



PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOBAL ACTION
PEACE AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAMME

evaluation

2006.05



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
Evaluation Department

**Evaluation of
Parliamentarians for Global Action,
Peace and Democracy Programme**

**CECILIA LJUNGMANN
JENS ADSER SØRENSEN**

COWI

DECEMBER 2006

© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
December 2006

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Cover Photo: PGA, Parliamentarians meet in Accra, 2004
Graphic Production: Designgrafik A/S, Copenhagen
Print: Schultz Grafisk

ISBN: 87-7667-019-6
e-ISBN: 87-7667-621-8
ISSN: 1399-4972

This report can be obtained free of charge by ordering on www.evaluation.dk or from

DBK Logistik Service
Mimersvej 4
DK 4600 Koege
Denmark

Telephone: +45 32 69 77 88

The report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.um.dk
or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk

Contact: eval@um.dk

Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the authors.

The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the Parliamentarians for Global Action, or the implementing organisations.

Preface

Denmark has supported the Parliamentarians for Global Action, PGA, since 1997 with a total of DKK 8,7 mio. including core support and project support. PGA is a small network or NGO of concerned individual parliamentarians from several countries all over the world dedicated to address global issues which can not be solved by any one government or parliament. The focus is on fostering democracy, conflict prevention and management, international law and human rights, population and sustainable development.

PGA operates on an annual budget of USD 1-2 mio. being provided from a range of a dozen sponsors like foundations, international organisations or bilateral development agencies. Denmark, Sweden, Ford Foundation and the Netherlands provides the bulk of the core funding, while most of the other sponsors provide earmarked project funding. Thus, PGA is in a vulnerable position as regards its financial basis. The Danish contribution is about 10 per cent of the total budget, or 23 per cent of the core budget.

At the beginning of 2006 it was agreed with the PGA to undertake an evaluation of its Peace and Democracy Programme with a special focus on Africa. The evaluation was to be conducted in connection with the PGA's meeting 'Realizing the Full Potential of the UN Peace Building Commission – The Role of Parliamentarians' taking place on 30th June, 2006, at the United Nations in New York.

The Evaluation Department commissioned COWI a/s to implement the evaluation, led by Ms. Cecilia M. Ljungman, basically as a desk-study, but supplemented by additional data collection and observation during the meeting sessions. As Swedish Sida carried out an organisational review of PGA at the same time the two teams coordinated their work in a smooth manner.

The draft final evaluation report was available soon after the completion of the field work by July 2006, and its contents has been discussed with PGA. This report is the final version of the Evaluation Report containing the conclusions and recommendations of the Evaluation.

The findings, lesson learned and recommendations of the evaluation report are expected to contribute to the planning and further capacity development of the PGA. Moreover, it is also found that it could provide interesting new general learning lessons of how to operate in the field of international conflict management.

Danida's Evaluation Department

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	6
Executive Summary	7
1 Introduction	10
2 Background	12
2.1 PGA's Mission	12
2.2 PGA's Structure	12
2.3 PGA's Programmes	13
2.4 Financial Resources and Danish Support to PGA	14
3 PGA's Peace and Democracy Effort	16
3.1 Côte d'Ivoire	17
3.2 Zimbabwe	20
3.3 Small Arms and Light Weapons	23
3.4 Overall Assessment and Conclusions	25
4 Management	32
4.1 Strategic and Programme Management	32
4.2 Management of Resource Mobilisation	34
4.3 Administrative and Financial Management	35
4.4 Human Resources	36
5 Conclusions	38
5.1 Recommendations	40

Table of Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference	41
Annex 2: Persons Met/Interviewed	48
Annex 3: Documents Reviewed	50
Annex 4: The Strategic Partnership Concept	52
Annex 5: PGA Membership Information	57

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<i>AMANI Forum</i>	Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum for Peace
<i>ANC</i>	African National Congress
<i>AUSAID</i>	Australian
<i>AWEPA</i>	West European Parliamentarian for Africa
<i>CIDA</i>	Canadian International Development Agency
<i>DEAIT</i>	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
<i>DFID</i>	Department for International Development, UK
<i>ECOWAS</i>	Economic Community of West African States
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>ICC</i>	International Criminal Court
<i>IPU</i>	Inter-Parliamentary Union
<i>MEP</i>	Member of European Parliament
<i>MP</i>	Member of Parliament
<i>NGO</i>	Non-governmental organisation
<i>PF</i>	Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons
<i>PGA</i>	Parliamentarians for Global Action
<i>RDR</i>	Le Rassemblement des Républicains de Côte d'Ivoire
<i>SALW</i>	Small arms and light weapons
<i>SIPRI</i>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<i>SRSG</i>	Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNDP</i>	United Nations Development Fund
<i>UNFPA</i>	United Nations Population Fund
<i>WHO</i>	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) was established in 1979 by concerned parliamentarians from different countries to address global problems, which could not be solved by any one government or parliament. PGA focuses on fostering democracy, conflict prevention and management, international law and human rights, population and sustainable development. Commissioned by Danida, COWI has evaluated the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme, with a special focus on Africa.

PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme has consisted of international, regional and sub-regional seminars and consultative missions. More than 80 per cent of PGA's Peace & Democracy activities have focused on Africa. Significant have included peace-building efforts addressing the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe. At the end of 2004, the Programme came to a standstill due to acute funding difficulties. The only work that has resumed is a new global pilot project with UNDP that focuses on small arms and light weapons.

Nevertheless, the Programme has been highly relevant to the needs as expressed by its members. A main factor contributing to the Programme's relevance is PGA's ability to engage appropriate persons. The organisation has skilfully used its impressive network to this end. In its activities, PGA has shown considerable regard for political, regional and gender balance.

Between 2001 and 2004, PGA showed commitment and active engagement in the efforts to promote dialogue in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe. PGA was tactful, responsive to the situation and showed efficiency in making the most of opportunities. PGA competently used relevant and effective approaches in its peace-building work.

PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme has not yielded the same level of impressive results and impact as the highly regarded International Criminal Court Programme (ICC) has. Nevertheless, PGA has been effective in achieving some concrete results that contributed positively towards conflict resolution. Furthermore, PGA's new initiative in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons, has already achieved effects. The project has a realistic chance of meeting its objectives if it is continued beyond its pilot phase to include more parliamentarians from different countries.

Insufficient funding has undermined PGA's planned activities – a number of which have not taken place. The initiatives in Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire had to be prematurely abandoned. As a result, PGA's distinctive edge and strength with regard to brokering peace has not been used to its full potential. This constitutes a wasted resource and a lost opportunity for the international peace effort.

PGA does not have the resources to develop its programmes and establish the critical mass of staff in the Secretariat to manage them. PGA needs to scale up its resource mobilisation effort considerably. If it does not, there is a real risk of entering a negative spiral of decline.

PGA's lack of a clear hierarchy of goals for its programmatic activities, coupled with the failure to systematically follow-up efforts has weakened its effectiveness. Given the importance most aid agencies place on effectiveness, not having elaborated results-based project documents and systems may have placed PGA at a disadvantage when seeking new funding sources. Likewise, PGA's inability to convincingly report on achievements may have prevented renewal of funding.

Currently PGA is at the crossroads. PGA is making a conscious effort to grapple with its weaknesses and is trying to carve out a future direction for the organisation. The question is whether PGA will have the resources to give it space to pursue these efforts or whether it will be confined to keeping the organisation running from day-to-day.

Given PGA's circumstances, the organisation would greatly benefit from a comprehensive strategic plan that stakes out the direction it aims to take, coupled with an indicative budget covering at least three years. This would contribute to greater long-sightedness; greater transparency within the organisation; and, facilitate activities with partners, including donors. The plan should cover all aspects of the organisation and be updated *every* year. Furthermore, quality monitoring mechanisms and indicators would also need to be devised.

Given PGA's current predicament and the possible momentum resulting from the two ongoing evaluation processes, it is now an opportune moment for PGA to embark on a strategic partnership process. This will require a concerted effort on behalf PGA, Danida and Sida.

The evaluation recommends the following to improve the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of PGA's work:

1. PGA should develop results-based project management capacities. This includes systematic project planning, monitoring and reporting.
2. Using results-based capacities, PGA should elaborate a **strategic three-year plan** with an indicative budget covering all aspects of the organisation. It should stake out the direction PGA aims to take with regard to each of its programme areas and set aims for internal organisational activities and processes. It should be developed in a participatory manner and be accompanied by an annual work plan and budget. PGA's donors should consider supporting this process.
3. Given PGA's unique strength with regard to brokering peace, PGA should reassert itself in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building. This will require the PGA to prioritise among potential/actual crises according to where PGA has a comparative advantage to engage. PGA should also identify donors that have a special interest in this area and strengthen ties with regional organisations and the UN Secretariat.
4. PGA needs to launch a concerted resource mobilisation campaign, based on research of relevant donor priorities and policies. PGA should clearly and convincingly outline its many strengths. Proposals should reflect result-based management.
5. PGA and its core donors should explore the possibility of engaging in a process leading up to co-ordinated core funding in the form of a **strategic partnership**. In addition to the strategic plan, a memorandum of understanding outlining the manage-

ment mechanisms and serving as a co-ordination framework would need to be devised. Efforts would need to be made by PGA and its “friends” to attract the interest of other donors.

6. PGA should systematise the reporting of the in-kind contributions it receives, calculate their value in dollars, include them in the annual report and use them strategically in the effort to attain funding.
7. PGA should consider devising a communication strategy. It should include an analysis of its communication needs, modes of communication available to PGA and what information needs to be communicated and when. PGA should also pursue the plan to improve its web-site and make it a dynamic tool to strengthen PGA’s internal communication and transparency.

1 Introduction

This is an evaluation of Parliamentarians for Global Action's Peace & Democracy Programme with a special focus on Africa. It has been commissioned by Danida and conducted by COWI A/S. The evaluation has been undertaken by Cecilia M. Ljungman (team leader) and Jens Adser Sørensen, former director of the Parliamentary Department of the Danish Folketing.

As specified by the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1), the evaluation is mainly undertaken as a desk study. Data collection has been undertaken through documentation review (see Annex 3), observing PGA work-shops/meetings and interviews with different stakeholders, including the PGA Secretariat, PGA members, PGA advisors, partners and donors (see Annex 2).

The evaluation has been conducted over a span of a few weeks. A more expansive methodology involving more interviews, questionnaires, visits to case study countries and a systematic examination of legislation and processes is likely to have yielded more evidence of the effects of PGA's efforts.

In line with COWI's proposal, three areas of work within the Peace & Democracy Programme were singled out for more in-depth assessment in consultation with PGA. Criteria used to identify these activities include available documentation, available interviewees, and size of the effort. The areas selected were the peace-building initiative Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire and the security sector reform/small arms and light weapons (SALW) pilot project. Together, these efforts constitute the bulk of PGA's work within its Peace & Democracy Programme, each covering several years and a number of activities. PGA's work with SALW has a global focus, but grew out of activities held in Africa and has a particularly strong relevance to Africa, given the scale of the problem of small arms on the continent.

The evaluation was conducted at the same time as Sida's Organisational Review of PGA. The latter constitutes a more comprehensive study with a larger team, much broader scope and longer timeframe. However, there are several overlaps. When both teams were in New York at the end June/beginning of July, they worked jointly conducting interviews together, openly sharing information and discussed conclusions and recommendations. The co-operation was smooth, mutually beneficial and lessened the burden of consultants for PGA.

The evaluation team has been obliged to interpret parts of the ToR of the evaluation to better relate to the realities of PGA. To begin with, the section on the aims of the evaluation in the ToR refers to "projects" of the Peace & Democracy Programme. In reality, with the exception of the current SALW pilot project, PGA has not undertaken projects as such but a series of activities. The ToR also mention the specific aim of "*providing advice and guidance on the project in case of deviation from the original ToR*" and that the team "*will make recommendations for the implementation of the remaining part of the project*" (Section 4). These aims are not applicable to PGA's work since i) there is no project, but a programme (Peace & Democracy); ii) the Peace & Democracy Programme is not based on a ToR; and, iii) all activities within the Peace & Democracy Programme came to a halt when the funding shortage emerged in the second half of 2004. Since

then, PGA has only had funds to initiate the above-mentioned pilot project on SALW, which is global (as opposed to African) in scope.

In view of disjoint between the ToR and the reality of PGA's work, the evaluation team has focused its recommendations on how to improve the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme – which constitute the key evaluation criteria outlined in the ToR. However, most of the actions required to improve PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme in relation to these criteria are organisation-wide in scope. Given these circumstances and the fact that Denmark provides core and not programme-specific support to PGA, the evaluations team has found it appropriate to use its assessment of the Peace & Democracy Programme's efforts in Africa to formulate recommendations relevant to the organisation as a whole.

This report consists of five chapters. The following chapter provide a brief background to PGA Chapter 3 examines PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme from 2001 to 2006. Chapter 4 examines PGA's overall management. The last chapter provides overall conclusions and recommendations.

The evaluation team would like to extend its profound gratitude to the members of PGA's Secretariat who have been very helpful to the evaluation team. The Secretariat has tirelessly supported the team in terms of organising meetings, agendas, phone conferences and contact details of members; and providing documents, financial information and work space. The team would particularly like to thank Helen Vasilopoulos, who has dedicated considerable time to assisting the evaluation. The team would also like to thank PGA's Executive Committee, members, former members and partners who have contributed important perspectives and information to the evaluation.

2 Background

This chapter discusses PGA as an organisation. It summarises PGA's past, its overall mission, structures and programmes. The final sub-section is devoted to the financial support PGA has received since 2001, with special focus on that provided by Denmark.

PGA was established in 1978-79 by concerned parliamentarians from different countries to address global problems, which could not be solved by any one government or parliament. In keeping with the Cold War context in which it was created, the organisation focused on disarmament and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. As the global context transformed, PGA moved on to address global issues such as fostering democracy, conflict prevention and management, international law and human rights, population and sustainable development.

