Synthesis Report –
Summative Evaluation of Canada’s
Afghanistan Development Program

Fiscal year 2004-2005 to 2012-2013

March 2015
Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the independent evaluation team from Ecorys for their work in the conduct of this evaluation, including data gathering and analysis, and technical reporting. Anneke Slob led the team, which included Alessandra Cancedda, Josef Decosas, Khadijah Fancy, Ivo Gijsberts, Yvan Conoir and Anette Wenderoth. We thank them for their diligence and professionalism in undertaking this challenging assignment. We are also very grateful to Ted Klies for his detailed feedback as the Peer Reviewer for this evaluation.

 Particularly appreciated was the time afforded to the evaluators by the various stakeholders involved during the course of this initiative. This included government officials, representatives of international organizations, civil society organizations, the private sector, and other development partners, who graciously made themselves available for interviews in Canada and Afghanistan. In particular, we would acknowledge the Afghanistan Development Program, the International Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, the Development Policy Directorate, the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force, and the Department of National Defence, all of whom were represented on the Internal Evaluation Advisory Committee.

 From the Development Evaluation Division, Vivek Prakash managed much of the evaluation process, succeeded by Deborah McWhinney who made a major contribution to drafting the final synthesis report. Michelle Guertin and then Tara Carney, Evaluation Team Leaders, were responsible for overall supervision.

James Melanson
Head of Development Evaluation
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<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>AIRP</td>
<td>Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program</td>
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<td>AKF</td>
<td>Aga Khan Foundation</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>APEI</td>
<td>Afghanistan Polio Eradication Initiative</td>
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<td>APHI</td>
<td>Afghan Public Health Institute (Ministry of Public Health)</td>
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<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Task Force</td>
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<td>AusAid</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BEGE</td>
<td>Basic Education and Gender Equality</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE International)</td>
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<td>CBE</td>
<td>Community Based Education</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
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<td>CEAA</td>
<td>Canadian Environmental Assessment Act</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency (now DFATD)</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Canadian Program Support Unit</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (now DFATD)</td>
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<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DoWA</td>
<td>Department of Women Affairs</td>
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<td>EQUIP</td>
<td>Education Equality Improvement Program</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation for Human Rights</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GE</td>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
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<td>GEP</td>
<td>Girls' Education Project (BRAC)</td>
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<td>GESP</td>
<td>Girls' Education Support Programme (AKF)</td>
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<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>I-ANDS</td>
<td>Interim Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>KLIP</td>
<td>Kandahar Local Investment Program</td>
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<td>KPRT</td>
<td>Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACCA</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Centre in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
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<td>MGPB</td>
<td>Multilateral and Global Partnerships Branch</td>
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<td>MISFA</td>
<td>Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCH</td>
<td>Maternal, Newborn and Child Health</td>
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<td>MOPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
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<td>MORE</td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Project</td>
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<td>MoWA</td>
<td>Ministry of Women Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NABDP</td>
<td>National Area-based Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
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<td>NAPWA</td>
<td>National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NESP</td>
<td>National Education Sector Plan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Priority Program</td>
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<td>NRVA</td>
<td>National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Program</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PACE-A</td>
<td>Partnership for Advancing Community Based Education in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Program Support Unit</td>
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<td>RFAW</td>
<td>Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<td>RRMAF</td>
<td>Results and Risk Management Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>RoCK</td>
<td>Representative of Canada in Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCR / UNSCR</td>
<td>(United Nations) Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Aid</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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Executive Summary

Objectives, scope and methodology

This evaluation was undertaken for accountability and learning purposes, to assess the performance and results of the Afghanistan Development Program in a fragile state and complex environment. The evaluation was implemented from April 2013 to June 2014 by an international team from Ecorys Netherlands. This synthesis report was prepared by the Development Evaluation Division, based on the data gathering and analysis that Ecorys undertook.

The evaluation covers the period from fiscal year 2004-05 to 2012-13. In June 2013, as this evaluation was starting, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) were amalgamated into Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). The object of this evaluation was Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program, implemented by the then CIDA, recognising that it needed to be understood in the context of both Canada’s “Whole of Government Approach” and the efforts of the wider international community.

The project sample assessed for this evaluation covered 55% of the project portfolio, including all main programming sectors, cross-cutting themes and a specific focus on Kandahar.

The evaluation design was based on internationally agreed principles for evaluations in fragile states. Four main evaluation questions addressing the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability were consolidated under one overall evaluation question: ‘To what extent has CIDA contributed to a more secure and democratic Afghanistan, able to deliver key services to Afghans and better provide for its longer-term stability and sustainable development?’ Program and sector evaluation matrices were developed to answer the evaluation questions based on solid evidence.

The evaluation team applied a multi-method approach to gather and analyze both qualitative and quantitative information. More than 2,000 documents were analyzed. Field visits to Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad were carried out and over 220 interviews were conducted with those involved in the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan during the evaluation period.

Background and basic characteristics

The evaluation covers a period in which development activities were carried out in three broad phases – i) 2004 to 2007; ii) 2008 to 2011; and, iii) 2011 to 2013.

From 2004-05 to 2012-13, the total volume of international assistance disbursed to Afghanistan by CIDA amounted to $1,546 million, with 310 initiatives implemented. This was the largest Country Program implemented by CIDA up to that time. Disbursements were highest from 2007-08 to 2011-12 – between $215 and $280 million per year – when the Whole of Government approach was implemented. Before and after that, annual disbursements were approximately $100 million per year.

Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program was part of the unprecedented international community involvement in Afghanistan after 2001 when the Taliban were ousted in a military effort – Operation Enduring Freedom, led by the USA. Canada was among sixty bilateral donors and forty-seven troop-contributing countries.

There was a growing resurgence of the Taliban between 2006 and 2009, particularly in the south of the country. From 2010 to 2013, the insurgency continued throughout the country and resulted in significant
loss of life. A transition to full Afghan leadership and responsibility for the country’s security, development and reconstruction in all spheres became the focus of attention from 2010 onwards. By early 2014, the withdrawal of most international troops was underway and many countries, including Canada, had completed their withdrawal as of March 2014.

A focus on state-building and long-term development support was reflected in Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program with economic growth and democratic governance representing the most important sectors in terms of disbursements (each 22% of the total). Emergency assistance represented 12% of total disbursements, which is comparable to contributions of other international agencies in this area.

CIDA developed its first strategy for the Afghanistan Development Program in 2003. When Canada assumed leadership of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team in August 2005 and sent 2,500 soldiers to secure this province, CIDA began programming there as well. However, insurgency increased and fighting in Kandahar was quite intense, which affected development activities. In October 2007, the government commissioned an Independent Panel to examine Canada’s future role in Afghanistan. In January 2008, the Independent Panel issued its report, commonly known as ‘The Manley Report’. The Government of Canada’s response to the Manley Report was multi-pronged, including: the definition of six policy priorities and three signature projects to focus Canada’s efforts; a shift from development programming at the national level to 50% of programming focused in Kandahar; and a Whole of Government approach with involvement of the Privy Council Office in the planning and management of Canada’s engagement in Kandahar. After the withdrawal of the Canadian military from Kandahar in 2011, the Afghanistan Development Program returned to its national focus and development activities specific to Kandahar were phased out.

Main findings and conclusions

On continuity and change in programming

Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program over the 2004 to 2013 period can be characterized by continuity in involvement on the one hand, and by clear changes in strategy and focus on the other. There was: i) an initial focus on state-building at the national level from 2004 to 2007; ii) a concentration on stabilization in Kandahar from 2008 to 2011; and, iii) a humanitarian, social sector and gender equality-oriented Program after 2011.

On short-term achievements and longer-term results

Canada, together with other donors, contributed to important short-term achievements in various sectors, ranging from the construction and rehabilitation of thousands of schools, increased enrolment, especially of girls, improved access to health facilities, construction of community infrastructure, delivery of food to millions of people and support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and women’s organizations.

Given Afghanistan’s low level of development in 2002, and ongoing insurgency, long-term development results were difficult to realize. Nevertheless, real gains were made, especially in the social sectors. Access to and use of health and education services have increased and a considerable amount of land has been cleared of mines. However, in economic growth, human rights and governance, little substantive change beyond the project level was observed. There is contradictory evidence on the level of awareness of human rights. In most sectors, issues of distribution and equity remain unaddressed.
Gender equality results are mainly concentrated in the social sectors through improved access to services. Limited improvements for women related to human rights and their role in decision-making were observed, though long time frames are needed for these kinds of societal changes.

Canada contributed to strengthened national capacity – particularly in the health, education and demining sectors. However, there is evidence of missed opportunities, especially in the work to strengthen sub-national governance and establish adequate linkages to national government. Generally, there were more short-term achievements than long-term development results.

**On risk awareness and efficiency**

Programming in Afghanistan entails certain risks that cannot be completely mitigated. There is evidence that the Afghanistan Program analyzed programming risks and developed mitigation strategies throughout the evaluation period but was, at times, quite risk averse. A project-level focus precluded the ability to address sectoral or cross-sectoral issues effectively. Despite CIDA’s comprehensive toolkits for results and risk management, there was a lack of specific guidance on how to identify, document or manage risks in a fragile and conflict context beyond the project level. A very prominent and effective risk mitigation measure taken by the Program was the choice made to diversify the range of implementing partners.

Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program addressed some efficiency considerations at the level of projects and implementing partners. However, major efficiency issues that affected overall Program performance, such as staff mobility in a conflict environment, rotation, and centralized decision-making, were only addressed from 2008-2011 when the Whole of Government approach was implemented.

**On unintended impacts and sustainability**

There was evidence of unintended impacts of the aid provided by the international community in Afghanistan – both destabilizing effects, including the shrinking of humanitarian space, and stabilizing effects, especially in urban environments where access to health and education facilities increased.

With the benefit of hindsight, it can be concluded that sustainability of development results – in particular, building the necessary capacity and local ownership – requires more time than foreseen in military stabilization theories. Furthermore, Canada’s contribution as part of the broader international community’s capacity building efforts in this area led to positive results but also to the creation of a parallel civil service and excessive use of costly technical assistance.

**On Canada’s role in the international community**

Canada has been a consistent and reliable donor working within negotiated international frameworks of engagement with Afghanistan. In recent years, Canada has led the dialogue on human rights and the elimination of violence against women, which was in line with its strategic focus. Canada’s role in general policy dialogue, as well as on education, health, human rights and gender equality policies, has been appreciated by other development actors and by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Progress by the Afghan government in some key areas supported by Canada, such as human rights and anti-corruption, was seen by some members of the international community to have been limited, although good progress was noted in other areas, such as public finance management.

Canada improved the alignment of its support with Afghan Government priorities, but fell short of the internationally agreed 50% target for on-budget support (see more detailed explanation of this in Chapter
3). The relatively low proportion of on-budget support and the decline in the absolute amount of aid provided by Canada is likely to affect its influence in policy dialogue.

On development in Kandahar as part of the Whole of Government Approach

The start of the development Program in Kandahar in 2005-06 was slow. Despite huge efforts to speed up implementation, fundamental absorption capacity problems made it impossible to reach the target of spending 50% of all disbursements in Kandahar. From 2008 to 2011, 29% of the development program disbursements were in Kandahar.

Understanding the political economy and main drivers of conflict and fragility received relatively little attention in Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program, but Canada was not exceptional in this regard. The situation improved when the Whole of Government approach was implemented in Kandahar, as considerable effort was made by various Canadian actors to better understand the context by using situational awareness mapping and other tools. A genuine attempt was made to identify and address grievances and to deal with drivers of conflict to the extent possible. However, this understanding remained incomplete. The principles for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states call for a thorough understanding of the context, including the conflict. In practice, the international community, Canada included, was more focused on implementation.

Within a very insecure environment, impressive short-results were realized and documented in the 14 reports to Parliament on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2012. One of the reasons for these achievements was that the various Canadian actors on the ground worked closely together from 2008 to 2011 in Kandahar. Work in silos and ‘stove-piping’ were overcome to a significant extent. Furthermore, institutionalized mechanisms for learning were established. There was a clear drive among development professionals and their colleagues, especially the ones that were present in the field, to learn from this important and unique experience of working jointly in a conflict zone. In 2010 and 2011, very interesting lessons for development programming in a conflict environment were drawn, touching on basic questions of the possibility of long-term development in a conflict zone that went beyond counterinsurgency and stabilization theories. Unfortunately however, these considerations and lessons were not taken up at a more strategic level.

The implementation of the development Program in Kandahar showed that long-term development cannot be accomplished with an emphasis on short-term implementation strategies, which sped up project delivery considerably, but failed to ensure sustainable, long-term development results in more than a few areas.
Main lessons and recommendations

Need for a broad strategic vision and the establishment of an institutional mechanism to build on the lessons learned from the Whole of Government effort in Afghanistan and elsewhere

The history of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program from 2004-2013 indicates that an overarching strategic development vision, based on a Whole of Government approach and principles for engagement in fragile states, provided a clear basis for planning and Program implementation. The transition away from a Whole of Government approach as of 2011 created a void in this respect and there remains a need for such an overarching strategic vision.

Counter-insurgency and stabilization approaches failed to address long-term development requirements. Complementarities between the “Three Ds” – development, diplomacy and defence – should have been further explored and strengthened. Canada’s continued engagement in Afghanistan should be based on lessons learned from its past involvement, including proven models and effective approaches.

Greater attention to drawing lessons on development programming and good practices in civilian-military cooperation from Afghanistan and other fragile state involvements, and an appropriate institutional mechanism to ensure that they are retained and used to inform future engagements, would be beneficial. Whereas each mission is unique and tailor-made approaches should be developed accordingly, it is clear that important efficiency gains could be realized if knowledge were preserved, maintained and built upon.

Balancing channels of support and working with different levels of government

The criteria and indicators for the choice of aid delivery channels changed over time and were not always clearly articulated. While in the first phase of the response there was an emphasis on the use of multilateral channels, a tendency towards the funding of international NGOs developed in the third phase of programming. However, disproportionate reliance on NGOs may mean that linkages to national policies, strategies and implementation are often not sufficiently addressed.

A lesson learned from an over-emphasis on national programs during the early years of Canada’s development efforts was that the sub-national level – the “missing middle” – also required attention to improve service delivery at local level, something that was more directly addressed during the Whole of Government phase of assistance.

Using political and policy dialogue to achieve results

In line with an overarching strategic vision, it is important to clearly align non-funded and funded activities to achieve one’s stated goals. Crucial non-funded activities include political dialogue (primarily a responsibility for diplomats) and policy dialogue (primarily carried out by senior development officials) in key areas of performance of the Afghan Government.

Two main cross-cutting issues: governance and gender equality

The cross-cutting nature of governance could be further enhanced in the Afghanistan Program. Decisions on the type of support to be provided – on-budget versus off-budget support, for example – should be linked to political and policy dialogue.

Capacity building at both the national and sub-national level is a key factor in the realization of long-term, sustainable results in Afghanistan. Innovative approaches to capacity building have to be developed given the context. Many evaluations and studies on Afghanistan, including this one, refer to the ‘missing middle’ as the absence of a sub-national level of government. A lesson learned from program activities in
Kandahar was that simultaneous capacity building at various levels of government is essential to the realization of long-term and sustainable results.

During the evaluation period, the importance of gender as a cross-cutting issue was noted. For the period 2014-2017, gender equality is meant to become an ‘integrating factor’ across the Program, which is positive. Therefore, a continued focus on gender mainstreaming is recommended while also “Afghanizing” the approach, to the extent possible.

**Respect for humanitarian principles while strengthening the linkages between humanitarian and development assistance**

The “blurring” of lines related to the politicization and militarization of humanitarian assistance has led to a reduction of humanitarian space in Afghanistan. Humanitarian actors have been unable to secure access to all parts of the country. The transition period following the withdrawal of international troops offers unique opportunities to regain humanitarian access. Canada’s provision of humanitarian assistance throughout the evaluation period and its respect for humanitarian principles and donor coordination places it in a good position to promote the redefinition of the humanitarian space in the country.

While constructive steps were taken to link relief, reconstruction and development, including by giving the Afghanistan Program direct responsibility for humanitarian response, in practice there was limited success in doing so.

**Improved efficiency and performance management**

There were times during the evaluation period when the Afghanistan Program was quite efficient at disbursing funds (notably, the second phase from 2008-2011). At other times heavy procedures and centralised decision making resulted in inefficiencies. There is a clear need to identify, track and measure long-term results beyond the output level to the extent possible. Strengthening of national statistical systems would allow for improved basic data collection through the Central Statistics Office and the monitoring systems of the ministries, while also reaching out to provinces and districts.
Recommendations

Recommendation 1 – Establish an institutional mechanism to capture lessons from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to better inform future Canadian engagement in fragile states.

Recommendation 2 – Develop a vision for Canada’s future engagement in Afghanistan, taking lessons from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach into account.

Recommendation 3 – The crosscutting nature of governance should be further enhanced in the Afghanistan Program, including the strengthening of linkages between political dialogue and development policy dialogue with Afghan government partners. Programming decisions on the type of support to be provided – on-budget versus off-budget – should be based on clear targets and directly linked to on-going political and policy dialogue.

Recommendation 4 – Continue the focus on gender mainstreaming while adapting it to ensure improved responsiveness to socio-cultural values and principles, to the extent possible.

Recommendation 5 – For future investment in key sectors, ensure clear strategic direction, including a realistic risk analysis and robust risk mitigation strategy:

- **Education** – undertake the transition from a program focused primarily on access to education to one that also targets quality education with an increased focus on learning outcomes, and that facilitates students’ transition through different stages of education (for example, from community-based to formal education).

- **Health** – strengthen program focus on the right to health, social equity and the objectives defined as part of Canada’s commitments to Maternal, Newborn and Child Health.

- **Human Rights** – strengthen the protection of human rights by increasing awareness and capacities on the part of government and non-governmental actors through political and policy dialogue, and programming.

- **Humanitarian assistance** – seek opportunities to further strengthen the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development while ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to be delivered in line with the principles of good humanitarian donorship.
1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose

The specific evaluation objectives (Terms of Reference, Appendix 1) were to:

- Analyze and provide credible and neutral information on the relevance, coherence, performance (effectiveness, efficiency, economy), sustainability, management principles (including Paris Declaration principles), and cross-cutting themes of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program;

- Identify good practices, areas for improvement and formulate lessons learned;

- Assess the performance and results of the various delivery mechanisms, including grants to multilateral organizations; and

- Formulate recommendations for improvements at the corporate and program levels to inform future development programming in Afghanistan and other fragile states.

1.2. Scope

The initial scope defined in the terms of reference (ToR) for this summative evaluation was fiscal year 2004-05 to fiscal year 2011-12. It was extended to include fiscal year 2012-13 following delays to the start of the evaluation. In addition, changes in the Afghanistan context from 2001-2004 were taken into account in so far as they affected the evaluation period. Developments from early 2014 have been mentioned to the extent possible.

The object of the evaluation was Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program that, in line with the ToR, had to be evaluated in the context of the Whole of Government (WoG) Approach and that of the international community towards Afghanistan.

To improve the readability of this report, the short phrase, Afghanistan Program (or Program) has been used to refer to the evaluation object.

The total volume of external assistance provided to Afghanistan by CIDA from 2004-05 to 2012-13 amounted to $1,546 million (total funds disbursed). A total of 310 initiatives were implemented by project partners during this evaluation period. The evaluation focused on the analysis of the following sectors: economic growth including private sector development; education; health; humanitarian assistance (combining emergency assistance and peace and security); and human rights (sub-sector of democratic governance also including democratic participation). In addition, specific attention was given to gender equality as a cross-cutting theme and to development initiatives in Kandahar. The sampling resulted in a selection of 50 initiatives, covering a total disbursement of $852 million, and approximately 55% of overall disbursements made from 2004-05 to 2012-13. Detailed information on sampling is provided in Appendix 6.

1 The 310 agreements include specific funds such as Kandahar Local Initiative Programme, the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women and Canada Fund for Local Initiatives under which many different small initiatives were funded.
1.3. Methodological approach

This summative evaluation developed a detailed methodological approach and work plan based on internationally agreed principles for evaluations in fragile states (see Appendix 6 for more details). The evaluation team prepared a theory of change and linked it to a consolidated intervention logic framework (see Appendix 6, A6.2), which formed the basis for field work in Afghanistan.

Evaluation questions

In the ToR (see Appendix 1), preliminary evaluation questions were formulated and grouped under six evaluation criteria and specific topics. Upon discussion, the ToR evaluation questions were regrouped in line with the four main evaluation criteria, and four lead questions were defined. In addition, one overarching question was formulated that was directly linked to the overall evaluation objective of the Afghanistan Program, as shown below:

Figure 1.3.1 Evaluation questions

A total of 39 sub-questions were formulated in relation to lead questions (see Appendix 6).

Approach to data collection and data analysis

The evaluation questions had to be answered at three different levels: Afghanistan Program level; sector/thematic level; and project/intervention level.

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3 The overall CIDA objective for the period 2007-2011 was “A more stable, self-reliant, and democratic Afghanistan that contributes to national, regional and global security”. The overall objective in the 2008-2011 logic model (formulated after the Manley report) is “A more secure Afghanistan, with a focus on Kandahar, able to deliver key services to Afghans, and better provide for its longer term stability and sustainable development”. The last objective was taken as point of departure for the central evaluation question, however, without the specific focus on Kandahar, because that did not apply throughout the entire evaluation period.
Both a top-down and bottom-up approach\textsuperscript{4} were applied. Evaluation matrices were elaborated for both the Program and sectoral levels, and evidence gathered at the project level informed higher level analysis.

**Methodological challenges and limitations**

During the evaluation, the team identified various methodological challenges, some of which could be overcome, while others related to contextual factors that could not be changed. These challenges included missing documents and incomplete files, rapid staff turnover and lack of institutional memory, some resistance to the evaluation, the “fishbowl effect”,\textsuperscript{5} availability of data, a challenging security situation, and incorporation of evidence from the evaluation of the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation project in a timely manner. A more detailed description of these challenges and mitigation measures can be found in Appendix 6.

### 1.4. Organization

**Phasing of the evaluation**

The evaluation was structured in several phases, as illustrated in the following figure (more details in Appendix 6):

**Figure 1.2 Evaluation phases**

![Evaluation Phases Diagram](image)

\textsuperscript{4} This was done by linking downstream, project-level efforts with upstream sector policy dialogue and by linking both agreements made at international conferences on Afghanistan and Canadian government policy with strategic development programming and implementation.

\textsuperscript{5} The “fishbowl effect” is referred to in the ‘Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, OECD DAC, 2008’ as a highly politicised and often media-dense environment resulting in increased great public attention on a particular topic or country; this then leads to correspondingly high stakes for evaluators. When human suffering is high and donor contributions large and visible, the desire to see positive results can place additional pressures on evaluators and managers in the field.
2. Canada’s International Development Program in Afghanistan

2.1. Context

A Communist Coup in 1978 ended 230 years of dynastic rule in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded the country in 1979 and withdrew a decade later, after which time civil war developed from 1992 to 1996. The Taliban seized power in 1996 and ruled Afghanistan for 5 years. International assistance was limited to humanitarian aid during this time.

A US-led military effort in October 2001 – Operation Enduring Freedom – overthrew the Taliban for sheltering Osama bin Laden. This marked the start of a period of reconstruction and state-building in Afghanistan with intensive international support. The scale of international involvement in Afghanistan was unprecedented with around sixty governmental donors and forty-seven troop-contributing countries engaged.

By the end of 2001, the Afghan government consisted of a new Cabinet that brought together warlords, returned refugees from Pakistan and technocrats from the diaspora. The first international conference on Afghanistan took place in December 2001 and led to the Bonn Agreement, which included a framework for the establishment of a new Constitution and national government. A Constitutional Jirga held in December 2003 led to the decision to form a centralised state with a powerful President. Elections were successfully held in 2004 and Hamid Karzai was elected President. Foreign donors concentrated their efforts on much-needed reconstruction and the International Security Assistance Force was formed.

Foreign donors supported the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s development of a ‘COMPACT’ identifying the main government priorities. An Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008-2013 was formally approved by the President in 2008 and National Priority Programs were defined. The goal during this period was to develop a vibrant, equitable and sustainable economy with infrastructure, private sector development and the expansion of the rural economy as its foundational pillars. This focus was accompanied by attention to the role of and participation by women in the economic and social growth of the country. A National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan 2008-2018 was prepared and followed up with a Law on the Prohibition of Violence against Women in 2009.

Challenges with security continued, particularly in the southern and eastern regions, as the Taliban insurgency regrouped and gained momentum. There were substantial amounts of international financial assistance and the development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in a number of provinces. The number of national and international troops increased steadily from 2005 to 2009 – from an estimated 92,825 troops (65,250 Afghan security troops, 18,200 US troops and 9,375 other foreign troops) in 2005 to over 300,000 troops (195,089 Afghan, 67,400 US and 38,370 other foreign troops) by December 2009.\textsuperscript{6} At the national level, elections in 2009 did not lead to increased political legitimacy for the government and were deemed neither free nor fair.

From 2010 onwards, transition to full Afghan leadership and responsibility for the country’s security, development and reconstruction in all spheres became the focus of attention. This led to the development of concrete targets and indicators both for the Afghan government and the international

\textsuperscript{6} Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index, Version April 26, 2013.
community. In 2010, donors agreed to align at least 80% of development funds with Afghan priorities within two years and to channel 50% of their development funds to the Government budget.

Canada withdrew its troops from Kandahar in 2011 and handed over responsibility for that province to the United States. Insecurity continued in many parts of the province.

In 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) was agreed upon, defining five areas for action by the Afghan Government and additional commitments for the international community. The five priorities were elections, improved public finance management, anti-corruption measures, human rights and inclusive growth. Progress in all areas was closely monitored by the international community and the GiRoA. Most foreign troops withdrew and international assistance continued to decline into early 2014 despite the continuation of a protracted, complex emergency in the country.

There are no reliable figures on the total amount of international assistance to Afghanistan after 2001, particularly because the majority of the expenditures have been in security. From 2002 to 2012, approximately US$50 billion of official development assistance was provided, of which 87% was development assistance and 13% humanitarian assistance. This reflects the strong focus of the international community on state-building and long-term development support. Canada’s disbursements from 2002 – 2011 were higher than those for most bilateral donors, with the exception of the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Japan (see Appendix 10 for more details).

2.2. Canadian government engagement in Afghanistan

The main trends, key international agreements, and Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2013 are outlined in the following chart:
Key International Trends and Canadian Engagement in Afghanistan

Key Afghan and International agreements

December 2001 – Bonn Agreement
- Lay out of a framework for the political transition
- Establishment of an interim authority

2002 – Multilateral Engagement
- Mainly reconstruction aid
- ISAF starts

2003 – Afghan Constitution

January 2006 – Afghan Compact
- Three key areas and benchmarks for reconstruction

2002 – Canada’s Involvement Increases
- Canada re-establishes diplomatic relations with Afghanistan
- Canadian troops are deployed to Afghanistan
- Afghanistan Program transitions from relatively small humanitarian budget to large development program

2003 – Diplomatic relations and development program
- Canada opens embassy in Kabul
- First interim Afghanistan Program strategy 2003-2005

2003 – Afghan and International agreements

2004 – Free and fair Presidential Elections

2008 – Afghan National Development Strategy
- Focused on security, governance, economic growth

2009 – Presidential elections, problematic process

TALIBAN RESURGENCE

2006

New Afghanistan Program Strategy with focus on Kandahar and role of women and girls

2008 – Anwar Report and Official Response:
- Whole-of-Government approach
- Increase of development budget to more than $200 million per year
- Increased development focus on Kandahar

2009

CONTINUED INSURGENCY; TROOP SURGE

2010 - Agreement on Transition Process
- NATO’s intention to transition responsibility for security
- Kabul Process - Introduction of the National Priority Programs
- Agreement on 80% alignment and at least 50% on-budget support

since 2011 – Various International Conferences
- Addressing the transition process including withdrawal of intl. military forces by Dec 2014 discussed at Chicago Summit in 2012

- Exit from Kandahar;
- Focus on education, health, humanitarian assistance, human rights and gender equality;
- Exit from Economic growth and democratic governance;
- Reduction in development budget to appr. $100 million

2012 – Tokyo Conference; Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
- Discussing Afghanistan’s future 2015-2024

2013 – DFATD: Amalgamation of DFAIT and CIDA

2014 – Canada’s military mission ends on March 31, 2014, Preparation of new DFATD Afghanistan Strategy

TODAY

2010

2011

2014
Prior to 2001, the Canadian International Development Agency’s assistance to Afghanistan consisted of humanitarian aid delivered through multilateral organizations, ranging between $10 and $20 million per year to address basic human needs.7

In line with the agreements reached at international conferences, Canada’s post-2001 mission in Afghanistan was initially characterised by military initiatives, with reconstruction support also provided. In February 2002, as part of the Operation Enduring Freedom, 850 Canadian troops were sent to Kandahar and roughly 1,700 to Kabul to join NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. In 2002, diplomatic relations were re-established and in August 2003, a small contingent of Canadian diplomats was sent to Kabul to establish the Embassy of Canada in Afghanistan.

There were then 3 phases of Canadian development assistance programming in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2014, the time frame of this evaluation.

2004 - 2007
In March 2004, the Government of Canada committed $250 million in aid to Afghanistan with a focus on national programming and state-building. In August 2005, Canada assumed leadership of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) and command of a challenging military mission – securing a large rural province (Kandahar) the size of Nova Scotia with just 2,500 soldiers.8 At that time, the security situation in the country, including in Kandahar, was still relatively stable. However, from the summer of 2005 onwards, insurgency in Kandahar increased after the regrouping of the Taliban. Fighting in Kandahar was quite intense in the first six months of 2006, followed by Operation Medusa in September 2007 involving 1,400 international, mainly Canadian, troops, with many casualties.

2007 - 2011
In October 2007, the government commissioned an Independent Panel to examine Canada’s mission in Afghanistan to make recommendations on the future of Canada’s role in Afghanistan. In January 2008, the Independent Panel issued its report, more commonly known as, ‘The Manley Report’. Key findings from this report are presented below.

### Key Findings of the Manley Report (2008)
- There is a communication deficit with the Canadian public that needs to be addressed through balanced communication and open, continuous engagement;
- Canada’s development program in Afghanistan is impeded by CIDA’s administrative constraints;
- CIDA staff in Kandahar is hindered from venturing beyond their base due to security constraints;
- The Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar suffers from lack of coordination and fragmentation;
- Canada’s civilian programs “have not achieved the scale or depth of engagement necessary to make a significant impact”;
- Coordination of GoC activities in Afghanistan across departments is fragmented;
- There is no logic for choosing February 2009 as the end date of Canada’s military involvement in Kandahar.

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8 Ibidem.
The Manley Report created the basis for a clear, centrally-led, Whole of Government approach with an important civilian presence, including CIDA staff in Kandahar.

The response by the Government of Canada to this report was multi-pronged. First, it resulted in the definition of six policy priorities (grounded in ANDS and the Afghanistan Compact) and three signature projects to focus Canada’s efforts.  

The first four priorities focus primarily on Kandahar:
- maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police, and support complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections;
- provide jobs, education and essential services, like water;
- provide humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees; and,
- enhance the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The last two priorities have a national focus:
- build Afghan institutions that are central to our Kandahar priorities and support democratic processes such as elections; and,
- contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.

The three signature projects are:
- rehabilitating the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system in Kandahar province;
- building and repairing 50 schools in targeted districts of Kandahar province; and,
- eradicating polio at the national level.

Second, the government declared that Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan would end in 2011.

Third, there was an increased level of involvement of the Privy Council Office in the planning and management of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan.

Canada’s initial Whole of Government (WoG) Approach was launched in 2005 and sought to bring development, diplomacy and defence (“3D”) together in a coherent vision and delivery framework, especially for work in fragile states with on-going crises. From 2005 onward, there were attempts to formalize and implement the 3D approach by various government actors. However, after the publication of the Manley Report, the WoG Approach became a defining characteristic of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan until the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Kandahar in 2011. The first report to Parliament in June 2008 stated that “Canadian contributions will significantly benefit the people of Kandahar with a shift from 17 to 50 per cent of programming focused in the province”.  

2011 - 2014

From 2011 to 2014, Canada’s policy for engagement in Afghanistan shifted to a focus on transition, handover, and development. During this period, Canada’s activities were national in scope but operations were concentrated in the capital city, Kabul, and in four sectoral areas: children and youth through education and health; security, rule of law and human rights; promotion of regional diplomacy;  

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9 Canada’s new way forward in Afghanistan was outlined in a Report to Parliament Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan – setting a course to 2011.
and humanitarian assistance. Canada continued to support the long-term objective of transferring governance and security responsibilities to GIRoA.

