This chapter recalls the recommendations outlined in the 2018 Integrity Review for Thailand to develop a consolidated legislation for whistleblower protection. The absence of a comprehensive whistleblower protection system remains an essential weakness in Thailand’s public integrity system, undermining efforts made thus far toward greater transparency and accountability in the public sector. Thailand is also encouraged to cultivate an open organisation culture and raise awareness on reporting to promote the critical role whistleblowing plays in preventing and detecting corruption.
Advancing Public Integrity in Thailand
7. Establishing a whistleblower protection system to safeguard public integrity
Copy link to 7. Establishing a whistleblower protection system to safeguard public integrityAbstract
An open organisational culture creates a safe environment where integrity concerns and questions can be raised between employees and managers without fear of judgement or harassment, and before they become damaging to the reputation of the organisation. However, public officials may confront situations in which they do not feel confident reporting integrity violations to their manager despite an open culture. Establishing a clear and comprehensive whistleblower protection framework is therefore a critical component of an open organisational culture, as it protects employees who speak up about wrongdoing and provides clear rules and procedures for reporting suspected violations, as well as legal protection against unjustified treatments that may arise from reporting on reasonable grounds. Both internal and external reporting channels should also be provided, including the possibility of confidential reporting to appropriate investigative authorities (OECD, 2020[1]).
Principle 9 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls for countries to support an open organisational culture within the public sector that is responsive to integrity concerns (OECD, 2017[2]). The OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Section XXII) sets out further requirements on protection of reporting persons, including establishing strong and effective legal and institutional frameworks to protect and/or to provide remedy against any retaliatory action to persons working in the private or public sector who report on reasonable grounds suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and related offences in a work-related context (OECD, 2021[3]).1
Chapter 5 of the 2018 Integrity Review of Thailand found that provisions for whistleblower protection were partially included across legislation, namely the Executive Measures Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, B.E. 2551, the Penalty in Witness Protection Act, B.E. 2546, and the Organic Act on Counter Corruption, B.E. 2542. Moreover, whistleblower protection was often conflated with witness protection. While there is some overlap, there is a distinct legal definition and procedure that separates the two. Whistleblowers may therefore not receive the scope of protective measures if their disclosure does not meet the standards of witness protection.
The Integrity Review recommended that Thailand develop a comprehensive legal framework for whistleblower protection. This included clearly defining whistleblower protection, the scope of disclosures that qualified for protection and retaliation measures against reporting persons. Sanctions against retaliation, measures against reporting in bad faith and possible remedial measures in case of reprisals were also recommended, as well as the availability of both internal and external reporting channels. Finally, a communications strategy could promote and increase awareness, and a review of the existing whistleblower protection legislation to help evaluate its purpose and effectiveness (OECD, 2018[4]).
The present chapter takes stock of the implementation of the recommendations as set out in the Integrity Review, grouping previous recommendations where relevant, and makes proposals for further action.
Fostering integrity and an open organisational culture through detection and protection
Copy link to Fostering integrity and an open organisational culture through detection and protectionThe Integrity Review recommended that Thailand develop a legal framework for whistleblower protection including several key features, such as a clear definition of wrongdoing and retaliation, multiple reporting channels, remedies for whistleblowers and monitoring of the law’s implementation (OECD, 2018[4]).
The most comprehensive update to Thailand’s legislation on reporting protections was passed in June 2025 through amendment of the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption (No.2), B.E. 2561 (2025) (Article 132). This provides protective rights and measures for individuals who may otherwise be pursued for defamation due to public reporting on alleged corruption in cases of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPS) (Government of Thailand, 2025[5]). The amendments relating to anti-SLAPP protections show Thailand has taken significant steps to safeguard public participation in Thailand. Nonetheless, fundamental to a whistleblower protection framework is protecting employees who speak up about integrity concerns or corruption in the workplace, not only protecting public participation. The amendments do not prescribe confidential reporting channels, nor define retaliation and remedial measures. In addition, the law only applies to cases received and handled by NACC, limiting its application (Box 7.1).
Box 7.1. Anti-SLAPP legislation to protect public participation in Thailand
Copy link to Box 7.1. Anti-SLAPP legislation to protect public participation in ThailandAmendments to the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption (No. 2) B.E. 2561 (2025) seek to prevent individuals from being wrongly pursued for expressing opinions or exposing information on matters of public interest. This is commonly known as an Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) Law.
Anti-SLAPP measures are used as a legal mechanism to protect and support individuals who are subject to malicious lawsuits, complaints or disciplinary action from providing public statements or disclosures, or expressing opinions in good faith considered offences under the NACC.
The Act outlines specific support measures for whistleblowers (amendments to Article 132):
The Act establishes immunity for individuals who, acting in good faith, provide information, testimony or opinions to NACC that investigates the case or transfers to PACC. This includes:
Civil, criminal, and disciplinary immunity for reporting persons acting in the public interest.
Immunity for both public officials and private citizens, although disciplinary immunity applies only to public officials.
Protection to individuals in ongoing cases, including retroactive.
NACC must issue a protection assessment within 15 days of a retaliation claim.
NACC may issue an official resolution of protection for use by police, prosecutors, courts, or disciplinary bodies.
NACC is empowered to intervene in criminal, civil, and administrative cases by:
Assigning legal support or representation.
Covering court fees and legal expenses.
Providing assistance with bail.
Ordering employers (when the whistleblower is a public official) to reverse retaliation.
The National Counter Corruption Fund is a dedicated fund that can cover all associated costs (amendment to Article 162 (2)).
However, despite its improvements, the amendment remains does not address:
Civil lawsuits and public prosecutions not linked to the NACC.
SLAPPs arising outside of corruption-related actions.
Criminal defamation and other laws frequently used to suppress public criticism.
The absence of legal definitions for “bad faith” or explicit protections for rights-based expression.
Sources: Government of Thailand (2025[5]), Organic Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption B.E. 2561, amended; questionnaire responses; NACC (2025[6]), “Anti-SLAPP Law (No. 2), B.E. 2568 (2025)”, https://nacc.go.th/english/categorydetail/2019122712514151207005112EK12853/20250606182339; ICJ (2025[7]), “Thailand: New law protecting SLAPPs marks progress but much more is needed”, https://www.icj.org/thailand-new-law-protecting-slapps-marks-progress-but-much-more-is-needed/.
Building on past efforts to enhance the protection of reporting persons, Thailand could consider developing a dedicated law to protect whistleblowers
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationThailand could consider developing a dedicated law to protect whistleblowers, in addition to existing witness protection arrangements.
Whistleblowers (also referred to as reporting persons) play a safeguarding role in ensuring public policies, programmes and service delivery uphold the public interest. Enabling safe reporting of wrongdoing is a key means of detecting and preventing corruption, fraud, and other forms of misconduct in the public and private sector.