2.1 PGA's Mission

PGA has defined its mission as promoting peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, sustainable development and population issues by informing, convening, and mobilising parliamentarians to realise these goals. PGA's activities **contribute to its mission** by:

- Providing parliamentarians with practical tools and **peer-to-peer advice** related to their role in the democratic system;
- Strengthening parliamentary systems through efforts that **lend support to parliamentarians** from the developing world, whose legislative institutions are often weak and under-mined by the executive powers;
- Providing information to **enhance knowledge** among members in the areas of the rule of law, human rights, sustainable development and population issues; and,
- **Mobilising members** to influence or hold their respective governments to account and to push for legislative action in their parliaments.

2.2 PGA's Structure

PGA is a membership-driven organisation with around 1300 individual members in 114 parliaments (see Annex 5 for a list of parliaments represented). PGA membership is open to individual legislators from democratically elected parliaments, as defined on PGA's website (see Annex 5). PGA's presence can be described as global, since members in some countries have formed national PGA groups. The organisational level of these groups varies from country to country.

Parliamentarians who lose their seat in their respective parliament are no longer eligible to be members in PGA. Unlike other international parliamentary groups, such as AWEPA, who allow retired parliamentarians to continue to hold membership, PGA regards the electoral process and the power to effect change from sitting members of parliament as central to its work. Nevertheless, several former members have remained active in supporting PGA by, for instance, referring ideas or assisting with networking. In some countries parliamentarians lose their seat if they become prime minister or president. PGA keeps a separate roster of such ex-members.

Members meet at the **Annual Forum** that is held in different countries each year. This meeting is attended by over 100 members. Around 70 of these have had their travel paid for by PGA. They have been selected for their engagement in PGA, their potential contribution to the meeting and/or due to specific circumstances in their country that are of interest to PGA.

The Forum elects the **International Council** (up to forty members) that represents the seven continents of the world. The Council, in turn, elects the **Executive Committee** ('the board') on the basis of 40/60 either or gender ratio. Its 15 members serve a two-year term and meet twice a year to make decisions on PGA's programme activities. PGA is allegedly the only parliamentary NGO that has rotation and term limits for all its board members. The Executive Committee is headed by a President. A Treasurer is also selected. Other positions within the board include acting as convenor or deputy convenor of PGA's programmes – there is one convenor and two deputies for each programme (see Section 2.3 below).

The day-to-day activities of PGA are run by the **Secretariat** which is headed by a Secretary-General. PGA's staff consists of a Director of Programmes, a Senior Programme Officer, one development officer, one administrator, a secretary and interns. The size of the secretariat has been reduced considerably since 2004 due to funding difficulties. This is discussed further in Section 4.4.

PGA has structures to involve partners and **external stakeholders** in the activities of the organisation. The UN Committee is comprised of senior UN ambassadors, high-level UN officials, and leading NGO representatives. It has not met in the last couple of years, but PGA draws on its members for logistical support and to, for instance, chair seminars. In addition, each of PGA's three programmes has external stakeholders serving as advisors, which the Secretariat has interacted with in an informal way when a new activity area is being developed. Furthermore, in recent years, when PGA has conducted several strategic meetings to determine the viability or direction of an initiative, external stakeholders have been invited to play a role in these processes too.

2.3 PGA's Programmes

PGA works in three programme areas

1. The Peace and Democracy Programme works with parliamentarians on two levels: building better relationships between parliaments and supporting the principles of parliamentary democracy in establishing moderate, stable political systems in each country. This programme is further described in Chapter 3.
2. The International Law and Human Rights Programme has, in recent years, focused its attention on the world-wide ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The programme aims to maintain a high level of parliamentary involvement and contribution to the ICC process. Activities include providing technical assistance to parliamentarians from countries that have made the decision to ratify or accede to the Rome Statute. The programme's results are impressive – the success of more than half of the countries that have ratified the Rome Statute can be directly or indirectly attributed to PGA's efforts.

3. PGA's Sustainable Development and Population Programme aims to galvanise political leadership to meet the pressing concerns of sustainable development and population. The programme involves mobilising and assisting parliamentarians to create an enabling environment to implement the International Conference on Population and Development Programme and Agenda 21. This includes contributing to advancing national agendas; undertaking legal review and reform; and, the enactment of progressive laws and policies.

These three programmes have been selected in accordance with the process described in the box below. In the case of the Peace & Democracy Programme, this process took place in 1991. Strategic guidance of each programme is provided by the programme's respective convenors, who are also members of the board. For instance, they decide upon specific country initiatives in teleconferences with the Secretariat and approved at board meetings. In case of disagreement, a two-thirds majority vote rule exists but is rarely required.

Box 1 How PGA's Issues Are Selected (From PGA's website)

PGA is a membership-driven organization, whose members propose issues that PGA works on. This mechanism ensures that the issues are of direct interest to the constituents and have primacy in the international community. While there are many organizations that work on similar issues – such as democratic assistance – PGA's issues are never "forced" on its members. Typically, the process of issues selection at PGA includes the following steps:

-
- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| Step 1 | An individual member presents a project idea to the Secretary-General or President of PGA. |
| Step 2 | The Secretary-General, program convenors, and development staff analyze and assess the feasibility of the project, as well as examine PGA's strategic niche for presentation to program convenors. |
| Step 3 | The project idea is debated at the annual International Council meeting. |
| Step 4 | The Executive Board makes the decision. The UN Committee Members and other Advisors provide the Secretariat with programming advice. They also suggest issues to work on. |
| Exceptions | In a crisis situation, PGA can respond immediately. This procedure requires the President and the Convenor of the program to take the decision. |
-

2.4 Financial Resources and Danish Support to PGA

Since 1997, the Danish Government has provided DKK 8.7 million to Parliamentarians for Global Action including core support (1997-2006) and project support (in 1997-98 this consisted of a two-year conflict prevention project in the Great Lakes region and in 2000, DKK 250,000 were provided to PGA's work with the ICC).

PGA has operated on an annual budget of between USD 1 and 1.8 million. Between 2001 and 2005, PGA has received funds from at least 12 different donors each year. Danida, Sida, Ford Foundation and the Netherlands have provided core funding, amounting to 45 per cent of the total budget. The rest of the income has been earmarked for specific activities.


The European Commission has provided the largest total support during this period, although the funds have been earmarked for the ICC. Danish support in this period has amounted to 10 per cent of the total budget, or 23 per cent of the core budget.

PGA receives a minimal income from membership dues, amounting to around one-half percent of the annual income. The annual membership fee is USD 50 and is a considerable challenge for PGA to collect. Members pay this fee from their private income. Parties or parliaments do not cover this cost. In some countries, where the salary of a parliamentarian is a couple of hundred dollars, this fee is considered relatively steep.

Typically, half the contributions every year average less than USD 40,000. For instance, in 2003 and 2004, more than half the funds were less than USD 40,000 and the average size of these were less than USD 20,000.

In 2005, expected core funding in the order of USD 300,000 from the Dutch government did not materialise, which had grave consequences for the organisation's activities.

Table 1 Support to PGA 2001-05 in US Dollars 1,000



*) American University Center for Global Peace

3 PGA's Peace and Democracy Effort

Peace and democracy are overall goals of PGA. These concepts are also what are closest to heart to its members. Similarly, parliamentary diplomacy¹ has been the essence of PGA since its establishment. Whether a PGA seminar directly relates to these topics or not, the members use PGA activities to network and engage in parliamentary diplomacy.

While all of PGA's efforts aim to contribute to peace-building and democratic development in one way or another, the activities in the programme area of Peace and Democracy have a particular focus on these areas. PGA's initiatives in this programmatic area include international, regional and sub-regional seminars and consultative missions. More than 80 per cent of PGA's Peace & Democracy activities have focused on Africa. Significant African efforts in this programme area have included:

- Peace-building missions, consultations delegations to seminars and annual forums that focus on the political crisis in **Côte d'Ivoire** (2001-04);
- Peace-building missions, consultations and delegations to seminars and annual forums to address the political crisis in **Zimbabwe**, (2003-04);
- Two seminars in Africa² on the **Brahimi report** on United Nations Peace Keeping, followed by an informal briefing of the UN Security Council, Senior UN officials and the G77 of the results of the seminars; as well as a discussion on the role of parliamentarians in peace-keeping efforts (2002);
- A consultative **mission to Sierra Leone** (2003) to assess the situation and efforts to include Sierra Leonean members in regional activities (2003-06) and PGA's annual forums;
- A regional **conference on trafficking** in co-operation with ECOWAS held in Abuja (2004); and,
- The Peace and Democracy Programme's recent focus on **small arms and light weapons** that stems from sub-regional and regional conferences on security issues, held respectively in Tanzania (2002) and Uganda (2004).

In addition to the African initiatives, the Programme has also included i) a few international meetings (e.g. on parliamentary ethic and accountability in Washington D.C.); ii) a couple of initiatives on Greek-Turkish parliamentary interaction, focusing on common environmental issues; and, iii) a visit to Yerevan and Baku with the aim to later conduct a session between Azeri and Armenian parliamentarians in Vienna.

In line with the methodology outlined in Chapter 1, the following section focuses on PGA's efforts related to Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and the security sector.

1) *Parliaments and individual MPs are not entrusted to conduct official foreign policy. Through their participation in international (parliamentary) cooperation in official bodies, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or via NGOs like PGA, they are, however, able to establish international contacts, promote international understanding and influence international policy and the relations between states indirectly. Some of these endeavours may rightly be characterised as "parliamentary diplomacy."*

2) *A third Brahimi seminar for Asian members was held in India,*

3.1 Côte d'Ivoire

3.1.1 Summary of Activities

PGA's efforts in Côte d'Ivoire began with a request for assistance by the Ivorian members of PGA following the contentious presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a failed coup d'état. PGA responded with a parliamentary preventative action mission in February 2001. The mission aimed to engage in activities that would promote dialogue, reconciliation and democracy in Côte d'Ivoire, to ensure that all parties participated fully in the upcoming elections. This was followed by a number of activities over two years:

1. At the request of all political parties, PGA contributed with parliamentarians from Ghana, Senegal, Canada and the Netherlands that teamed up with American and Dutch diplomats to **observe the municipal elections** one month after its first mission.
2. The following year, in February 2002, PGA organised a **regional conference** in Abidjan on integration, immigration, and naturalisation at the request Dep. Mollé Mollé, Vice President of the National Assembly in Côte d'Ivoire and President of PGA's Ivorian group.
3. In late 2002 and early 2003, Ivorian PGA members held discussions within the national group to seek consensus on how PGA could assist the National Assembly in contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Meanwhile, the PGA Secretariat discussed with the French Mission and the UN in New York on how PGA could **link its work to the international peace effort** in Côte d'Ivoire.
4. In May 2003, upon request of PGA's national group and the National Assembly, PGA sent a **consultative mission** to discuss with Ivorian parliamentarians the role they could play to support the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Process. The mission was organised in collaboration with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the UNDP Resident Representative.
5. In the aftermath of the political crisis of October 2004, PGA staff held consultations with its Ivorian members and **facilitated telephone consultations** with the SRSG and PGA's Peace & Democracy convenor Dep. Thiam from Senegal.
6. PGA **invited multi-party delegations** of parliamentarians from Côte d'Ivoire to attend its annual forums in 2002 (Ottawa) and 2003 (Washington DC). In both cases, the delegations were asked to brief the International Council and Executive Board on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.
7. **Peer-to-peer discussions** were held between the multi-party Ivorian delegations and different individual PGA members during the Annual Forum in 2002 and 2003; the Brahimi seminar in Ghana (2002); the Abidjan conference (2003); and, the conference on trafficking in Abuja (2004). These were typically semi-structured meetings of a bilateral nature (e.g. Danish with Ivorian counterparts) or a sub-regional constellation (e.g. Ivorian with Senegalese and Malian counterparts). On one occasion, a facilitator was present.

Since September 2003 until early 2005, PGA has allegedly held consultations with Ivorian parliamentarians regarding the ICC. PGA continually exposed these members to

PGA's work in this area, which made it clear to these parliamentarians that the international community would tolerate no impunity should genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes be committed.

In 2004, PGA's Annual Forum issued a declaration that condemned the violation of the cease-fire agreement and called upon President Laurent Gbagbo, as a former member of PGA, to ensure the safety of all political actors and the normal functioning of the parliament. Engagement with Côte d'Ivoire has been very limited since early 2005 due to the acute funding crisis experienced by the organisation.

3.1.2 Analysis

In the period 2001-05, PGA showed determination and commitment to support the peace effort in Côte d'Ivoire. PGA's activities were highly relevant to the needs as expressed by its Ivorian members and to promoting reconciliation and supporting democratic institutions.

PGA demonstrates its **prescience** regarding Côte d'Ivoire: it identified that the cause of the crisis was a result of i) restricting the civil and political rights of citizens of foreign origin; and, ii) the related political violence. It thus organised a conference in Abidjan to address immigration, integration and naturalisation at which it managed to have all parties agree to a forceful declaration that proposed measures to diffuse the tension. Nonetheless, violence escalated six months later. Meanwhile, the UN Secretariat and Security Council first publicly recognised the immediate causes of the conflict in a declaration issued nearly a year later.

The PGA members chosen to engage in the Ivorian effort represented **appropriate political and national diversity**. Typically, the peace-building teams consisted of senior parliamentarians from the sub-region and region, combined with one or two parliamentarians representing the developed world. Regarding the Ivorian delegations, careful consideration was taken in the selection of appropriate members. PGA's insistence to bring *multi-party* Ivorian delegations to its events crucially gave the opposing sides the occasion to meet and participate together. This strategy is believed to have fostered dialogue on the home front.

PGA's network and the respect it commands allowed it access to **relevant top-levels** in Côte d'Ivoire, including the government, civil society and the international community. Similarly, it enjoyed access to the relevant top levels of the UN system in New York. Furthermore, this also contributed to PGA being able to bring relevant high-level panel speakers to its conference in Abidjan.

The data available seems to indicate that PGA **co-operated well with partners**, in particular with the UN system, in its efforts to contribute to resolving the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. It also liaised with diplomatic representations in country and in New York. The team were not able to find evidence of overlapping efforts or lack of co-ordination and co-operation.

