Tracking Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks

4. Raising awareness of critical risks and fostering investments in risk prevention and mitigation

Abstract

This chapter assesses Adherents’ capacity to manage crises characterised by transboundary nature, uncertainty and rapid evolution. It examines crisis management frameworks, coordination mechanisms and the ability to adapt responses to novel and compound events. The analysis indicates that most Adherents have strengthened central coordination and updated crisis management arrangements since 2017, drawing heavily on lessons from the COVID‑19 pandemic. Many governments improved access to scientific advice during crises and expanded training and exercises for crisis managers.

Significant gaps are identified in the anticipatory and adaptive capacity of Adherents, including mechanisms to identify and manage unforeseen or poorly understood crises. International cooperation and cross‑border coordination remain among the least developed aspects of crisis preparedness and response. The chapter concludes that adaptive crisis management requires sustained investment in leadership, decision‑making under uncertainty, whole‑of‑society engagement and international collaboration.

A common feature of extreme events is they occur just infrequently enough for public perception to underestimate the likelihood of their occurrence, which contributes to a lack of support to invest in mitigation or self-protection measures. The third principle of the Recommendation calls on Adherents to raise awareness of critical risks, and to mobilise households and businesses to foster investment in risk prevention and mitigation. This requires effective risk communication practices that help policy makers, businesses and the public at large better understand the potential impacts of critical risks, and rectify misperceptions of risks, which often suffer from primacy or recency bias. In particular, the 2017 Report called on Adherents that had not done so to establish two-way communication channels to solicit stakeholder feedback through online platforms.

The success of risk communication efforts is ultimately related to whether stakeholders take self-protective measures and invest in disaster risk reduction. The third principle calls for a mix of different types of protective measures. Structural barriers, such as dikes, levies and dams, may reduce exposure of populations and economic activities to natural hazards, but in many cases they reassure populations it is safe to settle, or use land, in otherwise high risk areas. Over time, structural measures deteriorate if not properly maintained and may leave communities with a false sense of security. Non-structural measures such as land-use prescriptions, appropriate building codes, and nature-based solutions, are needed to sustainably reduce exposures and vulnerability over time.

Finally, the third principle calls on Adherents to encourage business continuity planning, and in particular amongst operators of critical infrastructure. Disruptions to critical infrastructure, such as electricity, food, water, transportation, and telecom networks (amongst other sectors) exacerbate harms already suffered by disaster affected communities by depriving them of basic needs. Moreover, these networks are the backbone of economic activities and disruptions to their operations delay recovery and impeded reconstruction. Moreover, with the development of cyberattacks and sabotage of critical infrastructure, service disruptions have been occurring outside the context of disasters yet still present similar negative impacts to production capacity.

When asked in 2016, Respondents considered this the principle where they were the least advanced. Slightly under one-third of the Respondents considered they had fully implemented the third principle, two-thirds considered that they had partially implemented it, and two reported that they were only taking steps toward implementing it.

Box 4.1.  Raising awareness of critical risks to mobilise stakeholders and foster investment in risk prevention and mitigation

IV. RECOMMENDS that Members [Adherents] raise awareness of critical risks to mobilise households, businesses and international stakeholders and foster investment in risk prevention and mitigation.

To this effect, Members [Adherents] should:

1. Encourage a whole-of-society approach to risk communication and facilitate transboundary co-operation using risk registries, media and other public communications on critical risks […]

2. Strengthen the mix of structural protection and non-structural measures to reduce critical risks […]

3. Encourage businesses to take steps to ensure business continuity, with a specific focus on critical infrastructure operators […]

Source: (OECD, 2014[1])

Encouraging a whole-of-society approach to risk communication

Risk communication is a fundamental element of a sound risk management framework that seeks to reduce future losses and damages from disasters. Without strong risk communication capability, the public may underestimate, or overestimate, the risks facing communities and thus take too few, or an overabundance of, precautionary measures. Risk communication spurs informed debate on public investment in prevention, mitigation and preparedness and is thus a key element of good governance in risk management policy.

All Respondents reported having policies and tools for communicating information concerning critical risks to their population (Figure 4.1). Most Respondents issue risk information to their population and businesses on a fairly regular schedule, striving to make it accessible to diverse communities, sectors, and industries. For example, in Ireland public information campaigns on seasonal risks are run in summer and winter to enhance societal resilience. (Government of Ireland, 2023[2]) (Government or Ireland, 2022[3]).

Figure 4.1. Measures for raising awareness of critical risks across the whole of society

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

When asked, nearly all Respondents reported they provide information on risks facing local communities and actions that households and businesses can take to minimise the impacts of risks on themselves. Such household level self-protective measures lie at the core of Respondents’ efforts to build whole of society resilience. Likewise, most Respondents have established capability to communicate about specific risks with media briefings and websites.

Another important area of progress concerns tailoring risk communication to address vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women, youth, people with disabilities, refugees and persons with limited access to information who are often the most at risk during times of crisis. Around three-quarters of Respondents reported they tailor risk communication to vulnerable groups, whereas only two-thirds reported doing so in 2016. Campaigns to communicate both about natural hazards and man-made threats help address specific needs and enable vulnerable populations to be better protect themselves from potential harm. For example, the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network developed specific tools adapted to gaming platforms for communicating about risks of extremist content to youth (European Commission, 2021[4]). Failure to address the unique needs of vulnerable groups can result in unequal access to vital information and resources, exacerbating existing inequalities (see Box 3.17). (OECD, 2023[5])

Compared to 2017, sharing risk information with international institutions is now quite commonplace. Adherents who are part of the European Union provide the European Commission and each other with an overview of the risks they have identified through their own National Risk Assessments (Poljanšek et al., 2019[6]). The continued risk communication challenges facing Adherents are more nuanced than one-way information flows from governments to the public or between governments. The complexity and wide-ranging impacts of critical risks affect every aspect of society and require mobilisation of capabilities from across government, economic sectors and civil society. The continued risk communication challenges facing Adherents are more nuanced than one-way information flows from governments to the public or between governments.

This implies that risk communication should raise awareness of multiple stakeholders and motivate their collaboration and co-ordination. The expected benefits of a whole of society approach to risk communication efforts are that it fosters shared responsibility and risk ownership, which ultimately lead to greater resilience and preparedness underpinned by more effective and legitimate policy responses.

The 2017 Report concluded that Adherents should strengthen efforts to engage the whole-of-society in risk communication. OECD research has shown that a key to successful risk communication is integrating audience and behavioural insights into the process of building more compelling communications (Cazenave and Bellantoni, 2022[7]; Alfonsi et al., 2022[8]). A good country case example is found in Ireland where a public survey was issued to measure the public understanding of the national risk environment. The results enable government to identify gaps in public knowledge and perception which can be filled by directed public information campaigns. It also provides a sense check on emergent risks as a secondary and imaginative source of perceived future risks, which can be analysed by sectoral experts with respect to their potentiality. (C.McMullan and Brown, 2023[9])

Consistent with this view, the 2017 Report called for more Adherents to establish two-way communication channels between message providers and message receivers. Two-way communication builds trust and credibility that one-way transfers of information cannot. It enables unique local characteristics and perspectives of diverse communities, sectors, industries and international actors to be taken into account. Paradoxically, opening channels to citizens’ active participation might also compromise the benefits of two-way (interactive) communication due to the power of social media to deliver fake news (Reuter, Hughes and Kaufhold, 2018[10]). When asked, fewer than half the Respondents reported that they provide platforms for two-way risk communication, whereas in 2016 two-thirds of Respondents reported they had done so (OECD, 2017[11]). This regression in prevalence across countries in two-way communication makes it stand out as one of the more challenging dimensions of risk communication.

Box 4.2. Tailoring risk communication efforts to the needs of those most vulnerable

In Australia, during the roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines, the country developed communication materials tailored for communicating with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, as their remoteness and difficulties accessing healthcare services made them more vulnerable than other communities. These materials included testimonies from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander healthcare workers discussing about the COVID-19 vaccines, and why they are important for keeping the community safe.

