Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum 2017

Competition authorities typically impose fines on companies for participating in a cartel. Sometimes they are criticised for setting large fines when the actual harm from the cartel is very low. To address this concern, some competition authorities are required also to calculate estimated harm from cartels, as a criterion for setting the fine, which builds on the economic effect of the conduct and not on a predefines formula based on turnovers. A major question then becomes whether fines should be more related to a formula based on affected revenues or whether fines should at least be pre-conditioned or built up from estimates of either harm to consumers or illegitimate profits derived by cartel participants. The roundtable tried to identify and discuss techniques for estimating harm or illegitimate benefits from cartels.

Session Chair: Frédéric JENNY (Chairman, OECD Competition Committee) 

Background documentation

Background note by the Secretariat • English | Español

Call for Contributions • English | Español

When faced with a notified merger, competition authorities need to be able to assess any potential anti-competition effects, the magnitude of these effects and their relationship to the potential benefits that the merger could produce.  Merger control raises complex challenges related to the legal standard applied by agencies, to the economic tools they need to master to predict the effects of the transactions and to the remedies– behavioural, structural or a combination of both – they need to devise in case of conditional clearances. 

A number of jurisdictions in the region have recently adopted, or are in the process of adopting a new merger control system; others have amended their regimes to improve their ability to catch, review and remedy potentially anti-competitive transactions. This three part session discussed i) recent developments in the Latin American and Caribbean region on merger control; ii) factors to take into account when considering structural and/or behavioural remedies; iii) and, agency decision making in prohibitions and conditional clearances.

Session Chairs:   Luis Humberto GUZMÁN (President, Procompetencia, Nicaragua) and Mario UMAÑA (Lead Trade and Competition Specialist Integration and Trade Sector, IDB) 

Background documentation

Background note by the Secretariat • English | Español

Call for Contributions • English | Español