The extent to which the efforts were effective is difficult to assess since PGA's documentation does **not provide specific and well-formulated objectives**, nor does it elaborate on outcomes and spin-off effects.

Nevertheless, **some achievements** can be identified. According to stakeholders, PGA's efforts contributed to the success of the municipal elections in 2001. For instance, the first peace-building mission received assurances from President Gbagbo (a former PGA member) and the National Electoral Committee that helped convince the RDR to participate in the municipal elections. Shortly after the mission's departure, President Gbagbo also initiated a series of meetings with opposition parties. In the end, all political parties fully participated in the municipal elections that were conducted in a democratic and transparent manner. There was no widespread invalidation of candidates as feared. The presence of the PGA election observers is likely to have had some positive effect on the election process.

Second, the seminar on migration in Abidjan placed a spotlight on the problems of integration, immigration and naturalisation in the region, and on Côte d'Ivoire, in particular. The negotiations to arrive at a consensus on the **declaration produced** by the conference were arduous. The seminar enjoyed international, national and regional press coverage and is **allegedly the only effort of its kind** that has been undertaken in the sub-region.

Third, the results of consultative mission in 2003 are considered to have been the most **tangible and concrete** of PGA's efforts in the country. It brought the Linas Marcoussis Agreement to the table of the legislators who treated the peace agreement in an orderly manner, despite great initial reluctance to do so.

Fourth, PGA holds that its sources in the country maintain that PGA's efforts to impart knowledge of the ICC to Ivorian parliamentarians, through its International Law & Human Rights Programme, has had a deterrent impact in terms of **curbing political violence**, since it is known that perpetrators may be held to account by the ICC.

Other potential achievements and spin-off effects are difficult to ascertain, given the **dearth analytical reporting and follow-up**. This is despite that, for instance, the Abidjan conference produced a declaration which could have been used to follow up on efforts made by the sub-regional members to address issues of integration, immigration and naturalisation.

Did the bilateral meetings with Ivorian parliamentarians at the different forums, seminars and conferences indirectly effect how the PGA dialogue partners' respective countries later dealt with the Ivorian crisis? Did the dialogue partner impart useful advice to the Ivorian parliamentarians that they could apply? These questions are obviously beyond the scope of this evaluation and may even be difficult for PGA to follow-up and report on (even if the organisation had an effective monitoring system), given the typically "closed door" nature of these meetings and the often hidden dynamics of influence that politics involves.

Could PGA have continued to play a meaningful role in Côte d'Ivoire after 2004? Experts consulted by this evaluation team believe this to be the case and that this **would have had a positive impact** on the peace-building effort. However, the lack of resources, caused by the end of the Dutch grant that provided core support for the Peace & Democracy Programme, resulted in that PGA virtually withdrew as an actor in the Côte d'Ivoire conflict.

3.2 Zimbabwe

3.2.1 Summary of Activities

PGA took the initiative to address the escalating problems in Zimbabwe in 2002. It developed a strategy to assist in the political crisis with the help of Ambassador Kristina Svensson in Harare, a former PGA member who deemed that PGA could play a crucial role in the crisis and who made the initial contacts with Zimbabwean MPs. A two-pronged approach was agreed on:

1. Invite two Zimbabwean parliamentarians from governing and opposition parties to the Annual Forum to brief the membership on the country's crisis;
2. Send a delegation of PGA members to Harare to discuss the rule of law, the ICC and larger political issues with Zimbabwe's MPs.

The two activities took place in November 2002 and May 2003 respectively.

The planning and implementation of the first activity allowed PGA to establish the necessary relations to prepare for and undertake the mission to Harare. The mission met with the Speaker (who was regarded as Mugabe's heir), House Leader, the Opposition Leader, six parliamentary committees and the floor. In addition to the rule of law, the ICC and the crisis, discussions included practical advice on, for instance, how to foster non-partisan behaviour in committee work; the parliamentary concept of "agreeing to disagree" and, how Mexican parliamentarians had grappled with land reform issues in the past.

A series of other activities followed:

1. In November 2003, PGA brought a **nine-member multi-party delegation** of Zimbabwean parliamentarians to the US to participate in:
 - PGA's *Second Session of the Consultative Assembly for the International Criminal Court and the Rule of Law* held at the UN;
 - PGA's *25th Anniversary Tribute* in Washington;
 - PGA's *Peer-to-Peer Dialogue among African and United States Legislators: Role of Parliamentarians in Peace-making and Peace-building*; and,
 - Closed-door bilateral meetings with PGA members from Ghana, South Africa and Denmark;
2. PGA's South African board member undertook a **follow-up mission** to Zimbabwe in late November 2003;
3. PGA invited a **multi-party delegation** of Zimbabwean MPs to attend PGA's *Seminar on Parliamentary Ethics and Accountability*, held in the US Senate, in Washington DC. in June 2004, where bilateral peer-to-peer meetings with PGA members from Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and the UK also took place; and,
4. PGA convened a **parliamentary dialogue** between four Zimbabwean and ten British PGA members on September 9, 2004 in the **House of Commons** in London.

Since then, contact with Zimbabwean members has, at best, been very sparse. The lack of resources caused by end of the Dutch grant in 2004, inhibited further PGA activities focused on Zimbabwe. The situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated and international attention to the crisis is negligible.

3.2.2 Analysis

The serious human rights abuses of Zimbabwean parliamentarians roused PGA to take action. While it was PGA that took the initiative to address the crisis in Zimbabwe, as soon as contacts in Harare were established, opposition MPs appealed to PGA to engage in Zimbabwe. From its involvement in 2002 until 2004, PGA's efforts were **highly appreciated by Zimbabwean MPs**. PGA was the first international body that was able to meet formally in the parliament and facilitate discussions among Zimbabwean MPs on an issue of common interest (the rule of law and the ICC) since the crisis had escalated. PGA interacted in a positive manner with Zimbabwean parliamentarians (several of whom became PGA members) and the relationship appeared to have grown more and more constructive over time.

PGA's approach was **tactful and responsive** to the situation and PGA seemed to have worked in a systematic manner to ensure a favourable reception from both sides in Zimbabwe. According to stakeholders interviewed, the fact that PGA used the rule of law and the ICC as a subject to embark on discussions with both sides was both clever and relevant: both sides were interested in the discussion and the subject matter was sufficiently related to the crisis without being confrontational.

PGA was efficient in **making the most of opportunities**. For instance, it used invitations to its Annual Forums as both a carrot and a tool of interaction. Furthermore, when President Mugabe in a television interview indicated that he was open to talks with the UK, PGA within a couple of months organised for Zimbabwean MPs to travel to the UK to discuss with peers there. Considering the UK's colonial past; the Lancaster House Agreement that had bound both countries; and, the mutual antipathy expressed by each country's media, the initiative was significant.

The PGA members involved in the Zimbabwean activities were **appropriately selected**. For instance, the delegation to Zimbabwe consisted of two members from neighbouring countries (Mozambique and South Africa); a member from the region (Ghana); a member from a European country that was involved in brokering peace at the embassy level (Norway); and an experienced member from a country that had gone through a difficult land reform process (Mexico). The inclusion of a top-level and well-connected South African MP was particularly astute, considering South Africa's role in mediating peace in the country. On the whole, the team represented parliamentarians with considerable experience.

To select appropriate Zimbabwean parliamentarians to participate in the various delegations, PGA **used its network**. It initially contacted both the Shadow Justice Minister and the chair of the Legal Affairs Committee – both constituting the most relevant MPs, given that the topic of the Annual Forum to which they were invited was the ICC and the promotion of the rule of law. All Zimbabwean delegations were conceived as multi-party compositions.

The evaluation team has only seen one background paper on Zimbabwe, which is of adequate quality. Participants interviewed found the material that was provided useful.

At some level, the PGA activities were **co-ordinated** with other efforts to foster dialogue among the political elite. PGA mentions in one report that the Zimbabwean MPs were also involved in parallel initiatives of the embassies of Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway. PGA communicated closely with the Swedish ambassador and met with the Dutch embassy when in-country.

Due to the **lack of project planning documents**, clear and concretely formulated objectives and analytical reporting, the assessment of the effectiveness of PGA's effectiveness has to be based on the information the team has compiled during the desk study.

1. PGA's efforts are deemed to have **fostered greater dialogue** and **reduced polarisation** to some degree. Each activity appears to have successively built enough common ground to raise the level of confidence and trust among the MPs to motivate them to take the process to the next level. According to stakeholders interviewed, the first consultative mission had impact on the relations between the MPs of the opposing parties. For instance, the Speaker began to refer to the opposition MPs as "our brothers and sisters". One stakeholder claimed out that PGA's effort yielded more results in terms of dialogue than that of the UN Secretary General.
2. Stakeholders interviewed believe that the strategy of bringing **multi-party delegations** of Zimbabweans to events abroad had several effects: i) it forged ties between the individuals; ii) it brought Zimbabwean MPs out of complete isolation – a predicament both sides were concerned about; and, iii) it demonstrated to the Zimbabweans how other parliamentarians constructively work and interact. Opposition MPs on one delegation related that their counterparts from the governing party had previously viewed them with fear and suspicion, but working together in the PGA context had developed their relationship in a way that would enable future collaboration. Likewise, delegates representing the governing party expressed that attending the various PGA conferences, forums and meetings was an eye-opening experience.
3. While MPs from the governing party were initially more reticent to work with PGA, after the first few activities, they showed **willingness and commitment** to work with PGA in improving the political dialogue and preparing the conditions for functioning government-opposition relations.
4. One stakeholder believes that PGA's work with Zimbabwean parliamentarians **helped curb the number of incarcerations** and human rights abuses of opposition MPs.
5. A few stakeholders mentioned that PGA's work in Zimbabwe indirectly **influenced South African policy**. The South African PGA member involved in the effort belonged to the upper echelons of the ANC and is believed to have contributed to the modification of South Africa's stance based on her hands-on experience of the situation.
6. While Zimbabwe has not ratified the Rome Treaty, PGA's effort to discuss the ICC did lead to **debate** on the topic in the Zimbabwean parliament.

3.3 Small Arms and Light Weapons

3.3.1 Summary of Activities

PGA's work in the security sector dates back to 2001, when it sent an exploratory mission to Tanzania to assess the viability and level of interest for a project dealing with democratic oversight of security issues – a project idea originally proposed by PGA's Tanzanian members in early 2000. The long-term aim of the proposed project would be to harmonize the requirements of good governance with that of national security through parliamentary oversight of the military.

The mission concluded that there was both a need and interest to embark on a series of capacity-building seminars in this area. However, a regional approach would be necessary to emphasise the potential of sharing information between different parliaments and to avoid the impression that a government was being singled out.³ Two seminars followed:

1. In 2002, PGA convened a **Sub-Regional Seminar on Capacity Building for Parliamentary Committees on Security Issues** in Dar es Salaam for legislators from eastern and central Africa. The seminar issued a declaration with a plan of action for parliamentary capacity-building in regional peace and security issues that outlined specific actions to be taken by PGA's national groups and members.
2. In 2004, PGA held a **Regional Parliamentary Seminar** on security sector reform in Kampala, which addressed ways to strengthen legislative oversight of the police and military forces. Participants included 60 parliamentarians from eastern, central and southern Africa. This seminar also produced a declaration with an action plan.

While most of text of the Kampala declaration is taken verbatim from the Dar Es Salaam declaration (which can be seen as reflecting PGA's effort to achieve consensus and more mutual undertakings), it contains some further elaboration, such as promoting the role of women in peace-building processes; strengthening existing African peace and security initiatives and mechanisms; and, stopping the misuse and proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the use of child soldiers.

PGA singled out the action plan's passage on small arms and light weapons (SALW) for further development. In late 2005, UNDP approved a small pilot project on small arms and light weapons. It insisted that PGA collaborate with Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PF), a relatively new single-issue NGO with a strong base of parliamentary members from Latin America, which had developed a very similar proposal. To date, PGA has undertaken the following activities related to SALW:

1. In January 2006, members from six countries from Africa and Eastern Europe, which are highly affected by the misuse and proliferation of small arms, were brought to the *Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference to Assess the Implementation of the Programme of Action* (PrepCom) at the UN in New York. Before the PrepCom PGA held an orientation workshop on SALW at PGA's offices.
- 3) *At the time of the mission, Tanzania faced an election controversy. The mission embarked upon the subject area with the different parties it met with. However, it turned out that PGA's offer to assist in resolving the dispute was not sufficiently welcome.*

2. In March 2006, Parliamentarians from over 20 African countries and a handful from other continents attended a **PGA seminar in Dakar** on *Addressing the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms/Light Weapons*. A nineteen-point action plan with several concrete articles and two articles on follow-up was produced.
3. In June 2006, Parliamentarians from Eastern Europe were invited to a similar **seminar held in Tbilisi**. A seventeen-point action was prepared that closely resembles the Dakar plan and contains the same follow-up articles.
4. In July 2006, PGA brought parliamentarians from six countries to the **Review Conference** to Assess the Implementation of the Programme of Action, who participated as part of their respective national delegation. They also attended a PGA strategy session on SALW.

3.3.2 Analysis

The security sector seminars in Dar es Salaam and Kampala were requested by PGA members who saw a need for capacity building in this area. In addition to being relevant **to member needs**, the effort was also relevant to the prevailing situation in many African countries – which is characterised by a precarious peace and weak parliamentary capacities in relation to security sector reform. The seminars also made a point of linking poverty, human security and national security.

Although no proper project document was prepared in this area of work, the fact that an exploratory session was conducted before the seminars were organised shows some form of systematic planning. PGA made use of its network to identify relevant participants from its membership base to the seminar. From what can be made out from the reports, the session **topics and panel participants were appropriate** and well thought out.

The **lack of a results-based** project planning document and analytical reporting makes it a challenge to assess the effectiveness of the seminars. Although each seminar produced an action plan that could have served as useful tools to follow up on actions by PGA and its members, no systematic monitoring or follow-up was undertaken.