The overall Canadian aid commitment was $1.9 billion for 2001 to 2011 of which $1.64 billion was disbursed by CIDA. Annual disbursements represented 10% of the total aid commitment ($190 million annually), which is in line with the reported average by other bilateral donors in Afghanistan at that time. An estimated $18 billion was to be spent on the whole government engagement in Afghanistan for the period 2001 to 2011 according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer in 2008.11

**2.3. Canada’s development strategies and priorities in Afghanistan**

CIDA developed various strategies and Results and Risk Management and Accountability Frameworks (RRMAFs) for the Afghanistan Program. They defined objectives, sector choices, aid modalities, aid channels and specific targets. Most of the Afghanistan Program strategies were never formally approved, which limited the possibilities for sharing these documents formally with the GIRoA and other development partners. The RRMAFs, however, were formally approved, although often with considerable delay. The linkages between the strategies and RRMAFs were not clear, particularly in the early years. The first RRMAF was meant to cover 2004-2009, while there were two strategies in that time: 2003-2005 and 2006-2008.

The overall objective for the Canadian development Program in Afghanistan has been reformulated several times:

**Table 2.3.1 Overall objectives of the Afghanistan Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy/RRMAF</th>
<th>Overall objective</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RRMAF 2004-2009</td>
<td>To support the efforts of the Afghan government, the Afghan people and the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan through the consolidation of the GIRoA’s authority and legitimacy across the nation and through improvements in people’s well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Model 2007-2011</td>
<td>A more stable, self-reliant, and democratic Afghanistan that contributes to national, regional, and global security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Model and RRMAF 2008-2011</td>
<td>A more secure Afghanistan, with a focus on Kandahar, able to deliver key services to Afghans, and better provide for its longer term stability and sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and RRMAF 2011-2014</td>
<td>Fulfillment of basic needs and reduced vulnerability of the people of Afghanistan, with a focus on women and girls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given differences in the strategy documents and RRMAFs described above, the evaluation team prepared a consolidated intervention logic, describing inputs, outputs and outcomes for the main sectors of intervention over the evaluation period.

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This overview shows continuity over time, as well as some shifts in priority; from a focus on state-building at the national level to stabilization in Kandahar. A people and needs-focused approach was adopted in more recent years. Afghanistan Development Program priorities changed across, as well as within, the noted phases. From 2004 to 2011, priority was given to democratic governance and economic development sectors, although different names were used; whereas from 2011 onwards, health, education and humanitarian assistance became the priority sectors (having received some support in the early years as well).

The sector analyses carried out for this evaluation, based on document review and interviews, provided insight into the overall strategic direction for the Afghanistan Program:

- Democratic governance, including community support via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) National Solidarity Program, and economic growth (under the thematic foci ‘livelihoods’ and ‘natural resources’) were priority sectors from 2004-2011, but were no longer a priority (with the exception of human rights) in the last strategic period 2011-2014;

- Until 2006, education was not a strategic priority of Canadian development support to Afghanistan. In the 2006-2008 strategy, education is mentioned together with economic growth activities under the strategic sector of focus “Enhancing the roles of women and girls in society”. In the 2008-2011 logic model, education is grouped together with economic growth as part of ‘Basic Services’. In the 2011-2014 strategy, education became one of two sector programs under the first development priority area, ‘securing the future for children and youth’;

- Until 2008, health was not a separate strategic priority of the Canadian development support to Afghanistan but sector support was provided through the humanitarian assistance program. From 2008 to 2011, health remained in the humanitarian pillar, separate from education, which was classified under basic services. A final shift in emphasis occurred after the launch of the Muskoka Initiative in 2010 when health became one of two sector programs under the first development priority area, ‘securing the future for children and youth’, in the 2011-2014 strategy;

- Humanitarian assistance was not specifically mentioned in strategic documents until 2008, although activities such as mine action and support to the reintegration of refugees were mentioned under other priorities. Humanitarian assistance became one of the six government priorities for 2008-2011. In the 2008-2011 logic model, security is mentioned as one of the three pillars and made up of three priorities: emergency assistance, peace and security, and health. In the 2011-2014 strategy, humanitarian assistance was one of three overall priorities;

- Human rights was another area that gradually increased in importance, especially from 2007 onwards, with specific attention to women’s rights. Democratic participation of women was already given specific attention in the 2006-2008 strategy;

- Gender equality was given explicit attention in the 2006-2008 strategy, in which “Enhancing the roles of women and girls in society” became a strategic sector of focus. In later strategies, gender equality became more mainstreamed with gender equality occupying a prominent place in the 2011-2014 strategy.

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12 The Muskoka Initiative with its 3 pillars, of which all three are pursued by Canada in Afghanistan, influenced health programming especially in the period 2011-2014. See appendix 9.

13 Third government priority: Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons (this included health and polio)
The strategic documents reviewed contained some information on aid channels and aid modalities, which was complemented and validated through interviews:

- With an initial focus on state-building and limited capacity on the ground, most aid was provided in the early years through multilateral agencies, especially via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Task Force and the UN;

- From 2007 onwards there were attempts to further diversify aid channels. Both NGOs and private sector firms were actively sought as implementing partners sometimes in specific sub sectors, such as Community-Based Education (CBE), which was implemented by NGOs like the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC).

While strategic documents vary considerably in length and depth of analysis provided, the RRMAFs provide information on context, risk assessment and risk mitigation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as detailed logic models.

**Canada’s Afghanistan development program portfolio**

The Government of Canada committed $1.9 billion to development and reconstruction in Afghanistan for the period 2001 to 2011. According to official information, $1.969 billion was provided during the period 2001-02 to 2010-11, of which CIDA accounted for $1.652 billion.\(^{14}\) Canada was among top five bilateral donors to Afghanistan after the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Japan largest bilateral donors (see Appendix 10 for more details).

**Table 2.3.2 Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements to Afghanistan, 2001-02 to 2012-13, in million $**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan - Canada</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which CIDA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portfolio information shows that a total of 310 initiatives with project partners were signed and implemented during the period 2004-05 to 2012-13.\(^{15}\) From 2004-05 to 2005-06, Canada’s annual aid disbursements for Afghanistan were around $100 million, with a clear increase from 2006-07 onwards, reflecting the focus in the 2006-2008 New Strategy for Afghanistan to expand the activities with specific emphasis on Kandahar. Disbursements to Afghanistan reached a peak in 2007-08 at $280 million. During the three year period 2008-09 to 2010-11, aid remained well above the $200 million mark annually and from 2011-12 started to decline again to the 2004-2006 levels of $100 million annually.

The following figure presents the shift in sectors of focus over the evaluation period.

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\(^{15}\) Not all agreements were fully implemented when the portfolio information was obtained in May-June 2013. Approximately 58% of the money disbursed represented closed agreements. The remaining volume is related to agreements that were terminating or still in operation at the end of FY 2013. The portfolio overview excludes imputed long-term institutional support to multilateral organizations, and includes contributions to multilateral agencies for implementation of activities in Afghanistan, which have been included in table 2.3. The portfolio includes project funding, ARTF funding including recurrent cost window and specific local funds such as the Kandahar Local Initiatives Projects, Canada Fund for Local Initiatives and the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women under which many different small initiatives have been funded.
Figure 2.3.1 Annual disbursements by Principal Sector of Focus, 2004-05 to 2012-13

This figure illustrates the change in strategic direction as indicated in section 2.3 above. Democratic governance was the most important sector for five years (from 2004-05 until 2008-09), while economic growth took over in 2009-10 and 2010-11. Health became the largest sector, as measured by disbursements, for the last two years of the evaluation period (2011-12 and 2012-13).16

Total disbursements over the entire evaluation period by principal sector of focus is presented in the following figure, showing that democratic governance and economic growth are the two most important sectors, each representing 22% of total disbursements. Emergency assistance represents 12% of total disbursements, which is very comparable to the percentage of humanitarian assistance in total ODA (see Table 2.2). Emergency assistance and peace and security combined represent 20% of total disbursements. Health and education comprised 11% and 10% of total disbursements, respectively.

16 The figures in the table are annual disbursements. However, there is not necessarily a direct relationship to the sectoral priorities in any given year as the disbursements may relate to contracts, frontloaded grants or other agreements. Nevertheless, trends in disbursements per sector give a good overall indication of changes in priorities in line with the change in strategic focus. See appendix 9 for more details.
Recent priority areas, such as community-based education, maternal, newborn and child health, and human rights, do not figure very prominently in the overall Afghanistan program portfolio from 2004-05 to 2012-13.

Over the entire evaluation period, it is estimated that $273 million of the $1.9 billion portfolio was spent in Kandahar. Disbursement for projects with a partial Kandahar focus are based on estimates by the Program staff as recorded in the financial statistical system, and are not based on verified disbursement figures. In absolute and relative terms, Kandahar disbursements were highest in 2010-11 with $72 million or 33% of the total Program. From 2008 to 2011, 29% of all disbursements were made in Kandahar.
3. Relevance to Afghanistan and the international context – Main Findings

Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program was clearly focused on state-building from 2004 to 2007, but lacked a clear vision of its role and function in a conflict environment. This changed in 2007 with the planning and implementation of engagement in Kandahar Province – an active conflict zone – as one of many components in the Whole of Government approach. After Canada’s withdrawal from Kandahar and from the democratic governance sector, the Program resumed its national level development focus and attention to peace-building and state-building goals became less prominent.

Relevance to Afghanistan
The Afghanistan Program appears to have been well aligned with GfRoA priorities as reflected in the ANDS and NPPs. Canada reached the 80% target of alignment agreed upon in the London and Kabul conferences in 2010. However, the very comprehensive and general character of ANDS and NPPs made it easy to assert that donor programs were “aligned”. This was less true for humanitarian assistance, which was not explicitly addressed in the ANDS or NPPs.

Canada’s development Program addressed important humanitarian and development needs in this protracted, complex emergency. The assessment of needs, however, required constant attention. Throughout the evaluation period, the Program was aware of the necessity to both update and deepen its understanding of the evolving context. That being said, there were issues with the quality of assessments used to this end. Humanitarian needs analyses were quite weak initially, and the specific needs of women and girls were not always sufficiently taken into account. Over time, needs analysis improved. Understanding the political economy and main drivers of conflict and fragility received relatively little attention in Canada’s Development Program, but Canada is not exceptional in this regard.

Aid Effectiveness
The Afghanistan Program mitigated risks appropriately by using a diversity of implementing partners and the balance of support among delivery channels varied substantially over time. From 2004-05 to 2008-09, 90% of disbursements were made through multilateral channels (in particular, multi-donor pooled funds and the United Nations). Civil society and the private sector became more important partners from 2008 onwards, as reflected in the figure below. However, the share of private sector funding declined again from 2011-12, which is related to the Canadian transition away from the economic growth sector. In 2012-13, civil society became the most important aid channel for the first time with 37% of total disbursements.17

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17 Annual disbursements by type of executing agency are indicative and present general trends in disbursements per aid channel over the evaluation period. See Appendix 9 for more details.
In addition to finding a suitable mix of partners and delivery channels, maintaining a balance between national and sub-national efforts was also challenging. Whereas using civil society organisations enabled access to certain populations, the implication of a disproportionate reliance on NGOs was that linkages to national policies, strategies and implementation were often not sufficiently taken into account.

The proportion of on-budget support provided by Canada varied between 19% and 34% from 2010 to 2013, which was less than the 50% target agreed to in 2010 in the London and Kabul conferences (see text box below). On-budget support was provided in two ways:

- To the ARTF Recurrent Cost Window as budget support and managed by the World Bank; and,
- To national programs (education, community development, microfinance, health, etc.), either via the ARTF or, to a lesser extent, via UN agencies (notably, UNDP).  

18 The NABDP program implemented by UNDP is an example of on-budget UN support, but most UN support is off-budget. See Appendix 9 for more details.
Figure 3.2 shows that between 2004 and 2008, when there were no international agreements, more than 50% of total support consisted of on-budget support (up to 65% in 2007-08). However, as noted above, from 2008-09 onwards, the proportion of on-budget support (programming and recurrent costs) varied between 19% and 34%, which was quite far from the 50% target.

The Canadian Program has been a regular supporter of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and was its third largest donor after the US and the United Kingdom for the entire period of the evaluation. After 2008, however, Canada’s contribution dropped sharply in absolute and relative terms. Slightly more than one third of the Afghanistan Program portfolio ($560 million) was channelled through the ARTF, supporting the Afghan governments’ recurrent costs (recurrent cost window) and key national development programs (investment window) (see Figure 3.2 where on-budget support, including ARTF funding, is presented).

Canada and other donors criticized the management of the Fund for being insufficiently results-oriented and paying inadequate attention to gender equality. In response to the criticisms, the ARTF paid more attention to outcome reporting and gender, for which evidence was seen after 2010. Various evaluations indicate that the ARTF donors’ consistency with the principles of the Paris Declaration (and follow-up agreements in Accra and Busan), including harmonization, alignment and donor coordination, but appears to have been less oriented to issues of sub-national governance, fragility and conflict.

According to ARTF rules, 50% of donor funding could have been preferenced for specific programs, although the World Bank has always publicly stated that the ARTF succeeded in meeting any preferencing requests of donors. In fact, Canada preferred 64% of its funding. The decreased Canadian funding of ARTF after 2008, in absolute and relative terms, and the high proportion of preferencing, may affect Canada’s negotiation position in the ARTF in the medium-term.

Canada also aimed to earmark part of its ARTF contribution to activities in Kandahar despite the fact that, in principle, the ARTF did not allow earmarking. In practice, Canada contacted ministries to negotiate that specific activities from national programs be implemented in Kandahar.

This points to an interesting challenge regarding aid effectiveness principles in a highly centralized, but fragile, state. On the one hand, there was a necessary focus on enhancing the role and capacity of the national government, which was reflected in the establishment of the ARTF. On the other hand, there was a necessity to pull-down national programs to provincial and district levels in order to address issues of equity, sustainability and efficiency of service delivery.
Cross-cutting themes

Gender equality has always been a specific priority in the Afghanistan Program, and over time the strategic focus on gender equality increased. The first gender equality strategy was elaborated by the Program for the 2011-2014 cycle and undertook a thorough gender analysis, including elements specific to fragile states, as its point of departure. There was a sharp increase in gender-integrated projects in that period, although the share of projects integrating gender equality results never reached half of the portfolio. This was partially because of the lack of gender equality integration in multilateral delivery channels (World Bank and UN), but also due to the difficult context and limited gender expertise available to the Program for significant periods of time. It should be noted that the gender coding of projects was based on an ex-ante assessment of expected gender results. Over the life of a project, gender aspects may have been addressed that were not foreseen at the outset. In practice, women-specific approaches have been the main mechanism used to address gender equality, while only limited attention has been paid to changing the behaviour of men and addressing underlying cultural constraints. The Afghanistan Program could have done more to encourage female participation in reconciliation and peace-building processes.

Canada Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) requirements, applicable to off-budget projects, appear to have been formally met and strategic environmental assessments were conducted. However, in interviews, the CIDA environmental specialists involved questioned the quality of the assessments carried out by some implementing partners – in the case of the Dahla Dam, for example. In practice, environmental issues were only addressed to a very limited extent.

Within the cross-cutting theme of governance,\(^{19}\) democratic governance as a sector figured most prominently from 2004 to 2011. Attention was also paid to strengthening the capacity of the government in the health and education sectors. However, no explicit strategy for mainstreaming governance issues into the overall Program was found.

Policy Dialogue

Canada was considered to be a pro-active and constructive donor on coordination, aid effectiveness principles, and policy dialogue, including the discussions around the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Further, Canada was very active in improving donor coordination, especially in health and education, where it led donor coordination for a number of years. It played a key role in establishing dialogue and coordination among international health sector partners in the country, which was widely acknowledged by key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Public Health. The same was not necessarily true at the sub-sector level. While Canada was recognised for its role in global polio eradication, this has not been the case for maternal, newborn and child health under the Muskoka Initiative where, despite considerable investment, it has yet to realize its goal of becoming a lead international partner.

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\(^{19}\) A distinction can be made between governance as a cross-cutting theme and governance as a sector. CIDA classified all projects in Afghanistan according to DAC Sectors of Focus. Democratic governance was the Sector of Focus for all projects related to democratic development and effective governance. In the documents consulted, various names were used for this sector (see Appendix 9 Policy and portfolio analysis). In practice, multi-sector community development projects focussing on democratic participation of the population in development activities was the biggest category in this sector. This sector also included support to public sector policy and administrative management. A third sub-sector was decentralisation and support to sub-national governments. Election support and human rights were the smallest sub-sectors in terms of disbursements.
4. Effectiveness – Main Findings

As discussed in section 2.3, the Afghanistan Program elaborated various logic models and detailed performance frameworks (RRMAFs) over the evaluation period. The analysis of effectiveness in this summative evaluation is based on objectives set in the various strategy and performance documents. The objectives were consolidated into one intervention logic (see Appendix 6) in order to focus on the Program’s key outputs and outcomes over the evaluation period.

4.1. Short-term results

Impressive short-term achievements have been realized. In many cases, Canada was not the sole funder of projects, but contributed to multi-donor programs.\(^{20}\) Although Canada’s contribution was analysed in a systematic manner,\(^{21}\) its specific contribution was difficult to measure. Nonetheless it is clear that Canada, together with other donors, contributed significantly to the following results:

- more than 50,000 community-based infrastructure projects, including the establishment of Community Development Councils;
- the creation of thousands of schools, including community-based schools;
- training of approximately 160,000 teachers of whom 31% are female;
- well-organized polio vaccination campaigns;
- training of thousands of health workers, midwives and immunization volunteers (37% of community health workers are women);
- delivery of loans to more than 400,000 people;
- delivery of food aid to millions of people; and,
- enhanced capacity of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and women’s organizations.

Reports to Parliament between 2008 and 2012 describe many of these results, but new reporting has been included in this evaluation based on an updated review of project documents. Some short-term achievements make a clear distinction between men and women. While gender-disaggregated reporting improved over time, there were still weaknesses in gender-specific reporting in some sectors, such as humanitarian assistance.

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\(^{20}\) For the 50 projects included in the sample, Canada’s contribution varied between 100% for some specific Kandahar-projects to only 2-5% for some big multi-donor programs.

\(^{21}\) In the evaluation design it was recognized that Canada is in many cases not the sole contributor to projects. Therefore, Canada’s absolute and relative contribution to each project included in the sample was assessed. Also, contribution was analysed at a sectoral level taking into account Canada’s absolute and relative funding of the sector and non-quantitative aspects, such as Canada’s role in the policy dialogue and donor coordination. A more detailed explanation is provided in Appendix 2. In addition to the fact that Canadian contributions were often made into the ARTF or other multi-donor programs, the scope and complexity of the programming made the application of a full contribution analysis very challenging.
4.2. Longer-term results and synergies

Given ongoing conflict and instability in Afghanistan, as well as the very low level of development at the start of the evaluation period, long-term results are challenging to realize in the timeframe available. Nevertheless, good outcomes were achieved in some sectors, such as health, education and mine action.

Health
The national target of 90% access to essential quality health services within two hours walking distance was reached in 2011-12 according to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment. This is due to the rapid expansion of the number of primary health facilities from 2001 to 2012, which has had a considerable positive impact on national statistics. Despite this achievement, issues of equitable access to services remain. Access to health services relates not only to the physical distance and travel time to health facilities, but also to the cost of travel and services, as well as opportunity costs. The cultural responsiveness of the health sector – for example, the provision of female health care providers – also remains an important obstacle for effective access to and use of health care.

The quality of essential health services provided to vulnerable populations, especially women and children, also increased. The most consistent and impressive results are reported by the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2011-12 on the use of skilled birth attendants at delivery.

Reported rates of increased use of health services, especially by women and children, are unreliable because of uncertain population denominators; however, trends in the total number of outpatient visits and the distribution of visits by age and sex indicate continued positive progress in health service coverage and use. The point has now been reached where a more refined social equity analysis is needed to identify the specific groups and communities who may be excluded from this progress.

Progress towards polio eradication has been realized although a major setback occurred when the number of reported cases of infection suddenly jumped from 25 cases in 2010 to 80 in 2011. A change in strategy was introduced that appears to have been effective in containing further spread of the polio virus. Nevertheless, until full country-wide routine immunisation coverage is achieved, a serious threat remains.

Education
There is ample evidence indicating an increase in access to education services between 2002 and 2013. The last NRVA suggests that the largest improvements in primary education school attendance were recorded before 2007-08 and that since then progress has been modest. In fact, the NRVA suggests that at the current rate of improvement, Afghanistan National Development Strategy enrolment targets for 2020 will not be met. The reasons that children are not attending school vary but include place of residence, education level and gender. Canadian support made a positive contribution to education, although relatively limited funding was provided during the period that major improvements were realized.

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22 NRVA 2011-12, p. 72.
23 Ibidem, p.73.
24 NRVA, p.63.
There has been limited attention given to assessing the improved learning of children in primary education as an indicator of the quality of education services. Some small-scale and scattered studies point to very low levels of achievement in primary education, but only in 2014 was the Education Equality Improvement Program (EQUIP) planning to undertake a major learning assessment study, which should provide real insight. In community-based schools, levels of achievement appear to be higher and this is quite promising.

Improvements in teacher methods and materials are other indicators of the quality of education for which only limited evidence is available. There was a clear increase in the number of teachers, of which about one third were women. There were some issues with the training and deployment of teachers to where they were needed; in particular, the concentration of female teachers in some areas remains a problem. In rural areas and in the south, there were fewer teachers and even fewer female teachers. Teacher/pupil ratios were good in some areas, but not in others.

**Economic-growth**
Short-term employment and income opportunities have increased for many Afghans as a result of economic growth projects in the Afghanistan Program portfolio. In many villages, community infrastructure works financed through national community-based programs, such as National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the National Area-based Development Programme (NABDP), have resulted in millions of labour days for the community. However, this employment creation has been mainly temporary in nature. Aid money created temporary jobs that have proven hard to sustain without continuing aid flows, as indicated in various studies and evaluations. The Program also invested in projects that have tried to create more sustainable income opportunities and jobs, through microfinance and enterprise development, but so far only output-level results have been reported (for example, the number of savings groups or the number of loans provided). Exact data on numbers of new businesses as a result of these projects was not available. Finally, there is limited evidence that vocational training or advisory support has resulted in additional jobs or higher incomes.25

Regarding improved access to financial and business services, there is some evidence that the Program contributed to this outcome, but there is no recent or solid evidence regarding the extent to which this was the case. An impact study of microfinance carried out in 2007 showed very positive results, but this was before the contraction of the sector from 2008 onwards. Nevertheless, the decline of the microfinance sector in Afghanistan did lead to an increased level of ‘Afghanization’ of the management of microfinance institutions and this was seen as a positive trend.

It is difficult to measure the enhanced capacity of communities to identify and implement development activities. The community development programs NSP and NABDP were supposed to lead to positive

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25 A tracer study carried out by Turquoise Mountain Trust of 116 graduated students in the period 2009-2012 (31 female, 85 male) from the Institute of Afghan Arts and Architecture shows that 23 percent are pursuing further study at Kabul University or private universities and 61 percent are employed in craft industries. Of those employed in the craft industries, some have opened their own businesses while others are working for existing businesses. The remainder are employed in different sectors or unemployed.

**Community-Based Education (CBE): Successful interventions at the community level**
Since 2006, Canada has funded community-based schools through various projects and programs implemented primarily by NGOs, such as BRAC and AKF. More than 5,000 community-based schools have been established with Canadian support where thousands of girls and boys in remote areas, in particular, have gained access to education and enjoy active support from their communities. These schools build on culturally appropriate approaches where schools and teachers are embedded in the community with community elders (mostly men) in the driving seat.

Learning outcomes appear to be positive. However, outcome tracking needs to be improved and long-term impact cannot be guaranteed. More evidence-based lessons should be drawn and disseminated, while linkages with the formal education system to facilitate transition should be strengthened.
long-term democratic governance and economic growth effects. Important community decision-making apparatus have been established: the Community Development Councils (CDCs) at village level and the District Development Authority at district level. Both organizations aim to promote the integration and inclusion of women and have given voice to women. It was the first time that women’s opinions have been systematically included in the design of village level projects. Moreover, it is reported that 70% of CDCs actively form linkages with government partners and civil society to support development activities in their village. Whether these linkages are successful and result in concrete projects still needs to be investigated. NSP impact evaluation results capture the economic perceptions and optimism of villagers, especially of women, but there is no evidence that NSP has generated general production and marketing outcomes or increases in agricultural yields, productivity, or harvest sales.

**Dahla Dam/Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program – Signature Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The difficulty of realizing and measuring long-term results</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goals:</strong> The project aimed to improve irrigated agricultural production in the Arghandab Valley by rehabilitating canals and irrigation works, improving water management practices and developing sustainable community management systems. A series of related projects was also funded by Canada in and around this valley to improve the entire agriculture value chain. The Afghanistan Program spent considerable time and energy in tracking outputs and outcomes to the extent possible in this very insecure environment.</td>
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<td><strong>Short-term results:</strong> Precise information is available that shows that the majority of planned outputs were realized, although not all secondary canals could be rehabilitated and only 7 of the 28 planned Water User Associations were established by the end of the project. Outcome information had to be collected after the closure of the projects when there was no longer staff on the ground.</td>
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<td><strong>Efficiency:</strong> The project evaluation notes that a second implementing agency, which was contracted locally to complete work on the secondary canals, appeared to have a much better cost-output ratio than the initial implementing agency.</td>
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<td><strong>Different baselines and targets:</strong> One main outcome indicator for this Signature Project was the increase in irrigated acreage as a result of project interventions. Documents consulted present different baseline data and targets. The pre-feasibility study carried out in 2007 and finalized in 2008 estimated that: 40,000 hectares would be irrigated for at least one crop per year; there would be a 50% increase in overall production; 60,000 additional farm jobs would be created; and, a sound Arghandab Valley Authority would be established. The 2009 inception report mentions that 27,600 families who had 20,000 hectares of irrigated land would benefit from 16,000 hectares of fallow land being turned into irrigated land, i.e. 0.6 hectare of additionally irrigated land per family. Finally, the Quarterly Reports to Parliament indicate a target of 30,000 hectares to be irrigated.</td>
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<td><strong>Measuring longer-term results:</strong> At the end of the project, no information was available on the increase in irrigated acreage. As a result of the security situation, the Afghanistan Program decided to track this outcome in an innovative yet costly manner using satellite images from March 2011 onwards. Satellite images show variations in vegetation, but cannot distinguish between rain-fed and irrigated agriculture via canals or wells. The increase in vegetation in April-May each year corresponds to the rainy season. The main findings from satellite image coverage of three seasons in the Arghandab Valley indicate an increasing trend of overall vegetation in the first two agricultural seasons – 2011 and 2012 – and a decline in 2013. They also show structural changes around the rehabilitated canal system, which likely indicates that there is a significant increase in agricultural, farming and land use activities over the AIRP study area. The positive trend of vegetation and land use is more significant in those areas that are close to some of the rehabilitated canals.</td>
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There is significant evidence of a positive contribution of the AIRP project to increases in vegetation. However, the interpretation of satellite data is extremely complicated in the absence of baseline satellite images and without additional verification on the ground. Therefore, while no reliable estimate can be made of the increase in irrigated area with one or two agricultural seasons per year, very rough estimates made towards the end of project implementation point to a total irrigated area of approximately 30,000 hectares, which is probably a maximum figure.

**Distribution and sustainability of benefits:** There is no information on land ownership or who benefited from the improvements in the irrigation system. Early in project implementation, crop diversification was introduced (e.g. pomegranates and saffron), but there is no information on the continued production of these crops. The Arghandab Sub-Basin Valley Authority has been set-up and is functioning; it is responsible for maintenance of the primary and secondary canals, but has a minimal and insufficient budget for this. Water User Associations should be responsible for the maintenance of tertiary canals, but they are few in number. Mirabs – the traditional system for irrigation water management – are controlling the distribution of water to farmers, as was the case before the project. There is no information on actual maintenance of the canals and organizations that were established during the project face challenges with maintenance or no longer exist. Further, the linkages between the organizations in charge of irrigation management and the agricultural departments appear weak.

In conclusion, the results of the Dahla Dam Signature project illustrate quite well the challenges related to achieving long-term outcomes in an insecure environment when no follow-up can be provided to the organizations on the ground following project completion. There is clear evidence that most outputs were achieved, but there is no evidence that the system is being effectively operated, which may lead to a rapid deterioration if no follow-up is provided through the new project funded by USAID.

**Humanitarian assistance**

In 2004-05, the Afghanistan Program provided support to UNHCR’s Refugee Return and Reintegration program, which facilitated the return of over half of a million Afghans to all areas of the country, a little less than the 778,000 returnees that were anticipated according to project documents.

Effectiveness of the projects implemented by the UNHCR and WFP are particularly difficult to measure partly because Canada’s contribution is part of a large international funding effort, but also because information beyond the output level is largely absent. Regarding the longer-term effects of food aid, there is limited or no information on lasting changes in the nutritional status of women and children. The NRVA 2011-12 even indicated that food security deteriorated slightly between 2007-08 and 2011-12, with 30% of Afghanistan’s population being food insecure in 2012. Food security varies widely by residence, household characteristics, season and geographical region.

There are some positive indications of improved resilience or an increased capacity to withstand emergencies, particularly at the community level and less so at a provincial or national level. While interventions were scattered and evidence limited, there was one clear positive example: the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) demonstrated strong capacity to address mine action concerns in various areas. The Mine Action Coordination Centre in Afghanistan (MACCA) has clear national ownership and has established positive and essential working relations with different ministries and a range of government and non-government actors.

Clearance of mines improved access by farmers and communities to the land and allowed for the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees. Approximately 100 km² was cleared of mines each year, but given the level of contamination, it is envisaged that total eradication of mines will only be realized towards 2022. Thus far, 123 districts and 2,243 communities are no longer affected by known landmines and explosive remnants of war as a result of mine action activities.
Human rights
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has gained the capacity to exert leadership, as well as to promote, monitor and protect human rights. Annual reports indicate a consolidation and expansion of the scope of the Commission’s activity and capabilities. There is a clear increase in the number of complaints of domestic violence received (from 915 in 2008 to 2,468 in 2012), more active reporting on detention centres, media monitoring, and improvements in planning and reporting. Active monitoring of detention centers, including female prisons, as well as orphanages and hospitals, contributed to the improvement of standards and the elimination of apparent human rights violations. Hundreds of men and women, boys and girls, who were illegally arrested, detained or imprisoned, were released following the AIHRC’s intervention. The main potential weakness of the AIHRC, highlighted in an impact evaluation, was their lack of focus. As demands grew over time, so did the need to focus on those tasks for which the Commission has a unique mandate (e.g. monitoring of detention centres) and outsource or leave to civil society organisations those activities which can be also implemented by partners (e.g. awareness raising and education).

There is contradictory evidence on the level of awareness of human rights. Surveys indicated a decreasing level of acceptance of women’s equal rights among the population between 2006 and 2012; however, there is some positive qualitative evidence on the human rights awareness of duty bearers. The AIHRC impact evaluation found that, “a range of key interlocutors (Ministry of Justice detention authorities, legal aid providers and other CSOs)…confirm with a degree of consistency that general awareness of detention-related rights has improved among detention personnel and detainees”.

Increased participation of women and men in political and electoral processes at national, provincial and local levels was not fully realized. Voter turn-out was above expectations in 2004, but low in 2009 as those elections experienced challenges. The share of women voters remained constant. The first round of the Presidential elections in 2014, which is formally beyond the scope of the evaluation, led to higher voter turn-out. Canadian-supported activities appear to have contributed to a higher number of female candidates, but there is no evidence of their higher electoral success rate.

Gender equality
The assessment of gender equality outcomes is linked to the three gender equality objectives defined by CIDA in its Gender Equality policy: decision-making, human rights and access/control of resources. Effectiveness appears to be stronger in terms of access to resources and services (education, health services, the AIHRC) and less evident when it comes to real improvements in women’s status and rights. This might be explained by the fact that changes in women’s status and rights require behaviour change that takes considerably longer to occur.

In sectors where the greatest gender equality results were reported, the picture is promising though with further room for improvement. On the demand side in health, national out-patient statistics show that

28 For instance, the 2008 Annual Report mentions that the release of 107 illegally arrested (105 men and 2 women), 255 illegally detained (92 men, 3 women, 136 boys and 24 girls) and 19 illegally imprisoned (18 men 1 woman) have been secured.
women use primary health facilities more frequently than men and that female attendance at clinics is growing at a faster pace than male attendance. On the supply side, the high percentage of males among health personnel is slowly decreasing due to pre-service training programs for female nurses and midwives. However, the issues of gender inequity in the assignments, task recognition and positions of female and male staff in the health sector remain.

Some longer-term gender equality results have been realized, particularly in community-based education, the Human Rights Commission, the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women, and Kabul Widows project, but there is limited evidence of positive results for the main ARTF programs in various sectors.

