This chapter examines implementation of the fifth principle of the Recommendation, which calls on Adherents to demonstrate accountability and transparency in risk-related decision making, and to continuously learn from past disasters. It tracks how governments provide access to risk information used in decision making, accountability frameworks related to managing the consequences of extreme events, and how they aim to continuously improve the management of disasters and crises.
Tracking Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks
Abstract
The 2017 Report highlighted three areas where Adherents should reinforce their implementation efforts concerning this Principle. The first area concerned making evidence used for risk management related decisions available, in particular access to data underlying disaster risk reduction policies, such as protective infrastructure and land use prescriptions. This is important to ensure affected stakeholders (such as landowners and exposed populations) may understand and, if needed, contest the evidence underlying policies and standards. Second, Adherents should undertake a risk governance review to identify innovative practices that improve the efficiency and/ or effectiveness of disaster risk and crisis management policies. Third, more Adherents should put in place systematic processes to learn from past events, near-miss events and similar risks encountered by different countries.
When asked in 2016, one-third the Respondents considered they had fully implemented the principle, slightly more than one half considered that they had partially implemented it, and the rest considered that they were taking steps in the direction of implementation.
VI. RECOMMENDS that Members [Adherents] demonstrate transparency and accountability in risk-related decision making by incorporating good governance practices and continuously learning from experience and science.
To this effect, Adherents should:
1. Ensure transparency regarding the information used to ensure risk management decisions are better accepted by stakeholders to facilitate policy implementation and limit reputational damage […].
2. Enhance government capacity to make the most of resources dedicated to public safety, national security, preparedness, and resilience […].
3. Continuously share knowledge, including lessons learned from previous events, research and science through post-event reviews, to evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and preparedness activities, as well as response and recovery operations […].
Source: (OECD, 2014[1])
In this context, transparency refers to openness of participation in policymaking processes, clear decision criteria, and access to data and information used in disaster risk and crisis management policy decisions. Transparency builds citizens’ trust in government decisions and increases public acceptance of disaster risk reduction policies. Sharing information with the research community enables experts to refine and deepen risk analysis, and thereby improve the scientific robustness of policy decisions. Open data informs stakeholder dialogues and thereby increases public trust and buy-in of risk management policy decisions. Public access to risk information also supports oversight mechanisms used to discern whether policies serve the public interest or present a conflict of interest.
These provisions of the Recommendation echo and reinforce the message of the OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance, which calls on Adherents to include transparency and participation in the regulatory process, to ensure that regulation serves the public interest and is informed by the legitimate needs of those interested in and affected by regulation.
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, access to information on the public health benefits of wearing masks aimed to overcome public resistance that had developed due to inconvenience, inconsistent public communication on effectiveness and the influence of mis/ disinformation. At least one study shows mask mandates link to a statistically significant decrease in new COVID-19 cases, deaths and the proportion of hospital admissions (Bundgaard et al., 2021[2]). Another study documents that mandates led to an increase in mask wearing of over 20% in geographically, culturally and politically diverse regions (Adjodah et al., 2021[3]). Access to and communication of this information was useful to defend mask mandates, which in turn increased public acceptance and possibly public health gains despite mask fatigue (Adjodah et al., 2021[3]).
Another example related to the COVID-19 pandemic concerned communication of and access to results of research into treatments and vaccines. In the COVID‑19 vaccine development process several companies published their clinical trial protocols, but the results of key trials were initially communicated in headlines and via press releases, with little detail, prompting speculation prior to publication and peer review about the underlying data. The rapid authorisations of vaccines were made mainly under emergency protocols, potentially creating questions whether the assessments involved less than usual rigour, or were based on preliminary or incomplete data. Since 2015, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) has instituted a policy of increasing transparency, publishing all clinical trial data submitted in pharmaceutical companies’ regulatory submissions and assessed by its Committee for Human Medicinal Products (CHMP). In addition, for each submission the EMA publishes a European public assessment report on its website, providing the CHMP assessment of the data. During the COVID‑19 crisis, regulatory authorities also instituted ’exceptional transparency’ measures in the assessment of COVID‑19 vaccines. For example, the EMA has published key documents following vaccine authorisation, including the complete version of the risk management plan and the vaccine clinical trial data reviewed in support of the authorisation (OECD, 2021[4]).
In addition to ensuring transparency of clinical trial data, it is critical to try to avoid, or where unavoidable, manage, conflicts of interest between the different parties (e.g. researchers, pharmaceutical companies, governments) involved in vaccine development, as well as to strengthen the independence of researchers through funding and oversight mechanisms that insulate them from political and economic pressures. The United States National Institutes of Health (NIH) maintains a database containing a registry of clinical trials where the public can access a list of clinical studies specifically related to COVID‑19. The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires scientists and organisations that provide inputs to their processes to disclose their revenue sources and funding (Bowers and Cohen, 2018[5]).