Nevertheless, PGA's report from the second seminar states that it achieved "its goal of informing and sensitizing participating parliamentarians on security sector reform". It also mentions that the legislators expressed that they had **learnt relevant issues** and strategies. The example of knowledge imparted to participants during the seminar that is provided in the report was a case of good-practice legislation from Uganda on budgetary oversight of the security sector. The law provides parliamentarians with the opportunity to influence the budget drafting process early on, rather than being limited to the role of simply passing or blocking the final budget proposal.

The relevance of the SALW initiative is indicated by the fact that SALW was a **concern voiced by the participants** of the Kampala seminar. PGA embarked on this area relatively late in the global SALW process but seems to have made up for lost time. While there are other parliamentary organisations that address the problem of SALW, the needs and available funding in this area are so great that the field is not considered overcrowded.

Although the SALW initiative with UNDP is currently **PGA's only effort** in the Peace & Democracy Programme, it is small pilot project with a budget of around USD 150,000. The project planning document prepared with UNDP is significant in that it is the first attempt at results-based project management. The project document has a clear exposé of the issues at stake; a solid project rationale that discusses the role of legislators in relation to SALW and PGA's capacity to address the issue; clear project goals and outputs; a log-frame table and a monitoring and evaluation plan with indicators.

The stringency in project planning that the co-operation with UNDP has yielded is already **having an impact on effectiveness**. The Secretariat is using questionnaires after each activity to gather information on how each participant viewed the sessions he/she participated in and what efforts he/she plans to engage in to further the non-proliferation of SALW. Already, despite the short time-frame since the project was initiated, PGA has been able to report on **tangible results**. The seven parliamentarians that attended the PrepCom have:

- Contributed articles and been interviewed by the media on SALW (Mozambique);
- Actively engaged in preparing relevant draft laws (Albania);
- Secured reference to the importance of the role of parliamentarians in the national statements made by their national governments at the PrepCom (Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique);
- Organised sub-regional parliamentary workshops on SALW (Senegal, Georgia); and,
- Gained a solid understanding of the importance of the UN Programme of Action and the challenges that lie ahead.

Furthermore, an external stakeholder interviewed by the evaluation team maintained that the PGA SALW event which he attended was the **most impressive** in terms of content, level of discussion and commitment of participants of all the many SALW events he has participated in.

PGA has had **some interaction with partner organisations** within the context of its work in the security sector and SALW. It has typically been limited to inviting selected NGOs (e.g. Safer World), international institutes (e.g. SIPRI), UN agencies (e.g. UNDP and the World Bank) and diplomatic missions to its seminars. The most important partners seem to be the national PGA group and the national parliament of the country where the events have been hosted.

Although PGA is engaged with PF in the SALW pilot project and the partnership seems to be functioning adequately, there is certainly scope for greater collaboration.

3.4 Overall Assessment and Conclusions

3.4.1 Relevance

This section will assess the extent PGA's Peace & Democracy effort has been relevant to the problems it has been trying to address and to the needs of its target group.

PGA has an acute awareness of the crucial importance of **engaging appropriate persons** – in terms of experience, knowledge, personal qualities and position of influence – in its work to make its efforts relevant and effective, be the persons members of peace mis-

sions, participants from crisis-affected countries in consultations, or delegations to PGA events. Unlike inter-governmental parliamentary organisations, PGA has the advantage of being able to select the most suitable candidates for the tasks it wishes to undertake, as opposed to having to rely on speakers of parliament to appoint candidates. Far more often than not, PGA has managed to co-opt the right people for its activities. It has therefore been able to **secure commitment** and active engagement for its efforts. Its peace & democracy initiatives have also all shown considerable regard for **political, regional and gender balance**.

Two assets allow PGA to identify the right people for the right job. First, it has an **impressive network**. In addition to its global membership of 1300 voluntary parliamentarians from 110 countries who each have their own extensive networks as politicians in power, PGA's secretariat has fostered external relations and gained respect from other actors in the international community – such as within the UN system and among diplomats.

Second, PGA has developed the skill of **using its network** in appropriate ways. It draws upon it significantly to identify, develop and undertake activities. PGA's interaction with its network has ensured suitable seminar and conference topics and panel participants. The interaction has included **involvement and consultation with members** and/or key primary beneficiaries from the beginning of each PGA activity, which in turn has enhanced the relevancy of PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme to the different problems it is trying to address.

In addition, PGA has applied other strategies to make its work relevant. First, it has invited **multi-party delegations** of parliamentarians from countries experiencing political crisis to its regional and international meetings and held side-meetings between them and different peers from other countries. Second, instead of making the crisis as such the topic of discussion, PGA has **identified highly central issues** to the crisis which are of mutual interest to the conflicting parties. For instance, the rule of law and the ICC were the entry point for discussions in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile the conference in Abidjan focused on immigration, integration and naturalisation. In the words of PGA's Secretary-General, the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire became the conference's "elephant in the livingroom" that was difficult to ignore.

Third, it has made use of **sub-regional and regional events**. In relation to, for instance, Côte d'Ivoire, this has constituted a means of tackling political crisis in a country, without cornering the conflicting parties. In addition to providing a less polarised setting, it adds informed perspectives of peers who are affected by the crisis as neighbours.

Holding sub-regional and regional meetings have also been a **relevant form of building capacity** since the situation, problems and solutions within a sub-region/region are often similar. Knowledge shared of good practice/bad practice thus becomes more applicable. Furthermore, chances that the ties between parliamentarians forged at the events are likely to be more sustainable than if the participants had been drawn from a broader range of countries. PGA has made extensive use of sub-regional and regional meetings in relation to its two other programmes too. It is therefore curious that its current preliminary plans to build parliamentary capacities in Liberia do not include a sub-regional approach.

On the down-side, the short timeframe and insufficient follow-up has limited the relevance of PGA's efforts in terms of the problems it has tried to address and the needs of the target group, namely parliamentarians and the parliamentary systems of crisis-affected countries.

3.4.2 Effectiveness

This section will focus on effectiveness; both in terms of whether planned activities have taken place and to what extent goals and achievements have been reached.

Several planned activities have **not taken place**. Of the activities outlined in the 2001-04 and 2004-06 proposals to Danida, the following activities within the Peace & Democracy Programme have not been undertaken:

1. The 2001-04 document proposed the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Fund with the aim of engaging in parliamentary diplomacy as a preventative action in crisis-affected countries. This would also entail annual meetings PGA's Africa task force in co-operation with the UN and EU special representatives and regional organisations to provide direction to this activity. PGA could not manage to mobilise resources for the concept.
2. The plans mentioned in the 2001-04 proposal include continued involvement to restore peace in the Great Lakes Region. No initiatives were undertaken in the sub-region. However, parliamentarians from the Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda attended the Dar es Salaam and Kampala seminars.
3. A second regional conference on Integration, Immigration and Naturalisation was planned for Abidjan in the 2004-06 proposal as part of the assistance to Côte d'Ivoire. The escalation of violence prohibited this activity. However, no alternative was undertaken either. Thus, while the Ivorian effort constituted the most concerted effort until early 2004, it came to an abrupt end.
4. A multi-party Zimbabwean delegation to Ghana as well as a seminar on the promotion of the rule of law in Harare were planned for 2005 in relation to its work with Zimbabwean MPs. According to PGA's reports, there were detailed plans and resources mobilised to bring a delegation of Zimbabwean parliamentarians to meet with peers in Ghana. PGA and UNDP-Harare decided to suspend the mission after President Mugabe's abuses in the shantytowns.
5. Parliamentary exchanges between EU and ECOWAS and a seminar on Regional Security and Conflict Management to strengthen ECOWAS and the Parliament's conflict resolution mechanisms are mentioned in the 2004-06 proposal. However, ECOWAS applied for and was granted funding directly from the European Commission.
6. In terms of non-African Peace & Democracy activities, there were plans to conduct security sector seminars in Asia and Latin America, similar to the one held in Kampala. PGA had also proposed to undertake a couple of activities in the area of its water management dialogues that had been held between Greek and Turkish members and Azeri and Armenian members. However, the new focus on SALW can be

seen as, to some extent, replacing these plans. Azeri and Armenian participants were invited to the Tbilisi seminar in June.

7. In 2004, PGA had plans to undertake an exploratory mission to Venezuela with the Carter Centre.

Most of the plans mentioned above did not take place due lack of funds caused by the discontinuation of funds from the Netherlands. PGA's resource mobilisation effort is covered in the following chapter. Of the plans that PGA have not managed to implement, its aim to address crisis situations through parliamentary diplomacy – or, what is sometimes known as one-and-half-track diplomacy – is the most significant. Since its conception, **parliamentary diplomacy has been central to PGA's identity**. In the 1990s, PGA has used missions to contribute to the resolution of political crises in Zambia, Togo and the Gambia. As the only global organisation with a voluntary membership base of democratically elected parliamentarians, PGA has a recognised unique edge and strength with regard to brokering peace:

1. Parliamentarians, given the nature of their jobs, tend to have the unique ability to talk with all levels in society – from grassroots to political elite;
2. Parliamentarians can engage in discussions with protagonists as peers and share relevant experiences of their own;
3. Given their professional culture, parliamentarians have a keen appreciation of “politics first”;
4. Through their contacts, parliamentarians can often provide reliable confidential information that may be critical in crisis situations;⁴ and,
5. PGA's parliamentarians mediate in crises in their own voluntary capacity. They have no set agenda dictated by their country's foreign policy or their organisation's position. This gives them the ability to be open, frank and direct in their approach and thus avoid being treated with suspicion of having a hidden agenda. This is an envious position that few international mediators enjoy.

The fact that PGA has not been able to sustain funding for rapid deployments of peace-building missions is a **lost opportunity for the international community**. Considering what is at stake and that these missions are typically a *very* inexpensive means of brokering peace, the consequence seems profound. That PGA's unique strength in this area has not been used to its full potential can be regarded as a resource wasted in the effort to further international peace.

4) *An example of this is that when the Brahimi seminar was to be undertaken in Cairo, the Egyptian members raised the issue of a looming crisis in western Sudan with PGA's Secretariat. They suggested that Sudanese participants be invited to the seminar (under the auspices of a sub-regional partner such as the Arab League, since there were no PGA members in Sudan as there was no democratic parliament) so that discussions could be held with them in one form or another. The Secretariat approached the donor of the conference but the latter thought the crisis did not seem sufficiently relevant and would take attention away from the seminar's main focus. The Sudanese were subsequently not invited. The brewing crisis in question turned out to be the one in Darfur.*

Currently some members of PGA's board are preoccupied with the **brewing crisis in Guinea** (Conakry). Guinean parliamentarians have appealed for help. Should the conflict spiral out of hand, the sub-region may be in serious trouble, given the precarious situations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. While PGA claims it can fairly easily muster up a suitable team of parliamentarians to undertake a consultation mission to Guinea within the space of a few weeks, it does not have readily available resources to finance this. Furthermore, the capacity of PGA's diminished secretariat is so stretched that it may not be able to prepare adequate proposals required to raise funds for this work.

PGA's peace-building **efforts cannot be compared** with UN Security Council missions or Danish Foreign Committee missions to project areas (see ToR). The former are large-scale high-profile and relatively expensive affairs used to bring international attention to a crisis area when negotiations have reached some form of impasse.

The Danish Foreign Policy Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee only undertake study tours to serve information gathering purposes. They typically involve 10-15 MPs and one or two staff members with a total budget of between USD 50,000 to 70,000 per tour. They do not play a part in the conduct of official Danish foreign policy, nor do they aim at peace-building or interact with peers in recipient countries with the aim of promoting democracy. They can, of course, be seen as activities indirectly falling under the general heading of "parliamentary diplomacy", but they can hardly be compared with PGA's peace-building activities in the form of conferences in and missions to conflict areas.

In terms of the extent to which PGA has been effective in reaching the goals it has set, with exception of the SALW pilot project, PGA has **not been able to produce systematic project documents** with a clear hierarchy of goals, expected outputs and a selection of indicators to monitor and evaluate achievements. Nor has there been any systematic monitoring, follow-up or analytical reporting. As is evident in Sections 3.1 to 3.3, this does not mean that important achievements have not been attained.

A disadvantage of the Peace & Democracy Programme with regards to effectiveness is the nature of peace-building. Goals may take a considerable time to achieve. It may be impossible to see how missions, delegations and closed-door bilateral talks are small steps contributing to a resolution until, all of a sudden, significant results are achieved. In addition, it may be counter-productive to report and analyse events such as closed-door meetings. Furthermore, establishing causality linking PGA's activities to positive changes of a situation is particularly difficult because of the complexity that a political conflict entails. In comparison, PGA can readily trace how its activities within its highly regarded ICC initiative, either directly or indirectly, have brought about ratification and legislation.⁵

The nature of PGA's new initiative in the area of SALW has a greater propensity to reach specific objectives and systematically monitor results, particularly if the project is contin-

5) *During interviews, the evaluation team were informed of several very clear examples of PGA's efforts directly contribution to ratification of the Rome Treaty of different countries (e.g. Ghana, Portugal and Reunion). There are also several spin-off effects, even at personal level. The legal assistant of one African member MP gained such expertise during the process leading up his country signing the treaty that he has since landed a job at the ICC itself.*

ued beyond its pilot phase to include more countries and parliamentarians. In many ways, the SALW project resembles PGA's ICC project – both involve mobilising and imparting knowledge to parliamentarians around the world so that treaties are signed and legislation is passed. Furthermore, both projects are part of a larger NGO effort accompanying an inter-governmental process. The SALW project may thereby bring an area of work to the Peace & Democracy Programme that has the **potential to yield clearly measurable results**. While this is a great advantage, it would be a great loss if SALW replaces PGA's peace-building effort through parliamentary diplomacy.

Aside from introducing results-based project management systems, which is discussed further in the following chapter, PGA can **enhance its effectiveness by creating synergies** between its programmes and **establishing strategic partnerships**. With regard to synergies, it is clear that PGA has created synergetic effects – such as using the ICC as a point of departure of discussions in Zimbabwe and sensitising Ivorian MPs on the ICC's role in addressing allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, there is no evidence of synergetic effects being systematically pursued for the mutual benefit of all PGA programme.