In Slovenia, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government provided tailored communication efforts for migrant workers and refugees (with the support of the World Health Organisation European Region office). Working with civil society organisations, the government ensured that information was provided in a variety of languages and that it was easily accessible to those who may have limited access to technology or formal channels of communication.

In Costa Rica, in response to the Zika virus outbreak in 2017, the Costa Rican government tailored their communication efforts to address the needs of pregnant women and their partners. Communication strategies included the use of targeted messaging through social media, public service announcements, and outreach to healthcare providers to ensure that accurate and up-to-date information was provided to those who were most at risk.

Sources: (Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care, n.d.[12]); (World Health Organization (WHO) – Regional Office for Europe, 2022[13]); (Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), 2017[14])

To build trust in democratic structures and take a strategic approach to their crisis communications Respondents often leverage the most highly trusted institutions to be the mouthpiece of communications before, during, and after a crisis. According to the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, first responders such as police and fire brigades enjoy the highest level of public trust across OECD Members (OECD, 2022[15]). During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, when crisis communications were actively undermined by foreign adversaries, offices of public communications collaborated extensively with third-party messengers, such as influencers, trusted experts, and relatable community members to deliver messages to the public.

In Finland, the Prime Minister’s Office, in collaboration with the National Emergency Supply Agency and the private sector partnered with social media influencers to provide information for younger audiences that can be harder to reach through traditional channels. Following a comprehensive influencer mapping, over 1 800 Finnish influencers helped the government share reliable information on health measures to engage citizens in the fight against COVID‑19. A follow-up survey conducted revealed that: “94% of followers felt they received enough information and instructions about coronavirus via influencers with over half saying influencer communication affected their behaviour” and “97% of respondents consider the COVID‑19 information shared by influencers reliable”. (OECD, 2021[16]).

In Korea, the Ministry of Health and Welfare launched the “Thanks Challenge” on Instagram, with the aim of expanding the reach of awareness raising efforts around COVID‑19 measures. The initiative invited citizens to share a picture of themselves at home to promote social distancing and “stay at home” measures. Celebrities and influencers also took part in the campaign and helped the government disseminate official information about the disease and its symptoms (OECD, 2021[16]).

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to inform and educate the public, in advance of emergencies about what measures to take when one occurs. The Recommendation promotes mobilising public education systems to develop a culture of resilience by integrating community skills and concepts into curriculums and thereby pass information on to households through students. Only 15 out of 27 Respondents use the public education system to promote risk awareness, which is slightly less prevalent than 23 out of 34 Respondents who reported doing so in 2016. Japan and Türkiye present good country case examples of Adherents that incorporate disaster risk reduction modules into their education systems.

Box 4.3. National examples of risk communication campaigns

Canada has developed a national advertising campaign aimed to educate and inform a broad swath of Canadians about the risks they could potentially face in their region. This multi-year communications campaign is targeted at increasing Canadians’ preparedness and readiness to respond to disasters and emergencies, helping to not only reduce the financial costs of disaster response and recovery, but enhance the resiliency of all individuals and communities in Canada. The most recent campaign, which ran from January to March 2022, was geo-targeted and regionally focused whenever possible, and included a multi-media presence on television, radio, web sites and apps, social media, as well as search engine marketing and ads, including weather-triggered digital banner ads on weather related websites.

The United States has improved lifesaving communication about evacuations in response to deadly storm surges and successfully reduced the number of direct deaths from hurricanes. The National Hurricane Center is increasing post-storm messaging to reduce impacts from indirect risks, such as carbon monoxide poisoning from the improper use of generators. Further, federal government agencies in the United States have also explored new ways of communicating hazards information, such as publishing hazard information in languages other than English and leveraging social media to reach and develop trust with local communities experiencing a disaster. For example, during the 2018 eruption of Kīlauea volcano, local, national, and international audiences alike turned to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Volcano Science Center’s social media accounts to see eruption imagery, learn about eruptive events, and ask questions to be answered directly by the volcanology experts managing the accounts. Additional innovations, such as integrating flood hazard information into real estate search engines, makes hazard information immediate and relevant to the American public, and helps them make informed choices about their hazard risk. The United States National Weather Service has set up a webpage that provides social media users a series of resources to help them amplify the government’s messages during Hurricane Preparedness Week (April 30-May 6).

Sources: (United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2020[17]); (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – National Weather Service (NWS), n.d.[18]); (Public Safety Canada, Government of Canada, n.d.[19])

Box 4.4. Disaster risk reduction in national education systems

In Japan, the national educational system has fully embraced the concept of disaster education, in part so that pupils can impart knowledge to parents. Japan produces extensive disaster risk education materials, even in several languages, to teach children about natural hazards, recognise alerts and the importance of timely evacuation. Japanese children also study evacuation routes and undergo evacuation training in school. The training is updated every year to show the students the best routes to evacuation zones based on previous experiences.

In Türkiye, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) launched a project focusing on teachers’ training to improve their awareness of disaster preparedness and their teaching skills for disaster risk reduction training in the schools, called ‘School-based Disaster Education’ (SBDE). In the first phase of the project between 2013 and 2017, 3600 teachers attended training for 18 hours. Starting in 2018, the second phase teacher training program was designed as a hybrid education, combining distance learning and face-to-face training methods. The program trained 567 volunteer trainer teachers, and by using the cascade training system, these trainer teachers taught 135,375 teachers in 67 provinces by December 2019.

Source: (Gokmenoğlu et al., 2021[20]); (Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan – Disaster Management Bureau, Cabinet Office, n.d.[21])

Respondents reported that the type of risk information made available to both businesses and households tends to be primarily related to exposures associated with natural hazards (see Figure 4.2). Fewer than half the Respondents share information on the risks of malicious attacks to critical national infrastructure (whether physical or cyber-attacks) with infrastructure owners and operators.

Figure 4.2. Information made available to the public or critical infrastructure operators

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Respondents have also introduced alert systems for critical risks designed to provide advance notice that enables the population to take self-protective measures. A representative example of the sort of system for alerting the population in advance of a specific emergency, including providing information about what measures to take when it occurs, can be found in Box 4.5 below.

Box 4.5. Providing information about different scales of hazards and human induced threats to households

The Canadian government has worked together with the federal states, provinces and territories to develop the National Public Alerting System which provides rapid warning of imminent emergencies and hazards to the public. The system gives the alert issuers of the different levels of emergency decision-making (Government of Canada, Federal Agencies, Provinces, Territories, and Authorised Municipal Agencies) to issue an alert through the National Alert and Aggregation and Dissemination system which then distributes it to media stations, social media companies, web-based applications and telecommunication distributors. Through those channels the public receives the alert and has the chance to respond and prepare appropriately for the emergency. This system has been updated regularly to address changes to exposures, such as the addition of wireless public alerting networks to in 2017. The system has been used since 2019 for several emergencies, such as flash floods, tornados, hurricanes, civil emergencies, wildfires, public health threats, dangerous animal sightings, drinking water related issues, and storms. The number of messages has exponentially increased: in 2019 a total of 131 alerts were issued and in 2022 the total amounts to 803.

Sources: (Canada – Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), n.d.[22]); (Public Safety Canada, Government of Canada, n.d.[23])

The risk of a potential human pandemic had been assessed by 24 out of 27 Respondents before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Information regarding this risk was also communicated widely by most Respondents (see Figure 4.3). Around four out of every five Respondents indicated they had communicated their assessment of human pandemic to officials across national government and national-level decision makers. Communication of the risk assessment was less prevalent to officials from sub-national levels of government and to other governments/international organisations. Overall, slightly more than half the Respondents stated they had communicated their risk assessment to the general public, to legislative bodies and to providers of critical infrastructure.

