This chapter examines systemic bottlenecks constraining Estonia’s public sector innovation system. These include funding, procurement, citizen engagement, regulatory rigidity and inability to experiment. While internal factors like culture shape central and local government capabilities, systemic barriers warrant structural reforms beyond the remit of any one organisation. Reliance on project-based EU funding creates an implementation funnel gap, encouraging risk aversion and short-term enhancement over transformative innovation. Rigid compliance-driven procurement and efficiency initiatives hollow out administrative resource buffers. To achieve long-term fiscal sustainability, the state must transition toward strategic, challenge-led procurement and long-term, coordinated funding.
Strengthening the Innovative Capacity of the Public Sector of Estonia
2. Structural barriers to public sector innovation
Copy link to 2. Structural barriers to public sector innovationAbstract
Public sector innovation systems are complex, and success factors vary across settings. In central government, the biggest innovation enablers (Figure 2.1) were connected to organisational-level factors (innovation culture, internal collaboration, team skills, learning from failure, data use and strategic role of innovation) that depend on the types of organisation in which public servants work and how they are managed. With some variation, local governments showed the same results, with less ability to learn from failure, collaborate internally and prioritise innovation (its strategic role). The least favourable factors, however, were connected to systemic issues: citizen involvement, procurement, legislative rigidity, the role of audit and political stability (local governments also struggled more with external collaboration than central government). These are systemic issues that no individual organisation can resolve. They require government-wide reforms to procurement frameworks, citizen engagement protocols, regulatory sandbox mechanisms and audit practices. During interviews, issues with funding were also reported – particularly the effects that specific (external) funding streams had on experimentation, risk-taking and the types of innovation with which the public sector engaged.
Figure 2.1. Innovation enablers in public sector organisations
Copy link to Figure 2.1. Innovation enablers in public sector organisationsInnovation culture, team skills and learning from failure were the strongest enablers of innovation; procurement, political stability, audit and legislative flexibility were the weakest enablers
Note: Agreement = “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”, by organisational culture enabler and government level. Central n = 816, Local n = 333.
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
These challenges are echoed in the innovation barriers that public servants report. Citizen engagement is widely seen as an issue (Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). Over one-third of heads of organisations see barriers with trustworthy and safe experimentation with generative AI and external collaboration with academia, private sector, and civil society (Figure 2.2). They also see legislative rigidity and a lack of procurement capability as primary obstacles (OECD, 2025[1]). The assessment report will discuss innovation culture and team dynamics in Chapter 4 and skills in Chapter 5 and issues concerning artificial intelligence in Chapter 7. Here the spotlight is set on systemic bottlenecks.
Figure 2.2. Innovation barriers reported by heads of organisations
Copy link to Figure 2.2. Innovation barriers reported by heads of organisations
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
Figure 2.3. Innovation barriers reported by staff
Copy link to Figure 2.3. Innovation barriers reported by staff
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
System-level barriers hinder innovation
Copy link to System-level barriers hinder innovationInnovation funding and budgets discourage transformative change
There are various ways in which governments can fund public sector innovation. Some countries -Australia, France, Ireland, Korea – use dedicated budget lines from the central government agency specifically for public sector innovation, while others dedicate budget lines in public sector organisations or have them in some key policy areas (see Figure 2.4). Many countries use a mixture of two or more funding resources (e.g., Korea, Sweden). Other countries provide structural funding to enable long-term foresight (see Box 2.1). Furthermore, recent research in Finland has shown that system‐level top‐down earmarked funding facilitates the launch of strategic large‐scale policy experiments (Raudla et al., 2025[2]). The Estonian public sector lacks dedicated central budget lines to support public sector innovation and relies heavily on external sources of funding – primarily from the EU.
Figure 2.4. Types of public sector innovation across countries
Copy link to Figure 2.4. Types of public sector innovation across countriesMore left = more institutionalised innovation funding.
Source: OECD OPSI National Contact Point Survey 2025.
Box 2.1. Anticipatory governance coupled with sustainable funding: example of Singapore
Copy link to Box 2.1. Anticipatory governance coupled with sustainable funding: example of SingaporeCentre for Strategic Futures
Established in 2009 within the Strategy Group of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) serves as the conceptual anchor of Singapore’s widely recognised anticipatory governance framework. The CSF's primary mandate is to identify blind spots, perceive weak signals, and map out emerging trends that fall outside the traditional horizons of line ministries. Rather than acting as a static research unit, the CSF functions as a strategic catalyst, embedding foresight methodologies—such as scenario planning and horizon scanning—across the wider public service. This systemic approach helps shield national policy from short-term shocks, ensuring the state remains resilient against long-term structural risks like demographic shifts and disruptive technologies.
Sustainable funding for innovation
The operational success of Singapore’s foresight model is structurally reinforced by its unique public financial management architecture. While many nations force innovation initiatives to compete directly with core operational expenditures within rigid annual cycles, Singapore utilises a top-down system of five-year funding blocks that determine roughly 60% of budget expenditure. This framework grants ministries long-term predictability and baseline autonomy.
However, to prevent institutional silos and ensure financial agility, the system explicitly structures a tension between decentralised blocks and centralised innovation funds. By design, these five-year funding blocks are intentionally not sufficient to cover all new policy priorities. Instead, the government extracts a systematic efficiency dividend from ministries: 70% of the Block Growth Factor and 40% of the allowable growth in the labour force are retained centrally by the Ministry of Finance.
This mechanism directly fuels a central pool of competitive funds and a cross-cutting Reinvestment Fund. To secure funding for transformative initiatives, cross-agency innovations, or emerging technological needs (such as public sector AI integration), ministries must bid into these centralised resources. The Ministry of Finance evaluates these bids based on whole-of-government transformation reviews rather than localised, ministry-by-ministry outputs.
By institutionalising analytical foresight through the CSF and pairing it with a budgetary framework that actively redirects baseline growth into centralised innovation pools, Singapore successfully mitigates the timeline mismatch that cripples public sector innovation elsewhere. The model prevents core operational expenditures from swallowing up transformative ideas, cultivating an administrative culture that financially incentivises cross-cutting, calculated risk-taking.
Note: While Singapore is neither an OECD nor EU member country, it’s a rare example of a mature governance mechanism linking strategic foresight with flexible public funding.
Line ministries and agencies lack sectoral budget allocations for innovation (Figure 2.5). Central government’s innovation funding tends to come largely from external, project-based sources. At the same time, innovation budgets in central government tend to be one order of magnitude higher than local government budgets for innovation (Figure 2.6). Local governments generally receive the lowest innovation budgets (as direct internal innovation investments), while, by administrative area, internal affairs and economic affairs report the highest proportions (noting that defence budgets are not included in the analysis).
Figure 2.5. Innovation funding sources by government level
Copy link to Figure 2.5. Innovation funding sources by government levelProportion of organisations reporting each funding type.
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
Figure 2.6. Reported innovation budgets by administrative area
Copy link to Figure 2.6. Reported innovation budgets by administrative areaReported funding amounts per organisation (EUR)
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
The heavy reliance on external funding at the central government level creates a gap in the implementation funnel. Many ideas are generated, but organisations scale only approximately 33% of them (as discussed in Chapter 6). This gap creates significant sunk costs for the state. Project-based EU funds focus on temporary piloting but lack long-term financial sustainability plans. Consequently, innovation projects cluster around available external funding streams. This dynamic results in incremental digital improvements being labelled as innovation (predominance of enhancement-oriented innovation – see Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1). In some areas, EU structural funds risk substituting for core state funding; Estonia is hardly alone, as these EU funds represent substantial public investment in many smaller EU countries (OECD, 2020[6]). Interviewees reported that strict compliance requirements and potential financial corrections attached to EU grants incentivise public servants to avoid high-risk experimentation. This dynamic reinforces a risk-averse culture across central government. Consequently, relatively less budget is devoted to mission-oriented or anticipatory innovation (Figure 2.7), and it is not surprising that dedicated budget seems to be associated with higher mission-oriented innovation, while anticipatory innovation happens more often with no dedicated funding at all (Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.7. Innovation portfolio mix by funding source
Copy link to Figure 2.7. Innovation portfolio mix by funding source
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
Figure 2.8. Budget amount vs strategic innovation share
Copy link to Figure 2.8. Budget amount vs strategic innovation shareOrganisation-level: budget (EUR) vs share of mission-oriented + anticipatory innovations
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
While there is a central innovation fund (see Box 2.2), it mainly supports innovations in their early stages of testing (developing a proof of concept, prototyping, etc.) and encourages higher-risk projects across government; it does not support their implementation or scaling. In the last fiscal year, the central government allocated approximately EUR 6 million to public sector innovation. European Union sources provided EUR 5 million of this total, representing 83% of all innovation funding. This is relatively minuscule compared with government spending, and most innovations across government are resourced through internal development funds.