**Synergies within and among sectors**

There are some areas where synergies were achieved or where there is potential for synergies. For example, the ARTF support to the GiRoA via the recurrent cost window – in particular, the Incentives Working Program – is clearly linked to progress on the policy benchmarks agreed to in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Whereas this is an international agreement led by the World Bank to ensure support to the ARTF, Canada is actively participating in the ARTF Incentives Program Working Group and in the TMAF policy dialogue, which has been quite important for the overall focus on state-building.

There are also synergies between Canada’s co-Chairing of the ARTF Gender Working Group and its support to EQUIP and the Strengthening Health Activities for the Poor initiative. Furthermore, Canada has served as donor lead for Area 2 of the TMAF focused on elimination of violence against women and human rights, which is complimentary to its financial support in these areas. Canada has stressed the issue of human rights and, in particular, women’s rights in donor coordination meetings and in policy dialogue with the Afghan government. The combination of financial support to specific organizations, such as the Human Rights Commission, and dialogue on legislation and law enforcement is more likely to lead to long-term results than if only financial support were provided. However, these are very difficult areas where it will take time for lasting change to be realized.

From 2008 to 2011, the intensive Whole of Government approach and focus on Kandahar led to considerable attention being paid to synergies within and across sectors aiming to stabilize the province. The mine action program is one very positive example, where the program tried to reach out to various ministries and sectors to realize long-term mine education results and re-integration of mine victims into society. Also, land was cleared of mines in the Arghandab Valley in order to enhance the effects of improved irrigation systems in that area, which is a positive example of synergies in Canadian programming.

The analysis of the education sector has shown that more linkages need to be established between the formal basic education system supported through EQUIP and community-based education. Canada’s role in donor coordination in this sector placed it in a unique position to establish these linkages and strengthen the CBE unit of the Ministry of Education, but this did not get much attention. Transition from community-based schools to primary and secondary education, but also from primary education into technical and vocational training, are areas where potentially important synergies could have been realized.

Finally, the linkages between development and humanitarian assistance in a complex emergency require continued attention. The Program was well aware of this challenge when humanitarian assistance was integrated as a responsibility of the Afghanistan Task Force, but it appears that, over time, less attention
was given to synergies, with the exception of mine action. Very limited evidence of positive synergies between humanitarian and development assistance was found.

While the focus of the Program has become sectoral and project-driven over time, it is very important to avoid a silo-approach, and to track cross-sectoral outcomes as much as possible so as to enhance broader development results.

**Explanatory factors**
The main internal factors contributing to, or limiting, effectiveness, which could be influenced by the Afghanistan Program over the three phases of programming, were:

**Factors contributing to positive results:**
- **Diversity of implementing partners**, which allowed for the mitigation of risks. In addition, the establishment of constructive relations with a variety of partners in each sector is a factor that positively contributed to effectiveness, especially in education;
- **Flexibility of implementation at the project level** with a focus on local ownership of projects. There are clear examples of learning and adjustments made to realize intended results. This was the case for NGO projects, but also for ARTF programs where joint donor action led to an improved focus on gender equality and results-based management;
- **Donor coordination** appears to have positively contributed to the establishment of joint policy benchmarks for government reforms through the ARTF Incentives Working Program and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. However, the effects of donor coordination are less clear at the sector level, despite considerable effort; and,
- **The elaboration of appropriate gender strategies** was an important explanatory factor for gender equality results. The projects and programs that had an adequate gender strategy based on solid, gender-differentiated needs analyses showed better gender equality results. This was the case across all sectors.

**Factors contributing to limited or negative results:**
- **On-going insecurity.** The security situation throughout the country and in Kandahar, in particular, affected the implementation of projects. It was not always safe for project teams to implement activities in the field. Mitigating measures adopted by the Program included increased security measures, which also led to increased costs, as well as increased reliance on Afghan partners for implementation;
- **Limited sector strategies** developed by the Afghanistan Program, which should have been based on a good understanding of the priority needs in the evolving context and including clear strategic direction and an exit strategy. Positive examples that emerged more recently include the Economic Growth Strategy developed for Kandahar in 2009-10 and the Education Strategy in 2011-2014;
- **Lack of consolidated results focus at the sector and Program levels.** Whereas project-level performance measurement tools, including RRMAFs based on logic models, were in place and project-level monitoring and evaluation given due attention, similar tools for the sector and Program levels were lacking. Annual reports reviewed do provide information related to the RRMAF targets and state whether the Program is on track to achieve the targets. However, these are short documents and the analysis is limited;
• **Multiple, short interventions and an absence of attention to sustainability** in specific sectors and sub-sectors limited the achievement of long-term results. Long-term results were also negatively affected when no proper handover took place. This was the case for promising local initiatives funded via the Canadian Local Funds, such as the Responsive Fund for the Advancement for Women and the Kandahar Local Initiatives Fund, which funded interesting local initiatives for a short period of time, but were not sufficiently focused on sustainability;

• **Weak implementing partners** explain, to a large extent, the instances of lack of project-level effectiveness. Certain UN agencies, particularly in Kandahar, had difficulty implementing projects according to plan. When new partners were contracted to work in areas where they did not have specific expertise, results lagged behind. This was the case for a few willing implementing partners in Kandahar who took on implementation in a very difficult environment. UN Habitat, for instance, implemented an NSP-type community development program but faced considerable challenges in implementation; and,

• **Insufficient focus on gender equality strategies** on the part of UN agencies and international financial institutions for quite some time. The Afghanistan program was active in improving the gender equality focus, which translated into improvements in the gender equality work for some, but not all, partners.
5. Efficiency – Main Findings

Efficiency is a measure of how economically resources, including funds and time, are converted into results. In a conflict environment, the costs of implementing an aid program in a situation with evolving security needs tend to be quite high because of staff and project security costs, which negatively affects efficiency.

Implementing partners
The Afghanistan Program diversified its choice of implementing partners in order to mitigate the risk of results not being achieved. Canada accepted that the risks presented by on-budget and multilateral funding were both expected and worthwhile in support of Afghan ownership and capacity building. Multilateral pooled funds, such as ARTF and the Multilateral Voluntary Trust Fund for UNMAS mine action, were meant to reduce the administrative costs for all donors involved, as well as to provide good oversight mechanisms and robust internal and external audit systems. The ARTF and the UNMAS Fund were considered to function very efficiently, although some ARTF-funded programs, such as the education program EQUIP, suffered from high overhead costs. In principle, UN agencies were also supposed to work efficiently, although their overhead costs were considered to be relatively high. Overhead costs for NGO projects are supposed to be relatively low. Nevertheless, the costs to manage these NGO projects appear to be higher than for multilateral organizations. The management of Local Funds was quite time consuming for the Program. Despite this, these Funds offered unique opportunities to work with local civil society actors, as was shown in the case of the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women and the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program. It is not possible to draw firm conclusions regarding the comparative efficiency of the various aid channels used by Canada.

In practice, although due attention was given to timely implementation of projects and audits, relatively little attention was given to efficiency considerations in terms of value for money, i.e. a comparison of the costs for various items and calculations of the costs per output and per outcome. Some positive measures were taken, such as the untying of food aid after 2008, which allowed for a more efficient procurement of food items.

Program management
CIDA’s centralized procedures negatively affected efficiency. This was the case for delays throughout the program management and project cycle, including decisions related to the freedom of movement for staff based in Afghanistan, especially after the withdrawal of the military, as well as project approvals and contracting. Although some authority was delegated to the field when the WoG approach was in place, after 2011 the Local Funds were phased out and decision-making was centralized again.

There is evidence that the Program was quite risk-averse, and focused too much attention on the project-level, which did not leave enough time for sectoral and cross-sectoral issues. A clear risk going forward is that the relatively large proportion of off-budget support will continue to place the management burden on the staff given the intensive procedures in place for the identification, approval, monitoring and closure of these projects.

Staffing
The Afghanistan Program has been the largest program in CIDA’s existence, both in terms of volume of aid as well as in number of staff involved. The Afghanistan Program occupies a unique place in CIDA’s history, as a special Afghanistan Task Force was established in 2007 and continued until 2011. It had its
own corporate services, including human resources, communications, and other programming departments, and was not housed in the CIDA building for most of its existence. During the period of implementation of the Whole of Government approach and heavy focus on Kandahar, the Afghanistan Task Force functioned as an organization within an organization. The majority of the Afghanistan Development Program staff was headquarters-based. From 2002 onwards, development staff were also based in Kabul, and from 2006 to 2012 CIDA staff were deployed to Kandahar. The Canadian Embassy in Kabul deployed local development staff in addition to the expatriate staff. In the early years, the number of professional staff engaged in the planning and implementation of this rapidly expanding program in a complex emergency situation was very limited – one senior development professional was based at the Embassy and approximately five people were working on the Program at CIDA headquarters. Subsequently the staffing of the Afghanistan Program showed significant variation: from less than 10 people in 2004-05, to approximately 20-25 full-time employees in 2006-07, and up to 125 people from 2008 until 2011 followed by a rapid contraction in 2011 to 70 people, down to fewer than 30 in 2013.

The management of a rapidly growing development program in a complex emergency led to specific human resources challenges, in particular when the Task Force was created. For various reasons, the enormous expansion from 2007 onwards could not be realized with CIDA staff only. As a result, there was a clear intention to recruit externally and develop a special esprit de corps. The idea of setting up a staffing incubator partially outside CIDA and recruiting individuals with relevant experience in the Balkans or the Middle East was launched. The Task Force was under considerable pressure to not only recruit sufficient, qualified staff, but also to put pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment packages in place, which included ‘duty of care’ responsibilities.29 Interviews showed that opinions differed on the extent to which sufficiently qualified staff was sent to the field. The idea of establishing a flexible staffing structure within CIDA or across government departments to recruit people with specific expertise in engagement in conflict zones and fragile states did not materialize. A Canadian Program Support Unit (CPSU), an arrangement also used in other countries where CIDA programs are delivered, served as the eyes and ears of the Afghanistan Program on the ground. It engaged locally contracted professionals and support staff in various disciplines. The CPSU was closed in March 2014, but given its importance, an interim arrangement has been put in place until a new model of DFATD Field Support Services is initiated.

Frequent rotation of staff combined with limited freedom of movement negatively affected institutional memory; however, some key staff had several rotations in different positions in the Afghanistan Program either at headquarters or in Afghanistan, which positively contributed to continuity and has reinforced Canada’s role in policy dialogue. However, there is a clear danger that this will no longer be the case in future given the reduced size of the Program.

Learning
There are various examples of project-level learning and improvement through monitoring and evaluation, studies and other means. This applied to all aid channels, although less so to some UN agencies. There is also evidence of some learning at sector level, especially in education, health, gender equality and in the work done in Kandahar. Reviews of Program-level operations were carried out, such as the Operational Program Review from 2005 to 2009 and a desk review carried out by the Evaluation Division at the end of 2007, and show that there was clear follow-up on operational recommendations but less so on strategic recommendations.

29 Duty of care responsibilities required extensive consultations and re-working of benefits, insurance, SOPs, etc.
6. Impact and sustainability – Main Findings

The evaluation design indicated that this summative evaluation would seek evidence for impact-level results to which Canada, as member of the international community, contributed.30 The extent to which intended impacts have been achieved and how sustainable these results will be is even more difficult to assess than the achievement of immediate and intermediate outcomes, given the context of insecurity and fragility. Future developments in Afghanistan will determine whether the Canadian investments will lead to the development of robust and equitable service delivery systems and an accountable state. Some seeds of hope have been sown despite the security challenges faced throughout much of the evaluation period, but results lag behind in some areas and the challenges of governance, sustainability, inclusive growth and recurrent cost financing remain.

6.1. Progress towards intended impacts

Whether Canadian investments contributed to economic growth, democratic governance, robust and equitable service delivery systems, and an accountable state remains to be determined. There were many risks and insecurities, as well as numerous system gaps to close. The risks related to these investments have to be accepted as part of the effort to build a peaceful and stable state; they could be mitigated but not avoided.

Significant improvements in Afghanistan’s health indicators have been reported over the period of the evaluation, although cultural barriers to greater progress remain. The rapid development of the demand for and supply of health services has been remarkable. Service-related statistics, such as immunization rates, outpatient consultations and supervised obstetric deliveries, are still below comparable rates in other countries in the region, but they continue to improve. The basis of this rapid development was a very early consensus by the transitional government and three large international partners, the European Union, the US Government and the World Bank on a contracting-out model for health services that had only been tested once before on such a large scale in Cambodia.31 The results have been impressive, but challenges of governance, sustainability and affordability remain. Canada was not among the largest donors to the health sector, but has definitely contributed to these improvements.

For polio eradication, the situation is different. Canada was the main international supporter of the initiative to eradicate polio in Afghanistan since 2006 and became the lead financing agency when it launched its signature project for polio eradication in 2008. With Canadian support, Afghanistan has acquired a very functional system for the containment of polio virus infection. As long as eradication in neighbouring Pakistan remains an issue and as long as routine immunization coverage in Afghanistan remains fragile, this system of communication, surveillance and response will be required to prevent outbreaks of poliomyelitis and to contribute to the global goal of polio eradication.

For education, the NRVA 2011-12 reported improvements for all education indicators, including gender equality, although the pace of improvement has slowed. It is still quite early to measure the intended impacts of the transition of girls from primary to secondary education or to vocational training and then to

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31 Loevinsohn, 2005
the labour market. There are various challenges facing girls in the transition from one school system to another.32

Evidence collected through international surveys33 suggests that support from Canada, as well as other donors, has yet to achieve visible impacts on the actual protection of human rights, increased democratic participation or broader access by women to decision-making. It is clear that the country still faces important human rights challenges. There is recognition that with Afghanistan becoming a signatory to key international human rights instruments and legislation on elimination of violence against women, a legal framework has been provided but further effort will be required in its application. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has been strengthened with important Canadian support and that of other donors, but there are some concerns regarding its continued independence and focus that require attention.

Canada contributed to the increased availability of microfinance services and community infrastructure. At the project level, there is some evidence that improvements in agriculture through irrigation, the introduction of new crops, vocational training or advisory support have resulted in more jobs and higher incomes. However, for important projects, such as the Dahla Dam signature project and NSP (see text box), this evidence is inconclusive. For the majority of the economic growth projects in the sample, there was no clear evidence of improved income or employment opportunities. Economic growth has been quite uneven, largely absent in the agricultural sector and rural areas where Canada’s support was concentrated and has yet to lead to poverty reduction at the macro level.

Canada’s efforts to link relief, reconstruction and development defined expected results at the outcome level. However, there remain few reported results of humanitarian assistance beyond the output level,34 with some notable exceptions. One exception is the Kabul Widows project, where widows successfully earned incomes, became economically empowered and their rights and participation at the community level were strengthened. Nevertheless, it was generally difficult to estimate or measure the longer-term effects of interventions carried out as humanitarian assistance. In Afghanistan, saving lives and alleviating suffering has been a short-term activity that was threatened by on-going political and military violence.

Uneven impact of the biggest flagship project, the National Solidarity Program

According to a 2013 impact evaluation, the NSP has been very successful in sponsoring Community Development Councils across the entire country, financing local subprojects, promoting local governance, empowering women and, in turn, enhancing the legitimacy of the Afghan state.

The evaluation reports positively on the program’s role in improving villagers’ access to basic utilities and education and health services, as well as increased empowerment of women. But, there is no noted impact of the Program on economic activity. The Program’s biggest success midway through the cycle – the promotion of local governance – had declined by the end of the evaluation period with a negative impact on the quality of local governance. NSP has produced a durable increase in the acceptance of female participation in local governance and broader political participation. However, there is no sound evidence that the NSP has changed attitudes towards broader economic or social participation of women.

The evaluation found that the NSP had impact neither on general production and marketing outcomes nor on agricultural yields, productivity, or harvest sales. Overall, the study concludes that the impact of the NSP on economic welfare appears to have been driven more by the infusion of block grants than by completed economic projects, such as irrigation canals, access roads or bridges. This is corroborated with the finding that NSP-funded village-level irrigation and transportation projects had limited success.

32 Burde, Dana and Leigh Linden, Bringing Education to Afghan Girls: A Randomised Controlled Trial at Village-based Schools, American Economic Journal, 2013
33 Some survey results presented in chapter 2 were mentioned as indicators in the RRMAFs.
34 For example, the RRMAF 2004-2009 mentions as an immediate outcome “Increase in number or rural families that are food secure; Income generated.
The collective efforts of mine action organizations operating in Afghanistan, including Canada’s support to MAPA, have led to a steady decline in the number of mine victims. Since 2001, the average number of mine victims each month has decreased by more than 50 percent. Teaching both rural and urban communities how to avoid the dangers of landmines has contributed to the decline. Additionally, mine-free land can now be used to grow crops, which can be sold at the market or used to feed families, or to raise livestock.

Canada’s contribution to capacity building was part of the international community’s efforts. In the early years of Canada’s engagement, the focus of the international community was on strengthening the capacity of national ministries through ARTF and UN agencies. Various reports mention the excessive number of technical assistants located in different ministries at that time.\(^{35}\) There was also a relative absence of capacity-building at the provincial and district level in these early years, which can be understood given the focus on national state-building.

There is sufficient evidence that the capacity and ownership of the GIRoA has increased, although some ministries clearly lag behind. The evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration principles in Afghanistan\(^{36}\) provides clear and positive examples of strengthened capacity. The Ministry of Finance has been playing a key role in managing donor relations. In other sectors, particularly health and education, capacity has improved although the government remains quite dependent on a so-called ‘second civil service’ consisting of well-paid, Afghan returnees whose salaries continue to be funded by donors.

Canada initially focused on capacity-building at the national level via the ARTF and the UN. From 2008-2011, the focus shifted towards capacity building at the province and district level in Kandahar. From 2011 to 2014, capacity building efforts were directly related to those sectors where Canada concentrated its support.

In Kandahar, there is little evidence of positive longer-term outcomes of capacity building activities, despite all efforts. The support provided focused on the rehabilitation of office buildings, provision of office equipment and training of staff. However, capacity-building requires long-term involvement. In most cases, the provincial authorities that were interviewed remembered the support provided, but did not consider this support as structural capacity building as no systems or working methods were changed or improved as a result of that support. Therefore, no evidence could be found of strengthened capacity in the provincial government departments that can be attributed to Canadian assistance. This also applies to the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program to a large extent. The Arghandab Sub-Basin Agency was set up with support from the project and people were trained. However, this Agency has a very minimal budget for operation and maintenance of the irrigation system, thus hindering its performance. Despite project intentions to establish institutional linkages between this Agency and the provincial Department for Agriculture, no clear linkages remain. Furthermore, water users’ associations that the project established no longer exist. These challenges can be explained both by the centralized government structure that did not allow for the channelling of additional budgets to the provinces, but also by the fact that Canadian-funded projects were time-limited.

Finally, a last important component is the capacity of local NGOs. The Afghanistan Program admits that this is an area where it had relatively little context-specific experience and where it invested less.

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Nevertheless, the Program did support local NGOs as a result of funding international NGOs and by using Local Funds, which led to promising short-term results. The Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women that supported women’s organizations involved local organizations to foster local ownership, although opportunities were missed to strengthen broader institutional partnerships, which affects sustainability. In general, the support to local NGOs was too short and too limited to achieve sustainable long-term results. The local Canadian development funds no longer exist, but support of local NGOs via international NGOs and UN organizations is continuing.\textsuperscript{37}

In general, few institutional assessments have been carried out to objectively assess capacities of ministries and other Afghan organizations and this was beyond the mandate of this evaluation. Furthermore, there are clear sustainability challenges related to the political, economic and security situation of the country.

### 6.2. Unintended impacts

Unintended impacts are not easy to measure and direct linkages to specific projects and programs are difficult to establish. Therefore, unintended impacts cannot be specifically attributed to Canada’s development efforts.

There is very little sound evidence on unintended impacts, either positive or negative, and perceptions prevail. On the one hand, optimists see signs of positive impacts in many parts of society and believe that these will only become stronger. On the other hand, critics point to negative trends, such as ongoing insecurity, growing poppy production and an increasing aspirations gap among Afghan youth, and see these as unintended consequences of international support. The World Bank, for example, has stated that aid inflows have become a source of rent, patronage, and political power, sometimes inadvertently exacerbating conflicts and grievances among different groups. More impact evaluations would be needed to shed further light on intended and unintended impacts.

In the area of community-based education, an evaluation of the Girls Education Program implemented by BRAC points to positive ‘hidden outcomes’ that are not being tracked: “This CBE experience should have significant development results, even for those girls who do not transfer to formal schools or drop out soon afterwards. The ability to read, write and count, and spending a few years in a structured learning environment away from home, will certainly affect the position of these young women in their households and their village. What those effects are is the hidden outcome.”

Health sector development engaged communities and contributed to building trust in the public system. These are collateral impacts that are not completely unintended but part of the rationale for investing in the sector. For instance, when the group of female immunization volunteers in Jalalabad told the evaluation team that they participated in the campaign because it provided them with an opportunity to contribute and interact with the community, they did not refer to achieving polio eradication but rather to overcoming discrimination.

Although the foundations for a healthy microfinance sector have been established through the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), a severe contraction took place from 2008 onwards with a substantial reduction in microfinance institutions and borrowers, before the sector

\textsuperscript{37} DFATD provided $4 million to OCHA’s Emergency Response Fund in 2013, which provided a significant portion of its funding (42% in 2013) to national NGOs and actively supported local NGO capacity-building.
stabilized again at a lower level. The rapid client base growth generated between 2006 and 2008 came at the expense of proper due diligence in lending, compliance with control processes or internal monitoring of performance. Collectively, donors appear to have failed to invest in adequate governance structures and internal control systems in this sector. By pushing more and more money into the system, they were actually contributing to the sector’s downsizing to more realistic proportions from mid-2008 onwards. In the process, millions of dollars evaporated as microfinance institutions folded.³⁸ Canada spent most of its money in microfinance before 2008, but still disbursed some funds after that time. As the focus turned towards new activities, MISFA meetings were neither actively followed nor documented and, thus, an opportunity to draw lessons was lost.

Development and humanitarian assistance were not considered to be neutral by non-government actors; therefore, increased hostility led to decreased access to many parts of the country by development and humanitarian organizations. There have also been an increasing numbers of attacks on development and humanitarian workers since 2006. These can be considered unintended impacts. The humanitarian space appears to have been affected by the politicization and militarization of aid; some of the possible reasons for this are discussed in section 6.3.

The poor quality of aid-funded infrastructure, especially at the community level, has been reported on in NSP evaluations and the insufficient quality of EQUIP schools, including in Kandahar, has been reported upon various times. The low quality of some of the new infrastructure was the result of a variety of factors, including limited capacities of construction companies, limited oversight and/or corruption. Poor quality of infrastructure may negatively affect the perceptions of the population on the government’s ability to deliver services to the people.

In-depth research by the Feinstein Center in five provinces in Afghanistan (Balkh, Faryab, Helmand, Paktia and Uruzgan; where Canada has not carried out direct programming),³⁹ found that development projects were frequently described negatively by Afghans. Perceptions of the misuse and abuse of aid fuelled the growing distrust of the government and aid agencies among the population. However, the authors indicate that a perception-based study is likely to paint a more negative picture of development assistance than may be warranted.⁴⁰ That being said, the primary complaints were that projects were insufficient, both in terms of quantity (not enough) and of quality (wrong kind or poorly implemented), unevenly distributed geographically, politically and, above all, associated with extensive corruption, especially those projects with multiple levels of subcontracting. There is enormous variation across regions, sectors and projects. Given the challenges of doing a survey of direct beneficiaries of Canadian support, it is virtually impossible to assess the extent to which these complaints are also related to Canadian support. In the case of the Dahlia Dam signature project, one of the lessons was that high expectations may do harm, as a large part of the population expected that the height of the dam would be raised and 100,000 jobs created. Frustration ensued when that did not occur, even if communication on the specific project goals was adjusted over time.

Widespread corruption is another unintended impact of the large flows of donor money into the country. While donors pay due attention to managing and mitigating fiduciary risks within projects, broader challenges related to corruption remain. It has been very difficult to track expenditures from central to

³⁹ Fishstein, Paul and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, January 2012. Canada did not provide direct development aid to the provinces where the research took place, but national programs to which Canada contributed covered these provinces.
community levels. Despite many risk mitigation measures, including audits, there is still a huge gap between accusations of corruption at the community level on the one hand, which is confirmed by corruption indices, and the absence of evidence on corruption in specific projects and programs on the other. The Afghanistan Program pointed out that mitigation of the potential risk of corruption is one of the reasons that they provided only a limited amount of on-budget support. They also selected partners carefully, according to their ability to deliver efficiently.

Contributing towards a more stable Afghanistan is part of the overall objective of Canada’s development assistance, yet it poses fundamental questions regarding the approach to be followed. On the one hand, the Feinstein Center indicated that stabilization theory places a high importance on the socio-economic drivers of conflict, such as poverty, literacy and lack of social services and therefore, emphasizes socio-economic solutions. However, research shows that causes of insecurity are diverse and intertwined. On the other hand, most development efforts did not address the major drivers of conflict, including grievances related to political or identity issues. The research studies found more evidence of destabilizing than of stabilizing effects of aid, especially in insecure areas where the pressure to spend large amounts of money quickly were greatest. These reports conclude that aid projects often did not address the root sources of conflict and, in some cases, fuelled conflict by distributing resources that rival groups then fought over.41

6.3. Development work in a conflict zone

The involvement of CIDA in Kandahar was directly linked to the decision that Canada would lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in that province from August 2005 onwards, a period when the security situation deteriorated rapidly. Despite a new development strategy for 2006-2008 in which stabilization in Kandahar played a key role, the start of the Afghanistan Program in Kandahar was quite slow. Various factors explain this slow progress, both operational – a lack of knowledge of the environment, few staff on the ground, limited freedom of movement – as well as strategic, such as fundamental differences of opinion regarding the role of a development program working together with the military in a conflict environment. In 2007, CIDA was under pressure to increase its engagement in Kandahar and disburse the increased funds allocated to the Afghanistan Program. Fierce external criticism of CIDA’s engagement in Kandahar also emerged at this time. CIDA responded to these criticisms by setting-up the Afghanistan Task Force in 2007 and by sending additional staff to Kandahar. Further, the Kandahar Local Investment Program (KLIP) was set up in April 2007 to fund local initiatives.

The fundamental underlying question being asked at the time was: is development in a conflict zone possible? When the Task Force had to expand rapidly, there was little or no time to reflect on appropriate development strategies as the overall policy framework was already defined based on a stabilization approach. Joint efforts were made in Kandahar to develop an advanced model for stabilization in order to achieve results for the population. Situation awareness, including an understanding of the local context, was the first step in this approach. The aim was to link short-term, quick impact projects financed by the military to CIDA’s longer-term, sustainable development activities at all levels. Interviews and lessons learned exercises indicate that, over time, a better understanding of the political economy in the districts and the province was gained, but fundamental differences of opinion regarding the correct approach to achieving long-term development goals remained. The underlying assumption was that if development benefits and services to the people were delivered, the population

41 Ibidem p.57-61.
would be less inclined to support the insurgency. In this approach, there was limited attention to address the grievances of the people and to deal with drivers of conflict, which are identified in the research literature as important factors to achieve lasting positive change.

There is no doubt that a lot of mutual understanding and good cooperation developed between civilian and military staff on the ground in Kandahar. While civilians based in Kandahar felt they were operating in a bubble with direct contact to headquarters in Ottawa, staff in the Embassy in Kabul worked to establish the necessary linkages between development activities in Kandahar and the national level. Kandahar was an important test site for the work to decentralise programs to the province and to the districts.

The development program in Kandahar was confronted with various fundamental challenges. The first was the balance needed between strengthening the capacity of the provincial and district authorities and civil society, on the one hand, and delivering immediate services to the population, on the other. This tension was reinforced by the fact that the governing structure in Afghanistan is highly centralized. The effort to decentralise national programs offered a unique opportunity to address the ‘missing middle’ in this governing structure. Canada, including CIDA, was aware of the ‘missing middle’ as illustrated in an interview with the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) from 2008: “Governance and figuring out “how do you advance governance?” has also been a challenge. How do you make systems of government work? How do you help Kabul link to its provinces? And then, how do you make the province link down to the districts”? Considerable attention was paid to building the capacity of the government at various levels and to strengthening the linkages between these levels. However, the 2011 lessons learned exercise pointed to the insufficient emphasis on allowing the government to lead and on really understanding the needs at the local level.

This leads to another important challenge between the fast-tracking of project implementation and enhancing local ownership. Instruments for understanding the local context, including the drivers of conflict, were developed during this period and served their purpose. This was reflected in the different levels of sectoral understanding. Economic growth became the backbone of the stabilization strategy and an innovative agricultural value chain approach was developed based on good insights into the main bottlenecks impeding economic growth, including poppy production. The development of alternative livelihood strategies and the diversification of agriculture were important elements. However, for various reasons, including security and lack of qualified personnel, insights into other sectoral issues were few, leading to a more scattered and less successful project implementation.

Another ongoing challenge was the provision of humanitarian assistance in a complex emergency with an active military conflict, where parties to the conflict included major donor countries. There are various components of this challenge. First, military forces were increasingly eager to work with development and humanitarian actors as part of their counter-insurgency (COIN) and stabilization strategies. Second, the politicization of assistance, including humanitarian aid, in the context of 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) and Whole of Government approaches was perceived by some to affect the neutrality of humanitarian aid; and a third, more traditional blurring of the lines, was the overlap between humanitarian and development assistance. While CIDA and other donors introduced the international concepts of ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ to move humanitarian assistance closer to development, in practice, there were important gaps to overcome. Humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors involved in the Afghanistan Program were aware of these tensions. The Kandahar Action Plan indicated that, “projects will not compromise humanitarian efforts and prevent future engagement for stabilization and development by non-military actors”. The Afghanistan Program invited strategic
humanitarian partners to concentrate part of their activities in Kandahar province and give more priority to Kandahar through additional funding. The response from humanitarian actors was mixed. Internal documents and interviews confirmed that humanitarian assistance in Kandahar required some form of collaboration with the Canadian or other military forces while maintaining the independence of humanitarian partners, which was considered a delicate balance and led to a “blurring” of lines. The politicization and militarization of humanitarian assistance led to a reduction of humanitarian space in Afghanistan as humanitarian actors have been unable to secure access to all parts of the country.

6.4. Sustainability

Conducive policy and institutional environment
The likelihood of continued benefits from Canada’s development investments depends to a significant extent on how the transition process unfolds. Key transition points in 2014 and 2015 will be the elections, the continued withdrawal of international troops and a likely further overall drop in development funding. There are clear risks related to these transitions and different scenarios can be foreseen. For the various sectors that Canada supported, specific factors can be identified that will promote or hinder sustainability.

In education, Canada has contributed to ensuring that the Ministry of Education has strong, appropriate policies in place, which offer clear – if highly ambitious – guidance to the sector. Nonetheless, the Community Based Education policy and shura policies need to be stronger and clearer, while also developing a vision for monitoring and measuring learning. It is recognized that excessive technical assistance and other external support to the Ministry of Education are unsustainable. This is a serious concern that was raised in many interviews – the fear that a parallel education sector was being created and that no real Afghan civil service exists.

The collaboration of the Afghan Government with the international donor community in the health sector has been exemplary, which is one explanation for the very impressive level of development in the health sector over a relatively short, ten-year period. Further strengthening of Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) capacity, which is planned for 2014 under the ARTF System Enhancement for Health in Transition, should ensure continued progress in this regard. However, it must be acknowledged that the government does not control the entire territory of the country. With the complete withdrawal of the foreign military presence, there are risks that government control may shrink rather than expand. Any program aiming at system strengthening faces risks inherent in working in a politically fragile country. The World Bank, in the evaluation of its Afghanistan Program over the period 2002-2011, concluded that, “without viable district or provincial institutions, the investment in community organizations at the village level may not be sustainable, substantial project benefits notwithstanding”.

Another factor that needs to be contemplated when reviewing sustainability is operation and maintenance of community infrastructure projects. In a sample of 100 NSP projects covering several provinces, 56% of projects were found not to be in good condition, and 14% were no longer functional.42 The research found an inverse relationship between the condition and use of a sub-project and the attention to operation and maintenance. Another finding was that some projects, such as water supply networks and tertiary roads, are simply too expensive for most communities to maintain.

