The Climate Action Monitor 2025

1. How far are countries from achieving national and global mitigation objectives?

The year 2025 is critical to align global action with a sustainable greenhouse gas (GHG) emission pathway as countries are expected to submit their Nationally Determined Contributions for 2035 (NDC 3.0). The Paris Agreement, designed to limit global warming to well below 2ºC and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century, has been pivotal in advancing global climate mitigation action (UNFCCC, 2015[1]). Since the ratification of the Paris Agreement, commitments by the global community have contributed to reducing the projected global warming by the end of the 21st century from 3.7–4.8°C to an estimated 2.4–2.6°C (UNEP, 2024[2]). Yet, current commitments are still not ambitious enough to achieve the temperature goals, and even these are not being fully implemented.

NDC 3.0 offers a critical opportunity for countries to raise ambition and importantly to align these commitments with 2050 net-zero targets. However, increased ambition alone is not enough – countries must also ensure that their pledges translate into concrete action. Currently, countries are not on track to meet their existing – and insufficiently ambitious – commitments. With global emissions continuing to rise, and climate action slowing, the world remains off course to achieve both the 2030 targets and longer-term net-zero commitments.

National climate action requires tailored approaches, as countries face diverse challenges shaped by differences in sectoral emissions profiles, income levels, and structural factors. Nevertheless, the potential impacts of climate change are devastating and unless countries recognise the urgency of action, the consequences for vulnerable communities, the global economy and ecosystems will be enormous.

1.1. Global GHG emissions reached an all-time high in 2023

In 2023, global GHG emissions reached around 55 Gt CO₂e,1 marking a 1.7% increase from 2022 and about 3% higher than in 2015 (including international bunkers and a Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) adjustment). Country-based GHG emissions including LULUCF reached 46 Gt CO₂e in 2023, increasing by 1.5% compared to 2022. Unless otherwise specified, this chapter refers to country‑based emissions including LULUCF.

Together, emissions from OECD and OECD partner countries account for around 78% of total country‑based emissions, underscoring their central role in global decarbonisation efforts (Figure ‎1.1). As a group, OECD countries have maintained a downward emissions trajectory since their peak in 2007, falling by 3.6% between 2022 and 2023, and by 10% since 2015, reaching around 13.1 Gt CO₂e. In contrast, emissions in OECD partner countries continue to rise – up 12% since 2015 and 4.1% since 2022 – reaching around 22.8 Gt CO₂e. In many partner countries emissions remain closely linked to economic growth, reflecting different stages of development and energy transitions.

Emissions in both OECD and OECD partner country groups are driven largely by major emitters. Between 2022 and 2023, emissions fell in several large OECD economies. Driven by expansions of renewable energy, significant decreases were recorded in Germany (-10.1%) and the European Union (-9.0%) (European Commission, 2024[3]). Several OECD partner countries also saw decreases, including Thailand (-2.2%) and Argentina (-1.6%). However, emissions increased in several of the largest emitting OECD partner countries. Notably, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) – accounting for approximately 30% of country-based emissions – saw an estimated increase of around 5%. Significant rises were also observed in India (+7.5%) and Saudi Arabia (+2.3%), while Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa experienced more moderate increases.

The continued growth of emissions in many OECD partner countries should be viewed in the context of lower average per capita emissions compared with many OECD countries as well as ongoing economic and demographic growth. Aligning pathways to the Paris Agreement temperature goals will require aligning decarbonisation efforts with broader development priorities, particularly in emerging economies. Over time, economic growth will need to be increasingly decoupled from GHG emissions, supporting development that is consistent with climate goals and reduces the risks of future climate-related damages (OECD/UNDP, 2025[4]).

1.2. Countries are not on track to meet their 2030 NDCs

A decade after the Paris Agreement, countries face challenges in aligning their emissions with the reductions pledged in their 2030 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The NDC Delivery Gap provides a benchmark for assessing progress. It measures the difference between actual emissions in 2023 and the estimated emissions for the same year implied by a linear reduction trajectory from 20192 to 2030. A larger gap indicates that additional efforts will be required for countries to meet their targets.

