Tracking Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks

2. Risk governance – an all-hazards and transboundary approach

Abstract

This chapter reviews how Adherents build preparedness for critical risks through risk anticipation measures including strategic foresight and risk assessment frameworks. It examines the extent to which forward looking analysis informs preparedness planning, prioritisation and investment decisions across government.

The analysis finds that most Adherents have established national risk assessments that adopt an all hazards perspective and provide strategic insight into risks of national significance. These tools have improved awareness of exposure and vulnerability, particularly for multi-risk scenarios. However, their use in guiding preparedness measures, resource allocation and public investment remains uneven. Foresight and horizon scanning capacities are underdeveloped in many countries, and remain weakly connected to operational decision making.

The first principle of the Recommendation calls upon Adherents to establish a comprehensive, all-hazards, transboundary approach to the governance of critical risks. The Recommendation invites Adherents to set-up a national strategy that clarifies roles, defines goals and sets priorities for measures to manage critical risks.

The institutional models for management of critical risks vary across Adherents, because responsibilities for risk assessment, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and reconstruction are dispersed across multiple institutional actors and jurisdictions. The first principle calls for a risk governance framework built around cross government co-ordination that aligns and facilitates execution of measures to manage critical risks. This chapter examines how Adherents have fostered such co-ordinated actions across government and beyond the traditional disaster management actors, to integrate multiple-stakeholders into a whole of society approach that is comprehensive, preserves societal values, balances stakeholder interests, and maximises opportunities for individuals.

Adherents often attribute roles and responsibilities for certain aspects of managing critical risks to sub-national levels of government. This chapter also considers what Adherents have done to address the challenges of co-ordination, overlaps in authority and gaps in capacity that decentralisation of risk ownership can lead to.

Finally, a whole-of-society approach to governance of critical risks also requires partnering with the private and voluntary sectors. Adherents should strive for clear division of responsibilities between the institutions involved, but also these non-government stakeholders, while ensuring that they have the necessary capabilities and capacities needed for addressing the scale of critical risks.

When asked in 2016, slightly over half the Respondents considered they had fully implemented the first principle, and the rest considered that they had partially implemented it.

Box 2.1. Establishing an all-hazards and transboundary approach to country risk governance

II. RECOMMENDS that Members [Adherents] establish and promote a comprehensive, all-hazards and transboundary approach to country risk governance to serve as the foundation for enhancing national resilience and responsiveness. To this effect Members [Adherents] should:

1. Develop a national strategy for the governance of critical risks […];

2. Assign leadership at the national level to drive policy implementation, connect policy agendas and align competing priorities across ministries and between central and local government […];

3. Engage all government actors at national and sub-national levels, to co-ordinate a range of stakeholders in inclusive policymaking processes […];

4. Establish partnerships with the private sector to achieve responsiveness and shared responsibilities aligned with the national strategy.

Source: (OECD, 2014[1])

Developing national strategies for the governance of critical risks

National risk governance strategies set forth how a society as a whole can deliver an agreed vision of who does what, across government and its various levels, the private and voluntary sectors, to identify, assess and manage all types of critical risks. The Recommendation calls on Adherents to clarify roles for the management of the full country portfolio of critical risks, and identify who is responsible for taking actions to protect citizens and assets; adopt an all-hazards approach; and set goals and priorities for each phase of the risk management cycle. These important national planning documents aim to bring clarity to a complex division of labour between many departments and agencies with responsibility for policies and practical measures across the disaster risk and crisis management cycles of risk assessment, risk reduction, preparedness, response and recovery.

Nearly all Respondents (23 / 27) provided a link to a policy document or piece of legislation they consider to be a national strategy on governance of critical risks. All but one Respondent reported having reviewed and expanded their national strategy since 2016, which indicates both how quickly this policy topic can evolve and the overall readiness of Respondents to adapt.

Three Respondents who had answered in 2016 that they did not have a national strategy on governance of critical risks, reported in 2022 that they had adopted one since, namely: Germany (see Box 3.2), Greece (National Crisis Management Mechanism and Risk Management), and Portugal (the National Strategy for Preventive Civil Protection 2030). One of the most recent OECD Members, Costa Rica, has also established a national strategy fulfilling many provisions of the Recommendation (see Box 3.3).

Box 2.2. Recent national strategy for governance of critical risks

Amongst the recently devised and revised national strategies on governance of critical risks, Germany stands out for covering nearly all the major elements called for by the Recommendation.

The “German Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters” takes a multi-hazard approach and considers all phases of the disaster risk management cycle, i.e. prevention, preparedness, recovery and reconstruction according to the “build back better” approach. The Federal Government formulates measures along five fields of action in order to counteract the effects of a wide variety of critical risks:

• Understanding disaster risk

• Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

• Investing in disaster risk reduction resilience

• Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

• International co-operation

These actions go hand-in-hand with the responsibility of being able to maintain and restore critical services for society, as well as a transformative process to reduce existing risks and prevent the emergence of new risks. The “Resilience Strategy” is the first time Germany takes a holistic view of strengthening resilience to disasters. It specifically aims to ‘strengthen disaster risk governance’ as one of five action areas. In this respect it aims to clarify interfaces to related topics such as climate adaptation and promote the coherence or interaction of all relevant policy areas for strengthening the resilience of society as a whole. It focuses on establishing which stakeholders must work even more closely together, how they can do so and which planning-related and regulatory principles should form the basis of such collaboration.

Source: (Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (BMI), Germany, 2022[2])

Several trends emerge from an analysis of the 23 national strategies on governance of critical risks. Generally, the revisions adopted by Respondents to their national strategies since 2016 have brought each into closer alignment with expectations of the Recommendation. The following trends in revisions reflect an on-going and explicit shift to place commensurate importance on disaster risk reduction and response capabilities. First, they give added visibility and emphasis to prevention efforts such as raising public awareness of critical risks. Second, they call for strengthening capability to quantify disaster losses and processes for analysing such data to inform and improve policies. Third, they call for strengthening co-ordination between government agencies and the private sector, academia and scientific research and development communities to design better informed resilience measures.

