policies to a context dependent, behavioural, risk-based approach with an emphasis on cultivating a culture of integrity across the whole of society.
The Public Integrity Indicators (PIIs) are designed to measure implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. The indicator framework establishes standard indicators for the resilience of the public integrity system at the national level to corruption risk The PIIs draw on both administrative data provided directly by governments.
The PIIs combine criteria establishing minimum legal, procedural and institutional safeguards for the independence, mandate and operational capability of essential actors in the integrity system with outcome indicators drawing on administrative data and surveys.
The PIIs:
Provide objective and credible measures of different elements of a public integrity system.
Are meaningful for governments because they are co-created by the OECD with governments and do not rely on subjective expert assessments. The aim is not to provide country rankings, but a tool for learning and informing better policies.
Are the first-ever comprehensive set of indicators based on an agreed international legal instrument from the OECD and beyond, adhering to the same high statistical standards as other OECD indicators and are validated by participating countries.
Provide a more robust alternative to existing measures, enabling an analysis of the impacts of anti-corruption efforts, linking the disaggregated data to a range of economic and social outcomes. The PIIs could also provide the basis for establishing cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit ratios.
The PIIs cover 38 OECD countries and 26 non-OECD countries, including Thailand. To date, the OECD has developed the indicators and sub-indicators for Principles 3, 10, 11 and 13 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity. Data is available on the Public Integrity Indicators website (https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/).
Source: OECD (2024[14]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
Thailand has made limited progress in linking the ITA to the national anti-corruption strategy and is encouraged to use the ITA results to directly identify and inform strategic priorities
Original recommendations
Copy link to Original recommendationsThailand may raise the strategic impact of the Integrity and Transparency Assessment (ITA) by fine-tuning its methodology and by linking it with the indicators and objectives of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
Thailand could strengthen the impact of the Integrity and Transparency Assessment by providing opportunities for institutional learning and knowledge sharing.
The Integrity Review found that despite using three different sources, measurement of the ITA relied mainly on compliance and that low scores reportedly reflected low motivation among personnel, rather than weak integrity systems. It recommended integrating qualitative integrity elements into the ITA methodology, such as organisational values, ethical leadership and staff competencies to deal with ethical dilemmas. Further recommendations included using the ITA to support institutional learning beyond integrity trainings for under-performing organisations, through for example, the Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) serving as an ITA focal point. The ITA could also serve as a monitoring instrument to inform and set priorities for the national anti-corruption agenda, which could be integrated as a formal policy objective of the NACS 2017-2021 (OECD, 2018[3]).
The ITA consists of three components:
Internal Integrity and Transparency Assessment (IIT): Internal stakeholders provide their opinions on the agency's operations across five indicators: performance of duty; budget expenditure; exercise of power; management of government property; and corruption mitigation.
External Integrity and Transparency Assessment (EIT): Surveys the perceptions and opinions of external stakeholders, including service users or those who have engaged with the agency’s missions, during the relevant fiscal year across three indicators: quality of operation; efficiency of communication; and improvement of work processes.
Open Data Integrity and Transparency Assessment (OIT): Evaluates the level of public information disclosure by government agencies across two indicators: disclosure of information and corruption prevention.
Thailand has made progress in implementing recommendations related to the ITA from the Integrity Review. Since 2023, the ITA includes a component that assesses public agencies’ implementation of their code of ethics under the OIT (see Chapter 3). The ITA score is also included as an indicator in the Master Plan sub-plan on corruption prevention, where all public authorities are expected to score at least 85% in the ITA by 2027. However, stakeholders confirmed that the results of the ITA are not systematically linked to or used to inform national public integrity and anti-corruption policies. NACC is leading an ad hoc ITA Committee for Review and Inspection to revise the ITA methodology as of October 2025.
Although NACC has implemented the original recommendation to integrate the ITA as an indicator of the national anti-corruption strategy, its focus on improving the ITA score does not reflect what types of corruption risks public organisations face and their responses to strengthen resilience to such risks. This information is missing from the Master Plan, where improving the ITA score is equated with an increase in integrity, but crucially does not address the root cause of integrity violations in public authorities.