In addition, access and transparency of information is an important tool to boost public trust, which in turn helps enhance compliance with protective measures and counter mis/disinformation. Although further research is required on the link between the effectiveness of the risk governance model contained in the Recommendation and its relationship with trust in governments – notably through the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Government –, Respondents suggested a positive relationship between levels of trust in government and compliance with risk mitigation measures. Specifically, populations in countries with higher levels of trust in government are more likely to comply with government advice on protective behaviours, indicating the importance of building and maintaining trust in government to effectively mitigate critical risks. There is extensive evidence in the literature in support of this position (Bollyky et al., 2022[6]); (Apeti, 2022[7]); (Harris Ali, Wells and Rose, 2021[8]); (Badman et al., 2022[9]).
The OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions found that less than half of surveyed people in OECD countries have reasonable levels of confidence in their government’s preparedness for a future infectious disease. The Trust Survey also established a strong correlation between public confidence in pandemic preparedness, and trust in national governments. Conversely, Respondents indicated that those with lower levels of trust in government were found to be more susceptible to disinformation concerning government motives and competence, leading to decreased compliance with advice on protective behaviours (OECD, 2020[10]). The literature also supports this finding, with research pointing to a strong correlation between low levels of trust in science and heightened susceptibility to disinformation messaging (Roozenbeek et al., 2020[11]). This highlights the need for increased government communication on national strategies on governance of critical risks and to engage the public in crisis management exercises.
The OECD Recommendation on Open Government, highlights the role of open government as a catalyst for strengthening democracy and building citizens’ trust in public institutions. It calls on Adherents to “develop, adopt and implement open government strategies and initiatives that promote the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in designing and delivering public policies and services”. The principles of open government, and in particular the importance of transparency regarding the data and information used in disaster risk management decisions, is a key component of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Critical Risks. When surveyed on implementation of the Recommendation on Open Government, 26 out of 32 Respondents reported fostering trust in public institutions is the most prevalent policy objective of open government agendas.
Note: N=32.
Source: OECD Perception Survey for Delegates of the OECD Working Party on Open Government.
When asked only 8 out of 27 Respondents make the evidence used for assessment of critical risks available to the public at large; 11 answered ‘Partially’ and 6 answered ‘No’. These responses create the impression that implementation of this provision is low across Adherents, but responses to further questions provide more useful nuance. 17 out of 27 Respondents reported making risk information available to the private sector (in general) to enable them to better understand risks to their operations. When asked to specify what type of hazard or threat information is made available and to whom, and on what type of hazard or threat, the responses reveal a more positive result.
Respondents are more open with information on exposure to natural hazards than they are with information on technological accidents or terrorist threats, which is consistent with the 2016 survey results. Another finding that tracks the 2016 survey results is that more Adherents make information available to the general public than to critical infrastructure operators specifically. This difference may be explained by the responsibility of operators in many countries to conduct their own risk analyses for hazard exposures, accidents, and threats.
In 2016, the proportion of Respondents that shared information on terrorist threats with critical infrastructure operators was lower than for any other type of hazard or threat (17 / 36 Respondents), and in 2022 the proportion of Respondents has further decreased (9 / 27 Respondents). In a context of growing and novel forms of cyber and kinetic attacks on critical infrastructure, a decreasing prevalence of publicly available information to critical infrastructure operators on exposure to technological accidents, terrorist threats or cyber-attacks is noteworthy.
It is important to share information about critical risks in the ‘peace time’ before a crisis occurs. It is during this period that Adherents can build up a capital of trust. During the early, acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis, many public health measures designed to reduce spread of the virus encountered citizen non-compliance with stay-at-home orders, mask requirements and vaccination programmes. Governments shared risk information and data about characteristics of the virus, spread of the pandemic and the impacts of infections on a daily basis to reduce scepticism and distrust. These efforts might have inspired higher levels of confidence had governments shared publicly their assessments on the risk of human pandemic before the COVID-19 outbreak.
All but one Respondent had assessed human pandemic as a critical risk prior to the COVID-19 crisis. 21 out of 27 Respondents had assessed human influenza as a source of pandemic, 7 assessed a coronavirus pandemic and 9 assessed some other type of pandemic. When Respondents were asked, however, whether they had communicated their risk assessment of a human pandemic to different types of stakeholders, the results show more Respondents made this information available to government officials compared to stakeholders outside of government. Most Respondents made this information available to government officials such as elected parliamentarians and civil servants. 21 out of 27 Respondents indicated that officials across government were provided the results of human pandemic risk assessments, whereas only 11 out of 27 Respondents indicated that this information was communicated to the volunteer sector (See Figure 6.2).
A good example of transparency and trust building is found in Portugal, where a summary of the “National Risk Assessment” (NRA) must be made available as part of public consultation procedures for civil protection emergency plans. Citizens are invited to take part in the validation process for a period of at least 30 days. After approval, the responsible authorities communicate more detailed results of the NRA available to territorial levels by online platform or specific communication mechanisms.
Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks
The voluntary sector plays an important role in a whole of society approach to governance of critical risks. The expectations placed on it and the private sector in national pandemic preparedness plans, justify more efforts to provide them data and information on the likelihood and impacts of a pandemic, and critical risks more broadly. Although many Respondents had assessed the risk of human pandemic, several preparedness capabilities were developed to insufficient capacity to meet the intensity of the COVID-19 pandemic. Broader communication of the risk assessments on human pandemic might have led to questioning whether the assessments were underestimating impacts on public health and the economy.