Box 2.2. The Estonian Public Sector Innovation Fund
Copy link to Box 2.2. The Estonian Public Sector Innovation FundThe Government Office of Estonia launched the Public Sector Innovation Fund in early 2023 to improve public sector innovation capacity. The Fund supports public sector organisations in finding novel solutions to societal challenges, in line with the long-term national strategy, Estonia 2035 across three central government priorities: economic growth, crisis resilience and government efficiency.
The Fund finances the search for innovative solutions, development, prototyping, and real-life testing. Projects are implemented in collaboration with the private sector and academia, allowing the public sector to commission solutions that accelerate private-sector innovation. This form of procurement is a key tool for obtaining and developing solutions that may not yet exist on the market.
The Fund targets a 40% implementation success rate, thus aiming for more transformative and radical innovation projects. Currently, the fund has 36 active projects. Examples include using machine learning to perform risk analysis of unfiled taxes, developing a sovereign administrative layer for AI agents, developing an autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle system for urban spaces, and developing an integrated data exchange system for mobility services and ticket sales (MaaS X-road).
To build capacity, the Innovation Fund and the Innovation Team develop the broader ecosystem by sharing tools, methods and guidelines. The Fund is financed from the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) for the 2021-27 period and aims to support experimentation and the exploration of innovative solutions with EUR 60 million over 2023-2029.
In addition to external resources and lack of direct budgets, experts also report that the way performance budgeting is currently used does not yet fully support innovation. According to interviews with experts, the budget process focuses heavily on collecting performance indicators and cost accounting, consuming significant analytical capacity. Spending reviews could also be more explicitly used to connect performance evidence with strategic reprioritisation, by assessing whether existing programmes remain aligned with government priorities and identifying opportunities for savings, redesign and innovation. At the same time, it is clear across OECD countries that delaying meaningful structural reform will ultimately cost governments more and limit their scope to handle future crises (OECD, 2026[8]). However, organisations rarely use these data in decision-making or to identify innovation needs. Furthermore, the 1+3 budget planning system (in State Budget Strategy) does not include explicit innovation proposals (Ministry of Finance, 2026[9]). It requires all costs to be covered by existing resources, forcing innovation activities to compete with core operational work. Simultaneously, efficiency initiatives – such as the Ministry of Finance’s Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) project (Box 2.3) and the Council of Efficiency and Economic Growth (see Box 1.3 in Chapter 1) – have systematically eliminated institutional resource buffers. These measures create a tension between the slack resources needed for experimentation and the pressure to cut costs, demonstrate value for money and deliver immediate results. They also reflect a broader trend noted in the OECD Restoring Public Finances 2026 report (OECD, 2026[8]), where member states are heavily deploying targeted savings measures and efficiency optimisations to counter fiscal pressures. However, as the Estonian case highlights, innovation requires uncommitted time, which disappears under high-pressure efficiency drives that only tend to drive enhancement-oriented innovation activities and hollow out capacity for more transformative types of innovation. This is backed by prior research, which shows that slack resources are however often critical for innovation projects and resilience of public sector organisations (Cinar et al., 2022[10]; De Vries, Bekkers and Tummers, 2015[11]; Criado, Alcaide-Muñoz and Liarte, 2023[12]).
Box 2.3. Estonia’s Zero-Based Budgeting project
Copy link to Box 2.3. Estonia’s Zero-Based Budgeting projectThe Estonian Ministry of Finance has undertaken a comprehensive state budget revision, centred around its Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) project (nullbaasilise eelarve projekt), equivalent to spending reviews in other OECD countries. The framework is built around three complementary pillars which form an integrated framework with a unified objective of strengthening spending efficiency:
i) Comprehensive reviews of ministerial budgets and activities using ZBB principles to assess the relevance and efficiency of baseline spending;
ii) Thematic cross-cutting reviews covering specific policy areas or functions across ministries; and
iii) Performance assessments of national development plans and EU structural funds to assess policy effectiveness.
Instigated by a mandate from the Government cabinet on 31 August 2023, the initiative marks a fundamental shift away from traditional, incremental budgeting. Instead of adjusting the previous year's figures upwards or downwards, Estonia’s ZBB framework requires line ministries and constitutional institutions to evaluate and justify every expense from a baseline of zero, explicitly linking expenditures to public service delivery and operational efficiency. Reviews of ministerial budgets are conducted in close cooperation with line ministries under political and administrative steering and follow a phased process from service mapping and screening to detailed analysis and political decision making.
The primary driver behind the ZBB project is the optimisation of public finances to ensure a sustainable fiscal trajectory while improving public administration transparency. The strategy focuses heavily on three critical areas:
Identifying non-prioritised services: pinpointing public services that are no longer considered essential, allowing their scope to be reduced or entirely phased out.
Eliminating duplication: highlighting redundant or overlapping services across different areas of governance to consolidate and streamline administration.
Optimising resource allocation: determining the minimal funding needed to run an organisation or deliver a programme efficiently, using performance-based metrics rather than historical precedent.
The project operates under a systematic, phased evaluation cycle across Estonia's line ministries. Managed by a dedicated team within the Ministry of Finance, the project has progressed through continuous oversight, culminating in highly detailed review processes.
The 2024 report laid the analytical groundwork, establishing robust methodologies, data models, and pilot criteria to accurately cost specific public services. Following this, the 2025 report significantly scaled the project's scope, delivering cross-sector analyses and targeted savings packages designed to restructure national spending patterns for consecutive budget cycles.
During the ZBB review organisations must explicitly justify how every requested fund generates tangible value for citizens. If a service cannot prove its contribution to current national strategic goals, or if its operational cost outweighs its societal benefit, its funding is targeted for reallocation or reduction.
Source: (Ministry of Finance, 2026[13])
Countries face pressure to deliver short-term fiscal consolidation while maintaining long-term fiscal sustainability (OECD, 2026[8]) and innovation is needed for both. However, when budgetary mechanisms and expenditure management systems focus mainly on immediate savings, they can discourage transformative innovation. The Estonian government’s 1+3-year budget planning and four-year political cycles focus on immediate, tangible outputs. This planning horizon clashes with long-term structural risks like demographic shifts and geopolitical threats. The results are visible in the types of innovation the government engages with focussing on digitalising existing processes – notably enhancement-oriented innovation – rather than reinventing policy logic.
Procurement as risk mitigation
Public procurement has increasingly evolved from a compliance-driven administrative function into a vital demand-side strategic tool for driving public sector innovation (Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016[14]). According to the OECD (Monteiro, Hlacs and Boéchat, 2024[15]), utilising procurement strategically allows governments to actively insource innovative approaches, novel solutions, and optimised processes directly into public services. By placing the needs, expectations, and unique insights of public sector innovators at the centre of the procurement framework, governments can shift from merely purchasing standard goods to actively co-creating value with the market. This mechanism is especially influential as public procurement accounts for approximately 13% of GDP in OECD countries and is critical to delivering most public services, such as infrastructure, health, defence, and education (OECD, 2020[16]). In Estonia, public procurement directs over EUR 3 billion to the economy yearly that accounts for 30% of the costs included in the state budget and is around 12-13% of the Estonian GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2023[17]). Despite this substantial economic footprint, less than 1% of procurements and 1.9% of the total procurement budget is currently channelled into R&D or radically innovative market solutions (Põllu, 2026[18]). Even though innovation procurement may not be applicable for the majority of standard procurements, it is underused.
The OECD complemented the survey with data from the Estonian Public Procurement Register (2018 to 2024) searching for innovation keywords using Natural Language Processing (NLP) (see Annex 2.B). The register analysis operates on open data from Estonia’s national public procurement register (Riigihangete register), systematically mapped to the international open contracting data standard (OCDS) format. Rather than relying on self-reported labels, the algorithmic extraction identified innovation through specific morphological text streams. For example, in the last fiscal year, public sector entities classified only 25 contracts as innovative procurements, while through an NLP text-mining approach "hidden" innovation contracts can be uncovered, not formally tagged by procurement officers. Benefits in NLP-based analysis have been showcased in prior analysis of Estonian procurement data for which also specific classification methodology has been developed (Ettevõtluse ja Innovatsiooni Sihtasutus, 2025[19]). Estonia has set explicit strategic procurement targets: by 2035, green criteria are expected to be included in 20% of procurement procedures, representing 30% of total procurement spending; socially responsible procurement should reach 10% of contracts and 20% of procurement value; and innovation procurement should account for 2% of all procurement by 2027 (OECD, 2025[1]).
