The Climate Action Monitor 2025

2. How vulnerable are countries to climate risks?

2.1. Climate-related hazards are projected to intensify

In 2025 the world again faced a series of severe climate impacts including deadly flooding events, record‑breaking heatwaves, and prolonged droughts. Such extreme weather events are becoming increasingly frequent and intense, with serious consequences for economies, ecosystems, human health and societies. Without stronger action to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, these impacts will worsen, amplifying risks and challenges for communities worldwide. As climate-related hazards and disasters escalate, countries must accelerate and scale up adaptation efforts to protect vulnerable populations and critical infrastructure and build economic resilience. The growing severity of disruptions underscores the need to raise climate ambition in line with the Paris Agreement temperature goals (Chapter 1) and to implement effective climate policies (Chapter 3).

Scientific evidence suggests that the planet may be approaching major climate tipping points, thresholds beyond which irreversible and abrupt changes in Earth systems could occur (OECD, 2022[1]) (OECD, 2024[2]). Since 2015-2016 major environmental changes have been observed including the shifting of Southern Ocean Circulation potentially reversing direction (Silvano et al., 2025[3]), as well as a marked decline in Antarctic Sea ice extent increasing CO₂ emissions to the atmosphere from CO₂-rich deep water. The latest IPCC report (IPCC, 2023[4]) indicates how close we are to these critical thresholds may have been underestimated suggesting that the slowing or collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) could occur within the coming decades (Aðalgeirsdóttir et al., 2024[5]). Given the Southern Ocean’s connection with other major ocean circulations, including the AMOC, these findings raise concerns of the likelihood and proximity of climate tipping points.1

Such a disruption would have significant effects on the climate, including extreme winter cooling in northwestern Europe, shifts in tropical rainfall patterns that could trigger droughts in West Africa and Central America, and accelerated sea-level rise (IPCC, 2023[4]). The acute and near-term risk of crossing climate tipping points highlights the need to deepen our understanding of climate-related hazards and their evolution over time to support effective policy responses.

To help policymakers respond to escalating climate risks, IPAC has developed a set of indicators that track the evolution of climate-related hazards over time. The indicator set assesses both the historical and projected exposure to hazards such as extreme temperature and precipitation, droughts, wildfires and floods (OECD, 2025[6]). They are developed using a variety of Earth observation (EO), remote sensing (RS) and other techniques, made available by leading organisations, such as the ESA and NASA, which adhere to national and international guidelines for developing climate data.2 These indicators contribute to the evidence base for informed climate resilience planning and policy development.

A major advancement in 2025 Edition of Climate Action Monitor is the expansion of the climate-related hazard and exposure indicators to include projections up until 2100, comprising anomalies for the 2030s, 2050s, 2070s and 2090s relative to the 1995-2014 baseline (Maes et al., 2025[7]).3 These indicators show an alarming results: global average temperatures are set to rise substantially over all climate scenarios (Figure ‎2.1). By the end of the century projections indicate an approximately 6°C difference in global mean temperature between the very low- and very high-emissions scenarios, underscoring the possibility of enormous impacts and risks. These indicators enable IPAC to offer information, at both national and subnational levels, on how climate-related hazards and disasters may evolve throughout the century. Drawing on this expanded perspective, this chapter presents an integration of both historical and forward‑looking indicators. This dual approach provides insights not only into events that have shaped recent decades but also into the future risks. Forward-looking data can also support the design of long‑term adaptation strategies and resilience planning.

To ensure in-depth coverage across the wide range of available indicators, the 2025 edition of the Climate Action Monitor introduced a three-year rotation on in-depth analysis of core hazard domains. These include extreme temperature, extreme precipitation, and drought. This edition provides a detailed focus on extreme temperatures, alongside concise updates on other hazard domains, including precipitation, droughts, flooding, wildfires, and wind threats. Future editions will focus will on different core hazard domains, ensuring that over a three-year cycle, each receives an in-depth analysis while all others continue to be tracked and reported in summary form. The full set of country-level indicators on climate‑related hazard remains available in the IPAC Dashboard.

 

Note: Only the median value of the multi-model ensemble is visualised here. However, the 10th and 90th percentile uncertainty ranges of the multi-model ensemble are available on the OECD Data Explorer.

Source: OECD (2025), “Climate-related hazards: Projected exposure to extreme temperatures”, OECD Environment Statistics (database).

