This chapter analyses trends in official development assistance provided by local and regional governments (DDC ODA) across OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries between 2013 and 2024. Drawing on the OECD Creditor Reporting System, it examines the evolution, scale and composition of DDC ODA, including aggregate and country-level patterns, and its allocation across sectors, macro regions, delivery channels and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The chapter provides a basis for understanding how subnational development co-operation has evolved over the past decade and where further improvements in reporting, granularity and comparability are needed.
The Impact of Decentralised Development Co‑operation
Driving Local Governance and the SDGs
Abstract
This chapter analyses trends in official development assistance provided by subnational governments (decentralised development co-operation official development assistance, DDC ODA) across 15 OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries (hereafter DAC countries) with available data1 over the past decade. It examines both aggregate and country-level patterns in the flows of DDC ODA, as well as its allocation across sectors, macro regions, delivery channels and the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The analysis builds on data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System, which provides detailed project-level information on aid activities. Key definitions and classifications used in this section are presented in Box 2.1.
The OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) is the most comprehensive database of ODA flows. The CRS contains project-level information reported by OECD DAC members, including committed and disbursed amounts by aid modalities, sectors, recipients and, in some cases, the level of government (national, regional or local) funding the activity (OECD, 2026[1]).
Decentralised development co-operation official development assistance (DDC ODA) refers to aid provided by subnational governments or agencies, such as regional and local authorities, in DAC countries (see Table A A.1). In 15 DAC countries, the CRS database enables the identification of subnational governments as provider entities. This allows for analysing DDC ODA separately from flows disbursed by national governments or other public bodies. It should be noted that, in most cases, DDC ODA is reported as a country aggregate, grouping all subnational governments together. This reporting format does not allow for identifying contributions by individual cities or regions. Only Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom provide some data disaggregated by individual regions in the CRS database. To ensure comparability, this section focuses on country-level aggregates.
DDC ODA can be classified into two groups: i) in-donor expenditures, such as costs related to supporting refugees and asylum seekers in the donor country; and ii) cross-border flows, defined as financial transfers provided directly from subnational governments in DAC countries to partners in ODA‑eligible countries. These flows exclude scholarships and student costs in donor countries, debt relief, administrative costs not included elsewhere and other in-donor expenditures (OECD, 2025[2]). While total DDC ODA provides a useful picture of the scale of subnational engagement, cross-border DDC ODA is particularly relevant to assess direct co-operation in partner territories. It captures the flows most closely linked to territorial partnerships and to the transfer of financial resources, expertise and support to cities and regions abroad. In most cases, cross-border DDC ODA can also be disaggregated by recipient country or macro region, sector, delivery channel and SDG focus.
Providers of DDC ODA are subnational governments in DAC member countries, while recipients of ODA are cities and regions in ODA-eligible countries (also referred to as partner countries in this report) (OECD, 2025[3]). It should be noted that the terms “provider” and “recipient” are used specifically to describe the direction of DDC ODA flows. This terminology does not imply a hierarchical relationship, as DDC partnerships are generally characterised by mutual benefits and shared responsibilities between equal partners.
Sources: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds]; OECD (2025[2]), “Update on the Secretariat’s revised measurement of Country Programmable Aid”, OECD, Paris; OECD (2025[3]), “ODA recipients: countries, territories, and international organisations”, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/oda-eligibility-and-conditions/dac-list-of-oda-recipients.html.
DDC ODA has more than doubled over the past decade. Between 2013 and 2024, it increased by 108%, on average, in 15 DAC countries with available data, rising from USD 1 755 million to USD 3 649 million. This growth outpaced that of total ODA over the same period by approximately 46 percentage points. However, DDC ODA still represents a relatively small share (around 3.7%) of the total USD 98 billion of ODA disbursed in 2024 by the 15 countries analysed (Figure 2.1). It should be noted that total DDC ODA is likely underestimated, as only 15 of the 34 DAC members currently report such flows and, even in reporting countries, DDC ODA may be underestimated as many local and regional governments (LRGs) do not systematically report, pointing to untapped potential for greater engagement and reporting by subnational governments. In addition, non-financial and in-kind contributions from DDC activities may not be captured by the CRS (OECD, 2025[4]).