The combined analysis shows that most public sector organisations in Estonia do not leverage innovation procurements or procurement to scale previously developed solutions. These procurements are done by a handful of organisations (Figure 2.9) – top 10% of public sector organisations procure 98.7% of all procured innovation projects. This concentration is driven almost entirely by central state IT authorities and major hospital networks and national transport/infrastructure bodies; local municipalities, with exception of largest cities, are statistically absent from innovation procurement metrics. However, this structural concentration must be interpreted alongside systemic blind spots within the national dataset. The public procurement register inherently excludes key pillars of public expenditure: government spending executed outside formal procurement routes (such as direct grants or in-house deliveries), and high-technology frameworks exempt due to security or defence sensitivities. Furthermore, research and development (R&D) contracts are frequently routed through independent funding streams like the Estonian Research Council. Consequently, these findings reflect the top innovators among those legally required to report within standard parameters, rather than capturing the totality of the state's innovative activities.
Figure 2.9. Innovation procurements and procurements to scale
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Innovation procurements and procurements to scale
Note: “n” represents the number of procurements.
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
Procurement awarded in-part on quality, not just price, were more likely to go to an innovative bid (see Figure 2.10). However, the impact of quality in the procurement hit diminishing marginal returns after quality comprised over 30% of the procurement weighting (Figure 2.11). The statistical modelling confirms this non-linear relationship by grouping tender evaluation into distinct operational tiers: price-only evaluations (0% quality), token quality frameworks (1% to 30%), and significant quality models (exceeding 30%). Econometric estimations indicate a stark step-change: shifting away from a pure price focus to even a token quality baseline yields an immediate, statistically significant jump in the probability of capturing an innovative bid. However, once evaluation thresholds cross the 30% quality baseline, the probability curve flattens significantly, proving that large quality weightings do not yield proportional gains in innovative outcome. This flattening occurs partially because Estonian contracting entities rarely use functional or outcome-based descriptions. Even when assigning a higher weighting to “quality,” the criteria are frequently evaluated using rigid, bureaucratic sub-metrics (such as years of specialist experience) rather than the actual innovative performance or life-cycle cost optimisation of the proposed solution.
Figure 2.10. Quality criteria and innovation rates
Copy link to Figure 2.10. Quality criteria and innovation rates
Source: OECD based on procurement data analysis.
Figure 2.11. The relationship between award criteria strategy and probability of innovation
Copy link to Figure 2.11. The relationship between award criteria strategy and probability of innovation
Source: OECD based on the procurement data analysis.
A bias towards the lowest price, combined with legal risk aversion, systematically disadvantages innovative solutions in public tenders, as these solutions are harder to evaluate against standardised price criteria given their unproven, sometimes non-standard nature. Innovation need not be inherently more expensive – cost reduction is a legitimate consideration in innovation. However, an exclusive focus on cost may limit innovation. Only a few organisations demonstrate both a high level of innovation intensity and the use of quality criteria in procurement (Figure 2.12). Expert interviews confirmed that Estonian contracting authorities view procurement predominantly as an exercise in risk avoidance rather than a strategic tool. A focus on low cost over value for money stifles innovation. In a prior survey of Estonian contracting authorities, the OECD (2025[1]) established that inadequate capability was the main challenge to implementing innovation procurement, followed by a lack of time to prepare the procedure and a lack of legal clarity, which could be associated with implementing complex procurement procedures such as innovation partnerships.
Figure 2.12. Innovation intensity and the use of quality criteria
Copy link to Figure 2.12. Innovation intensity and the use of quality criteriaProcurement maturity and innovation rates vary across government
Note: Dashed lines = Medians. Analysis restricted to organisations with >20 tenders.
Source: OECD based on the procurement data analysis.
Based on the survey findings, 34% of organisations report having no dedicated support mechanisms for public procurement for innovation. Where mechanisms do exist, the adoption of procedural tools (36%), risk-sharing levers (8%), and capability support (14%) remains notably low. This structural deficit compounds the staff-level experience of bureaucratic friction: 23% of staff disagree that their organisation has simple rules and procedures, compared to only 36% who agree. Unlike some other OECD countries, Estonia currently lacks a centralised, permanently funded competence centre for innovation procurement or a dedicated financial risk-mitigation fund (OECD, 2025[1]). This leaves individual procurement officers to bear the entirety of the legal and financial risks associated with failed novelty. In Estonia, the Action Plan of Public Procurement Strategic Principles (Rahandusministeerium, 2023[20]) mentions the future plan to set up a competence centre within the State Shared Service Centre, a national central purchasing body, to provide advice and support for strategic procurement such as innovation procurement. Since 2024, the advisory function is fulfilled by Estonian Business and Innovation Agency, but reportedly their direct support is mainly connected to procurements connected to the Innovation Fund projects (Box 2.2). They have released practical guidance for innovation procurement (Box 2.4), but the issue is with its uptake. To make a difference a more systemic approach may be needed addressing both the leadership level demand, risk behaviours and practitioner levels skills (some examples across the OECD public sector innovation procurement framework are provided in Table 2.1 below).
Box 2.4. The Innovation Procurement Handbook
Copy link to Box 2.4. The Innovation Procurement HandbookThe Innovation Procurement Handbook is a comprehensive digital guidance document published in 2024 by the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency (EIS). The drafting team comprised key legal and procurement experts Estonian law firms (Sorainen and NOVE) alongside EIS specialists. The text was validated by a wide cross-governmental peer-review group, including representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Government Office, the State Shared Services Centre and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications.
The guidelines are specifically designed as a practical guide for all public sector contracting authorities and practitioners across Estonia. While the framework is legally non-binding, it serves as the official national recommended practice to help public servants act as a collaborative bridge between state needs and innovative market offerings.
The handbook serves as a direct operational toolkit to meet the Estonian Government's cross-sectoral target: ensuring that 2% of all public procurements are directed toward innovative solutions by focusing on purchasing solutions to problems rather than buying standard goods and services.
The operational content of the guide walks public buyers through the lifecycle of innovation-friendly tenders, focusing on several key thematic pillars:
Procurement flexibility and procedures: it details how to leverage flexible, dialogue-driven statutory frameworks. It focuses heavily on competitive procedures with negotiation, competitive dialogues, and Innovation Partnerships showing how to legally structure interaction with the market.
Market engagement and dialogue: the guidelines offer mechanisms for robust market research before launching a tender. This helps officials understand current technological capabilities and reduce structural risk.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) management: a dedicated, critical section provides guidance on allocating economic and author rights within public contracts. It outlines how to reduce legal ambiguity, navigate the choice between copyright assignment and licensing, and make tenders attractive to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by protecting vendor innovation.
Risk management and challenge-focused drafting: the handbook shifts the focus away from overly prescriptive, rigid technical specifications. It instructs buyers on how to draft outcome-based, functional tender requirements. This creates "safe spaces" for trial, addresses risk-aversion, and prevents the premature failure of novel projects.
Source: (EIS, 2024[21])
Table 2.1. Country examples of initiatives across the four pillars of innovation procurement
Copy link to Table 2.1. Country examples of initiatives across the four pillars of innovation procurement|
Pillar |
Country examples of initiatives |
|---|---|
|
1. Strategic and policy frameworks\ Setting clear national objectives, legal mandates and political backing to ensure public buyers prioritise long-term innovation over just the lowest short-term price. |
Austria: Launched the PPPI Strategy, creating a clear political mandate and institutional framework to promote innovation procurement across ministries. Finland: Embedded specific innovation and sustainability targets directly into their overarching National Public Procurement Strategy. Korea: Operates a highly formalised 'Innovative Product Designation' scheme, giving top-down legal protection and strategic priority to public entities purchasing certified innovative goods |
|
2. Capacity building and professionalisation Developing specialised skills, toolkits and expert networks so procurement officers feel confident managing complex, interactive and functional tenders. |
Netherlands: Utilises PIANOo (the Dutch Public Procurement Expertise Centre) to foster professional networks, share legal expertise and map innovation pathways. Finland: Created the KEINO Competence Centre, a co-funded hub that actively coaches public authorities on how to execute innovative procurement. Germany: Funds KOINNO (the Competence Centre for Innovative Procurement), which offers standardised training, toolkits and a national certification programme to professionalise public buyers. |
|
3. Financial support and risk management Providing dedicated funding streams, insurance mechanisms or co-financing to offset the financial risks inherent in buying unproven, new-to-market technologies. |
Spain: Uses the FID Line (Fomento de la Innovación desde la Demanda) to deploy European structural funds specifically for co-funding high-risk public innovation projects. Sweden: Vinnova (the national innovation agency) offers targeted grant schemes to public buyers to fund the early planning and feasibility phases of innovative tenders. Belgium: The Flemish region runs the PIO (Programme Innovation Procurement), providing substantial financial co-funding to de-risk experimental public sector projects. Canada: Operates Innovative Solutions Canada, a dedicated funding mechanism where federal departments act as first-stage buyers to test and validate early-stage R&D. |
|
4. Market engagement and operational processes Creating structural platforms for early dialogue between public buyers and suppliers (especially start-ups and SMEs) to communicate public needs before a formal tender is launched. |
United Kingdom: Uses the SBRI (Small Business Research Initiative) framework to match public sector challenges with tech innovators through structured pre-commercial procurement. Lithuania: Developed dedicated innovation platforms and streamlined pre-market consultation tools to lower the barrier of entry for agile tech start-ups. Norway: Developed the StartOff framework, a highly structured, rapid operational process designed to facilitate early market dialogue and quickly contract tech start-ups for proof-of-concept solutions. |
Source: OECD based on (Monteiro, Hlacs and Boéchat, 2024[15])
The primary barriers seem to stem from a tendency towards solutionism, which results in overly prescriptive tenders. Bidders lack experience with challenge-led procurement, and officials face limited incentives to pursue complex procedures. Based on the analysis on identified innovation procurements they tend to cost more and on average two weeks longer to complete (Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14). Procurement officers and lawyers view innovation procedures as legally risky and default to familiar open methods. Furthermore, uncertainty around the ownership structures of intangible assets (e.g., connected to national information systems, databases, and digital solutions) or inflexibility around that may discourage bidders in participating in innovation procurement. Prior analyses (Olt et al., 2026[22]) concerning the Estonian innovation ecosystem have repeatedly pointed to the fragmentation of coordination mechanisms and areas of responsibility. The division of roles among ecosystem stakeholders – the Estonian Patent Office, Enterprise and Innovation Foundation (hereinafter EIS), the Estonian Research Council (ERC), ministries, universities, etc. – is not always clearly defined, and the creation of intangible assets within cooperation between businesses and the public sector (including research and development institutions) is insufficiently supported. This fragmentation reduces the impact of knowledge transfer and innovation and limits the utilisation of investments made into intangible assets, including public investments.