Figure 4.3. Communicating risk assessment of a human pandemic: target audiences

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Prior to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, several Adherents had already issued advice to their population on how to prepare themselves for a potential crisis, including the possibility of war. contains country case examples in Sweden and Poland following precisely this model already. These two examples feature a new dimension to risk communication that was not as present when the Recommendation was adopted, namely the more adversarial context surrounding geopolitical relations. In this context, a combination of factors converges to make risk communication more complex, while undermining its effectiveness. Public scepticism about government communications is compounded by misinformation and disinformation campaigns led by malicious states and non-states actors. These factors amplify distrust and advocate non-compliance with government suggested measures (OECD, 2020[24]) (OECD, 2022[25]).

Box 4.6. Readiness for crises and war in Poland and Sweden

Both Poland and Sweden have produced and disseminated guides to help citizens take proactive steps in their own preparedness and resilience in case of crisis and war.

In Sweden, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) sent a brochure to all citizens detailing steps for emergency preparedness, warning systems and attack preparedness, including conventional and cyber-attacks. The brochure gives home preparedness advice such as stockpiling food and water, emergency phone numbers, and ways to contribute to collective security and preparedness such as joining non-profit organisations, faith communities and other third sector organisations.

In Poland, the guide was released by the Government Centre for Security (RCB). It gives guidelines on planning and preparing for families such as identifying shelter, and preparing stock and evacuation kit. It also encourages awareness of disinformation threats, and offers explanations of the different types of emergency warnings and alarms and appropriate behaviours. The guide also provides specific advice to citizens on how to behave and act for first aid and rescue, hostage situation, temporary foreign occupation, power shortages, CBRN attacks, shooting and bomb incidents

Source: (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Government of Sweden, n.d.[26]); (Government Centre for Security (RCB), Government of Poland, n.d.[27])

Another important shift that has occurred since the Recommendation was adopted is the increase in the level of scepticism and mistrust from the public that is present when attempting to communicate science behind critical risk management decisions, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic or longer-term climate risk scenarios. A potential solution for increasing confidence and trust in science is more effective citizen and stakeholder participation, and in particular participatory approaches are potentially very promising for better connecting science and civil society during crisis (OECD, 2023[28]).

A good country practice in France showcases how open science is used to better communicate potential climate risks and impacts under different climate scenarios in order to prompt the required mitigation and adaptation actions. The DRIAS portal makes available information on climate impacts from regional climate models developed and used in the main French research centres. This portal brings together both data mainly intended for professional users, and interactive maps representing climatic indices, associated with different layers of geographical information that can be consumed by a wider audience.

Consistent with findings in 2016, more Respondents reported risk communication activities that focus on raising public awareness of natural hazards than communication concerning national security risks, which tend to involve a restricted audience of central government officials and key decision makers. The Recommendation, however, calls for an all-hazards and threats approach, which encompasses human induced and security threats. Box 4.5 below contains an example from New Zealand where they have conducted such an exercise.

Box 4.7. ‘Long-term Insights Briefings’ to help New Zealand better prepare to meet future challenges and opportunities as a whole society

New Zealand’s Public Service Act 2020 (Schedule 6, clauses 8 and 9) places a new requirement on departmental chief executives to publish a Long-term Insights Briefing (a Briefing) at least once every three years. The Briefings are an opportunity to identify and explore issues that matter for the future wellbeing of the people of New Zealand. They provide an opportunity to enhance public debate on long-term issues and usefully contribute to future thinking on challenges New Zealand might face as a whole society by including – not only government agencies but also Māori, new migrants, business, academia, not-for-profit organisations, and the wider general public as part of the Briefings’ development.

The purpose of the Briefings is to make available to the public:

• information about medium and long-term trends, risks and opportunities that affect or may affect New Zealand and New Zealand society

• information and impartial analysis, including policy options for responding to these matters.

The Briefings are independent of ministers and are not government policy. They are presented as “think pieces on the future” intended to foster open discussion about future challenges and opportunities and possible ways forward. Examples of Briefings produced for this current round include:

• “Enabling active citizenship: public participation in government into the future”

• “Let’s talk about our national security: Engaging an increasingly diverse Aotearoa New Zealand on national security risks, challenges and opportunities”

• “The impact of automated vehicles operating on Aotearoa New Zealand Roads”

• “Preparing all young people for satisfying and rewarding working lives”

Source: (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2023[29])

New Zealand’s innovative approach highlights the potential benefits of engaging with the whole of society to better understand longer term risks. Identifying authorities to address such emerging risks and developing capabilities to manage them are amongst the potential areas where further work to implement the Recommendation could be useful.

Strengthening the mix of structural protection and non-structural measures to reduce critical risks

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to reinforce investment in prevention and mitigation efforts that limit the exposure of persons and core services to known hazards and reduce their vulnerability. Respondents reported on measures that generally fall within three categories: structural measures, non-structural measures and technological innovations that provide, enhance or inform protection against critical risks.

The Recommendation defines structural measures as “engineering or civil work prevention measures aimed at reducing exposure to hazards by protecting assets or communities, or controlling the variability of natural phenomena (e.g. dams or dikes for floods or storm surges, grids for rock falls, barriers for avalanches, antibomb walls or concrete blocks for terrorist attacks). It defines non-structural measures as those that “focus on the reduction of exposure and vulnerability through longer term planning and adaptation to hazard patterns and threats (e.g. raising public awareness, emergency preparedness and early warning systems, land use prescriptions, urban planning, building codes or the restoration of natural functions of ecosystems to buffer extreme hazards), and they also encompass organisational or regulatory measures such as hazard zoning, spatial planning, risk communication measures, and business continuity planning.

Respondents reported technological innovations that can be deployed before and during emergencies, such as mobile flood walls or real time weather forecasting. Improvements in artificial intelligence, a rise in computing power, and the accessibility of massive data sets could revolutionise scientific understanding of disaster risks and design of resilience policies more broadly.

When asked, only 5 out of 27 Respondents reported use of machine learning to look for patterns in data and make predictions about what can be expected in a given set of disaster circumstances. Published reports, however, indicate broader use of artificial intelligence tools in disaster management. In the United States, FEMA is developing the capability to understand the full extent of disaster impacts within 72 hours post-incident using Geospatial Damage Assessments. This analysis takes advantage of Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)-based modelling and remote sensing processes to provide initial situational awareness and expedited recovery planning. Achieving the 72-hour goal requires many components including artificial intelligence or machine learning image processing. The machine learning model helps expedite assessments and eliminate areas where there is no visible damage, reducing the need for manual analysis. Rapid assessments are especially useful when a large area with thousands of structures is impacted, for example in the aftermath of Midwest tornadoes over 62,000 structures were assessed in one hour. Additional benefits of this technology include cost reducing of field team deployments and provision of vital imagery analysis for those who do deploy. (FEMA, 2023[30]) In Japan (Fujitsu, 2019[31]) artificial intelligence has been used to improve the timeliness of flood detection, the accuracy and lead times of forecasts, and the efficacy of emergency communications by combining a wealth of geospatial observation, global luminescence and river flow data. Such innovations are constantly improving the performance and design both of structural and non-structural measures. Several Respondents suggested that international co-operation has an important role to share knowledge about innovative technologies in disaster risk reduction, including studying barriers to their uptake and diffusion.

When asked close to half the Respondents reported that their line ministries are expected to take an all-hazards approach when making decisions regarding risk reduction measures, as can be seen in Figure 4.4. This means their investments in protective measures consider the full range of identified risks.

Figure 4.4. Line ministries that take all-hazards approach to reduction of critical risks

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

The questionnaire invited Respondents to name three top priorities for public investments to reduce critical risks. The most frequently cited priority for disaster risk reduction was “increasing public awareness of critical risks”, which was also the most frequently cited priority in 2016, and is also the less costly. The next most commonly cited priorities were to increase investments in early warning systems as well as increasing investments in new protective infrastructure. Aside from increasing public awareness, few Respondents identified non-structural measures to reduce hazard exposures as a priority (see Figure 4.5].