The Integrity Review identified the necessity of developing legislation to address whistleblowing in Thailand. Although Thailand had cursorily mentioned provisions for whistleblower protection in some laws, a dedicated national whistleblower protection mechanism could support and improve integrity in the public sector. The Integrity Review also found that there was no clear distinction in the legislation, such as the Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act, B.E. 2551, between witness protection and whistleblower protection, highlighting that many public officials believed existing witness protection mechanisms and their protective measures were sufficient for whistleblowers.
Currently, Thailand has no dedicated whistleblower protection legislation and is encouraged to consider the original recommendation. Despite there being several provisions related to protective measures, immunity and remedies for witnesses and persons who report complaints or provide information or clues about corruption, they do not constitute a whistleblower protection framework. The legal provisions are scattered among several different laws, lack rules for private companies and do not contain details or mechanisms that safeguard against retaliation (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1. Legal provisions for protection, immunity and compensation for witnesses and persons providing information
Copy link to Table 7.1. Legal provisions for protection, immunity and compensation for witnesses and persons providing information|
Legal provision |
Measure |
Section |
|---|---|---|
|
Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Labour Court B.E. 2522 (1979) |
||
|
Remedy for unfair dismissal |
If the Labour Court thinks the dismissal is unfair, it shall order the employer to reinstate the employee at the same level of wage held at the time of dismissal. |
Section 49 |
|
Labour Relations Act B.E. 2518 (1975) |
||
|
Prohibition from retaliation |
No employer shall terminate the employment or act in any manner which may cause an employee being unbearable to continue working due to the fact that the employee files a complaint, is a witness, or submits evidence to the competent officials under the law on labour protection, or is preparing to do so. |
Section 121 |
|
Labour Protection Act B.E. 2541 (1998) |
||
|
Employees’ right to submit a complaint |
Where an employer violates provisions concerning entitlement to any sum of money under the Act, the employee has the right to submit a complaint to the labour inspector. |
Section 123 |
|
Investigation timeline |
The labour inspector shall investigate the facts and issue an order within 60 days from the date when the complaint was received. |
Section 124 |
|
Powers of inspection |
Labour inspectors have the power to enter any place of business or workplace to inspect conditions, make inquiries as to facts, take photos, make copies of documents, and obtain facts relating to enforcement. Inspectors can also send notices or summonses to relevant persons for clarification of facts. |
Section 139 |
|
Order to improve conditions |
Labour inspectors shall have the power to issue a written order requiring the employer to improve the working environment if Ministerial Regulations relating to safety, occupational sanitation, and working environment are violated or not complied with. The Minister sets these standards via Section 103. |
Section 104 |
|
Expert assistance |
Labour inspectors may arrange for a physician, social welfare official, or expert appointed by the Minister to enter the workplace to provide assistance or opinion in the performance of their duty. |
Section 142 |
|
Civil Service Act, B.E. 2551 (2008) |
||
|
Dismissal for violation of discipline |
Any public official who is abusive, oppressive or intimidates others is in gross violation of discipline and shall be punished by dismissal (minimum) or expulsion. |
Section 85 |
|
Executive Measures Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption B.E. 2551 (2008) |
||
|
Protecting identity |
When an allegation is made orally, NACC is prohibited from disclosing the name or address of the discloser, including any other evidence that would reveal their identity, if that person intends to remain anonymous. |
Section 24 |
|
Protection measures |
NACC may provide preliminary protection measures for accusers, victims, petitioners, complainants, testifiers, or those who provide information or clues regarding corruption in the public sector or other information relevant to this Act. |
Section 53 |
|
Protection (witness) |
If NACC deems that a case warrants protection measures for a person under Section 53, it shall notify the relevant agencies to implement such measures. Persons will be deemed a witness entitled to protection under the Witness Protection Act in Criminal Cases. NACC shall also submit its opinion as to whether general measures or special measures under the Witness Protection Act in Criminal Cases should be applied to such person. |
Section 54 |
|
Protection (witness): Compensation for damages |
Persons (including spouses, close relatives, ascendants, and descendants) who suffer damage to their lives, bodies, health, reputations, properties, or any rights as a result of making a statement or giving clue or information to NACC have the right to file motions to responsible agencies to receive remuneration as necessary and reasonable. |
|
|
Reward |
NACC shall give a reward or any other benefit to persons. |
Section 55 |
|
Recognition |
NACC may request the Council of Ministers to consider promoting such persons to be praised and modelled for the State Officials or public. |
Section 56 |
|
Protection from persecution |
If NACC believes a person may be persecuted or unfairly treated, the matter will be forwarded to the Prime Minister to consider the persons to be protected or other measures deemed appropriate. |
Section 57 |
|
Immunity for witnesses |
Once NACC passes a resolution to use such person as witness, no criminal proceeding or disciplinary action is permitted against such person. |
Section 58 |
|
Immunity for witnesses: Protection of position and salary for witnesses |
Witnesses shall gain any assistance as needed until the lawsuit finally reached, including the protection of their position, including salary and other benefits. |
|
|
Confidentiality |
Any person who discloses information obtained during official duties without authorisation from NACC during an inquiry (unless for official or public interest or for verifying facts) is liable to imprisonment or a fine. |
Section 64 |
|
Budget Procedures Act B.E. 2561 (2018) |
||
|
Non-liability for objecting to act contrary to regulations |
Civil servants, government employees, state enterprise employee or state officials who object to a superior’s orders if they are contrary to regulations or law shall not be held liable to protect honest expression of opinion and the performance of duties in good faith. |
Article 52 |
|
Organic Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, B.E. 2561 (2018) |
||
|
Confidentiality |
NACC, competent officials and persons appointed by NACC shall not disclose information that contains personal data obtained from professional duties or information relating to details of a whistleblower or witness. |
Section 36 |
|
Disciplinary action for unlawful disclosure |
NACC Secretary-General shall investigate and take disciplinary action against persons violating section 36; Failure to do so will be deemed his/her negligence. |
Section 37 |
Source: Desk research and questionnaire responses.
Clarify the difference between whistleblower and witness protection
Thailand is encouraged to clarify the difference between whistleblower and witness protection. Considering the long-standing confusion between the two legal concepts, promoting clarity about the distinct legal basis, reporting requirements and different protection measures available is key for those making reports and the public officials responsible for receiving and managing such reports.