Figure 2.13. Funding of innovation procurement
Copy link to Figure 2.13. Funding of innovation procurementInnovation projects tend to cost 61% more than standard projects on average
Note: Comparison of Contract Values (Log Scale).
Source: OECD based on the procurement data analysis.
Figure 2.14. Time cost of innovation
Copy link to Figure 2.14. Time cost of innovationInnovation projects take more time to be processed
Note: Black diamond indicates the mean. Outliers excluded from visualisation.
Source: OECD based on the procurement data analysis.
Only 27% of organisations use procurement to scale successful innovation pilots. To address this, the government agreed on strategic public procurement principles in November 2023. These principles mandate that procurement must be reliable, environmentally friendly, socially responsible, and innovative. The state has set clear targets: innovation procurements must comprise 2% of all public procurements by 2027, rising to 5% by 2035.
Balancing compliance with agility: problems in experimentation, anticipation, collaboration and audit
The weakest enablers of public sector innovation in Estonia relate to systemic factors, notably legislative rigidity, risk-averse audit cultures, and weak external engagement. While individual organisations can foster internal innovation cultures (see Chapter 3), there are systemic bottlenecks in addition to funding and procurement.
Lack of large-scale experimentation
First, in an accelerated state of change, experimentation remains central to public sector reform. In previous years, the Government Office developed practice guidelines and a repository of examples to support this approach (Box 2.5). However, public sector experiments remain small-scale in comparison to neighbouring countries like Finland (Hämäläinen, Simanainen and Verho, 2025[23]; Kauhanen et al., 2026[24]). This limited scope stems from fragmented, undirected funding sources that increase transaction costs (Raudla et al., 2025[2]). Furthermore, existing structures often prevent ministries from hiring additional staff, meaning human resource constraints limit the capacity to experiment (lack of slack resources mentioned above). Hence, for small-scale trials, the lack of initiative and time poses a greater hurdle than funding, which the central Innovation Fund does not solve.
Box 2.5. The Public Sector Experimentation Guide
Copy link to Box 2.5. The Public Sector Experimentation GuideThe online handbook “Katsetamise juhend avalikule sektorile” (the Public Sector Experimentation Guide) developed by the Estonian Government Office, is a structured methodological framework designed to embed small-scale experimentation into public policy and innovation. Navigating complex societal challenges requires cost-effective and evidence-informed strategies, so this resource acts as a practical manual for civil servants, discouraging immediate, sweeping national reforms in favour of testing novel configurations locally first.
The guide highlights four primary experimental archetypes utilised in public policy:
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs): Comparing an experimental group against a randomly assigned control group to establish definitive causal outcomes.
Pilot projects: evaluating a localised, ring-fenced version of a service within a limited timeframe or specific target group.
Design experiments: Integrating iterative user-centric design principles to refine services interactively.
Regulatory experimentation: Temporarily adapting, waiving or testing legal requirements under controlled conditions to observe real-world regulatory impacts safely before permanent codification.
By providing clear checklists, communication strategies, and evaluation protocols, the guide aims to demystify failure, build cross-sector trust, and reduce taxpayer risk by exposing policy flaws early.
The guide is also accompanied by a series of policy experiment examples carried out in Estonia, including, but not limited to the following:
The social tax nudging experiment
To combat tax evasion and improve regulatory compliance, the Estonian tax authorities implemented a randomized controlled trial targeted at employers. Instead of deploying immediate punitive actions, the state issued tailored nudge notifications via email. By testing various configurations of phrasing, urgency, and civic-duty framing against a control group, the experiment successfully mapped which specific psychological signals drove the highest rates of proactive compliance and voluntary tax correction.
Early childhood education and equity optimisation
Addressing educational inequality, researchers and policymakers launched an RCT assessing the structural expansion of formal early childhood education to younger cohorts (specifically five-year-olds). By randomly prioritizing certain groups for earlier placement access, the experiment tracked immediate cognitive and social progress. This data-driven layout allowed the Ministry of Education to isolate how early access mitigates long-term socio-economic disadvantages before committing to broad legal revisions.
Green behavioural interventions (Rohekäitumine)
Coordinated alongside the Praxis Think Tank, this initiative utilised public spaces and events as behavioural sandboxes to test sustainable lifestyles. Small adjustments were deployed to gently redirect human choices connected to plant-based defaults and resource conservation prompts.
Property development and environmental compliance
Faced with unauthorised construction within protected coastal zones, environmental inspectors deployed localised design experiments. Rather than executing standard retrospective policing, they tested the preventative impact of interactive advisory interventions. By evaluating how landowners responded to early plain-language legal notifications and hypothetical scenario mapping, the state aimed to determine whether early guidance effectively neutralizes non-compliance before permanent structures are unlawfully built.
Cultural resistance also hinders progress. Public officials view experimentation with caution due to a fear of failure and media criticism. Unlike the United Kingdom or Finland, where experimentation is a more accepted, low-risk approach to policy design (Kauhanen et al., 2026[24]; Economic and Social Research Council, 2018[26]), Estonian officials report that they face intense public scrutiny. In public officials’ perception, media coverage frequently labels failed projects as wasteful, particularly when funded by the European Union. Decision making is often driven by blame-avoidance more than innovation (Raudla et al., 2025[27]). This risk-averse climate discourages open discussion of policy failures and reduces the willingness of officials to innovate. While funding helps absorb the financial risks of innovation, financial resources alone cannot resolve underlying systemic issues. Estonia does not have a general public-sector experimentation clause; changes must be approved case-by-case on an ad-hoc basis where the outcome is uncertain. Without structural regulatory reform, broader legislative flexibility, and a supportive audit framework, financial support generates isolated projects rather than systemic capacity.
Public servants widely perceive legal frameworks as too rigid for meaningful experimentation. Interviewed experts argued that current legislation lags technological developments in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. Laws are typically written with fixed outcomes and specific technologies in mind, making iterative development legally risky. This could be addressed through a focus on digital-ready policy making (DRPM). For example, Denmark reviews all new legislation against its 7 digital-ready legislation principles, and Germany applies a digital check to all new forthcoming legislation to ensure that it does not create digital implementation issues further down the line. Amending detailed legislation requires lengthy processes, whereas performance-based regulatory approaches, such as outcomes or principles-based regulations that take a technology-neutral approach, would allow greater operational flexibility, meaning that legislation should not require frequent updates as technologies change. While line ministries do not view regulation as an absolute barrier, public agencies find that slow legislative processes discourage innovation projects with regulatory implications. The Government Office has commissioned an analysis of how to make experimentation possible in the Estonian public sector; meanwhile, for the private sector, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications with the lead of Accelerate Estonia team is looking to move ahead on the topic faster.
Box 2.6. Accelerate Estonia’s Experimentation Framework
Copy link to Box 2.6. Accelerate Estonia’s Experimentation FrameworkRedesigning a country's regulatory landscape to keep pace with rapid technological innovation requires more than just goodwill; it demands systemic legal agility. To address this, the Accelerate Estonia team is pioneering a structured experimentation framework designed to transform how the state handles novel business models and technologies. Rather than letting rigid legal frameworks stifle innovation or waiting years for traditional legislative updates, this new approach allows for controlled, real-world testing. The goal is to safely validate new solutions, gather empirical data, and co-create future-proof regulations alongside innovators.