Many Respondents now state as a goal the enhancement of critical infrastructure resilience or the narrower mission of critical infrastructure protection. The difference between the two for most Respondents consists in an emphasis in resilience measures to foster continuity of functionality across interconnected networks, as distinct from physical security or protection measures for a single sector of infrastructure assets against hazards and attacks.

Several updated national strategies include topics that are not covered or not strongly emphasised in the Recommendation, as they were not as well understood or prevalent across so many Adherents at the time of adoption of the Recommendation. Recent themes added to national strategies include, for example, the impacts of mis/disinformation on the management of critical risks and strengthening the resilience of supply for essential goods and services.

The Recommendation calls for national strategies to further several risk governance functions, for example: to clarify roles and responsibilities for management of critical risks; to identify core capabilities; to set forth goals and define priorities for each phase of the disaster risk management cycle, and ensure these priorities are integrated into the policies and programmes of departments and agencies. Figure 2.1 presents an aggregate view of how many national strategies differentiate and attribute these roles.

When asked, 23 out of 27 Respondents reported their national strategy adopts an all-hazards and threats approach, i.e. it integrates analysis on the full range of natural hazards, terrorist attacks, pandemics, cyberattacks, etc. into an overarching framework for planning and response for risks of national significance. The perceived advantage of an all-hazards approach is relative cost effectiveness compared to hazard specific planning. Sufficient similarities exist between various critical risk scenarios that governments should development generic capabilities to manage most disaster planning needs, irrespective of the hazard type.

Figure 2.1. Characteristics of national strategies on governance of critical risks

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on Governance of Critical Risks

When asked, 18 out of 27 Respondents use their national strategy to clarify institutional roles for the management of critical risks. However, only 12 out of 27 of national strategies clarify the expected roles of non-government stakeholders in various phases of the disaster risk management cycle. Clarifying institutional roles is fundamental, but there is high potential for gaps in risk ownership, and overlaps of function, when relevant actors from outside government do not have a defined place in a national strategy.

Further, only 14 out of 27 Respondents reported that they set forth goals for the main phases of the disaster risk management cycle, define priorities and ensure central government departments and agencies integrate these into policies and programmes. A good case example is found in Canada where the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Emergency Management Strategy Interim Action Plan (2021-2022) outlines short-term plans and implementation outcomes under these five priority areas (Government of Canada - Public Safety Canada, 2022[3]). The lack of established goals and priorities indicates these Respondents are missing a common vision of what is to be achieved for their countries through disaster risk management measures and, in a context of limited resources, what risk management measures should take precedence. Clear statements of purpose and priorities would strengthen accountability of relevant public authorities by providing broad criteria to guide monitoring and evaluation.

Box 2.3. Recent national strategy for governance of critical risks

Costa Rica has established a fifteen-year ‘National Policy on Risk Management 2016-2030’, and three year ‘National Risk Management Plan’, which are administered by the National Commission for Risk Prevention and Emergency Response (CNE), the lead institution for disaster risk management. CNE supports implementation of priorities set forth in the ‘National Policy’ and ‘Plan’ through the ‘National Risk Management System’, comprising relations, programmes and resources of state institutions, the private sector and civil society organisations on risk management.

The National Policy is structured around three cross-cutting goals (risk reduction, preparedness and response, and recovery) and five main thematic axes: building resilience and social inclusion, participation and devolution for risk management; education, knowledge management and innovation; financial investment, infrastructure, and services and planning; mechanisms and policy instruments for risk reduction. Each axis includes public policy challenges, strategic objectives, expected results, indicators and guidelines for the fulfilment of this National Policy.

In Greece, Law 4662/2020 introduced a single structure for disaster risk management, the National Crises and Hazard Management Mechanism, comprising three parts: the civil protection system, volunteering in civil protection and disaster risk management, and the National Fire Service. This mechanism covers all phases of the disaster risk management cycle and lays out the necessary actions, procedures and projects at the local and national level to improve and reinforce resilience to critical risks. The law provides for the first time a legal basis for the establishment of the National Hazard, Threat, and Disaster Loss Database (under development), which aims to support planning and allocation of resources in emergencies and the appropriate and necessary levels of preparedness and response. Further, the new law focuses on reducing existing weaknesses, such as overlaps, conflicts and structural difficulties, by reinforcing and improving co-ordination and co-operation at all levels between stakeholders, starting with policies for prevention and culminating in recovery.

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risk; (Comisión Nacional de Prevención de Riesgos y Atención de Emergencias (CNE), 2015[4])

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to identify and designate ‘core capabilities’ in their national strategies, which it defines as human and technical means to accomplish a mission, function or objective that is necessary to achieve national preparedness and resilience goals. No two emergencies or disasters are identical, but in each situation, regardless of cause, the generic capabilities and skills that first responders need to manage injuries or deaths, property damage and environmental contamination are broadly similar. As the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates, shock events also produce second order effects such disruption of supply chains for essential goods and services, or overloading the capacity of health care services. Core capabilities are key to manage both the direct and indirect consequences. They may comprise human capital, equipment, financial resources and administrative capacities needed to ensure the last line of defence, i.e. to rescue people, protect property and restore lifelines and livelihoods.

Despite taking an all-hazards and threats approach, only 15 out of 27 Respondents reported having identified core capabilities required to preserve public safety against the harmful impacts of critical risks. This finding indicates that even though the national strategies of Respondents generally take an all-hazards approach, many do not leverage some of the main risk governance benefits of doing so, i.e., that the country will likely be able to mobilise most of the skills and equipment needed to manage consequences of extreme events that were not anticipated.

Notable country case examples of identifying core capabilities are found in the United States and Canada. In the United States, the ‘National Preparedness Goal’ identifies five mission areas (prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery) and 32 core capabilities that address the greatest risks to the nation.