42 World Bank and Altai Consulting: NSP Subproject Sustainability, Draft - March 2013
The assessment of the probability of long-term benefits of CIDA-supported interventions in the field of human rights and democratization suggests clear challenges. Institutional capacity has been strengthened, as illustrated in the outcomes section – AIHRC and women’s organizations have been reinforced. Yet, the policy environment does not appear to be very conducive to sustaining these improvements without external support. The controversial process of appointment of new Human Rights Commissioners points to clear setbacks. The policy environment in general has become difficult for human rights, as became clear from the persistent attempts by some political parties to introduce regressive modifications to legislation (e.g. on the Elimination of Violence Against Women law, on the criminal code regarding the use of stoning). Moreover, the latest electoral law has reduced the quota of guaranteed seats for women in provincial assemblies from one quarter to one fifth.

Canada did promote local ownership to some extent, but very few institutional links were created between the local NGOs supported via the local funds and governmental counterparts. This was the case for NGOs supported by the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs at national and provincial levels. Financing through the Fund was deemed to have hampered sustainability, synergy and coordination. Opportunities to enhance sustainability by linking these projects to the responsible government institution and embedding them in a broader institutional setting were missed. Focus groups and interviews showed that beneficiary organizations have expectations of continued donor funding.

There are other factors to be considered when assessing the sustainability of results of CIDA’s human rights programming, including security. The AIHRC’s women’s rights sections, for instance, have had problems conducting activities in provinces like Kandahar and getting suitably qualified officials to work there because of the difficult security conditions. Further, the sustainability of results achieved through civic education and women’s electoral participation projects is linked, at least in part, to the existence of minimum security conditions for women to exercise a political role. Support for women’s rights and leadership by men and religious leaders is another key factor for ensuring sustainability of the related programming. Surveys show that men are less inclined than women to recognize the legitimacy of women’s civic engagement and economic activity.

Financial sustainability
Financial sustainability was not a primary concern of the Afghan government or the international community for quite some time. However, since the start of the discussion on the transition to increased Afghan ownership and given the decline in international assistance, this issue is now higher on the agenda, as recognised in World Bank and International Monetary Fund publications. Area 4 of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework focuses on government revenues, budget execution and anti-corruption, for example.

In education, the work done by the Ministry of Education to get selected for Global Partnership for Education (GPE) funding, with the support of Canada and other donors, can be considered a clear achievement in planning for secured future funding. This shows strong planning and leadership on the part of the Ministry. Other than this, however, there is little evidence of planning for the reduction of aid flows in the next few years.

The MoPH national health priority program estimates a funding gap of US$ 255 million over the next three years.43 The polio eradication initiative projects a gap of US$ 112 million over the same period.44

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43 MoPH 2012.
Funding gaps of similar magnitudes are reported by other programs, including the tuberculosis control program which, according to interviews, will experience a major gap in funding when the CIDA support ends in March 2014. Health sector development in Afghanistan is highly dependent on international financing and it has very large requirements. Any additional sources of funds that may be identified will be rapidly absorbed by one of the many holes in program budgets.

Sources of funding to sustain development results brought about by the Afghanistan Program after the end of Canadian support (and donor support more broadly) have been identified to a very limited extent. In 2013-14, more than a decade after its inception, the Program is reported to be undertaking a set of studies to develop a more sustainable model, but there is very little time in which to test out and institutionalize an alternate model.

6.5. Sustainability of development results in Kandahar

From 2008 until 2012, the Canadian government reported on its engagement in Afghanistan, with a specific focus on Kandahar. A very detailed monitoring and reporting system was set up to inform the Canadian public and these reports contained a significant amount of information on output-level results. There were also various internal attempts to collect information beyond the output level.

Signature Project: 50 schools in Kandahar

Under EQUIP, 38 schools were indicated as completed and another 13 were under construction as of July 2011. Of these 51 EQUIP schools, 26 were situated in Kandahar city. According to UNICEF in 2013, 17 schools were built in Kandahar with CIDA support. Some other schools were built by NGOs. This would bring the total number of schools, even if double counting is taken into account, to 64, which is well above the target of 50 schools.

However, monitoring reports, field visits by the evaluation team and visits by journalists to a number of schools in Kandahar indicate that there have been problems with the construction in many cases. EQUIP schools faced construction problems in other provinces as well, which EQUIP and the Ministry of Education tried to address. Therefore, the quality of construction is not a problem specific to Kandahar. Also, not all schools in rural areas appear to be functioning as a result of insecurity.

There is no doubt that the construction of these schools has increased the enrolment of boys and girls, although no reliable enrolment figures are available. There are monitoring reports for the UNICEF and NGO project and also for one or a few EQUIP schools. However, there are no specific monitoring reports available for the EQUIP Signature schools in Kandahar as the ARTF did not allow geographic earmarking.

Good outputs were achieved in Kandahar, such as hundreds of pieces of community infrastructure built, polio campaigns executed, more than 50 schools constructed, and irrigation systems rehabilitated, among other things. However, some outputs, such as the construction of certain schools, were of poor quality. The many positive outputs could be considered a solid foundation for achieving long-term development results. In Kandahar city, in particular, positive outcomes related to improved access to education and health services for girls, boys, women and men were observed. However, a few years after the Canadian exit from Kandahar, there is limited evidence of positive outcomes in terms of more jobs, enhanced income opportunities or better quality of services outside of the health and education sectors. In fact, there are some signs of potential negative impacts as a rapidly growing group of unemployed, educated youth, especially in Kandahar city, may be turning to drugs (the number of drug addicts in Kandahar city is reported to be growing rapidly), or to the insurgency.

Regarding gender equality impacts, there was some evidence of improved access to education and health services by women. However, Kandahar and other provinces in the south still lag considerably behind many other provinces, especially in gender terms; there is neither evidence of improved access by women to decision-making nor improved access to resources or better protection of women’s rights, which can in any case be expected to take years to achieve.
If the security situation improves, more positive impacts may emerge, although further support might be needed to realize this. There are still positive developments at the community level as a result of improved physical infrastructure and strengthened community organizations, but there are also clear signs of frustration and anger, despite the fact that some development activities are continuing. Endemic corruption has been shown to be a factor limiting sustainable long-term results.

There is no evidence showing that the capacity of the provincial and district-level governments has been strengthened sufficiently to enable the creation of a policy and institutional environment conducive to sustaining the accomplished results. The need to “Afghanize” project activities was recognized from the start but, as mentioned, there was a tension between the time needed to strengthen local ownership of the projects and the need to show quick results. The Kandahar Local Investment Program proved to be an excellent and innovative opportunity to enhance local ownership, which is reflected in the number of local NGOs that got the chance to implement projects. However, only two out of the seven NGOs that implemented KLIP projects that were tracked by the evaluators remain active. The short period of time in which projects were implemented meant that local NGO ownership could only be strengthened to a limited extent. This applies not only to KLIP but also to other NGO projects.

The COIN/stabilization theories adapted on the ground focused on the ‘build’, ‘enable’ and, possibly, ‘transition’ stages in order to achieve sustainable development results. However, the challenges related to sustainability in this complex environment were not sufficiently thought through. Stabilization was supposed to enable an environment where sustainable development could occur, but the lessons learned exercise points to missing elements. It was implicitly assumed that with the withdrawal of the military, development results would be realized and automatically lead to a development exit by Canada. It was only in 2011 that attention was paid to exit strategies. Interviewees indicated that no other options to continue Canada’s development engagement in Kandahar were explored. A lot of attention was paid from 2010 onwards to close collaboration with and handover to the US, which had been the political agreement reached. A pragmatic exit strategy was eventually developed and consisted of elements including: i) no premature closing of projects; and, ii) handover to USAID and the possibility of developing a bi-national economic development strategy. In practice, after the Canadian withdrawal from Kandahar, USAID started pursuing its own priorities, which were not those that had been previously held by Canada. The frequent change of American staff on the ground meant that there was little institutional memory remaining to keep the strategic Canadian legacy alive.

Many interviewees indicated that this exit strategy may have been short-sighted and that, given the enormous Canadian investments made in Kandahar, other alternatives should have been explored as was done by other bilateral donors. While the Netherlands took a similar approach to Canada’s by completely withdrawing its development assistance from Uruzgan, the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway continued to provide their development assistance to the provinces where they were active in order to realize sustainable results through 2014 and beyond.
7. Conclusions, lessons and recommendations

Canada’s Afghanistan Development program was part of the unprecedented international community involvement in Afghanistan after 2001. Throughout the three broad phases of development activities covered by this evaluation (2004 to 2007; 2008 to 2011; and 2011 to 2013) Afghanistan remained a challenging context to work within given an evolving security environment. Despite the challenges, Canada, together with other donors, contributed to achievements in various sectors and there are lessons to be learned from work in a fragile and conflict-affected environment.

7.1. Conclusions

1. Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program was characterized by continuity in its involvement on the one hand, and by clear changes in strategy and focus from 2004 to 2013, on the other. There was evolution from an initial focus on state-building at the national level from 2004 to 2007 to a main concentration on stabilization in Kandahar from 2008 to 2011, towards a humanitarian, social sector and gender equality oriented Program after 2011.

2. Canada was recognized as a main development partner in Afghanistan and effectively participated as a member of the international community in policy dialogue with the Afghan government to reinforce the international agreements and principles for aid effectiveness and engagement in fragile states. However, Canada has, for various reasons, provided a relatively low proportion of its aid on-budget (around 30% in the last few years) and did not meet the target set in 2010 to provide 50% on-budget support. There was a lack of clear and transparent decision-making in this regard.

3. The Afghanistan Program was clearly aligned with the priorities of the Government of Canada, but not all strategic priorities were addressed with high levels of funding. This was the case for the focus on Kandahar, where the absorption capacity at the provincial level posed serious problems, but also for gender equality that was an important priority in policy dialogue, but was addressed in less than 50% of the projects.

4. The Afghanistan Program developed relevant approaches to assess the enormous developmental and humanitarian needs in all sectors of focus. However, the needs assessments that were undertaken had limitations and conflict analyses used did not enable a complete understanding of the drivers of conflict and grievance, thus limiting overall development performance.

5. Canada, together with other donors, contributed to impressive short-term achievements in various sectors, ranging from the construction and rehabilitation of thousands of schools and increased enrolment, especially of girls, to improved access to health facilities, construction of community infrastructure, delivery of food to millions of people and support to the independent Human Rights Commission and women’s organizations. In education and health, as well as in mine action, long-term results have been realized through increased access to and use of health and education services and land cleared of mines. However, in the economic growth, human rights and governance sectors, few substantial positive changes beyond the project level were observed. Issues of distribution and equity remain unaddressed. Gender equality results are mainly concentrated in the social sectors through improved access to services. Limited real improvements for women related to human rights and their role in decision-making were observed, recognising that long timeframes can be required for such societal changes.
6. Canada contributed to strengthened capacity at the national level. However, there is evidence of missed opportunities, especially in the work to strengthen sub-national governance and establishing adequate linkages to national government.

7. The implementation of the development Program in Kandahar showed that long-term development cannot be accomplished with an emphasis on short-term implementation strategies, which sped up implementation considerably, but which failed to ensure sustainable, long-term development results.

8. The Afghanistan Program did address some efficiency considerations at the level of projects and implementing partners, but major efficiency issues affecting overall Program performance such as staff mobility in a conflict environment, rotation, and centralized decision-making were only addressed between 2008 and 2011 when the Whole of Government approach was implemented.

9. Canada is recognized as a consistent and reliable donor with a clear results orientation, but there is insufficient evidence to provide a definitive answer to the overall evaluation question related to Canada’s contribution to long-term stability and sustainable development in Afghanistan.

7.2. Lessons

1. The history of the Afghanistan Program from 2004-2013 indicates that an overarching strategic development vision, based on a Whole of Government approach and principles for engagement in fragile states, provided a clear basis for planning and Program implementation. While this was the case during the “Whole of Government” phase (2008-2011), it was less evident at other times.

2. It is essential to align and harmonize political and policy dialogue – both overall and sector-specific – with the funding of activities, while also promoting synergies across and within sectors, based on leadership and support to the government to achieve concrete goals.

3. A good understanding of the main demand and supply-side challenges and of the main governance and funding issues in each sector, particularly during the Whole of Government phase, positively contributed to the performance of Canada’s development activities in Afghanistan while also paying due attention to the evolving context.

4. Capacity building at both the national and the sub-national levels is a key factor to realize sustainable long-term results in a centralised state like Afghanistan. Innovative approaches have to be developed given the context of insecurity and fragility.

5. There is a need to reiterate the commitment to respect humanitarian principles in Afghanistan in order to regain access to all areas of the country and to promote the respect for humanitarian norms with all parties to the conflict.

6. It was a challenge for the Afghanistan Program to remain sufficiently focused on achieving its development objectives, while understanding the fluid contextual factors on the ground, learning and communicating while under pressure to implement, addressing administrative requirements, undertaking risk assessments and reporting on progress, among other things. A key lesson is the importance of maintaining a strategic view at the program and sector levels, so that project level interventions are well informed and situated.
7. The implementation of the Whole of Government approach in Kandahar showed that good collaboration between Canadian actors on the ground can speed up the implementation of development projects, but more attention should have been paid to the elaboration of a development approach in conflict zones as an intrinsic part of the Whole of Government approach.

7.3. Recommendations

**Recommendation 1** – Establish an institutional mechanism to capture lessons from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to better inform future Canadian engagement in fragile states.

**Recommendation 2** – Develop a vision for Canada’s future engagement in Afghanistan, taking lessons from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach into account.

**Recommendation 3** - The crosscutting nature of governance should be further enhanced in the Afghanistan Program, including the strengthening of linkages between political dialogue and development policy dialogue with Afghan government partners. Programming decisions on the type of support to be provided – on-budget versus off-budget – should be based on clear targets and directly linked to on-going political and policy dialogue.

**Recommendation 4** - Continue the focus on gender mainstreaming while adapting it to ensure improved responsiveness to socio-cultural values and principles, to the extent possible.

**Recommendation 5** – For future investment in key sectors, ensure clear strategic direction, including a realistic risk analysis and robust risk mitigation strategy:

- **Education** – undertake the transition from a program focused primarily on access to education to one that also targets quality education with an increased focus on learning outcomes, and that facilitates students’ transition through different stages of education (for example, from community-based to formal education).

- **Health** – strengthen program focus on the right to health, social equity and the objectives defined as part of Canada’s commitments to Maternal, Newborn and Child Health.

- **Human Rights** – strengthen the protection of human rights by increasing awareness and capacities on the part of government and non-governmental actors through political and policy dialogue, and programming.

- **Humanitarian assistance** – seek opportunities to further strengthen the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development while ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to be delivered in line with the principles of good humanitarian donorship.
Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

A. TITLE
AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM SUMMATIVE EVALUATION (FY 2004-2005 TO FY 2010-2011)

B. DEFINITIONS

1. “Conflict-Affected State,” includes Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People's Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, Tajikistan, West Bank & Gaza. This list does not represent the official views of CIDA or the Government of Canada.

2. “Evaluation” is the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors.

Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or completed development intervention. Note: Evaluation in some instances involves the definition of appropriate standards, the examination of performance against those standards, an assessment of actual and expected results and the identification of relevant lessons. (Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid Evaluation)

3. “CIDA Evaluation Committee,” is an independent body of external development and evaluation experts, which advises the CIDA’s President in ensuring the efficient implementation of the evaluation function and activities within CIDA.

4. “Consultant’s Evaluation Team,” mean the Consultant’s proposed professional and non-professional personnel who will fulfill the terms of this contract.

5. “Evaluation Advisory Committee,” is a consultative body from CIDA and other federal departments, which provides advice to the CIDA Evaluation Directorate on the Afghanistan Program evaluation.

6. “Evaluation Peer-Review Group,” is an external consultative body, which provides advice on the evaluation design, implementation and the draft reports only to CIDA to ensure methodological rigour and neutrality.

7. “Domain of Experience,” refers to specific experience in the following areas:
   a. Evaluation experience (program/thematic) with multilateral organization;
   b. Evaluation experience (program/thematic) with a national development agency (i.e. CIDA, DFID, etc.);
   c. Evaluation experience (program/thematic) with an NGO;
   d. Evaluation experience on a single development project; and
   e. Other evaluation experience.

8. “Fragile State,” includes Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People's Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, West Bank & Gaza, Yemen. This list does not represent the official views of CIDA or the Government of Canada.

C. BACKGROUND

1. Introduction

CIDA is required to evaluate 100% of its direct program spending, including all grants and contributions every five years, in accordance with the 2009 Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation. Therefore, a summative evaluation of the Afghanistan Program during 2011-12 and 2012-13 is required to fulfill both TB Policy and CIDA’s commitment to undertake a second review of the Afghanistan Program, as per Treasury Board Submission B-07/0217. The objective of the Consultant is to design and implement the Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation.

2. Afghanistan Development Context

Afghanistan is a fragile state with a fluctuating security situation. It remains among the world’s least developed countries with most of its population lacking access to basic services. In 2010, Afghanistan ranked 155th out of 169 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI). Forty-two percent of the country’s population lives below the poverty line and life expectancy at birth is 44.6 years\(^45\). Years of conflict and poverty have undermined the human, infrastructure and state capacity of Afghanistan.

Gender inequality is prevalent and persistent in Afghanistan\(^46\), creating additional barriers to sustainable development and poverty reduction. Traditional social norms often restrict women and girls rights, such as freedom of movement. They also impose particular burdens, such as early and forced marriage and gender-based violence\(^47\). Continued gender gaps in education and high maternal mortality ratios are indicative of women’s unequal access to services, and meaningful participation in decision-making.

However, the country has made important progress during the last decade. For instance, Afghanistan has seen infant and under-five mortality rates drop by a fourth in recent years. This reduction is the result of major efforts in constructing health centres and district hospitals, training community health workers and applying simple technologies such as standardized drug kits. Similarly, the country has experienced significant but volatile economic growth, partly as a result of its reliance on the agricultural sector\(^48\).

Initial development results indicate that more girls are going to school than ever before, and women are increasingly engaging in politics. Other important achievements include the Afghan Government accession to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women without reservation; and the inclusion of gender in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy\(^49\).

Progress on human rights has been slow and Afghanistan continues to suffer from a pervasive culture of impunity and a weak rule of law. Freedom of expression remains threatened, with continuing reports of arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of journalists\(^50\). Afghans perceive corruption as the country’s third biggest problem after insecurity and unemployment\(^51\). In fact, Transparency International identified Afghanistan as the third most corrupt state in the world in 2010\(^52\). Finally, implementation and enforcement of legislation to protect social and economic rights also remains limited due to weak judicial institutions\(^53\).

The prevalent poverty and ongoing conflict affecting Afghanistan influence the scale and dimension of the country’s humanitarian situation. In 2011, the combination of poverty, conflict and natural disasters, many of which are linked to environmental degradation, is expected to leave 7.8 million Afghans in need of food assistance. In addition, over 440,600 internally displaced people and half a million returning refugees are in need of emergency support\(^54\).

\(^{46}\) Afghanistan ranks fourth to last on the UN’s 2010 Gender Inequality Index.
\(^{50}\) Afghanistan ranks 147 out of 178 countries in 2010, according to the Reporters without Borders’ Index of Press Freedom.
\(^{52}\) Afghanistan has consistently dropped in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.
\(^{54}\) UN Humanitarian Appeal (2011). *Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan 2011*. 

51 Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program 2004-2005 to 2012-2013
Women’s access to humanitarian assistance has been difficult, with few actors identifying strategies to assess and respond to men and women’s different needs and priorities. Humanitarian actors have expressed significant concern over the “shrinking of humanitarian space” due to insecurity, attacks on humanitarian workers and the real and perceived involvement of international and Afghan military forces in delivering humanitarian assistance. These factors have increased the risks for both humanitarian actors and beneficiaries.

Finally, the security situation in Afghanistan remains fragile, although the country has seen some improvements in recent years. Since 2008, the Afghanistan government has taken significant steps to strengthen its ability to address the country’s security needs. However, the human cost of the armed conflict grew to 2,777 civilian deaths in 2010, an increase of 15% compared to 2009. Growing insecurity has forced the closure or delay of a number of development projects and has limited the ability of both government officials and non-governmental organizations to extend services to conflict affected populations. Insecurity has simultaneously increased the need for humanitarian assistance, while also limiting its reach.

3. Afghanistan Program Context

The Afghanistan Program is CIDA’s most significant in terms of magnitude, complexity, visibility, and challenges. These challenges derive from a formidable combination of risks in areas such as the security situation, weak infrastructure and governance systems, limited Afghan institutional capacity for financial administration and risk management, and significant absorptive capacity constraints within the Government of the Independent Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Since 2001, CIDA’s development efforts have supported a number of key Afghan national priorities aligned with Canada’s priority areas of focus.

Canada’s total allocation of development aid to Afghanistan over the 2001 to 2011 period stands at $1.9 billion, of which CIDA’s total contribution is $1.6 billion (See Table 1). Prior to, and including 2001, CIDA’s focus was on emergency humanitarian assistance. Beginning in 2002, this emphasis broadened to include investments supporting the process of democratic governance (such as presidential and legislative elections), and institutions at the national level, as well as the planning of national development programs.

Canada’s strategy for Afghanistan during 2003-2005 aligned Canadian development assistance programming with the priorities of the Afghan government's National Development Framework (NDF). CIDA selected three priorities for concentration from the NDF, in addition to support for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

(a) *Rural livelihoods and social protection:* CIDA supported sustainable rural livelihoods for Afghan families and increased access to social services through improved governance and community-driven development.

(b) *Natural resources management:* CIDA supported improved food security and standards of living for Afghan citizens through rehabilitation and development of agriculture and the sustainable use of natural resources.

(c) *Security and rule of law:* CIDA contributed to the restoration of a secure environment for reconstruction and development, through peace building, de-mining, legal and judicial reform, and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

(d) *Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF):* Given the lack of capacity for financial management and expenditure controls within the Afghan Government, Donors agreed on the establishment of the ARTF, a mechanism administered by the World Bank that channels international resources towards key government programs.

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56 OCHA indicates that growing insecurity in 2009 forced the closure of the National Solidarity Program's reconstruction and development projects in 40 of Afghanistan's 364 districts.
57 See Canada’s Afghanistan/Pakistan site: www.afghanistan.gc.ca
In May 2006, CIDA’s effort broadened further towards more sustainable development programs across Afghanistan, including an emphasis on Kandahar Province. In fact, CIDA’s Interim Strategy for Afghanistan (2006 – 2008) included four central components:

- Democratic Development and Effective Governance;
- The Role of Women and Girls in Society;
- Sustainable Rural Livelihoods; and
- State Building and Stabilization, particularly in Kandahar.

This broader engagement complemented the efforts of other government departments, including through a whole-of-government approach. The 2007 Review of the Afghanistan Program stated that the needs of Afghanistan have been evolving since the inauguration of the provisional government in 2001, and Canada’s involvement and strategy have had to keep pace with this evolution.

Table 1: CIDA Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan, 2000 to 2010\(^{59}\) (figures in $ millions)

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<td>Country programs</td>
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<td>270.14</td>
<td>219.70</td>
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<td>Canada fund for local initiatives</td>
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<td>1.98</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance Programs</td>
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<td>8.30</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>23.63</td>
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<td>Other Programs with International Organizations</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-total Bilateral Aid</strong></td>
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<td><strong>178.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>280.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>223.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>230.14</strong></td>
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<td>Imputed Multilateral Core Funding</td>
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<td>5.54</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>7.98</td>
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<td><strong>Total CIDA</strong></td>
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<td><strong>184.47</strong></td>
<td><strong>289.48</strong></td>
<td><strong>226.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>238.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,433.36</strong></td>
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In 2007, the Afghanistan Program’s Results and Risk Management and Accountability Framework (2007 – 2011) focused the Program on three pillars of the Afghan Compact\(^{60}\). These pillars were aligned with the

\(^{59}\) For 2010, preliminary estimates are provided.

\(^{60}\) The Compact (2006-2011) is the final report of the London Conference on Afghanistan held in London between the 31 January – 1 February 2006 where the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community agreed on a partnership plan. www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf
Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS)\textsuperscript{61}. A description of the revised focus and related programming is provided below:

a) **Governance.** CIDA supported service delivery and capacity-building initiatives for justice, electoral and human rights institutions, and helped develop an accountable and capable civil service.

b) **Social and Economic Development.** CIDA supported the mainstreaming of gender equality across Afghan policies and programs, as well as funding initiatives that improve access for all Afghans to health and education services. It also implemented program activities related to economic governance, private sector development, basic infrastructure, and natural resources development.

c) **Security.** CIDA funded initiatives that improved the security of Afghans (removing and destroying landmines, providing mine risk education); assisted with the resettlement and repatriation of internally displaced persons and returnees; and provided social assistance to vulnerable populations\textsuperscript{62}.

In June 2008, CIDA’s programming in Afghanistan for the 2008–2011 period was aligned with both the ANDS 2008-2013 and the recommendations from the Report to Parliament entitled *Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan - Setting a course to 2011*\textsuperscript{63}. As a result, CIDA increased its aid and development programming in Kandahar by 50% of its total investment in the country. In addition, CIDA focused on decentralizing staff and delegating authorities to the field to increase effectiveness. Promotion of equality between women and men and environmental sustainability were cross-cutting themes.\textsuperscript{64}

A series of key benchmarks, indicators and targets were developed in consultation with relevant departments in order to measure performance\textsuperscript{65}. Communication of results involved closely monitoring and reporting to Parliament on progress against key priorities, established benchmarks, and associated targets on a quarterly basis (CIDA was responsible for delivering on 24 of the 44 whole-of-government indicators).\textsuperscript{66} Programming for this period was guided by the implementation of three priorities and three signature projects:\textsuperscript{67}

**Priorities:**

- **Basic services:** Strengthening Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, while enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government.
- **Humanitarian Assistance:** Providing humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.
- **Democratic Development and National Institutions:** Advancing Afghanistan’s capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.

**Signature Projects:**

- Rehabilitate the Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system.
- Improve education in Kandahar, including through constructing 50 schools.
- Expand support for polio immunization, with the aim to eradicate polio in Afghanistan by the end of 2009.

4. **Evaluation Context**

\textsuperscript{61} The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008-2013 and Interim-ANDS (pre-2008) outline the strategic priorities, mechanisms and planned results for achieving the GfRoA’s development vision and multi-year commitments to the MDGs.


\textsuperscript{66} Source: APTF Team.

The Consultant must take into consideration the Agency's international aid effectiveness commitments, including the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Action Agenda (2008). It will also consider the emerging international consensus on development cooperation (e.g. Millennium Development Goals) and CIDA's key steps to implement Canada's Aid Effectiveness Agenda (i.e. greater focus, effectiveness and accountability).

5. Principles for Evaluating Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

The Consultant must conform to the principles, standards and practices set out by the DAC's Evaluation Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/0/44798177.pdf) when performing the Afghanistan Evaluation Program.

CIDA will ensure that the Afghanistan Program evaluation adheres to the Treasury Board of Canada 2009 Policy on Evaluation and accompanying Directive and Standard.

Constraint: The Afghanistan Program evaluation must integrate in its methodological approach and analysis the implications of Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis, its conflict and fragile situation. The OECD/DAC Networks on Development Evaluation and on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation provide direction on integrating these considerations, mainly through the following documents:

- Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Activities;
- Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.

In particular, the evaluation will assess the extent to which the Afghanistan Program incorporated in its programming design, delivery and management the OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. These principles are:

1. Taking context as the starting point;
2. Doing no harm;
3. Focusing on state-building as the central objective;
4. Prioritizing prevention;
5. Recognizing the links between political, security and development objectives;
6. Promoting non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies;
7. Aligning with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts;
8. Agreeing on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors;
9. Acting fast but staying engaged long enough to give success a chance; and
10. Avoiding pockets of exclusion.

Given the complex nature of the situation in Afghanistan, it is paramount that the Afghanistan Program evaluation integrates the notion of conflict sensitivity in its design, planning and implementation. Sometimes policies, projects and programs working “in” or “on” conflict do harm – often without intending...
Doing harm in a conflict situation means having impacts (intended or not, direct or indirect) that aggravate grievances, increase tension or vulnerabilities, or perpetuate conflict in some way. The notion of conflict sensitivity is intended to mitigate such harm by encouraging systematically taking into account both the positive and negative impacts of interventions on the conflict contexts in which they are undertaken.  

Conflict can also play a major role in forming a society’s understanding of, and responses to, gender roles. Violent conflict is often accompanied by a surge in violence towards women. Therefore, the Afghanistan Program evaluation will present a clear and critical understanding of gender within the particular context of Afghanistan.

6. Evaluation Audience

The Afghanistan Program evaluation will provide to CIDA’s President, CIDA’s senior management, CIDA’s external Evaluation Committee, the Afghanistan Program Task Force (APTF) program management, central agencies, and other government departments with key lessons and recommendations to support evidence-based decision making on policy, expenditure management and program improvements.

The audience for this evaluation also includes the Government of Afghanistan, partner NGOs and other development agencies working with CIDA in this country. The evaluation will inform these stakeholders about what was achieved by and learned from CIDA’s development interventions in Afghanistan. It will also provide them with information methodologies and approaches related to evaluating development interventions in conflict and fragility situations.

As per CIDA’s evaluation policy, sharing evaluation reports with key audiences in Canada and abroad demonstrates accountability and transparency to Canadians, and benefits development cooperation. The final Afghanistan Program evaluation report will be made available to Parliament and Canadians through the Agency’s website, as per CIDA’s efficiency and accountability commitments and Treasury Board of Canada Evaluation Policy.

Disseminating the evaluation findings will be an integral component of the evaluation process. The CIDA Technical Authority will work with the Consultant to ensure that evaluation knowledge is disseminated, based on CIDA Evaluation Directorate’s Strategy for the Dissemination of Evaluation Knowledge.

7. Evaluation Challenges

The Consultant will need to take into account the following challenges when conducting the Afghanistan Program evaluation:

- The ability to attribute direct results to the Afghanistan Program interventions is challenging, given the extent of donor activities in the country and the Program’s significant investment through grants to multilateral organizations. Additionally, the evolution of the Afghanistan Program during the proposed evaluation scope (FY 2004/05 – FY 2010/11) introduces further constraints to implementing a summative evaluation, particularly as there are two distinct programming periods (pre and post-2008). The Consultant must develop a sound approach, in the proposed methodology, to address this challenge.

- In the context of conflict situations, highly politicized and often media dense environments mean that there is sometimes great public attention on and correspondingly high stakes for, evaluators. When human suffering is high and donor contributions are large and visible, the desire to see positive results can place additional pressures. In addition, the complexity of conflict situations limits the usefulness of evaluation conclusions or lessons learnt since they may not be readily applicable to other conflict situations.

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75 Evaluation of Donor-Supported Activities in Conflict-Sensitive Development and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, Donor Peace Support Group, Sri Lanka, 2009 [http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,3380,en_35038640_35039563_1_70579_35074428_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,3380,en_35038640_35039563_1_70579_35074428_1_1,00.html)

76 Fragile States Monitoring Survey, Afghanistan Country Report, 2009 [http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_42277499_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_42277499_1_1_1,00.html)

77 See the International Alert website: [www.conflictsensitivity.org](http://www.conflictsensitivity.org).

78 Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Correctional Service of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
contexts, even within the same region. Therefore, the Consultant will identify in the evaluation design specific measures to address and/or mitigate these concerns.

- Conducting evaluations in conflict zones may put evaluation teams and stakeholders at risk. Therefore, the Consultant’s evaluation design must analyze the security risks related to implementing the Afghanistan Program evaluation and provide recommendations to mitigate these risks. The recommendations will be subsequently integrated into the evaluation work plan, budget, and management of the evaluation. Close collaboration between CIDA and other government departments is central to identifying and mitigating the security risks of this evaluation.

D. RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

1. Evaluation Rationale

The Consultant will conduct the Afghanistan Program Evaluation to satisfy the reporting requirements of the Canadian Government, including those stemming from the Federal Accountability Act (2006) and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) of Canada. In particular, the rational for the Afghanistan Program evaluation is threefold.

- First, it delivers on CIDA’s commitment, through its 2007 submission to Treasury Board of Canada, to complete an evaluation of the Afghanistan Program in FY 2009-2010.
- Second, it implements the Evaluation Directorate’s Rolling Five-year Evaluation Work Plan.
- Third, it delivers on CIDA’s commitment to perform systematic and timely evaluations of country programs to account for the management of allocated funds, and promote effective and efficient development cooperation.

2. Scope – Objectives and Questions

The Consultant will assess the Program in terms of the following six criteria: relevance, coherence, performance (effectiveness, efficiency, and economy), sustainability, management principles/Paris declaration, and cross-cutting issues. The Consultant will assess these six criteria for the period covering fiscal year (FY) 2004/05 to FY 2010/11.

The Consultant will consider in his/her analysis the broader whole-of-government effort in which CIDA’s effort was situated. S/he will differentiate between traditional development activities and those that were part of stabilization efforts (e.g. development work in Kandahar). S/he will also consider the degree to which the tools available to team leaders in the field helped or hindered the delivery of programming in a conflict environment. Finally, the Consultant will assess how CIDA’s efforts evolved pre and post 2008, including an analysis of successes and challenges.