The Recommendation calls on governments to foster an honest and realistic dialogue with the public about the nature of hazards and threats as well as the potential impacts and the cost-effectiveness of various mitigation, response, and recovery options. While a few Respondents make publicly available a national risk register that provides descriptions of critical risks in terms of likelihood and consequences, these documents generally do not provide information on the types of mitigation and recovery options available to a population.
Most Respondents report that publicly available risk registers report scenarios that inform development of appropriate emergency preparedness plans and capabilities, but without providing detail. Several national risk assessments have been produced since 2017, e.g. in Portugal and Iceland, which provide details on the methodology used to determine how the likelihood and impact of civil emergencies are assessed, and what types of risk management options are envisaged. These various initiatives involve a range of stakeholders from across government and are used to inform discussions on cross-government committees on civil protection planning and seasonal priorities.
Further, the Recommendation calls on Adherents to provide public access to risk information. As described below, several international initiatives have improved access to multi-hazard disaster loss data since 2017. However, most Respondents have not made it a priority to develop and make available national disaster loss data bases for multiple hazards. Good country case examples include the ‘Canadian Disaster Database’, which contains detailed disaster information on more than 1,000 natural, technological and conflict events (excluding war) that have happened since 1900 at home or abroad and that have directly affected Canadians. In Mexico, the National Centre for Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) makes information publicly available on the data used to develop risk assessments through the use of the National Risk Atlases. This innovative web-based tool integrates data on exposure and vulnerability from the federal, state and municipal levels of government (Government of Mexico, 2023[12]). The Risk Atlases are publicly available online, for authorities and the general population.
A number of Respondents reported loss databases on specific types of natural hazards, including Belgium, France, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain (see Box 6.2). Finland has a loss database for floods (Flood Loss Statistics database); Italy has loss databases for floods and earthquakes (FloodCat, RASDA, D.a.DO); and Greece has developed databases for earthquakes, forest fires and floods (GENCAT Database and GDAEK Building damage and costs assessments).
By tracking and monitoring disaster impacts at national and local levels these initiatives support efforts to benchmark the effectiveness of disaster risk management strategies. National level initiatives vary, however in terms of the hazards and threats covered, threshold impacts for qualifying events, and how comprehensively the national territory is covered. Overall, Adherents have faced a number of common challenges in such efforts, ranging from limited capacity to collect accurate data at local level, to no standard model for reporting losses, parallel efforts where separate data bases are developed for separate hazards, inability to avoid double counting for concurrent events, and difficulty to collect disaggregated data by age and disability. An open source, all-hazards disaster loss database covering the entirety of a national territory remains exceptional.
In Spain, the National Catalogue of Historical Floods (CNIH) was first developed in 1983. Drawing on this experience, the Catalogue of Earthquake Damage (CDTE) was developed in 2015 by the Spanish Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergency, National Geographic Institute and Insurance Compensation Consortium (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros) as a single database to reflect the damage caused by earthquakes in Spain. CDTE records the characteristics of earthquakes that impact upon the Spanish territory, even if the epicentre is outside Spain. It documents the causes, and human and material losses associated with the events (in relation to services, infrastructure, buildings, industries, etc.) as well as the state compensation pay-outs. The catalogue covers over 3,200 events in digital format.
In Slovenia a disaster loss database (AJDA) was established to inform state compensation for disaster losses to agricultural products, land, buildings, civil engineering facilities, animals, fixed and current assets, cultural property and loss of revenue from a holding. The database is fed using external sources of information on natural hazards and technological accidents, and regularly updated, for example in the case of cadastral data, prices for materials and repair costs.
Progress is most evident in several international initiatives such as the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (Guha-Sapir, Below and Hoyois, n.d.[13]), DesInventar (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, n.d.[14]) and eMARS, the Major Accident Reporting System, which facilitates the exchange of lessons learned from accidents and near misses involving dangerous substances in order to improve chemical accident prevention and mitigation of the potential consequences (see Box 3.43).
The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), operated by the Centre for research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain, Belgium, is a free and fully searchable database that contains worldwide data on the occurrence and impacts of over 20,000 natural hazards and technological accidents from 1900 to 2020. EM-DAT is intended to be used for vulnerability assessments and to help policymakers identify the most common disaster types in a given country and the associated impacts on human populations. Its methodology comprises clear impact threshold criteria for including or excluding events. These criteria help improve the overall consistency and quality data contained in EM-DAT, but they also result in undercounting a certain number of extreme events every year.
According to EM-DAT, there was a decrease in the number of disasters (658) caused by natural hazards and technological accidents between 2017-2022, compared to the period 2011-2016 (Guha-Sapir, Below and Hoyois, n.d.[13]). Comparing the same two periods, Adherents also suffered 349% more deaths from 2011- 2016, and 22% less in economic damages (more than USD 477 billions). These figures continue the trend of higher average economic damages and fewer deaths per disaster in OECD Member countries.
Reporting an event to eMARS is compulsory for European Union Member States when a Seveso establishment is involved, and the event meets the criteria for a ‘major accident’. For non-European Union Member States, reporting accidents to the eMARS database is voluntary. The information on the reported event is entered into eMARS directly by the official reporting authority of the country in which the event occurred. From 1979 to 2022, eMARS has published 38 major ‘Seveso tier’ accidents in OECD countries, a third of which occurred in two industries: plastic and rubber manufacture (8), and general chemicals manufacture (5). Four major accidents have been recorded since 2017, as well as two near misses and three ‘Other’ events.