In Canada, the ‘Core Capabilities List’ identifies and defines core capabilities linked to Capability-Based Planning, an evidence-informed process for reducing risk and building resilience (see Box 3.4).

Box 2.4. Identification and designation of core capabilities

The ‘Canadian Core Capabilities List’ (CCCL) identifies, defines and groups thirty-eight emergency management capabilities into a hierarchy of five priority groups associated with the ‘Emergency Management Strategy for Canada: Toward a Resilient 2030’ (EMS), and the National Risk Profile. Five of the core capabilities required to respond effectively are:

• Rapid lifesaving medical services to reduce illness, injury and death;

• Search and rescue capability needs in impacted areas;

• Fatality identification management and reunification solutions for impacted communities;

• Transportation, including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services, for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people;

• To deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities (e.g. power, fuel, water, and basic food items).

For the full list see the link in the source line below.

Each entry of the CCCL is associated with the priorities of the Emergency Management System and can be linked with one or more of the four pillars of the Emergency Management Framework for Canada: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An initial 2021-2022 Interim Action Plan to commence implementation of the Emergency Management Strategy was approved in March 2022.

Source: (Public Safety Canada, Government of Canada, 2022[5])

Assigning leadership for critical risks at the national level

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to designate a lead authority to drive policy implementation, connect policy agendas and align competing priorities concerning management of critical risks across line ministries, departments or agencies, and levels of government. National leadership fosters implementation of national goals and promotes accountability for failure to manage critical risks adequately. The intended aim of this provision is to reinforce policy coherence before an extreme event occurs and maximise adaptive capacity by orchestrating capabilities found across numerous government departments and agencies into a national resilience effort.

When asked whether they had assigned leadership for critical risks at national level, 20 out of 27 Respondents reported that a central government institution or body had been established with various functions and responsibilities related to governance of critical risks.

There is no single model for national level leadership concerning governance of critical risks. Across Respondents, the bodies charged with leading co-ordination and monitoring of disaster risk and crisis management functions are most frequently found within an office of prime minister, or line ministries with responsibility for security, public safety, defence, or a department of civil protection.

Several Respondents reported that the authority to implement disaster risk and crisis management policies is dispersed across central government ministries and agencies according to different types of hazards or threats. The number of competent bodies at central and sub-national levels of government with responsibility for various phases and functions of the disaster risk management cycle underscores the need for strong co-ordination and alignment of purpose that a lead co-ordinator can provide.

In the assessment, mitigation and preparedness phases Respondents described national leadership functions in terms of prompting consistency of practice with guidance and standards that promote interoperability across line ministries and sub-national levels of government. Several lead authorities work to foster a common understanding of trade-offs across line ministries when several policy objectives are at odds. In the response phase, Respondents noted the key role of national leadership to co-ordinate national institutional responses involving multiple agencies, and to intervene or support when sub-national authorities are overwhelmed. Finally, in a context of increased transboundary risks and crises, Respondents noted the role of lead authorities in the co-ordination and monitoring of disaster risk and crisis management actions in co-operation with different countries or international institutions. Figure 2.2 indicates where attribution of these functions to a lead agency is well advanced across Respondents and areas where implementation through lead agencies is still low.

Figure 2.2. Risk governance functions performed by lead agencies

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

The Recommendation calls for institutional leadership to facilitate co-ordination and co-operation between line ministries in carrying out their responsibilities related to management of critical risks. A good country case example of effective institutional leadership can be found in Poland with the Government Center for Security, which facilitates the identification of inter-linkages that underlie critical risks through expert discussions, information sharing and risk assessment workshops (see Box 3.5).

A few Adherents have recently taken noteworthy efforts to strengthen institutional leadership on governance of critical risks. In Canada , the Prime Minister appointed a new Minister of Emergency Preparedness in 2021 with the mandate to strengthen all aspects of the emergency management system through a systemic, all-hazards, whole-of-society approach. In carrying out this mandate, Canada’s new Minister of Emergency Preparedness is responsible for working with provinces, territories, municipalities and indigenous partners to take action to prepare for future emergencies, including extreme weather, with a focus on proactive prevention and mitigation efforts and ensuring response and recovery capabilities (Government of Canada - Public Safety Canada, 2022[3]).

In Greece, devastating forest fires in 2021 led to the establishment of an autonomous Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection to bolster fire prevention and preparedness capabilities, as well as the defensive fire-fighting system, of the civil protection mechanism. Several competencies were transferred to the new Ministry, including the General Secretariat of Civil Protection and the Fire Brigade along with responsibilities from other ministries, the relevant department from the Directorate of Climate Change and Atmospheric Quality of the General Directorate of Environmental Policy, and oversight of the Earthquake Planning and Protection Unit from the Ministry of Infrastructure. This new structure has achieved in particular 1) enhanced central co-ordination of all the agencies for the first time as the outcome of a multi- agency preparation framework for forest fires; 2) a new operational philosophy of immediate response with the involvement of all the respective agencies; and 3) the initiation of large-scale wildfire prevention projects in forest areas with European funding from the ‘Resilience and Recovery Fund’.

The institutional structures for disaster risk management in Kazakhstan comprise top-down and bottom-up processes across a multilevel system of government. The Security Council drives the National Security Strategy, which is meant to align sectoral risk policies to common objectives. The Central Committee for Emergency Situations in the Ministry of Internal Affairs aims to co-ordinate disaster risk management policies and stakeholders across central level government, technical agencies, and subnational level stakeholders. In this way, it plays an important role to develop a shared vision of risks, drive relevant polices, and co-ordinate risk management roles across sub-national levels of government (OECD, 2019[6]).

The Ministry of Interior of Morocco has established a position of Chief Risk Officer to co-ordinate disaster risk management efforts across government and with departments at different levels of government. The Chief Risk Officer is supported by teams of experts in the analysis of critical risks in order to support prioritisation of investments in risk management capabilities. It also includes a team of experts developing a National Risk Observatory that collects hazard data from multiple organisations with scientific expertise on various hazards and threats.