For example, findings from the 2025 OIT assessment show that small administrative organisations and those in the south and north-eastern regions had the lowest scores, reflecting potentially lower implementing capacity than larger authorities. NACC states this is an indicator for relevant public authorities to double efforts in driving implementation in such organisations and regions to meet national standards of integrity and transparency. Such insights provide evidence-based data on vulnerabilities to integrity breaches or lack of transparency. This information is crucial to support the initial diagnostic and corruption risk assessment, and helps develop specific output and outcome indicators for public organisations to mitigate these risks.
Rather than basing improvements in public integrity on an arbitrary score, similar to the CPI, the ITA assessment could be reinforced to enhance the strategic approach to public integrity by showing where organisations could improve processes and mechanisms for public integrity and transparency.
Furthermore, to support knowledge-exchange, NACC could use the ITA results to show the measures or policies that have been developed or improved. This could help to promote transparency and open organisational cultures (further outlined in Chapter 7) in the public sector, which support the public integrity system. Findings from the ITA could be used to develop ethical trainings and build public officials’ capacity to identify and respond to integrity risks. NACC’s Integrity and Transparency Assessment Committee and Bureau of Integrity and Transparency Assessment would be well-placed to lead these efforts.
Institutional co-ordination and stakeholder engagement
Copy link to Institutional co-ordination and stakeholder engagementThailand could continue to consider streamlining and consolidating the public integrity and criminal investigation mandates of anti-corruption authorities to promote clarity and efficiency in the public sector
Original recommendations
Copy link to Original recommendationsThailand may streamline the mandates of NACC, PACC and OCSC and consolidate the mandate for public sector integrity for the executive branch within PACC.
Thailand may centralise and consolidate the mandate for criminal investigations of corruption cases in the public sector within NACC, to encourage efficiency.
The Integrity Review found that responsibility for corruption prevention and enforcement in Thailand’s public sector was spread primarily among PACC, NACC and OCSC. Although co-ordination mechanisms were established, they were complex and costly in terms of time and resources, leading to policy and activity overlap without durable results or impact. Furthermore, no institution had oversight on all policy measures and activities on corruption prevention in the public sector (see section above). The Review found there was room for improved efficiency and impact in public ethics, knowledge management, standard setting, awareness raising, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, asset declarations and corruption reporting.
Despite NACC’s overarching co-ordination role for anti-corruption across all sectors, the Review also found that its status as an independent quasi-judicial agency limited its capacity for corruption prevention within the executive branch. Its investigative mandate, responsible for high-ranking officials, could also discourage those public officials and authorities from engaging with it on corruption prevention. Given its location within the executive branch, the Review recommended PACC to hold an exclusive mandate on public ethics and lead on public integrity and corruption prevention in the public sector. As lead agency for human resources in the public sector, it was recommended that OCSC focus on integrity in recruitment processes, performance appraisals and career enhancement mechanisms. OCSC could collaborate with PACC on training for new civil servants, and rely on PACC to conduct ethics training and provide training materials. Furthermore, the Review recommended to consolidate the split mandate for criminal investigation of corruption in the public sector, held primarily between NACC and PACC, within NACC. This would reduce duplication between these two entities, where PACC currently holds an investigative mandate for low-ranking public officials, and support a streamlined institutional set-up (OECD, 2018[3]).
Since the Integrity Review, institutional responsibilities for corruption prevention and investigation remain spread across PACC and NACC, with some overlaps with OCSC. While PACC continues to function as the main government agency for corruption prevention, leading on conflict-of-interest management and providing public ethics trainings to public officials, OCSC and NACC also implement corruption prevention activities. Chapter 3 further outlines the roles and responsibilities for public ethics in Thailand. The mandate for investigations also remains spread between NACC and PACC. If PACC receives a complaint, it may conduct a preliminary investigation if the case qualifies as ‘misconduct’, defined as a failure to perform official duties but which is not considered corruption (Government of Thailand, 2025[15]). Cases that NACC receives regarding low-ranking public officials can be forwarded to PACC or the police, but NACC remains the main body for criminal investigations of corruption among high-level officials. PACC is required to keep NACC informed of case developments and NACC can re-open cases investigated and closed by PACC.
Stakeholders acknowledged the continued overlap in both NACC and PACC’s activities for corruption prevention and detection. The current arrangement leads to duplication, whereby PACC’s investigative function is subject to NACC’s discretionary involvement. This can generate inefficiencies, delays case management progress, and undermine the clarity and autonomy of each institution’s mandate.