The specific objectives for the Consultant are to:

- Analyze and provide credible and neutral information on the relevance, coherence, performance (effectiveness, efficiency, economy), sustainability, management principles/Paris declaration, and cross-cutting issues of the Afghanistan Program (FY 2004/05-FY 2010/11);
- Identify good practices, areas for improvement and formulate lessons learnt;
- Assess the performance and results of the various delivery mechanisms, including grants to multilateral organizations; and
- Formulate recommendations for improvements at the Corporate and Program levels, and inform future development programming in Afghanistan and other fragile states and situations.

At a minimum, the following questions will be addressed for both the pre and post 2008 period of the Afghanistan Program. However, these questions may be modified during the evaluation design phase to reflect the particular objectives, challenges and focus of the Afghanistan Program pre and post 2008.

The Consultant must answer the following questions in the final report:
<table>
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<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
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| Relevance                        | • Is the Afghanistan Program aligned with the strategic priorities of the Government of Afghanistan, the country's development context and its particular needs?  
• Have the Afghanistan conflict dynamics as well as the priorities and rights of affected populations been considered in the Afghanistan Program, including in its international humanitarian assistance programming?  
• Were program responses appropriately designed to mitigate or prevent further conflict?                                                                                          |
| Coherence                        | • Has the Afghanistan Program interventions been aligned with federal government priorities, CIDA’s strategic outcomes and Canada’s whole-of-government approach?  
• Has the Afghanistan Program coordinated its programming efforts with those of other international donors, including through policy dialogues and joint interventions? |
| Performance                      | • Were the financial resources and other inputs efficiently used to achieve the expected results?  
• To what extent have the expected outcomes (immediate, intermediate and ultimate) of the Afghanistan Program been achieved?  
79 Is there evidence of effectiveness of programming in the context of on-going insecurity? If expected outcomes were not fully achieved, what were the barriers preventing success? (see Annexes 2 and 3 for logic models). |
| Sustainability                   | • Do the Government of Afghanistan, community leaders and other civil society representatives demonstrate “ownership” of results?  
• To what extent are the accomplished results sustainable? Has the Government of Afghanistan created a policy environment that is conducive to sustaining the accomplished results? Have sources of funding been identified by local stakeholders to sustain development results brought about by CIDA’s programming in Afghanistan? |
| Management principles/Paris declaration | • What is the overall performance of the Afghanistan Program in relation to the Paris Declaration principles of ownership, alignment and harmonization and the OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations?  
• Does CIDA have the right tools, processes and procedures to support effective development programming in fragile states and situations?  
• To what extent were the Afghanistan Program delivery mechanisms conducive to better programming interventions? |
| Cross-cutting issues             | • Was the Afghanistan Program effective in addressing the cross-cutting themes of gender equality, governance and environmental sustainability?                                                                 |

79 For the post-2008 programming, the evaluation will assess progress towards expected outcomes (immediate, intermediate and ultimate).
E. DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Given the scope, nature and challenges of the Afghanistan Program, the Consultant will carry out the evaluation in two separate phases: i) **Evaluation Design** and ii) **Evaluation Implementation**. The Terms of Reference cover both phases.

Stakeholder participation is fundamental to CIDA’s Afghanistan Program Evaluation. The Consultant must provide for active and meaningful involvement by investment partners, beneficiaries and other interested parties. The Consultant must ensure that stakeholder participation is an integral component of the evaluation design and implementation, including during data collection, the development of findings, evaluation reporting, and results dissemination. The Consultant must include an analysis of stakeholders’ views on evaluation needs and priorities in the evaluation design.

A detailed description of the two phases is provided below:

**Phase 1 – Evaluation Design**

The Consultant must define a realistic and useful methodology, approach, focus, and timing for the Afghanistan Program evaluation. The Afghanistan Program staff will have an opportunity to comment at the various milestones of the evaluation design phase, including during development of the evaluation methodology.

The specific objectives for the Consultant during this phase are:

- Prepare a work plan (as per Annex 1) for Phase 1;
- Conduct a literature review on Afghanistan’s development challenges, current approaches to evaluate development interventions in fragile states and situations, and the Afghanistan Program evolution since 2004;
- Develop a methodology to evaluate the Afghanistan Program for the period covering FY 2004 – 2011; and
- Draft a work plan for implementing (as per Annex 1) the Afghanistan Program evaluation, including an evaluation matrix, evaluation deliverables, roles and responsibilities, timeframes and resource requirements (human, financial or other).

During the evaluation design phase, the Consultant will engage in a field mission to Afghanistan, which will include interviews with key stakeholders, preliminary data collection and review of documents, reports and analysis provided by stakeholders. The scoping mission is expected to be no longer than one week in duration.

The Consultant will also analyze the security risks implications for the evaluation budgeting and management. In particular, the Consultant’s proposed methodology will provide for a clear distinction between the different result levels (immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes) and delivery mechanisms (program and project-based approaches through grants and contributions). The Consultant must provide justification for his/her proposed evaluation methodology, including his/her approach to data collection and analysis.

The Consultant must explore the possibility of joint evaluation work with other donors. The Consultant must assess the logistical and other considerations related to undertaking joint evaluations, including by providing details on costs, timing, etc. The Consultant must provide a final recommendation on this matter in the work plan.
NOTE: Upon approval of the Work Plan for the Implementation Phase from Phase 1, the CIDA Contracting Authority will notify the Consultant in writing either that CIDA intends to proceed with Phase 2 or that CIDA wishes to withdraw any further support in the project, the Consultant selected to implement the first phase of this mandate may or may not implement the second phase. Upon completion of Phase 1, the CIDA Technical Authority reserves the right to seek senior management guidance and approval for the methodology, approach, focus, timing, and other issues. If CIDA decides to withdraw its support, the CIDA Contracting Authority will so inform the Consultant in writing and the Contract will be deemed to have come to an end without any cost or liability to CIDA.

Phase 2 – Evaluation Implementation

Upon receiving the approval from CIDA to proceed with Phase 2, the Consultant must implement the evaluation work plan, including its fieldwork in Afghanistan. The Consultant must make all logistical decisions in consultation with the APTF and other government departments. Subject to the timelines provided in the CIDA-approved implementation phase work plan, the Consultant must engage in data collection and analysis during the Fall 2012 (see tentative timeline below).

The Consultant must deliver its draft report to the Technical Authority upon the agreed timeline by both parties. The final report must describe the evaluation and present the evaluation findings, recommendations and lessons learned. The presentation of results is to be intrinsically linked to the evaluation issues, establishing a logic flow from the information collected. The Final Evaluation Report will be approved by the CIDA Evaluation Committee.
F. Resources and Timelines

CIDA’s tentative timeline for the Afghanistan Program evaluation is provided below.

**Afghanistan Evaluation Tentative Timeline**
(from date of contract signature)

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80 These deliverables and the timeline were modified when the decision was taken in June 2014 to present the “final report” to the Development Evaluation Committee as a technical report and then also prepare a synthesis report.
G. DESCRIPTION OF THE TEAM

The Consultant must propose a multi-disciplinary team to design and implement the Afghanistan Program evaluation, including one Evaluation Team Leader and sector specialists as required. The Team Leader and Sector Specialists will participate in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. Specifically, the team must include:

1. Evaluation Team Leader
   Specific Responsibilities
   This resource will be responsible for the following:
   - leadership and coordination of the work of the evaluation team;
   - assessment of Program-level issues;
   - ensure quality control of all reporting documents;
   - ensure quality assurance of the evaluation;
   - Ensure quality of all written materials, including all deliverables; and,
   - Ensure the delivery of professional results.

2. Sector Specialists
   Specific Responsibilities
   Each of these resources will be responsible to conduct the following (as requested by the Evaluation Team Leader):
   - Complete field assignments;
   - Conduct interviews with relevant personnel;
   - Produce analytical reports in their area of specialty;
   - Produce recommendations for appropriate action, based on analytical findings;
   - Supervise local professionals;
   - Support the Evaluation Team Leader; and,
   - Provide expert advice on key priorities of the Afghanistan Program Evaluation, such as gender, governance, health, humanitarian assistance, etc.

3. Local Professionals
   Specific Responsibilities
   The Consultant is to identify relevant and appropriate local consulting expertise available in Afghanistan. Each of these resources will be responsible to conduct some or all of the following:
   - Provide logistical support;
   - Provide security advice;
   - Participate in data collection and analysis; and
   - Provide any other support for which a Local Professional contributes added-value to the Afghanistan Program evaluation.

H. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

The following resources must possess the following levels in English:

- **Evaluation Team Leader**
  Oral = 4 (Advanced Professional Proficiency)
  Reading = 4+ (Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus)
  Writing = 4+ (Advanced Professional Proficiency, plus)

- **Sector Specialists**
  Oral = 3 (General Professional Proficiency)
  Reading = 3+ (General Professional Proficiency, plus)
  Writing = 3 (General Professional Proficiency)
I. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Consultant

Phase 1: EVALUATION DESIGN
- Deliver a literature review,
- Develop and deliver the evaluation methodology and
- Develop and deliver two evaluation work plans (for the Design and Implementation) (including all draft and final versions as noted under “Deliverables”)

Phase 2: EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION
- Lead the data collection and data analysis activities;
- Develop conclusions and recommendations;
- Prepare the draft and final evaluation reports;
- Prepare the draft and final summary of results and key lessons for dissemination purposes; and
- Ensure high quality standards (OECD/DAC as amended) and timeliness in all deliverables.

CIDA’s Technical Authority
- Provide the Consultant with access to the relevant literature on the Afghanistan Program;
- Provide oversight;
- Provide the Consultant with strategic direction and guidance on the evaluation planning, implementation and reporting;
- Provide evaluation report template;
- Manage the evaluation’s day-to-day progress according to contract and work plans;
- Facilitate the Consultant’s application for required security clearances to access CIDA projects and facilities in Afghanistan;
- Co-ordinate CIDA’s internal review process;
- Provide feedback and commentary on all draft versions of deliverables; and,
- Approve all deliverables.
- Note: The CIDA Program Support Unit (PSU) may (to the extent possible) provide information regarding security, logistics and local consultants to the Consultant. The PSU may also facilitate the provision of additional security briefings.

CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee
The Afghanistan Program evaluation will be guided by CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee, which is composed by a Director-level representative from the Afghanistan Program Task Force (APTF) and the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate. It is chaired by the CIDA Director from the Evaluation Directorate. Representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Department of Defence will be invited to participate in the CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee meetings on an ad-hoc basis. CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee will act as a consultative body.

CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee provides guidance and recommendations to the CIDA Technical Authority on the overall evaluation. CIDA’s Evaluation Advisory Committee communicates their advice and recommendations directly to the CIDA Technical Authority, who may request the Consultant to incorporate the feedback within the deliverables.

Evaluation Peer-Review Group
The Evaluation Peer-Review Group will advise the CIDA Technical Authority on methodology. The group is made of:

- A Director from an international NGO specializing in delivering aid to fragile and conflict affected states;
- An evaluator from an international aid agency, with extensive experience in Afghanistan;
- An academic working for a research centre or a university, with extensive experience in conflict prevention and peace building activities; and
- An international consultant with several years of experience in international development evaluation, particularly in fragile states and situations.

The Evaluation Peer-Review Group provides advice on the evaluation design and implementation as well as provides recommendations to the CIDA Technical Authority on how to improve draft deliverables to be completed under this evaluation. The Evaluation Peer-Review Group communicates their advice and recommendations directly to the CIDA Technical Authority, who may request the Consultant to incorporate the feedback within deliverables.

J. DELIVERABLES

Phase 1: EVALUATION DESIGN

These deliverables will be prepared in English and submitted to the CIDA Technical Authority electronically (i.e. via email or memory stick).

i. Work Plan for the Design Phase

The Consultant must prepare a detailed work plan for the design phase (see Annex 1). The work plan for the design phase will elaborate on the proposed approach to implement the TORs mandate, providing specific timelines, deliverables, level of effort per team member, and budget information.

The Consultant must submit a draft work plan for the design phase to the CIDA Technical Authority within (2) weeks of signing the Contract. The CIDA Technical Authority will provide comments on the draft work plan for the design phase within (1) week from its receipt. Within (1) week of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant submit for CIDA’s approval a final work plan for the design phase that incorporates CIDA’s comments.


ii. Literature Review Report

The Consultant must conduct a literature review of Afghanistan’s socio-economic situation, development challenges and achievements. The literature review must present a clear and critical understanding of gender within the particular context of Afghanistan. The Consultant must also discuss current issues on evaluating development interventions in fragile states and situations, including evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities, as well as potential evaluation approaches.

In the Literature Review Report, the Consultant must include a profile of the Afghanistan Program, which provides a detailed description of the Program context and its programming evolution since 2004. This section of the literature review report must be based on various documents and reports provided by CIDA (including internal analysis prepared in anticipation of the Afghanistan Program Evaluation). The Literature Review Report must also include a complete list of sources.

The CIDA Technical Authority will provide comments on the draft literature review report within (1) week from its receipt. Within (1) week of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant will submit for CIDA’s approval a final literature review report that incorporates CIDA’s comments.
iii. Scoping Mission Report

In this report, the Consultant must summarize the findings and recommendations emanating from the one-week scoping mission to Afghanistan. The report will also present the data collected during the scoping mission, including information collected through interviews with key stakeholders as well as a list of documents and reports provided by local stakeholders.

The Consultant must provide in the report specific recommendations for the development of the evaluation methodology, including on managing security risks, engaging local consultants, access to project sites, etc.

The Consultant must submit the draft scoping mission report within (2) weeks from returning from Afghanistan. The CIDA Technical Authority will provide comments on the draft scoping mission report within (1) week from its receipt. Within (1) week of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must submit for CIDA’s approval a final report that incorporates CIDA’s comments.

iv. Evaluation Methodology

The Consultant must ensure that the evaluation methodology maintains coherence with the larger contribution of the Afghanistan Program for the period FY 2004/05 – FY 2010/11, while taking into consideration the different objectives/logic models guiding programming during this period. The Consultant must consider the implications of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis and its ongoing conflict and fragility. Based on the literature review report, the Consultant’s methodology must integrate best practices derived from the OECD’s recent experience in evaluating development interventions in fragile states and situations, including integrating the notion of conflict sensitivity. The Consultant’s methodology must also take into consideration the security risks related to implementing fieldwork in Afghanistan.

CIDA’s Technical Authority will provide comments on the first draft of the evaluation methodology within two (2) weeks from its receipt. Within two (2) weeks of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must deliver a second draft evaluation methodology that incorporates CIDA’s comments.

The Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee will provide comments on the second draft of the evaluation methodology within two (2) weeks from its receipt. Within two (2) weeks of receiving these comments, the CIDA Technical Authority will provide these comments to the Consultant, the Consultant must submit for CIDA’s approval a final evaluation methodology that incorporates the comments from the Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee.

v. Work Plan for the Implementation Phase

Based on the literature review and methodology, the Consultant must determine the most appropriate approach for implementing the Afghanistan Program evaluation. The Consultant must expand the work plan for the design phase to include the tasks contained in the implementation phase of the Afghanistan Program evaluation. The Consultant must prepare a detailed evaluation work plan that fulfills these TORs and provides recommendations to address the expected challenges (see section C: Background, paragraph 7, Evaluation Challenges). Finally, the work plan for the implementation phase will integrate multiple information sources and lines of evidence, including documentation review, interviews and field visits, where and if appropriate. At a minimum, the work plan for the implementation phase will address the following elements:

- Afghanistan Development Context: Main findings from the literature review;
- Principles to Conduct Evaluations in Fragile States and Situations: Main findings from the literature review;
- Overview of the Afghanistan Program: Objectives, scope, operations, disbursements, mechanisms, procedures, investment environment/context (Canada and international);
- Evaluation Profile: Reasons for the evaluation, general background, objective, scope, focus, revised logic model;
- Evaluation Expectations: Evaluation clients and their information needs (i.e. decision-making, general corporate learning, etc.);
- Evaluation Challenges and Mitigation Strategy: Security risks, joint evaluation recommendations, external pressures management.
• Evaluation Framework: Evaluation approach, methodology and data collection tools;
• Roles and Responsibilities: Description of the evaluation team’s roles and responsibilities, main tasks, and level of effort per team member;
• Work Schedule and Reporting: Description of timeframes and deliverables;
• Detailed budget, including a thorough description of the level of effort for each proposed team member; and
• Summary of findings and recommendations drawn from previous CIDA and stakeholders evaluations.

CIDA’s Technical Authority will provide comments on the draft work plan for the implementation phase within two (2) weeks from its receipt. Within two (2) weeks of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must deliver a second draft work plan for the implementation phase that incorporates CIDA’s comments.

The Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee will provide comments on the second draft work plan for the implementation phase within one (1) week from its receipt. Within one (1) week of receiving these comments, vis-à-vis the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must submit for CIDA’s approval a final work plan for the implementation phase that incorporates the comments from the Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee.

Note: The Phase 2 evaluation implementation will begin only if CIDA’s Contracting Authority has authorized, in writing, the Consultant to continue with the evaluation.


Phase 2: EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION

These deliverables will be prepared in English and submitted to the CIDA Technical Authority electronically (i.e. via email or memory stick).

i. Data-Gathering Report

In this report, the Consultant will summarize the activities of the data-gathering mission to Afghanistan. The report will include the following:

• Itinerary of the mission;
• List of persons interviewed and their organizational affiliation(s);
• List of projects and organizations visited and documents gathered;
• Data verification techniques employed in Afghanistan;
• The Consultant’s Evaluation Team Leader’s preliminary impressions regarding evaluation findings; and,
• Highlights of any problems that arose during the data-gathering mission.

The Consultant must submit the draft data-gathering report within two (2) weeks from returning from Afghanistan. The CIDA Technical Authority will provide comments on the draft data gathering report within (1) week from its receipt. Within (1) week of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must submit for CIDA’s approval a final report that incorporates CIDA’s comments.

ii. Progress Reports

The Consultant must produce monthly progress reports during the implementation phase. The monthly progress reports will provide an update on the status of the evaluation implementation, lessons learned, challenges, and steps undertaken by the Consultant to mitigate these challenges.
iii. **Evaluation Report**

The draft Evaluation Report must be formatted using the CIDA’s Evaluation Directorate’s Report template. The Consultant must submit a first draft evaluation report for review to the CIDA Technical Authority within four (4) weeks of the end of the data collection process. At a minimum, the report should have the following structure:

- Executive summary (to be included in the second draft report);
- Table of contents;
- List of acronyms;
- Afghanistan development context;
- Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations;
- Description of Afghanistan Program and its environment;
- Description of the methodology, including its limitations;
- Evaluation report, including conclusions and recommendations
- Lessons learned, including examples of innovative good practices; and
- Annexes: TOR; work plan; list of organizations and persons met; summary of survey results; bibliography, etc.

CIDA’s Technical Authority will provide comments on the first draft Evaluation Report within one (1) week from its receipt. Within one (1) week of receiving comments from the CIDA Technical Authority, the Consultant must deliver a second draft Evaluation Report that incorporates CIDA’s comments.

The Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee will provide comments on the second draft of the Evaluation Report within two (2) weeks from its receipt. Within one (1) week of receiving these comments, the Consultant must submit for CIDA’s approval a third draft of the Evaluation Report that incorporates the comments from the Evaluation Peer-Review Group and CIDA’s Advisory Committee.

The CIDA Technical Authority will send the third draft of the Evaluation Report to the CIDA Evaluation Committee for their comments and approval. If there are comments from the CIDA Evaluation Committee, the Consultant will address these comments in the final Evaluation Report.

iv. **Source Data**

Upon completion of the contract, the Consultant must provide electronic versions of data compiled for the Afghanistan Program evaluation. For any new data that the Consultant directly collects on behalf of this evaluation and provides to CIDA, all identifying information about participants must be removed from the data before it is given to CIDA.

v. **Approval of the documents**

CIDA will confirm that all deliverables meet OECD-DAC Standards for evaluation. CIDA will also use the following criteria when reviewing the draft Evaluation Report approval:

Good evaluation reports strike a balance between depth and length. Reports should be approximately 30 pages, with additional materials provided in annexes. The report should include:

- An overarching narrative about the evaluation findings;
- Compelling titles which describe findings;
- Key data displays using clearly labelled data tables and charts;
- Text boxes which highlight evaluation findings through quotes from interviewees, reports, or other sources of information; and,
- Complete bibliographic references.

The Evaluation Report must be credible (ensure the information is validated and triangulated) and convincing to readers within CIDA. The flow of information must make sense and does not confuse the reader. The Evaluation Report is also the primary instrument by which the Canadian public will access the

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81 The nature of this report was modified when the decision was taken in June 2014 to present the “final report” to the Development Evaluation Committee as a technical report and then also prepare a synthesis report.
evaluation results. Thus, it is essential that the report be clear, readable, concise, powerful, and persuasive to the general professional reader.

Annex 1: Sample Outline of the Evaluation Work Plan

1.0 Rationale, purpose and specific objectives of the evaluation

2.0 Evaluation Object and Scope

3.0 Preliminary issues having a potential impact on the evaluation

3.1. Findings and recommendations from previous and/or other evaluations (if applicable)

3.2. Evaluability assessment

- Review of the coherence and logic of the intervention;
- Review of the evaluation questions.
- Assessment of data availability and quality, and of the availability of key informants;
- Level of and reasons for resistance to the evaluation;
- Factors that may compromise the independence of the evaluation;
- Address possible conflicts of interest

4.0 Evaluation Criteria and key questions

(Criteria and updated questions.)

5.0 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

1.1. Evaluation Approach

1.2. Evaluation Methodology (taking into consideration budget, time, data and political constraints)

- Description and justification of the proposed design
- Description and justification of the proposed techniques for data collection;
- Description of proposed data sources;
- Description and justification of the proposed data analysis;
- Narrative explanation the evaluation matrix (the matrix is to be include as an annex)

1.3. Sampling

- For each sampling (e.g. stakeholder’s selection, country/region/sites/sub-project selection, etc.)
  define general sampling parameters and provide detailed explanations in an annex.

6.0 Reporting

6.1. Debriefing /validation (how it will be done)

6.2. Table of contents of the final report

7.0 Evaluation Management

7.1. Evaluation Team Members

7.2. Roles and Responsibilities

7.3. Risks and Risk Mitigation

8.0 Key Deliverables, Timelines and Resources

8.1. Deliverables and Milestones, Schedule

8.2. Level of Effort and Budget (updated if necessary)

Annexes

- Evaluation Matrix
- Sampling (detailed explanations). For each sampling specify: purpose/objectives, universe/population, sampling criteria, sample design, sampling frame, sampling unit, sample size, sampling method, proposed sample and limitations.
- Bibliography (used for the work plan design)
- List of individuals (consulted for the work plan design).
- Logic Model and PMF
- TORs
### Appendix 2 Logical Framework for CIDA’s Afghanistan Program (2004-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities/Pillars</th>
<th>Core Budgetary Funding</th>
<th>Security and Rule of Law</th>
<th>Rural Livelihoods and Social Protection</th>
<th>Natural Resources Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Program Activities</td>
<td>1. Operating budget for the functioning of the GoA.</td>
<td>2. Judicial infrastructure; training of judges, police, prosecutors, legislators, public servants; mine removal; demobilization of ex-combatants; appropriate legal framework.</td>
<td>3. Micro loans for poor people, particularly women; basic social and physical infrastructure; vocational training and education for women.</td>
<td>4. Studies on irrigation possibilities in the Hari Rud and Kajakai Basins; irrigation infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>1. The government functions effectively as its recurrent budgetary expenses are met and is enabled to maintain and expand the delivery of basic services to its citizens.</td>
<td>2. An appropriate legal framework, a functioning judicial system, effective law enforcement mechanisms and functioning governance institutions (national and sub-national) are developed, exist and/or are enforced.</td>
<td>3. Micro and small enterprises established by rural poor; basic human needs in areas such as health and basic infrastructure, increasingly met; community participation strengthened; financial self-reliance of women engendered.</td>
<td>4. Increase in food and non-food agricultural crops generate improved food security and additional income generating activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Outcomes (Short Term)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Outcomes (Medium Term)</td>
<td>1. and 2. Emergence of a government administrative capacity and of a well structured and functioning security sector that can provide services and promote safety and security for an increased number of Afghans at the national and sub-national levels.</td>
<td>3. and 4. Selected basic social and economic needs of the people are increasingly met.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Outcome (Long Term)</td>
<td>Consolidation of central government’s authority and legitimacy across the nation, and improvement in people’s well being, enable the increased stabilization of the State of Afghanistan.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 Afghanistan Program Logic Model (2007-2011)
Appendix 4 Afghanistan Program Logic Model (2008-2011)

Ultimate Outcome

A more secure Afghanistan, with a focus on Kandahar, able to deliver key services to Afghans, and better provide for its longer term stability and sustainable development

Immediate Outcomes

- Improved access to quality education services for women and girls (Kandahar focus)
- Improved access to employment and income opportunities for women and men (Kandahar focus)
- Improved productive potential of land and livestock (Kandahar focus)
- Improved access to essential quality health services for women and children among other vulnerable populations
- Reduced vulnerability to polio and other diseases among populations
- Improved protection of returnees, refugees, IDPs, and among other vulnerable populations
- Improved human security with respect to mines and explosive remnants of war
- Increased capacity of public health institutions to deliver essential quality health services to vulnerable populations
- Increased capacity of public institutions and communities to plan and coordinate emergency assistance
- Increased access to humanitarian aid for returnees, IDPs, women and children among other vulnerable populations
- Increased capacity and role of the GSA in mine action coordination
- Improved capacity of key public institutions to plan, budget, resource, manage and maintain the delivery of services at national and subnational levels
- Strengthened capacity of Afghan electoral institutions and stakeholders to participate effectively in political and electoral processes

Outputs

- Teacher training completed; community-based education services established; educational facilities built or rehabilitated; literacy, vocational and life skills development training provided; local community capacity development supported.
- Community-based infrastructure and livelihoods projects delivered; water management systems developed, market-oriented vocational and skills development training provided; agricultural extension services supported.
- Immunization campaigns conducted; health workers trained, primary health infrastructure supported.
- Afghan disaster management organizations and structures supported; food assistance provided to vulnerable populations.
- Land surveyed and released to communities; mine risk awareness education delivered.
- Technical assistance provided to key Afghan institutions; provincial strategic plans developed; subnational governance institutions established and supported.
- Providing technical assistance to key Afghan institutions; supporting development of provincial strategic plans; supporting the development of subnational governance institutions.
- Candidate, voter and civic education and outreach activities completed; institutional and oversight entities established and supported.
- Conducting candidate, voter and civic education and outreach campaigns; developing institutional and management capacity of electoral institutions and oversight entities.

Program Activities and Expenditures

- CBA Activities: Performing policy research, planning sectoral direction and viable entry points; designing programs and projects and managing proposals from prospective implementing agencies; providing funding to implementing agencies; coordinating program and policy dialogue, and implementing principles of aid effectiveness with donors, stakeholders, and Government of Afghanistan partners; participating in steering committees and working groups; monitoring and reporting of program delivery, risks and results; leading Canadian monitoring and sectoral level missions in Afghanistan.

CBA Themes

- Children and Youth
- Economic Growth
- Food Security
- Economic Growth
- Access to Education
- Economic Growth
- Access to Health
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Security
- National Institutions and Democratic Development

CBA Priorities

- Basic Services
- Social and Economic Development
- Emergency Assistance
- Mine Action
- Public Institutions
- Electoral Processes

ANDS Pillars

- No direct contribution to thematic areas
- Enabling environment contributing to children and youth, food security, and economic growth
- No direct contribution to thematic areas
- No direct contribution to thematic areas
- No direct contribution to thematic areas
- No direct contribution to thematic areas
### Appendix 5 Afghanistan Program Logic Model (2011-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</th>
<th>INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs met and reduced vulnerability of the people in Afghanistan, with a focus on women and girls</td>
<td>Increased availability of quality learning spaces for both girls and boys.</td>
<td>Educational facilities established for girls and boys (either mixed or single-sex facilities)</td>
<td>Operational: EQUIP, AKFC BRAC, QPEP UNICEF-BEGE Afghanistan Challenge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Youth: EDUCATION</td>
<td>Increased access for girls and boys to relevant learning opportunities that respond to their different priorities and interests</td>
<td>Enabling infrastructure established (e.g. latrines, school boundary walls, transportation) to respond to the different needs and requirements for girls and boys to go to school</td>
<td>Planned: Increased support to community based education Other Program Activities: Participate in EQUIP Donor Group, and the Afghanistan Girls’ Education Initiative working group.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enhanced delivery of quality learning opportunities for girls and boys through the education system</td>
<td>Increased availability of male and female school teachers who reflect community need and meet gender-specific demand.</td>
<td>Operational: BRAC, QPEP, UNICEF-BEGE</td>
<td>Planned: Increased support to community based education Other Program Activities: Chair of CBE working Group (promotes coordination amongst partners and with the MoE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved ability of local, provincial and national institutions to deliver basic education services nationally.</td>
<td>CBE teachers, particularly female ones, are identified and recruited. Community-based classes established, especially for women and girls.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improved ability of teachers and educators to deliver quality basic education.</td>
<td>Technical assistance in management provided to the Ministry of Education Policy development processes supported and coordinated within the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Operational: EQUIP, AKFC BRAC, QPEP UNICEF-BEGE, Education in emergencies (CARE)</td>
<td>Planned: TC&amp;A (MoE and Partner)Technical assistance Other Program Activities: Participate in the Education Management Working Group (strategic guidance and support services for implementation of education programs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased ability of communities to engage in basic education-related decision-making processes.</td>
<td>Teachers and educators provided with appropriate training. Teacher Training accreditation system established Teacher certification system established</td>
<td>Operational: EQUIP, AKFC UNICEF-BEGE BRAC, QPEP</td>
<td>Planned: Teacher certification and accreditation Other Program Activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local community school governance bodies established, inclusive of both women and men. Infrastructure and other needs-based grants disbursed</td>
<td>Operational: EQUIP, AKFC BRAC, QPEP</td>
<td>Planned: Other Program Activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</td>
<td>INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES</td>
<td>IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic needs met and reduced vulnerability of the people in Afghanistan, with a focus on women and girls</td>
<td>Increased equitable and gender-sensitive health services to mothers, newborns and children under-five.</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity of government to plan, implement, and evaluate maternal, neonatal and child health strategies and programs.</td>
<td>Technical support provided to the Ministry of Public Health to strengthen its leadership and coordination of the health sector, especially the maternal, newborn and child health sub-sector. Routine collection of health information, specific to maternal, neonatal and child health in particular, including gender-sensitive indicators and reliable sex-disaggregated data, at various levels of the health system.</td>
<td>Operational: WB SHARP HPIC CBAM Planned: H4+ Secretariat H4+ Action Plan GPFSS Other Program Activities: Chair – Health Donor Coordination Group Participant – Consultative Group on Health and Nutrition Technical support to the Ministry of Public Health for Strategic Framework development:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased capacity of government and health institutions to deliver effective, safe, quality and standardized health services for mothers, newborns and children under-five.</td>
<td>Pre- and in-service training on evidence-based, high-impact health interventions, including health promotion and disease prevention, provided to health practitioners, male and female. Health infrastructure strengthened for the provision of maternal, neonatal and child health services at the appropriate level of the health system.</td>
<td>Operational: WB SHARP HPIC CBAM UNICEF MCH Planned: Regional MNCH centre H4+ Action Plan Other Program Activities: TBD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children &amp; Youth: MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH</td>
<td>Enhanced awareness among men, women and children of the existence and importance of using available health resources to prevent, manage and treat the major causes of excess maternal, neonatal and child morbidity and mortality.</td>
<td>Local health practitioners and volunteers, male and female, trained to communicate the existence and importance of using available health resources to prevent, manage and treat the major causes of excess maternal, neonatal and child morbidity and mortality. Messages on behaviours and practices and available resources related to health promotion and disease prevention/management/treatment disseminated at community gatherings.</td>
<td>Operational: WB SHARP GPEI UNICEF MCH WHO TB Planned: Regional MNCH centre (TBD) H4+ Action Plan Other Program Activities: TBD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enhanced utilization of essential health commodities and supplies needed to prevent, manage and treat the most common and severe diseases affecting mothers, newborns and children under five, including gender-based inequalities and harmful practices.</td>
<td>Health practitioners, male and female, trained to provide services encompassing prevention, diagnosis, management and treatment of leading maternal, neonatal and childhood diseases (e.g., Integrated Management of Pregnancy and Childbirth, neonatal resuscitation, Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses). Skilled and knowledgeable health practitioners and volunteers, male and female, deployed to underserved areas to address the most common and severe diseases affecting mothers, newborns and children under-five. Community outreach, including vaccination campaigns and integrated health services, conducted.</td>
<td>Operational: WB SHARP GPEI HPIC CBAM Planned: Regional MNCH centre H4+ Action Plan Other Program Activities: TBD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82 The wording of the three expected intermediate outcomes for maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) match CIDA’s draft intermediate outcome statements for the G8 Muskoka Initiative. The MNCH intermediate outcome statements for Afghanistan may therefore be revised as CIDA finalizes its results statements for the G8 Muskoka Initiative, in order to ensure alignment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN RIGHTS</td>
<td>Enhanced nutritional practices by mothers, newborns, and children under-five (by among other factors, addressing gender and socio-cultural determinants).</td>
<td>Increased availability of nutrition-related goods and services that minimize risks and optimize nutrition, health and survival outcomes, for men, women, and children, particularly pregnant and lactating women and children under-five.</td>
<td>Health practitioners, male and female, trained on nutrition issues and interventions.</td>
<td>Operational: WB SHARP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased awareness and knowledge among men, women and children of moderate/severe acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies at the community level.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dry or ready-to-use supplementary food rations and key vitamins and minerals (e.g., vitamin A, zinc, folic acid, iodized salt, multiple micronutrient powders) provided to pregnant women and children under-five.</td>
<td>Planned: Community-based nutrition initiative (TBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased awareness by Afghans - women in particular about their rights, state commitments and rights protection/ protection mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled breastfeeding support provided to lactating women.</td>
<td>Other Program Activities: TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced participation and inclusion of women and their concerns in decision-making processes at the national and sub-national levels.</td>
<td>Training provided to community leaders - women in particular - in basic governance and decision-making processes (e.g. priority planning; consultations, negotiations and budget literacy).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational:</td>
</tr>
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<td>Planned: Women’s rights/decision-making project (TBD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Technical (individual skills development and/or strategic organisational direction) and financial support provided to human rights institutions, including Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Program Activities:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic needs met and reduced vulnerability of the people in Afghanistan, with a focus on women and girls.