At the heart of this initiative is a fundamental shift in Estonia’s economic legislation. The team is driving a comprehensive amendment through the MSÜS (Majandustegevuse seadustiku üldosa seadus — the General Part of the Economic Activities Code Act).
Historically, regulatory sandboxes and testing exemptions have been handled on an ad-hoc, fragmented basis. The proposed change to the MSÜS institutionalises experimentation. It embeds a generic, agile framework directly into the overarching economic code, creating a standardised legal mechanism for granting temporary testing permits and regulatory exemptions. This ensures that the process for setting up an experiment is transparent, uniform, and legally sound across the entire public sector. While amending the MSÜS provides the necessary high-level legal umbrella, it cannot operate in a vacuum. To be functional, this general framework must be mirrored and activated within specific industries. Therefore, the overarching legislative shift must be accompanied by targeted "permissive clauses" within individual sectoral laws.
These clauses act as the practical "hooks" that allow ministries and regulators to temporarily lift specific domain rules for approved experiments. The Accelerate Estonia team is currently managing this dual-layered approach by simultaneously drafting amendments for five distinct sectoral laws. By advancing both the general framework and the first wave of sectoral clauses together, the team is ensuring that the legislative runway is immediately usable. This approach bridges the gap between high-level legal principles and the practical realities of industry-specific testing, positioning Estonia as a unique global hub for scalable, state-supported experimentation.
Regulatory experimentation can strengthen experimentation more broadly. The OECD Regulatory Sandbox Toolkit frames sandboxes as controlled environments for testing innovations under regulatory oversight, with structured tools to define the test, monitor risks, evaluate results and determine how the experiment should close or transition (OECD, 2025[30]). Testing plans and exit plans can be mechanisms that turn a temporary regulatory derogation into evidence for future policy, regulation and scaling.
The government maintains explicit guidelines for experiment design, stakeholder engagement, and market interaction. However, critical regulatory gaps remain. The state lacks official guidelines for governance and decision gates, problem discovery, risk management, data privacy controls, value-for-money evaluations (see Chapter 6), and scaling frameworks. Furthermore, internal and external audits rarely support innovation. To bridge these regulatory and cultural gaps, the Ministry of Finance focused its procurement action plan on creating safe spaces for trial including having auditors engaged early in the procurement design phase to shift the audit paradigm from retrospective fault-finding to a collaborative compliance framework that tolerates calculated, well-documented project risks. However, governments can do more to utilise internal auditing functions to establish innovation needs and phase out obsolete processes or services.
Absence of anticipation
In terms of more radical innovation, organisations that conduct anticipatory innovation tend to have a higher prevalence of direction mechanisms. These include strategic roadmaps and organisational vision documents (Figure 2.15). These bodies also report a higher prevalence of international exchanges, appropriate competencies, structures, and procedures (Figure 2.16).
Figure 2.15. Anticipatory innovation mechanisms
Copy link to Figure 2.15. Anticipatory innovation mechanismsPercentage of organisations reporting mechanisms by innovator status.
Note: Direction mechanisms help clarify and align policies around a shared future vision (e.g., organisational vision documents, strategic roadmaps); future readiness mechanisms help polities take into account possible future scenarios and events (e.g., regular horizon scanning exercises; scenario-planning guidelines, long-term risk registries); endurance mechanisms strengthen the resilience of policies against future shocks and changes (e.g., stress-testing of policies, contingency planning protocols, resilience assessments); innovation mechanisms create space for identifying and testing new solutions (e.g., experimentation guidelines, challenge funds); long-term perspective mechanisms embed long-term and intergenerational perspectives into policymaking (e.g., long-term strategy units, future commissions, intergenerational impact assessments).
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
Figure 2.16. Anticipatory innovation enablers
Copy link to Figure 2.16. Anticipatory innovation enablersPercentage of organisations reporting enablers by innovator status.
Source: OECD based on the Public Sector Innovation Capacity Survey (2026).
To help bridge these gaps, Estonia also needs targeted organisational supports to build up anticipatory capacity (see also Chapter 5 on skills). These structures must connect explicitly with broader strategic efforts and day-to-day public sector practices. To design these frameworks, Estonia can deploy the baseline OECD guidelines and draw on the practical expertise of Finland (Box 2.7).
Box 2.7. OECD anticipatory innovation guidelines in practice: the example of Finland
Copy link to Box 2.7. OECD anticipatory innovation guidelines in practice: the example of FinlandAnticipatory governance guidelines for public sector organisations
Anticipatory innovation governance helps public sector organisations act under deep uncertainty. After years of work on the topic, the OECD developed with 15 member countries guidelines on anticipatory governance for public sector innovation. Government teams and organisations can use these guidelines to explore alternative futures, test policy options early, and build structural resilience.
The framework structures public sector capability around three main pillars:
Futures literacy: building institutional capacity to identify emerging signals, question status quo assumptions, and map out alternative scenarios.
Experimental space: creating safe regulatory and operational environments to test novel interventions before wide-scale deployment.
Authorising environments: designing flexible governance, funding mechanisms, and accountability structures that support iterative learning and managed risk.
The guidelines provide clear self-assessment indicators. These indicators help public bodies evaluate their current capacity, spot structural bottlenecks, and design targeted reform pathways. Implementing this approach shifts public administration from reactive crisis management to proactive policy design.
Finland: a pioneer in institutional anticipation
Finland has served as a primary champion of anticipatory innovation governance, collaborating closely with the OECD since the early 2020s. This partnership began with a comprehensive country study, documented in the OECD report Anticipatory Innovation Governance Model in Finland (2022). The study analysed how Finnish ministries could integrate foresight directly into core budgetary and legislative processes.
Finland led a working group of 15 countries to co-design and refine the global OECD guidelines published in 2025. This leadership ensured that the final framework reflected diverse operational realities across different civil service traditions.
To operationalise these international principles nationally, the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra published a practical playbook, Ennakoivan innovaatiotoiminnan pelikirja (2025). This playbook introduces a tailored self-assessment tool. Finnish public sector institutions use this tool to measure their anticipatory capacity, manage systemic risks, and systematically pilot new governance models.
Constrained collaboration and stakeholder engagement
Meaningful citizen engagement remains a consistent bottleneck across public sector organisations, regardless of the official's role (see Figure 2.1). While the government maintains specific frameworks for stakeholder and citizen engagement – focusing on co-creation, inclusion, and accessibility – operationalising these principles remains difficult. To support these efforts, the Government Office has tried to provide financial resources and training through the Co-creation Development Accelerator to move ministries beyond standard, tokenistic consultations (Box 2.8). However, this has not brought about a significant change within the system.
Box 2.8. Co-creation Development Accelerator
Copy link to Box 2.8. Co-creation Development AcceleratorTo enhance external stakeholder participation and counter falling public trust, the Estonian Government Office launched the Co-creation Development Accelerator (Koosloome arengukiirendi) in 2024. Operating with a total budget allocation of EUR 2.5 million for the 2021–2027 funding period, the initiative provides line ministries with targeted financial support and capacity building. Individual ministries can apply for grants of up to EUR 50 000 to finance cross-sectoral engagement, including using innovative solutions and testing, and expertise for engagement. Financed through European Union technical assistance and state co-funding, the accelerator combines financial support with a mandatory three-day development programme managed by the Government Office. This framework addresses core systemic barriers by helping internal ministerial teams develop functional engagement skills, map relevant civil society actors, and avoid tokenistic consultation. Early cohorts under the accelerator include:
The Ministry of Social Affairs to manage stakeholder engagement in the renewal of Communicable Diseases Prevention and Control Act.
The Ministry of Justice to design co-creation events and produce analytical summaries for the draft Consent Act.
The Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture to coordinate public consultation and optimise the public transport network reform.
However, these grant-based efforts face clear structural limits. Even as a recurring mechanism, short-term funding cannot easily dismantle deeply embedded institutional mindsets or systemic solutionism. Ministries frequently involve citizens and civil society organisations too late in the policy and innovation design phases, treating engagement as a retrospective verification rather than an upstream collaborative tool. Mindset, cultural changes are necessary in addition to more formal training and capacity building.
Recognising these persistent structural gridlocks, the Estonian government has sought to codify a more permanent, digital-first approach through the OGP Action Plan – Estonia 2025-2029 (Government Office of Estonia, 2025[35]). The plan directly targets infrastructure and institutional design to bypass the limitations of ad hoc grant cycles. Specifically, a dedicated tool for co-creation and participation is under development, aiming to streamline and standardise the upstream workflows that ministries currently struggle to build independently. Furthermore, the government has pledged a comprehensive overhaul of the Open Government Committee on Development (ARVAK). By reshaping ARVAK into a substantial, broad-based co-operation and innovation testing platform led by the Government Office, the action plan attempts to systematically integrate civil society, academia and private sector representatives directly into the state's central policy-monitoring apparatus.