In 2023, OECD and OECD partner countries together recorded a combined NDC Delivery Gap of around 2.5 Gt CO₂e. To align with the aggregate emissions implied by 2030 NDCs, this group of countries would need to cut emissions by an additional 8%. The size of the gap varies across groups. OECD countries recorded an NDC Delivery Gap of 0.8 Gt CO₂,3 representing around 6% of their current emissions. By contrast OECD partners recorded a larger NDC Delivery Gap of 1.7 Gt CO₂e, around 8% of current emissions (Figure ‎1.2).

As the NDC Delivery Gap widens, the likelihood of meeting 2030 targets declines, with implications for the global temperature goals of limiting warming to 1.5°C or even 2°C. Closing this gap is therefore essential: not only to reduce near-term emissions, but also to build momentum and credibility to achieve longer-term NDCs and net-zero targets.

 

Note: To calculate IPAC aggregate targets, individual countries’ targets were harmonised across sectors and gases. Further details are provided in the methodology section. Saudi Arabia is not included in the IPAC target since its 2030 NDC target cannot be quantified.

Source: Emissions are based on OECD calculations using Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC and PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]). Targets are IPAC estimates which convert NDC submissions to the UNFCCC to common units (Pizarro et al., 2024[7]).

1.3. Current NDCs are misaligned with long-term commitments and net zero

While the NDC Delivery Gap demonstrates that countries are not on track to meet their 2030 targets, a critical second question is whether these near-term pledges are aligned with countries’ own long-term commitments and global net zero emissions. This issue is especially relevant since countries are reassessing their ambition in the context of the NDC 3.0. Due in 2025, and covering the 2035 horizon, this round of NDCs provides countries the opportunity to align short- and long-term targets.

A clear misalignment persists between near-term NDCs and long-term 2050 targets. While many OECD and OECD partner countries have pledged net-zero emissions by mid-century, their current NDCs do not reflect a trajectory consistent with these goals. This misalignment is captured by the 2050 Targets Consistency Gap. Across countries covered by IPAC, this gap accounts for around 4.6 GtCO₂e for 2030 – approximately 16% of aggregate NDC emission target – indicating that even full implementation of current NDCs would leave countries off-track for their own mid-century commitments (Figure ‎1.3). An even greater misalignment persists when countries, whose net-zero targets goes beyond 2050 (e.g. China and India), are adjusted to 2050.

 

Note: To calculate IPAC aggregate targets, individual countries’ targets were harmonised across sectors and gases. Further details are provided in the Methodology section. Saudi Arabia is not included in the IPAC target since its 2030 NDC target cannot be quantified.

Source: Emissions are based on OECD calculations using Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC and PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]). Targets are IPAC estimates which convert submissions to the UNFCCC to common units (Pizarro et al., 2024[7]).

The upcoming set of 2035 NDCs presents a critical opportunity to close the 2050 Targets Consistency Gap by increasing ambition to ensure that the emissions trajectory is aligned with countries’ 2050 targets. Due in 2025, and covering the 2035 horizon, this round of NDCs allows countries to align short- and medium-term targets with their 2050 commitments. Among the thirteen countries covered by IPAC that have submitted a 2035 NDC, less than half have proposed targets consistent with their own long-term target trajectories (see Box ‎1.1). This continued misalignment is even more concerning than in 2030, given the shrinking window to course-correct before 2050. Without increased ambition and accelerated climate action, countries risk missing mid‑century targets. It is therefore critical for countries to use this round of NDCs as an opportunity to increase ambition and ensure a credible, consistent trajectory toward their long-term net-zero commitments.

1.4. Most countries face climate ambition and implementation challenges

Figure ‎1.4 illustrates the position of individual countries, covered under IPAC, in terms of their alignment with their 2030 NDC and 2050 commitments. The horizontal axis presents the NDC Delivery Gap where positive values represent the size of the NDC Delivery Gap. The larger the value, the greater the distance between current emissions and a linear trajectory towards the countries own NDC target. It should be viewed as an indicator of implementation or lack thereof. The vertical axis presents the 2050 Targets Consistency Gap, where positive values represent the size of the distance from the 2030 NDC target to the estimated emissions needed in 2030 to stay on track with 2050 targets. It should be viewed as an indicator of ambition. Only a small share of global emissions are in the bottom-left quadrant which represents countries that are both on track to meet their NDC 2030 target and aligned with their 2050 pledge. Only about 9% of emissions from IPAC covered countries (6% of global emissions) are in this quadrant (bottom-left), while more than 58% of emissions (43% of global emissions) fall in the top-right quadrant meaning that NDCs are not being delivered nor aligned with 2050 targets.