<p>| Basic needs met and reduced vulnerability of the people in Afghanistan, with a focus on women and girls. | Operational: Multi-year institutional support to Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) | Planned: None | | |
|                  | Chair AIHRC Donor Group | Participate in EU Human Rights Working Group (?) | Participation in Gender Donor Coordination Group | Coordinate with DFAIT on human rights (mutual information-sharing and leveraging investments so that GoC positions also reflect CIDA views/concerns) | |
|                  | | | | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</th>
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<th>IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE | Enhanced responsiveness of humanitarian assistance provided by international and Afghan actors to address the basic human needs of crisis-affected populations. | Increased access by affected populations in targeted areas to appropriate humanitarian assistance, including protection, food, shelter, water, sanitation and health services for affected populations in targeted areas. | Financial support provided to priority humanitarian actions. Food assistance provided. Response to appeals coordinated and consulted with other government departments, donors and stakeholders. | Operational (2011):  - 2011 Appeals (ICRC, ARCS/IFRC, UNHCR)  - WFP Protracted Relief & Recovery Operation 200063 (PRRO)  - CARE Canada’s Emergency Response & Capacity Building for Emergency Preparedness in Afghanistan for FY11/12  - Mine Action Program for Afghanistan for FY11/12  
Other Planned Program Activities:  - Continue to chair and/or participate in the Donor Coordination Group  - Participate in humanitarian cluster meetings that remain open to donors - potentially the following: (i) Emergency Shelter; (ii) Food Security & Agriculture; (iii) Nutrition; (iv) Emergency Telecommunications; (v) Water/Sanitation (WASH); (vi) inter-cluster meetings during disasters  - Coordinate and consult with IHA/MULTI, DFAIT, and Canadian missions abroad (for e.g. Geneva) |

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<tr>
<th>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</th>
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<th>IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                  | Improved resilience of crisis-affected vulnerable populations, with a focus on women and girls. | Increased ability of implementing partners to apply durable and gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian responses. | Food assistance provided for the re-establishment of livelihoods. Cash grants provided for the re-integration of returnees. Stakeholders engaged in policy dialogue on the issue of gender equality and early recovery/humanitarian assistance. | Operational (2011):  
- 2011 Appeals (ICRC, ARCS/IFRC, UNHCR)  
- WFP Protracted Relief & Recovery Operation 200063 (PRRO)  
- CARE Canada’s Emergency Response & Capacity Building for Emergency Preparedness in Afghanistan for FY11/12  
- Mine Action Program for Afghanistan for FY11/12  

Planned:  
- Assess the option of funding humanitarian appeals and operations in Afghanistan, including food and non-food assistance, for 2012, 2013, 2014  
- Assess the option of funding natural disaster response operations in Afghanistan for 2012, 2013, 2014  
- Assess the option of funding Mine Action programming in Afghanistan for 2012, 2013, 2014  

Other Planned Program Activities:  
- Continue to chair and/or participate in the Donor Coordination Group  
- Participate in humanitarian cluster meetings that remain open to donors - potentially the following: (i) Emergency Shelter; (ii) Food Security & Agriculture; (iii) Nutrition; (iv) Emergency Telecommunications; (v) Water/Sanitation (WASH); (vi) inter-cluster meetings during disasters  
- Coordinate and consult with IHA/MULTI, DFAIT, and Canadian missions abroad (for e.g. Geneva)  
- Support at least one study/assessment/evaluation integrating and/or focussing on gender equality and early recovery/humanitarian assistance |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ULTIMATE OUTCOME</th>
<th>INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced performance of national and sub-national actors in disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness.</td>
<td>Improved ability of Afghan authorities to mitigate the effects of natural and man-made disasters on the Afghan population, including most vulnerable groups such as women and girls.</td>
<td>Preparedness activities undertaken to address the occurrence of natural and man-made disasters. Information regarding disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness/response disseminated to stakeholders through studies/assessments/evaluations, including information on gender equality.</td>
<td>Operational (2011):  - 2011 Appeals (ICRC, ARCS/IFRC, UNHCR)  - WFP Protracted Relief &amp; Recovery Operation 200063 (PRRO)  - CARE Canada’s Emergency Response &amp; Capacity Building for Emergency Preparedness in Afghanistan for FY11/12  - Mine Action Program for Afghanistan for FY11/12  Planned:  - Assess the option of funding humanitarian appeals and operations in Afghanistan, including food and non-food assistance, for 2012, 2013, 2014  - Assess the option of funding natural disaster response operations in Afghanistan for 2012, 2013, 2014  - Assess the option of funding Mine Action programming in Afghanistan for 2012, 2013, 2014  Other Planned Program Activities:  - Continue to chair and/or participate in the Donor Coordination Group  - Participate in humanitarian cluster meetings that remain open to donors - potentially the following: (i) Emergency Shelter; (ii) Food Security &amp; Agriculture; (iii) Nutrition; (iv) Emergency Telecommunications; (v) Water/Sanitation (WASH); (vi) inter-cluster meetings during disasters  - Coordinate and consult with IHA/MULTI, DFAIT, and Canadian missions abroad (for e.g. Geneva) on humanitarian issues related to Afghanistan and the region  - Support at least one study/assessment/evaluation integrating and/or focusing on disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness/response, and that includes the issue of gender equality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6 Methodological approach

The methodological approach for this evaluation was elaborated in the “Final Evaluation Design and Work Plan, October 15th 2013” for this evaluation in line with the requirements of the ToR (see Appendix 1). The evaluation design is an internal working document and some elements of the design are presented in Chapter 1 and in this appendix. In addition, an appendix to the evaluation design was developed on May 7th 2014, presenting the “Approach regarding integration of findings on the Dahla Dam or Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program (AIRP)”.

This appendix complements the main information provided in chapter 1, which means that information that is extensively dealt with such as evaluation purpose, data collection and analysis methods, and risk assessment and mitigation is not repeated in this appendix.

A6.1 Guiding principles

Against the background of the evolving context in Afghanistan and the guidance on evaluations in fragile states the following specific guiding principles for this evaluation have been identified:

1. The evaluation should be based on the Theory of Change underpinning Canada’s development support to Afghanistan;
2. Take context as the starting point, which was already done in the literature review and will be continued throughout the evaluation process;
3. The evaluation process itself should be conflict sensitive;
4. The evaluation has to overcome problems of data availability by combining different methods of data collection and triangulation;
5. Unintended effects of Canada’s development support to Afghanistan should not be ignored;
6. The evaluation approach should be gender aware i.e. gender should be mainstreamed in the evaluation approach;
7. Rapid turnover of staff further might limit data collection and often leads to a lack of institutional memory that needs to be overcome;
8. Evaluators may face lack of access to specific areas and security concerns that limit data collection and the evaluators may not be able to speak to all parties;
9. Evaluators should be aware that emphasis on rapid interventions or ‘windows of opportunity’ can hinder establishment of baseline data and collection of monitoring data.
A6.2 Consolidated Intervention Logic

**Inputs/activities**
- Build/rehabilitate schools
- Provide teacher training
- Set-up community schools
- Literacy, vocational training
- Immunization campaigns
- Training of community health workers, midwives and others
- Support to essential health services
- Provision of BPHS
- Provision of community-based infrastructure
- Provision of microfinance
- Support to SMEs
- Training of craftsmen
- Provision of food assistance
- Provision of shelter, etc.
- Training on disaster management
- Demining
- Support to AIHRC
- Support to civic education
- Support to women’s organizations

**Outputs**
- Schools built/improved
- Teachers trained
- Community-based schools
- People trained
- Children immunized
- Trained health workers
- Better performing health facilities
- Improved MMIS indicators
- Completed infrastructure
- CDC’s established
- Loans provided
- SMEs supported
- People trained
- People reached
- Vulnerable households reached
- People trained
- Demined area
- Trained staff
- People trained
- Grants provided

**Outcomes**
- Improved access esp. for girls
- Improved learning
- Improved quality of education
- Enhanced capacity
- Improved access to health services
- Improved quality of health services
- Progress towards polio eradication
- Enhanced capacity
- Improved access to employment and income
- Improved access to microfinance
- Enhanced capacity
- Improved food and nutritional status
- Increased resilience
- Enhanced capacity
- More human rights activities
- Enhanced capacity
- Increased awareness of human rights
- Increased access of women’s decision making

**Impact**
A more secure and democratic Afghanistan, able to deliver services to Afghans
A 6.3 Detailed sampling approach

In order to arrive at a meaningful sample to study the portfolio in more detail the evaluation team deployed the following methodology:

- Based on the sector of focus classification used by CIDA, a list was made of the 15 largest financial initiatives in each sector. The major projects in each sector were then reviewed by the evaluation team;

- Based on the analysis, the team decided to drop the interventions classified under “other”. The sector “other” is really a mixed bag of ARTF Recurrent Cost Window support, the cost of the CPSU and a number of knowledge management activities;

- For the six remaining sectors (“democratic governance”, “improving health”, “strengthening basic education”, “private sector development”, “emergency assistance”, and “peace and security”) it was assessed whether all sub-sectors would be taken into account or logical new clusters could be formed. From an evaluation organization perspective, it was decided to combine the sector “peace and security” focusing almost exclusively on demining and other related mine action with “emergency assistance”. Furthermore, not all democratic governance activities were taken into account as explained below;

- For all selected sectors, a further selection of initiatives was made taking into account that the main themes relevant for the sector are represented, that a mix of executing agencies (WB-ARTF, UN, International NGO, private sector) is represented, that an adequate mix of the size of investments (large, medium, small) is represented, and that initiatives from different years are represented. The mix of executing agencies also covers a multitude of delivery modalities, including ‘on-budget’ support, pooled funding, multilateral appeals, and support to individual initiatives. Some projects that are not yet completed are included in the portfolio as they represent new priorities or approaches;

- As there are several follow-up initiatives concerning one and the same project, or grant contributions to the same UN organizations for similar activities, all these similar initiatives with the same executing agencies were included in the sample to be considered together;

- This list was then critically reviewed to determine whether it included an adequate number of initiatives with a Kandahar focus as well as a sufficient focus on “specific” or “integrated” gender equality initiatives. Where necessary, changes were made to include Kandahar specific or gender specific initiatives, which led to the selection of KLIP as part of the sector “other/multisector”;

- Finally, the complete preliminary sample across all sectors was checked (both quantitatively as well as qualitatively) against the main selection criteria i.e. a good balance of initiatives over the entire evaluation period, a good mix of executing agencies and delivery channels, and a good mix of big, small, and medium sized projects.

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83 In the Afghanistan Program Strategies different names are being used throughout the evaluation period for the various sectors as explained in chapter 3. In the portfolio information, the same sector names are being used throughout the entire evaluation period. While in the strategies “Peace and security” is not mentioned as a separate sector, this is the case in the portfolio as reflected in Appendix 5. As “Peace and security” is often presented together with emergency assistance, for example under the overall heading “Security”, the portfolio sectors emergency assistance and “peace and security” have been merged to humanitarian assistance.

84 On-budget support means that donors channel 50% of development aid through the recipient government’s core budget.

85 Canada uses a four dimension classification to code the gender equality aspects of its projects: 1. Gender equality “specific” initiatives; 2. Gender equality “integrated” initiatives; 3. Limited gender equality results; 4. No gender equality results.
medium-sized initiatives. Furthermore, the comments of the Evaluation Advisory Committee led to some small adjustments.

The sampling resulted in a selection of 50 initiatives, covering a total disbursement of $852 million, approximately 55% of overall disbursements during the period 2004-05 to 2012-13 ($1.546 million). All selected projects have a 100% Afghanistan focus. The three signature projects, that accompanied Canada’s military engagement in Kandahar, are included in the sample. Table A6.1 represents the sample by sector of focus.

### Table A6.1 Evaluation sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Focus</th>
<th>Initiatives</th>
<th>Sample Budget</th>
<th>Sample Proportion</th>
<th>Portfolio Budget</th>
<th>Sample/Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening basic education</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>133,951,837</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>153,524,544</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>127,342,619</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>167,126,861</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>209,080,118</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>333,042,421</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector development</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>163,966,051</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>333,366,726</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>101,066,527</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>184,130,029</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99,895,138</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>121,094,082</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (KLIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,952,118</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>224,893,107</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>852,254,408</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,546,257,497</strong></td>
<td><strong>55%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample is considered to be representative of the entire portfolio, although slight differences between the evaluation sample and the total portfolio could not be avoided. For example, education, health and peace and security are slightly overrepresented and this is also the case for the gender equality focus. This is the case in those sectors where the Program was more active in recent years, which also serves to enhance learning opportunities. On the other hand, the category ‘other/multisector’ is underrepresented.

The sector Democratic Governance was the subject of further sampling, given the wide range of sub-sectors under this sector, which does not always correspond with the country strategies. The sub-sector Human Rights with a strong gender equality focus has been selected as the sub-sector on which the evaluation will focus as it is expected that for this sub-sector most relevant findings can be found, which will provide a good opportunity to draw lessons. The gender equality focus is another reason to concentrate on this sub-sector. The sub-sector election support took place in 2004-05 and in 2009, and these elections have been thoroughly evaluated and therefore it was not expected that this evaluation could add any value in terms of new insights. Furthermore, two main projects related to Democratic participation and civil society, and specifically focussing on community development were selected. These projects have focused on the delivery of rural infrastructure to community-based organisations.

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86 The column with the sample proportion presents the weight of the various sectors within the sample, while the last column sample/proportion presents the disbursements of the sample as a percentage of the total disbursements in each sector. This last column is an indicator for representativeness of the sample and shows to what extent the various sectors are covered by the sample. In the evaluation design 48 initiatives were selected, but during the implementation of the evaluation it became clear that the Dahla Dam Signature project consisted of three related initiatives. This explains the slight difference in the evaluation sample presented in the evaluation design and the final evaluation sample.

87 In the evaluation sample, 46% of the projects were classified as “gender equality integrated” compared to 35% in the overall portfolio.

88 The category ‘other’ was already included in the original portfolio and consisted of funding of the ARTF recurrent cost window and the Canadian Program Support Unit, but for the purpose of this evaluation some reclassification had to be done to correct errors. For example, the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program was classified as “education” while, in practice, it was a multisector fund. The evaluation paid due attention to the funding of ARTF recurrent costs, but did not include this funding in the sample.
and in the intervention logics for the Afghanistan Programs these projects were not classified in the governance sector, but rather as part of the sector “Economic Growth”.

A specific problem that the evaluation team faced was that that the sector classification used in the portfolio does not correspond entirely with the sector priorities for the Afghanistan Program as they were defined over the course of the evaluation period. Therefore, consistent sector labels have been used throughout the evaluation: democratic governance with human rights as sub-sector; economic growth (including private sector development); education, health, and humanitarian assistance (combination of emergency assistance and peace and security).

The table below outlines the specific projects that have been investigated under each sector heading. A project can consist of various initiatives as initiatives concerning the same projects or type of activities have been combined. Therefore, the 50 initiatives result in 25 projects.

### Table A.6.2 Sample by name of project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Focus</th>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>No. of Initiatives</th>
<th>Executing Agency</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Disbursement</th>
<th>Gender focus</th>
<th>Kandahar focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>World Bank – ARTF</td>
<td>2007 - ongoing</td>
<td>91.50</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE), Kandahar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>2008 - ongoing</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Specific for Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Girls Education Support Program (GESP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BRAC/AKF</td>
<td>2006-2013</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Selected provinces incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Education for Afghanistan Consortium (BEACON)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>2011 - ongoing</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Selected provinces incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Global Polio Eradication Initiative – WHO</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>2006 - ongoing</td>
<td>74.00</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Health Activities for the Poor (SHARP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>World Bank - ARTF</td>
<td>2010 – 2012</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>Limited gender equality results</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Maternal New-born and Child Health (MNCH) Program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aga Khan Foundation</td>
<td>2011 - ongoing</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>No Kandahar focus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89 Although this specific project has a reference to gender in its name, desk research and interviews revealed that indeed gender equality is not part of the approach. Therefore, the coding “no gender equality results” is correct.

90 These two projects do not constitute a unified program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Focus</th>
<th>Name of Project/Initiative</th>
<th>No. of Initiatives</th>
<th>Executing Agency</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Disbursement</th>
<th>Gender focus</th>
<th>Kandahar focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>Dahlia Dam Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SNC Lavalin International/ Central Asia Development Group</td>
<td>2008 – 2012</td>
<td>47.07(^{91})</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Specific for Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Enterprise Development in Kandahar (REDKan)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2009 – 2011</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Specific for Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turquoise Mountain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Turquoise Mountain Trust</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>No Kandahar focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kandahar Rapid Village Development Plan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Development Works Inc.</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Specific for Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>WFP Appeals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
<td>various years</td>
<td>84.52</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabul Widows</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CARE Canada</td>
<td>2004 – 2011</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>Gender equality specific</td>
<td>No Kandahar focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee Return and Reintegration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>2004 – 2005</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness and Response Project</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CARE Canada</td>
<td>2012 – 2013</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>Limited gender equality results</td>
<td>No Kandahar focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Kandahar Local Initiatives Fund (KLIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Multiple implem. Partners</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>No gender equality results</td>
<td>Specific for Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community development</td>
<td>National Solidarity Program (NSP)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>World Bank - ARTF</td>
<td>2004 – 2010</td>
<td>147.50</td>
<td>Gender equality integrated</td>
<td>Nation-wide, and incl. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{91}\) This amount also includes the cost of the AIRP feasibility study ($0.45 million)
Smaller projects are included under two fund management programs, namely the Kandahar Local Initiative Program (KLIP), managed through the KPRT and the Responsive Fund for the Advancement of Women managed by the CPSU.

### A6.3 Approach to data collection and methodology

In the ToR (see Appendix 1), preliminary evaluation questions were formulated and grouped under six evaluation criteria and specific topics. Upon discussion, the ToR evaluation questions were regrouped in line with the four main evaluation criteria and four lead questions were defined that were presented in the Introduction of this synthesis report. A total of 39 sub-questions were defined in relation to all lead questions.

In order to answer the evaluation questions at the three levels (Program, sector and project/intervention), a ‘top-down and bottom-up’ approach was carried out by linking downstream, project-level efforts with upstream sector policy dialogue and by linking the international conferences on Afghanistan since 2001 and the decision-making by the Government of Canada on Afghanistan to strategic development programming and implementation. A **program level evaluation matrix** was elaborated, specifying for each sub-question, indicators and sources and methods for data collection (see Table A6.3).

#### Table A.6.3 Program level Evaluation Matrix (as presented in final Evaluation Design, 15 October 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alignment with Afghan government priorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 To what extent is the Afghanistan Program aligned with the strategic priorities of the Government of Afghanistan?</td>
<td>Degree of alignment between objectives of the Program and GoA priorities; References in CIDA strategic Program documents to GoA priorities; International conferences on Afghanistan setting benchmarks on alignment.</td>
<td>Document review; Interviews CIDA and GoA; Trend analysis of the degree of alignment over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taking into account needs and conflict dynamics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 To what extent are the main needs of the people of Afghanistan (in particular women and children) addressed through the CIDA Afghanistan Program?</td>
<td>References to needs assessments in Program documents; Needs assessments commissioned by the Program; Quality of needs assessments esp. focus on gender equality and conflict sensitivity; Awareness and actual use of needs</td>
<td>Document review: CIDA documents, but also international literature, documents of other donors, international organizations and of GoA; Interviews; Focus groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3 Have the Afghanistan conflict dynamics as well as the priorities and rights of affected populations been considered in the Afghanistan Program, including in its international humanitarian assistance programming?</strong></td>
<td>Indications of gender-sensitive conflict analysis being commissioned and/or used by the Program; Quality of the conflict analysis being referred to; Specific strategies to deal with conflict dynamics for humanitarian assistance in view of humanitarian principles; Awareness and actual use of conflict analysis by Program staff and executing partners; Availability of conflict analyses for Kandahar; Evidence of monitoring of stabilization in Kandahar.</td>
<td>Document review: CIDA documents, but also international literature, documents of other donors and of GoA; Interviews; Focus groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.4 Were risks adequately assessed and risk mitigation strategies formulated? In particular, were program responses appropriately designed to mitigate or prevent further conflict?</strong></td>
<td>Availability of risk assessments at various levels; Availability of risk mitigation strategies at various levels; Quality of risk assessments at various levels; Actual implementation of risk mitigation measures; Evidence of adaptation of risk strategies and risk mitigation specifically for Kandahar.</td>
<td>Document review: CIDA documents, but also international literature, documents of other donors and of GoA; Interviews; Focus groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.5 To what extent did CIDA have an adequate contextual understanding of Afghan society and the programming context to design and implement relevant and effective programming? How were choices on aid channels (executing agencies) and aid modalities made based on contextual understanding?</strong></td>
<td>Good knowledge shown of the Afghan context in strategic documents and in interviews; Existence and use of clear criteria to decide on aid channels and aid modalities.</td>
<td>Review of CIDA Program and project documents; Interviews; Focus groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.6 How appropriate and realistic were the (evolving and changing) overall Program objectives and/or the envisaged results/targets of specific</strong></td>
<td>Mapping of Program and project objectives over time; Mapping of objectives of selected projects over time.</td>
<td>Review of Program and project documents; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Sources and Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alignment with WoG approach</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Have the Afghanistan Program interventions been aligned with federal government priorities, CIDA’s strategic outcomes and Canada’s Whole of Government approach?</td>
<td>Mapping of federal government priorities on Afghanistan; Mapping of CIDA’s overall priorities and objectives; Mapping of priorities of DFAIT and DND on Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Memoranda to Cabinet; TB submissions; Statements of PM and Ministers; Interviews; Comparison of objectives and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 What were the main implications of the Manley report for CIDA’s programming and implementation of the Afghanistan Program? How did the increased coordination of Government of Canada efforts affect CIDA’s performance?</td>
<td>Priorities of the Afghanistan Program pre and post-Manley; Reorganisation of the Program as a result of Manley report; Increase of staff as a result of Manley report; Change in resources as a result of Manley report; New coordination mechanisms as a result of Manley report.</td>
<td>Program document review; HR statistics; Org. charts; Articles and documents of WoG approach and coordination mechanisms; Interviews; Triangulation and validation of findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 What was the CIDA strategy regarding activities in Kandahar before and after the shift of policy related to the Manley report in 2008? What were the implications of this concentration on Kandahar for CIDA programming and results?</td>
<td>Portfolio information on activities in Kandahar throughout the evaluation period; Mapping of Program objectives on Kandahar pre-and post-Manley; Changes in CIDA staffing Kandahar pre-and post-Manley; Changes in reporting on Kandahar pre- and post-Manley.</td>
<td>Portfolio analysis and trend analysis; Review of Program documents; Interviews specifically with Kandahar-based staff; Field visit Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 What were the implications for CIDA programming and results when Canada withdrew from Kandahar in 2010-2011?</td>
<td>Portfolio information on activities in Kandahar throughout the evaluation period; Mapping of Program objectives on Kandahar post-Manley and after 2011; Changes in CIDA staffing Kandahar post-Manley and after 2011; Changes in reporting on Kandahar post-Manley And after 2011.</td>
<td>Portfolio analysis and trend analysis; Review of Program documents; Interviews specifically with Kandahar-based staff; Field visit Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 To what extent are CIDA’s overall priorities and strategies reflected in the Afghanistan Program?</td>
<td>Mapping of CIDA’s overall priorities; Mapping of Afghanistan Program priorities.</td>
<td>Comparison of the objectives and priorities on the basis of document review; Interviews; Validation of preliminary findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-cutting issues: gender equality and environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12 Did the Afghanistan Program adequately prepare for and consider gender equality (a</td>
<td>Indications that the prevailing overall CIDA GE policies, strategies and action plans were taken into account</td>
<td>Document review at Program and overall CIDA level; Review of reports by gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Sources and Methods</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA cross-cutting theme)?</td>
<td>in planning and implementation of the Program; Existence and use of articulated gender equality strategies at sector and project level i.e. strategies and tactics to overcome cultural, social, logistical and other barriers to achievement of GE results? Gender-disaggregated reporting at various levels; The extent to which international agreements e.g. on the UN resolutions on peace, women and security were promoted and implemented by the Afghanistan Program; The extent to which GE considerations were taken into account in the choice of sectors and executing agencies; The extent to which action was taken if GE was insufficiently addressed in specific sectors or projects.</td>
<td>specialists; Interviews with gender specialists/focal points; Additional interviews Canada and Afghanistan at various levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.13 Did the Afghanistan Program adequately prepare for and consider environmental sustainability issues (a CIDA cross-cutting theme)?</td>
<td>Indications that the prevailing environmental strategies and regulations were taken into account in planning and implementation of the Program; Existence and use of articulated environmental strategies in the Economic Growth sector; Actual reporting on environmental for the Economic Growth sector.</td>
<td>Overall CIDA and Program documents related to environmental assessments; Project assessment forms and related guidelines for sector expert Economic growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada’s role in donor coordination</td>
<td>The extent to which division of labour was taken into account in the choice of priority sectors; The extent to which other donors were consulted on and informed about strategic choices by the Program; The extent to which CIDA participated in or led the joint policy dialogue with the GoA on general or sector issues.</td>
<td>Information regarding composition of general donor coordination groups over the years and formal leadership roles of CIDA/Canada; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.15 To what extent did the CIDA Afghanistan Program take the prevailing international principles on ownership, alignment and harmonization and on engagement in fragile States and Situations into account in its programming and implementation?</td>
<td>References to prevailing international principles in Program and project documents; Evidence of actual follow-up of international principles; Evidence of joint action with other donors.</td>
<td>Document review of all prevailing international principles in relation to CIDA Program documents; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.16 To what extent were the principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship taken into account in the Afghanistan Program?</td>
<td>References to humanitarian principles in planning documents; Indications of actual follow-up of humanitarian principles in practice; Reporting on humanitarian principle by the Program and/or executing agencies; Active participation in humanitarian assistance donor coordination and references to implementation of humanitarian principles.</td>
<td>Document review of international literature on humanitarian principles Afghanistan, international conferences, Program documents, minutes of donor coordination on humanitarian assistance, etc.; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.17 What role did CIDA play to improve aid coordination and how is this perceived by other actors?</td>
<td>Role of CIDA in general and sector coordination groups over time (lead, member); Perception of the role of CIDA in general and sector coordination groups by other stakeholders; Joint actions taken by donors to improve coordination.</td>
<td>Documents on donor coordination in Afghanistan: international conferences, aid architecture, minutes of meetings, studies and reviews; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Sources and Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 How result-oriented was the CIDA support to Afghanistan? Was a clear distinction made between outputs, outcome and impacts in programming, implementation and finalization?</td>
<td>Review of CIDA Program and project documents; Interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Were the planned outputs delivered?</td>
<td>Sector evaluation matrices with output and outcome indicators have been developed that are the basis for the analysis of effectiveness at selected project and sector level; Project assessment forms and related guidelines for sector experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 To what extent were expected outcomes achieved?</td>
<td>Sector evaluation matrices with output and outcome indicators have been developed that are the basis for the analysis of effectiveness at selected project and sector level; Project assessment forms and related guidelines for sector experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 If expected outcomes were not fully achieved, what were the barriers preventing</td>
<td>Mapping of barriers hindering effectiveness including other barriers to achievement of GE results; governance barriers; capacity barriers; Evidence of risks being identified timely and mitigated against.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>success? And were risks anticipated and mitigated against?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Was the Afghanistan Program effective in addressing the cross-cutting theme of</td>
<td>See sector evaluation matrices; Evidence of active promotion and implementation of UN resolutions on peace, security and women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender equality?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Was the Economic Growth sector effective in addressing environment as a cross-cutting</td>
<td>See sector evaluation matrices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theme?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Were synergies realized within the sectors and between the various sectors? Did</td>
<td>Evidence of activities that mutually reinforced each other to achieve the same goal; Indications of planning of synergies within and across sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the WoG approach contribute to synergies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 What specific internal and external factors have contributed to results? Did</td>
<td>Mapping of internal factors including good strategies being implemented, leadership shown, staffing, adequate procedures, etc.; Mapping of external factors: including on-going security, governance problems, donor coordination issues, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA leadership in specific sectors or sub-sectors contribute to the results achieved?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What about on-going security?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 What measures were taken to deliver the aid in an efficient way at Program level?</td>
<td>Number of FTE involved at various levels of the Program over time; The extent to which security concerns affected efficiency; Measures to deliver the Program in an efficient way in the context of increasing insecurity e.g. adequate criteria for recruitment of new staff, training provided prior to posting abroad, counselling, post-deployment action, career perspectives being offered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Have adequate risk mitigation strategies been put in place to reduce various types of risks, including the risk of corruption?</td>
<td>Type of risks identified; References to risk mitigation strategies being in place and implemented; Systematic collection of information related to risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Does CIDA have the right tools, processes and procedures to support effective development programming and implementation in fragile states and situations?</td>
<td>Overview of main tools, processes and procedures; Composition of Program staff: job descriptions and job profiles; Position of gender and environmental experts in the Program; Position of humanitarian assistance staff in the Program and relation to Humanitarian assistance Division; Actual follow-up of advice of gender and environmental specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 To what extent were the Afghanistan Program delivery mechanisms conducive to better programming interventions?</td>
<td>Statistics on delivery mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Was the delivery of CIDA support timely? Were there any delays?</td>
<td>Planning of project duration vs. actual implementation period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 What measures were taken to deliver the projects in an efficient way?</td>
<td>Composition of project budgets: Management costs; Security costs; Overall overhead costs; Contribution of CIDA to the overall project budget; Budget execution compared to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Were appropriate M&amp;E mechanisms set up and were lessons from M&amp;E taken into account in programming and implementation</td>
<td>Existence of M&amp;E systems at Program, sector and project level; Reporting at various levels in line with M&amp;E systems; The extent to which M&amp;E reports include GE results and environmental results; Quality of M&amp;E reports; Adequate use of gender coding; Follow-up of M&amp;E findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Did CIDA learn lessons from its involvement in Afghanistan? What were the mechanisms?</td>
<td>Indications of lessons-learned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability and impact</td>
<td>Listing of positive and negative long-term effects including recognition by the population that the Afghan government is providing better services, improved policies and strategies (including GE) of the government at national and sub-national level that are being implemented, improved stability, improved role of women in decision-making at various levels, increased use of resources and services for the poor and in particular women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 What are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects of the Afghanistan Program?</td>
<td>Evidence that institutional capacity has been strengthened to continue with the interventions after finalization of CIDA support; Evidence on a supportive policy environment to continue with the interventions after finalization of CIDA support; Actions taken to involve men, religious leaders, civil service personnel, and other stakeholders that can support the continuity of benefits of CIDA supported interventions for GE equality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For each of the five sectors of focus - education, health, economic growth, humanitarian assistance and human rights - an evaluation matrix was developed during the design phase specifying indicators, sources and methods for sector-specific outputs and outcomes (see Tables A6.4 to A6.8).