Thailand is therefore encouraged to consider the original recommendations to centralise and consolidate the mandate for public integrity within PACC and the mandate for criminal investigations of corruption cases within NACC. Clarifying responsibilities along functional lines, rather than by the level of public official concerned, could reduce overlap, limit discretionary intervention and enable both agencies to concentrate resources on their core mandates.
Given Thailand’s complex and entrenched institutional system, a pragmatic intermediary step towards clearer separation could involve assigning all disciplinary investigations within the executive to PACC (see Chapter 5). This would streamline administrative accountability and reduce duplication, while allowing NACC to focus on its mandate for criminal investigations and enforcement of anti-corruption laws. In parallel, PACC could strengthen collaboration with OCSC and ACOCs to raise awareness and advance capacity-building initiatives in public ethics across the public sector, while NACC prioritises criminal enforcement.
Thailand has suspended the National Administration Centre for Anti-Corruption, and could consider streamlining integrity responsibilities in the existing institutional structure, rather than create new anti-corruption bodies
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationThailand may phase out temporary anti-corruption bodies, such as the National Administration Centre for Anti-Corruption, integrating them into existing structures and mandates.
The National Administration Centre for Anti-Corruption (NACAC) was created in 2014 as a temporary anti-corruption body, with PACC as its Secretariat, to develop anti-corruption policy recommendations and for corruption prevention. The Integrity Review recommended integrating the NACAC’s prevention mandate into PACC and its investigation and enforcement mandate in NACC (OECD, 2018[3]).
The NACAC has been suspended following the change in government in 2024. PACC has since proposed creating a new co-ordination structure similar to the former NACAC, the Administrative Centre for Anti‑Corruption Resolution, which is under review by the current government. However, Thailand has not specified what functions a new entity would perform that cannot already be handled by the existing institutions, or what strategic value an additional coordinating body would bring to the existing anti‑corruption architecture. PACC could therefore consider streamlining responsibilities for public integrity in the existing institutional structure.
PACC could continue to strengthen the strategic and operational role of Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) to formalise their role and mainstream corruption prevention in the public administration
Original recommendations
Copy link to Original recommendationsTo mainstream anti-corruption policies in government institutions, Thailand could increase the capacity of the Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) and co-ordination by PACC.
Thailand could improve co-ordination and effectiveness of anti-corruption policy research by creating a policy research platform.
While PACC and NACC coordinate anti-corruption policies at the centre of government, Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) drive such strategies and policies at the ministry and department level in public authorities and in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Established as an internal unit in these institutions, ACOCs are designed to be a central hub for implementing anti-corruption initiatives and are responsible for promoting and mainstreaming public integrity. ACOCs are under the responsibility of PACC.
The Integrity Review found that the ACOCs were considered a good platform for awareness raising, providing ethical advice, capacity development, monitoring and evaluation and risk mapping in the public sector. To maximise impact, the Integrity Review recommended to reinforce the ACOC’s operational capacity (to be developed as a learning community of public sector integrity advocates, develop guidance and training material) and strategic role (focusing on prevention activities while reserving investigation and enforcement for other specialised bodies).
NACC collaborates with the ACOCs for various initiatives, including the budget allocation for anti-corruption activities as outlined above. By monitoring public activities within ministries that request financial support for anti-corruption projects and promoting public participation in such efforts, ACOCs can request and implement activities through a centralised model, conducted at the headquarters or at the central level of an agency. ACOCs can also propose projects on behalf of an organisation and distribute funds to regional administrative units for local implementation of activities. ACOCs encourage agencies to improve their ITA scores and integrity and transparency standards through good governance policies and transparency. ACOCs and NACC also coordinate to integrate anti-corruption education into public sector training programs across all ministries and government agencies. This includes “training the trainers” within ACOCs to ensure that they can share specialist and technical knowledge. ACOCs also function as an internal reporting channel to disclose suspected or actual wrongdoing (see Chapter 7).
Stakeholders highlighted that ACOCs remain under-operationalised, as ministries do not actively drive initiatives through them, and their role is unclear to public officials, which may be due to their widespread responsibilities. Stakeholders also noted some inefficiency between ACOC and PACC’s activities for corruption prevention. An annual knowledge-exchange initiative between ACOCs was initiated by PACC to share information between ACOCs but due to budgetary restraints, this has occurred on an irregular basis. Moreover, ACOCs are often perceived as lacking value and personnel may be reluctant to work in this area, which could impact recruitment and career progression, as well as the capacity between ACOCs to conduct and drive common capacity-building and corruption prevention activities.