However, there is still a gap between these ambitious official plans and the daily reality faced by public servants. Over one-third of heads of organisations identify external collaboration with academia, the private sector and civil society as a primary obstacle to innovation (Figure 2.2). This difficulty in managing external engagement reduces the capacity for collaborative problem-solving and reinforces risk aversion. While the OGP Action Plan (Government Office of Estonia, 2025[35]) provides the necessary technical blueprints – such as the use of open data and new technologies for decision making – the digital pipelines may underperform if civil servants lack the cultural confidence to deploy them early in design cycles or simply the time to do so meaningfully. This is central to innovation outcomes, as recent research demonstrates that managerial reforms focusing on collaboration and results orientation facilitate public sector innovation (Raudla, Mohr and Douglas, 2023[36]). For Estonia to bridge the gap between its international OGP commitments and its internal bureaucratic hurdles, the structural and technical tools promised for 2025-2029 must be accompanied by behavioural changes that treat public feedback as active policy intelligence rather than only an administrative checking exercise.
Recommendations
Copy link to RecommendationsFunding
Take steps towards dedicated central budget lines (block funding) for public sector innovation by creating organisational innovation funds from public sector organisations’ annual savings. While ideally the government should establish internal funding pools to reduce its reliance on external European Union structural funds in direct public sector innovation funding, this is difficult to achieve under current fiscal constraints. Thus, organisational innovation funds could be done step-wise by incentivising public sector organisations to find innovation buffers internally through prioritisation and savings and enhancement-oriented innovation. To create meaningfully functioning buffers, public sector organisations should be able to keep those savings in internal innovation funds for which impacts should be demonstrated to the Ministry of Finance over 3-4 years. This funding mechanism serves both the goal for public sector organisations to carry out structural reforms, find savings with the ability to safeguard internal resources (including staff time) and reallocate to more meaningful, innovative activities. To function properly the Ministry of Finance should institutionalise the innovation savings and buffer schemes in the budget frameworks. These savings goals could be also linked to the AI goals of the government and automatization challenges connected to organisations direct goals to redirect resources to more meaningful innovations.
Incorporate innovation resource buffers into existing budgeting frameworks. Efficiency drives must leave adequate uncommitted time for staff to engage in creative problem-solving and for organisations enough costs to plan innovative projects over time. This is especially true of, but not limited to, those impacted by Zero-Based Budgeting. Stripping away all operational buffers eliminates the cognitive and resource space required for innovation. Innovation resource buffers can be linked to the broader budgeting framework, including spending reviews, to identify lower-priority expenditure and create fiscal space for innovation. Protecting slack in this way preserves institutional capacity for strategic renewal. However, the expectation that this should be used for innovation should be clearly communicated up front by the Ministry of Finance to organisations and timelines to follow up in both use of funds and their impact clear for all stakeholders.
Eliminate strict penalties for experimental project failures and move towards portfolio evaluation. The Ministry of Finance should reform grant conditions to tolerate calculated risks in pilot programmes. Current rigid penalty frameworks actively discourage public servants from attempting bold administrative changes. Removing these punishments and moving risk management onto a portfolio-based level in public sector organisations, could incentivise bolder and more transformative reforms. Estonia could also provide contracting authorities with further practical guidance on enablers of strategic public procurement (e.g. prior market consultations, implementation of selection and award criteria, etc.) to alleviate legal uncertainties.
Extend the public sector innovation fund beyond the initial testing phase and formulate explicit scaling pathways for initial ideas. Government Office should expand their funding support across the whole innovation lifecycle (from ideation to scaling). This should go hand in hand with incentivising organisations to develop clear financial plans with life-cycle costing to transition pilots into permanent public services. This could take the format of a scaling accelerator that provides technical, legal, and procurement support specifically for taking proven prototypes to national scale. This measure will increase the current 33% scaling rate for innovative concepts. It ensures that early-stage investments yield tangible long-term public value.
Create seed grants for anticipatory innovation. Anticipatory innovation currently happens largely without dedicated funding. Government Office should establish small, agile seed grants specifically for foresight and early-stage experimentation to professionalise this activity and reduce reliance on ad-hoc resources.
Reform the performance budgeting system to value long-term capability building. Ministry of Finance should look beyond current budget metrics and immediate cost accounting and short-term performance indicators and include innovation as a specific topic into (organisational and central) budget planning documents. The system must recognise and reward investments made in anticipatory policy infrastructure. This adjustment balances fiscal discipline with necessary public sector transformation.
Procurement
Strengthen existing innovation planning in annual public sector strategies. The Ministry of Finance should standardise and support how all major public sector organisations identify and outline their top upcoming innovative procurement opportunities within their annual budget and procurement action plans (currently collected by in part by the State Shared Service Centre). Currently, innovation procurement is treated in some organisations as an afterthought or an exceptional project rather than a core strategic objective. By institutionalizing this requirement, leadership teams will be forced to look ahead and actively screen upcoming tenders for modernization potential. To support this mandate, a lightweight reporting framework should be developed to ensure that identifying these opportunities does not become a bureaucratic box-ticking exercise, but rather a tool for early internal market alignment. This systemic nudge transforms procurement from a passive utility into a proactive lever for public sector transformation.
Introduce multi-year budgetary flexibility (time premiums) for innovation procurement. The Ministry of Finance should introduce flexible budgetary rules that allow contracting authorities to easily carry forward (from one fiscal year to another) unused funds, specifically when tied to an active innovation procurement procedure. Standard public budgeting operates on a rigid "use-it-or-lose-it" annual cycle, which creates friction for innovative projects, which often need longer market consultations, agile prototyping or flexible timelines. This mismatch leads officials to put funds in low-risk, off-the-shelf purchases to exhaust their budgets. Providing a formal "time premium" removes artificial fiscal deadlines, reduces administrative anxiety over multi-year project planning, and allows public funds to align naturally with the realities of iterative technology development.
Establish a centralised Innovation Procurement Risk Insurance Framework. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications together with the Ministry of Finance should establish a dedicated central "Insurance Fund" to act as an internal insurance mechanism covering the financial risks of ambitious procurement projects. Innovation inherently involves the risk of failure, yet current administrative structures disproportionately penalise well-intentioned failures, stifling public servants' appetite for risk. The insurance fund can cover additional costs and delays associated with innovation procurement (e.g. covering up to a fixed percent of staff time and tendering costs for market consultations that take more than a predetermined time to tender, compared to the median non-innovation procurement. This fund could absorb a predetermined portion of the financial losses if an authorised innovative procurement fails to deliver despite due diligence. Providing this financial safety net defuses the pervasive culture of risk avoidance, protects individual agency budgets from project failures, and encourages public entities to pursue high-reward, disruptive solutions.
Establish an ROI and impact-tracking framework and public communication loop for innovation procurement. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, in partnership with the Ministry of Finance, should establish a concise, mandatory annual indicator framework to measure and report on the socio-economic impacts of completed innovation procurements. This could be supported by tools or standard templates to help procurers automate the monitoring the implementation of procurement. Regular surveys could assess the performance of procurements. Currently, data collection stops at contract award or project delivery, leaving the long-term return on investment (ROI) invisible. The ministries should track specific, post-implementation indicators over a rolling 3-to-5-year window, including local jobs created, additional private capital leveraged, subsequent tax revenues generated, and whether the private contractor successfully exported or commercialised the solution in other markets. To maximise the value of this data, a dual-track communication strategy should be launched: returning micro-level impact insights back to the contracting authorities to justify their risk-taking, while publishing aggregated macro-success stories to the wider public. Demonstrating measurable economic growth and public service improvements justifies public spending, builds political buy-in for experimental budgets, and directly incentivises the wider market to participate in future state-led innovation challenges.
Improving contracting authorities’ practices regarding the use of quality criteria. For example, Ministry of Finance could mandate a minimum 20% to 30% quality weighting in public tenders with innovative outcomes. Shifting away from a pure lowest-price selection criteria increases the probability of sourcing innovative market solutions. Contracting entities should evaluate technical excellence alongside financial costs. To make this operational, officials will need clear guidelines to assess quality weightings without resorting to bureaucratic box-ticking. Note that it is useful not to score bidders on how they will build a solution (which invites subjective grading), but evaluate them on what performance metrics the solution will achieve. This grounds the "quality" in objective, measurable outcomes. Simplified yet highly objective evaluation frameworks (that are published up front) – utilising standardised, absolute scoring rubrics, outcome-based specifications, and clear bidder debriefing protocols – ensure that genuine technical merit overrides purely formalistic documentation while robustly mitigating the risk of bid disputes. This change helps the state leverage its budget footprint strategically.
Develop comprehensive training on innovation procurement and the use of functional and outcome-based descriptions. The Ministry of Finance and the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency should train contracting officials so that tenders specify the desired end result rather than rigid technical methodologies. This flexibility invites private contractors to propose creative, modern solutions that officials might not anticipate. It shifts procurement from risk avoidance to strategic problem-solving (OECD, 2025[37]).