Chemical accident reports from investigations can be powerful in raising awareness of potential failures that could cause major accidents in establishments using dangerous substances. They also provide the general public with access to accident information to aid local and national efforts to reduce chemical accident risks. Reports in eMARS are not intended to serve as instruments for passing judgement on individual companies or countries associated with an accident. The collaboration considers that a blame culture surrounding the database would greatly reduce the sharing of information. For this reason, companies’ names and locations are not identified in the database in order to maintain a focus on the value of the information in terms of lessons learned and to encourage complete and accurate reporting of what happened so that everyone can learn from it.
The Recommendation calls on Adherents to demonstrate accountability in risk-related decision making. Accountability involves efficient public expenditures and responsive service to the public’s needs. Responsible stewardship of public safety and security means both fulfilling disaster risk and crisis management duties and using public resources to their highest utility in accordance with principles for accountability and integrity. Risk management policies should be grounded in evidence that supports a rationale for trade-offs and possess clear objectives that can be continuously monitored to evaluate effectiveness.
In furtherance of rule of law, one aim is to hold decision makers accountable to service in the public interest, and disincentivise the pursuit of personal objectives. A second objective is to make the most of resources dedicated to public safety, national security, preparedness and resilience.
Respondents have implemented a mix of policy tools and practices to inform decisions, optimise resources, and ensure oversight such as decision support systems, quality assurance audits and open government platforms, as well as analytical frameworks governing resource allocation and personal accountability.
Fewer than half of Respondents, 12 out of 27, reported there is a body charged with ensuring accountability related to governance of critical risks. The extent to which disaster risk and crisis management authorities might be subject to different forms of general public accountability in the performance of their statutory duties and obligations as civil servants is unclear. In one Adherent, a special tribunal charged the Minister of Health with "endangering the lives of others" by initially downplaying the gravity of COVID-19. The charges were eventually dismissed by a higher-level court.
Among the 12 accountability bodies reported, not all possess authority to investigate fraud in disaster response, recovery, or reconstruction Yet, significant government transfers are made every year related to disaster recovery and reconstruction. In the United States, 975 tax and money laundering cases connected to COVID-19 fraud have been investigated three years after the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was passed. Alleged fraud in these cases totals $3.2 billion. These instances cover a wide spectrum of illegal activities, such as loans, credits, and payments gained fraudulently that were intended for employees, families, and small businesses. Of those cases, 236 people have received sentences for an average of 37 months in federal prison, and 458 people have been indicted for crimes they are accused of committing in connection with COVID-19. It has established the National Center for Disaster Fraud, a partnership between the federal government Department of Justice and various law enforcement and regulatory agencies, to advance the detection, prevention, investigation, and prosecution of fraud related to disasters.
The 12 Respondents that have established institutional mechanisms of accountability reported various forms of oversight and monitoring that might provide inspiration to those Adherents without one (see Figure 6.4). 10 out of 12 Respondents had established at least a parliamentary oversight committee or internal oversight body with the authorities needed to ensure accountability. For example, after the ‘Grenfell Tower Fire’ in 2017, the United Kingdom initiated a parliamentary inquiry in 2019, separate from the police investigation, with the objective to form an accurate picture of the causes and to determine which lessons can be drawn from it for prevention and mitigation efforts in the future (Box 6.4).
Respondents cited ‘Internal oversight bodies’ as the second most frequent organisational form of accountability (8 / 27 Respondents). In the United States, in addition to legislation on integrity and efficiency in government, the institutional leads for governance of critical risks (i.e., the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency) both have an Office of Inspector General (OIG) since 2002.
Audits and review mechanisms are also used to provide independent opinions and recommendations on the use of public resources for emergency preparedness and risk reduction measures. For example, in Latvia the State Audit Office assessed the civil protection and disaster management system in 2022, finding a chronic lack of funding for material reserves had led to capacity shortages that compromise disaster preparedness. Funding requests from the state budget for the provision of material reserves had not been allocated for four years, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, personal protective equipment and other necessary goods were procured using the capacity of the defence sector, instead of the mechanisms provided for in the system of civil protection and national material reserves (Latvijas Republikas Valsts kontrole, 2022[16]).
Only 4 out of 27 Respondents reported that external oversight bodies and specially appointed committees are organised for use to oversee accountability within government.
The Grenfell Tower disaster – United Kingdom
In 2017, a high-rise fire broke out in the 24-storey Grenfell Tower block of flats in West London. 72 people died, 70 more were injured and 223 escaped. A Parliamentary Inquiry was established to examine the building infrastructure and its modifications, the fire and safety measures and inspections, the management of the building, the communication with the inhabitants (including fire safety advice given to them), and the response of the central and local government. The Parliamentary Inquiry is ongoing and strives for maximum transparency, as shown by open access to documents related to the Inquiry on a public website. The Parliamentary Inquiry has established an open dialogue between public bodies, citizens, trade unions, the fire service, and commercial organisations. Through the inquiry the impacts of central housing infrastructure fire are better understood, which informs cost-benefit analysis of relevant risk reduction measures and the reinforcement of preparedness for such events.