PACC is encouraged to consider the original recommendation and formalise and professionalise the role of ACOCs. This could clearly outline their responsibilities for corruption prevention both for individuals in the role and for public officials that seek their advice. PACC could help shape ACOCs’ role to become the focal point for daily guidance and advice to public officials on public integrity, such as the conflict-of-interest policy framework that is led by PACC. ACOCs could also strengthen collaboration with CSOs to promote and disseminate anti-corruption policy and research. PACC, on the other hand, would oversee corruption prevention at the executive level, while communicating the scope and coverage of ACOCs’ role to public officials.
Good practices from across the OECD show that integrity contact points typically execute both preventive and reactive anti-corruption responsibilities but have no investigative powers. This mitigates the risk of conflicts of interest when holding both an advisory and watchdog role. Responsibilities include mainstreaming integrity within organisations, advising on ethics and integrity issues, and managing corruption risks within organisations. As identified focal points in the workplace, integrity contact points are also able to facilitate co-ordination of integrity and transparency policies with other organisations and jointly with other integrity actors (OECD, 2020[1]). OECD countries have formalised integrity units or advisors, as well as specific mechanisms to operationalise their capacity building efforts for public officials, including by co-ordinating networks of integrity contact points across public institutions (Box 2.2).
Box 2.2. Institutionalising advisors and capacity building on integrity matters
Copy link to Box 2.2. Institutionalising advisors and capacity building on integrity mattersAustria’s Integrity Network
In Austria, the Federal Bureau to Prevent and Fight corruption (BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network to strengthen integrity by anchoring integrity as a fundamental element in public sector. BAK trains civil servants to become experts in the field of integrity and corruption prevention within the framework of the Integrity Network. The foundational training for integrity officers lasts one week and includes the following training content: the phenomenon of corruption, corruption prevention and risk management, criminal law, public service and organisational law, as well as compliance and integrity management in public administration.
Drawing on their training, the integrity officers are then equipped to offer advice and guidance within their entities to reinforce integrity. Moreover, the BAK establishes, operates, and administers an online platform for the network, which provides additional information on topics such as compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity, and organisational culture. BAK also offers regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers on specific topics such as risk management and ethics and values.
Belgium’s Federal Network of Integrity Co-ordinators
The Federal Network of Integrity Co-ordinators (FNIC), co-ordinated by the Federal Integrity Bureau, supports implementation of integrity policies and facilitates knowledge-sharing across the federal public service. The FNIC holds four official meetings every year as well as additional unofficial online meetings to allow for the exchange of information and good practices among the integrity Co-ordinators. Integrity Co-ordinators serve as the focal points for integrity management at organisational level, providing information, guidance and advice on integrity standards to encourage compliance with relevant laws and regulations and foster a culture of integrity in their organisations.
Poland’s Network of Ethics Advisors
In July 2017, the Head of the Civil Service launched the work of a team of Ethics Advisors employed at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, ministries, central offices, and provincial offices. The main goal is to form a networking opportunity for ethics advisors and to create a forum for the exchange of knowledge, experience and good practices. Furthermore, the network serves to deepen knowledge and enhance the competencies of advisors through workshops and meetings with experts in fields such as psychology, mediation, disciplinary proceedings, and soft skills. It has also been perceived and used as the first body to consult drafts developed by the Head of Civil Service to promote and build a culture of integrity in the civil service.
Sources: IBN (2026[16]), “Integrity Officers Network”, https://integritaet.info/; Government of Belgium, 2023; Government of Poland, 2017.
The Integrity Review also recommended Thailand to consider creating a research platform for co‑ordination and the exchange of evidence amongst partnering public sector and academic actors. The platform could feature a website with publications, data sets, calls for projects and information on grant opportunities. The review recommended that NACC, as the lead agency for anti-corruption across sectors, together with the Anti-Corruption Research Centre Puey Ungpakorn, serve as a secretariat, to make sure linkages are established between research and the anti-corruption policy agenda. The NACC has a division responsible for anti-corruption policy and research, but no specific platform has been established. The policy research on anti-corruption is conducted and analysed by NACC researchers and counterparts. However, to maintain coherence in Thailand’s corruption prevention-detection architecture, a research platform could be established under the ACOCs who would be responsible for mainstreaming new research and guidance on anti-corruption to public authorities.