Figure 4.5. Priorities for disaster risk prevention and mitigation measures

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Early warning systems (EWS) provide timely alerts about impending hazards, which gives individuals and communities more time to take self-protection and recovery measures or avoid a hazardous event altogether. The uptake of modern early warning systems over the past 50 years is credited with major reductions in disaster mortality rates, chiefly in developed economies with means to develop or purchase them (World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2021[32]). EWS illustrate how the trend in digital government of data driven decision making is highly relevant to governance of critical risks, both in disaster risk reduction policy and crisis management. Respondents noted, however, the importance of not relying solely on outputs of digital monitoring systems to take crisis management decisions such as issuing alerts and evacuation orders. These decisions require weighing numerous human factors and deciding whether to err on the side of safety at the risk of major inconvenience and costly disruptions.

Respondents reported adoption of early warning systems as key technological advances for climate risk adaptation, especially for flood and flash-flood risk, tropical storms, forest fires, heatwaves and droughts. EWS comprise hazard or threat detection, analysis, forecasting, and issuance of warnings followed by decisions on such responses as rapid mitigation measures (e.g. stacking sandbags along river banks), taking to specialised shelter or mobilising an organised evacuation.

Additional economic sectors benefit indirectly from EWS, such as transportation, e.g. when exposed roads or rails are closed in advance and traffic is rerouted. Tourism also benefits when early warning systems ensures tourist groups are warned not to access hazardous areas or to avoid outdoor activities during extreme weather periods.

Respondents reported EWS are directly relevant not only for safety of persons but also for resilience measures in such economic sectors as health, agriculture, forestry, buildings, coastal and urban planning.

The costs associated with satellite-based disaster early warning systems has been one of the main barriers to implementation in past. Respondents reported the implementation of many regional EWS initiatives where costs are shared. Among recent developments at regional level are EWS that provide services and products for more than one specific type of risk, so-called multi-risk early warning systems. In the European Union, Meteoalarm is a joint effort from the Network of European Meteorological Services that provides alerts in Europe for extreme weather events, including heavy rain with risk of flooding, severe thunderstorms, gale-force winds, heatwaves, forest fires, fog, snow or extreme cold with blizzards, avalanches or severe coastal tides ((n.a.), 2023[33])

The ‘Copernicus Climate Change Service’ includes an ‘Emergency Management Service’ that supports disaster management by providing timely and accurate geospatial information derived from satellite remote sensing and other sources. Copernicus provides forecasting services for fire risks covering the globe (Wetterhall and ORegan, 2023[34]), and flood risks in Europe (Copernicus EMS, 2022[35]). EFAS is the first operational European system monitoring and forecasting floods across Europe. It supports preparatory measures before major flood events strike, particularly in the large trans-national river basins and throughout Europe in general. EFAS provides probabilistic, medium range flood forecasts to the relevant national and regional authorities.

EuroHEAT quantifies the health effects of heat in European cities and identifies options for improving health systems’ preparedness for and response to the effects of heat-waves. The online heatwave forecast displays probability (0–100 %) for the upcoming ten days in a colour-coded map. The tool also links to national heat / health warning systems (Climate-ADAPT, 2023[36]).

In addition to these large-scale, pan-European initiatives mentioned above, Respondents reported the development of highly innovative hazard specific EWS implemented at national, sub-national and local levels. In Austria, a weather monitoring and EWS has been developed specifically for Alpine region hazards to railways (Climat-ADAPT, 2022). In Hungary, a local EWS provides alerts about urban heatwaves and forest fires (Climat-ADAPT, 2023). In Italy, the Emilia Romagna region has a Weather Alert Web Portal in parallel to the development and refinement of real-time hydro-meteorological monitoring technologies and a widespread risk communication programme. In Sogn og Fjordane (Norway) EWS are dealing with multi-hazards (avalanches, landslides, storm surges and flooding). As part of the National Heatwave Contingency Plan in Portugal, daily alerts related to extreme temperature and heat waves are communicated to the general public. The alerts indicate what protection measures must be carried out to protect the population during periods of elevated temperatures. Various training and communication activities aimed at vulnerable populations are defined by the Plan (Diegues, 2023[37]).

Box 4.8. Innovations in Early Warning Alert Systems

In the United States, the University of California, Berkeley developed a publicly available early warning system for earthquakes in California, Oregon and Washington. Notifications are made available on smartphones through the ‘My shake’ app. The notifications provide lead time that might permit recipients to reach zones or positions of safety. Warning notifications might arrive before, during or after an earthquake depending on a user’s location, the depth of the earthquake and its path through different geological layers. MyShake collects motion data from a user’s smartphone sensors and uses a patented neural network to determine whether that motion fits the model of an earthquake.

New Zealand launched an official emergency alert system that broadcasts a signal form cell towers to mobile phones. The novelty of this system is that persons within the territory are unable to decline reception of alert messages, which can be sent by: the National Emergency Management Agency, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, NZ Police, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Ministry of Health, and Ministry for Primary Industries. Messages are sent in case of a threat to life, well-being, property or occasionally for testing.

Chile initiated an emergency alert system whereby its National Office of Emergencies (ONEMI) sends a message to all compatible mobile phones for risks of tsunami, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and forest fires. Alerts are sent to the mobile phones on a reserved frequency so that they will not be affected by network saturation, which frequently occurs during emergencies. Since 2017 the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications declared that all phones commercialised in the country should be compatible with the emergency alert system.

In Greece, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection is responsible for the Public Safety Answering Point 112, which answers and responds to calls to the 112 Single EU Emergency Number. Upgrades to the 112 emergency service in 2020 include a new service, the 112 Citizen Alert System, which enables alerts to the entire population in a given geographical area by text message and to issue instructions on what to do in the event of an emergency. The service does not require an app or subscription. Messages are sent to all cell phones in an area at risk, both in Greek and in English. The tool aims to strengthen a culture of immediate evacuation, which is especially important for wildfires. During the summer of 2021 only one person died during a period of multiple forest fires and the mega- fire in Evia. During the fires of summer 2023, use of the 112 number helped authorities evacuate more than 20.000 visitors securely from the island of Rhodes.

Source: (Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection, n.d.[38]); (California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) / Earthquake Warning California, n.d.[39]); (National Emergency Office (Servicio Nacional de Emergencia, ONEMI), Government of Chile, n.d.[40]); (Get Ready – Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM), Government of Aotearoa New Zealand, n.d.[41])

Concerning early warning systems, the Recommendation goes beyond natural hazards and specifically calls on Adherents to strengthen surveillance, monitoring and alert networks to reduce critical risks associated with threats to public health. By detecting and monitoring outbreaks early on, public health officials can take proactive measures to prevent the spread of infectious disease. Nearly all Respondents (24 out of 27) indicated that, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, their crisis management and risk governance systems included explicit means for linking to international public health surveillance and early warning systems. The pandemic revealed, however, significant gaps in disease surveillance capacity and financing worldwide. Only 3 out of 27 Respondents identified strengthening infectious disease surveillance systems as a priority in disaster risk reduction.

Investment in disease surveillance has increased in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet this large-scale emergency financing is focused on SARS COVID-2, which continues the trend of disease specific investment rather than disease surveillance in general. Current funding needs are estimated to be far greater than financing levels. A G20 High Level Independent Panel estimated an additional USD 74 billion in public investment is needed for robust surveillance and detection over the next 5 years to prevent and detect emerging infectious diseases (Financing the Global Commons for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 2021[42]).

Respondents are also prioritising investment in new physical protective infrastructure and maintenance of existing protective infrastructure assets. These include innovations in long established disaster risk reduction measures such as coastal flood barriers, river levies and seismic retrofitting as well as erosion control measures. Such measures can include the use of nature-based solutions such as mangrove forests, sand dunes and coral reefs, whose conservation and/or restoration can reduce the physical impacts of certain hazards (OECD, 2021[43]); (OECD, 2019[44]). Such public works constitute significant public investments and help mitigate the effects of natural hazards while reducing damages (OECD, 2021[45]).