Office of Inspector General – United States
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have an Office of Inspector General (OIG). OIG is led by an Inspector General appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. Its mission is to provide independent oversight and promote excellence, integrity, and accountability within DHS and FEMA. The OIG operates a hotline where DHS employees and others can report fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or other criminal or noncriminal misconduct. Among its fiscal year 2021 accomplishments, the OIG cites ‘Dollar Impact’ along three categories: Questioned Costs (98,260,816 USD), Funds Recovered / De-obligated (9,330,454 USD) and Recoveries, Fines, Restitution, Asset Forfeiture (21,332,995 USD), or a total of approximately 0.0026 of the 2021 DHS budget of nearly 50 billion USD.
Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks
When asked what the accountability bodies investigate and/ or focus their oversight on, Respondents most frequently pointed to failure to prepare adequately for emergencies, and failure to carry out a defined responsibility in emergency response. Investigations into failure to prevent or reduce disaster risks are relatively rare, though several Respondents reported the use of oversight or ombudsman bodies to promote good practices in disaster risk reduction and preparedness before a disaster or crisis. Prominent examples of investigations, however, include Mexico and Türkiye, which detained building contractors suspected of violating construction codes in connection with the collapse of buildings due to earthquakes in 2017 and 2023, respectively.
Further, accountability bodies possess relatively weak powers related to responsibilities for management of critical risks. When asked, Respondents indicated they possess powers such as issuing advisory reports or issuing directives to government bodies, though they do not necessarily face any penalty for ignoring them. Only 6 Respondents noted that they may convene formal enquiries and subpoena witnesses; only 5 Respondents refer complaints to administrative, civil, or criminal courts; and only 1 Respondent noted the power to issue a fine to an agency. Without authority to issue stronger accountability measures the organisations in place might not serve a strong incentive for risk and crisis management decisions to meet their responsibilities and serve the public interest.
Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks
Respondents were asked whether their government evaluates the effectiveness of measures for critical risk prevention, preparedness, response, or recovery. 19 out of 27 Respondents reported they evaluate the effectiveness of emergency response capabilities, 17 out of 27 evaluate pre-event prevention measures and 15 out of 27 evaluate preparedness measures. Only 13 out of 26 Respondents evaluate recovery measures after a disaster occurs (see Figure 6.5).
Spain provides a good example of annual policy evaluations at every stage of the disaster risk management cycle and publishes its results in an annual National Security Report for the Joint Commission on National Security (See Box 3.45). In other cases, the scope of evaluations covers only responsibilities conferred by specific legislation.
In Korea, an index to evaluate public safety performance was established to raise safety awareness among the public and to incentivise performance amongst safety and emergency managers. The ‘Local Safety Index’ is a quantitative composite indicator based on data collected from local governments on fire, traffic accidents, crimes, general safety, suicide rates, and infectious diseases. The scores determine the grade of each region (provinces, metropolitan cities, etc.), with the “safest” regions being Grade 1. This system encourages local governments to take responsibility and accountability in the safety of their jurisdictions by announcing the safety level of each region. The system enables local governments to assess their safety levels and devise and implement customised safety policies.
Evaluations provide critical tools to support real-time sharing of lessons on what is working, what is not, what could work and for whom. Despite the significant time and resource constraints that they were facing at the height of the COVID-19 crisis, governments understood this need to draw lessons from their policy responses to the pandemic. By April 2021, most OECD countries had already conducted evaluations on each of the key stages of the risk management cycle: preparedness, crisis management, and response and recovery (OECD, 2022[19]). Many evaluations came to similar conclusions: pandemic preparedness was generally insufficient, actions to mitigate the economic and financial effects of the pandemic required careful monitoring of longer-term budgetary costs, and public trust requires government transparency, not only through frequent and targeted crisis communication, but by engaging stakeholders and the public in risk-related decision-making.
Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks
In Spain, the Annual National Security Report 2021 (its ninth edition) reported the COVID-19 pandemic was continuing to have an impact on practically all areas of national security and on the daily lives of citizens. The Report acknowledged increased cybersecurity challenges linked to the massive transfer of activities and organisations to the virtual environment. All ministerial departments and the National Intelligence Centre participated in the preparation of the Report, co-ordinated by the Department of National Security of the Cabinet of the Presidency of the Government. The report analyses the context and environment of national security in Spain, provides a repository of information on the main challenges faced and the actions undertaken to address them. The Annual Report is structured according to fifteen areas of National Security. The Joint Committee on National Security, a standing parliamentary committee, is briefed on the National Security Strategy and its revisions. The National Security Strategy calls for the elaboration of Strategic Sectoral Plans (SSPs) to be approved by the National Commission for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure.
The Recommendation calls on Adherents to continuously improve disaster risk and crisis management policies through development of scientific knowledge, including lessons learned from previous events, and through post-event reviews, to evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and preparedness activities, as well as response and recovery operations. This risk governance function is distinct from accountability described above. Its aim is not to incentivise behaviour through structured oversight, but rather to incorporate findings from events and research into improved preparedness and resilience planning.