Thailand should consider strengthening the merit-based system for appointing NACC commissioners to promote and uphold its independence
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo ensure continuity and independence of institutional operations, Thailand could strengthen the merit-based system for appointing NACC commissioners.
The Integrity Review recommended Thailand strengthens the merit-based system for appointing NACC commissioners, including the possibility of adopting an open competition for selection procedures that includes non-government stakeholders. The appointment procedure for the leadership of the NACC is enshrined in Thailand’s Constitution (B.E. 2560 (2017)). Both the NACC selection committee and the Senate must approve the candidates, but final appointment lies with the King. Although candidates must show integrity criteria and other qualifications, the pool of potential candidates is limited to a handful of mostly political positions. Stakeholders highlighted a prevalent perception that the appointment of candidates is influenced by political bias.
The selection process for NACC commissioners remains the same since analysed in the Integrity Review, as well as the composition of the selection committee. Stakeholders did not provide information about procedures or measures to ensure impartiality from the Senate, nor sanctions if there are concerns of undue influence over the NACC leadership. Stakeholders continue to show concern about executive interference in corruption investigations and the level of NACC’s political independence (OECD, 2024[17]). Thailand is encouraged to strengthen the merit-based appointment of NACC commissioners to ensure the leadership can independently and effectively fulfil their mandate. Thailand could consider reforming the selection confirmation process by enabling cross-party (Government and opposition) consensus of candidates to preserve neutrality, similar to OECD countries (Transparency International, 2013[18]) (Box 2.3). Chapter 5 provides further detail about ensuring fairness and objectivity in the disciplinary functions in Thailand.
Box 2.3. Cross-political support for leadership of anti-corruption agencies in OECD countries
Copy link to Box 2.3. Cross-political support for leadership of anti-corruption agencies in OECD countriesNew South Wales, Australia
As outlined in the Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988, No. 35 (Section 64A), the responsible minister can propose candidates for Inspector or Commissioners of the Independent Commission against Corruption to a joint parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the Commission. The committee who retains the power to veto any nominee.
Korea
According to the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Act No. 15617, 2018, Articles 13(3) and (4)), all three branches of government are involved in appointing commissioners to the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. The Chair and Vice-Chair are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, from among officials in political service. Standing members are appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chairperson, and non-standing members are appointed or commissioned by the President.
As such, three non-standing members are appointed or commissioned upon recommendation of the National Assembly and another three non-standing members upon recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Standing members are appointed from among public officials in general service in the Senior Civil Service Corps with a fixed-term position under Article 26-5 of the State Public Officials Act.
Sources: ACRC (2018[19]), Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Act No. 15617), https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=48545&lang=ENG; New South Wales Government (2025[20]), Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988, https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035#sec.64A.
Thailand could double its efforts to reinforce the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in all stages of the anti-corruption policy cycle and support CSO-led awareness-raising initiatives to strengthen government accountability and anti-corruption policies
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo increase government accountability and the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies, Thailand could reinforce the role of civil society organisations in the anti-corruption policy cycle, including by supporting CSO awareness-raising initiatives.
The Integrity Review found that civil society organisations were consulted for the development of the NACS 2017-2021 but had a limited role in its implementation. It was recommended that Thailand strengthen co‑operation with CSOs in the entire anti-corruption policy cycle to increase and improve oversight, awareness-raising, capacity development and civic education.
Ensuring public participation is a safeguard to protect public policies from capture to benefit select interests and conflict of interest (OECD, 2020[1]). Stakeholders highlighted that CSO’s involvement in the policymaking cycle is formalistic and has not visibly improved since the Integrity Review. Public officials and the policies that they make need to acknowledge the existence of diverse legitimate interest groups and consider the costs and benefits for these groups in the policymaking cycle. Although some CSOs may be part of government-led committees to reduce corruption in specific sectors, they lack a sufficiently strong mandate to meaningfully contribute to and influence public policies. Stakeholders also conveyed that the responsibility for inclusion and consultation is often put on CSOs, as there are no comprehensive policies regulating participation of CSOs in public policy consultations and decision-making. This has led to a perception that public authorities avoid responsibility and accountability in developing and enforcing an inclusive environment for all stakeholders, and that CSO involvement is a box-ticking exercise.