In 2022 the Australian government established a new national agency, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), to provide end-to-end oversight on risk reduction, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery in Australia. In bringing together several pre-existing agencies NEMA is intended to strengthen capacity to prepare for, manage and recover from more frequent, complex, competing, cascading and compounding crises. While previous institutional arrangements focused primarily on natural hazards, NEMA sits within the Home Affairs portfolio, enabling disaster risk reduction to pivot to an all-hazards approach to managing current, emerging and future crises and disasters, which will support more holistic resilience building efforts (Hook and Leeanne, 2022[7]).

Several Respondents noted in the 2017 Report that co-operation from across government requires backing from political leaders. For this reason, Respondents were asked in 2022 whether the lead organisation for governance of critical risks reports to the head of government and/or a cabinet-level minister on actions to further the strategy and performance of its authorities. Only 12 out of 20 of the identified lead organisations prepare such a report at a frequency of at least once per year. Of these twelve Respondents, only nine make their reports available to the public. Developing such reports provides transparency concerning the efforts of agencies across government to co-ordinate in disaster risk management responsibilities, and provides a tool for political leadership to hold them to account. All but one Respondent with a lead agency reported it is empowered through legislation and/ or implementing regulations to co-ordinate and/or monitor disaster preparedness measures taken by various departments for different phases of the disaster risk management cycle.

A good case example is found in the United States, where the ‘National Preparedness Report’ summarises progress made and challenges that remain in building and sustaining the capabilities needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats, hazards and incidents that pose the greatest risk. This annual report offers all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and the public with practical insights into preparedness that support decisions about programme priorities, resource allocations, and actions that can create more resilient communities (FEMA, 2022[8]).

More than two thirds of Respondents with a lead organisation possess authority for co-ordination of inputs to national risk assessment, for response co-ordination and crisis management administration at centre of government. The public expects emergency response services above-all to be well co-ordinated for effective management of civil contingency events, and shortcomings in this phase lead to loss of trust in government.

Most Respondents follow a framework that clarifies what department or agency has front-line decision-making authority for managing the consequences of different hazards and threats and that enumerates clearly the authorities and mechanisms whereby decisions and co-ordination are exercised across government. A good practice example is found in Ireland, where the framework designates different Lead Government Departments (LGD) with a mandate and responsibility to co-ordinate all national level activity for its assigned emergency types. The LGD role includes risk assessment, planning and preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. The National Risk Assessment in Ireland for 2020 sets out the LGD for each emergency type identified (Department of Defence, 2021[9]).

Box 2.5.  National lead organisations for the governance of critical risks

New Zealand’s recent history provides several examples of complex (and often concurrent) strategic crises that required co-ordinated all-of-government responses. Since 2016, New Zealand has managed the impact of the Whakaari/White Island eruption, Christchurch mosque terror attack, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and for Cyclone Gabrielle, in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic.

New Zealand’s arrangements, including those led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and the national Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) provides for a timely and appropriate government response that aims to identify and manage risks; apply national resources effectively; minimises adverse outcomes; deals with multiple objectives together; and co-ordinates agencies’ activities. Managing a range of hazards and threats is complex and involves a wide range of government agencies. Local government, non-government agencies and the private sector also have increasingly important roles in this effort. New Zealand’s strategic crisis management and emergency management arrangements facilitate the co-ordination of sectoral, regional, and government capabilities where national planning or a national response is required, and help to ensure that risks receive appropriate attention, the right capabilities are developed, and lessons are identified and learned from.

High-level co-ordination of effort during a crisis is provided for by the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC). ODESC refers to ad-hoc meetings of Chief Executives, chaired by the Chief Executive of DPMC, who operate as a collective to provide all-of-government co-ordination on issues and resources, provide strategic advice on priorities and the mitigation of risks beyond the lead agency’s control, and advise Ministers on strategic crisis matters related to their portfolio. ODESC does not override the responsibilities which individual Chief Executives or Ministers have to take decisions in their own areas of concern.

In Poland, the Government Centre for Security (RCB) was created as a supra-ministerial unit under the Office of Prime Minister to facilitate emergency management and increase national resilience through prevention and mitigation. RCB plays the important role of co-ordinating and monitoring crisis management procedures and response on national level, the implementation of planning and programming tasks in crisis management and critical infrastructure protection, the conduct of trainings and exercises both on a national and international level, and co-operation with international partners such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union in crisis management.

RCB gathers information and data from crisis centres across the national territory and from international partners to build a continuous and regular risk analysis of potential threats and map inter-linkages. It develops emergency solution plans and co-ordinates information flows to government entities, international partners and the public. It compiles a risk catalogue that is updated on a regular basis and monitors potential threats. It also publishes a daily report on potential crisis situations in the country, such as meteorological events, extreme temperatures, and water levels in main rivers. In addition, RCB records critical infrastructure threats both inside and outside the national territory, since regional or international threats could have a potential impact on Poland’s national territory. This information is made publicly accessible.

Source: (Government Centre for Security (Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa), Government of Poland, n.d.[10]); (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), Government of New Zealand, n.d.[11])

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Respondents initially maintained the lead agency approach for response, and generally attributed leadership and co-ordination for the crisis to ministries of health or public health departments. Cross-department co-operation was key to an effective response in Respondents where public health agencies did not have the authorities, private sector networks or experience of managing an emergency of such scale. To achieve public health policy goals, such as flattening the curve of infections, required intensive co-ordination of rapid actions by multiple government bodies.

Departments of civil protection, in particular, were leaned upon to ensure various operational measures were implemented e.g. leasing or building isolation facilities, and transportation of infected patients to clinics with available intensive care units. Simultaneously, civil protection authorities had to fulfil their responsibilities related to concurrent disasters; i.e. those with no causal correlation to the pandemic, such as earthquakes, floods and tropical storms. The prolonged crisis eventually led to burn-out amongst healthcare, homecare, senior homes and emergency management workforce, indicating capacity gaps in skilled personnel (Benincasa et al., 2022[12]). Several Respondents indicated the need for policy reforms post COVID-19 that would attribute such authorities to Ministries / Departments of Health, and the need to conduct exercises to build capacity to use them.