Relatively few Respondents reported relocation of residents living in highly exposed hazard areas as a priority for disaster risk reduction. Though the inconvenience factor is high, relocation may be justified on the basis of public safety and repetitive claims for state sponsored indemnity following a disaster. Sea-level rise will increasingly affect coastal developments in years and decades to come. Similarly, few Respondents considered enforcement of building codes as a top three priority despite evidence that they are especially effective at reducing property losses from earthquakes and tropical storms. A study in one country of 18 million buildings constructed since 2000 found jurisdictions with modern building codes would avoid at least USD 32 billion in direct losses from disasters over a 20-year period (FEMA, 2020[46]) . Similarly, studies suggest that structural improvements alone can reduce wildfire risk by up to 40%, reducing losses by five times compared to highly flammable structures (OECD, 2023[47]).

Box 4.9. Strengthening structural protection and non-structural measures

Japan has invested in disaster risk reduction measures co-ordinated with urban planning and territorial management policies by combining conventional structural measures with nature-based solutions such as forest conservation, in their prevention and mitigation efforts. Through the installation and growth of coastal forests as protection and attenuation methods against tsunamis and other natural hazards, and pairing these with comprehensive community education campaigns, Japan has been able to increase the resilience of some of its most vulnerable communities against tsunamis.

Using research on the vulnerabilities and exposures of infrastructure to known natural hazards Japan has been a world leader in seismic reinforcements and quake-proof technologies for infrastructure such as bridges and wharves. High rise buildings in highly populated areas are equipped with seismic reinforcements of columns and a seismic isolator to be less vulnerable to structural damages during earthquakes. City planning includes a multipolar decentralised structure to ensure less vulnerable transportation networks in times of evacuation, improvement of drainage systems, and a higher resilience to disasters in densely populated areas. The central concept is to develop urban plans that reduce overcrowded, central urban districts and increase redundancy in transportation systems.

Source: (Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan – Disaster Management Bureau, Cabinet Office, n.d.[48])

Respondents also prioritised the integration of hazard zoning into land-use planning as a risk reduction measure. By zoning local areas according to their level of hazard and restricting development in high-risk areas, communities can reduce their exposures to natural hazards. A good country case example is found in France, where risk information is integrated into land use and urban planning at the municipal level (see Box 4.10).

In Mexico, the National Centre for Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) has developed over the last 20 years an innovative web tool, the National Risk Atlas, which features data from risk assessments for natural and man-made phenomena, including information on exposures and vulnerabilities of the population, assets and infrastructure. The collected information on the tool is accessible online for federal states and integrates data, tools, maps, and applications. It is also available to the public and businesses to inform them about assets exposed to natural or man-made hazards. National legislation on disaster risk management explicitly recognises the Risk Atlas as a tool for supporting the creation and implementation of comprehensive risk reduction public policies. The Atlas is, therefore, actively used in decision-making on national and local level in risk management, including the development of critical infrastructure. The National Territorial Planning Strategy, which sets out the principles for urban development and growth, incorporates the information from the Risk Atlas at the national, regional and municipal level. By 2019, already more than one fifth of municipalities had a fully developed local Risk Atlas.

Box 4.10.  Incorporating risk information in national and local land use planning

In France, a law was introduced in 2021 to consolidate the country’s civil protection system. This law included a number of provisions concerning changes to the requirement for communal safety plans. The law extends the scope of municipalities subject to the obligation to establish a communal safety plan (PCS), a tool that determines, according to known risks, the immediate measures for guaranteeing public safety and protecting people, communicating hazard exposure information, and establishing the means for preparing for a potential “civil protection event”.

Until then, only municipalities with a PPRN (natural risk prevention plan) or located within the scope of a PPI (special intervention plan), i.e. located near a dangerous installation such as a nuclear power station, a dam, etc., were subject to this obligation. Since the introduction of the Loi Matras, municipalities subject to major flood, seismic, volcanic or cyclonic risks, as well as those whose territory includes a forest exposed to the risk of fire, must also draw up a communal safety plan (PCS).

In addition, an inter-municipal safety plan (PICS) must now be adopted in all Public Establishments of Inter-municipal Co-operation (EPCI) wherever at least one member municipality is subject to the obligation to draw up a municipal safety plan.

According to the government’s estimates, these new measures will require approximately 8,200 additional municipalities to implement a communal safety plan (PCS). If we add the municipalities that were already subject to this obligation but have not yet done so, the government estimates that around 10,800 municipalities will have to draw up a communal safety plan (PCS). As for the inter-municipal safety plans (PICS), they will concern 1,125 EPCI.

Sources: (Secretariat / CENAPRED (Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres), Government of Mexico, 2022[49]); (National Risk Atlas / Government of Mexico, n.d.[50]); (Government of Mexico – National Territorial Planning Authority, n.d.[51]); (Government of France / Legifrance, 2021[52])

In Korea, the Comprehensive Plan for Natural Hazard Mitigation (CPNHM) is a comprehensive compendium of natural hazard mitigation plans from each local government. It contains specific strategies and action plans of each local government for combating natural hazard risk factors arising from area-specific geophysical and climate-related causes. Such strategies and action plans are products of risk assessments tailored to local hazards. Local governments that have high drought-risk regions within their jurisdiction review their water resource management strategies and include them in the CPNHM to secure and invest mid- and long-term funding for related programmes.

Nature-based solutions (NbS) are another type of measure to reduce the impact of natural hazards (OECD, 2021[43]). Some examples of such measures include the protection and restoration of riverbeds and wetlands, coral reefs, mangrove forests, urban green areas, sand dunes and other ecosystems that can play a role in protecting people and assets from hazards. These measures typically mitigate hazard exposures or vulnerabilities to coastal flooding, riverine flooding, urban flooding and drought, as well as to urban heatwaves and tsunamis, among other hazards. While reducing risk, these measures also provide other co-benefits to society such as quality of life for local communities, creating habitat for local species, and contributing to climate mitigation goals (OECD, 2020[53]). Although only 2 out of 27 Respondents reported NbS as high-priority risk reduction investments, numerous examples of government funded projects showcase their positive impacts (OECD, 2023[54]) (OECD, 2021[43]) (OECD, 2020[53]).

Box 4.11. Restoring Wetlands in Southwest Queensland – Australia

In Australia, funding from the Queensland and federal Governments is helping the implementation of projects to restore the wetlands and floodplains in the arid southwest of Queensland. These projects include various targeted interventions, such as mitigating scald and erosion, rehabilitating bore drains, managing property infrastructure, and changing grazing practices and water management to slow high velocity runoff flows. Southern Queensland Landscapes, a community owned organisation, has collaborated with land managers and communities to address the long-term decline of the once highly productive and biodiverse floodplains and wetlands of the Bulloo, Paroo, and Warrego River systems. This has in turn helped reduce risks to other wetlands. The restoration efforts aim to increase flood and drought resilience, ecological function, biodiversity, and regenerative productivity. With the combination of innovative technologies and community knowledge, the restoration partners are developing cost-effective ways to address the rangelands’ decline, and the results are already contributing to social and economic benefits to the wider community. The process includes changes to land use and management as well as the strategic placement of “slow the flow” works to slow, spread, and filter runoff in high velocity flows, repair erosion, reduce soil loss, and rehydrate areas.

Source: (Department of Climate Change Energy the Environment and Water, 2023[55])

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to use cost/ benefit analyses (CBA) to maximise the cost-effectiveness of public and private investments that reduce the exposure of housing and commercial facilities. Demonstrating the positive ratio of costs to benefits not only reinforces the rationale for public investment in disaster risk reduction, it helps compare competing project proposals that seek public financing. In the United States, a major study on disaster mitigation measures found that the nationwide average benefit-cost ratio of building retrofit measures for seismic hazards was 13:1. (National Institute of Building Sciences and Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2019[56])

When asked, only 10 out of 27 Respondents indicated CBA of protective infrastructure projects was a requirement in their country. Similarly, only a small proportion of Respondents that do require CBA indicated they use it to inform the design of resilience measures (see Figure 4.6). The questionnaire results reveal much room for improvement concerning not only the use of cost / benefit analysis overall, but also concerning the governance and methodology used. Japan provides a good case example in the use of CBA for structural measures (see Box 3.27). Similarly, according to the 2022 OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, less than half of OECD Respondents (12 out of 26) require climate adaptation measures to be integrated into the design of transport infrastructure projects. Only 9 out of 26 systematically use climate resilience criteria to inform project selection and prioritisation, mainly through CBA and multi-criteria analysis (OECD, 2023[57]).