Establish dedicated support mechanisms for innovation procurement. Ministry of Finance and Estonian Business and Innovation Agency should provide specialised legal and technical advisory service to contracting authorities on procuring innovation. Even if guidelines exist, their uptake is low and a large number of organisations report lacking access to these critical advisory resources. Further practical guidance could include provisions on prior market consultations, implementation of selection and award criteria, etc. to alleviate the perception of legal uncertainty. Centralised support will reduce the bureaucratic anxiety associated with complex tenders.
Create a central repository of innovative procurement templates. The Ministry of Finance and the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency should create an easily accessible repository of proven legal frameworks and templates used by top-performing organisations. The low adoption of procedural tools, risk-sharing levers and capability support indicates that contracting authorities lack the practical instruments needed to conduct innovation procurement. Estonia should consider introducing standardised templates for innovation partnerships, pre-commercial procurement and AI procurement, drawing on established EU frameworks. This should also include disseminating success stories based on good practices. Sharing these documents and success stories reduces the time and cost required to draft novel tender specifications. It scales successful procurement practices across the entire administration.
Encourage public sector organisations to buy previously developed market solutions (Ministry of Finance, Estonian Business and Innovation Agency and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications). Procurement should be used systematically to scale up completed prototypes and pilots. Public sector organisations should stop treating every purchase as an isolated, custom-built project. Buying proven technologies accelerates public sector digitalisation while supporting the domestic economy. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications should continuously monitor the impact of these investments.
Review and rebalance intellectual property (IP) clauses in public procurement. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Finance, and the Patent Office should modernise standard contract templates to move away from rigid, one-sided IP ownership models. Public contracts often default to the state retaining all IP rights, which creates disproportionate contract terms, increases legal anxiety, and destroys the private sector's incentive to offer innovative solutions. Instead, authorities should adopt a flexible, balanced framework that distinguishes between background and foreground IP, utilising alternative models like shared ownership, commercial licensing, or leaving exploitation rights with the contractor while securing usage rights for the state. The Government Office and the Ministry of Justice and Digitalisation have started working on this as part of the Guide: Selection of Owner and Provider of a Digital Service. To make this more operational, the Patent Office and the State Shared Service Centre could build upon the latter and develop a practical decision-making matrix (such as an IP decision tree) and pre-formulated "default" clauses that prevent vendor lock-in while preserving the commercial potential of new technologies. Providing clear guidelines on state aid rules and establishing a permanent, inter-ministerial IP support network will alleviate the perception of legal uncertainty and drastically reduce negotiation timelines. Ultimately, letting businesses retain the rights to commercialise and scale solutions developed via public funds significantly increases private sector motivation to participate in innovation procurement, turning public spending into a catalyst for the domestic knowledge economy.
Create an innovative procurement premium to encourage public sector organisations to use innovative procurement. Since innovation projects cost more on average, in addition to the ‘failure fund’, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications together with the Ministry of Finance should consider creating a top-up fund for innovation procurement allowing public sector organisations to bid for top-up funding from a central pot to cover the risk premium associated with procuring novel solutions. To nudge the uptake of the measure each public sector organisation could have a premium budget earmarked and if not taken up the money will be reallocated at the end of the year.
Engage the National Audit Office and internal auditors early in the procurement design phase. The purpose is to create a shared understanding of what constitutes acceptable, well-managed risk in innovation procurement before a project is launched. Guidance on involving auditors before executing a project should be developed to define the audit trail, risk controls, decision gates and evidence requirements, and to create a shared understanding in advance (Ministry of Finance). This proactive collaboration prevents retrospective penalties for well-intentioned administrative failures. It transforms auditing from a barrier into a supportive guardrail.
Develop an AI-driven market consultation platform to accelerate supplier engagement. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, alongside the State Shared Service Centre, should develop and deploy a specialised AI tool designed to streamline and enhance prior market consultations. Contracting authorities frequently struggle to identify capable tech vendors, benchmark international market capabilities, or synthesise complex industry feedback within legal boundaries, leading to narrow, restrictive tender definitions. This AI assistant would analyse global market trends, map relevant ecosystems (including startups and SMEs), and draft initial functional requirement profiles based on past cross-border successes. By drastically reducing the administrative time and effort needed to conduct thorough market dialogues, this tool lowers the barrier to entry for innovative procurement, ensures tender specifications match modern technological realities, and prevents vendor lock-in right from the design phase.
Legislative flexibility and experimentation
Incorporate outcome-oriented language into new legislation. Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs should work on guidance for policymakers to avoid embedding specific technologies or fixed outputs directly into statutory texts. Drafting adaptable laws reduces the legal risks associated with iterative public service development. It allows regulations to remain relevant as new tools emerge. The ministries could consider implementing digital-ready policy making principles into the policymaking and legislative drafting processes.
Set up a taskforce to develop a legal experimentation framework for the public sector (using the Accelerate Estonia’s proposed private sector experimentation framework as an example). Changing the legislation for every experiment takes too long and is too resource-intensive in current accelerated change conditions where technology develops much faster. The Government Office together with the Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs and other stakeholders should develop a legal experimentation framework for the government. It should provide public servants with a clear legal basis and process for issuing temporary testing permits. For example, Germany uses a federal guide and “building kit” for experimentation, which helps ministries draft temporary legal exemptions, evaluations and transfer provisions for regulatory sandboxes (OECD, 2022[38]). This legislative anchor institutionalises safe experimentation, such as sandboxes for testing policy interventions. Temporary regulatory exemptions for pilot projects could allow teams to test solutions. Successful sandbox trials can then inform permanent legislative updates.
Develop guidelines for governance decision gates for trustworthy experimentation. The Government Office, together with the Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, should establish clear protocols to manage experimental policy frameworks safely. These guidelines should define criteria for selecting projects. Centralised guidance on experiment set-up, testing plans, implementation, closure and evaluation can provide critical governance support that standardises experimentation approaches and promotes good practices.
Develop standardised risk management and data privacy controls for experiments (including AI experiments). Public sector organisations need uniform operational rules to protect citizen data during live trials. Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs should establish clear compliance baselines to reduce the legal uncertainties that stall innovative projects. It ensures that all experiments respect national and international privacy standards.
Inclusive innovation and policy design
Establish a systematic framework for citizen and stakeholder engagement in innovation processes (Government Office and all line ministries). The Government Office should establish a comprehensive, systematic mechanism to embed citizen and stakeholder engagement directly into public sector innovation and policy reforms. This mechanism should actively leverage and operationalise Estonia’s OGP Action Plan 2025–2029, specifically aligning with its core commitments to deploy dedicated co-creation tools and digital platforms that support open government. Instead of treating public feedback as a retrospective verification tool, early co-creation must become a standard administrative practice across the civil service. Individual line ministries should integrate mandatory citizen participation milestones directly into their early-stage policy drafting workflows and digital participation pipelines. This upfront integration ensures that upcoming state innovations are built around the lived experiences of end-users rather than top-down assumptions, maximizing the legal and practical impact of the OGP framework.
Launch a central advisory, training and funding service for stakeholder engagement. To support ministries and public organisations in implementing this new framework, the Government Office should develop a dedicated advisory service and a structured training programme on participatory methodologies, especially for innovation processes. Over one-third of organisational heads currently view external partnerships as an operational obstacle; targeted upskilling modules will equip senior management with the practical risk-management tools needed to lead open governance confidently. Crucially, this advisory service should be tied to dedicated small grants to ensure that ministries have the resources to implement high-quality participation. Clear guidelines and advisory pathways must be established for individual ministries that require tailored help to develop their stakeholder engagement models.
Reform the Co-Creation Development Accelerator around government priorities (Government Office). As the existing Co-Creation Development Accelerator has not delivered critical impacts within the system there is a need to reframe the current structure and align it more directly with core government priorities. By moving past the temporary grant model, the accelerator can pivot from supporting isolated, ad-hoc projects to systematically scaling capacity-building across the entire administration based on strategic national goals (economic growth, crisis resilience and reduction of administrative burden).
Develop standardised evaluation frameworks and metrics that move beyond quantitative engagement tallies. Public sector organisations should track how citizen inputs tangibly improve final policy outcomes and service delivery, rather than just tracking the volume of feedback or its temporal length. The Government Office should advise ministries on how to track qualitative indicators, ensuring they can measure the real public value of co-creation and directly audit how citizen inputs improve final regulatory outcomes. Ministries should report back to citizens how their input improved outcomes, building trust in the system and motivation to participate in future.