As the acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis arose in March 2020, more than half of Adherents set up ad hoc crisis management bodies that focused on specific aspects of crisis response such as health or economic measures (OECD, 2022[13]). Due to the scale and duration of the pandemic, many heads of government centralised key crisis management decisions insofar as they were able. Respondents reported a multiplicity of crisis management structures that stretched staff across numerous meetings, which improved communication across the different groups / committees, but created a division of labour and chains of command that were not always clear to the major stakeholders involved (OECD, 2022[13]).

Moreover, in many Adherents the responsibility for public health emergencies falls within the remit of sub-national levels of government (OECD, 2020[14]). National institutions often lacked authority to make certain crisis management decisions for the entirety of the country. For example, national level institutions could restrict non-citizens from entering their country, but in many Adherents they had little or no authority to restrict movement of people, order school closures or restrict urban transportation across the entire national territory.

Several Respondents pointed to the benefits derived from a co-ordinated approach in building synergies of effort across government and ensuring policy coherence across different policy strategies. Recent developments in national strategies on governance of critical risks reflect a trend in efforts to integrate and mainstream various policy agendas, such as critical infrastructure resilience, national security, climate adaptation and development-aid, but also food security and pandemic preparedness plans into broader resilience frameworks. As already noted in the 2017 Report, exercise of central government leadership presents an important opportunity to align disaster risk management policies implemented by sub-national levels of government with central government goals and priorities.

Several Respondents noted the potential for synergies between disaster risk reduction policies and climate adaptation goals in particular. The overlaps in goals between climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction agendas need to be more clearly recognised, and all sectors of society need to actively participate in reducing and effectively adapting to growing climate risks. Respondents recognised this cannot be achieved without robust funding mechanisms and a significant increase in opportunities to invest in resilience.

Respondents called attention to important risk governance frictions that exist between different levels of government. Many Respondents place primary authority for the implementation of disaster risk reduction policies and emergency response at the sub-national levels of government, while central government authorities mainly monitor and evaluate how sub-national levels perform as indicated in Figure 2.3. Central government may push for local disaster risk reduction measures because disaster damages and losses often give rise to claims paid out by the disaster compensation funds or programmes that they manage. Local land use and zoning regulations to reduce exposures and/or vulnerability to high level hazards encumber land rights and incur costs that might deter investors in local economies.

The tension between many central and local governments was clear throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, where sub-national levels of government in some Adherents protested the central government guidance, e.g. concerning restrictions on movement, self-isolation, social distancing, reporting infections and how COVID-19 related deaths were determined. During subsequent waves of infections, sub-national levels of government were often at odds with central government on such matters as mask mandates, school closures, and making travel and participation in public events conditional on proof of vaccination. Differing views between central and local governments were particularly visible in some Adherents with a federal structure of government, not only concerning public health measures and travel restrictions, but on support for individual households and small businesses in financial distress (OECD, 2020[15]).

There is no one-size-fits-all for effective distribution of authorities on management of critical risks, yet the Recommendation clearly calls for central governments to play an essential leadership role in exercising authorities they possess. During the COVID-19 crisis several Respondents illustrated this leadership by enacting mask, vaccine and teleworking requirements for central government workers. Other measures included issuance of policy guidance, analytic methodologies or frameworks on risk management issues where gaps persisted at sub-national levels. In particular, Respondents referred to policy guidance they developed on designation of essential critical infrastructure workers (see Box 3.6) and critical occupations (European Commission, 2020[16]). These guidance documents invited stakeholder input to help find a balance between the challenge of avoiding disruptions to the delivery of essential goods and services and undermining the public health benefits of temporary restrictions on movement.

Box 2.6. Stakeholder input to refine policy guidance issued during crisis

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the United States Department of Homeland Security took on board stakeholder feedback to update successive versions of its ‘Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers list’- first issued on 19 March 2020. The aim was to help state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities decide who to allow freedom of movement in areas that are under restrictions such as shelter-in-place or quarantine. The initial guidance was developed with input from government and industry partners, on the assumption that it would need to update the guidance once additional stakeholder feedback was received.

CISA moved quickly to incorporate feedback to update the list, by expanding and specifying additional categories of essential workers who are key to maintaining a community’s safety, public health, and economy. Changes were included in successive updates to the guidance, generally representing clarifications or additions that did not shift the overall scoping of critical infrastructure activity as highlighted in the initial release. The guidance is a resource for state and local decision makers and is not a binding document. Ultimately, all final decisions rest with state and local authorities, who must use their own judgment to balance public health and safety with the need to maintain critical infrastructure.

Source: (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2021[17])

Engaging government actors at national and sub-national levels to co-ordinate policymaking

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to develop a shared vision of critical risks and the division of responsibilities for shouldering the management burden. The review of national strategies on governance of critical risks found that disaster risk reduction and preparedness are deemed to be a responsibility not just for government agencies, but households and businesses.

Risk governance enables decision making informed by the views of a range of stakeholders, including technical experts, citizens and civil society. Participatory processes at all stages of the risk management policy cycle, and during the policy formulation stage in particular, are key to sound risk governance. Relevant public officials at different levels of government need to be aware of the benefits of involving stakeholders for more effective public policy decision making and commit to identifying opportunities for their participation. A whole-of-society approach to risk governance not only helps decisions on allocation of risks, it establishes a public record that clarifies accountability for decisions which might otherwise obscure complex trade-offs.

The expectation that stakeholders take greater responsibility for their own safety should imply enhancing opportunities for them to participate in policy design through consultative processes.