Amongst the 10 Respondents that reported using CBA, either by requirement or voluntarily, only 7 reported a government mandated discount rate for use in its calculation. Only 4 Respondents reported that a specific threshold ratio of cost to benefit should be achieved for a project or subsidy to be approved. Likewise, only 4 Respondents reported that CBA is conducted more than once in a project life cycle, despite the dynamic hazard and vulnerability conditions surrounding many structural measures. Respondents reported the need to improve assessing the cost-effectiveness of non-structural measures.

Since the 2017 Report, Adherents have discussed in a dedicated workshop of the High Level Risk Forum whether one obstacle to investment in structural protection measures is that mandated discount rates are not revised frequently enough. As a result, many disaster risk reduction project proposals fail to achieve the minimum cost/benefit ratio required for project approval or a government financial subsidy. For some Respondents, this means that a portion of the annual budget dedicated to disaster risk reduction goes unused. While the questionnaire did not gather information on whether Adherents require CBA for non-structural measures, several Respondents reported it is required as part of Regulatory Impact Analysis for such disaster risk reduction measures as land use decisions.

Figure 4.6. Use of cost benefit analyses in structural protection measures

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Box 4.12. Governance of project appraisals and cost/ benefit methodology in public works projects

In Japan, project appraisals and cost / benefit analysis are conducted before public works are adopted, and every three to five years after adoption to evaluate project efficiency. Committees for project appraisal (consisting of academic, business, or legal experts) are established for national and local entities responsible for project implementation. The committees assess the need, costs and benefits, progress, possibilities for cost reduction, and the continuity of projects. The appraisal results and associated documents are made open to the public to ensure the transparency of decision making.

Different CBA methodologies can be found according to the type of project. This generally means different types of costs are included in the analysis, and usually include costs of construction, operations and maintenance. Benefits typically include estimated disaster damages averted over the life span of the asset, but might also include a monetisation of protection of the natural environment or recreational utilisation.

Source: (World Bank / Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), n.d.[58])

Encouraging business continuity planning with focus on critical infrastructure operators

Business continuity planning (BCP) constitutes a key element to reduce the potential disruption of the supply of goods and services, especially in vital systems such as electricity, gas, water, transport, telecommunications, food and health. After a disaster, the economic recovery of a country or region depends heavily on the continued productive capacities of such essential services and might require specific recovery programmes. For public and private sector organisations alike, the first step in business continuity planning is to model the potential impacts and consequences of a hazard on an organisation’s entire range of activities. They must distinguish essential functions and assets in their organisations from what can be neglected temporarily.

Beyond the continuity of essential services, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed widespread vulnerability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to shock events, both on the supply and demand side (OECD, 2020[59]) In all OECD countries, SMEs account for the vast majority of companies, value added and employment. The pandemic led to reduction in the supply of labour, as workers were ill or needed to look after children or other dependents while schools were closed and movements of people were restricted. Furthermore, supply chains were interrupted leading to shortages of parts and intermediate goods. On the demand side, a dramatic and sudden loss of demand and revenue for SMEs severely affects their ability to function, and/or causes severe liquidity shortages. The tourism and transportation were particularly affected, also contributing to reduced business and consumer confidence. These impacts were a source of liquidity position and even business survival for a high number of SME in OECD countries.

The Recommendation specifically calls on Adherents to develop standards and toolkits designed to manage risks to operations or the delivery of core services. When asked about measures to encourage the private sector in business continuity planning, 21 out of 27 Respondents stated they issue standards or toolkits (compared to 28 out of 34 in 2016). When asked about critical infrastructure however, only 9 out of 27 Respondents reported that business continuity plans are mandatory for all critical infrastructure operators. An equal number of Respondents reported business continuity plans are voluntary. The remainder of Respondents noted BCP are mandatory for certain sectors of critical infrastructure or are mandatory for certain operators in certain sectors.

A notable practice is found in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office of Japan, which published the “Business Continuity Guidelines Third Edition – Strategies and Responses to Overcome All Crisis Events” in 2013. In 2019 the Cabinet Office published the ‘Fact-finding Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster Preparedness Initiatives’ which indicates the percentage of large companies that adopted business continuity plans had increased in two years (from 2018 to 2019) from 64% to 68%, and from 31% to 34% for medium-sized companies. The percentage of firms with business continuity plans either completed or in the process is much higher; approximately 83% of large companies and 53% of medium-sized companies are taking action (Japan Cabinet Office, 2022).

Aside from incentives found in sectoral regulations, relatively few Respondents reported providing incentives for operators of critical infrastructure to invest in resilience measures (compared to none in 2016). Among the regulated sectors identified most frequently by Respondents were hardening measures for water, gas and electricity.

Business continuity planning in critical infrastructure networks

Critical infrastructure networks constitute the backbone upon which modern and interconnected economic systems are built. The disruption of telecommunication services, water or energy supply, transportation or financing systems can cause significant harm to the well-being of citizens and incur adverse economic effects. Major shock events of all types, from natural hazards to industrial accidents, terrorist or cyber-attacks, have demonstrated the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure networks. The Recommendation on Digital Security of Critical Activities adopted by the OECD Council in 2019, provides policy guidance on cyber risk affecting critical infrastructure. In recognition that damage or disruption to critical infrastructure can lead to cascading effects across sectors and sometimes across national borders the Recommendation on Governance of Critical Risks calls on Adherents to take several measures.

Specifically, the Recommendation calls on Adherents to identify interdependencies between critical systems. Only 12 out of 27 Respondents reported that they analyse interdependencies between critical infrastructure assets, systems or functions. Many initiatives are conducted on a sub-national basis since many infrastructure networks are not national in scale. For example, in Australia a project to map interdependencies of essential services, critical infrastructure and supply systems in the Northern Territory is undertaken to enhance understanding of the impacts and flow-on effects of disasters on regional and remote communities, which are highly vulnerable to disruptions to essential services and infrastructure.

In addition, identifying interdependencies presupposes several steps, including whether Adherents have identified critical sectors and use a methodology to assess criticality. Indeed an enabling policy framework is usually a prerequisite to foster the stakeholder co-operation necessary to undertake such technical analysis, consisting of a national strategy and institutional leadership to co-ordinate stakeholders across multiple sectors. Many Respondents have established working groups or council across government in co-operation with sub-national level of government. In Canada, the federal government meets with provincial and territorial government critical infrastructure leads on a regular basis via its Federal/ Provincial/ Territorial Critical Infrastructure Working Group, where members share information on ongoing policy and program-related activities, and discuss challenges that are being faced.

When asked 28 out of 30 Respondents reported that they had defined critical infrastructure in their country. The distinction between infrastructure sectors, assets and functions has become an important one for Respondents to distinguish the merely important from what is truly critical. Overly broad definitions can result in overly broad regulations or plans that do not significantly add to national resilience. Denmark defines it as “infrastructure – including facilities, systems, processes, networks, technologies, assets and services – that is necessary to maintain or restore vital societal functions”.

27 out of 30 Respondents reported they have a national policy instrument or strategy on either critical infrastructure protection or resilience. The most frequent policy objectives stated in the national strategies are continuity of government functions (24/30), ensuring public safety and security (23/30) and ensuring economic resilience (20/30). Only 7 out of 30 Respondents reported as an objective of their strategy the provision of infrastructure services at affordable costs. This difference implies a strong focus in the national policy instruments for resilience measures without explicit consideration of costs, which can significantly impede policy implementation.