 

Note: The EU-27 is treated as a single entity due to its collective NDC target. Country-level targets are maintained according to the gas and sectoral scopes specified of each country’s NDC. Saudi Arabia is not included in the IPAC target since its 2030 NDC target cannot be quantified. The United States is not presented. Countries with extreme values (±40% for the NDC Delivery Gap or ±110% for the 2050 Targets Consistency Gap) have been omitted as outliers.

Source: Calculations are based on OECD estimates using Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submissions to the UNFCCC and PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]). Targets are expressed in common units consistent with UNFCCC submissions. Further details are provided in the Methodology section.

Box 1.1. NDC 3.0: Raising ambition for 2035 targets

The year 2025 marks a pivotal moment for climate action, as countries are due to submit updated NDCs with targets to 2035. This is the first submission round informed by the Global Stocktake which provided evidence that current pledges fall short of pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals or net-zero pathways.

The 2035 NDCs present an opportunity not only to strengthen ambition but to link climate action with sustainable economic growth (OECD/UNDP, 2025[4]). Recent OECD/UNDP analysis shows that enhanced NDCs can outperform business-as-usual scenarios, once climate damages are considered economic benefits are even larger (Chapter 2).

Progress to date has been limited. As of October 2025, only 64 Parties have submitted their NDC 3.0 and 13 countries covered under IPAC (Figure ‎1.5). IPAC harmonises countries’ 2030 and 2035 mitigation targets in physical units, facilitating evaluation and monitoring (Pizarro et al., 2024[7]).

1.5. Only 18% of GHG emissions, covered by net-zero targets, are backed by legally binding commitments

As of September 2025, 114 countries and the European Union – together accounting for 92% of country‑based emissions – have adopted net-zero targets.4 However, the scope and timing of existing net‑zero commitments varies considerably. Not all pledges cover all greenhouse gases and sectors, nor are they uniformly set for 2050. For instance, China and India have set net-zero targets for 2060 and 2070 respectively, while Uruguay’s target is limited to CO₂. As a result of both the absence of commitments in some countries and delayed targets in others, the aggregate global GHG emissions trajectory implied by net-zero commitments by 2050 remains above the 1.5-2°C range.

Due to gaps in implementation and the absence of enforceable commitment even these pledges may not be met. Most countries have pledged net-zero targets through policy documents, such as Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategies (LT-LEDS), NDCs or non-binding declarations.5 Although the number of countries pledging net-zero emissions has increased in recent years, only 30 countries and the EU (27 Parties)6 – representing 17.7% of global GHG emissions – have enshrined their targets into law (Figure ‎1.6). Progress has stagnated with the share of global country-based emissions covered by legally binding net-zero targets increasing only by 0.5% since 2024 with only Moldova and Ukraine putting new legislation into force.7 Embedding net-zero targets in legally binding frameworks is important to ensure accountability and secure long-term implementation.

1.6. GHG emission reduction commitments remain inconsistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals

Ambitious mitigation commitments and their effective implementation are essential for meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goals. The NDC Delivery Gap illustrates the persistent challenges in achieving pledged reductions. Looking ahead, the full delivery of current NDCs, and countries 2050 commitments for all countries would still not be sufficient to align with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C and 2°C. This shortfall is often referred to as the ambition gap. To meet these goals, global GHG emissions, including bunkers and a LULUCF bookkeeping adjustment8 (55 Gt CO₂e), would need to fall by at least 40% for 1.5°C and by 25% for 2°C by 2030 (Figure ‎1.7) (UNEP, 2024[2]). Moreover, bridging the ambition gap will also require enhanced international cooperation on finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building to ensure equitable participation in global mitigation efforts.

The aggregate emissions reductions committed by OECD and OECD partners in their 2030 NDC targets is just 5.5 Gt CO₂e, around 16% compared to 2023 levels9, with OECD countries targeting a 30% emission reduction and OECD partner countries 7%.10 Since these countries account for 78% of aggregate country‑level emissions, they play a critical role in closing the global ambition gap and achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goals. Given their economic structures and development levels, mitigation targets and trajectories across OECD and partner countries should be interpreted in light of respective national circumstances. However, total efforts still remain well below the scale required to be consistent with the temperature goals.