2.2. Extreme temperatures across and within countries are reaching critical levels

Global temperatures are reaching critical thresholds. The year 2024 was the warmest on record and marked the first calendar year to surpass Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C target above pre-industrial levels (WMO, 2025[8]; C3S and ECMWF, 2025[9]). This alarming milestone concluded a decade (2015–2024) of the ten hottest years ever recorded, increasing the risk of crossing irreversible climate tipping points. Beyond rising global average temperatures, exposure to heat stress is not evenly distributed. Countries with high exposure often have limited capacity to adapt, deepening global inequalities. Projections show that regions with both high- and low-exposure will experience worsening heat stress, with significant subnational variations. These trends underscore the need for locally tailored adaptation strategies.

Record-breaking temperatures in 2025 suggest that the previous decades trends will continue, producing severe human and environmental consequences. In Western Europe, June temperatures exceeded 46 °C, contributing to an estimated 2,300 heat-related deaths (Grantham Institute, 2025[10]). India endured one of its deadliest heatwaves on record in April-May, with temperatures exceeding 48 °C (United Nations, 2025[11]). North Africa also experienced exceptional temperatures, with Morocco reaching 47°C in some areas, while several subnational regions in Brazil and Argentina faced temperatures of 10 °C above seasonal norms (NOAA National Center for Environmental Information, 2025[12]). These developments reflect a rapidly warming climate, with mounting human costs, reinforcing the need for robust mitigation and adaptation policies.

Heat stress exposure and adaptive capacity are unevenly distributed. Heat stress is a concept that tries to convey how humans perceive higher temperatures by considering other variables such as humidity (Maes et al., 2022[13]). For example, countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Israel have been historically exposed on average to more than 100 strong heat stress days annually, while most European countries face fewer than 50 (see Box ‎2.1 for a detailed case for Japan).4 However, exposure alone does not determine vulnerability, as economic capacity plays a critical role in shaping countries’ ability to adapt (Costa and Hooley, 2025[14]).

Countries with high exposure to heat stress often have lower adaptive capacity (Figure ‎2.2). For instance, India, with the world’s largest population, has the highest mean population exposure to heat stress among OECD and OECD partner countries over 267 strong heat stress days annually -measured considering a temperature of at least 32°C as well as humidity, winds and solar radiation - while maintaining one of the lowest GDP’s per capita (Figure ‎2.2). By contrast, most European countries experience fewer number of heat stress days but have a higher GDP per capita – Greece has the highest exposure (79 days), followed by Italy (67) and Spain (65). North American countries show similar levels of population exposure to heat stress days compared to European peers, except for Mexico. These disparities underscore that the most exposed countries are often least equipped to adapt. Without stronger international cooperation, the gap in climate resilience between wealthy and emerging economies will continue to widen, exacerbating global inequalities (UNEP, 2024[15]).

 

Note: GDP per capita is purchasing power parity (PPP) converted, based on 2020 as the reference year. Strong heat stress days are defined here as days where temperatures exceed 32°C, and is based on the Universal Thermal Climate Index, which accounts for temperature, humidity, wind speed and solar radiation.

Source: OECD (2025), "Climate-related hazards: Historical exposure to extreme temperature", OECD Environment Statistics (database). OECD National Accounts.

Box 2.1. Vulnerability to extreme heat also varies within populations: The case of Japan

Population risk to adverse impacts from extreme heat is influenced by both environmental and demographic factors. It varies not only across geographical regions but also within populations, particularly in relation to age distribution and levels of exposure. In Japan, more than 60% of the population is already exposed to days exceeding 35°C – one of the highest exposure levels in the OECD (Maes et al., 2022[13]). The public health consequences are clear, with increasing cases of heat-related illnesses and mortality, particularly among the elderly (Ministry of Health, 2024[16]).

One way of identifying areas that are potentially more at risk across a vulnerability dimension is by developing a bivariate covariance indicator between a vulnerability factor and heat exposure, potentially supporting tailored adaptation efforts of regions and populations. For example, Figure ‎2.3 presents an experimental indicator that accounts for both heat exposure (i.e. yearly number of hot days where maximum temperature is above 30°C) and an important vulnerability factor (i.e. share of people aged 65 or over). This covariance indicator identifies the towns of Nagomi and Yunomae on the Kyushu Island areas as having high heat-elderly risks compared to other places in Japan. However, this does not imply that densely populated areas are at low risk, as large numbers of older residents can lead to high absolute heat-related risk there as well. Similar analyses have been conducted for the Slovak Republic, where districts exposed to high heat are considered more vulnerable if they have a large population above the age of 70 (OECD, 2023[17]).