On the one hand there is little research on whether citizens and stakeholders support this “shared responsibility” approach, and whether they expect a greater voice in decisions on disaster risk and crisis management measures. Japan provides a good practice example in one respect by attempting to understand whether the public is willing to take on more responsibility. Surveys conducted by the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office in 2017 found 39.8% of the public believes self-help during a disaster should be of primary importance, whereas only 18.6% held this view in 2002. Similarly, in 2017 only 6.2% of the public believed public support measures should be of primary importance in recovery, whereas 24.9% did in 2002 (Japan Cabinet Office, 2022[18]).

On the other hand, a lack of participatory process in disaster risk and crisis management decisions in the past has led to public protest and even civil unrest, for example concerning the construction of new reservoirs or dams to foster resilience to floods or droughts. During the COVID-19 crisis, prolonged protests in many countries followed top-down decisions about the duration and conditions of restrictions on movement, or the need to show proof of vaccination to enter public venues.

When asked, 19 out of 27 Respondents reported that lead agencies with responsibilities related to management of critical risks do consult with a variety of stakeholders in the policy-formulation process. This is a slightly lower prevalence of stakeholder consultation in policy design than was reported in 2016. The questionnaire results reveal some insightful granularity concerning what actors the government engages, on what topics and through what means.

When asked what types of stakeholders are consulted in policy formulation for management of critical risks, 18 out of 27 Respondents answered national level institutions and academic experts, followed closely by consultations with the private sector and civil society. However, only 6 out of 27 Respondents reported that they consult with the general public. Overall, these results indicate a propensity among Respondents to consult with experts, inside or outside government, rather than openness to a broad set of stakeholders who represent a variety of interests. A notable practice in consulting the general public concerning design of its national strategy is found in the United Kingdom. Any person in the country with an interest in developing a ‘National Resilience Strategy’ was invited to engage in an on-line ‘Call for Evidence’ comprising over 30 questions related to various resilience policy topics. Inputs from this questionnaire were used to develop the United Kingdom Government Resilience Framework (Cabinet Office, 2022[19]).

Figure 2.3. Stakeholders consulted in formulation of policies for management of critical risks

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

This dimension of the Recommendation is also aligned with the Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, as well as with the overall objectives of the OECD Recommendation on Open Government and the Open Government Partnership, whereby citizen participation is meant to achieve a shared vision of critical risks and the division of responsibilities for shouldering the risk management burden. The aim of opening policy consultations to a variety of stakeholders, and offering various means to engage, is to promote a system of social accountability. Where citizens and stakeholders have access to accurate public information, are actively involved in public decision-making processes, they can undertake an oversight role and contribute to holding their governments to account.

Ultimately the aim of such multi-stakeholder processes is to foster an optimal balance of trade-offs when deciding on disaster risk and crisis management measures. From this perspective, participatory process creates buy-in from stakeholders while governments can, in turn, better align laws, policies, and services to societal needs. In this respect the Recommendation also reinforces the message of the OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance, which calls for the promotion of regulatory coherence through co-ordination mechanisms between the various levels of government.

Respondents were asked what disaster risk and crisis management policy areas stakeholders are invited to provide input on. About two-thirds answered policies concerning response co-ordination of critical risks. Stakeholder input is significantly lower for other phases of the risk management policy cycle, with only one-half of the Respondents answering that stakeholders provide inputs on preparedness monitoring, or engaging in consultations on risk assessment and recovery co-ordination.

Crisis management administration and co-ordination of reconstruction are far less often subjects that stakeholders are invited to provide input on. Generally speaking, the time frame of crisis management measures is very limited and not conducive to consultations with stakeholders. Nevertheless, certain crisis management measures should be monitored over time and comprise mechanisms for stakeholder feedback, especially if the decision restricts civic freedoms as during the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD, 2021[20]).

Of greater concern is the severe lack of stakeholder consultation during the reconstruction phase. When asked only 3 out of 26 Respondents reported that stakeholders are consulted on reconstruction plans, which might include such decisions as population displacements, public housing investments or expropriation for the construction of infrastructure (Garces, 2017[21]). A notable country case example is found in the participatory approach of the ‘Strategic Reconstruction Plan’ of Constitución, Chile. Following a destructive tsunami, the highly decentralised plan invited residents to select public housing designs, prioritise the public buildings to be rebuilt, and identify social needs that otherwise would have been overlooked in the reconstruction process (Garces, 2017[21]).

Figure 2.4. Stakeholder inputs to policy design for management of critical risks

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Box 2.7. Platforms for governance of critical risks across levels of government

In Germany, one focus of the 2022 “German Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters” is better co-ordination of risk and crisis management at both the federal and sub-national government levels, including cross-sectoral measures for all phases of risk management from prevention to recovery. At national level, the Interministerial Working Group for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the National Focal Point for the Sendai Framework and the “Fachtagung Katastrophenvorsorge” (a national disaster risk reduction conference) serve as the core of the National Platform for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters, that will be extended to stakeholders from different levels of government, the private sector, academia, civil society and the media. In addition, in the area of critical infrastructure protection, the UP KRITIS initiative links critical infrastructure operators and their associations with the relevant government authorities. In June 2021, the Federal Government and the Länder agreed to establish a "Joint Competence Centre for Civil Protection" (“Gemeinsames Kompetenzzentrum Bevölkerungsschutz”, GeKoB). This platform aims to strengthen the co-operation of all partners in civil protection within a set framework. At the beginning of June 2022, an administrative agreement was signed between the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Interior Ministers of the Länder. Representatives of the federal and state ministries responsible for civil protection - with participation of other civil protection actors (e.g. aid organisations) - work together in the Joint Competence Centre, which is based at the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK).

The tasks of the Joint Competence Centre include, among other things, the regular preparation of Joint Situation Reports on civil protection, which provide responsible actors on federal and state level with information and assessments of the current situation. This information is meant to improve response and recovery capabilities, as well as the establishment and operation of a register of special resources for crisis management in order to facilitate the co-ordination of resources between actors at all levels. Before and especially during crises, the Joint Competence Centre advises and supports the authorities responsible for civil protection at federal and state level.