In the aftermath of a major disaster or crisis, community leaders, victim’s associations, industry groups, labour organisations and civil society often demand policy changes that can prevent repetition and / or strengthen preparedness for a similar event in future. Aside from the COVID-19 pandemic, 18 out of 26 Respondents indicated that their country had experienced an additional crisis with significant national impacts within the past five years. When asked, 15 out of 27 Respondents answered they had conducted a post-disaster review of risk management policies for such crises. This indicates a slightly less prevalent implementation across Respondents than in 2016 (26 / 36 Respondents), despite the fact more disasters occurred on average between 2017-2022 than in 2014-2016.
Respondents reported using various mechanisms to formalise lessons learned and structure continual improvement, including ad hoc post-disaster reports and performance evaluations written by lead ministries or agencies, oversight bodies or outside experts; official commissions established by statute to carry out post-disaster reviews; recurring seasonal reviews for extreme hazard events; recurring reviews of legislation; and peer reviews by intergovernmental organisations.
In Japan, the Basic Act on Disaster Management (BADM), the foundation of all pre-and post-disaster management efforts, calls for revisions to be made if necessary, based on lessons learned from disaster responses. In particular, recent revisions have been made to improve plans on evacuation of vulnerable populations such as the elderly and disabled. In the United Kingdom the government has a legal obligation every five years to conduct a post-implementation review of the Civil Contingencies Act, which sets out the framework for emergency preparedness (Cabinet Office, 2022[22]).
The conduct of emergency exercises is the most prevalent practice across Respondents for learning lessons and incorporating findings into improved disaster risk and crisis management plans and policies. Exercises enable emergency services to evaluate capacity in specific capabilities and are instructive for design of new routines, changes to emergency planning assumptions, assessment of digital tools and skills development. This practice, however, tends to focus on identifying strengths and weaknesses in capacities for preparedness and response capabilities, and does not link strongly to prevention and recovery policy reforms.
When asked, 20 out of 27 Respondents reported that they had reviewed pandemic preparedness plans prior to COVID-19 as a result of infectious disease epidemics and outbreaks such as MERS, Zika and Ebola. Korea presents a good example of using lessons learned from past crises to enact policy reforms and invest in future pandemic preparedness (OECD, 2020[23]) (see Box 3.46).
The Republic of Korea built on its experience and lessons learned from the MERS-CoV outbreaks in 2015 to formulate forty-eight policy reforms that enabled it to quickly flatten the epidemic curve for infections of SARS-CoV-2 in March and August 2020. Korea did not close businesses, issue stay-at-home orders, or implement many of the containment measures adopted by most other OECD Members, until late 2020. This successful outcome is linked to guidelines it had developed after the MERS-CoV outbreaks on comprehensive testing, contact tracing, and supporting citizens in quarantine to make compliance easier. Overall, the reforms resulted in vast improvement across three phases of the epidemic preparedness and response framework: detection, containment, and treatment.
Detection: Korea built innovative, high-capacity screening facilities and worked closely with the private sector to ensure supply of tests from the onset of the pandemic. By November 2020 Korea had approximately 600 screening and testing centres, sufficient to service ˃1:100,000 population, and 150 diagnostic laboratories with capacity reaching 110,000 daily tests.
Containment: support for infected patients in quarantine or isolation increased compliance, and traced contacts with unusual thoroughness. Hundreds of epidemiological intelligence officers were deployed to conduct tracing and used a wide variety of data sources, including credit card transactions and closed-circuit television footage.
Treatment: The health system capacity surged to meet demand in sites of large infection clusters in March 2020. An additional 2,400 health workers were recruited in Daegu alone. Across the country, the government restructured the hospital system, built temporary hospitals to increase capacity, and addressed shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) through centralised government purchasing. In addition to a well-functioning national health insurance system, with ample human resources and infrastructure, constructive relationships between key institutions enabled a decisive response to the pandemic.
In several countries reviews take place on a regular basis. In some cases, these reviews are hazard specific, as in Greece, where a process is organised every year to draw lessons learned on the previous fire season. In Belgium, a review takes place after every emergency. Depending on the type of event, a competent authority examines which procedures worked well and where there is room for improvement. The points for improvement from the assessment are addressed in the appropriate emergency and contingency plans. In the event of large-scale emergencies at federal level, Parliament may decide to appoint a commission of enquiry to investigate how the crisis was managed and issue recommendations for system improvements. The Federal Parliament of Belgium set up commissions of enquiry after the Brussels terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 (La Chambre des représentants de Belgique, 2017[26]) – see Box 3.47) and a special commission during the COVID-19 pandemic (La Chambre des représentants de Belgique, 2021[27]).
In other countries such in-depth reviews and evaluation reports might take place after an unexpected or particularly destructive event, for example following severe weather and flooding events in Ireland in 2017-2018 (Department of Housing Local Government and Heritage, 2021[28]), large-scale wildfires in Sweden in 2018 (MSB, 2019[29]), and a quick clay disaster in Norway in 2020, which all led to in-depth reviews. In Luxembourg, the COVID-19 pandemic led it to request OECD to evaluate its risk preparedness, crisis management and the implementation of policies in health, education, economy, and labour (OECD, 2022[19]). In Portugal, after the massive forest fires in 2017, a detailed evaluation of the wildfire risk management policies was conducted, and eventually led to a new Rural Fire Integrated Management System (AGIF, 2019[30]).