While international aviation and shipping and LULUCF sinks play important roles, achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goals ultimately depends on countries significantly increasing their climate ambition – making the submission of NDC 3.0 a critical moment. Given the guiding principle of the Paris Agreement of common but differentiated responsibilities, (CBDR), capacities and national circumstances, the exact emissions reduction commitment of individual countries will differ, but to be on a sustainable trajectory consistent with the 1.5°C and 2°C temperature goals of the Paris Agreement, countries would need to commit to an aggregate emissions in 2035 of approximately 17 GtCO₂e for the 1.5°C temperature goal and 28 GtCO₂e for 2°C.11 This implies an emission reduction of between 39-63% compared to 2023 levels.

 

Note: World emissions include national inventories plus international bunkers and a LULUCF adjustment to account for differences in reporting methods. Unlike other figures that use country-reported emissions including LULUCF, this figure calculates emissions including LULUCF by combining country-based emissions excluding LULUCF with a separate LULUCF bookkeeping adjustment. The estimate found in (UNEP, 2024[2]) for projected emissions in 2030 under Unconditional NDCs has been proportionally adjusted to align with the world emissions estimate.

Source: Historical emissions are based on OECD calculations using Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC and PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]). The 2050 targets estimate is based on IPAC calculations outlined in the Methodology section. The 2030 NDC target and temperature pathways are from (UNEP, 2024[2]).

Continued momentum for net-zero pledges in international aviation and shipping

Recent years have seen growing momentum to decarbonise international aviation and maritime transport - two sectors that account for 2.5% and 2% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions respectively (IEA, 2025[8]) (IEA, 2023[9]). In 2022, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a net-zero carbon emissions target for international aviation by 2050, supported by mechanisms such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) (Chapter 3). Building on this, the ICAO requested member states to submit State Action Plans detailing their national strategies toward this goal by 2024. By June 2025, 150 states – representing over 99% of international air traffic – had done so (ICAO, 2025[10]).

In 2023, member states of the International Maritime Organization also committed to reach net-zero emissions “by around 2050” for the international maritime sector (IMO, 2023[11]). In April 2025, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee approved a draft Net‑Zero Framework – including a global emissions pricing mechanism and fuel standards – for adoption by October 2025 and enforcement from 2027 (IMO, 2025[12]).

While net-zero pledges in international aviation and shipping provide welcome signals of intent, they risk remaining aspirational without immediate action and innovation. Both sectors are hard-to-abate and are currently off track with the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (IEA, 2023[13]). Aligning with a net-zero pathway requires a rapid and large-scale deployment of low-carbon fuels such as green hydrogen and synthetic fuels. Simultaneously, more effective global carbon markets and pricing mechanisms are needed (Wetterberg, Lanzi and Gómez, 2025[14]), alongside strong regulatory signals to drive investments in infrastructure and fleet transformation.

1.7. Fossil fuel reliance in heat production and transportation continues to drive emissions

Identifying the sources of emissions is fundamental to designing effective climate mitigation strategies (Chapter 3). These sources differ widely across countries, depending on factors such as the level of development, natural conditions, available resources, distance to markets, economic sectors, energy resources and land-use patterns (see Box ‎1.2, on a discussion on LULUCF emissions).

Despite progress in decarbonising electricity and heat generation, this sector remains the largest source of emissions in OECD and OECD partner countries (33%), reflecting a continued reliance on fossil fuels. Emissions from the transport sector follows, accounting for 15% of total emissions while agriculture and buildings contribute 11% and 6%, respectively. Emissions from manufacturing industries and construction and industrial processes account for 13% and 11%, driven in part by China’s significant emissions in the manufacturing sector (Figure ‎1.8).

These aggregate percentages mask substantial cross-country variation in emissions sources, highlighting the need for tailored policy approaches. Even within the OECD there is significant heterogeneity in sectoral emissions profiles. For instance, Japan’s emissions are concentrated in energy and industrial processes, whereas agriculture emerges as a key sector for mitigation for Sweden (14%) and Costa Rica (20%) (OECD, 2025[15]) (OECD, 2025[16]) (OECD, 2023[17]). The IPAC Dashboard provides country-specific data to support more detailed analysis (OECD, 2025[18]). Carbon dioxide is the predominant GHG, accounting for approximately 80% of emissions (OECD, 2024[19]).