When asked, 20 out of 30 Respondents reported they have established a cross-government policy co-ordination mechanism for critical infrastructure resilience, most of which include link to critical infrastructure operators in the public and private sectors. These mechanisms facilitate understanding of infrastructure systems and the interdependencies within them that could lead to cascade effects. Overall, Respondents show a high degree of co-operation, though they report that information sharing on functional dependencies between operators, as well as their exposures and vulnerabilities to risks, could still improve.

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to foster a trusted information sharing environment through which operators of critical infrastructure partner in this effort. When asked, 19 out of 27 Respondents reported that they have in place regulations or policies to support information sharing about risks or vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure. Concerning incentives for operators to share information, 14 out of 30 Respondents reported reciprocal access to information as the most prevalent incentive, followed by access to complementary services (7/30). Among the additional types of incentives reported were invitations to joint risk assessments, exercises, and schooling to improve crisis management skills.

As mutual trust between operators, and between operators and government interlocutors, is key to sharing information, Respondents were asked what measures are taken to ensure security and confidentiality of sensitive information. A range of measures were reported, including use of secure platforms, restriction of access to personnel with security clearances, security vetting, and signing a legal deed of confidentiality.

Figure 4.7. Information shared by critical infrastructure operators

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

On the basis of information they gather, 14 out of 30 Respondents reported they have established an inventory of critical assets nationwide. Further, 13 out of 30 Respondents reported that once critical infrastructure is identified there is a standard process in place to assess their vulnerabilities, and 10 out of 30 reported a standard process to assess level of resilience. Despite these analyses, only 7 out of 30 Respondents reported they possess a comprehensive national picture of weak points where potential failures are more likely to happen.

The Recommendation calls on Adherents to encourage businesses, and specifically critical infrastructure operators, to ensure continuity of core services in the aftermath of a shock event. When asked, 23 out of 30 Respondents reported they had developed resilience guidelines for critical infrastructure operators. Ireland has developed guidance to government departments and agencies and public and private operators of essential services on how to identify what is critical infrastructure (Government Task Force on Emergency Planning, 2021[60]). The guidance adopts a risk-based approach that is societal centric and is focused on the impact of the loss of services to Irish society rather than on the losses incurred to the owner or operator of that service.

In addition, Respondents take various steps to encourage, guide or otherwise support the private sector to ensure business continuity in case a critical risk occurs. 24 out of 30 Respondents reported organisation of emergency preparedness drills or exercises with the private sector. Typically, this involves exercising the company business continuity plan, crisis communications and stress tests of emergency response structures and real time decision making. Further, 17 out of 30 Respondents reported that they ask identified critical infrastructure operators to conduct vulnerability/resilience analysis of the assets, systems or functions. In 9 /17 Respondents this is voluntary and in 8 out of 17 it is mandatory.

Box 4.13. Encouraging the adoption of consistent business continuity practices

The Government of Japan has operated a third-party certification system for companies as “Organisations Contributing to National Resilience” when they actively engage in business continuity planning. As of the end of March 2021, 213 organisations have received certification. Through evaluations from experts and periodic updates every two years, further improvement of initiatives is promoted, and 11 incentives such as preferential interest rates for business continuity planning loans are provided by the Japan Finance Corporation.

In Korea, business continuity plans are mandatory for certain public and private companies that provide goods and services deemed essential and strategic, and they are encouraged other companies. Policies for incentivising business continuity plans are designed to increase the responsibility and investment of the private sector in disaster risk reduction by changing perceptions and raising awareness. The government has established programs such as the ‘Safety Culture Campaigns, Excellence in-DRR Accreditation’, to incentivise the private sector to increase disaster risk reduction measures with reduced insurance premiums and tax benefits. The Korea Safety Culture Awards were introduced to recognise organisations and individuals who have made substantial contributions to the society-wide safety culture, and to identify and disseminate best practices in safety.

Source: (Republic of Korea – Government, 2022[61]); (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2021[62])

Figure 4.8. Government measures to facilitate business continuity for critical infrastructure

Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on the Governance of Critical Risks

Respondents noted that the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have prompted them to give more focus to enhanced resilience of supply chains for essential goods, services and strategically important economic activities. In Australia the Office of Supply Chain Resilience, within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, monitors vulnerabilities in critical supply chains and co-ordinates responses to improve ongoing access to essential goods. Research on natural and human induced shocks has improved understanding of risks to road and rail supply chains, including research on heavy rainfall flooding of the East-West rail corridor, the ongoing challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, and shortages of diesel exhaust additive AdBlue that challenged fuel security. The National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy provides a framework to increase Australia’s supply chain performance and resilience. In March 2022, the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) commenced a review of Australia’s road and rail supply chain resilience. The review identifies the supply chain routes which are most critical to Australian communities and businesses, the risks they face, and takes stock of work mitigate risks.

Respondents noted the role of building risk scenarios to anticipate how such supply chain disruptions could occur and plan resilience measures. While this development goes further than the focus of the Recommendation on business continuity of critical infrastructure, it follows the same logic, which is to avoid, reduce and recover quickly from shock events that can significantly disrupt economic flows. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the criticality of private sector suppliers in delivering basic public services, such as health services. This prompted a broad recognition of the strategic dimensions of public procurement which is supported by the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement. Respondents have sought to address these challenges through a variety of means, ranging from better co-ordination and visibility on public authorities’ procurement needs to increased advice to contracting authorities to using their established frameworks for emergency procurement for ensuring they could respond to the emerging needs and disruptions in an agile way, while still managing the increased exposure of procurement systems to integrity risks through measures aimed at improving transparency and accountability related to emergency contracting (OECD, 2020[63]).

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, when export restrictions during periods of simultaneous supply and demand side shocks led to shortages of many goods and materials, Adherents have sought to implement non-structural measures to address future disruptions to supply chains for essential goods. An example is the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI), a European Commission policy tool to facilitate the functioning of the European Union Single Market in times of crisis. The SMEI aims to provide greater transparency and co-ordination in order to ensure the free movement of goods, services, and persons, and is expected to act as a legally binding tool to address future crises. If activated, the SMEI would establish a comprehensive crisis-response architecture, relating to different levels of impacts to the Single Market. Its provisions establish contingency plans and taking early action prior to a crisis, as well as measures foreseen under a vigilance mode that includes monitoring supply chains of strategically important goods and services and a framework for building up strategic reserves in these areas. The SMEI includes a framework for an emergency mode with principles to be followed by European Union Member States that prevent specific restrictions to the free movement of crisis-relevant goods and services, unless these are a justified measure of last-resort (European Commission, 2022[64])_.

Box 4.14. International co-operation in monitoring supply chain vulnerabilities

Australia and the United Kingdom have launched a joint supply chain resilience initiative to provide support and capability building to interested countries through shared insights and approaches (Australian Government/ UK Government, 2022). Its four-module framework consists in:

• Module 1: Identify, analyse and assessment of global supply chain risks and challenges;

• Module 2: Proportionate and effective actions to mitigate resilience to supply chain risks;

• Module 3: Monitoring and regular review process to adapt to evolving global pressures;

• Module 4: Governance through a centralised body within government responsible for co-ordinating responses to supply chain risks.

Source: (Department of Industry, Science and Resources (Australia), n.d.[65])

The COVID-19 pandemic and impacts of Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine brought into sharp focus the strategic challenges associated with disruptions to critical supplies (OECD, 2021[66]). Several Adherents have already designated institutions responsible for co-ordinating stockpiles and addressing the continuity of supply of essential goods. Finland, Switzerland, Denmark and Canada provide useful case examples of leading practices in this field (see Box 3.30).

As noted in the 2017 Report, Members States of the European Union maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and other petroleum products (Council Directive 2009/ 119/ EC). Members of the International Energy Agency hold emergency stockpiles of 1.5 billion barrels. They are required to ensure oil stock levels equivalent to no less than 90 days of net imports and to be ready to collectively respond to severe supply disruptions affecting the global oil market. In addition to stockpiling crude oil as a resilience measure, several Respondents diversify natural gas supplies and monitor that supplies do not exceed an established percentage from a single country of origin. This includes CORES in Spain, which has been a model for other entities in Europe such as the Société Anonyme de Gestion de Stocks de Sécurité (SAGESS), in France; the Organismo Centrale di Stoccaggio Italiano (OCSIT), in Italy; or the Entidade Nacional para o Setor Energético (ENSE), in Portugal.