While PGA works with different partners within its Peace & Democracy Programme, there appears to be considerable scope to deepen and further develop these partnerships. For instance, PGA's relationship with ECOWAS Parliament could be invigorated. In relation to SALW, PGA is one of five parliamentary actors (AMANI Forum, Parliamentary Forum, AWEPA and Inter-Parliamentary Union). This can be compared to PGA's work within the Sustainable Development & Population Programme, in which it is one of four parliamentary organisations working with UNFPA. Upon request of UNFPA and in agreement with the others, PGA takes the lead to co-ordinate the others. PGA could work for a similar arrangement with the SALW organisations since it is best suited among the five for this role, given its scope, network and membership base. Should PGA develop a help-desk as is foreseen in the project document with UNDP, this function could suitably serve all organisations – thereby contributing to overall efficiency and effectiveness of all five actors and the overall goals of the international SALW *Programme of Action*.

3.4.3 Sustainability

Sustainability in relation to PGA and its efforts can be viewed from two angles: i) PGA's sustainability as a global organisation and network of democratically elected parliamentarians; and, ii) the sustainability of the results achieved by PGA's programmes. The latter can be seen as a wider criterion of impact. In fact, the nature of PGA's efforts means that when PGA obtains its desired impact (in terms of e.g. passed legislation on SALW), then the results will be sustainable.

In terms of PGA's sustainability as an institution, there are two perspectives. PGA's institutional sustainability is buttressed by its core of highly committed members and by being recognised as an established membership-driven organisation with a functioning secretariat, internal network and governance structure. The organisation's relative longevity, despite a drastically changed environment, is also a testament to its sustainability. However, being an organisation of parliamentarians who generally are highly subscribed people and who are engaged in PGA on a voluntary basis *only for as long as they have a seat in parliament*, the members are relatively dependent on the Secretariat for the organisa-

tion to function smoothly. Since membership dues are far from sufficient to keep the Secretariat operational, the organisation is highly dependent on donor funding. Thus, were the Danish assistance to end, the organisation would have to rely on its capacity to draw in new donors to replace the Danish contribution. Currently, judging from the lack of adequate funds, this capacity does not show signs of being sufficiently effective to ensure institutional sustainability.

4 Management

The ToR specify that the quality of PGA's management is to be assessed terms of efficiency. To provide an adequate assessment and coherent recommendations, the evaluation team has decided to assess management from four perspectives. These are i) strategic and programme management; ii) management of resource mobilisation; iii) financial and administrative management; and, v) human resource management. Each must function well to contribute to the achievement of results.

There are many detailed aspects of PGA's management, governance, membership and organisational structures and communication practices that are beyond the scope of this assessment. Nevertheless, the team is aware that these areas warrant analysis and could benefit from suggestions and recommendations. However, the ongoing Sida review is addressing most of these issues. The two reports will therefore be complementary.

4.1 Strategic and Programme Management

Throughout the period covered by this evaluation, PGA has organised its work into three programme areas – a strategy developed as a reaction to the proliferation of different projects that the organisation was juggling in the 1990s. The three programmes would allow the organisation to apply more focus to its efforts. All project ideas have had to fall within the scope of one of the three programmes.

However, it is arguable **whether** the programme areas actually have **achieved enough focus**. Each programme consists of two areas each (peace *and* democracy, human rights *and* international law, and sustainable development *and* population) and is thus tremendously broad in scope. In reality, the Peace & Democracy Programme has mainly undertaken peace-oriented activities (at least they are no more democracy-oriented than other activities) with almost an exclusive focus on Africa. Likewise, the Human Rights & International Programme is mainly concerned with activities relating to the ICC but is global in scope; while the Sustainable Development & Population Programme has had a strong HIV/AIDS focus and has been especially active in Asia.

PGA is coming to realise that it must improve its **project management**. Until its co-operation with UNDP, the Peace & Democracy Programme proposals have lacked analysis and explicitly formulated goals and outcomes. Nor does PGA have established systems and routines for monitoring, follow-up and gathering of lessons learnt. Often planned activities have had a short-sighted timeframe and been vaguely described. Nonetheless, interviews and discussions with PGA's staff and members reveal that strategic thinking takes place and relevant rationales exist. These are not, however, adequately reflected in its project documentation.

PGA would gain considerably from introducing results-based project management. It would make it clear and transparent to internal and external stakeholders what the organisation is trying to achieve and how. Not only will results-based management make it easier to report on results, the systematic approach that result-based management entails would also contribute to enhancing the quality of the efforts and producing more results.

Linked to the issue of project management, is **reporting on progress** and achievements. Reporting has lacked analysis, consisted of descriptive accounts and seemed to have relied considerably on word-processing's "cut & paste" function. For instance, one report stated that the activity "had achieved its goals" but failed to outline what these were. Another referred to "the concrete results achieved" without explaining what these were. One would expect that reporting to core donors would go beyond reporting on programmatic activities to include information and analysis on all aspects of the organisation's undertakings – but this is not the case. For instance, the 2005 report to Danida could appropriately have provided the reasoning behind selecting migration, immigration and integration as a central topic at the latest Annual Forum in Dublin, and what PGA hoped to attain. What were the outcomes of the Forum in terms of governance related issues? How many of PGA's members were sponsored by PGA to attend the forum? What principles guided PGA in selecting participants it sponsored? Did bilateral consultations take place?

Another area of weakness acknowledged by the organisation is that its communications **practices and systems** are not optimal. Information flows between within the organisation are not always as good as they could be.⁶ To be able to be responsive to and activate members, good channels of communication are crucial. In addition, the technical aspects of PGA's communications system are inadequate – its email system has been known to crash, sometimes for several days. Furthermore, PGA recognises the deficiencies of its website and has had plans to revamp it for the last couple of years. As of yet, there have not been sufficient resources to engage in a website facelift. Having a "member's only" intranet, from where *all* documentation could be downloaded and where contact details of all members would be available, would contribute to transparency, improve information-sharing and might mobilise less active members.

PGA would benefit from a communications strategy covering both external and internal communications, not least given the high turnover of Secretariat staff (see Section 4.4) which requires introducing new employees to the organisation's practices. It would not have to be highly sophisticated. Elements could include an analysis of current communication practice, its communication needs, modes of communication available to PGA and what information needs to be communicated and when.

Spurred by the funding crisis and the recognised weaknesses of the organisation, PGA has undertaken a process of reflection in the last year to try to establish direction, improved focus and a plan for the way ahead. Unfortunately, PGA has not had sufficient funds and human resources to profoundly engage itself in this process while trying to keep the organisation afloat. Nevertheless some headway is being made. A survey of members' views was undertaken by a consultant and an internal strategic meeting held at Harvard last autumn. Consultants have also produced strategic plan for 2006 to 2010, but it is too shallow to actually be used as such. Within the Peace & Democracy Programme there seems to be considerable consensus that the organisation should assert itself in the area of conflict prevention by undertaking peace-building missions to countries where it has window of opportunity.

6) *The data gathered on communication between the Secretariat and members is contradictory. Some reports and members, particularly those who are not members of the International Council, find their communication with the Secretariat to be inadequate. Meanwhile, others say they are in regular contact with the Secretariat, mainly by email, and are satisfied with how informative and responsive the Secretariat is.*

4.2 Management of Resource Mobilisation

PGA's funding base is far from optimal. While it currently enjoys crucial multi-year core funding from Sida, Danida and the Ford Foundation, the rest of its income is earmarked, unpredictable and comes from too many different sources in what are generally too small sums. This places PGA in a very vulnerable position as witnessed in 2005 when expected Dutch core funds failed to come through. This had devastating consequences for the organisation and its activities, not least those of the Peace & Democracy Programme. This also had negative consequences for the core budget donors such as Danida, since much of their grants had to support the Secretariat that had insufficient funds to undertake programmatic activities – core resources were thus tied down in “holding the fort”.

Compared to its early years of existence, PGA faces stiffer competition for funds because of the upsurge of NGOs that are scrambling for financing. PGA's members and Secretariat seem relatively discouraged by the difficulties it has faced in mobilising resources. However, it appears that PGA has experienced greater competition because PGA i) has not been sufficiently skilled in marketing itself; and, ii) has not devised a concerted strategy to raise funds.

First, PGA has unique qualities that, if properly communicated, could make it more popular with funding institutions. It is the only global non-governmental network organisation of democratically elected parliamentarians that does not focus on a single issue. It is membership-driven and its members provide impressive in-kind contributions. The organisation is flexible and action-oriented. It can mobilise itself on short notice. Its work is of solid quality and advice on ICC issues is considered first class by some stakeholders. None of these characteristics are convincingly argued in its proposals.

In addition, as discussed in Section 4.1 above, PGA has not been proficient in presenting credible enough proposals. With the demands that aid agencies have on showing that aid money is contributing to development goals and yielding outcomes, funding proposals need to reflect results-based management. Furthermore, it may be difficult for some aid agencies to gain a clear understanding of what areas PGA actually works with since there is a disconnect between the broad programme titles and the focus of the activities undertaken.

Second, PGA needs a resource mobilisation strategy to identify what sources might be available, which aid agencies it would like to work with and what will be the best approach to secure these sources. This will require keeping abreast with the aid policy debate and what budget lines in the agencies are in keeping with the aims of PGA's programmes.

PGA is currently in the process of working on such a strategy. This process will require creative thinking, prioritisation and a resolute campaign. Would it be advantageous to partner with another organisation when seeking specific funds? Should it package some efforts as regional to access regional earmarked budget lines? How can it use partners and other donors to open doors to new potential donors? Are there opportunities to bring donors/potential donors together to discuss PGA's overall or programme-specific direction? While the bulk of the fund-raising needs to be responsibility of the Secretariat, drawing on members to support the resource mobilisation effort may be valuable. When doing so it is important to determine whether the donor would react positively or nega-

tively to meeting with a northern parliamentarian member who may be seen as “benefiting” from aid resources.⁷

PGA would benefit from fewer funding sources in total, but more donors who provide larger grants. According to PGA, it spends considerable time on meeting with and preparing separate reports for each donor. Given the relatively small size of the total budget, significant resources are tied down in managing donor relations and preparing separate reports to each donor. To access larger sums, one must generally request bigger contributions. PGA could, for instance, ask for a contribution for a whole series of seminars as opposed to for one event.

PGA is also in dire need of more predictable funding. In consultation with its current core donors, PGA could consider trying to establish co-ordinated multi-year core funding with a group of supportive donors. This has been successfully achieved by other small membership NGOs such as the African Publisher’s Network and the Media Institute of Southern Africa. In both cases, Danida and Sida played active roles throughout the process of establishing the set-up which has become known as a *strategic partnership concept*.⁸

The strategic partnership concept constitutes more than financial support to PGA’s core budget. It should be regarded as a process in which PGA and its major donors participate as “strategic partners”. Central to the concept is that PGA and its partners together take collective responsibility for achievements and failures of PGA’s programme. The strategic partnership would hinge on the partners together aiming at a common set of goals – specifically those outlined in a three-year strategic plan produced by PGA. Fundamental principles include: i) each donor’s long-term commitment to PGA’s mission; ii) open dialogue and exchange between the partners on policy development and progress, which is based on respect, trust, transparency and the recognition of PGA as the owner of the process; and, iii) donors contributing to PGA’s core budget and adherence to a co-ordination framework with specific management mechanisms. The set-up would entail leaner reporting since the same format would be used for all partners. This is outlined further in Annex 4.

4.3 Administrative and Financial Management

PGA’s Secretariat operates on a very small budget, compared to many other global NGOs. It is highly cost-conscious. Its salaries are lower than other New York NGOs. PGA has developed efficient expenditure control, including use of vouchers and a strict petty cash system. Likewise, PGA ensures that its expenditure on travel and per diem are low. The cheapest prices of air tickets available in New York and in the country of a member’s origin are compared before a ticket is bought. PGA’s per diems for any city in the world amount to no more than USD 60 – and they are reduced if hotel breakfast

- 7) *When it is possible, arranging for donors to meet with a group of northern and southern members would be a suitable approach that is likely to have a beneficial effect.*
- 8) *Other donors that have been involved with Sida and Danida in strategic partnerships with an NGO include the Ford Foundation, the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, Norad and DIFD. Sida is currently exploring the use of this model in the funding of several other global networking NGOs.*

and/or working lunches and dinners are provided. Entitlements are clearly explained to members and seminar participants. Nevertheless, travel and lodging are among the greatest costs of PGA's programmes. Interpretation also constitutes an important expense.

Because PGA's programmes operate on fairly low costs and consist of comparatively few and inexpensive activities, the relationship between the cost of supporting the Secretariat and implementing activities is relatively high. The ratio has been further worsened by the down-scaling of programme activities as a result of PGA's funding difficulties.

In addition to receiving more funds, the relationship between operating costs and programme activities would be improved if the value of in-kind contributions were aggregated and entered into budget calculations. The scale and range of in-kind contributions are considerable. They include the time contributed by dozens of member parliamentarians who, for instance, serve as seminar chairs, on the board, in the International Council and who help organise events and mobilise funds. Furthermore, national parliaments frequently contribute with meeting facilities and logistical assistance when events are hosted by a national member group. The value of these contributions can amount to significant sums – particularly with regard to the Annual Forums. In addition, some parliamentarians find sponsorship or pay their own way to the Annual Forums. Moreover, PGA does not pay any stipend to its external programme advisers, members of its UN Committee or to its guest speakers – all contribute in-kind to PGA.

During the course of this evaluation, the evaluation team raised the issue of the importance of recognising its in-kind contributions as a resource with a monetary value. For instance, the in-kind contribution to the SALW meeting in Dakar this year amounts to USD 34,000 and the in-kind resources granted by Bangladesh during the last meeting held in Dhaka is estimated at USD 80,000. As a consequence of the team's discussions with board members, a board decision was taken before this report was even drafted to go ahead and estimate, record and account PGA's in-kind contributions.