In Norway the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction is a co-operative network, including national authorities as well as local and regional authorities that identifies shortcomings or potential for improvements in prevention and management of natural hazards and makes proposals on how to address them. The national platform initiates projects on relevant topics such as landslide prevention, hazards and risk mapping, methodology development and strengthening capabilities. A major future initiative is meant to explore central government financing of disaster risk prevention measures, whereby co-funding would range between 100% for non-structural measures to 40-50% for structural measures. The proposal is fashioned after the National Disaster Risk Prevention Fund in France, which consistently invests EUR 200 million per year in disaster risk reduction (OECD/The World Bank, 2019[22]). The national platform is involved in the development of the “Knowledge Bank” – a digital system compiling disaster loss data from various sources including the insurance sector.

Source: (UNDRR – United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2022[23]); (GMLZ – Germany, n.d.[24]); (Die Bundesregierung, 2022[25]); (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany, n.d.[26])

When asked what mechanisms they use to facilitate stakeholder consultation, 23 out of 27 Respondents reported holding national workshops series to promote dialogue among government officials. In Costa Rica, the National Risk Management Plan emerged from a process of public consultation with the participation of more than 94 entities involved in risk management in the National Forum for Risk Management. This process achieved a collective definition of strategic actions and goals using an interagency and interdisciplinary approach.

21 out of 23 Respondents reported the use of ad hoc conferences to involve national experts, and 18 out of 23 Respondents noted that they engage with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and interest groups through conferences, as a means to test new ideas. A small minority of Respondents have put in place mechanisms to foster more granular citizen participation, such as social media platforms, online consultations and town hall meetings.

Figure 2.5. How stakeholders participate in design of critical risk management policies

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Establishing partnerships with the private sector to achieve shared responsibilities aligned with the national strategy

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to establish partnerships with the private sector to achieve responsiveness and shared responsibilities aligned with their national strategy. Since a high percentage of physical and virtual infrastructure networks that Adherents rely on to manage critical risks are owned or operated by the private sector, partnerships with operators are not only important to improve their own preparedness efforts for large-scale disasters but can also help improve the resilience of society as a whole. Moreover, the private sector can mobilise resources, leverage knowledge and insights to develop and provide innovative risk management capabilities across the disaster risk management cycle.

When asked, 17 out of 27 Respondents reported the private sector is consulted in the policy formulation process for the management of critical risks. Respondents reported numerous I and mechanisms to foster active participation and co-operation of the private sector. Co-operation ranges from establishment of I with remit related to joint action on disaster risk management in general, to ad hoc actions focused on specific challenges. The trend across Respondents is to use a variety of frameworks for public private co-operation to consult, guide and incentivise the private sector in taking actions to prepare for disaster risks and respond to crises. For example, Australia and Japan engage the private sector regularly to identify shared interests and articulate common goals and encourage activities that further their national resilience whereas the European Commission took pro-active initiative during the COVID-19 crisis to call for voluntary co-ordinated action by regulators, network operators and the public in response to a specific shortage in supply (see Box 2.8).

Box 2.8. Fora and consultations to integrate private sector into national resilience efforts

In Australia, several participation mechanisms between the different levels of government and industry exist, including the ‘Trusted Information Sharing Network’ (TISN), the primary participation mechanism with industry on critical infrastructure. The TISN stakeholders from across the critical infrastructure community – including owners and operators, supply chain entities, peak bodies and all levels of government meet regularly to enhance the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The TISN comprises 13 sector groups, which enable critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information on threats and vulnerabilities, and collaborate on appropriate measures to mitigate risk and boost resilience. Also in Australia, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR) facilitates a monthly Supply Chain Roundtable (SCRt) with key bodies to hear supply chain concerns directly from industry and facilitates whole-of government conversations to discuss policy responses to identify issues, including disaster issues, as they arise. In the monthly SCRt, DISR monitors industry supply chain disruptions and refers industry to the relevant portfolio agency based on the disruption.

In Japan, the “Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium” was established with the support of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, to foster exchange of opinions and experience by 17 economic organisations. The Consortium formulated the “Principles of Disaster Management Economic Action” as a common philosophy. In addition, the “Disaster Risk Reduction x Technology Public-Private Partnership Platform” was established in 2021 as a forum for matching the disaster response needs of local governments to private companies with advanced technologies. The Cabinet Office supports exchange of information between the public and private sectors to facilitate these industrial initiatives to stimulate uptake of advanced digital technologies.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis a massive shift to teleworking, e-learning, telemedicine and online entertainment led to a surge in demand for broadband communication services, with some operators experiencing as much as 60% increase in Internet traffic (Keeping the Internet up and running in times of crisis, 2020). Network operators in the European Union were concerned that drastic spikes in use of streaming services might strain the capacity of Internet infrastructure to cope with increased demand. As a precautionary measure, the Commission and the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) set up a special reporting mechanism to monitor the internet traffic situation in each Member State to be able to respond to capacity issues. The European Commission urged streaming platforms to co-operate with telecom providers and temporarily downgrade the quality of video streaming by offering standard definition rather than high definition, while regulators and telecom operators took preventive and mitigating measures, and users applied settings that reduced data consumption, including the use of Wi-Fi or lower resolution content.

Source: (European Commission & BEREC, 2020[27]); (Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre (CISC), Department of Home Affairs, Australia, 2023[28]); (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2022[29])

Public-private partnerships may facilitate the achievement of goals elaborated under national strategies on governance of critical risks that do not receive priority in government budgeting processes. While few Respondents consider the use of ‘Nature-based Solutions’ a priority in disaster risk reduction, numerous projects find financial and organisational support from outside government in part due to shared goals. A notable country case example of partnering with civil society is ‘Climate Resilient by Nature’, a partnership of the Australian Government and WWF-Australia that restores and protects critical ecosystems, and increases resilience to climate shocks (Hook and Leeanne, 2022[7]).