**Table A6.4 Evaluation Matrix Health**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children immunized against polio</td>
<td>Proportion of children who received three doses of polio vaccine by the age of 12 months by gender and Province*</td>
<td>HMIS data, WHO and UNICEF data, MICS, Post-campaign assessment surveys, other surveys, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children immunized against vaccine-preventable diseases</td>
<td>Proportion of children who received one dose of measles vaccine by the age of 12 months by gender and Province</td>
<td>HMIS data, WHO and UNICEF data, MICS, Post-campaign assessment surveys, other surveys, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Health Workers trained and deployed</td>
<td>Number of CHWs active / number of CHWs trained by gender and Province</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, SHARP project reports, NGO reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunization Volunteers trained</td>
<td>Number of immunization volunteers and volunteer coordinators trained by gender and Province</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, polio campaign reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwives and Community Midwives trained and deployed in</td>
<td>Number of Midwives and Community Midwives active /</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, AKF project reports, USAID/JHPIEGO reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Sources and methods</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakshan and Bamyan</td>
<td>number of midwives trained in Badakshan and Bamyan Provinces</td>
<td>informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential health structures supported.</td>
<td>Number of health facilities submitting timely HMIS reports by Province and by type of facility</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, NGO reports and evaluations, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic package of health services provided</td>
<td>Number of Health Posts per 1,000 population Number of Basic Health Centres per 1,000 population Number of Comprehensive Health Centres per 1,000 population (all by Province and by rural/urban distribution)</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, NGO reports and evaluations, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to essential quality health services</td>
<td>Proportion of population residing within two hours walking distance from primary care services by Province and rural/urban distribution</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, population surveys (e.g. MICS), key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased quality of essential health services provided to vulnerable populations, esp. women and children.</td>
<td>Proportion of births delivered by skilled personnel by Province and by type of provider</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, population surveys (e.g. MICS), SHARP/NGO reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased use of health services, esp. by women and children</td>
<td>Number of visits to rural and urban health facilities by gender, children under 5 /adults, and by Province Number of health care visits per person per year by gender and Province</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, population surveys (e.g. MICS), key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards polio eradication</td>
<td>Incidence of acute flaccid paralysis Incidence of confirmed polio by type of virus (vaccine derived polio virus, wild polio virus type 1-3) By gender and Province</td>
<td>HMIS data, Disease Early Warning System Weekly and Annual Reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved child health</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate by gender and Province Under-5 mortality rate by gender and province</td>
<td>HMIS data and reports, population surveys (e.g. MICS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced capacity of the Ministry of Public Health to provide leadership and coordination of the health sector at national and provincial level, especially for maternal, new-born and child health.</td>
<td>Qualitative assessment of reporting, monitoring and supervision systems, and of the availability of policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines</td>
<td>Evaluation reports, organizational reviews and assessments, review of supervision plans and reports, review of health information system, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Throughout the table, indicators to be evaluated “by province” refers to focal provinces of the CIDA/DFATD program (number of provinces to be determined).
### Table A6.5 Evaluation Matrix Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number of teachers trained per year (gender-disaggregated).</strong></td>
<td>EQUIP: document review; field visit; focus group discussions with trained teachers, students and parents; KIIs with program staff and CIDA staff. GESP: document review; field visit; KIIs and focus groups with female teachers trainees. BEACON: document review; field visit; focus groups with teachers and Colleges of Education; KIIs. BEGE (TT): Document review, KIIs, field visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide teacher training.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building or rehabilitating education infrastructure.</td>
<td><strong>Number of schools built, expanded or repaired (per category) in Kandahar.</strong></td>
<td>EQUIP: document review; KIIs; field visit to one of the 50 schools. BEGE: document review; KIIs; field visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set-up of community based schools.</td>
<td><strong>Number of community based schools established</strong></td>
<td>BEACON: document review; KIIs; field visit; focus groups with community members. GESP: document review; field visit; KIIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy, vocational and skills development training provided.</td>
<td><strong>Number of individuals who received literacy training (gender-disaggregated)</strong></td>
<td>GESP: document review; field visit; focus group discussions with girls and parents; KIIs. BEGE: document review; KIIs; focus groups with local women; field visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community capacity development supported.</td>
<td><strong>Number of school management committees established</strong></td>
<td>EQUIP: document review; field visits and focus groups with SBMC members and teachers and principals and students. GESP: document review, field visits, focus groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td><strong>Student enrolment rate in education at national and provincial levels by gender</strong></td>
<td>EMIS and other data sources; verify at school level and with KIIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to quality education services for women and girls (Kandahar focus).</td>
<td><strong>Number of community-based education students who transition to the formal education system</strong></td>
<td>Program reporting data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Net enrolment ratio of children in primary education, nationally and in Kandahar, disaggregated by gender</strong></td>
<td>EMIS and other national data sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Number of students enrolled in Technical/Vocational Education Training (TVET)</strong></td>
<td>EMIS and other national data sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Sources and methods</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved learning of children in schools</td>
<td>Test design and regular assessments (EQUIP)</td>
<td>GESP: document review; field visit; focus group discussions with girls and parents; KII; EQUIP: documents review; KII; field visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustained progression into higher levels of the education system (GESP/AKF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality of basic education.</td>
<td>· Improved curricula and teaching methods;</td>
<td>Program reporting data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Number and percentage of pupils (gender-disaggregated) finishing basic education.</td>
<td>EMIS and other national data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved capacity of national, provincial and local institutions to deliver quality education</td>
<td>Evidence of improved planning and reporting</td>
<td>BEGE: document review; KII; EQUIP: document review and KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of improved monitoring and reporting</td>
<td>EMIS and school data; verified in field visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of better performance by parents and communities</td>
<td>EMIS and other national data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of schools receiving quality enhancement and infrastructure grants through local school management committees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Evidence of better performing organizations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pupil to teacher ratio in primary education;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Number of teachers, disaggregated by gender</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A6.6 Evaluation Matrix Economic Growth⁹²</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Sources and methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based infrastructure and livelihoods projects delivered (mainly Kandahar focus)</td>
<td>NSP and NABDP data, other surveys, key informant interviews,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Community Development Committees (CDC) established and supported; Length of roads completed; Number of villages connected by roads; Number of infrastructure completed per type;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance services provided</td>
<td>MISFA data, WB reports and surveys, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of active microfinance clients; percentage of active clients who are women. Number of active microfinance service providers (MFIs) operating under Afghan laws.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹² As NSP and NABDP, originally belonging to the Democratic Governance sector, have been added for pragmatic reasons to the Economic Growth sector Analysis indicators related to community development are also included in this matrix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises provided with increased access to credit and improved technical knowledge and skills</td>
<td>Number of active Producer Associations established; Number of SMEs that have received knowledge packages and are still active (gender disaggregated); Number of links established between enterprises and commercial lending institutions/MFIs.</td>
<td>REDKan data and reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional craftsmen and artists trained through the Institute for Afghan Arts and Architecture and gainfully employed</td>
<td>Number of craftsmen and artists trained; Jobs held by graduates</td>
<td>Turquoise Mountain data and reports, key informant interviews, focus group with graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to employment and income opportunities for women and men, with a particular focus on Kandahar</td>
<td>Unemployment and underemployment rate; Number of jobs created (temporary, permanent) through CIDA financed interventions</td>
<td>Household and livelihood surveys, CIDA end of project reports or final evaluation reports, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to financial and business services for SMEs and entrepreneurs, run by Afghans for Afghans.</td>
<td>Number of microfinance institutions with an operational self-sufficiency ratio of more than 100%; Number/% of MFIs with Afghan board members/directors and % of Afghans working as top managers.</td>
<td>Household and livelihood surveys, MISFA data, World Bank data, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced capacity of communities to identify and implement community development projects (Kandahar focus)</td>
<td>Balanced composition of community based organizations in terms of age, socio-economic status and gender (gender disaggregated); Evidence on use and functioning of infrastructure; Evidence on community organizations approaching authorities to address their needs.</td>
<td>NABDP and NSP data and reports, household and livelihood surveys, key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A6.7 Evaluation Matrix Humanitarian Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance provided to vulnerable populations.</td>
<td>Quantity of food assistance and cash vouchers provided; Number and nature of people assisted through food assistance (gender-disaggregated, children, TB patients, etc.); Nutritional status among vulnerable groups (women, children under 5, pregnant women and lactating mothers, HIV and TB patients) is improved Geographic coverage of food assistance – outreach to remote districts.</td>
<td>Review of WFP PRRO Appeals, Project Reports, Annual Reports, Grant Arrangements, Project Approval Documents, Operational Updates and Situations Reports Review of CIDA Evaluations of WFP’s portfolio, Memorandum to the Minister Interviews with WFP officials and CIDA Humanitarian Team in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter, winterization packages and non-food items (NFI) provided to vulnerable households.</td>
<td>Number of vulnerable households to which shelter, winterization packages and NFI was provided (gender disaggregated)</td>
<td>Review of CARE Canada proposals, narrative and financial reports, agreements and evaluations Interviews with CARE Canada Emergency Unit and CARE International staff in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved capacity of public institutions and communities to plan and coordinate emergency assistance.</td>
<td>Number of GoA staff trained on disaster management; Number of Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Committees and community volunteers trained on disaster management; Number of effective disaster preparedness plans put in place by Afghan public institutions to respond to emergencies. Strengthening of capacities and working methods of Afghan National Disaster Management organizations (esp. ANDMA and PMDC).</td>
<td>Review of CARE Canada proposals, narrative and financial reports, agreements and evaluations Interviews with the CARE International staff in Kabul, the CIDA Humanitarian Team in Kabul and selected officials of the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of sustainable livelihoods for affected communities and returnees</td>
<td>Nature and number of community assets rehabilitated or constructed (Canals, Schools, Roads, Rehabilitated irrigation schemes, etc.) Number of beneficiaries of Food for Assets and Food for Training</td>
<td>Review of WFP PRRO Appeals, Project Reports, Annual Reports, Grant Arrangements, Project Approval Documents, Operational Updates and Situations Reports Review of CIDA Evaluations of WFP’s portfolio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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93 In the original logic models and RRMAF there are no indicators for non-food assistance like shelters, assistance to returned refugees etc. and these have been added in this evaluation matrix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Outcomes</strong></td>
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<th><strong>Objectives</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sources and methods</strong></td>
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Table A6.8 Evaluation Matrix Human Rights

The original logic models and RRMAF hardly had any indicators related to human rights and therefore the evaluation team has identified most of the indicators.

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<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and methods</th>
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<tr>
<td>for women and men conducted95.</td>
<td>activities completed under sampled projects; Number of women and men reached by candidate, voter and civic education and outreach activities completed under sampled projects (further distinguishing by type of activities).</td>
<td>Interview with IP of sampled projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations supported.</td>
<td>Number of women’s organizations which received grants per type of organizations and type of funded activities under the RFAW</td>
<td>Final evaluation RFAW Annual Reports RFAW Interview with CPSU</td>
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**Outcome**

| Enhanced capability of the AIHRC to exert leadership and to perform promotion, monitoring and protection of human rights | Number of complaints received, by type; Number of complaints followed-up with competent authorities; Number of advice requests received from public institutions and stakeholders Number and type of awareness-raising and educational activities conducted and number of participants (women-men) Number and type of monitoring visits and investigations conducted number of press releases disseminated/media actions undertaken Perceived strengths and weaknesses of the AIHRC and their evolution in the evaluation time frame | AIHRC Annual Reports AIHRC Evaluation report Interviews with AIHRC chair and staff |
| Increased awareness of human rights by right-holders and duty-bearers. | Number of citizens that are more aware of their rights (women, men, children, disabled, etc.) as a result of AIHRC activities Number of complaints received and characteristics of complainants (sex, age, educational level, etc.) Number of personnel of duty-bearer authorities that are aware of human rights as a result of AIHRC activities Qualitative changes in the attitudes | AIHRC research reports AIHRC annual reports Interviews with AIHRC chair and staff Interview with other HR expert Opinion surveys (e.g. Asia Foundation) |

95 Although this objective and related indicators appears to be directly relation to election support, the selected projects also included this objective.
### Objectives

| Improved protection of human rights for women and men | Improved protection of human rights that can be attributed to AIHRC action | AIHRC research reports  
AIHRC annual reports  
Interviews with AIHRC chair and staff  
Interview with other HR expert |
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<tr>
<td>Improved protection of human rights for women and men</td>
<td>Improvements obtained specifically for women and girls, with focus on gender violence</td>
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</table>
| Improved protection of human rights for women and men | Number of candidates (gender – disaggregated);  
Number of voters (gender-disaggregated?);  
Evidence of increased interest and participation of women in political and electoral processes |  |
| Increased participation of women and men in political and electoral processes at national, provincial and local levels.  
96 | Increase in the number of women holding positions:  
- In provincial government institutions;  
- In CDCs.  
Quality and importance of roles performed by women in decision-making positions |  |
| Strengthened access of women to decision-making. | Increased ability of CSO to conduct activities for the advancement of women (increase of the number of beneficiaries, geographical areas covered, themes and issues addressed). |  |
| Women’s CSO strengthened. |  |  |

In addition to the sector analyses two cross-cutting analyses were carried out – one on gender equality and another on the province of Kandahar where Canada implemented a Whole of Government approach from 2008-2011.

Evaluation principles that were applied included time sensitivity – taking into account that policies, yardsticks and goal posts changed during the period covered by the evaluation - and conflict sensitivity - designing and implementing the evaluation in such way to guarantee the safety of informants, be aware of the effects of the evaluation process, understand the conflict and pay due attention to the safety of evaluators.

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96 Elections are not included in the sample, but in relation to human rights and women rights some selected gender-specific projects do focus on participation and decision making, which also includes electoral participation and sensitization.
The evaluation team applied a **multi-method approach** to gather and analyze both qualitative and quantitative information to answer the evaluation questions. The specific context in Afghanistan and the time and resources available for this evaluation meant that no surveys could be carried out. As a result, the evaluation had to rely, to a large extent, on secondary data. The main data collection methods included:

- **Desk research** - over 2,000 documents reviewed (see Appendix 7 - List of documents);
- **Interviews** – over 220 individual interviewed (face-to-face, telephone and skype; see Appendix 6 - List of people interviewed);
- **Focus groups** - two focus groups in Kabul were carried out during the field visit to Afghanistan;
- **Site visits/observations** - projects were visited in and around Kabul, as well as in Herat, Jalalabad, and Kandahar.

Throughout the evaluation, all information was collected and recorded in line with the evaluation matrices. This means that the questionnaires were structured in line with the evaluation questions taking into account the specificity of the sector and the background of the interviewee. Given the relatively large number of evaluation questions and indicators, choices were made prior to the interviews on the most relevant questions to be asked. In this process, gaps in information could be identified and additional information was collected to fill the gaps.

At the project level, a project assessment form was elaborated for each selected project, including findings from the desk review and data collection in the field. The project assessment forms were also based on the evaluation questions and related evaluation matrices.

Sector reports were elaborated for the five main sectors, while also two additional reports were made on gender equality as a cross-cutting theme and on Kandahar. The five draft sector reports included the project assessment forms for all selected projects. In the finalization process, the sector reports have been turned into appendices and the project assessment forms are considered as internal working documents.

In the design and implementation of the evaluation, due attention was paid to contribution analysis as Canada was in most cases not the single donor of projects and programs, but contributed to multi-donor programs. Contribution analysis, as defined by John Mayne in ‘Contribution analysis: Coming of age?, Evaluation, 2012 18: 270, relies on a systematic analysis as a way of making credible claims about results achieved. This type of analysis requires a developed theory of change where assumptions and external factors are tested to confirm the results logic and this approach was followed in this evaluation. For each project, the evaluators aimed to analyse the contribution of Canada to the project both in monetary and non-monetary terms. In general, it is assumed that Canada contributed proportionally to the results in line with its monetary contribution. This assumption could be validated in most cases. In some cases, where Canada played a very active role in the policy dialogue and donor coordination, Canada's impact was greater than what could be expected on the basis of its monetary contribution. However, in other cases, Canada engaged less in policy dialogue and its contribution may have been smaller than what could be expected on the basis of its monetary contribution.

Once the data collection was completed and the data were coded in line with the evaluation matrices, all data was triangulated to the extent possible. When evidence was insufficient, no firm conclusions were formulated. Throughout the data analysis and quality assurance process, due attention was paid to
ensure that conclusions were based on sound and robust evidence, lessons were in line with the conclusions and recommendations were linked to the conclusions and lessons.

The sector reports served to inform the evaluation at program level. In addition, specific program level information was collected and analyzed, in particular related to the Whole of Government approach. In order to improve the readability of the final report, including the sector reports presented in Volume 2 of the Technical Report, the evaluation questions by evaluation criterion were clustered under the specific headings that were used as sub-titles in this report and the sector reports (See Table A2.2).

Data were collected and coded in line with the evaluation matrices at program and sector levels. In the data analysis process, data were triangulated in order to arrive at sound findings based on solid evidence.

### A6.4 Methodological challenges and limitations

Table A6.4 describes in more detail some of the challenges faced during this evaluation and the measures taken to mitigate their negative impact on the evaluation process and outcome.

**Table A6.9 Methodological challenges and mitigation measures**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Risk/ challenge</th>
<th>Mitigation measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>Missing documents, incomplete files</td>
<td>The evaluation team received approximately 2,000 documents from the Afghanistan Program throughout the evaluation process. Many versions of the same document were received, often without dates, making it challenging to determine the sequence of changes. The project portfolio information was complete from the beginning of the evaluation, although not all coding was done in a way that enabled clear analysis and, therefore, some recoding was required (see Appendix 5). Given the high profile nature of this Program, there was a certain amount of classified information that the evaluation team only gained access to once it had been declassified. This may have affected the quality of information as the declassification process often took time. In one case, some classified information became available to the evaluation team after an ‘access to information’ request. The Program did its best to provide access to documents and people, but faced limitations, which resulted in some delays in the transmission of documents to the evaluation team and hindered the efficiency of the process. All crucial documents appear to have been shared.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid turnover of staff and therefore lack of institutional memory</td>
<td>A large number of staff was involved in the Afghanistan Program throughout the evaluation period. Turnover of Canadian staff based in Kabul and Kandahar was relatively high, which was the case for most countries and not specific to Canada. With some delay, the evaluation team was able to collect names and contact details of relevant staff (xCIDA, xDFAIT, Canadian Forces, Department of National Defense), and a large number of interviews were scheduled (see Appendix 4). The fact that CIDA provided access to various staff involved at different times and in more than one role during the evaluation period contributed positively to institutional memory and enabled learning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance to evaluation</td>
<td>The team met only limited resistance to the evaluation. The Program, the main stakeholder in the evaluation, facilitated the evaluation to the extent possible. It is clear that they sought to learn lessons, and draw meaningful conclusions that would benefit their work. Most stakeholders were willing to cooperate in the evaluation, as reflected in the extensive list of interviewees (Appendix 4). Some resistance from certain stakeholders related to time constraints, which</td>
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<td>Risk/ challenge</td>
<td>Mitigation measures</td>
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<td>were overcome by reaching clear agreements on timing. Several interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the opportunity to reflect upon their work during the interview and to take some distance from their hectic daily operations. However, other interviewees expressed some frustration with the fact that they had been interviewed before for 'lessons learnt' exercises, but no lessons learnt were ever presented to them as these exercises were internal.</td>
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| “Fishbowl effect” | The team also encountered some cases of the so-called, “fishbowl effect”, where there was a clear desire to stress the positive results. The team has mitigated this risk through the use of open and transparent communication methods and through the triangulation of evidence from multiple sources, including a large number of interlocutors and field visits. The evaluation team prepared detailed response sheets providing replies to each comment on draft sector reports and the draft technical report, indicating whether and how comments were addressed. |

| Data availability | The evaluation team was very well aware of data availability challenges in Afghanistan, where the pressure to show short-term results and ensure visibility hindered the establishment of useful baselines and, ultimately, impeded the measurement of long-term effects. This problem was recognized and a certain number of new surveys and evaluation reports became available during the evaluation period and were used as sources of information. Nevertheless, there was an important absence of reliable information – particularly for certain provinces - that could not be entirely overcome. |

| Problematic security situation in Afghanistan | The consultants were aware that they needed to plan with security in mind and ensure that alternative plans were ready in the event that there was a need to mitigate identified or emerging security risks. The consultants liaised closely with the Canadian Program Support Unit (CPSU) in the planning of field work in Afghanistan - in particular, the visits to project sites outside of Kabul: Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad. Only one planned visit to the province of Bamyan was cancelled due to weather conditions. |

| Separate Dahla Dam / Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation (AIRP) project evaluation | Since CIDA had commissioned an independent review of the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation signature project (AIRP), it was agreed that this summative Program evaluation would rely on the findings from that project evaluation in order to avoid duplication. Findings, conclusions and lessons learned from the project evaluation were to be incorporated into this summative evaluation. It was agreed that evaluation methodologies and matrices used by both evaluations would be consistent and aligned. Despite substantial effort, this alignment was not realized. The project evaluation went ahead with very serious delays and the risks that were presented could not be sufficiently mitigated. Therefore, an alternative approach was developed to integrate findings on this important signature project in this Program evaluation on the basis of additional desk research and some data collection done by the program evaluation team. An appendix to the evaluation design was developed to address this and is presented in Appendix 2. |

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97 The fishbowl effect is referred to in the ‘Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, OECD DAC, 2008’ pointing at a highly politicised and often media-dense environment meaning that there is sometimes great public attention on, and correspondingly high stakes for, evaluators. When human suffering is high and donor contributions large and visible, the desire to see positive results can place additional pressures on evaluators and managers in the field.
A6.5 Phasing of the evaluation

Figure A6.10 Phasing of the evaluation

- **Evaluation preparation phase**: Evaluability study (2011-2012)
  - Evaluation preparation phase
  - Elaboration of Terms of Reference (2011 – 2012)
  - Tender procedure and contracting of the evaluation team (2012 – March 2013)

- **Evaluation design phase**: Kick-off meeting between the Development Evaluation Division and the team leader in Canada (April 2013)
  - Interviews main stakeholders Canada April 2013
  - Literature review – May-June 2013
  - Preliminary portfolio analysis May –June 2014
  - Scoping mission Kabul July 2013
  - Draft evaluation design and work plan July 2013
  - Final evaluation design and work plan October 2013

- **Data collection phase**: Interviews stakeholders Canada including face to face telephone and skype interviews September 2013 (see Annex 2, List of interviews);
  - Document review (see Annex 3, List of documents);
  - Field mission Afghanistan October – November 2013.

- **Data analysis and reporting phase**: Presentation of preliminary findings of the field mission to Embassy staff Kabul, Nov 7, 2013;
  - Presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions Evaluation Advisory Committee Ottawa, December 12th 2013;
  - Elaboration of draft sector and thematic reports based on triangulation of findings, review by the Development Evaluation Division, December 2013– Feb. 2014;
  - Draft final report including comments on sector reports, March 2014;
  - Revised final report to be presented to the Evaluation Committee in June 2014

- **Finalization of the Technical Report**
A6.6 Approach regarding the integration of findings on the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Program (AIRP) evaluation

The approach outlined in the evaluation design was to rely to an important extent on findings from the Dahla Dam/AIRP project evaluation that was commissioned by the Afghanistan Program. However, that approach could not be implemented for reasons briefly indicated in Table A6.9 above. Therefore, an alternative approach had to be developed.

The alternative approach developed for this main Signature project is based on desk research done for the summative evaluation in line with the main evaluation design, findings from interviews in Canada and Afghanistan, additional desk research and a few findings from the project evaluation on some key issues for which sufficient triangulated evidence was available on time.

This approach regarding the integration of findings on the Dahla Dam/AIRP project is comparable to the approach adopted for the other two Signature projects i.e. specific findings on these projects are presented either in the text or in specific text boxes related to the evaluation questions and the indicators defined in the evaluation matrices. Only the field work on the Dahla Dam was not explicitly focused on this Signature project, but it was also not ignored. Although it was expected that through the project evaluation substantial more information would become available than for the other projects of the sample, this expectation could not be fulfilled, but the coverage of the Dahla Dam is comparable to the other projects of the evaluation sample.

A6.7 Organization of the evaluation

The roles and responsibilities of the main actors in the summative evaluation are explained below.

Development Evaluation Division
The Development Evaluation Division was ultimately responsible for oversight of the design, implementation and dissemination of the evaluation. The Development Evaluation Division is the Technical Authority as indicated in the ToR, providing oversight, coordinating review processes and approving all deliverables. As a decision was taken in June 2014 to use the final report produced by Ecorys as the technical report, the Development Evaluation Division was also responsible for producing the final synthesis report.

Consultant
The Consultant was responsible for the detailed evaluation design, work plan, implementation of the evaluation and preparation of the final report according to high quality standards as indicated in the ToR.

Evaluation Advisory Committee
The Evaluation Advisory Committee acted as a consultative body providing guidance and recommendations to the Technical Authority. The Evaluation Advisory Committee was chaired by the Director General responsible for managing the Development Evaluation Division and included participants from the Afghanistan Development Program, stakeholders from other branches of DFATD, and the Department of National Defence. The Evaluation Advisory Committee provided comments on all deliverables.
Evaluation Peer Reviewer
An independent evaluation expert was brought in as an external evaluation peer reviewer, and was responsible for providing additional quality assurance throughout the evaluation process, including comments on all deliverables.

Departmental Development Evaluation Committee
The Development Evaluation Committee, with a majority of external members, is responsible for quality assurance of evaluation reports. This report was presented as technical report to the Development Evaluation Committee, whose members provided comments that were integrated in the final version of this report. The Committee will also be responsible for the quality assurance of the final synthesis report and will decide whether or not to recommend it for approval by the Deputy Minister of International Development.

Evaluation Team
The division of responsibilities within the evaluation team was as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anneke Slob</td>
<td>Team Leader/Expert Advisor on Synthesis Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandra Cancedda</td>
<td>Gender equality and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yvan Conoir</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josef Decosas</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadijah Fancy</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Gijsberts</td>
<td>Economic growth and portfolio analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anette Wenderoth</td>
<td>Policy analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7 List of documents

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• World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2012, May 2012;
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• World Health Organization. Polio vaccine coverage database (obtained 4 November 2013);

In addition:
• Blogs, websites, articles in newspapers on Afghanistan and Canada’s role in Afghanistan;
• Project documents on all projects of the evaluation sample;
• Internal correspondence, e-mails, letters, aide-memoires, etc.
Appendix 8 List of people interviewed

A8.1 Ministry and Government Officials in Afghanistan

M Qarizada, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance

Ameen Habibi, Director General for Strategic Policy Implementation, Ministry of Finance

Mustafa Aria, Director Aid Management Division, Ministry of Finance

Ghulam Mustafa Safi, Aid Coordination Specialist, Ministry of Finance

Abdul Raheem Daud “Rahimi”, Program Manager National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Muneer Ahmad Barmak, Head, Program Management Support Unit, NABDP, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Ghulam Rasoul W. Rasouli, Director of Operations, National Solidarity Program (NSP), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Jovitta Thomas, Operations Adviser, NSP, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Mamoon Khawar, Donor Relations Manager NSP, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Noor Mohammed Arzoie, Head of Aid Coordination Unit, Ministry of Public Health

Sadia Fayeq Ayubi, Director of Reproductive Health, Ministry of Public Health

Tawab Hashemi, Health Specialist, Ministry of Public Health

Yousufzai Khoshrav, Head of Monitoring / M&E Directorate, Ministry of Public Health

Jalili Ab Maruf, Head of Evaluation / M&E Directorate, Ministry of Public Health

Mohammad Taufiq Mashal, General Director of Preventive Medicine, Ministry of Public Health

Shahla Rahmani, Provincial Polio Communication Officer, Ministry of Public Health

Abdul Salam Rasooly, EPI Manager, Eastern Region, Ministry of Public Health

Baz Mohammad Shirzad, Director of Health, Nangahar Province, Ministry of Public Health

Shukrullah Shakiv, M&E Consultant/ Gavi/ M&E Directorate, Ministry of Public Health

Musli Waheedullah, M&E Officer / Global Fund / M&E Directorate, Ministry of Public Health

Habibi Wahidullah, Chief of Paediatrics, Nangahar Regional Hospital

Kameen Wali, HMIS Officer, Nangahar province, Ministry of Public Health

Sayed Ahmad, Provincial Liaison Officer, CBE Unit. Ministry of Education

Multan Alingari, Team Leader, CBE Unit, Ministry of Education
Jalaudin Atayee, Manager for Research and Evaluation, Ministry of Education
Hamida Nizami, Director of Basic and Secondary Education, Ministry of Education
Mohammad Rahman Rahimi, Technical Advisor, CBE Unit, Ministry of Education
Abdul Haq Rahmati, Director of Academic Affairs, Ministry of Education
Khalil ur Rahman Rahmani, Provincial Liaison Officer, CBE Unit, Ministry of Education
Khowaja Mohammad Sediqi, Technical Advisor, CBE Unit, Ministry of Education
Razia Stanikzai, Senior Manager, Pre-Service Training, Ministry of Education
Arian Wassay, Director, Ministry of Education
Susan Wardak, Senior Policy Advisory & General Director of Teacher Education, Ministry of Education
Saadatullah Zaheer, Technical Advisor, CBE Unit, Ministry of Education
Fareshta Akhgar, Community Mobiliser, EQUIP, Ministry of Education
Amri Basir, EQUIP EMIS Director, Ministry of Education
Abdul Jabbar Hazim, Provincial Social Mobiliser Supervisor, EQUIP, Ministry of Education
Seddiq Weera, EQUIP Director. Ministry of Education
Qaderi Salehi, Herat, EQUIP Director, Ministry of Education
Zia Ahmad Ahmadi, CRS Education Project Manager, Herat Teacher Training College
Wahida Baburi, CRS Education Project Officer, Herat Teacher Training College
Katy Cantrell, Head of Office, Herat Teacher Training College
Haji Ghawsoddin, CRS Education Project, Injil District Coordinator, Herat Teacher Training College
Gholam Hazrat Tanha, Director, Herat Teacher Training College
Farida Hancuzai, Principal, Dalai Girls’ School, Jalalabad
Mojgan Mustafavi, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Women Affairs
Mohamed Sediq Rashid, Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
Aziz Ahmad Khaled, Provincial Director of Education Kandahar
Dr. Abdul Quyoom (Pokhla), Provincial Health Director Kandahar
Dr. Qassam, Ex-provincial council member, Kandahar
M. Eshan Noorzai, Chairman Kandahar Provincial Council
Mohammed Omar Satai, Head of Joint Secretariat of Kandahar Peace Committee
Parwiz Najeeb, Chief of staff, for Kandahar Governor Office

Prof. Tooryalai Wesa, Governor of Kandahar

Rafiullah Rawan and staff, Director AICB- Kandahar office

Eng. Sher Mohammad, Director, Arghandab River Sub-basin Agency

Abdul Sattar “Baryalai and staff, Director, LKRO - Loy Kandahar Reconstruction Organisation, Kandahar

Saidullah Saeed, Financial manager, SHAO - Social and Humanitarian Assistance Organization, Kandahar

Muhammed Yaqub Sulliman, Regional Manager, Southern Region MRRD / NABDP office, Kandahar

Ehsanullah Ehsan and staff, Director, Kandahar Institute of Modern Studies of Afghan Learning and Development Organisation

A8.2 Development Partners

Joji Tokeshi, Country Director ADB

Mark Bailey, Counsellor – Development, AusAid

Semin Qasmi, Senior Program Manager, AusAid

Andrew Leigh, Deputy Head of Office DFID

Olivier Rousse, Director ECHO Afghanistan

Rocco Busco, Anna Stege, Dr Habib, EU Delegation, Team Leader Agriculture & Rural Development, Political Advisor, and Health Advisor

Katja Weigelt, Development Counsellor, Embassy of Germany

Chiara Fonghini, Program Manager, Italian Development Cooperation Office, Kabul

Azzurra Chiarini Gender and Human Rights officer, Italian Development Cooperation Office, Kabul

Kenicho Masamaoto, Counsellor Embassy of Japan

Laetitia van Asch, Head of Development Cooperation, Netherlands Embassy

Nasrin Hoseini, Program Manager, Education and Gender (Second Secretary), Embassy of Sweden

Dr. Ken Yamashita, Director Program Coordination, Embassy of the USA

Sarah Wines, Deputy Mission Director, USAID

Edward P. Heartney, Deputy Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs

Charles Swagman, Mark Michell and Allister Starr, Head USAID Kandahar and staff

Charles V. Drilling, Director Office of Economic Growth and Infrastructure, USAID
Michael Nehrbass, Deputy Director, Office of Economic Growth and Infrastructure, USAID

Freeman Daniels, Stabilization Liaison Officer, USAID

Mohammad Faiz, Acting Health Team Leader, USAID

Christopher Steel, Education and Youth Development Officer, Office of Social Sector Development, USAID

A8.3 United Nations

Aidan O’Leary, Head OCHA

Arnhild Spence, Deputy Head OCHA

Cindy Issac, Kabul Region Coordinator, OCHA Afghanistan

Shoaib Timory, Assistant Country Director, Sub-National Governance and Development Unit, UNDP

Amiri Atiqullah, Reports Officer, UNICEF

Khadija Bahram, Education Officer, Curriculum UNICEF

Catherine Panji Chamdimba, Education Specialist (CFS), UNICEF

Carmen Garrigos, Chief of Polio Eradication Unit, UNICEF

Zulfikur Ali Khan, Programme Specialist - GPE Education, UNICEF

Amina Mohammed, Chief of Field Office, UNICEF

Bo Shack, UNHCR Afghanistan Representative

Abigail Hartley, United Nations Mine Action Service

Pamela Hussain, UN Women

Rik Peeperkorn, Representative WHO

Mohammad Akram Hussain, Head of Eastern Region Office, WHO

Arshad Quddus, Team Leader PEI Afghanistan, WHO

Mehmet Akif Saatcioglu, Deputy Team Leader PEI Afghanistan, WHO

Djordje Vdovic, P4P Coordinator, WFP

Keiko Izushi, Head of Donors Relations, WFP

Marcus Prior, Deputy Head, WFP

Shafiq Yari, Programme Officer, WFP

Bob Saum, World Bank Country Director
Ditte Fallesen, Dolly Aziz and Sara Azimi, ARTF Operations Officer and staff, World Bank

A8.4 Non Governmental Organisations

Rafiullah Rawan, Kandahar office, AICB

Sima Samar, Chair AIHRC

Mohd Shafiq Nour, AIHRC - Head of Special Investigations Team, AIHRC

Qaiss Bawari, AIHRC – monitoring and investigation unit officer, AIHRC

Erik Bentzen, Director, Education, AKF Afghanistan

Farzana Bardal, National Coordinator, Education Programme, AKF Afghanistan

Khoban Kochai, National Coordinator, Health Program, AKF Afghanistan

Mohammad Dauod Khuram, National Manager, Health Program, AKF Afghanistan

Tanya Salewski, Program Manager, AKF Afghanistan

Hasina Safi, Director, Afghan Women Network

Palwasha Hassan, Founder, Afghan Women Network

Amanul Haque Chowdhury, Manager, Programme Development, BRAC

Fatema, Provincial Manager, BRAC

Golab, Provincial Manager, BRAC

Gulbuddin, Provincial Liaison Officer, BRAC

Mahbubul Kabir, Coordinator BRAC International Research for Asian Countries, Sr. Research Fellow, Research and Evaluation Division

Abdul Qdaer, Project Manager, BRAC

Abdul Quyyum, Programme Manager, BRAC

Rana, Masud, Provincial Director, BRAC

Suraiya, District Manager, BRAC

Richard Paterson, international programs director, Care Canada

Alain Lapierre, Former Humanitarian Assistance coordinator, Care Canada

Jessie Thomson, Humanitarian assistance coordinator, Care Canada

Karen Moore, Interim Director, Care Afghanistan

Abdul Ghafoor Latifi, Emergency Response Coordinator, Care Afghanistan
Delawaiz Sayeda, Programme Coordinator, Humanitarian Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, Care Afghanistan

Frozan Hahmana, Monitoring and Evaluation Senior Officer, Care Afghanistan

Khawani Rashed, Program Coordinator, Humanitarian Rural Assistance Program (HRAP), Care Afghanistan

Haqmal Munib, Department Manager, HRAP, Care Afghanistan

Drew Gilmour (through Skype), Development Works Inc.