PGA has developed sound and systematic financial management systems. The budget activities are clear and realistic. This allows for efficient administrative and financial management of the programmes. Audits of the organisation have been satisfactory. There has been no mention of any irregularities in the auditor's covering letters to the audited accounts.

4.4 Human Resources

PGA's Secretariat is relatively small and has shrunk from a staff of 11 persons to 7. In 2004, the Secretariat had a Secretary-General, an Administration and Finance Director, three other administrative staff members, five programme officers and one programme associate. Today, the Secretariat is down to a Secretary-General, two programme staff members and three administrative staff members. A consultant helps PGA run the Sustainable Development & Population Programme. In addition, PGA has an intern programme.

The reduction in the size of PGA is a result of the reduced resources available to the Secretariat in 2005. Not only were staff members fired in this period, salaries were temporarily reduced. Needless to say, the financial crisis had a negative impact on staff morale.

PGA's Secretariat has several strengths. The Secretary-General's vast network, particularly within the UN system, is regularly referred to as an important asset to the organisation. Both programme officers are considered knowledgeable in their respective area of work and highly appreciated by members. The administrative staff appears to be hard-working. Commitment and dedication is high. The Secretariat is competent in organising events. While last minute upsets and changes to agendas are not unknown to happen, PGA's Secretariat has the professionalism to address these obstacles so as to land on its feet. In addition, when funds are available, the Secretariat makes appropriate use of consultants, often from academia, to provide country-specific knowledge and expertise.

In addition to the weak capacities regarding results-based project management, resources mobilisation and communications management as discussed above, with only two staff members dedicated to its programmes, the Secretariat does not have sufficient human resources to run current projects as well as develop new initiatives in line with the demands of the members. The lack of sufficient human resources acts as a bottleneck for programme development.

PGA is known to attract young (often in their 20s), and ambitious people to its secretariat positions. However, the fact the organisation is small in size and can offer no opportunities for career advancement, combined with a salary level that is considered slightly lower than the average NGO wage in New York City, has contributed to a regular turnover of staff. This turnover has particularly affected the Peace & Democracy and Sustainable Development & Population Programmes and is a considerable concern of the members.

5 Conclusions

PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme is highly relevant to the needs as expressed by its members. A main factor contributing to the Programme's relevancy is PGA's ability to **engage appropriate persons** – in terms of experience, knowledge, personal qualities and position of influence – for peace-building missions; consultations and initiatives within conflict-affected countries; or international, regional or sub-regional Peace & Democracy events. The organisation has skilfully used its impressive network to this end. In all its peace & democracy initiatives PGA has shown considerable regard for **political, regional and gender balance**.

Between 2001 and 2004, PGA showed **commitment and active engagement** in the efforts to promote dialogue in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe. PGA was tactful, responsive to the situation and showed efficiency in making the most of opportunities. PGA **competently used relevant and effective approaches** in its peace-building work. This included sending multi-party delegations from crisis-affected countries to relevant international events; identifying highly pertinent but not ostensibly confrontational topics for discussion between opposing parties; and, broadening the scope of the dialogue by using sub-regional settings. Furthermore, PGA has made use of formal and informal peer-to-peer consultations that have discussed issues such as parliamentary principles, practical procedures and conduct; the current situation in a crisis-affected country; and, how specific types of crises have been addressed in other parliaments in the past.

PGA's Peace & Democracy Programme has not yielded the same level of impressive results and impact as its highly regarded ICC programme has. One reason is perhaps that it is more difficult to assess its impact than to establish that of the ICC programme. Nevertheless, although the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe are far from resolved, PGA was effective in achieving some concrete results that contributed positively towards resolution. Furthermore, PGA's new initiative in the area of SALW, which is guided by a results-based project document, has already achieved effects. The project has a realistic chance of meeting its objectives if it is continued beyond its pilot phase to include more parliamentarians from different countries.

Insufficient funding, particularly in the last couple of years, has undermined PGA's planned activities – a number of which have not taken place. The initiatives in Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire had to be prematurely abandoned. As a result, PGA's **distinctive edge and strength** with regard to brokering peace has **not been used to its full potential**. This constitutes a wasted resource and a lost opportunity for the international peace effort. Although it runs its operations on a shoestring, PGA does not have the resources to develop its programmes and establish the critical mass of staff in the Secretariat to manage them. PGA needs to scale up its resource mobilisation effort considerably. If it does not, there is a real risk of entering a negative spiral of decline.

PGA's lack of a clear hierarchy of goals for its programmatic activities, coupled with the failure to systematically monitor and follow-up efforts have weakened its effectiveness. Given the importance most aid agencies place on effectiveness, not having elaborated results-based project documents and systems may also have placed PGA at a disadvantage when seeking new funding sources. Likewise, PGA's inability to convincingly report on achievements may have prevented renewal of funding.

Currently PGA is **at the crossroads**. PGA is making a conscious effort to grapple with its weaknesses and is trying to carve out a future direction for the organisation. The question is whether PGA will have the resources to give it space to pursue these efforts or whether it will be confined to keeping the organisation running from day-to-day.

Given PGA's circumstances, the organisation would greatly benefit from a **comprehensive strategic plan** that stakes out the direction it aims to take, coupled with an indicative budget covering at least three years. This would contribute to greater long-sightedness; greater transparency within the organisation; and, facilitate activities with partners, including donors. The plan should cover all aspects of the organisation and be updated *every* year. It would need to include a clear results-based multi-year plan for each programmatic area. With regard to Peace & Democracy, this entails providing an analysis of the current situation and problems with a rationale for the programme's activities – including risks and external factors. A detailed account of PGA's capacity to address the issues at stake, clear objectives, expected outcomes, planned activities and required input would need to be elaborated. Furthermore, quality monitoring mechanisms and indicators would also need to be devised.

The plan would address questions such as: will PGA aim to undertake one to three, two to four or three to six peace-building initiatives in a three-year period? Will the programme have a geographical focus? Which partners will it work with and how? At what stage would the SALW project be phased out? How will the Peace & Democracy Programme interact with PGA's other programmatic areas to create synergetic effects?

For it to function as an effective steering instrument for the Secretariat and PGA's governing structures, the strategic plan would need to cover more than just its programmes and include relevant governance and organisational issues. For example, it would outline how it will interact with its membership base, mobilise funds, organise its annual forums, undertake communications, engage in partnership arrangements, and how it will undertake any planned governance reforms. The preparation of the strategic plan should, to the extent possible involve the broader membership base. Active direction would be required from PGA's governing structures.

A realistic and well-structured strategic plan is central to the **strategic partnership concept**. Given PGA's current predicament and the possible momentum resulting from the two ongoing evaluation processes, it may be an opportune moment for PGA to embark on a strategic partnership process with its core donors. This will obviously require a concerted effort on behalf PGA. It will also require more engagement, at least temporarily, from Danida and Sida, to support the process and persuade other donor agencies to consider joining in. This effort may be justifiable on five grounds: i) the process will lead to enhanced effectiveness; ii) the mechanism involved entail more leaner reporting systems; iii) it reduces the risk of being stuck with funding a wing-clipped Secretariat, should additional ear-marked funds for programme activities be insufficient; iv) the concept of co-ordinated funding is in line with the harmonisation and alignment outlined in the Rome Declaration, which both agencies have committed themselves to adhere to; and, v) it provides the strategic partners with the opportunity to engage in dialogue with PGA and its members on strategic policy issues of mutual interest (such as the ICC, peace-building, potential conflicts and the concept of parliamentary democracy itself) that could potentially inform their respective foreign and development policy.

5.1 Recommendations

1. PGA should develop **results-based project management capacities**. This includes systematic project planning, monitoring and reporting. This is likely to entail some form of in-house training. In terms of the effort to monitor results, this will require commitment on behalf of members involved in the organisation's activities to support the Secretariat in providing information and participating in surveys.
2. Using results-based capacities, PGA should elaborate a **strategic three-year plan** with an indicative budget covering all aspects of the organisation. It should stake out the direction PGA aims to take with regard to each of its programme areas. It should also set aims for internal organisational activities and processes such as, for instance, resource mobilisation, Annual Forums and enhancing its membership base. It should be developed in a participatory manner with the involvement of members and active guidance from PGA's governing structures. The plan should be accompanied by an annual work plan and budget. PGA's donors should consider supporting this process.
3. Given PGA's unique strength with regard to brokering peace, PGA should reassert itself in the area of **conflict prevention and peace-building**. This will require the PGA to prioritise among potential/actual crises according to where PGA has a comparative advantage to engage. PGA should also identify donors that have a special interest in this area and strengthen ties with regional organisations and the UN Secretariat.
4. PGA needs to launch a concerted **resource mobilisation campaign**, based on research of relevant donor priorities and policies. PGA should clearly and convincingly outline its many strengths. Proposals should reflect result-based management.
5. PGA and its core donors should explore the possibility of engaging in a process leading up to co-ordinated core funding in the form of a **strategic partnership**. In addition to the strategic plan, a memorandum of understanding outlining the management mechanisms and serving as a co-ordination framework would need to be devised. Efforts would need to be made by PGA and its "friends" to attract the interest of other donors.
6. PGA should systematise the **reporting of the in-kind contributions** it receives and calculate their value in US dollars. These in-kind contributions should be included in the annual report and should be used strategically in the effort to attain funding.
7. PGA should consider devising a **communication strategy**. It should include an analysis of its communication needs, modes of communication available to PGA and what information needs to be communicated and when. As part of this effort, PGA should pursue the plan to **improve its website**. In addition to upgrading the site to provide a better reflection of what PGA is and does, it should become a dynamic tool to strengthen PGA's internal communication and transparency. A "member's only" intranet could be established from where *all* documentation is downloadable and where contact details of members would be available.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Peace and Democracy Programme

1. Introduction

The object of this evaluation is the work of the 'Peace and Democracy Programme', with a special focus on Africa, which is supported by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, under core funding and implemented by the NGO Parliamentarians for Global Action, PGA.

An evaluation of the Peace and Democracy Programme's work on Peacemaking and Peace Building with focus on Africa will be conducted in connection with the PGA's meeting 'Realizing the Full Potential of the UN Peace Building Commission – The Role of Parliamentarians' to take place on June 30th, 2006, at the United Nations in New York.

The evaluation will be carried out by an Evaluation Team of external consultants engaged by Danida's Evaluation Department in consultation with PGA.

2. Programme Description

The objectives of the 'Peace and Democracy Programme' are to mobilize and strengthen the capacity of legislators to prevent and resolve violent conflict and to strengthen accountable democratic institutions at national and regional levels. In response to emerging or ongoing political crises (especially those with the potential for, or a history of, violence), PGA members assist their peers by sharing skills and experience, promoting parliamentary dialogue across lines of political confrontation and supporting democratic institutions and processes. Through parliamentary oversight and capacity-building initiatives, the program aids newly emerging democracies in building and strengthening a democratic framework of legal and political institutions.

The Peace and Democracy Programme's work in Africa falls under 1) peace-building measures in response to immediate or ongoing crises, which encompasses its work in Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi; and 2) long term structural peace-building work including collaboration with ECOWAS and our work on Human Security and the promotion of Security Sector Reform in East Africa:

Zimbabwe

Through its confidence building measures since 2002, PGA has established trust and relationships across party lines among members of the parliament of Zimbabwe, and has facilitated links between Zimbabwean MPs and parliamentarians from other countries with a stake in the outcome of the crisis such as South Africa and the United Kingdom. These dialogues culminated in the September 2004 dialogue between Zimbabwean and United Kingdom legislators at the House of Commons in London. PGA plans to move the multi-party political dialogue among Zimbabwean MPs to a higher political level by reviving the dialogue between higher level officials in ZANU-PF and MDC who were involved in past negotiations on constitutional reform. In May 2005, PGA will sponsor

an exchange, hosted by PGA Ghana, between a high level multiparty delegation of Zimbabwean MPs and legislators from Ghana who negotiated constitutional reforms and electoral codes that are relevant to the Zimbabwe situation.

Côte d'Ivoire

In February 2001, PGA sent a parliamentary *Preventive Action Mission to Côte d'Ivoire*. As the mission stressed the importance of international observers during the municipal elections, PGA sent a small observer team to work with the observers from the Embassies of the Netherlands and the United States. On March 15, 2001, PGA presented the results of the mission in an *Arria's Formula briefing on West Africa* to the United Nations Security Council.

At the request PGA's multiparty national group in Côte d'Ivoire, PGA organized a sub-regional *Parliamentary Seminar on Immigration, Naturalization and Integration in West Africa* in February 2002. The seminar created space for dialogue on regional reconciliation and integration issues. The emphasis was placed on democratic dialogue to reduce ethnic and political tensions and reduce human rights violations.