Alongside static sectoral shares, examining changes over time is crucial for identifying where emissions are falling and where further policy intervention is needed. Since 2015, OECD countries have reduced emissions in most sectors, especially electricity and heat generation (-21%) and manufacturing and construction (-20%). Transport emissions, however, remained constant in OECD countries and rose in partner countries, highlighting the sector’s hard-to-abate nature (Chapter 3). OECD partner countries saw increases in most sectors with electricity and heat (+37%) and industrial processes (+30%) experiencing the largest increases. These two sectors also account for the largest absolute shares of emissions in partner countries (36% and 16%), making their growth particularly concerning (Table ‎1.1).

Table 1.1. OECD countries advance in all sectors except transport, OECD partner countries see increases in most sectors

Relative changes in %, 2015 and 2023 levels (Gt CO₂e), OECD and OECD partner countries

	OECD		OECD partners
Sector	Relative change 2015-2023 (%)	2023 level (Gt CO2e)	Relative change 2015-2023 (%)	2023 level (Gt CO2e)
Electricity/Heat	↓ 21%	3.9	↑ 37%	8.4
Transportation	↑ 0%	3.5	↑ 20%	2.1
Agriculture	↓ 1%	1.5	↑ 4%	2.5
Buildings	↓ 10%	1.3	↓ 13%	0.8
Manufacturing/Construction	↓ 20%	1.4	↓ 13%	3.7
Industrial Process	↓ 5%	1.1	↑ 30%	2.9
Waste	↓ 2%	0.5	↑ 14%	0.7

Note: Emissions follow IPCC categories. The Buildings category includes residential and commercial fuel use, classified under Energy.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC, PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]) and the IEA database of GHG emissions.

Box 1.2. LULUCF: A critical but uncertain component of global emissions

The Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector is central to many countries’ climate pledges and plays a key role in limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Yet, its contribution to global emissions remains highly uncertain. National inventories often report LULUCF as a net sink, while global assessments applying the IPCC’s method estimate it as a net emissions source (IPCC, 2023[20]). The discrepancy is large, amounting to approximately 7 Gt CO₂e per year, close to one sixth of world emissions in 2023.

This uncertainly complicates both the achievement and tracking of climate goals. Many countries rely on LULUCF to offset emissions in other sectors and this role is expected to grow as mitigation needs increase. However, the assumption that LULUCF consistently functions as a sink carries significant risk. Beyond mitigation, the LULUCF sector also supports wider environmental objectives such as adaptation and biodiversity. Land-based solutions, including ecosystem restoration, can deliver multiple co-benefits.

Advances in Earth observation (EO) technologies are improving the accuracy and transparency of LULUCF monitoring (Tesnière, Maes and Haščič, 2024[21]). Ongoing OECD work on measuring emissions from carbon stock changes using EO data complements these international efforts.

Figure 1.9. Land cover as shown by Earth observation data in Europe

Source: OECD (2025), “Land cover and land cover change”, OECD Environment Statistics (database).

1.8. OECD countries have higher per capita emissions across sectors than OECD partners, except in manufacturing and industry

Sectoral emission shares must be interpreted with care, as they reflect the relative importance of emissions within a country’s overall emissions profiles, rather than absolute levels. While sectoral emissions provide insights into domestic decarbonisation priorities, they can be misleading when comparing mitigation challenges across countries or regions. In such cases, per capita sectoral emissions serve as a valuable complement, offering deeper insights into a country’s capacity to reduce emissions by adopting best practices. For example, in many Latin American countries, transport often appears as the dominant source of emissions. This can lead to the assumption that the region faces a major transport-related challenge. However, this prominence is due to comparatively low emissions from other sectors, such as energy and industrial processes, thanks to widespread use of hydropower and limited heavy industry. This has important implications for mitigation potential, which can be better understood through per capita sectoral emissions.