Figure 2.3. Heat exposure and vulnerability among elderly populations in Japan

Results on the bivariate covariance indicator measured by the share of elderly and elder-weighted number of hot days (>30°C), 2020

Note: These maps visualise mainland Japan, excluding Okinawa Prefecture and some remote islands from Kagoshima and Tokyo Prefectures. The legend is based on standard deviations (SD), with three categories on each axis benchmarked against the national average using SD. For example: low means 1SD below average share of elderly and 1SD below average count of annual hot day.

Source: OECD (forthcoming), “Vulnerability to environmental hazards: Measurement framework and empirical results: the case of Japan”.

At the global level, all regions will be affected by increasing exposure to extreme heat irrespective of past exposure. By 2100, under an intermediate-emissions scenario, Brazil, Greece, India, Israel, Mexico and Saudi Arabia are expected to be the countries that experience the greatest increase in hot days relative to the climate reference period (Figure ‎2.4). Hot days are defined here as days where the maximum temperature exceeds 35°C, this is considered a threshold that affects human health (Maes et al., 2022[13]). Although Brazil, Greece, Israel, and Mexico have experienced a comparatively low population exposure in the past, India and Saudi Arabia are already facing relatively high exposure -two to five months of hot days per year (Figure ‎2.4). Under the high-emissions scenario, Greece could experience an additional 43 hot days, and Israel an additional 61 hot days by 2080-2099, as compared to the climate reference period (Figure ‎2.4). These projections suggest that a global strategy, albeit with a differentiated adaptation approach, is needed since both historically high- and lower-exposed countries will face escalating risks.

 

Note: The six countries selected for illustration in this figure are projected to experience the highest increase in the number of hot days for the period 2080–2099 relative to the climate reference period under an intermediate-emissions scenario. A hot day is defined here as days where the maximum temperature exceeds 35°C. In contrast to the heat stress index, the hot day index does not account for factors such as humidity, wind speed or solar radiation. The four Tier-1 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) represent the low to very high-emissions scenarios (i.e. SSP 1-2.6, SSP 2-4.5, SSP 3-7.0 and SSP 5-8.5).

Source: OECD (2025), “Climate-related hazards: Historical exposure to extreme temperature”, OECD Environment Statistics (database). OECD (2025), “Climate-related hazards: Projected exposure to extreme temperature”, OECD Environment Statistics (database).

Subnational variation in exposure reinforces the need for localised adaptation measures. National averages mask significant regional disparities especially in large countries spanning diverse climates. For example, in India changes in exposure range from -14 days in Puducherry to +26 in Tripura, despite a national average of +2.5 days. In Brazil, Mato Grosso has experienced 33 additional hot days and tropical nights, 24 days above the national average. The top four sub-national regions with the greatest increases are concentrated in South America -Mato Grosso (Brazil), Cordoba (Colombia), Madre de Dios (Peru), and Formosa (Argentina) (see Box ‎2.2 on a detailed case for Brazil). In Europe, Spain leads in projected increases, with Castille-La Mancha experiencing 10 days more than the national average (Figure ‎2.5). These differences mean that even within the same country, adaptation responses must be tailored to regional conditions and risk levels.

 

Note: Countries are ordered by national mean. The following countries are excluded because there is little to no change when compared to the climate reference period: Slovak Republic, Portugal, Great Britain, Austria, Korea, Canada, Sweden, Slovenia, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, Latvia, Luxemburg, Lithuania, Malta, Iceland, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Chile, Switzerland, Belgium, Poland, Germany, Czechia and Costa Rica. Currently, no subnational data is available for Thailand.

Source: OECD (2025), "Climate-related hazards: Historical exposure to extreme temperature", OECD Environment Statistics (database).

Box 2.2. Large swaths of Brazil are projected to face growing impacts of extreme heat under high-emission scenarios

Brazil is experiencing extreme climate variability, with historic floods occurring just one month before intense and long heatwaves. In early 2025, temperatures reached 44°C in Rio de Janeiro, well above the mid-to-late February normal (Climate Central, 2025[18]). Meanwhile the national heat index, which combines temperature with humidity to determine how humans feel heat, recorded its highest temperature on record hitting 62.3°C in March 2023 (Moreira et al., 2024[19]). These events occurred despite temperate regions normally experiencing milder conditions than Brazil tropical north.