As stated, existing legal provisions often focus on witness protection rather than whistleblower protection. PACC has introduced a physical protection mechanism from between one to six months, in line with Section 54 of the Executive Measures Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, B.E. 2551 (2008), but this applies to witness protection. Stakeholders also confirmed during the on-site mission that provisions for whistleblower protection in the public sector are largely based on witness protection measures in criminal cases, which focus on protecting individuals testifying in criminal trials. The Department of Rights and Liberties has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with PACC to enhance protection of witnesses that report corruption, but this does not extend to whistleblowers who make workplace-related disclosures.
Thailand provides such a definition of a witness in Section 3 of the Witness Protection Act in Criminal Cases B.E. 2546 (2003), amended:
“Witness” means a person who will give or has given facts to an official with the authority to investigate criminal cases, an official with the authority to investigate criminal cases, an official with the authority to prosecute criminal cases, or a court in a criminal proceeding, including an expert, but does not include a defendant against whom the court has given a final judgment to punish and who has escaped.
Effective whistleblowing systems, however, protect individuals reporting wrongdoing in the workplace and in professional activities, including criminal, civil and administrative matters. Understanding and communicating the definition, purpose and impact of these two distinct protections is crucial to enable public officials, employees and individuals to understand the applicable legal recourse (see Table 7.2.):
Whistleblower laws protect individuals from being punished for reporting actual or suspected misconduct or wrongdoing, either internally within their place of work or externally to a competent authority.
Witness protection laws protect individuals from harm or intimidation because they have assisted with an investigation or provided testimony.
Table 7.2. Differentiating between whistleblower and witness protection
Copy link to Table 7.2. Differentiating between whistleblower and witness protection|
Whistleblower protection legal framework |
Witness protection legal framework |
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Japan |
2004 Whistleblower Protection Act Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 |
Prohibits employee dismissal and other detrimental treatment for whistleblowing. Obliges larger companies and public bodies to set up internal reporting systems and designate a responsible officer. Broadens scope of “protected persons” to include officers, some former workers and freelancers, as well as employees. |
1948 Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) Articles 157-2 to 157-4, 295 (2), 299-2, 304-2 |
Measures focus on visual/psychological protection, reduced exposure to the accused, and limitations on disclosing identity, rather than a separate relocation type programme. Courts may shield witnesses with screens, allow testimony via video link, permit an attendant to accompany the witness, restrict disclosure of identity to the defence, and in some cases examine witnesses outside the public courtroom with limited attendance, while still preserving cross examination rights. |
|
New Zealand |
2022 Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act Articles 3, 11, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, |
Facilitates reporting and investigation of “serious wrongdoing” (now including certain private sector misuse of public funds and serious health and safety risks) and protects workers who report in good faith. Covers employees and other workers. Allows disclosures to employer or directly to an “appropriate authority”. Requires public bodies to maintain and publish internal procedures. Emphasises confidentiality of the discloser and defines prohibited retaliation acts. |
2006 Evidence Act Articles 79, 80, 85, 87, 95, 105, 106A, 106D, 107, 108, 109, 109A/B, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 120 |
Measures to restrict the disclosure of information that could lead to harm or identification, and to protect the physical and psychological safety of the witness. Judges can grant anonymity orders where disclosure poses serious risk of harm. Courts handle disclosures to defence to balance protection with fair trial rights. Police run operational protection for threatened witnesses, especially in serious crime cases. |
Sources: Japanese Ministry of Justice (1948[8]), Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 131), https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2056/en#je_pt1ch11at17; Japanese Ministry of Justice (2004[9]), Whistleblower Protection Act (Act No. 122), https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/3362/en; PCO (2006[10]), Evidence Act, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2006/0069/latest/whole.html?search=sw_096be8ed81f59730_witness_25_se&p=1; PCO (2022[11]), Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0020/latest/whole.html#whole.
The Department of Rights and Liberties could co-ordinate an inter-agency working group and consult with relevant public authorities to include key features of a whistleblower protection system in the legislation
Original recommendations
Copy link to Original recommendationsThailand could consider developing a broader definition of whistleblowers.
Thailand could consider establishing a clear definition of the scope of disclosures that justify coverage under the whistleblower protection system.
Thailand could consider establishing a comprehensive overview of the types of retaliation against whistleblowers.
Thailand could consider establishing a mechanism to sanction those who retaliate against whistleblowers.
Thailand could consider establishing more detailed guidelines for remedies in the event of reprisals.
The Integrity Review recommended that, in addition to collecting the existing legal provisions for whistleblower protection under one law, at that time suggested under the responsibility of PACC, Thailand could also expand the definition of a whistleblower to legally include specific categories of employees (personal scope) and clarify the scope of disclosures that quality for protection (material scope). It also suggested several other key features to include in the legislation, such as prohibited types of retaliation against whistleblowers; penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers; and remedial measures to compensate whistleblowers should they suffer harm due to their disclosure.
Thailand is encouraged to consider the original recommendations, as well as harmonise existing legislation. Given its rights-mandate and cross-sector convening capacity, the Department of Rights and Liberties Protection in the Ministry of Justice may be well-placed to spearhead these efforts. Unlike specialised anti-corruption agencies such as the NACC and PACC, which receive disclosures for public officials and focus narrowly on corruption prevention and detection, the Department’s remit extends beyond thematic silos. Its focus is on the protection of individual rights, avoiding inherent conflict of interest with specialised anti-corruption or law enforcement bodies.
Harmonise existing legal provisions
The Department of Rights and Liberties Protection in the Ministry of Justice is mandated to protect rights and civil liberties under both the Constitution and international human-rights standards. It provides legal assistance to individuals as victims, defendants or witnesses, and has developed laws to protect witness rights. The Department could develop an inter-agency working group with relevant public authorities, including the Ministry of Labour, NACC, PACC, OCSC, OCS and the judiciary, among others, to conduct a national legislative gap analysis on protections for reporting persons, including all existing provisions related to whistleblower protection. The Department could further consult with relevant government authorities as well as civil society and private sector representatives to draft a harmonised national legal framework.
This would promote clarity for reporting persons as well as for responsible persons (the officials charged with managing reports and protecting whistleblowers). The dispersed legal provisions leave whistleblowers with an incomplete framework, which could dissuade individuals reporting on workplace misconduct due to uncertainty about protection.
Clarify material scope and personal scope
The Department could clarify the material and personal scope of the whistleblower protection legislation, as outlined in the original recommendation. Material scope refers to the range of situations in which a person can make a public disclosure to qualify for protection from the relevant authority. A broadly defined scope enables individuals to report not only on (alleged) corruption but on a range of other disclosures that are in the public interest, such as threats to public health and safety, fraud, financial misconduct and other legal, regulatory, and ethical breaches vulnerable in both the private and public sectors. By defining the scope of reports that qualify for protection, individuals are better placed to understand the types of reports susceptible to be approved or rejected by responsible persons and other competent authorities.
