Tracking Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks

Executive summary

Implementation

Overall, Adherents to the 2014 OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Critical Risks have continued to make progress in implementing most provisions of the Recommendation’s five key principles. They have used the Recommendation in the design of new strategic policy initiatives and in revisions to existing national strategies on governance of critical risks. Several Adherents have also used it to assess national policies, to review legislation and to reorganise institutions with responsibility related to managing critical risks.

Country risk governance as the foundation for national resilience and responsiveness

An increasing number of Adherents have developed national strategies on the governance of critical risks and most Adherents updated their existing strategies at least once since 2016. These national strategies generally adopt an all-hazards and transboundary approach to risk governance and set forth objectives concerning most phases of the disaster risk management cycle.

All Adherents have established consultative mechanisms to coordinate stakeholder input in disaster risk and crisis management policy decisions. Greater efforts are still needed, however, to foster a whole-of-government approach to building resilience. The COVID-19 pandemic underscores the importance of regulatory flexibility, clear emergency authorities with appropriate time limits and oversight, and incentives for the private and voluntary sectors to strengthen capacities for response to a massive scale crisis.

National strategies on governance of critical risks increasingly include priority policy topics, such as assessing emerging climate risks, concurrent and multi-risk events, the impacts of mis- and disinformation on crisis management, and security of supply for essential goods. Integration of these themes into strategic frameworks can help governments identify synergies and invest in strengthening generic preparedness capabilities.

Enhancing anticipatory capacity for complex and wide-ranging impacts to build preparedness

National risk assessments provide policymakers with a useful strategic overview of the critical risks facing their country. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed a clear gap, however in using the results of risk analyses to prioritise investments in disaster risk reduction and preparedness capabilities. There is scope to strengthen understanding of risks to supply chain disruption, emerging climate risks, hybrid threats and technological risks such as artificial intelligence and to use this knowledge to identify where authorities are needed to take preventative and mitigating actions. Adherents should redouble efforts to strengthen understanding of emerging critical risks with foresight tools and horizon scanning.

Raising awareness of critical risks and encouraging businesses and households to reduce and mitigate critical risks

Almost all Adherents have developed risk communication tools to raise public awareness of extreme weather events. Notable practices in risk communication featured in the 2017 Report are now widely followed, including the publication of National Risk Registers whereas in 2016 this was an exception. More Respondents have developed digital tools to alert communities through real-time hazard monitoring systems, especially for climate related risks. However, turning risk awareness into concrete risk reduction actions remains an important challenge.

An increasingly complex geo-political context makes risk and crisis communication more challenging. Malign influencers are undermining the effectiveness of government risk and crisis communication efforts with disinformation campaigns. Public scepticism about government communications and scientific experts has been exacerbated by the proliferation of misinformation. Some Adherents have responded by broadening the scope of their risk communication strategies to raise awareness about the tactics of malign actors who aim to sew confusion during crises.

Developing adaptive capacity in crisis management

Adherents should accelerate efforts to adapt their crisis management systems to an international risk landscape that has evolved significantly since 2014. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have altered the context of security of supply for some essential goods and resources, and the digital transition will create new dependencies and emerging risks. In anticipation of similar poly-crises in future, political leaders and senior civil servants could benefit from more frequent participation in crisis management training and exercises. Their leadership is key to boost whole-of-society crisis readiness for unexpected risks and respond to shocks of an unprecedented nature.

Adherents show significant progress in mobilising scientific advice in emergency plans and procedures, but robust scientific advice mechanisms for crisis management are not yet present in all countries. Although international co-operation is seen by Adherents as an essential pillar for crisis management, enabling international co-operation remains one of the least developed and least exercised elements of crisis management arrangements.

Demonstrating transparency and accountability in risk-related decisions and continuously learning from experience and science

More efforts are needed to increase the transparency of crisis management systems, their organisation and decisions. Institutional arrangements for accountability specific to disaster risk and crisis management responsibilities are scarce and generally lack sufficient authorities to properly incentivise officials who fall within their purview.

Many Adherents have completed ad hoc efforts to identify what was done well in managing the COVID-19 crisis, and where improvements are needed. However, most Adherents do not have in place an institutionalised process for systematic learning from past crises or disasters. Additional efforts are needed to establish authorities empowered to gather evidence of disaster damages, investigate their causes, examine dereliction of disaster risk and crisis management duties, and propose policy changes.

While the Recommendation has guided Adherents in enhancing their critical risk governance systems for over a decade, recent polycrises reveal challenges where revisions would help ensure its continued relevance in a rapidly evolving risk landscape. To this end, the Recommendation could expand its scope to look at opportunities offered by emerging technologies to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability, but also the risks that come with these technologies. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the limits of preparedness plans and the fragility of global supply chains for certain essential goods and services. As geopolitical tensions persist and broaden, the need to better understand vulnerabilities of supply chains and their potential to disrupt critical infrastructure systems that depend upon them increases. An updated Recommendation could provide more specific guidance on building resilience, especially for emerging risks, and leveraging processes for lessons learned from crisis to reform policies throughout the critical risk management cycle.