Note: Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
DDC ODA levels and growth trends vary significantly across DAC countries. Among the 15 DAC countries reporting DDC ODA (including both in-donor expenditure and cross-border flows, see Box 2.1), Germany is by far the largest contributor, disbursing USD 2 369 million in 2024, around 65% of the total. However, 98% of this amount corresponds to in-donor expenditure, of which 97% is for indirect (“imputed”) student tuition costs. Spain and Canada follow, with contributions of USD 445 million (12% of total DDC ODA) and USD 346 million (10% of total DDC ODA) respectively. France is also a notable contributor, representing around 6% of the total. The strongest growth over the 2013-2024 period was observed in Canada (1 706%) and France (143%), though, for Canada, this is partly due to relatively low starting levels in 2013 (USD 19 million). Growth in Germany (108%) and Spain (75%) has also been significant, particularly given their already high levels of engagement in 2013 (Table 2.1).
In millions of USD, deflated amounts
Notes: n.a. = not available. Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data. Table arranged by values of 2024.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Cross-border DDC ODA grew by 24% between 2013 and 2024. While part of the recent increase in total DDC ODA (including both in-donor expenditure and cross-border flows) is explained by rising in-donor expenditure to assist refugees and asylum seekers, which tripled from USD 219 million in 2013 to USD 619 million in 2024 (Figure 2.2), cross-border DDC ODA (i.e. DDC ODA excluding in-donor expenditure) has continued to expand. It reached USD 665 million in 2024, reflecting growing international engagement by subnational governments. Project-type interventions2 was the aid modality that accounted for the bulk of this expansion, increasing by 39% over the period and representing 77% of total cross‑border DDC ODA in 2024 (Figure 2.3).
Note: Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Note: Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Cross-border DDC flows remain highly uneven across DAC countries. LRGs in Spain are the leading contributors, accounting for around half (51%) of all cross-border aid disbursed by subnational governments in DAC countries. This reflects the distinctive scale of Spain’s cross-border DDC engagement, which stands out among DAC countries.3 Other major contributors in terms of cross-border DDC ODA disbursed by subnational governments are Belgium (14%), Switzerland (12%), Germany (7%) and France (7%). Cross-border DDC ODA has gained notable momentum in recent years, particularly in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom where it grew by 81%, 70% and 50% respectively over the past decade (Table 2.2).
Cross-border DDC ODA supports a broad range of policy areas, with a strong focus on local governance and key SDG-related sectors. In 2024, the largest share (19%) of cross-border DDC flows was directed to government, civil society and peace-related activities. Other relevant areas include health (16%), multisector activities – including urban and rural development –, research and training (15%), emergency response (12%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (10%) and education (9%). Between 2013 and 2024, the most notable increases were observed in emergency support, and in government, civil society and peace, which rose by 8.2 and 7.7 percentage points respectively. While the rise in emergency support reflects growing needs linked to multiple crises and displaced populations such as those generated by the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine (OECD, 2026[5]), the increase in support for government, civil society and peace points to efforts in areas that extend beyond short-term responses and contribute to long-term development (Figure 2.4).
Note: Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
In millions of USD, deflated amounts
Notes: n.a. = not available. Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data. Table arranged by values of 2024.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
DAC countries show different sectoral profiles in their cross-border DDC ODA, partially reflecting diverse priorities and co‑operation approaches. In 2024, Spain, the largest provider of cross-border DDC ODA, channelled most of its support to government, civil society and peace-related activities (30%), followed by health (14%) and emergency response (12%). Belgium, the second-largest provider, concentrated over 29% of its cross-border DDC on health, complemented by multisector activities (21%). Switzerland, the third-largest provider, directed over one-fourth of its cross-border DDC to emergency response (26%), while France, the fifth largest, allocated the largest share to water supply and sanitation (24%) and multisector activities (17%). Germany, the fourth-largest provider, allocated a diversified portfolio across health (25%), multisector activities (23%) and education (21%) (Figure 2.5).