Modaser Islami, Technical Coordinator, Human Resources Development Board

Wakil Ahmad Naji, Herat Provincial Education Manager, International Rescue Committee

Nirali Mehta, BEACON - Program Director, International Rescue Committee

Bahram Barzin, Director – Operations and Acting Managing Director, Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)

Shoshana Clark Stewart, Chief Executive, Turquoise Mountain

Abdul Wali, Chief Communication and Reporting Officer, Turquoise Mountain

Wazhma Frough, Women Peace and Security Research institute

A8.5 CIDA/ DFATD Development Headquarters Gatineau/ Ottawa

Adrian Walraven, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, based in Kabul, Kandahar and Ottawa

Andrew Scyner, Former Advisor KAF (Kandahar)

Anne Lavender, CIDA Kandahar 2010-2011

Bernard Etzinger, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, DG responsible for communications

Cheryl Urban, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force 2010-2011

Christie Skladany, Chief of staff CIDA Afghanistan Program 2011-2013

David Metcalfe, Director Kandahar Ops; Senior Director, Afghanistan, Geographic Programs Branch

Francoise Ducros, Vice President Afghanistan Task Force

Heather Cruden, CIDA Head of Aid Kabul, 2009-2011

Tracie Henriksen, Education Advisor, Ottawa

Ingrid Knutson, CIDA Head of Aid Kabul

James Melanson, CIDA Kandahar Director of Development (2009-2010) and DG of CIDA Afghanistan Program 2010-2011
Jean-Frédéric Beauchesne, CIDA Kandahar Senior Advisor Economic Growth 2008-2010, Senior advisor transition Afghanistan Task Force 2010-2011

John de Boer, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force Sector Lead Governance 2007-2011

Jonh Summerbell, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, Senior Analyst

Lara Romaniuc, Former Program Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance (HQ)

Lawrence Peck, Team leader CIDA Afghanistan Task Force and Program

Lucas Robinson, CIDA Kandahar

Maliha Dost, Former Program Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance (HQ)

Margaret Biggs, CIDA President (2008-2013)

Michael Collins, CIDA Afghanistan Task Force, Director of Management Services 2007-2012

Michael Koros, CIDA fragile states specialist

Mojaddedi, Abdullah, Education Advisor, Ottawa

Moreno Padilla, Senior Environmental Specialist, CIDA

Nipa Banerjee, CIDA Head of Aid Kabul 2003-2006

Nicolas Lacroix, Afghanistan Program

Robert Greenhill, CIDA President (2005-2008)

Sam Millar, Director Policy Afghanistan Task Force

Stephen Salewicz, Director, International Humanitarian Assistance

Stephen Wallace, Vice President Afghanistan Task Force, Vice-President Policy

Sudeep Bhattarai, Senior Health Specialist

Vincent Raiche, Governance officer, CIDA India, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan Programme 2004-2006
CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ 2007-2010

Viola Cassis, Former Program Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance (HQ)

Zoe Kahn, CIDA Kandahar

A8.6 Canadian Embassy Kabul and PRT Kandahar

Abdullah Mojaheddi, Governance officer CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ 2006

Alia Mirza, Gender focal point CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ and Kabul

Geneviève Bussière, First Secretary (Health)

Catherine Coleman, Governance officer CIDA Kabul 2011-2013
Laurie Clifford, Gender specialist (consultant) Afghanistan Task Force HQ and Kabul 2004-2006 and 2011

Caroline Delaney, Governance officer CIDA Kabul 2007-2009

Claude Desilets, Deputy Head of Cooperation

Nasir Ebrahimkhail, Senior Development Officer (Health)

Genevieve Gasser, Governance officer CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ 2007-2—8; 2011

Mohammad Iqbal Halimi, Education Officer. Kabul

Jennifer Heys, Deputy Head of Aid

Geeta Khosla, First Secretary Health (2008-09) at Canadian Embassy in Kabul

Deborah Lyons, Canadian Ambassador, 2013-

Jennifer Miles, Gender specialist CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ and Kabul 2009-2011

Crystal Procyshen, Head of Cooperation

Provencher, Marie-France, Former Health Sector Staff, Afghanistan Programme / Embassy (2009-2012)

Alison Riddle, Former First Secretary - Health at Embassy of Canada, Kabul (2010-11)

Jeea Saraswati (phone interview), Gender specialist CIDA Afghanistan Task Force HQ 2007-2008


Taslim Madhani, First secretary Embassy of Canada (Development)

Suzanne Quinn, Governance officer CIDA HQ and Kabul 2008-2011

Sue Wiebe, Senior Education Officer, Kabul

Ben Rowswell, Deputy Head of Mission in Kabul, ROCK in Kandahar

Elissa Golberg, Executive Director Manley Panel, ROCK 2008-2009, DG START

Ron Hoffman, Ambassador Kabul and Deputy Head of Mission Kabul

Shelley Whiting, Deputy Head of Mission Kabul, A/Ambassador Kabul

A8.6 DND and CF

Bernd Horn, Security and Defence Consultant

Dr Howard Coombs, Special Advisor to the Commander

A8.7 PCO

David Mulroney, PCO and Secretary Manley Report
Fayaz Manji, PCO

**A8.8 Canadian Program Support Unit - Kabul**

Director
Education Advisor
Health Advisor
Humanitarian Advisor
Gender advisor
Development officer Governance and Human Rights
Field Monitor
Operations Manager
Mission Coordinator

**A8.9 Other**

Graeme Smith, Journalist and author
Janice Gross Stein, University of Toronto

**A8.10 Focus Groups**

Beneficiaries of the Kabul Widows Humanitarian Assistance project, Twelve Kabul Widows
Beneficiaries of theResponsive Fund for the Advancement of Women.

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98 The names of individuals working for the CPSU have been removed to protect their anonymity.
Appendix 9 Additional Policy and Portfolio Analysis

A 9.1 Strategic Frameworks

CIDA developed the following strategies and Results and Risk Management and Accountability Framework (RRMAFs) for the Afghanistan Program in which objectives, sector choices, aid modalities, aid channels and specific targets were defined:

- Interim Assistance Plan for Afghanistan, 2003-2005 (document not available);
- Results and Risk Management and Accountability Framework, 2004-2009;
- Afghanistan Program Logic Model and RRMAF, 2007-2011;
- Afghanistan Program Logic Model, 2008-2011;
- Results and Risk Management and Accountability Framework 2008-2011 (November 2010);
- Afghanistan Program Strategy 2011-2014;

A new Afghanistan Program strategy 2014-2017 was being prepared as of early 2014.

Across as well as within the noted phases, Afghanistan Development Program priorities changed. This is captured in Table A 9.1, which illustrates that while the sector priority labels changed, several of the sub-themes that were addressed remained the same.

Table A9.1 Priority sectors in the Afghanistan Program as per strategic documents and logic models

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Democratic development and effective government Building capacity and strengthening institutions Stabilization in</td>
<td>Governance Rule of law Democratic institutions and processes Public Administration Reform</td>
<td>Governance (National institutions and democratic development) Public Institutions Electoral processes</td>
<td>Human rights in particular women’s rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁰⁰ CIDA’s New Afghanistan Strategy (Interim Strategy 2006-2008). State building and stabilization were common cross cutting thrusts for all three sectors. A fourth area was supporting the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) which was renamed as priority “Democratic Development and Effective Governance” in May 2006.
¹⁰¹ Afghanistan Program Logic Model (2007-2011). i.e. following the 2007 review of the CIDA program but before the Manley report.
¹⁰² Afghanistan Program Logic Model (2008-2011) i.e. in response to the Manley report.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kandahar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Human Rights</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social and economic development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Basic services</strong></td>
<td><strong>Basic education and maternal, newborn, and child health</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource management Community-driven development&lt;sup&gt;104&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Enhancing the role of women and girls in society Education of women and girls Micro-loans Women’s rights Institution building</td>
<td>Social and economic development Gender Equality Private Sector Development Community-based infrastructure Economic governance Natural resources</td>
<td>Basic services Economic growth Community-based infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural livelihoods and Social protection Increased access to social services</td>
<td>Sustainable rural livelihoods&lt;sup&gt;105&lt;/sup&gt; Agriculture, livestock and horticulture support Micro-loans</td>
<td>Social and economic development Access to Health Access to Education</td>
<td>Basic services Access to Education Access to Health services&lt;sup&gt;106&lt;/sup&gt; Eradicate Polio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Human and physical safety (mine action/ mine risk education, resettlement)</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance Emergency assistance and preparedness Mine action</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Sector categories over time are not always fully comparable. Inclusion in the same rows indicates at least partial overlap similarities in the respective thematic areas of programming. There is a lack of information on the period 2003-2005 as regards whether and how specific projects supported during this period corresponded with the noted priority sectors.*

This table on CIDA’s priorities in combination with the portfolio analysis clearly indicates the following:

- The naming of the priorities changed considerably over time (e.g. wording on website versus in CIDA Plans and Priorities documents versus strategic documents and RRMAFs), as did the categorisation and groupings. For example, the challenge of demining and raising landmine awareness fell, at different times, under Security and Rule of Law (2003-2005), Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (2006-2007), Human Security (2007-2008), and Humanitarian Assistance (2008-2011);

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104 Originally community-driven development was included in Rural Livelihoods and Social Protection, but given the later classification this sub-sector was moved to Natural Resource Management.

105 The 2006-2008 Sustainable Rural Livelihoods included economic growth activities, some humanitarian activities and also some social services although they are not all exclusively mentioned. Given the later regrouping two main priorities one focussing exclusively on women and the other economic and social Sustainable Rural Livelihoods have been grouped together.

106 Focus on Eradicating Polio and therefore originally classified under Humanitarian assistance in the documents.

• There was also considerable change in how the different priority sectors were grouped (e.g. economic growth and social sectors were grouped together for some time in the category “Social and economic development”, humanitarian assistance was included in “Sustainable and rural livelihoods”).

These observations illustrate that most of the noted sectors constitute very broad concepts that capture a multitude of rather diverse sub-themes. Furthermore, the strategic documents provide very little information on the criteria and/or processes used to select and label sector and/or related thematic (or sub-thematic) priorities, or on how these priorities were used to inform decisions on specific projects/investments or on sector exit strategies. The documents do refer to alignment with priorities of the GIRoA and perceived comparative advantage of Canada in the priority sectors.

A 9.2 Portfolio analysis

The source of the portfolio information is DFATD’s CFO Statistics Branch and the dataset has been generated from the system on 18 April 2013. Information related to fiscal year 2012-2013 is preliminary. All calculations performed by the evaluation team are based on information contained in the dataset listing the 310 initiatives that form the portfolio of the Afghanistan program. Figures exclude imputed long-term institutional support to multilateral organizations.

During the data analysis process a series of minor corrections have been made with regard to the coding and the definitions used in the dataset. Which each revision, the changes made in the dataset have been duly recorded in a special “changes” tab. For example, the KLIP program was originally classified as private sector development in relation to the principal sector of focus. It has been re-classified as multi-sector. The dataset also listed three NABDP initiatives, of which one was implemented by the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association. The title of this $3.1 million project was subsequently changed to Nationalization of Legal Aid Services, after checking the project codes in the CIDA database. Other changes made by the evaluation team relate to the classification of aid channels and the Kandahar focus of projects. No changes have been made with regard to the gender coding used by CIDA.

With regard to the disbursement data it needs to be realized that the data relate to payments made in a given fiscal year. The majority of projects or initiatives record multi-year payments. Taking into account the long evaluation horizon (total of 9 Fiscal Years) and the large numbers of sectors (7), trends in disbursements per sector give a good overall indication of changes in priorities in line with changes in the strategic thrust of the program.
The top ten projects with highest disbursements are the following:

Table A9.2 Top Ten Projects - Afghanistan Program, 2004/05 to 2012/13, in million $

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Focus</th>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>No. of Initiatives</th>
<th>Executing Agency</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Disbursement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other/Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Recurrent cost window</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>World Bank - ARTF</td>
<td>2004-2013</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic governance*</td>
<td>National Solidarity Program (NSP)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>World Bank - ARTF</td>
<td>2004 - 2010</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security</td>
<td>Mine Action Program Afghanistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>World Bank - ARTF</td>
<td>2004 - 2010</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>World Bank – ARTF</td>
<td>2007 - ongoing</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>WFP Appeals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
<td>various years</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Global Polio Eradication Initiative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>WHO and UNICEF</td>
<td>2006 - ongoing</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>Dahla Dam/ Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SNC Lavalin International/</td>
<td>2008 - 2012</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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108 Fiscal year 2012-2013 information is preliminary

109 Signature Projects
### Sector of Focus | Name of Project | No. of Initiatives | Executing Agency | Period | Total Disbursement |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic(^{10}) governance</td>
<td>National Area Based Development Program (NABDP)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2004 - 2011</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Girls Education Support Program (GESP)(^{11})</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BRAC and AKF</td>
<td>2006 - 2013</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of these projects are either implemented through the UN or via ARTF, with the exception of the Dahla Dam signature project implemented by the private sector and the Girls education Support Program implemented by NGOs. It is therefore not surprising that the International Financial Institutions and the United Nations Agencies are the two most important aid channels, each representing 38% of all disbursements. The International Financial Institutions include all ARTF funding via the World Bank.

### A9.3 Aid Channels

Figure A9.2 presents the main aid channels used by the Afghanistan Program during the entire evaluation period.

**Figure A9.2 Total disbursements by type of executing agency, 2004-05 to 2012-13**

![Pie chart showing aid channels](chart)

When the use of aid channels is analyzed over the evaluation period, a clear pattern emerges, as illustrated in Figure A7.3 In 2004-05 to 2007-08, more than 90% of all disbursements were channelled via the World Bank/ARTF (and a very small proportion of other international financial institutions) or the UN, and the share of the private sector and civil society partners were minimal.

\(^{10}\) In the portfolio NSP and NABDP are classified under Democratic Governance as main sectors of focus, while in practice these are multisector projects.

\(^{11}\) These two projects do not constitute a unified program, but cover the same theme and focus on Community Based Education - one project implemented by BRAC and another by AKF.
This drastically changed from 2008-09 onwards when civil society and private sector became more important partners. However, the share of private sector funding declined again from 2011-12, which is related to the Canadian transition away from the economic growth sector. In 2012-13, civil society became the most important aid channel for the first time with 37% of total disbursements.112

Figure A9.3 Aid channels by type of executing agency, 2004-05 to 2012-13, per year

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112 Annual disbursements by type of executing agency presented in the portfolio differ depending on whether they relate to contracts, frontloaded grants or other, agreements and are not always a monetary representation of the particular weight of priorities in that given year. Nevertheless, trends in disbursements per aid channel give a good overall indication of changes in aid channels over the evaluation period. See appendix 5 for more details.
The following figures present a further breakdown of disbursements over the aid channels:

**Figure A9.4 Aid channels by type of Executing Agency, 2004-05 to 2011-13 per year in %**

![Aid channels by type of Executing Agency](image1)

**Figure A9.5 Comparison disbursements between UN and international financial institutions, per year in %**

![Comparison disbursements between UN and international financial institutions](image2)
**A9.4 Sectors of Focus**

The following figures show the division in Principal DAC Sector codes per Principal Sector of Focus:

**Figure A9.6 Disbursements per UN agency, per year in %**

![Disbursements per UN agency, per year in %](chart1)

**Figure A9.7 Democratic Governance using DAC sector codes**

![Democratic Governance using DAC sector codes](chart2)
Figure A9.8 Economic Growth using DAC sector codes

Figure A9.9 Education using DAC sector codes
Figure A9.10 Health using DAC sector codes

- Infectious disease control: 59%
- Health policy and administrative management: 12%
- Basic health infrastructure: 6%
- Tuberculosis control: 11%
- Reproductive health care: 6%
- Other: 6%

Figure A9.11 Emergency assistance using DAC sector codes

- Emergency food aid: 57%
- Material relief assistance and services: 15%
- Input required: 6%
- Relief coordination; protection and support services: 8%
- Other: 14%
A9.5 Gender coding

An overview of the gender coding of the Afghanistan Program portfolio provides a first indication of the extent to which gender equality was considered in programming. The coding specifies whether a project was designed based on a gender analysis and whether gender equality results were consistently included in its intervention logic.¹¹³

Figure A9.13 Gender coding Afghanistan Program 2004-05 to 2012-13

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¹¹³ The gender coding was based on an ex-ante analysis and did not take into account actual results (see 4.2.3).
Appendix 10 Donor Disbursements to Afghanistan 2002-2011 (million US $), excluding multilaterals and excluding USA

Appendix 11 Management Response

Overarching Comments on the Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program (Fiscal years 2004-2005 to 2012-2013)

1. This summative evaluation is a strategic milestone for the Afghanistan Development Program. The Afghanistan Development Program is cognizant of the significance of this evaluation exercise for Canada, our development partners, the Government of Afghanistan, and the international community. The evaluation findings offer the opportunity to share lessons learned with the international donor community, while adapting to new realities in Afghanistan over the years ahead as Afghanistan enters its self-declared Transformation Decade (2015-2024).

2. The Program recognizes the complexity and magnitude of this evaluation exercise spanning nine fiscal years, and the good work delivered by the Evaluation Team. The Afghanistan Development Program agrees with the report’s conclusions, and acknowledges that over the period of the evaluation, the contextual environment for planning and implementing a development assistance program in Afghanistan within an international military mission was of the highest order of complexity and insecurity. While CIDA had limited expertise working in this context, the Program developed skills and innovative approaches over time to better support Afghan and international efforts aimed at establishing the conditions that lead to generating sustainable development.

3. The evaluation affirms that Canada is recognized as a main development partner of Afghanistan and effectively participated as a member of the international community in policy dialogue with the Afghan government, and that the Program contributed to both short term and long term results that led to real improvements in the lives of Afghans.

4. The evaluation presents areas where the Program should direct its focus on gender equality and human rights, and that promote synergies across and within sectors, while continuing to build upon policy dialogue, planning and programming efforts with strong leadership and support to the government to achieve concrete goals.

5. The evaluation also helps inform the next phase of the Afghanistan Program over the coming years. Through this exercise, the Program has drawn upon key findings, lessons learned, and recommendations that will help shape the Afghanistan Development Program Strategy over the 2014-2019 period.

6. Canada’s announced commitment to Afghanistan of $227 million over 2014-2017 will build on areas where the Program has demonstrated leadership and experience, and where there is a strong basis for continued development assistance and results, namely in education, health, capacity building for disaster risk reduction and advancing the rights and empowerment of women and girls.
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<td>Recommendation 1</td>
<td><strong>Establish an institutional mechanism to capture lessons learned from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to better inform future Canadian engagement in fragile states.</strong>&lt;br&gt;Partially Agree:&lt;br&gt;The Department agrees that it is important to ensure that lessons learned in one challenging context are understood and applied as appropriate in other situations. Rather than establish a stand-alone institutional mechanism focussed on lessons learned from Afghanistan, the Department’s preference is to use established channels to achieve this objective, including relevant departmental governance committees such as Program Committee, missions in the field (which retain locally-engaged staff with a wealth of knowledge), and key departmental bureaux. In terms of fragile states policy, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) Bureau is the department’s focal point and, as part of its ongoing role, facilitates dialogue on fragile states policy and applies lessons learned to future engagements in situations requiring an extraordinary Canadian response. The ADM, International Security and Political Affairs also has a dedicated role in coordinating whole-of-DFATD and whole-of-government integrated responses to major crises, bringing together, as appropriate, security, defence, development and diplomatic policy and programming responses, and building on lessons learned.</td>
<td>ADM IFM</td>
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<td>Recommendation 2</td>
<td><strong>Develop a vision for Canada’s future engagement in Afghanistan, taking lessons from the implementation of the Whole of Government approach into account.</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Afghanistan Development Program agrees with this recommendation.&lt;br&gt;While the Program certainly agrees with the Whole-of-Government approach, the Government of Canada’s footprint in Afghanistan has been reduced to a few ministries. This includes the amalgamation of Canada’s development agency with the foreign affairs and trade ministry.&lt;br&gt;The Program will develop a Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019) in consultation with relevant partners and other government departments, and that takes into consideration:&lt;br&gt;• key lessons from the Summative Program Evaluation;&lt;br&gt;• the needs of the Government of Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs and alignment with Afghanistan’s Aid Management Policy and OECD-DAC policies;&lt;br&gt;• Canada’s renewed commitment for development assistance to Afghanistan</td>
<td>ADM Asia Pacific</td>
<td>The Program’s completed Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019) is approved by the Minister in 2015. Canada’s vision for its engagement in Afghanistan (2014-2019) is presented to the Afghan Ministry of Finance through the annual Development Coordination</td>
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<td>Recommendation 3: Governance</td>
<td>The crosscutting nature of governance should be further enhanced in the Afghanistan Program, including the strengthening of linkages between political dialogue and development policy dialogue with Afghan government partners. Programming decisions on the type of support to be provided—on-budget versus off-budget support—should be based on clear targets and directly linked to on-going political and policy dialogue.</td>
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<td>The Afghanistan Development Program agrees with this recommendation. The Program will: • continue to be the Department’s interlocutor with the Government of Afghanistan and the international donor committee on the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF); • consolidate linkages within the Department (political, consular, trade and development bureaus) to strengthen political engagement and development dialogue with the Afghan Government; • continue to engage with the international community and the Afghan Government on the refinement of the TMAF reform indicators and deliverables; • examine opportunities to strengthen linkages between Afghan government partners in the development of the Bilateral Country Development Strategy; • develop a toolkit on policy dialogue for the purpose of strengthening our Afghan partnerships across our sectors; • seek approval of an approach to incentivizing the performance of the Government of Afghanistan as per the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and in line with Canada’s 2012 renewed development assistance commitment for the 2014-17 period, and where possible, aligned with the</td>
<td>ADM Asia Pacific</td>
<td>On an ongoing basis, the Program will engage on the implementation of the TMAF, as determined by the Government of Afghanistan and in coordination with other international partners, as DFATD’s interlocutor with the Government of Afghanistan. On an annual basis, the program will</td>
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| Recommendation 4 | **Continue the focus on gender mainstreaming while adapting it to ensure improved responsiveness to socio-cultural values and principles, to the extent possible.**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | ADM Asia Pacific | The Program’s completed Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019) is approved by the Minister in 2015.  
The Program’s completed Women’s and Girls’ Rights and Empowerment Sector Strategy (2014-2019) is approved by the Program’s Senior  
The Afghanistan Development Program agrees with this recommendation.  
While the Program certainly agrees to continue with the focus on gender mainstreaming, it must be recognized that in Afghanistan, there is continued limited acceptance of women’s participation in the economic, social and political spheres of society. This limited acceptance is a barrier to effective gender mainstreaming.  
In the development of the Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019), the Program will use gender equality –with a focus on rights and empowerment of women and girls – as the “integrating factor” across the Program’s development assistance intervention areas. This will also entail the development of a sector-level logic model articulating our results commitments on initiatives supporting women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment.  
The Program, together with other partners, will explore innovative approaches |
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<td>Recommendation 5</td>
<td>For future investment in key sectors, ensure clear strategic direction, including a realistic risk analysis and robust risk mitigation strategy: The Afghanistan Development Program agrees with this recommendation. In the development of a Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019), the Program will develop sector strategies that take into consideration: • Canada’s proven experience in the sectors; • current commitments in the sectors; • implementation of gender equality with a focus on women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment as the “integrating factor”; • ensuring continuity for sustainability by remaining active, as much as possible, in Canada’s already identified niche areas of involvement; • leveraging the support of other donors or the Government of Afghanistan support across all sectors to maintain a focus toward sustainable results; • monitoring the evolution of the local context, along with other donors and partners, to enable adjustments to strategic planning and program implementation; and,</td>
<td>ADM Asia Pacific</td>
<td>The Program’s completed Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019) is approved by the Minister in 2015.</td>
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<p>| to adapt the objective of gender equality to the cultural reality of Afghanistan including the importance of engaging men, boys, women, girls, religious leaders and social authorities. New approaches will be based on comprehensive gender equality analysis to understand the gender dynamics, to develop applicable initiatives, and to mitigate the associated risks. To increase the Program’s Gender Equality (GE) components, regular GE training will be offered to staff at headquarters and in Kabul. | Director in September 2015. The Program’s completed Women’s and Girls’ Rights and Empowerment Sector Level Logic Model (2014-2019) is approved by the Program’s Senior Director in September 2015. Annual Gender Equality training is delivered to Program staff at headquarters and in Kabul on an ongoing basis. |</p>
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| Education – undertake the transition from a program focused primarily on access to education to one that also targets quality education with an increased focus on learning outcomes, and that facilitates students’ transition through different stages of education (for example, from community-based to formal education). | Specifically:  
**Education**: the sector strategy will continue to focus primarily on basic education, with a view of improving: access to education, quality of education, and the capacity of local systems to deliver education services. This effort will take into consideration:  
• Canada’s proven experience and current commitments;  
• recognizing the different needs and challenges faced by boys and girls for access and retention at school;  
• maintaining a balance between on-budget and off-budget support to the Ministry of Education;  
• supporting the transition of students from community-based to formal education where appropriate. | | The Program’s completed Education, Health, Women’s and Girls’ Rights and Empowerment, and Humanitarian Assistance Sector Strategies (2014-2019) are approved by the Program’s Senior Director in September 2015. |
| Health – strengthen program focus on the right to health, social equity and the objectives defined as part of Canada’s commitments to Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH). | **Health**: the sector strategy will focus on promoting women’s and girls’ rights through strategic investments aimed to improve their access to quality health services, in line with Canada’s continued international commitments in Maternal, Newborn and Child Health and the fight against polio, and take into consideration:  
• continue supporting targeted interventions with implementing organizations that have a positive track record in assisting health workers and facilities to increase access to quality health services, with a special focus on the strengthening of the health system at all levels, reducing the burden of preventable diseases such as polio, and improving the nutrition of mothers, newborns and children;  
• maintaining a balance between on-budget and off-budget support to the Ministry of Public Health. | | |
| Human Rights – strengthen the protection of human rights by increasing awareness and capacities on the part of the government and non- | **Human Rights**: the sector strategy will focus on leveraging the lessons learned from the Whole of Government experience and continue to refine and enhance an already operational strategic plan for Canada’s involvement in protecting and promoting human rights in Afghanistan, especially in the area of the rights and empowerment of women and girls, and will take into | | |

Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program 2004-2005 to 2012-2013
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| governmental actors through political and policy dialogue, and programming. | consideration:  
• support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) as a strategic part of Canada’s engagement in supporting human rights, with a focus on women’s and girls’ rights;  
• support initiatives at national and local levels to develop Afghan awareness and capacity for human rights, and complementarity in programming between the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and Afghan Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Organizations. | The Afghanistan Program’s | |
| Humanitarian Assistance – seek opportunities to further strengthen the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development while ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to be delivered in line with the principles of good humanitarian donorship. | **Humanitarian Assistance**: the sector strategy will focus on linking relief to recovery and development (LRRD), bridging the gap between the provision of emergency relief phase humanitarian assistance and to the short and longer term sustainable development phases, in consultation with DFATD’s International Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, that will take into consideration:  
• Canada’s proven experience in this sector and commitments;  
• the respective accountabilities of the Program and the Humanitarian Assistance Bureau so as to fully inform each other’s programming and planning;  
• seek opportunities for LRRD to be complementary to programming in the health and education sectors. | The Afghanistan Program’s | |
| In the context of developing and implementing the Bilateral Country Development Strategy (2014-2019), the Program will ensure its risk management and approaches through:  
• using various programming analytical tools such as needs/gap assessments, political economy analyses, conflict-impact and mapping assessments, and data and statistics collection available at the sector and program level as well as those developed by researchers, and/or those developed jointly with other donors and GirRoA partners;  
• taking lessons learned and best practices into consideration;  
• identifying a performance measurement strategy to form the basis of our monitoring and performance reporting to best demonstrate progress toward long term results on an ongoing basis for our stated commitments and outcomes, and adjusting as required to reflect changes in strategic policy or program direction; and | | | |

The Afghanistan Program’s Logic Model (2014-2019) and Program Level Performance Measurement Framework is aligned to DFATD’s strategic development priorities and completed in 2015 and approved by June 2015 by the Asia-Pacific Bureau’s Director General (Development).
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<td>• developing a Program level logic model and risk profile, and fully integrated sector level logic models and performance measurement frameworks. In addition, the Program will: • update the Program Risk Register and re-evaluate on the risk, risk ratings and risk mitigation strategies on a semi-annual basis or more frequently should circumstances dictate; • ensure thorough risk analysis for new projects across sectors, and review on an annual basis; • examine opportunities to support the Government of Afghanistan’s efforts to strengthen its statistical databases, systems and monitoring activities that will improve its oversight of its national programs, all of which would form the basis for impact evaluation.</td>
<td>assessment of risk through the Program-level Risk Register exercise is completed on an ongoing basis at twice-yearly intervals. DFATD risk assessments are completed for all new projects on an ongoing basis.</td>
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