In Sweden, the Swedish civil contingencies agency (MSB) was directed to evaluate the incident response of a deadly terrorist attack in 2017 involving a truck that was used to kill five people and injure 14 more. MSB published its detailed assessment of how the attack was handled and the impact of incident response management on society (MSB, 2018[31]). Information about the incident had spread quickly through traditional and social media, including dissemination of rumours. Among the detailed recommendations focus was given on how to improve information flows and address the propagation of misinformation during a crisis.
In the United States a large-scale lessons learnt process concerned the concurrent, complex series of hurricanes and massive wildfires events during 2017-2018 (FEMA, 2018[32]). In the United Kingdom, the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) system, overseen by the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) team, is used to capture and share lessons identified from exercises and operations. Through JOL the Home Office and Cabinet Office collates, validates, and promulgates lessons from both local and national emergencies (JESIP, 2023[33]).
Australia established a Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements in response to the extreme bushfire season of 2019-20, which resulted in unprecedented destruction of wildlife and environmental resources, as well as lost lives (Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020[34]). Under the Royal Commissions Act 1902, these bodies have powers to issue summons to appear before a Commission at a hearing to give evidence or to produce documents specified in the summons; to require witnesses to take an oath or give an affirmation; and to require a person to deliver documents to the Commission at a specified place and time. A person served with a summons or a notice to produce documents must comply with that requirement, or face prosecution for an offence. The penalty for conviction upon such an offence is a fine of AUS $1,000 or six months imprisonment. A Royal Commission may authorise the Australian Federal Police to execute search warrants. The final Bushfire Commission report contained 80 recommendations spanning topics that included, but went beyond, the full range of preparedness, prevention, response and recovery issues. Likewise, in New Zealand a Royal Commission of Inquiry may be established to investigate and report on specific events (see Box 3.47).
Korea suffered a deadly ferry accident in 2014, in which 304 persons died. The incident raised calls for closer collaboration between central ministries, stronger disaster management capacities of local governments, and improved crisis management capacities of the private sector and civil society. The Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety was revised to designate the Ministry of Internal Security as the overseer of the co-ordination of disaster and safety management related matters. Under FAMDS, the Prime Minister can assume this role and serve as Chairperson of the Central Safety Management Committee (SMC) in the event of large-scale disasters prescribed by a Presidential Decree.
In Belgium, in addition to evaluations of emergencies conducted by competent authorities, the House of Representatives may exercise its right of inquiry under Art. 56 of the Belgian Constitution. After the terrorist attacks at Brussels Airport Zaventem and the Brussel’s metro station Maelbeek on 22nd March 2016, a Parliamentary investigation committee was set up, separate from the criminal investigation, and considered victim accounts through hearings, on-the-spot observations, examination of judicial and administrative dossiers and expert opinions. The composition, inquiry period, and terms of reference for such committees must be defined in a proposal for establishment. The Committee has a wide range of powers and possibilities: hearing and confronting witnesses, making on-the-spot findings, establishing international contacts, consulting judicial and administrative files, requesting the assistance of experts, inspections, request the assistance of experts. When the investigating commission meets in camera, the members are bound by a duty of confidentiality. The investigation commission delivers a report that is made available to the public.
The Committee objectives for the terrorist attacks were to identify responsibilities and issue recommendations to adapt legislation to reduce risks and reinforce resilience. At the centre of the investigation committee were the emergency responses (first responder services and emergency planning), assistance to the victims (closely linked to emergency responses, focusing on the victim hearings), security architecture (operation, regulations, and procedures of security services), and radicalism (forms of violence directly related to religious radicalism). The Committee consulted with France, which had been previously hit by radical Islamic-related terrorist attacks in 2015, for exchange and co-operation.
New Zealand launched a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain, which occurred on 15 March 2019. The scope and purpose of the inquiry were defined in its Terms of Reference and included “whether public sector agencies were at fault in respects relevant to the terrorist attack” and recommendations for the future.
Between April 2019 and September 2020, the Commission held more than 400 meetings with affected communities, survivors and witnesses, community organisations and individuals, public sector agencies, integrity agencies, local government, members of Parliament, experts, academics, and international representatives. It issued more than 47 summonses to current and former public sector employees to appear and provide their evidence under oath or affirmation. New Zealanders were invited to answer three open-ended questions respectively on their communities’ safety, on government agencies’ safety actions, and on steps to prevent a similar incident from occurring again. Respondents were also allowed to provide any comment on issues related to the Commission’s Terms of Reference. It received 1,123 submissions from individuals (including researchers and academics) and 45 from organisations.
The Commission met with New Zealand’s intelligence and security and law enforcement counterparts, as well as foreign academics and experts to compare experience. In the final report, the Commission offered recommendations in four key areas: Improving New Zealand’s counter-terrorism effort; improving the firearms licensing system; supporting the ongoing recovery needs of affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack; and improving New Zealand’s response to its increasingly diverse population. The report also made specific recommendations for effective implementation and made a case for a whole of society and whole of government effort in making New Zealand safer.