Climate scenarios project that large areas of the country will be experiencing many more months of extreme heat compared to the climate normal. More than 31.9 million people in the north of Brazil are projected to endure an additional 6 months of hot days annually in 2080-2099 compared to the climate normal under a very high-emissions scenario (Figure ‎2.6). The Amazonian region is projected to be the hardest hit, with a marked increase in extreme heat. Earth system models also project long-term drying trend in large parts of the Amazon rainforest (Ritchie et al., 2022[20]) (OECD, 2022[1]) which will accelerate forest degradation (Duffy et al., 2015[21]), with increase risks for all communities living in the region, including vulnerable populations on indigenous lands (Figure ‎2.6).

Figure 2.6. Brazil could face over 200 hot days annually by the end of the century, under a very high emissions scenario

Projections for 2080-2099 with hot days defined as (Tmax > 35°C)

Note: The end of the century is defined as the period from 2080-2099. Projected extreme temperature data in this visualisation represents the median value of the multi-model ensemble, providing reliable climate projections that capture uncertainty of individual models, and are used by IPCC assessments (IPCC, 2021[22]).

Source: OECD (2025), "Climate-related hazards: Projected exposure to extreme temperature", OECD Environment Statistics (database).

2.3. Droughts are deepening risks to agriculture, economies and lives

The Earth's shifting heat balance is driving more frequent and severe droughts. Rising temperatures accelerate evaporation, reducing soil moisture and freshwater availability in many regions. Currently, 40% of the world’s land area is exposed to increasingly frequent and severe droughts, with the economic cost projected to grow between 3 to 7.5% annually (OECD, 2025[23]). Droughts heighten the risk of wildfires putting pressure on economic sectors and livelihoods particularly in agriculture and water systems within and across countries.

In 2024-2025, severe drought events have had devastating consequences. In Romania, one of the EU’s leading cereal exporters, droughts destroyed approximately 2.5 million hectares of staple crops, resulting in nearly USD 2 billion in losses and widespread disruption to rural livelihoods (Reștea, 2024[24]). In Chile, drought-fuelled wildfires claimed 137 lives and caused an estimated USD 1 billion in damages (Dearbail, 2024[25]). These events underscore the rising threat of “hot droughts”, where high temperature, low humidity and reduced precipitation, compound to intensify impacts (King et al., 2024[26]). They underscore the need for climate-resilient agricultural practices and disaster prevention methods, including nature-based solutions for fire protection (OECD, 2023[27]).

In recent years, most OECD and OECD partner countries have experienced drier cropland conditions. Trends in soil moisture anomaly reveal growing exposure to drought stress, with heightened implications for key food-exporting economies (Figure ‎2.7). For example, Argentina, one of the largest food-exporting economy of countries covered under IPAC, experienced its largest soil moisture decline, while Brazil and Costa Rica also face both high export dependence on agriculture and a decrease in soil moisture Figure ‎2.7). Other high-risk, countries with a high share of cropland include Denmark (71%), India (69%), Hungary (68%) and Thailand (67%), are also at risk - even moderate droughts can disrupt production and food security (OECD, 2025[23]).These patterns highlight the systemic nature of drought risk and the need for proactive, cross-sectoral resilience strategies (OECD, 2025[23]).

 

Note: Cropland soil anomaly describes the cropland soil moisture content of the topsoil layer compared to the climate reference period 1981-2010.

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution system (WITS); Staff estimates, World Bank (WB). OECD (2025) "Climate-related hazards: Historical exposure to droughts", OECD Environment Statistics (database). OECD (2024) “Land cover and land cover change”, OECD Environment Statistics (database).

Drought is driving more frequent, intense and prolonged wildfires (see Box ‎2.3). For example, in 2024-2025 the United States experienced unprecedented fires in the Los Angeles metropolitan area destroying 16,255 structures while another 2,090 structures were damaged, with an estimated total property and capital loss of USD 76-131 billion (Wall, Steinberg and Shew, 2025[28]; Li and Yu, 2025[29]). In 2025, Southern Europe experienced one of its worst wildfire seasons in two decades with an estimated 380,000 hectares burned in Spain and 260,000 hectares in Portugal (Keeping et al., 2025[30]). These events underscore the need for climate adaptation, including resilient infrastructure, sustainable forest and land management, and an enhanced and coordinated wildfire response capacity (OECD, 2023[27]).