PGA sent a *Consultative Mission to Côte d'Ivoire* on May 8-11, 2003, in collaboration with the United Nations Special Representative, to discuss with Ivorian parliamentarians how they can work on a parallel level to provide support for the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Process. PGA also brought a multiparty delegation of parliamentarians from Côte d'Ivoire to its 25th Anniversary Tribute, held on September 16, 2003 in the United States Congress, Washington D.C. The delegation agreed to hold the Second Regional Seminar on Immigration, Integration, and Naturalization in Abidjan, in Côte d'Ivoire.⁹

Since then, PGA has been focusing on Côte d'Ivoire on achieving "secondary" objectives and indirectly supporting efforts that are led by other entities, such as the implementation of the Linas Marcoussis Peace Accord, the UN Peace-keeping Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI), and the intervention on the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹⁰ PGA also continued its initiatives to foster dialogue among MPs, including with "hard-liners", as a strategy that PGA pursues to curb the violence and support the peacemaking

9) *The UN Security Council recognized, with its resolutions on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in 2003 and the pivotal report of the Secretary General of January 2004, that the key factors provoking the conflict were the policy of limiting civil and political rights of citizens of foreign origin and the connected violent actions structured along the lines of political parties and groups. A similar analysis of the problems – and potential solution – to the Ivorian crisis was included in the Final Document of the PGA seminar held in Abidjan in February 2002, well before the deflagration of the civil conflict, for which the UNSC resolutions 1464 and 1479 of 2003 posed as conventional starting-date September 19, 2002.*

10) *Notably, the Government of Cote d'Ivoire accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Cote d'Ivoire after September 19, 2002, as the Registrar of the ICC made public on February 15, 2005, in the website of the ICC. However, PGA is aware that the declaration of the Ivorian Government accepting the ICC intervention was deposited already in the course of 2003: this triggered the recruitment of a consultant/expert by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in The Hague, who was given the task to monitor the Ivorian situation. Following the escalation of violence between October and November 2004, the Prosecutor decided to send a team of investigators in Cote d'Ivoire. Since then, PGA received informal communications from its Ivorian Members that the "presence" of the ICC in Cote d'Ivoire might have had the effect of reducing the scale of the violence.*

efforts. At the meeting of the International Council of PGA held during the 2005 Annual Forum in Wellington New Zealand on December 5, 2004, PGA members discussed the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly the reported human rights violations, the suppression of free press and state-sponsored hate media. Alarmed by the gravity of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the members of the International Council passed a resolution condemning the violation of the cease fire and calling on the government to restore a free and independent press and ensure the safety of political actors and the normal functioning of Parliament.

Burundi

At the request of its members and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, PGA's Peace and Democracy Programme sent a series of missions to **Burundi** in 1993-96 to assist in conflict management, and preserve the national parliament and its role in peacemaking. From 1997-2004, PGA has followed developments in Burundi and involved Burundian parliamentarians in its international and regional meetings. At the request of Burundian members and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Burundi, PGA is considering organizing a *Seminar on Political Leadership* in Burundi for September 2005.

ECOWAS

On June 13, 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the **ECOWAS Parliament** and PGA that ensures that both parties "will work collaboratively on issues of political integration and sustainable development in West Africa." The MOU enables PGA to use its proven track record in West Africa and well established regional and global network to assist ECOWAS in finding lasting solutions to interrelated regional conflicts. The first project facilitated under the MOU was the *Parliamentary Seminar on Human Trafficking in West Africa* which took place on February 24-25, 2004 in Abuja, Nigeria. The seminar provided over 140 participants (including 52 MPs as well as members of the diplomatic community, NGOs, international organizations, and the media) with information on how to adopt laws criminalizing trafficking in human beings and to build the necessary administrative structures to address and prevent the phenomena.

Security Sector Reform

On September 19-20, 2002, PGA organized a *Sub-Regional Parliamentary Seminar on Capacity-Building of Parliamentary Committees on Security Issues* in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Legislators from Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Sweden, Tanzania, Uganda and local and international experts discussed mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of budget, defense and foreign relations parliamentary committees with regard to security sector decision-making and oversight. In follow-up to this meeting, the *Regional Parliamentary Seminar on Security Sector Reform* was convened on October 14-15, 2004 in Kampala, Uganda. Topics addressed included the concept of "human security" as a goal of national security policy, the role of legislators in promoting human security through their oversight of national security policy and the armed forces, methods of strengthening the government-opposition relations with regard to the creation and oversight of national security policy and the role of the International Criminal Court in promoting accountability with regard to the use of force.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

During the course of a number of PGA events addressing human security, parliamentarians have expressed concern about the illicit or otherwise destabilizing proliferation of small

arms and light weapons, particularly in post conflict situations. A successful Strategy Session was held on Addressing the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) at the end of February 2005 to obtain the invaluable input of different stakeholders vis-à-vis how PGA could constructively put its skills and membership to best use in the SALW area and identify potential future areas for collaboration as between the different parties involved. The result was a pilot project to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa and the CIS regions composed of the following activities in 2006:

- *January*: Parliamentary Delegation to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference to Assess the Implementation of the Programme of Action (UN Headquarters, New York).
- *February*: Parliamentary Seminar on Addressing the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms/Light Weapons in Africa (Dakar, Senegal).
- *May*: Parliamentary Seminar on Addressing the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms/Light Weapons in the Western CIS, Caucuses and Eastern Balkans (Tbilisi, Georgia).
- *June*: Parliamentary Delegation to the July 2006 Review Conference to Assess the Implementation of the Programme of Action (United Nations Headquarters, New York).

3. Aims of the Evaluation

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess whether the Peace and Democracy Programme's projects in Africa are achieving their objectives – given the financial and staff resources – in accordance with established indicators of success.

The specific aims will be to:

- Assess each action undertaken to date, under the Programme in Africa, with specific reference to the degree of achievement.
- Provide advice and guidance on the project in case of deviation from the original ToR.

The evaluation is intended for use by PGA and Danida.

The outcome of the study will be a set of conclusions and related recommendations.

4. Methodology

The evaluation will assess the results achieved by the Programme in relation to those planned, and using the lessons learned, will make recommendations for the implementation of the remaining part of the project.

The evaluation will be carried out according to the activity scheduled in this ToR. The visits to projects sites will be conducted in New York during PGA's meeting 'Realizing the Full Potential of the UN Peace Building Commission – The Role of Parliamentarians' to take place on June 30th, 2006, at the United Nations and at PGA's Secretariat in New York. During the meeting, the evaluators will have opportunity to observe the activities of the Peace and Democracy Programme and interview some of the leading parliamentarians and project leaders of the programme.

5. Descriptive Analysis

5.1 Degree of achievement of activities

The planned project's activities can be grouped into three types:

- Peace building missions.
- Regional/sub-regional conferences, meetings, briefings and consultations.
- International conferences (i.e. Annual Fora, and Seminar on Ethics and Accountability).

The peace building missions will be evaluated on the basis of what was accomplished, the regional and political balance in the mission and the level of interaction between the delegation and the target audience of parliamentarians.

The regional/sub-regional, and international conferences/meetings/briefings and consultations will be carefully evaluated based on the following indicators such as: the level of political diversity of participants, the relevance of their roles with regard to the conference topic, participants' overall level of commitment, the appropriateness of session topics and panel participants, and the quality of background materials and conference reports. Based on what finances were there to support follow-up activity, the degree to which appropriate follow-up action was initiated will also be evaluated and will include a comparison of PGA's peace-building work with other relevant actions including an analysis of the budget available for the action.¹¹

It is important to note at the outset that the PGA Peace and Democracy Programme aims to achieve long- and mid-term objectives, even though PGA interventions also target urgent crises that require short-term solutions, which might be achieved only through the concerted and coordinated efforts of several institutional interventions (governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental).

6. Evaluative Analysis

6.1 Relevance

The analysis involves assessing the adequacy of the project objectives to the problems it is addressing. Attention will be given to the quality of project design and planning. The degree of involvement and consultation with beneficiaries and counterpart institutions from the very beginning of the Project will be an important aspect to be considered.

6.2 Efficiency

Attention will be focused on the cost and time required to produce project results. Have project inputs been used in the best possible way to achieve results? Were activities carried out on time, within budget and according to plan? How far did funding, personnel, administrative and other resources contribute to, or hindered, the achievement of results? Did unexpected results arise from activities?

¹¹ For comparison-budget, data may be requested regarding Security Council mission to conflict areas or Danish Foreign Committee mission to project areas.

The following aspects of efficiency will be particularly assessed:

- financial efficiency, adequacy of resources;
- quality of internal management;
- quality of technical assistance;
- quality of monitoring;
- co-ordination with beneficiaries, local institutions, national Governments, other Donors.

6.3 Effectiveness

The analysis of effectiveness concerns the extent to which planned project achievements have been achieved, whether at the level of activities, results or objectives.

6.4 Sustainability

The analysis of sustainability relates to the continuation of benefits from the project intervention after major assistance of the programme has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits are to be assessed.

7. Input to the evaluation

Preparation of the evaluation will be undertaken by the evaluators prior to the PGA meeting through three-four days; two days are assigned to participant observation and interviews; and three-four days will be spent on reporting. The Team leader will be allocated 10 days of work, while a team member// resource person will be allocated max. 8 days of work. In addition, funds will be allocated to cover the reimbursable costs of logistics (i.a. one travel New York-Copenhagen for the team leader, and one travel Copenhagen-New York for the team member, if necessary). The consultants' contract will be concluded as per Danida KR-rules.

8. Outputs

The main outputs of the evaluation will be 1) a Draft Evaluation Report, max. 30 pages, excluding annexes, to be delivered in Word and pdf.files, with cover photo proposals; the draft report will be adjusted by the evaluator after receiving comments from the evaluation management; 2) a Final Evaluation Report, max. 30 pages, excluding annexes, with attached CD-ROM (of all major evaluation documents), to be delivered in Word and pdf.files; 3) a Draft Evaluation Summary, 3-4 pages, for production of a pamphlet aimed at public audiences; 4) finally, the evaluation team will also be required to deliver a 'post-mortem' brief report (max. five pages) of their evaluation process experiences.

9. Timetable of the evaluation

The tentative time schedule of the evaluation is as follows:

Draft Contract proposal submitted by consultant	Latest by 12 June 2006
Preparation of work	3-4 days mid-June
Participant observation and interviews in New York	(29) 30 June (1 July)
Reporting	3-4 days in July
Draft Evaluation Report submitted	10 July 2006
Final Evaluation Report submitted	10 August 2006

10. The proposed Evaluation team

The Evaluation team will be composed of a Team leader, Consultant Ms. Cecilia Magnusson Ljungman, and a team member/resource person (to be decided). The Team leader has expertise on African issues with a focus on peacemaking and peace building, democracy building, conflict resolution, and political leadership. The other team member/resource person should have expertise in the areas of inter-parliamentary work.

11. Reporting

The basic DAC-evaluation principles of independence of those responsible for the design and implementation of the development intervention, and of utilisation of evaluators external to the donor and implementing organisations will be applied. The evaluation team will refer to Danida's Evaluation Department, EVAL, as regards contracting, quality assurance and implementation arrangement.

Responsibility for the content and presentation of the findings and recommendations of the evaluation rests with the evaluation team. The views and opinions expressed in the report will not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish Government, the Parliamentarians for Global Action, or the implementing organisations. The report of the evaluation will be available to all relevant stakeholders and the public, and submitted to the Board of Danida, and to the Parliamentarians for Global Action.

Copenhagen, 6 June 2006
Evaluation Department

Annex 2: Persons Met/Interviewed

Persons Interviewed

1. *Shazia Rafi* Secretary General, PGA.
2. *Peter Barcroft* Senior Programme Officer, Peace & Democracy Programme, PGA.
3. *Michael Agbeko* Finance/Administrative Director, PGA.
4. *Helen Vasilopoulos* Development Officer, PGA.
5. *David Donat-Cattin* Director of Programmes, International Law & Human Rights, PGA.
6. *Nebiyat Woldemichael* Former Programme Officer, Peace & Democracy Programme, PGA.
7. *Gilbert Martin* Consultant, PGA.
8. *Oláfur Ragnar Grímson* President of Iceland, former PGA member.
9. *Karl-Göran Biörsmark* Former Swedish MP, former President of PGA.
10. *Alain Destexhe* Belgian Senator, President of PGA.
11. *Kent Olsson* Swedish MP, Executive Committee, former Peace & Democracy Convenor.
12. *Ermelinda Meksi* Albanian MP, International Council, former Deputy Prime Minister, former Minister of Economic Co-operation, Minister of European Integration.
13. *Davis Coltart* Zimbabwean MP, Shadow Minister of Justice.
14. *Jeppe Kofod* Danish MP, Foreign Policy Spokesman, PGA Treasurer.
15. *Albin Bagbin* Ghanaian MP, Chair of Legal Committee, former member of International Council.
16. *Naveed Qamar* Pakistani MP, Executive Committee, Deputy Convenor, Peace & Democracy Programme.
17. *Raynell Anreychuk* Canadian Senator, Senate Committee on Human Rights, Former Judge and Ambassador, Convenor International Law & Human Rights Programme.
18. *Bassey Ewa-Henshaw* Nigerian Senator, Executive Council, Deputy Convenor, Peace & Democracy Programme.
19. *Ibrahim Sorie* Sierra Leonean MP, Minority Whip.
20. *Fatima Nagdee Hajajij** South African MP, Chair, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Member of International Council, former Convenor Peace & Democracy Programme.
21. *Jonas Sjöstedt* Swedish MEP, member of PGA International Council.
22. *David Malone** Canadian Deputy Foreign Minister, Former PGA adviser.
23. *Pierre Schori* SRSG in Abidjan, former PGA member, former Swedish Ambassador & former Chair of PGA's UN Committee.
24. *Kristina Svensson* Former Swedish MP, actively involved in PGA's Burundi and Zimbabwe efforts.
25. *Peter Kolding* Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
26. *Harumi Kodama** UNFPA.

*) *Interviewed by Sida consultant and information passed on to the Danida team.*

27. *Arjan Hamburger* Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of the Netherlands.
28. *Helena Bjuremalm* Sida PGA Desk Officer, Division for Democracy and Human Rights.
29. *Lauro L. Baja* Ambassador, Permanent Representative, Philippine Mission to the UN, Chair of UN Committee.
30. *Marc-Antoine Morel* UNDP, Division for Small Arms and Light Weapons.
31. *Bayani S. Mercado* Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative, Philippine Mission to the UN.