Box 4.15. Institutions responsible for strategic stockpiles and supply of essential goods

In Finland, provisions on emergency stockpiling are provided in the legislation and responsibility is shared between the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) and companies. NESA is a central government organisation operating under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. It is responsible for maintaining national emergency stockpiles while companies and other key operators are responsible for compulsory stockpiling. Security stockpiling is based on agreements between relevant companies and NESA. In addition to emergency stockpiles owned by NESA (mainly grains and petroleum products), other stockpiled materials are agreed upon with the relevant companies to ensure that the products included in stockpiles circulate as part of the companies’ normal operations. NESA supports such measures by providing companies critical to security of supply with tools for developing their continuity management.

In Switzerland, companies are responsible under the Federal Constitution for ensuring the availability of goods and services. The federal government only intervenes in the event of a serious shortage when companies are no longer able to fulfil this function. The state intervenes in the market gradually and in a subsidiary manner through targeted measures, for example to make up for a shortage of vital goods and services. The National Economic Supply (NES) is the umbrella organisation of the Federal Office for National Economic Supply (FONES). It helps companies and industries to improve their preparations, promoting the exchange of information between the actors involved. The organisation also prepares measures for the intervention phase. In the intervention phase, NES pursues its supply objectives in stages, depending on the severity of the shortage. The FONES is responsible for all administrative matters relating to national economic supply and supervises compulsory storage, for example for oil products, sugar, and rice. It also co-ordinates co-operation between the federal agencies involved, the armed forces and civil protection, and is responsible for informing the population. The administration of NES is organised into six divisions: Energy, Food, Therapeutic Products, Logistics, ICT and Industry, as well as a stockpiling section within the Federal Office.

In Denmark, the Critical Supply Agency was established in August 2020 under the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for creating a national overview of stocks of protective equipment and consumption across sectors. Drawing from the COVID-19 experience, the Agency developed a procurement and storage model in collaboration with the Agency for Security of Supply, regions and municipalities. It is preparing a national strategy for security of supply, which will include industrial and trade policy, as well as on strengthening the security of supply for socially important functions. In addition, the strategy will focus on strengthening crisis management during supply crises. The Board for Security of Supply co-ordinates with private actors and public authorities who are, or in the long term may be, involved in uncovering alternative sourcing options for critical resources. The Board for Security of Supply is in ongoing dialogue with Danish Business and Danish Industry, where a Business Forum has been established in co-operation. Meetings take place once a month. The participants include the Danish Critical Supply Agency, the Confederation of Danish Industry, the Danish Chamber of Commerce and other trade organisations, when relevant. Additional round table meetings take place every six months with trade organisations and private companies.

In Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada manages the National Emergency Strategic Stockpile (NESS), a federally-owned stockpile of medical assets. These assets include medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and social service supplies. Provinces and territories can request these assets during public health emergencies or events when their own resources are depleted or not immediately available. The NESS also provides emergency triage units called “mini-clinics”, which can adapt to emergency types and contain medical equipment and supplies. They also help health care professionals assess and offer primary care to non-critical patients.

Box 4.16. Supporting the enhanced resilience of essential services and industrial sectors

In Spain, the National Security Strategy foresees the development of a strategic reserve based on National Industrial Production Capacities (RECAPI). The reserve is intended to ensure access to resources of basic necessity in times of crisis that mitigates dependence on foreign sources. During the COVID-19 pandemic the government announced it would compile a collection of building blocks for future crises. The National Security Strategy 2021 sets out among its initiatives the creation of a strategic reserve based three key points:

• Identify the essential industrial resources of the different public administrations and the private sector corresponding to their respective areas of competence.

• To guarantee the supply of those goods and services that are considered to be of prime necessity and of a strategic nature.

• To safeguard the industrial base that supplies strategically important essential resources such as energy, food, water, electronic components, strategic materials, high-tech machinery, aeronautics, semiconductors, essential chemicals, medicine and health equipment.

In Sweden, the Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) provides guidance to companies to strengthen their preparedness for crises and war. The guidance helps companies identify socially important activities, ensure continuity management and availability of personnel for the business to function, protect company information and strengthen the company's security protection. The MSB website also provides concrete examples of social disturbances that can threaten companies and society at large while encouraging companies to use scenarios to support the planning of supply preparedness. MSB supports early collaboration between public and private sectors for better preparedness and development, as companies are responsible for their own contingency planning under crisis preparedness and total defence legislation. MSB also provides courses, trainings, reports and investigations to promote better understanding of preparedness for companies.

Sources: (Myndigheten för civilt försvar (Swedish Civil Defence Agency), Government of Sweden, n.d.[67]); (Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DSN), Gobierno de España, 2021[68])

Box 4.17. Overall assessment of implementation: Raising awareness of critical risks to mobilise stakeholders and foster investment in risk prevention and mitigation

The third principle of the Recommendation focuses on raising awareness of critical risks and encouraging actions to reduce and mitigate those risks. Implementation of this provision is advancing; however, key challenges remain.

Strong progress has been made in regular sharing of disaster risk information with international partners and institutions, a marked improvement from 2016. Steady progress has been made in the risk communication measures to inform citizens and businesses about critical risks and ways to minimise their impacts. However, there is still a lack of credible means to measure how increased risk communication translates into enhanced risk awareness that in turn leads to concrete risk reduction action. Consequently, risk mitigation measures often do not receive the financial support required for effective implementation, nor do policy makers have an informed view of the public’s risk tolerance. Adherents should consider administering dedicated public consultations that invite the public’s views on whether to support a range of mitigation actions, e.g. to adapt to climate risks, and use the opportunity to raise awareness and inform citizens about the critical risks they face.

All-hazards risk communication remains a challenge. Risk communication efforts focused on natural hazards are prevalent, however fewer than half the Respondents share information with owners and operators of critical infrastructure on the risks of malicious attacks. Adherents face a complex geo-political environment, where accurate information is obfuscated by misinformation and deliberate disinformation campaigns can undermine effective risk and crisis communication. Government communications can be attacked with counter narratives and ‘alternative facts’ that confuse and erode trust in public institutions, raising the need for novel practices, for example the use of trusted influencers to communicate facts to the public.

Notable progress has been made in use of both structural and non-structural measures to reduce community vulnerability and adapt to climate risks, but additional efforts are needed. Investments and uptake of early warning systems illustrate how data driven decision making is highly relevant to governance of critical risks, both in disaster risk reduction policy and crisis management. Many Adherents have adopted legislation or strategies since 2016 that declare disaster risk reduction is a priority. It will be important to provide financial means to implement prevention and mitigation priorities, e.g. by linking to national development strategies and investment programmes.

Room for progress is apparent in the scant use of cost / benefit analysis for the approval of publicly funded protective infrastructure projects and resilience measure. Mapping vulnerabilities across critical infrastructure networks also remains a patchwork, and only rarely culminates in a comprehensive national picture of weak points where potential failures are more likely to happen. Many Adherents possess a national strategy for critical infrastructure resilience that establishes an enabling environment for cross sectoral co-operation, but more progress is needed to identify interdependencies and commit to investments in targeted resilience measures. Protective measures alone cannot ensure speedy restoration of critical infrastructure, thus more emphasis is needed on critical infrastructure resilience. Business continuity planning for critical infrastructure has advanced, but room for progress remains as disruptions to essential services constitute a significant share of total economic losses due to disasters.

The COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s war against Ukraine have altered the context of security of supply for some essential goods, services and resources. Respondents are extending their vision of public/ private partnerships for resilience beyond critical infrastructure. How to operationalise these ambitions beyond stockpiling essential goods, without creating harmful interference in markets, is a challenge that governments and private sector companies alike are keen to address.

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