Box 2.3.  The expanding reach of wildfires: forests and populations at risk

IPAC data reveals a significant increase to wildfire danger in 2020-2024 compared to 2000-2004 (Figure ‎2.8. Not only have new forest regions become increasingly exposed over the past two decades (red in Figure ‎2.8), but areas that were already exposed in the early 2000s remain at risk today (orange in Figure ‎2.8), indicating little progress in reducing long-term vulnerability. Notably, northern Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Amazon show substantial new forest exposure due to increasing temperatures, underscoring the growing geographic spread of wildfire risk. This expansion highlights the need for both mitigation and adaptation strategies to protect ecosystems and nearby populations (OECD, 2023[27]).

Figure 2.8. An increasing amount of forest cover is in areas at risk of wildfires

Forest cover at risk of wildfire danger in 2020-2024, 2000-2004 or both for selected countries

Note: Forests are considered exposed to wildfire danger if they are within regions with a very high or extreme Fire Weather Index.

Source: OECD (2025) "Climate-related hazards: Wildfire exposure", OECD Environment Statistics (database).

2.4. Extreme precipitation is rising puts crops and communities at risk

Rising global temperatures are changing humidity and precipitation patterns. Higher evaporation rates and increased atmospheric humidity levels alter precipitation distribution across regions leading to more intense and frequent extreme precipitation events in some regions and prolonged droughts in others. Some regions now face both effects at different times of the year which heightens the risk and severity of flooding. These shifts reflect the complex interaction within the Earth system, where warming not only increases overall atmospheric moisture but also modifies weather patterns across and within regions.

The consequences of extreme precipitation events are increasingly severe, threatening lives, economic stability, and infrastructure. For example, in June 2025, Central Texas suffered catastrophic flash floods, resulting in at least 138 fatalities and widespread destruction (Henson, 2025[31]). Similarly, during the 2024-2025 wet season, the state of Queensland in Australia received one year worth of rainfall in just four days, causing widespread flooding across an area four times the size of the United Kingdom (BOM, 2025[32]). These unprecedented events forced mass evacuations causing extensive economic losses. More than 70% of all land worldwide was exposed to a few days of extreme precipitation events on average across 2020-2024, with 80% of agricultural land exposed.

Agricultural systems are vulnerable to extreme precipitation events with exposure varying widely across regions (Box ‎2.4). IPAC indicators reveal that 29 out of 50 OECD and OECD partner countries experienced, on average, at least one week of extreme precipitation on cropland annually between 2020 and 2024 (OECD, 2025[6]). However, the degree of exposure differs significantly: over 40% of Indonesia’s cropland is exposed to extreme precipitation, compared to less than 1% in Czechia. The top ten subnational regions across OECD and OECD partner countries with the highest cropland exposure are predominantly located in tropical zones and include French Guiana (France), North Maluku (Indonesia) and Amazonas (Colombia) (Figure ‎2.9). While these regions exhibit the highest shares of exposure, larger countries such as China have greater absolute cropland areas affected. This uneven exposure highlights the need for location-specific adaptation strategies, particularly in tropical and high-risk regions.

Box 2.4.  Measuring progress in adapting the agricultural sector to climate risks

In the face of significant subnational variability in climate-related hazards - such as extreme precipitation and drought - countries face challenges in tracking their progress on climate adaptation in agriculture. However, measuring sectoral progress is essential for building resilience, as effective climate risk management requires robust monitoring systems (OECD, 2024[34]). To support this, recent OECD work proposes a framework for assessing adaptation progress across four key dimensions:

1. Exposure of agricultural production to climate-related hazards

2. Adoption of resilient agricultural practices to reduce vulnerability

3. Impacts of climate change on agricultural outputs

4. Enabling conditions that support agricultural adaptation

This methodology supports the development of 17 sector-specific indicators, offering tools to assess achievements and gaps in agricultural resilience. These indicators can guide policy design, investment decisions, and the prioritisation of adaptation measures, helping countries tailor their responses to local climate risks and strengthen resilience in the agricultural sector.

Source: OECD (2025), “Measuring progress in adapting the agricultural sector to more variable and extreme weather conditions: Framework, indicator methodology and results”.