Per capita emissions in OECD countries are almost double those of OECD partner countries and this disparity is reflected across sectors. OECD countries emit more per capita in nearly every sector – especially transport and buildings – reflecting the need to address energy-intensive lifestyles and infrastructure such as widespread car use and high heating and cooling demands. Conversely, reflecting the emergence of new industrial sectors and ongoing transition efforts, OECD partner countries have higher per capita emissions in industrial sectors due to their role as global manufacturing hubs. This contributes to higher emissions per unit of GDP (Figure ‎1.10), reinforcing the need for low-carbon growth strategies and cleaner industrial technologies.

1.9. Economic growth drives emissions in OECD partner countries

Decoupling emissions from economic and population growth is central to long-term climate mitigation. Greenhouse gas emissions are influenced by several factors, but they tend to rise with increasing GDP or population growth and decline with improvements in energy efficiency or shifts toward cleaner energy sources. The Kaya identity provides a useful framework for analysing trends in energy-related GHG emissions, which account for most global emissions (Box ‎1.3) (Figure ‎1.11).

Decomposing emissions trends into their underlying factors reveals contrasting trajectories between OECD and OECD partner countries. Figure ‎1.11 decomposes the emissions trends into the four key factors of the Kaya identify. Since 2015, OECD countries have reduced emissions by improving energy efficiency and shifting to cleaner energy, alongside continued economic and population growth. In contrast, emissions in OECD partner countries have risen. Population growth and strong economic growth outweigh improvements in energy efficiency. Worryingly, despite record-high renewable energy deployment, GHG intensity of energy has increased, reflecting a resurgence in coal-fired power generation amid the global energy crisis (Koilakou, Hatzigeorgiou and Bithas, 2024[22]). This trend highlights the potential and imperative to reduce emissions in OECD partner countries including through international cooperation by accelerating the decarbonisation of energy systems as these countries experience economic development.

 

Note: Emissions were decomposed using the Kaya Identity. OECD calculations were used to estimate total final energy consumption for Peru and Saudi Arabia.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC and PRIMAP-hist (Gütschow et al., 2016[5]) (Cárdenas Rodríguez et al., 2024[6]); IEA, World Energy Balances, IEA, Paris..

Complementing this structural decomposition, the Drivers section of the IPAC Dashboard presents economy-wide indicators that provide additional information on country-specific drivers of emissions including energy use, material use, land use and cover, transport and mobility, and other economic drivers which can be used to inform targeted climate mitigation policies (OECD, 2025[18]).

Box 1.3. Decomposing changes in emissions using the Kaya Identity

The Kaya Identity provides a useful framework for decomposing changes in energy-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, helping policymakers identify which underlying factors contribute most to emissions trends and where mitigation efforts will be the most effective (IPCC, 2023[23]). When applied to two periods (e.g., 2015 and 2023, as shown in (Figure 1.11), the Kaya Identity breaks down the change in emissions into four components:

$∆\%GHG=∆\%P+∆\%\left(\frac{GDP}{P}\right)+∆\%\left(\frac{E}{GDP}\right)+∆\%\left(\frac{GHG}{E}\right)$

Where:

• P = Population

• GDP/P = GDP per capita

• E/GDP = Energy intensity of GDP

• GHG/E = GHG intensity of energy

This decomposition focuses on energy-related emissions, which account for more than three-quarters of global GHG emissions. It does not include emissions from other sectors such as agriculture which are not directly tied to energy use and economic activity. While all gases are converted to CO₂e, the majority are carbon dioxide.

By linking changes in energy-related emissions to structural factors and policies (Chapter 3), decomposition supports effective policy development by identifying sources of progress and areas needing further action. For example, an emissions reduction attributed to a lower GHG intensity could reflect successful efforts accelerate the deployment of renewables. Conversely, weak decreases in energy efficiency could signal mitigation potential though energy renovations or demand-side policies. It also reveals the extent to which countries have decoupled emissions from population and economic growth.

To measure countries’ progress of decoupling, two complementary indicators are used: GHG emissions per unit of GDP (emissions intensity) and GHG emissions per capita.