Personal scope refers to the status that individuals must have and the circumstances in which they obtained information related to the disclosure to qualify for protection. Broad personal scope provides protections to a wider range of individuals that may provide insights about misconduct. This means protection could be offered not only to traditional employees but also former and future employees, interns, external consultants, contractors and volunteers in both the public and private sectors, as well as in state-owned and -controlled companies and in statutory agencies.
Specify prohibited types of retaliation
The existing laws for protection against reporting in Thailand do not specify unlawful types of retaliation against whistleblowers. In many countries with whistleblower legislation, retaliation such as dismissal, suspension or demotion, transfer or reassignment, change in duties, and decrease of pay benefits, awards or training are specified and considered unlawful (OECD, 2018[4]). The Protected Disclosure Act in New Zealand gives an overview of the types of prohibited retaliation against whistleblowers (see Box 7.2).
Box 7.2. Unlawful types of retaliation against whistleblowers in New Zealand
Copy link to Box 7.2. Unlawful types of retaliation against whistleblowers in New ZealandAs stated in Article 21 of the Protected Disclosures Act, “an employer must not retaliate, or threaten to retaliate, against an employee because of the employee’s actual or intended protected disclosure.
Retaliation is defined as doing or organising to do any of the following:
Dismissing the employee.
Refusing or omitting to offer or afford to the employee the same terms of employment, conditions of work, fringe benefits, or opportunities for training, promotion, and transfer as are made available to other employees of the same or substantially similar qualifications, experience, or skills employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances.
Subjecting the employee to any detriment or disadvantage (including any detrimental or disadvantageous effect on the employee’s employment, job performance, or job satisfaction) in circumstances in which other employees employed by the employer in work of that description are not or would not be subjected to such detriment or disadvantage.
Retiring the employee, or requiring or causing the employee to retire or resign”.
Source: PCO (2022[11]), Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0020/latest/whole.html#whole.
Establish penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers
In Thailand, there is no legal provision for sanctions for retaliation. When developing a new dedicated whistleblower protection system, the Department could consider introducing sanctions for retaliation to deter wrongdoers from intimidating or exercising reprisals against whistleblowers. Such an initiative may also serve to reinforce the message that reprisals against whistleblowers will not be tolerated (see Box 7.3).
Box 7.3. Penalties for retaliating against whistleblowers in Canada
Copy link to Box 7.3. Penalties for retaliating against whistleblowers in CanadaThe 2005 Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) establishes penalties (offenses and fines/imprisonment) for taking reprisals against whistleblowers:
Prohibition Against Reprisals (Section 19): “No person shall take any reprisal against a public servant or direct that one be taken against a public servant”. Reprisal is defined to include disciplinary measures, demotion, termination, measures adversely affecting employment, or threats to take such measures.
Applications by Commissioner (Disciplinary action) (Section 21.8(1)): “The Tribunal may, by order, require the Governor in Council, the employer or the appropriate chief executive, or any person acting on their behalf, to take all necessary measures to take the disciplinary action, including termination of employment or revocation of appointment, specified by the Tribunal against any person named in the application who was determined by it to have taken the reprisal.”
Offence and punishment (Section 42.3): “Every person who knowingly contravenes section 19 or contravenes any of sections 40 to 42.2 commits an offence and is guilty of:
(a) an indictable offence and liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or to both that fine and that imprisonment; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both that fine and that imprisonment.”
Source: Government of Canada (2005[12]), Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (S.C. 2005, c. 46), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-31.9/.
Clarify remedial measures to compensate whistleblowers
Most whistleblower protection systems include remedies for whistleblowers who have suffered harm. Such measures usually include all direct, indirect and future consequences of reprisal, and can range from return to employment after unfair termination, job transfers or compensation. It can also include punitive damages in case whistleblowers have suffered harm that cannot be remedied by injunctions, such as difficulties in seeking employment or inability to find a new job. A dedicated whistleblower protection law in Thailand could specify remedies safeguard whistleblowers in the event of reprisals (OECD, 2018[4]).
The 2021 OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation calls for “ensuring appropriate remedies are available to reporting persons to compensate direct and indirect consequences of retaliatory action following a report that qualifies for protection, including financial compensation, and interim relief pending the resolution of legal proceedings” (OECD, 2021[3]).
In 2023, NACC announced that citizens reporting on public corruption or illicit wealth could be eligible for monetary rewards up to 15% of the value of the assets that are transferred to the state, capped to BHT 100 million. Regulated by the 2023 NACC Regulations on the Payment of Rewards, the initiative aims to encourage public participation in tackling corruption, who can make reports by letter, in-person, online (via its watchdog network www.nacc.go.th/we) or via hotline #1205 (NACC, 2023[13])).
To be eligible, individuals should provide privileged or essential information inaccessible to NACC and to have “exerted effort to obtain this information or evidence”. Given that whistleblowers are currently not protected from civil or criminal liability for reporting corruption or corruption-related offences in Thailand, the potential for financial incentives could have an unintended consequence of inciting potentially dangerous or unlawful actions, and exposing whistleblowers to civil and criminal liability, to retrieve or access sensitive information in the expectation of financial gain.
Box 7.4. Remedial measures in Korea
Copy link to Box 7.4. Remedial measures in KoreaKorea’s Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act provides broad remedial measures for whistleblowers, including reinstatement to their position, lost wages and annulling or prohibiting retaliatory actions (Articles 17 and 20). The Act also provides relief funds to cover medical treatment, relocation, litigation costs and lost wages for whistleblowers and their relatives or cohabitants resulting from the disclosure (Article 27). Failure to implement ordered measures incurs monetary charges of up to KRW 30 million (Article 21-2). Retaliators are also liable for damages of up to three times the harm suffered by the whistleblower (Article 29-2).
Source: KLRI (2024[14]), Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=69285&lang=ENG.
Establish measures to protect disclosures made on reasonable grounds
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationThailand could consider establishing measures to preclude reporting in bad faith.
Measures to protect reporting on reasonable grounds aim to protect disclosures that have been made in honesty but that may be inaccurate at the time of reporting. Rather than attempting to prove that a whistleblower reported in bad faith, which involves establishing an intent to knowingly make false allegations, such measures render the issue of personal motive or intent irrelevant. They do not penalise or discriminate against whistleblowers who, despite believing the information they have obtained is accurate and that a report should be made to protect the public interest, could nonetheless be mistaken. Protecting whistleblowers who reasonably believe that the disclosure is in the public interest is a core feature of an effective whistleblower protection framework in line with international standards (see Box 7.5).
Box 7.5. International standards outline protection for persons who report on reasonable grounds
Copy link to Box 7.5. International standards outline protection for persons who report on reasonable groundsUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Article 33)
“Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention”.