Stakeholders further underscored the need to involve CSOs even before a draft law has been prepared, rather than at the final stage when the draft has been developed, as this defeats the purpose of a multi-stakeholder consultation. When CSOs are involved in public policy discussions, efforts should be made to facilitate open participation, for example, asking open questions rather than ‘yes/no’ or ‘agree/disagree’ questions. While CSOs are not strictly excluded from public policy discussions, Thailand could proactively ensure they are engaged throughout the policymaking process and support CSO-led awareness-raising initiatives for anti-corruption.
Proposals for action
Copy link to Proposals for actionEffective public integrity systems
Enhance and track implementation of the current strategic documents by establishing robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; task the National Strategy Committee to strengthen inter-institutional co-ordination and ensure greater coherence in implementing the strategic framework.
Conduct a corruption risk assessment to ensure the strategic framework reflects identified corruption risks; consider establishing regular and dedicated funding sources to increase the efficiency, coherence and sustainability of anti-corruption initiatives.
Continue to broaden the use of objective indicators to strengthen the measurement framework for anti-corruption policies, including, for example, the OECD PIIs.
Identify and inform national anti-corruption strategic priorities by using the ITA results.
Institutional co-ordination and stakeholder engagement
Consolidate and streamline the public integrity and criminal investigation mandates of anti‑corruption authorities to promote clarity and efficiency in the public sector.
Streamline integrity responsibilities in the existing institutional structure, rather than create new anti-corruption bodies.
Strengthen the strategic and operational role of Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) to formalise their role and mainstream corruption prevention in the public administration.
Strengthen the merit-based system for appointing NACC commissioners to promote and uphold its independence.
Reinforce the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in all stages of the anti-corruption policy cycle and support CSO-led awareness-raising initiatives to strengthen government accountability and anti-corruption policies.
References
[19] ACRC (2018), Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Act No. 15617), Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=48545&lang=ENG.
[15] Government of Thailand (2025), Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act. B.E. 2551 (2008) and the additional amendment up to (No. 4) B.E. 2568 (2025).
[16] IBN (2026), “Integrity Officers Network”, Integritätsbeauftragten-Netzwerk, https://integritaet.info/.
[10] NACC (2023), Action Plan Anti-Corruption and Misconduct Policy Phase 2 (2023-2027) - Revised edition, National Anti-Corruption Commission, https://www.port.co.th/port_en/index.php/2023/10/28/action-plan-to-prevent-and-suppress-corruption-and-misconduct-2023-2027/.
[13] NACC (2023), “NACC Holds Internal Meeting to Boost Organizational CPI Efficiency for Fiscal Year 2024”, National Anti-Corruption Commission, https://www.nacc.go.th/categorydetail/2019122712514151207005112EK12853/20230919113434?.
[12] NESDC (2024), Data on the Progress of the Master Plan under the National Strategy (Excel file), Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council, https://www.nesdc.go.th/nscr/report-nscr/.
[4] NESDC (2023), Master Plan under the National Strategy (2023-2037) (Revised edition), Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council.
[5] NESDC (2018), National Strategy Summary, Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council, https://bic.moe.go.th/images/stories/pdf/National_Strategy_Summary.pdf.
[20] New South Wales Government (2025), Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988, https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-035#sec.64A.
[6] OCSC (2022), Strategy for Ethical Standards and Promotion of Public Sector Ethics (2022-2027), Office of the Civil Service Commission.
[9] OECD (2025), OECD Integrity Review of Kazakhstan: Advancing Integrity for Economic Development, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d705d02f-en.
[7] OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators, OECD, Paris, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
[14] OECD (2024), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
[17] OECD (2024), OECD Review of Thailand’s Legal and Policy Framework for Fighting Foreign Bribery, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/09fbb31d-en.
[8] OECD (2022), OECD Integrity Review of the Slovak Republic: Delivering Effective Public Integrity Policies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/45bd4657-en.
[1] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[3] OECD (2018), OECD Integrity Review of Thailand: Towards Coherent and Effective Integrity Policies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264291928-en.
[2] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD/LEGAL/0435, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[11] PACC (2025), “PACC Collaborated with Public and Private Sectors to Drive Forward Urgent “Quick Win” Projects Aimed at Raising Thailand’s CPI Score”, Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission, https://eng.pacc.go.th/view/16.
[18] Transparency International (2013), “Anti-corruption helpdesk: Best practices for anti-corruption commissions”, https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/best-practices-for-anti-corruption-commissions.