Despite progress, OECD partner countries have potential and need to lower emissions intensity

Emissions intensity remains high in OECD partner countries. Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, most OECD and OECD partner countries have reduced their GHG emissions per unit of GDP (Figure ‎1.12). However, despite some progress, OECD partner countries still emit, on average, twice as much as OECD countries to generate the same level of economic output (OECD, 2024[19]). This is particularly significant as many OECD partner countries are undergoing economic expansion (Figure 1.11). Without further reductions in emissions intensity, continued growth in these economies could lead to a substantial rise in global emissions.

Per capita emissions in many OECD countries exceed the global average

Despite progress since the Paris Agreement, per capita emissions in several OECD countries remain above the global average. While countries like the United Kingdom have successfully reduced their per capita emissions below this threshold (5.4 tCO₂e), others - such as Australia and Canada - still emit approximately three times more per person. This disparity is tied to income levels, with high-emitting households concentrated in wealthier nations (UNEP, 2024[2]). Meanwhile, per capita emissions in emerging economies like China and Brazil have risen, driven by rapid economic growth (Figure ‎1.13). However, some of the observed reductions in territorial per capita emissions may be due to the outsourcing of carbon-intensive production (Figure ‎1.14).

1.10. GHG emissions are embedded in trade

While the Paris Agreement requires individual countries to meet their targets, it is important not to lose sight that the ultimate objective is to reduce global emissions. Measuring territorial emissions of individual countries can mask emission offshoring where carbon-intensive production is shifted to lower-income or less-regulated countries. This presents a challenge for assessing actual ambition (Figure ‎1.14), as climate commitments rely on national inventories which do not consider emissions embedded in trade. Monitoring consumption- and production-based emissions helps determine whether countries are genuinely reducing emissions or merely outsourcing them.

In OECD countries, both consumption- and production-based emissions peaked in 2007 and have been declining since. However, consumption-based emissions remain significantly higher, suggesting continued reliance on imported goods that generate significant emissions, in effect exporting emissions to other countries – particularly OECD partner countries. In contrast, OECD partner countries’ production-based emissions exceed those based on consumption. This divergence underscores the need to consider global supply chains when monitoring and evaluating countries’ climate action and mitigation efforts.

Alongside consumption- and production-based emissions, complementary tools such as carbon footprint indicators available on the IPAC Dashboard and carbon intensity metrics can offers insights into emissions outsourcing (Box ‎1.4).

Box 1.4. Addressing carbon leakage risks by using interoperable carbon intensity metrics

The Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA) is supporting the development of interoperable carbon intensity metrics as essential tools for identifying carbon leakage risks. These metrics quantify the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production of goods and services. To enable standardised comparisons of emissions performance across jurisdictions, carbon intensity metrics must be interoperable. Interoperable metrics provide the data backbone for emissions standards and border carbon adjustment mechanisms, such as the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM). Applying carbon intensity metrics, such policies can be implemented to disincentivise emissions outsourcing and align trade flows with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Source: (OECD, 2025[24]).

References

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[12] IMO (2025), IMO approves net-zero regulations for global shipping, https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-approves-netzero-regulations.aspx.

[11] IMO (2023), Revised GHG reduction strategy for global shipping adopted, https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/revised-ghg-reduction-strategy-for-global-shipping-adopted-.aspx.

[20] IPCC (2023), “Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU)”, in Climate Change 2022 - Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.009.

[23] IPCC (2023), “Industry”, in Climate Change 2022 - Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.013.

[22] Koilakou, E., E. Hatzigeorgiou and K. Bithas (2024), “Social and economic driving forces of recent CO2 emissions in three major BRICS economies”, Scientific Reports, Vol. 14, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-58827-9.

[18] OECD (2025), IPAC Dashboard, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/climate-action-dashboard.html.

[15] OECD (2025), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan 2025, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/583cab4c-en.

[16] OECD (2025), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2025, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/91dcc109-en.

[24] OECD (2025), “Towards interoperable carbon intensity metrics: Assessing monitoring, reporting and verification systems”, Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers, No. 9, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b185bcfa-en.

[19] OECD (2024), The Climate Action Monitor 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/787786f6-en.

[17] OECD (2023), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Costa Rica 2023, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ec94fd4e-en.

[4] OECD/UNDP (2025), Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: The Case for Enhanced NDCs, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16b7cbc7-en.

[7] Pizarro, R. et al. (2024), “GHG Emission Trends and Targets (GETT): Harmonised quantification methodology and indicators”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 230, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/decef216-en.