2021 OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Foreign Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Section XXII)
“Recommends in view of the essential role that reporting persons can play as a source of detection of foreign bribery cases, that member countries establish, in accordance with their jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, strong and effective legal and institutional frameworks to protect and/or to provide remedy against any retaliatory action to persons working in the private or public sector who report on reasonable grounds suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and related offences in a work-related context […]”.
EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (Article 32)
“To enjoy protection under this Directive, reporting persons should have reasonable grounds to believe, in light of the circumstances and the information available to them at the time of reporting, that the matters reported by them are true. That requirement is an essential safeguard against malicious and frivolous or abusive reports as it ensures that those who, at the time of the reporting, deliberately and knowingly reported wrong or misleading information do not enjoy protection. At the same time, the requirement ensures that protection is not lost where the reporting person reported inaccurate information on breaches by honest mistake. Similarly, reporting persons should be entitled to protection under this Directive if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the information reported falls within its scope. The motives of the reporting persons in reporting should be irrelevant in deciding whether they should receive protection”.
Sources: UNODC (2009[15]), Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/TechnicalGuide/09-84395_Ebook.pdf; European Parliament (2019[16]), EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937.
In developing a dedicated whistleblower protection law, Thailand could consider establishing measures to protect whistleblowers if they had reasonable grounds to believe the information reported was true at the time of reporting, and that this information falls within the material scope of the law. Such measures aim to provide broader protections than those precluding reporting in bad faith, which place the burden of proof on the whistleblower.
Thailand could institutionalise the role of ACOCs as internal reporting channels and clearly define processes for internal reporting within organisations. Thailand could also streamline institutional responsibilities for receiving reports through external reporting channels.
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo ensure clear and robust reporting channels, Thailand could consider clearly identifying in the law both the internal and external reporting options for whistleblowers.
The Integrity Review recommended that Thailand clarify the reporting channels available for disclosure, including internal channels, external channels to a designated or competent authority, and external disclosures to the public or media. It outlined that internal reporting channels within organisations are often operated by Anti-Corruption Operation Centres (ACOCs) but they lacked specific regulations regarding actions to take when receiving a report and timeliness of responses. PACC was designated as the external reporting channel. The Integrity Review recommended PACC, along with other government agencies, strengthen the capacity of ACOCs to deal with enquires from internal whistleblower and for Thailand to establish alternative reporting channels in the law.
Institutionalise and build the capacity of ACOCs as internal reporting channels in public authorities
Despite their front-line role in receiving and managing complaints, as well as other corruption prevention activities, ACOCs have often only been established in some (large) ministries and lack a dedicated budget and defined resources. As outlined in Chapter 2, stakeholders highlighted that ACOCs are under-operationalised, as ministries do not drive initiatives through them proactively, and their role is unclear to public officials, which could be due to the broad activities under their responsibility.
In response to the fact-finding questionnaire, PACC highlighted that 40 ACOCs collect information on complaints made across 440 government units and submit this information to PACC through an electronic platform.2 This enables PACC to disaggregate data on disciplinary, administrative, criminal and legal proceedings related to complaints against public officials, and highlights ACOCs’ critical role in collecting data on complaints that can inform PACC’s broader policies on corruption prevention.
Given ACOCs’ range of responsibilities for corruption prevention, PACC is encouraged to formalise the establishment of ACOCs across the public sector with a defined mandate of responsibilities. It is also key to ensure ACOCs have a reliable budget to fund their activities. This would ensure consistency not only for individuals working in the Centres but also for individuals seeking guidance and advice from ACOCs and help to establish ACOCs as a formal body for corruption prevention and guidance.
Employees within ACOCs who are responsible for receiving reports must also understand the legal and technical requirements and obligations within their role, as well as those for whistleblowers. Such responsible persons have a duty to maintain professional secrecy, and respect data protection and confidentiality, particularly when transmitting information between authorities, which is the cornerstone of an effective whistleblower reporting mechanism. To ensure that responsible persons are aware of and effectively follow the process for processing reports, PACC and ACOCs could jointly develop a manual for responsible persons receiving reports. This could outline the steps involved, from the initial stages of receiving a report, to following up and communicating with authorities, to dealing with retaliation measures, remedies and sanctions. Box 7.6 shows the workflow for persons receiving reports in internal channels in Romania (known as ‘designated persons’).
Box 7.6. Receiving a whistleblower report - management process in internal channels in Romania
Copy link to Box 7.6. Receiving a whistleblower report - management process in internal channels in RomaniaLaw no. 361 of 16 December 2022 regarding the protection of whistleblowers in the public interest assigns a “designated person” who is responsible for receiving reports on violations of the law and for protecting employees who report violations in the workplace.
Key actions include:
Receiving reports via the dedicated platform, email, letter, telephone, or in-person.
Saving all reports in an electronic register, ensuring all information is kept strictly confidential.
Saving telephone reports, either through a recording or a complete and accurate transcript.
Confirming receipt of the report to the whistleblower within 7 days of receiving it.
Ensuring information about who the designated person is and the methods of reporting are visible and clearly communicated in the workplace.
Diligently performing the follow-up actions.
Follow-up actions
The designated person must ensure diligent follow-up and notification processes. Key requirements include:
Informing the whistleblower of the report’s status within three months, providing updates as necessary.
Informing the whistleblower about how the report was solved.
Informing the heads of authorities, public institutions, and public and private legal entities about how the report was solved.
Making information on external reporting procedures to the competent authorities (including to the European Union) clear and accessible.
Ensuring the confidentiality of the whistleblower’s identity and any third parties, and preventing unauthorized access to the report.
Keeping reports for five years and then destroying them.
Penalties
Fines are established for violations related to the reporting process and confidentiality.
Fines between RON 2,000 – 20,000 apply for obstructing the reporting, by any means, of the designated person.
Fines between RON 4,000 – 40,000 apply for the breach by individuals of confidentiality regarding the identity of reporting persons, data subjects, or third parties.
Source: Government of Romania (2022[17]), Law No. 361 of December 16, 2022 on the protection of whistleblowers in the public interest, https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/262872.
As integrity skillsets are increasingly specialised and technical in nature, it is key that employees’ ethical concerns are being handled by competent officials, which helps build trust within organisations (OECD, 2020[1]). Professional competencies required for responsible persons should be clearly communicated to them to ensure reports are managed with discretion and in line with the regulations. Professional competencies for the role should also be consistently communicated across public entities to prevent a fragmented and inconsistent approach in implementation of the law (see Box 7.7).
Box 7.7. Professional competencies of the responsible person in the Slovak Republic
Copy link to Box 7.7. Professional competencies of the responsible person in the Slovak RepublicThe manuals published by the Whistleblower Protection Office for implementing an internal reporting mechanism outline some of the professional competencies required of the responsible person.