Notes: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024. For legibility, only the top three sectors are shown; the category “Other” includes all remaining sectors.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Central America and the Caribbean are the main recipients of cross-border DDC ODA. Around 21% of DDC flows in 2024 were recorded without a specified recipient country or macro region. Among flows with reported recipients, Sub-Saharan Africa received nearly one‑third of total cross-border DDC in 2024, followed by Central America and the Caribbean, and South America, each accounting for around 13%. While the share of aid to South American recipients has remained relatively stable over the past decade, the share allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa has declined by close to 4 percentage points since 2013. Support to the Middle East has increased steadily, with cross-border DDC flows rising from USD 20 million in 2013 to nearly USD 46 million in 2024 – now representing 7% of the total (Figure 2.6). In most cases, cross-border DDC ODA trends are broadly aligned with patterns observed in overall cross-border ODA (which covers disbursements by both national and subnational governments). These include the declining share of cross-border ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa (by 7 percentage points, from 26.6% to 19.6% over the period) and the growing support to the Middle East (from 6.9% to 7.3%). One notable difference is in the case of Europe, where cross-border ODA increased from 2.9% in 2013 to 9.5% in 2024 (compared to 2.5% in 2013 to 3.4% in 2024 for cross-border DDC ODA), largely driven by national governments’ support to Ukraine in response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression.
Notes: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024. The group “Africa” refers to recipients located in Africa where the specific country is unspecified and the allocation could not be classified as either “North of Sahara” or “South of Sahara”. “America”, “Asia” and “Oceania”, the three smallest rectangles, each represent less than 0.2% of the total.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
In 2024, cross-border DDC flows reached over 150 countries and territories (Figure 2.7). However, recipients of cross-border DDC ODA flows are largely unspecified in reported data, representing a total of USD 136 million. Among top providers of cross-border DDC ODA, the share of unspecified flows is particularly high in the case of Germany (39%), Belgium (37%) and Switzerland (30%). France stands out as an exception, with most flows directed to specifically identified recipients, notably Senegal (11%), Madagascar (9%), Benin (5%) and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (5%). Among providers with detailed recipient information, Spain channels the largest shares of its cross-border DDC to Guatemala (8%), El Salvador (7%), Peru (6%) and Bolivia (6%) (Table 2.3).
Notes: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024. For readability, “Unspecified” flows are not shown. Only recipients accounting for 1% or more of total cross-border DDC ODA are shown. “Africa, regional” and “South of Sahara, regional” refer to aid activities benefiting a broad territory rather than a specific country. These categories are used when the exact country-level allocation is not provided.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Notes: x = not applicable. Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Cross-border DDC flows align most strongly with SDGs targeting gender equality and health, though a share of aid remains unspecified. In 2024, only 7% of cross-border DDC flows were not linked to a specific SDG. Among identified goals, SDG 5 “Gender equality” and SDG 3 “Good health and well‑being” received the highest support, at USD 102 million and USD 80 million respectively, followed by SDG 2 “Zero hunger” and SDG 1 “No poverty”, each at around USD 65 million. SDG 4 “Quality education”, SDG 16 “Peace, justice and strong institutions” and SDG 6 “Clean water and sanitation” also received significant support, with more than USD 43 million each. The relatively low volume targeting SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities) is notable given the territorial nature of DDC. This may partly reflect reporting practices that classify flows under more sector-specific SDGs, such as health and education, and the limited coverage in the CRS of non-financial partnerships, which often identify SDG 11 as a core area of impact, as shown by the OECD DDC impact surveys in Chapter 3. SDG 7 (Affordable and clean energy, +55%), SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities, +49%), SDG 8 (Decent work, +24%) and SDG 2 (+22%) registered the largest increases since 2021 (Figure 2.8).