Annex 3: Documents Reviewed

List of Documents Reviewed

1. *Cutler, Robert* “PGA Strategic Review and Planning Document”, October 2005.
2. *Cutler, Robert* “The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society”; www.robertcutler.org.
3. *Hilding, Sven and Michael Camitz* “Parliamentarians for Global Action, Appraisal of a Request for Endowment Fund”, Sida, June 1999.
4. *Landsberg, Chris* “Understanding the Crisis in Zimbabwe”, PGA background paper.
5. *PGA* “Core Funding Proposal to Danida 2004-06”.
6. *PGA* “Africa Task Force on Peace and Democracy Exploratory Parliamentary Mission to Tanzania to Assess the Viability for a Project on Democratic Oversight of Security Issues”, June, 2001.
7. *PGA* “Africa Task Force on Peace and Democracy Preventive Action Mission to Côte d’Ivoire”, 2001.
8. *PGA* “Background Report”, Consultative Mission to Côte d’Ivoire May, 2003.
9. *PGA* “Dakar Action Plan”, March 2006.
10. *PGA* “Electoral Observer Mission to Abidjan, Municipal Elections, March 25, 2001”.
11. *PGA* “Grant Report for Core Support for 2001-03”. Submitted to Danida.
12. *PGA* “Grant Report for Core Support for 2004”. Submitted to Danida.
13. *PGA* “Grant Report for Core Support for 2005”. Submitted to Danida.
14. *PGA* “Parliamentary Track Diplomacy: Peace Building in Central Africa”, Workshop report from Lusaka, 2001.
15. *PGA* “Peace & Democracy Programme – Three Year Plan 2001-04”. June 2001.
16. *PGA* “Peace & Democracy Programme, Narrative Grant Report 2002-04”. Submitted to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17. *PGA* “PGA Regional Seminars on Strengthening United Nations Peace Keeping Operations – International Parliamentary Input. Informal Briefing with the Security Council, G-77, United Nations Committee for PGA and UN Officials”. May, 2002. Final Report.
18. *PGA* “Policy Initiative on Small Arms and Light Weapons”. Final Grant Report Submitted to Department for International Development (DFID), January 1st – March 31st 2006.
19. *PGA* “Strategic Plan for 2006-10”.
20. *PGA* “Sub-regional Parliamentary Seminar, on Immigration, Naturalization and Integration in West Africa.

-
21. *Abidjan* February 16-18, 2002. Submitted to The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
 22. *PGA* “Tbilisi Plan of Action”, June 2006.
 23. *PGA* “Ten Years of Peace-Making. Parliamentarians For Global Action and its Task Force on Peace and Democracy 1991-2001”.
 24. *PGA* 25th Anniversary Commemorative Edition.
 25. *PGA* Annual Report 2000 (Includes audited accounts).
 26. *PGA* Annual Report 2001 (Includes audited accounts).
 27. *PGA* Annual Report 2002 (Includes audited accounts).
 28. *PGA* Annual Report 2003 (Includes audited accounts).
 29. *PGA* Annual Report 2004 (Includes audited accounts)
 30. *PGA* Annual Report 2005 (Includes audited accounts).
 31. *PGA* Newsletter, February 2005.
 32. *PGA* Peace & Democracy Programme, Parliamentary Policy Initiative on Small Arms and Light Weapons, July 2005 to July 2007, Proposal submitted to NDP, May 2005.
 33. *PGA* Policy Initiative on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Final Grant Report submitted to DFID, May 2006.
 34. *Udenrigsministeriet* “Bevillingsnotits Paliamentarians for Global Action”, 2004-06.
 35. *Udenrigsministeriet* “Bevillingsnotits Paliamentarians for Global Action”, 2001-03.
 36. *Udenrigsministeriet* “Bevillingsnotits Paliamentarians for Global Action”, 2000.

Annex 4: The Strategic Partnership Concept

The Strategic Partnership Concept

This annex has been prepared based on the experience of strategic partnership processes undertaken by other organisations in the past. Should PGA and its partners embark on a strategic partnership process, they may consider making modifications of specific aspects to meet explicit needs. For sake of clarity, this annex has by drafted in the imperative form as opposed to conditional.

1. Overall Principles

Fundamental to a strategic partnership between PGA and its donors is each donor's long-term commitment to:

1. PGA's mission;
2. Open dialogue and exchange between the partners on policy development and progress, which is based on respect, trust, transparency and the recognition of PGA as the owner of the process; and
3. Contributing to PGA's core budget and adherence to the framework of the partnership's co-ordination and management mechanisms.

Thus, strategic partnership with PGA constitutes more than financial support to PGA's core budget. It should be regarded as a process in which PGA and its major donors participate as "strategic partners". Central to the strategic partnership concept is that PGA and its partners together take collective responsibility for achievements and failures of PGA's programme. The strategic partnership would hinge on the partners together aiming at a common set of goals, specifically those outlined in a three-year strategic plan produced by PGA.

A strategic partnership has several implications. It would require the following:

1. A well-structured and realistic strategic plan, biannual work plan and annual budget that analyse the current position and problems – including risks and external factors. Objectives, expected outcome, planned activities and required input would be elaborated. Furthermore, quality monitoring mechanisms and indicators would also be included.
2. Open dialogue between PGA and the donor group in which the general direction of PGA, its expenditure and strategic plan are covered.
3. Timely, professional, well-planned and well-managed implementation of PGA's overall programme.
4. Reporting and accounting of high standard and integrity.
5. Annual reviews.
6. Timely donor disbursements.
7. Recognition of PGA as the owner of the process.
8. Adherence to one annual management cycle.
9. Commitment to the core funding of PGA in the medium term.
10. Agreement to one standardised annual narrative report.

11. Agreement to one standardised audited annual accounts.
12. Agreement to the strategic plan, biannual work plan and annual budget to serve as the funding proposal.
13. Dialogue, trust and respect among the major donors and between the donors and PGA.

2. Making a Strategic Partnership Operational

To implement the strategic partnership concept, an expression of the common vision and commitment to the concept is required. With this in view, a **Memorandum of Understanding** and **Standard Agreement** should be prepared.

The Memorandum of Understanding is signed by all parties together. It outlines the principles of the partnership discussed above and the key values (in the case of PGA this could be related to the importance of effective democratically elected parliaments, human rights and poverty reduction) that underpin it.

The Standard Agreement is a funding contract that is to be signed by the NGO and each individual funding agency should be drafted to constitute the largest common dominator in terms of the different donor requirements. It also outlines the management mechanisms discussed in the paragraphs below.

3. Management Mechanisms

A common management cycle is required to implement the strategic partnership that is calibrated to PGA financial year. To ensure that the partnership is solidly founded, the following seven components are necessary:

1. Strategic plan;
2. Biannual work plans and annual budget;
3. Annual report;
4. Annual audited accounts;
5. Annual review;
6. Annual strategic partnership meeting;
7. Request for funds.

In the sections that follow, each component is presented and discussed.

3.1 Strategic Plan

The purpose of the strategic plan is to provide a strategic framework for PGA's objectives and the implementation of its activities. It should serve as a steering instrument for the implementation and monitoring of activities, output and impact.

The strategic plan is a well-structured and realistic document that establishes the objectives and activities for a three-year period. The overall programme should be rolling and revised annually and take into account the annual review report, as well as the results, failures, developments and rising opportunities experienced. The strategic plan should:

1. Present problem analyses;
2. Provide rationales for PGA's programme's activities – including risks and external factors;
3. Outline PGA's capacity to address the issues at stake;
4. State clear objectives;
5. Specify expected outcomes;
6. Determine activities to be undertaken;
7. Establish required inputs;
8. Specify indicators and monitoring mechanisms; and
9. Establish an indicative budget for the three-year period.

The annual review and the other monitoring mechanisms should feed into the process of preparing and updating the strategic plan. Any changes in emphasis within the programme areas should be discussed. The updated document should be completed and submitted to the strategic partners by a predefined date.

3.2 Biannual work plans and annual budget

The biannual work plan and annual budget should constitute an implementation and monitoring guide for PGA's activities. The budget should provide an overview of the estimated income and expenditure and thereby provide a framework for the level of donor contributions required each year.

The annual budget and the first biannual work plan should be prepared at the end of every year, before the start of the financial year and submitted to the strategic partners by the beginning of the financial year. The second biannual work plan should be prepared after six months. In line with the objectives, output and activities specified in the strategic plan, the work plans should specify “who”, “what”, “where”, “when” and budget for each planned activity.

3.3 Annual report

The annual report should consist of two main parts: a narrative report and the annual accounts. The narrative report should describe, and most importantly, analyse the implementation and monitoring in the past year. It should:

- Cover the results obtained/not obtained;
- Summarise to what extent objectives have been achieved using monitoring indicators established in the strategic plan;
- Discuss lessons learnt from the implementation experiences during the year;
- Discuss changes in emphasis within the programmes for the following year.

The annual accounts should be prepared according to PGA's financial management guidelines. All contributions from donors should be mentioned under income, but the annual accounts will not specify the purposes for which each individual contribution has been used. The annual report should be completed and sent to strategic partners by within the first couple of months of the first couple of months of the financial year.

3.4 Annual Audited Accounts

The audit of the annual accounts should be conducted according to PGA's financial management guidelines. The audited accounts should be submitted to the strategic partners later than three months after the start of PGA's new financial year.

3.5 Annual Review

The purpose of the annual review is to assess progress. The objectives and indicators in the strategic plan shall provide the framework for assessing developments. The annual review constitutes an important monitoring mechanism. It serves as input for PGA's internal learning with the aim of improving results in the future. It should also be an important mechanism for dialogue within PGA and between PGA and its strategic partners.

The annual review should:

- Review the results achieved by PGA in terms of output, impact and cost-effectiveness;
- Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the programmes; and
- Analyse the priorities of PGA in light of the changing environment it operates in.

The analysis should be problem-oriented and distinguish between external and internal factors affecting the implementation of the programmes.

The annual review should be conducted in the last few months of the financial year and may have a specific focus to be agreed upon by the partners. The annual review should be presented and sent to the donors before the end of the financial year. For the third year an external evaluation should substitute the annual review. The annual strategic partnership meeting to be held in the second year should prepare the ToR for the evaluation and appoint an evaluation team. The evaluation would draw extensively on the annual reviews. PGA should budget for the costs of the annual reviews and the evaluation.

3.6 Annual Strategic Partnership Meeting

In the first quarter of the financial year, an annual strategic partnership meeting should be held between PGA, its strategic partners and other interested donors. To simplify logistics, reduce costs and enhance the meeting, PGA may consider holding a board meeting in connection with the partnership meeting. The donors may wish to designate a representative among them. The purpose of the annual meeting is to provide an opportunity for dialogue between the parties.

PGA should prepare the agenda of the meeting that will include:

- Presentation of the annual report and a discussion on the results of the past year;
- Presentation of the annual work plan & budget and a discussion on the future direction of PGA;
- Indications of the intended contributions/disbursements from donors;

- A presentation of the most recent annual review report and agreement on the specifics of the upcoming annual review/evaluation; and
- Presentation and discussion of issues of mutual interest.

Agreed minutes should be prepared. PGA should be represented by at least the Secretary General, Director of Finance and Administration, the President of the Executive Council, the Treasurer and other PGA members that are relevant to the agenda of the meeting. Ideally, it should not be exclusive to the strategic partners, but should also be open to other donors/potential donors. There should be sufficient room within the agenda of the annual strategic partnership meeting to allow it to serve as a forum for discussion of broader policy issues related to for instance, and the role of parliamentarians in peace-building, international processes and poverty reduction.

3.7 Request for Funds and Disbursements

A formal “Request for Funds” should be prepared and sent to donors with the finalised annual work plan & budget and annual report by the start of the new financial year. The disbursement of funds to PGA should be made as soon as possible. Since new funds would not be released until the audit is completed in the first months of the financial year, at least one of the strategic partners needs to agree to allow the grant to be carried over into the following year to cover the first three months of the following financial year.

Annex 5: PGA Membership Information

PGA Membership Rules

(from PGA's website)

Full Membership

In order to qualify for full membership the Parliament must adhere to all of the following criteria in order that a group or an individual be admitted as a member of Parliamentarians for Global Action:

- (a) the members must be freely elected by the general population or a reasonable segment of it,
- (b) the election should be open to more than one party, or to those who have no party,
- (c) the Parliament must evidence an actual ability to engage in free debate,
- (d) the Parliament must have the right to turn back legislation proposed by the government.

In accordance with these guidelines, the Board shall decide first whether a parliament meets the criteria for membership, and then the Board shall approve or reject applications for membership from individuals and groups from those parliaments, and the decision shall be recorded in its minutes.

Associate Membership

Associate Membership may be offered by the Board in its sole discretion to any suitable candidate whose country's constitutional make-up, at the time such Associate Membership is offered, may not meet in full the requirements of the Charter or PGA By-laws. An Associate Member shall have no voting rights nor may such an Associate Member occupy a position of responsibility either on the Council or on the Board or both.

National Group Guidelines

1. Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) national groups should be open to all members of parliament in multi-party states and be composed of at least 10 individuals, open to all parties, or five individuals if the total membership of the national parliament is less than 100.
2. Groups should accept the Constitution and By-Laws of Parliamentarians for Global Action.
3. Groups should elect group officers – for example, Chair, Vice Chair(s), Secretary and Treasurer – with due regard to political and gender balance.
4. Groups should elect one of their members, annually, to serve on the International Council, with written confirmation of this election to the Secretariat.
5. Groups should hold at least one meeting per year.

6. Groups should submit a written annual report to the Council Chair in advance of the Council meeting.
7. Groups should each year provide the names of its members to PGA in New York and assist in the collection of fees.
8. The Chair of the International Council or the President shall certify to the Executive Committee those national groups that have met the guidelines.
9. The National group representatives on the International Council shall be rotated after two years.

North Africa and the Middle East

Algeria
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Morocco
Tunisia
Yemen

The Americas Caribbean

Barbados
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago

Central America

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Panama

North America

Canada*
United States

Europe

**East/Central Europe, CIS
and Russian Federation**

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
Georgia

Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovenia
Turkey
Ukraine

Regional Parliaments

European Parliament*
ECOWAS Parliament

South America

Argentina*
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela

South Pacific

Australia
New Zealand*
Western Samoa

Southeast/South Asia and Pacific

Bangladesh
Cambodia
India*
Indonesia
Japan*
Malaysia
Maldives
Pakistan*
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand

Sub-Saharan Africa


Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chad
Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria*
Senegal*
Seychelles
Sierra Leone*
South Africa
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

West Europe

Austria
Belgium
Denmark*
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland*
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden*
Switzerland*
United Kingdom*

*) Denotes multi-party PGA National Group





Parliamentarians for Global Action

Danida