Expertise - In the private sector this is ideally in the field of law, compliance, audit, internal control, personnel department. For the public sector, this could be in in the field of ethics, public procurement or integrity. They should also be familiar with internal, official or work regulations and disciplinary regulations.
Independence - The employer is obliged to enable them to perform tasks independently to objectively check the notification. Team members review reports independently and impartially, are trusted by management and consider recommendations for corrective action.
Impartiality - The employer must ensure that none of their other activities and duties lead to a conflict of interest. In these cases, the employer should ideally appoint a person who would act as a substitute in such a case or deal with the conflict of interests in another suitable and transparent way.
Data protection - Only the responsible person should have access to notifications. Any possible external input, such as the company's IT department, must be clearly traceable.
Training – Have up-to-date knowledge of laws, regulations, and employers should ensure regular maintenance of professional prerequisites by providing opportunities for training.
Adaptive - Employers whose employees and suppliers are of different nationalities should consider the availability of reporting methods in multiple languages, which could also imply the necessity for multi-lingual responsible persons.
Sources: Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (2023[18]), Manual for public sector, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/manual_statna_sprava_10_2023_UOO.pdf; Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic, 2024[19]), Internal reporting system requirements - Quality and Functionality criteria, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Nalezitosti_vnutorneho_systemu_oznamovania_kriteria_kvality_a_funkcnosti_UOO.pdf.
Streamline the report management workflow between NACC and PACC as external reporting channels
PACC and NACC have similar roles and responsibilities related to receiving and examining reports of corruption and complaints and providing related protective measures, given their overlapping mandates for corruption prevention. PACC is a designated agency for external disclosures for public officials and is required to forward certain corruption allegations to NACC, as stipulated under the Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act, B.E. 2551 (2008) (Sections 25, 36 and 43). NACC’s legal authority for protection of reporting persons covers high-level public officials and transfer complaints that relate to lower-level public officials to PACC. Figure 7.1 outlines the workflow between PACC and NACC to process complaints under the Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act B.E. 2551 (2008) and the additional amendment up to (No. 4) B.E. 2568 (2025).
Figure 7.1. PACC and NACC complaint processing procedure
Copy link to Figure 7.1. PACC and NACC complaint processing procedureNACC developed the Centralised Complaint Center (CCC) (https://www.nacc.go.th/allcomplaint), which is the main channel for online reports. The CCC allows for i) making online complaints (for general cases); ii) making complaints against NACC officials; iii) tracking complaint status; and iv) reporting corruption.
NACC developed the public electronic Whistleblower System (WBS) (https://wbs.nacc.go.th/) in 2022, the fourth component of the CCC, to facilitate public reporting of corruption where individuals can submit and track progress of their reports. Once a report is made via the WBS, it is recorded in NACC’s internal Whistleblower Management System (WMS). It undergoes two internal reviews if it contains sufficient detail, and is then recorded as a "complaint letter" in an internal electronic system. Relevant data and attachments are drawn from the WMS into the Preliminary Examination System on Corruption Accusation (PESCA). The PESCA is an additional internal case management database used by NACC to receive, examine and forward corruption cases. It was designed to implement Section 60 of the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption, B.E. 2561 (2018). Access to PESCA is limited to high-level positions in the judicial procedure branch of NACC. PACC does not have access to or use the PESCA.
NACC further developed a working group (Working Group for the Development of Whistleblowing Channels, In-depth Information Systems, and Whistleblower Identity Concealment Systems), established under NACC Office Order No. 630/2564, 20 October 2021, to encrypt data in reports and protect the identity of reporting persons in the WBS. The working group met five times during the development phase (2021-2022). A reporting person can request protection under Regulation of the NACC on Witness Protection, B.E. 2562 (2019), but the categories, scope and types are related to witness protection rather than whistleblower.
It is not unusual for more than one entity to act as an external reporting channel; indeed, countries often have several competent external authorities that can receive and investigate reports. Reporting to the media is also an external reporting mechanism, which can be used in cases where neither the internal reporting channel nor the external competent authority(ies) are suitable, depending on the legislation. However, a lack of public confidence in law enforcement and the absence of whistleblower protections are viewed as impediments to reporting corruption in Thailand, where the culture is generally deferential to authority and status (Potipiroon and Wongpreedee, 2021[21]). Civil society and private sector representatives have highlighted that corruption allegations are often reported externally to civil society organisations or the media because individuals fear reprisal or inaction if they report to law enforcement (OECD, 2024[22]). The use of reporting to the media as a ‘social sanction’ to denounce corruption was also highlighted during the fact-finding mission.
While Thailand has made significant progress in facilitating public reporting of corruption in Thailand, the public complaint, tracking and protection system does not provide the typical measures and protections of a whistleblower protection framework that protect reporting persons from harassment or discrimination in the workplace due to a public disclosure. Furthermore, as shown above, NACC and PACC have an over-elaborate and at times lengthy case transfer and processing system, which is further complicated by NACC’s internal workflows and exclusive case management and database systems that are not accessible to PACC.
It is crucial to establish a clear system of processing reports both within and between external channels to enable effective and timely handling of reports as well as any subsequent investigative procedures. PACC and NACC should consider streamlining how they receive and transfer external reports, ensuring disclosures are received, investigated and forwarded in the most time and resource-effective manner, or risk leaving whistleblowers vulnerable to retaliation or exposure. Figure 7.2. outlines Korea’s workflow for processing reports in the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) and between external competent authorities.
Figure 7.2. Processing corruption and public interest reports in Korea
Copy link to Figure 7.2. Processing corruption and public interest reports in Korea
Source: Based on ACRC (2024[23]), Annual Report, https://www.acrc.go.kr/synap/skin/doc.html?fn=17562529411211.pdf&fno=%E2%98%852024%20ACRC%20Annual%20Report.pdf&rs=/synapfile/64/202512/.
Anti-corruption authorities could increase efforts to raise awareness of open organisational cultures and whistleblower protection in promoting a culture of integrity
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationTo support a whistleblower protection system, Thailand could consider promoting a broad communication strategy, increasing awareness of the issue through various channels.
Open communication and commitment to organisational values creates a safe and encouraging environment where employees voice their opinions and feel comfortable freely discussing ethical dilemmas, potential conflict-of-interest situations, and other integrity concerns before they become damaging to the organisation (OECD, 2020[1]).
The Integrity Review recommended that efforts to promote an open organisational culture and whistleblower protection legislation should be supported by effective awareness-raising, communication, training and evaluation efforts. An organisational culture of openness reinforces most incentives and protection measures for whistleblowers. In addition, employees and the public need to understand how whistleblowers play an essential role in protecting the public interest by exposing misconduct that undermines effective management and delivery of public services. Awareness-raising efforts should highlight that employees’ loyalty is first and foremost to the public service to improve negative cultural connotations linked to the term “whistleblower” (OECD, 2018[4]).