[21] Tesnière, V., M. Maes and I. Haščič (2024), “Monitoring land cover change to understand biodiversity pressures: Indicator methodology and key findings”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 254, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/441a7a6c-en.

[2] UNEP (2024), Emissions Gap Report 2024: No more hot air … please! With a massive gap between rhetoric and reality, countries draft new climate commitments, United Nations Environment Programme, https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/46404.

[1] UNFCCC (2015), The Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Geneva.

[14] Wetterberg, K., E. Lanzi and N. Gómez (2025), “Exploring governments’ efforts to shape carbon credit markets: Possible actions to enhance integrity”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 263, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0bafe9af-en.

Notes

← 1.  In this year’s edition of the Climate Action Monitor, the calculation of world emissions had methodological changes with respect to previous editions given the availability of new official data sources. In particular, the main data source now used for GHG emissions are the Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by parties to the UNFCCC. World emissions are calculated as the sum of country-based total emissions excluding LULUCF, international bunkers (aviation and maritime shipping) from the IEA GHG emissions data matching the energy module of 2006 IPCC Guidelines, and a LULUCF bookkeeping adjustment based on the approach outlined in (UNEP, 2024[2]) and data from (Friedlingstein et al., 2025[25]). Further details are provided in the methodological note in Annex B.

← 2.  2019 was chosen as the base year to calculate the trajectory because most countries committed to their 2030 targets in 2020 and used emissions data from the previous year, 2019, for their projected emissions trajectory, and also this was before the COVID-19 pandemic which temporarily and extraordinarily reduced emissions.

← 3.  For target and gap calculations, the EU-27 is treated as a single entity due to its collective NDC. This bloc is categorised under the OECD group rather than OECD partners, as 23 of its member states are part of the OECD, accounting for 96% of the EU’s total emissions. The remaining EU countries not currently in the OECD are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania – though Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania are OECD accession candidate countries.

← 4.  Countries that introduced new net-zero targets this year are Mongolia (pledge) and Micronesia (policy document).

← 5.  There are differences with other databases that also aim to identify the number of countries that have pledged net-zero targets. One of these is an IEA database, which presents differences with respect to some countries, in particular Comoros, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Niue, Paraguay, Vatican City (which IEA does not cover), and Morocco, Romania, Chinese Taipei (which IPAC does not cover).

← 6.  Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, EU (27), Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Moldova, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

← 7.  Slovenia also adopted a Climate Law with a binding net-zero target; however, its emissions are covered under the EU-wide binding target.

← 8.  In this report, to present NDC targets including national LULUCF emissions, as is the usual convention, an adjustment is performed to be consistent with (UNEP, 2024[2]): subtracting national inventory-based LULUCF emissions and adding global LULUCF bookkeeping emissions. This reflects the varying methodologies countries use to estimate LULUCF emissions from managed versus unmanaged lands. To ensure consistency, UNEP estimates global emissions by aggregating GHG emissions from national inventories excluding LULUCF and then adds a global estimate of GHG emissions from LULUCF for managed lands – a process referred to as a “bookkeeping” adjustment.

← 9.  GHG emissions inventories are compiled following territory- and production-based emissions principles. This means that, in most countries’ cases, total GHG emissions does not include emissions from international transport. In addition, emissions from consumption of products produced in other territories or emissions from transporting these products are not included.

← 10.  In the IPAC Dashboard, GHG emissions targets are presented in scope defined by the countries’ NDCs (including or excluding LULUCF, gases, AR GWP) for aggregation; an adjustment was made to have a common scope considering all gases.

← 11.  The estimates of 36 GtCO₂e (below 2°C) and 25 GtCO₂e (around 1.5°C) for 2035 global total GHG emissions are comprised of: country-based emissions excluding LULUCF, international bunkers (aviation and shipping), and a LULUCF bookkeeping adjustment. To estimate country-based emissions excluding LULUCF in 2035, international bunkers and the bookkeeping adjustment are subtracted from the global total. However, because NDCs are typically expressed as country-based emissions including LULUCF, a projected 2035 LULUCF value - based on country inventory data - is added to country-based emissions excluding LULUCF. This provides an estimate of the aggregate emissions level that countries should target in their 2035 NDCs to align with the temperature goals.