2.5. Economic losses and mortality from climate-related disasters reveal systemic vulnerabilities

Climate-related hazards become natural disasters when they overwhelm a community’s ability to manage, causing widespread damage and disruption. Natural disasters cause substantial economic damages and loss of life, primarily through sudden extreme weather events such as cyclones, convective storms or flash floods. In 2024, total economic losses in the world due to climate-related natural disasters reached USD 328 billion, up from USD 303 billion in 2023 (Swiss Re Institute, 2025[35]). Of these, approximately 43% of total economic losses are insured, and global insurance losses will continue to grow at 5 – 7 % annually (Swiss Re Institute, 2025[35]), placing an increasing strain on the economy and broader society. Beyond the economic losses, disasters cause devasting human costs, with more than 16 000 deaths and more than 167 million people affected by natural disasters in 2024 alone, an affected population greater than that of Japan. (CRED, 2025[36]). These figures underscore the need to shift from reactive disaster response to proactive resilience planning.

The cumulative cost of climate-related disasters such as storms, flood and wildfires are growing. Between 1994 and 2024, OECD and OECD partner countries experienced an upward trend in cumulative economic losses (Figure ‎2.10). The increase was particularly pronounced in OECD countries, with some exceptional years showing spikes in damages; for instance, in 2005 and 2017, cyclones alone caused cumulative losses exceeding USD 270 billion in the United States. This upward trend in climate-related losses suggests that there is a need to proactively invest in resilience (OECD, 2025[37]). Investments in disaster risk reduction can reduce reconstruction costs five to sevenfold (European Investment Bank, 2024[38]). Therefore, as the severity and frequency of climate-related disasters increase, countries should increase disaster risk reduction as a cost-effective approach to reduce future economic losses.

Mortality from climate-related disasters – especially extreme heat – reveals critical gaps in climate risk planning, particularly in protecting vulnerable populations. For example, in late June to early July 2025, a severe heatwave swept across Western Europe resulting in widespread impacts. A recent study estimated that over 2 300 people died of heat-related causes across 12 European cities (Bird et al., 2025[39]). In London alone, approximately 260 heat-related deaths were recorded, with 65% of those deaths attributed to climate change, effectively tripling the death toll relative to a non-warming baseline (Bird et al., 2025[39]).

Sharp spikes in extreme years of mortality from climate-related disasters reveal weaknesses in preparedness and response systems. These figures reflect confirmed deaths attributed to extreme temperatures by reporting authorities – though attribution criteria vary across jurisdictions. OECD countries experienced high mortality in 2003 (71 000 deaths), 2022 (56 000 deaths), and 2023 (41 000 deaths), which were particularly deadly due to prolonged and intense heatwaves (Figure ‎2.11)5. These deadly heatwaves are directly observable in IPAC data on climate-related hazards (see OECD Data Explorer). These events confirm that even in wealthier countries resilience planning remains insufficient, as the impacts of extreme heat are largely preventable through public health and multisectoral interventions and measures to support vulnerable populations (WHO, 2024[40]).

These figures likely underestimate the true human toll, as spatial gaps, underreporting, and inconsistencies in disaster databases remain pervasive, particularly in emerging economies (Moriyama, Sasaki and Ono, 2018[41]). Closing these data gaps is essential to improve climate risk assessments and support adaptive measures to reduce mortality.

Climate-related disasters are causing escalating economic losses and significant losses of life, and projections from organizations such as the Swiss Re Institute suggest that these risks will intensify throughout this century (Swiss Re Institute, 2025[35]).However, the extent of economic and human impacts is not solely determined by the severity of the hazards themselves – they depend on adaptive capacity and resilience measures in place (UNDRR, 2025[42]). Therefore, countries must prepare for increasing risks by strengthening disaster preparedness, reducing vulnerability, and investing in long-term resilience to protect lives and livelihoods.

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Notes

← 1.  In climate science, a tipping point is a critical limit beyond which the climate system shifts rapidly, often irreversibly, into a different state. For example, the Greenland ice sheet could melt past a threshold where its loss becomes self-perpetuating, contributing to sustained sea level rise over time.

← 2.  Data sources include ESA’s Copernicus programme, NASA’s MODIS and Landsat missions, and other recognised repositories. Methodologies follow established standards such as the IPCC’s framework for climate data quality assurance, ensuring temporal consistency, spatial comparability, and scientific reproducibility.

← 3.  These projections are based on Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) covering four Tier-1 Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) with an additional Tier-2 SSP providing detailed assessments of climate responses across different emissions trajectories.

← 4.  IPAC employs data on strong heat stress days where temperatures exceed 32°C to assess population exposure to climate extremes. This is calculated using the Universal Thermal Climate Index, which accounts for temperature, humidity, wind speed, and solar radiation.

← 5.  The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) remains a critical resource for tracking mortality and injury from natural disasters offering key insights into the human toll of climate-related hazards.