Notwithstanding NACC’s efforts to disseminate its policies on protections for reporting persons, Thailand is encouraged to promote not only the whistleblower protection system, but also an open organisation culture that can address integrity concerns before they become too serious or damaging. Reporting channels are not a replacement for an open organisational culture. In 2020 in Norway for example, amendments to the 2006 Working Environment Act (Section 1-1 c) include the objective to foster a satisfactory environment for free expression (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2005[24]). This recognises that the “expression climate” within an organisation, meaning the level of comfort or ease with which employees can speak up, could influence whether individuals feel comfortable reporting integrity concerns and the way such reports are handled. Box 7.8 outlines how countries and organisations can cultivate a safe environment to raise ethical concerns.
Box 7.8. Building an open organisational culture
Copy link to Box 7.8. Building an open organisational cultureCultivating public officials’ identity with the organisation’s values - communicating rules and standards in simple language; conducting merit-based recruitment; and ethics onboarding for new employees to discuss the rules, standards and values of the organisation.
Building employee engagement and empowerment – leaders can forge meaningful relationships with their employees on a one-on-one basis, which can make employees feel their individual contribution is valued and important, and in group settings where other employees may feel more comfortable sharing their views.
Leaders and managers are responsive, credible and trustworthy on integrity issues – leaders can demonstrate their commitment to integrity by developing recruitment and performance systems that include integrity; role modelling; communicating about integrity; rewarding good behaviour and sanctioning poor behaviour.
Cultivating and sustaining a safe environment for voicing questions, concerns and ideas– employees should feel they are safe to speak out without being rejected or face reprisals. The emphasis lies with leaders and managers, who should be open to suggestions and encourage diverse perspective, as well as not retaliate when their own views are challenged.
Source: OECD (2020[1]), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
Box 7.9. Promoting whistleblowing in OECD countries
Copy link to Box 7.9. Promoting whistleblowing in OECD countriesKorea
Since 2018, the ACRC has designated 9 December, declared ‘International Anti-Corruption Day’ by the United Nations, as the ‘Public Interest Whistleblowing Day', to positively portray and elevate the role of whistleblowers in society and improve public perception of reporting misconduct.
The ACRC has awarded individuals who have co-operated in whistleblower protection efforts and has collaborated with whistleblowers and experts to advance the protection and support of reporting persons.
Slovak Republic
The Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers conducted a comprehensive awareness-raising campaign in 2022 to inform the public about whistleblowing and Office’s role. The tagline “Speaking up is golden” is a spin on the phrase “silence is golden” and aimed to encourage Slovak citizens to raise integrity concerns.
The national campaign included over 186 outputs on all traditional and social media, encompassing public debates, talk shows, concerts and a podcast called “The Unsilentables”. The Office was mentioned 508 times in the media. It enlisted national figures, such as the president of the police and Slovak celebrities, to act as champions of the campaign. In 2023, the campaign won the Association for Public Relations of the Slovak Republic’s Prokop award for best Slovak public relations project in the public sector category.
Sources: ACRC (2024[23]), Annual Report, https://www.acrc.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20302000000&bid=64&cg_all=all&cg_code=C02; Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (2022[25]), 2022 Annual Report, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WPO_annual_report_year_2022.pdf.
PACC and NACC could also collaborate with civil society organisations to support companies and organisations in mainstreaming and promoting whistleblower reporting and protection (see Box 7.10).
Box 7.10. Integrity at Work Initiative in Ireland
Copy link to Box 7.10. Integrity at Work Initiative in IrelandThe IAW Initiative, designed by Transparency International Ireland, aims to assist employers to comply with the 2014 Protected Disclosures Act and foster workplaces where people feel safe to speak up about wrongdoing and supported to act with integrity. Over 30 organisations from all the public, private and not-for-profit sectors have joined or signalled their intention to join IAW. IAW members receive a tailored package of support that includes, amongst others:
Expert training and guidance for senior staff and board members about the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and how to foster supportive environments for receiving and dealing with disclosures.
Free legal advice.
Access to Transparency International Ireland resources, including the IAW Self-Assessment Framework, which enables members to evaluate existing whistleblowing/protected disclosure policies and systems against best practice standards.
Participation in peer-to-peer learning forums, workshops and the annual IAW conference. Two IAW Forums were delivered to over 100 participants between December 2016 and June 2017, focusing on providing expert guidance to employers on issues such as assessments and investigation, and complying with the Protected Disclosures Act.
Source: Integrity at Work (2023[26]), “What Is Integrity at Work?”, https://integrityatwork.ie/about/what-is-iaw/.
Thailand could review existing whistleblower protection legislation to help evaluate its purpose and effectiveness
Original recommendation
Copy link to Original recommendationReviewing existing whistleblower protection legislation can help evaluate its purpose and effectiveness.
The Integrity Review outlined that once a legislation was in place, Thailand could, under PACC’s leadership, collect data on the application of the legal framework to assess its purpose, implementation and effectiveness. This could include information on i) the number of cases received; ii) the outcomes of cases (i.e. if the case was dismissed, accepted, investigated and validated); iii) compensation for whistleblowers and recoveries that resulted from information from whistleblowers; iv) awareness of whistleblower mechanisms; and v) the time it takes to process cases. This data, in particular information on the outcome of cases, can be used in the review of a country’s legislation, to assess whether the framework is working effectively to protect whistleblowers in practice. Surveys could also be distributed among staff to review their awareness, trust and confidence in these mechanisms (OECD, 2018[4]).
Thailand is encouraged to consider the original recommendation to review any new whistleblower protection legislation, once in place, to evaluate how well it is achieving its intended aims. As outlined in the Integrity Review, periodical reviews of the whistleblower policy could help ensure the system remains effective and benefits from public support and trust.
PACC and NACC could develop summary reports of activities, similar to Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Box 7.11) to inform and educate citizens about corruption prevention and detection and how reporting wrongdoing safeguards the public interest. It includes data on the number of cases received and handled, remedial measures, anonymous reporting, rewards and relief funds, among other information. Such data can be collected, analysed and used not only to inform the public about the legislation’s purpose and effectiveness, but also to raise awareness about the law and implementation mechanisms to promote understanding of whistleblowing as a tool for public good.
Box 7.11. Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission’s (ACRC) Annual Report
Copy link to Box 7.11. Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission’s (ACRC) Annual ReportKorea’s ACRC publishes an annual report on of its activities and policies, including a dedicated chapter on handling reports on corruption (regulated under the 2022 Anti-Corruption Act) and public interest disclosures (regulated under the 2011 Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act).