Notes: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data. Although some DDC projects may contribute to more than one SDG, this figure classifies each project according to its primary SDG focus.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df%5bds%5d=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df%5bid%5d=DSD_CRS%40DF_CRS&df%5bag%5d=OECD.DCD.FSD&dq=DAC..1000.100._T._T.D.Q._T..&lom=LASTNPERIODS&lo=5&to%5bTIME_PERIOD%5d=false&isAvailabilityDisabled=false
Top providers of cross-border DDC ODA share a focus on SDGs related to poverty reduction gender equality, health and decent work, while also maintaining distinct co-operation priorities. In 2024, LRGs in Spain provided substantial support for SDG 5 “Gender equality” (22%), and SDG 3 “Good health and well‑being” (16%) with a notable focus on SDG 2 “Zero hunger” (13%). In Switzerland, 39% of cross-border DDC was directed to SDG 1 “No poverty”, alongside allocations to SDG 5 (11%) and SDG 3 (9%). France prioritised SDG 6 “Clean water and sanitation” (32%), while also supporting SDG 1 (21%) and SDG 8 “Decent work and economic growth” (11%). In Germany, significant shares went to SDG 3 (25%), SDG 8 (20%) and SDG 2 (14%). Belgium stands out for allocating 34% of its cross-border DDC to SDG 9 “Industry, innovation and infrastructure”, while Canada allocated 28% to SDG 17 “Partnerships for the SDGs” (Figure 2.9).
Notes: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024. Although some DDC projects may contribute to more than one SDG, this figure classifies each project according to its primary SDG focus. For legibility, only the top three SDGs are shown; the category “Other” includes all remaining SDGs.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
Most cross-border DDC ODA is channelled through NGOs and civil society, although other channels such as public sector institutions are also relevant. In 2024, nearly 70% of DDC flows were disbursed via NGOs and civil society organisations, confirming their central role not only as implementing partners for subnational governments in DAC and partner countries, but also as actors that support territorial anchoring, accountability, democratic governance and transnational solidarity. This channel has grown by 45% over the past decade. Higher education and research institutions also expanded their role over the same period, growing by 57% and now account for around 10% of flows. By contrast, the share directed through public sector institutions has fallen by 46% since 2013, although they remain the second most important channel, representing 11% of flows in 2024. These shifts suggest a gradual substitution pattern, where subnational governments increasingly provide support through intermediary organisations rather than directly via public institutions (Figure 2.10).
Note: Based on 15 DAC countries with available DDC data.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
The channels for cross-border DDC ODA vary widely across countries, reflecting different models of partnership and implementation. In 2024, LRGs in Switzerland, Austria and Spain channelled most of their cross-border DDC through NGOs and civil society (91%, 87% and 83% of flows respectively) confirming these organisations’ central role in their co-operation models. France and Italy also relied primarily on NGOs and civil society but channelled a significant share, around one-quarter, through public sector institutions. Belgium and Germany showed more balanced distributions, with their cross-border DDC more evenly spread across NGOs and civil society, public sector institutions and higher education and research institutions. In contrast, more than one-third of Canada’s flows were channelled through multilateral organisations, while around one-quarter of the United Kingdom’s flows went through private sector institutions, making both models distinctive among major providers (Figure 2.11).
Note: Based on 14 DAC countries with available DDC data in 2024.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&pg=0&snb=18&df[ds].
References
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← 1. Only 15 OECD DAC countries report DDC ODA in the CRS: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
← 2. A project is defined as a set of inputs, activities and outputs agreed upon with the partner country to reach specific objectives/outcomes within a defined time frame, with a defined budget and within a defined geographical area.