In addition, several Respondents reported notable practices on how to leverage private sector know-how, resources and capacity to develop innovative technologies that improve effective response to disaster and crisis situations. A good country case example is found in Japan where formal agreements between regional governments, municipal governments and industry bodies are set-up in the fields of broadcasting, emergency relief, transportation, disaster recovery, housing and waste management amongst other resources (Japan Cabinet Office, 2022[30]). Moreover, the Japan International Public-Private Association for Disaster Risk Reduction (JIPAD) was established in 2019 to promote the overseas deployment of disaster risk reduction technologies of Japanese companies . In collaboration with the Japan Bosai Platform, a private-based consortium established in 2014, JIPAD encourages the global expansion of Japanese technologies for disaster management with collaboration between public and private sectors and takes a lead in improving disaster management capabilities across countries. As of 2022, over two hundred companies and organisations participate in this partnership that introduces Japanese policies, technologies and knowledge on disaster management through the “Public-Private Sectors Disaster Management Seminar” (JIPAD, 2022[31]).

Public-private partnerships related to disaster risk and crisis management also take place at international level. A practical example is EUMETNET Meteoalarm, a one-stop shop and a repository for relevant multi-hazard warnings to be used by professionals or tourists on a European scale. Meteoalarm brings together in one place the authoritative hydromet warnings of 37 National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHSs) in Europe. National services on their own had struggled to bridge the “last mile” of delivering warnings to end-users. Private operators (e.g. Google, Apple, IBM/The Weather Channel and AccuWeather) that provide information service to their users integrate warnings from European NMHSs and submit them to Meteoalarm. Well known products and services of these companies include the standard weather applications for smart phones, weather widgets for computer operating systems and many others. The involvement of these major re-users of information generated with government operated capabilities allows the early warning products and services of the relevant NMHSs to reach hundreds of millions of end-users on a twenty-four hour basis, helping to contribute to public safety in Europe and to offer a seamless transboundary warning service to citizens (Kaltenberger, 2022[32]).

Public-private partnerships are an opportunity for businesses to take initiative to offer their capabilities in support of all phases of disaster risk and crisis management. Respondents provided diverse examples of partnerships covering each phase, from collecting high-quality hazard event loss data to developing more hazard-resistant materials. Public-private partnerships can also serve to advance science and technology vital to the forecasting of, response to and recovery from critical risks. A number of private companies have partnered with public organisations or developed their own charitable branches to reduce disaster risk in communities. For example, Airbnb.org (Airbnb, 2023[33]) has partnered with governments and local communities to provide free and discounted housing for refugees and persons affected by disasters. Google’s Crisis Response Team disseminates government hazard alerts for floods, wildfires, and earthquakes to users in potentially impacted areas (Google, 2023[34]).

Novel forms of partnership have developed around all areas of disaster risk and crisis management, including professional networks of front-line workers. The wide range of organisations involved in governance of various critical risks comprise policy- makers, experts and practitioners from diverse fields and sectors and with different perceptions. Multi- agency co-operation is critical both for awareness, prevention and resilience to critical risks. A good case example is the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network, an international reservoir of practitioner experience that traverses policy portfolios, which was created as a forum for exchanges and collaboration to counter the extremists’ own networks. RAN is an umbrella network that draws together a constellation of previously unconnected efforts and programmes, gives them visibility and forms a cohesive response to critical risks. Since it was established, RAN has grown to include over 6,000 practitioners from all over the European Union to exchange insights, experiences, ideas and good practices, RAN has created thousands of connections and fostered hundreds of partnerships, which has resulted in countless new initiatives, projects and interventions (European Commission, 2023[35]).

Box 2.9. Overall assessment of implementation: Establishing a comprehensive, all-hazards and transboundary approach to country risk governance as the foundation for national resilience and responsiveness

The first principle of the Recommendation focuses on setting a framework for governance of critical risks where roles are clearly attributed for the full range of disaster risk and crisis management actions, and co-ordination mechanism facilitate stakeholder participation. Implementation of this principle has progressed steadily although certain key challenges persist.

• Almost all Respondents have established national strategies for the governance of critical risks, and updated them to incorporate additional goals, often related to climate risk adaptation, mis/ disinformation, security of supply for essential goods and services. Adherents should consider broadening the scope of their national strategies to integrate policy agendas where synergies of effort and alignment of purpose can help build adaptive capacities for national resilience.

• The national strategies of many Respondents promote an all-hazards approach to country risk governance and provide a comprehensive policy framework built around the identification and assessment, reduction, preparedness and response phases of the risk management cycle. However, recovery and reconstruction phases are frequently missing from these otherwise comprehensive national strategies. Adherents should pay additional attention to good practices in the all-hazards approach, reinforce international co-operation to learn effective practices from each other, and incorporate these into their national strategies.

• More Adherents should define and enumerate the core capabilities required to prepare for and manage the consequences of critical risks where public safety is jeopardised on a large scale regardless the cause. This is a key measure to increase adaptive capacity that enables some degree of response even to poorly understood critical risks.

• Government ownership of disaster risks is multi-faceted and complex, with roles and responsibilities attributed across multiple agencies and levels of government. Overlaps in roles and responsibilities persist due to the inherent structure and statutory limits of government authorities, but gaps in risk ownership also derive from the complexity and uncertainty of emerging risks.

• Most Adherents have established mechanisms to co-ordinate a variety of government authorities at national and sub-national levels, and consult a range of stakeholder input in at least some phases of disaster risk and crisis management decisions. Reinforced efforts are needed, however, to foster a whole-of society approach to building resilience. Additional efforts are needed to identify how the lead co-ordination agencies in government can address institutional limitations in governance of critical risks.

• Frameworks are well established to mobilise the capabilities of private sector companies for risk assessment, preparedness, and response, and to mobilise volunteer organisations for recovery. A particularly significant gap in the whole of society approach to disaster risk management appears to be stakeholder consultation in decisions taken during the recovery and reconstruction phase.

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