Regarding monetary incentives:
In 2024, the ACRC awarded a total of KRW 5 billion in rewards and KRW 330 million in awards to whistleblowers of corruption and public interest violations.
For public interest reports filed on or after 7 August 2024, the previous cap of KRW 3 billion on rewards was abolished, meaning there is now no limit on the reward amount.
For reports related to acts of corruption, the reward remains up to KRW 3 billion.
The Relief Fund System may provide funds to cover expenses incurred in physical and mental treatment, moving, litigation procedures, and lost wages during the period of disadvantageous measures faced by the whistleblower. In 2024, KRW 24 million in relief funds were provided.
Regarding anonymous reporting via a proxy:
The ACRC introduced the Anonymous Reporting through Attorney Representation system in October 2018, allowing whistleblowers to file reports under a lawyer's name without disclosing their identity, of which there were 91 cases in 2024.
The ACRC runs a “Non-Real Name Proxy Report Advisory Lawyer Group” with around 100 members to provide free assistance to whistleblowers who might otherwise face penalties for reporting.
Figure 7.3. Reports received from 2019-2024 (corruption and public interest reports)
Copy link to Figure 7.3. Reports received from 2019-2024 (corruption and public interest reports)
Source: ACRC (2024[23]), Annual Report, https://www.acrc.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20302000000&bid=64&cg_all=all&cg_code=C02.
Figure 7.4. Protections provided to disclosers from 2019-2024 (corruption and public interest reports)
Copy link to Figure 7.4. Protections provided to disclosers from 2019-2024 (corruption and public interest reports)
Source: ACRC (2024[23]), Annual Report, https://www.acrc.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20302000000&bid=64&cg_all=all&cg_code=C02.
Between 2019 to 2023, the most common type of corruption or corruption-related offence that led to public officials being removed from their position was receiving money and entertainment (425 individuals), followed by embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds (262 individuals).
Source: ACRC (2024[23]), Annual Report, https://www.acrc.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20302000000&bid=64&cg_all=all&cg_code=C02.
Proposals for action
Copy link to Proposals for actionFostering integrity and an open organisational culture through detection and protection
Building on past efforts to enhance the protection of reporting persons, Thailand could consider developing a dedicated law to protect whistleblowers.
The Department of Rights and Liberties could co-ordinate an inter-agency working group and consult with relevant public authorities to include key features of a whistleblower protection system in the legislation.
Institutionalise the role of ACOCs as internal reporting channels; streamline institutional responsibilities for receiving reports through external reporting channels.
Anti-corruption authorities could increase efforts to raise awareness of open organisational cultures and whistleblower protection in promoting a culture of integrity.
Review existing whistleblower protection legislation to help evaluate its purpose and effectiveness.
References
[23] ACRC (2024), Annual Report, Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, https://www.acrc.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20302000000&bid=64&cg_all=all&cg_code=C02.
[16] European Parliament (2019), EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937.
[12] Government of Canada (2005), Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (S.C. 2005, c. 46), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-31.9/.
[17] Government of Romania (2022), Law No. 361 of December 16, 2022 on the protection of whistleblowers in the public interest, https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/262872.
[5] Government of Thailand (2025), Organic Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption B.E. 2561, amended.
[7] ICJ (2025), “Thailand: New law protecting SLAPPs marks progress but much more is needed”, International Commission of Jurists, https://www.icj.org/thailand-new-law-protecting-slapps-marks-progress-but-much-more-is-needed/.
[26] Integrity at Work (2023), “What Is Integrity at Work?”, https://integrityatwork.ie/about/what-is-iaw/.
[9] Japanese Ministry of Justice (2004), Whistleblower Protection Act (Act No. 122), https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/3362/en.
[8] Japanese Ministry of Justice (1948), Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 131), https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2056/en#je_pt1ch11at17.
[14] KLRI (2024), Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act, Korea Legislation Research Institute, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=69285&lang=ENG.
[6] NACC (2025), Anti-SLAPP Law (No. 2), B.E. 2568 (2025), National Anti-Corruption Commission, https://nacc.go.th/english/categorydetail/2019122712514151207005112EK12853/20250606182339?.
[13] NACC (2023), “Whistleblower of the Corruption Complaints in Thailand May Be Eligible for Monetary Rewards”, National Anti-Corruption Commission, https://www.nacc.go.th/categorydetail/2019122712514151207005112EK12853/20231116135732?.
[24] Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (2005), Act on the Working Environment, Working Hours and Job Protection (Working Environment Act), https://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/regelverk/lover/arbeidsmiljoloven--aml/.
[22] OECD (2024), OECD Review of Thailand’s Legal and Policy Framework for Fighting Foreign Bribery, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/09fbb31d-en.
[3] OECD (2021), Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD/LEGAL/0378, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0378.
[1] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[4] OECD (2018), OECD Integrity Review of Thailand: Towards Coherent and Effective Integrity Policies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264291928-en.
[2] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD/LEGAL/0435, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[20] PACC (2025), “Complaint Procedure”, Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission, https://eng.pacc.go.th/complaint-center.
[11] PCO (2022), Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act, New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0020/latest/whole.html#whole.
[10] PCO (2006), Evidence Act, New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2006/0069/latest/whole.html?search=sw_096be8ed81f59730_witness_25_se&p=1.
[21] Potipiroon, W. and A. Wongpreedee (2021), “Whistleblowing Intentions: Testing the Mediating Roles of Public Service Motivation and Psychological Safety Among Local Government Employees”, Public Personnel Management, Vol. 50/3, pp. 327-355, https://doi.org/10.1177/0091026020944547.
[15] UNODC (2009), Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/TechnicalGuide/09-84395_Ebook.pdf.
[19] Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (2024), Internal reporting system requirements - Quality and Functionality criteria, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Nalezitosti_vnutorneho_systemu_oznamovania_kriteria_kvality_a_funkcnosti_UOO.pdf.
[18] Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (2023), Manual for public sector, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/manual_statna_sprava_10_2023_UOO.pdf.
[25] Whistleblower Protection Office of the Slovak Republic (2022), 2022 Annual Report, https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WPO_annual_report_year_2022.pdf.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. The OECD Recommendation for Further Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions seeks to enhance the ability of parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to prevent, detect and investigate allegations of foreign bribery. On 8 December 2025, Thailand submitted a request to become a Party to the Convention.
← 2. In accordance with Cabinet Resolution dated 27 March 2018 on Measures for Preventing and Suppressing Corruption and Misconduct in the Bureaucratic System, and Cabinet Resolution dated 28 January 2020 on the receipt of performance reports from the ACOCs in cases of corruption and misconduct by state officials.