The report was presented to New Zealand’s Governor General on 26 November 2020. The New Zealand Government accepted the findings of the report and agreed in principle to its 44 recommendations. A programme of work is underway to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission.
Three Adherents (Morocco, Kazakhstan and Colombia) have undertaken an OECD led peer review on risk management policies since 2017, and two Adherents (Portugal and Tunisia) undertook peer reviews led by the European Commission in which OECD advised on the methodology used and participated in fact finding missions.
The peer reviews have supported tangible institutional and policy reforms. Morocco has been vigilant in following-up the recommendations contained in the OECD peer review of its risk management policies, developing a programme of work within the Morocco Country Programme to strengthen its disaster risk management capabilities. Portugal used recommendations contained in the peer review report on risk communication, the development of early warning system in Seveso establishments, and protection of cultural heritage to update its National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for 2021-2030.
Each of the above-cited post-disaster reviews mentioned in this chapter describes specific learning points on how to make improvements in preparedness, prevention, response and / or recovery phases of disasters or crises. The most prevalent theme covered in lessons learned reports concerned response capabilities: e.g., rescue operations, response management, co-ordination between local and central government services, civil-military co-operation, and media management. Relatively few post-disaster lessons learned reports address disaster recovery and reconstruction.
Adherents have engaged with international expert bodies and civil society organisations to facilitate transboundary dissemination of the experiences and good practices they learned from managing the COVID-19 crisis. For example, Japan and the Netherlands play a key role in the High-level Experts and Leaders Panel on Water and Disasters (HELP), which published the ‘Guiding Principles to Build Resilient Post-Corona World -Towards building a more resilient and adaptive post-corona society’ (HELP, 2021[166]).
When asked what the results of post-disaster reviews are used for, 14 out of 27 Respondents answered the design of revised emergency preparedness plans. Only 11 out of 27 Respondents reported making the results of the evaluation available to the public (compared to 21 / 34 in 2016), and even fewer, 9 out of 27 Respondents, track progress against fulfilling recommendations from the reviews reports over time. These findings indicate that even though numerous Respondents conduct post-disaster reviews, and some use the results to change emergency plans, relatively few Respondents are open about the results of reviews or use them to reform policies.
When asked during follow-up interviews, numerous Respondents noted that pandemic preparedness has been, or will be, comprehensively studied following the COVID-19 crisis. In some cases, plans for such reviews had been delayed to focus attention of ministries on Russia’s war against Ukraine. One risk of concurrent or consecutive crises is insufficient capacity to collect, analyse and initiate reforms informed by policy relevant lessons from the antecedent event.
Several Respondents also noted that their country lacked an institutionalised mechanism that could respond to opportunities for improvements to critical risk management strategy and policy. This finding is itself a key learning point that could be the basis of policy improvement. The wide ranging and severe economic and social impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic justify the establishment of lesson learned process in every Adherent to gather evidence on reasons for lack of preparedness, examine dereliction of duties, and propose policy changes.
Implementation of the fifth principle has progressed across most Respondents in several key provisions, yet specific gaps are lagging behind and require significant attention.
Many Respondents provide sufficient information about critical risks to raise public awareness about what should be done in case various shock events occur. However, they generally do not enable citizens to question or contribute to the evidence about risks that underpins public policies. Generally, risk analysis about human pandemics was available to government agencies before the COVID-19 pandemic, yet the information was not shared with private sector and voluntary organisations, despite their important role in pandemic response plans. More efforts are needed to increase the transparency of evidence behind policy decisions concerning management of critical risks.
Overall, accountability for decisions concerning management of critical risks is quite low. Most Respondents implicitly resort to political accountability through democratic elections rather than make use of administrative and legal procedures to ensure responsibilities are met. Few Respondents have established an executive body with formal responsibility for oversight and accountability of public officials related to governance of critical risks. Where such bodies have been established, they generally focus investigations on failure to adequately prepare or respond to emergencies. The powers of accountability bodies are limited to such soft measures as issuance of advisory reports and directives issued to government bodies, rather than authority to levy fines or administrative sanctions. The use of non-government bodies, expert commissions or public hearings as an accountability mechanism is very rare.
Increased attention should be given in evaluations to effectiveness of recovery measures given the significant government transfers involved, especially following the unprecedented amounts transferred as part of COVID-19 recovery and resilience plans.
Implementation of mechanisms to draw lessons from past disasters or crises is widespread, however more Adherents could publish the findings of such processes and use ensuing recommendations to inform policy reforms. Adherents could enhance transparency, accountability and continuous learning based on lessons from past events, by establishing a public body with powers to gather evidence of disaster damages and to investigate their causes, examine dereliction of duties, and propose policy changes. Such structured, institutional processes for identifying lessons learned, backed by consistent support for research, would facilitate change to policies and not just operational performance.
Few Adherents have undertaken peer reviews of risk governance frameworks and policies since 2017 despite funded opportunities to do so. Peer review is a useful tool to identify innovative practices found in other Adherents, and to stimulate reflection on policy reforms, adoption of best practices and innovative tools in risk governance. Adherents should make more widespread use of offers by international organisations to conduct peer reviews.
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