Reinforce quality control via spot checks and committee oversight. To incentivize compliance and monitor the development of the field, the Government Office should conduct random "spot checks" on the quality of participation within high-impact policy areas (e.g., checking annually 10% of the most impactful innovative reforms/innovations). These spot checks are early indicators whether further, deep-dive reviews are warranted. Government Office should support Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs to assess inclusion in the law-drafting processes. Furthermore, discussing and reviewing spot checks could be mandated as a core operational duty of the Open Government Committee on Development. This dual approach provides a necessary accountability mechanism to ensure engagement efforts meet rigorous quality standards, while simultaneously tracking the long-term maturity of participatory practices across the civil service.
Leverage insights from participation for cross-departmental insights and learning across different innovation portfolios. With the new consultation platform, the Government Office should establish a cross-departmental portfolio approach specifically designed to maximize the utility of citizen participation data and eliminate engagement silos. This framework should treat citizens’ and other stakeholders feedback not as a one-off asset for a single ministry, but as a shared repository of public insights that can systematically inform and improve inclusive policy design across related sectors. To operationalise this insight-sharing network, the Government Office should: deploy a shared portfolio management tool (e.g., utilising AI) to tag, categorise, and stream public feedback in real time, making citizen insights gathered by one ministry immediately visible to others working on overlapping social or economic issues. Actively analyse existing participation data across the portfolio before launching new consultations, ensuring the government builds upon what citizens have already expressed rather than asking the same questions across different ministries. Present and disseminate the gathered knowledge to both the Open Government Committee on Development, but also innovation cells and possibly the innovation leads taskforce described in Chapter 1. By identifying cross-cutting trends in public feedback, localised citizen input can be turned into a whole-of-government intelligence tool for more cohesive, inclusive policy reforms.
References
[28] Accelerate Estonia (2026), Experimentation framework.
[14] Appelt, S. and F. Galindo-Rueda (2016), “Measuring the Link between Public Procurement and Innovation”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2016/3, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jlvc7sl1w7h-en.
[10] Cinar, E. et al. (2022), “Public sector innovation in context: A comparative study of innovation types”, Public Management Review, Vol. 26/1, pp. 265-292, https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2022.2080860.
[12] Criado, J., L. Alcaide-Muñoz and I. Liarte (2023), “Two decades of public sector innovation: building an analytical framework from a systematic literature review of types, strategies, conditions, and results”, Public Management Review, Vol. 27/3, pp. 623-652, https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2023.2254310.
[11] De Vries, H., V. Bekkers and L. Tummers (2015), “Innovation in the Public Sector: A Systematic Review and Future Research Agenda”, Public Administration, Vol. 94/1, pp. 146-166, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12209.
[26] Economic and Social Research Council (2018), The rise of experimental government: cross-government trial advice panel update report.
[21] EIS (2024), Innovatsiooni hankija käsiraamat, https://innohangetekasiraamat.eis.ee/.
[19] Ettevõtluse ja Innovatsiooni Sihtasutus (2025), Avaliku sektori innovatsioonihangete klassifitseerimise metoodika..
[7] Government Office of Estonia (2026), Avaliku sektori innovatsioonifond.
[25] Government Office of Estonia (2026), Katsetamise juhend avalikule sektorile.
[35] Government Office of Estonia (2025), Estonia’s Open Government Partnership Action Plan 2025-2029.
[34] Government Office of Estonia (2024), Koosloome arengukiirendi.
[23] Hämäläinen, K., M. Simanainen and J. Verho (2025), “Health effects of cash transfers: Evidence from the Finnish basic income experiment”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 250, p. 105480, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105480.
[24] Kauhanen, A. et al. (2026), Advancing Policy Through Randomised Experiments, Nordic Council of Ministers, https://doi.org/10.6027/nord2026-001.
[29] Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2026), Majandustegevuse seadustiku üldosa seaduse ja riigilõivuseaduse täiendamise seadus (eksperimenteerimisprojekt).
[13] Ministry of Finance (2026), Riigieelarve revisjon.
[4] Ministry of Finance (2026), Section 3: The Block Budgeting Framework’, Managing Public Expenditures., https://www.mof.gov.sg/policies/fiscal/overview/.
[9] Ministry of Finance (2026), State Budget Strategy 2026-2029, https://www.fin.ee/riigi-rahandus-ja-maksud/riigieelarve-ja-eelarvestrateegia/riigi-eelarvestrateegia?view_instance=0¤t_page=1.
[17] Ministry of Finance (2023), Strategic principles for conducting public procurement.
[15] Monteiro, B., A. Hlacs and P. Boéchat (2024), “Public procurement for public sector innovation: Facilitating innovators’ access to innovation procurement”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 80, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9aad76b7-en.
[8] OECD (2026), Restoring Public Finances: Enabling Effective Government, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fbcf9161-en.
[5] OECD (2025), “Budgeting in Singapore in 2025”, OECD Papers on Budgeting, No. 2025/01, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/79ec8b00-en.
[37] OECD (2025), “Professionalising public procurement through certification: A comparative study across selected countries”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 83, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/06c70975-en.
[30] OECD (2025), Regulatory sandbox toolkit: A comprehensive guide for regulators to establish and manage regulatory sandboxes effectively, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/de36fa62-en.
[1] OECD (2025), Strategic Public Procurement and Professionalisation Initiatives in Estonia: Diagnostic Report, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56e03f80-en.
[32] OECD (2022), Anticipatory Innovation Governance Model in Finland: Towards a New Way of Governing, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a31e7a9a-en.
[38] OECD (2022), OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Germany 2022: Building Agility for Successful Transitions, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/50b32331-en.
[16] OECD (2020), Integrating Responsible Business Conduct in Public Procurement, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/02682b01-en.
[6] OECD (2020), Strengthening Governance of EU Funds under Cohesion Policy: Administrative Capacity Building Roadmaps, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9b71c8d8-en.
[22] Olt, K. et al. (2026), Immateriaalse vara ärilise väärindamise edendamine Eesti innovatsiooni ökosüsteemis..
[18] Põllu, E. (2026), Pilguhet minevikku ja tulevikusuunad riigihangetes. Konverentsil 30 aastat riigihankeid..
[20] Rahandusministeerium (2023), Riigihangete läbiviimise strateegilised põhimõtted, https://fin.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2024-04/Riigihangete%20la%CC%88biviimise%20strateegilised%20po%CC%83himo%CC%83tted_2023.pdf.
[36] Raudla, R., Z. Mohr and J. Douglas (2023), “Which managerial reforms facilitate public sector innovation?”, Public Administration, Vol. 102/2, pp. 771-788, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12951.
[2] Raudla, R. et al. (2025), “Budgeting for Innovation: How Funding Strategies Enable or Constrain Public Sector Experimentation”, Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 45/4, pp. 28-40, https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12402.
[27] Raudla, R. et al. (2025), “The politics of experimental policymaking: the influence of blame avoidance and credit claiming”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 58/2, pp. 245-266, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-025-09568-7.
[33] SITRA (2025), Ennakoivan innovaatiotoiminnan pelikirja.
[3] Tõnurist, P. and A. Hanson (2020), “Anticipatory innovation governance: Shaping the future through proactive policy making”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cce14d80-en.
[31] Tõnurist, P. and J. Orlik (2025), “Towards anticipatory governance guidelines for public sector organisations”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 82, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a5203d0b-en.
Annex 2.A. The value of public sector innovation investments
Copy link to Annex 2.A. The value of public sector innovation investmentsTo analyse the efficiency of innovation spending the OECD mapped organisations based on their resource inputs versus realised benefits reported in the innovation capacity survey. The data collected concerns the self-reported “most significant” innovation the respondents were involved in in the last two years. Hence, the analysis does not concern all innovation investments public sector organisations in Estonia were making during this period.
To conduct the analysis, first the Innovation Investment Score (horizontal axis in Annex Figure 2.A.1.) was calculated as a composite index that combines the presence of structural supports – such as dedicated budgets and external funding – with the relative magnitude of financial investment. Financial amounts were extracted from open-text responses and converted into a percentile rank (0–1), ensuring that organisations are compared on their relative resource commitment rather than absolute costs, which vary widely by sector. The Outcome Score (vertical axis in Annex Figure 2.A.1.) represents the average proportion of six key innovation results achieved, including service improvements, reduced administrative burden, and increased trust. In Annex Figure 2.A.1. each dot represents a single organisation, with the size indicating the number of innovation projects analysed.
Annex Figure 2.A.1. Value for money analysis
Copy link to Annex Figure 2.A.1. Value for money analysis
Note: Quadrant analysis where investment is weighted by the relative size of the budget reported (percentile rank). Financial amounts extracted from text. Excludes 197 missing records.
Source: OECD based on the Innovation Capacity survey 2026.
The figure classifies organisations into four performance profiles. Efficient organisations (top-left) achieve high outcomes with relatively low investment, representing the ideal value-for-money scenario. Resource-intensive organisations (top-right) deliver strong results but require significant resource inputs. Inefficient organisations (bottom-right) invest heavily but report limited tangible gains, suggesting potential friction in their innovation processes. Finally, under-resourced organisations (bottom-left) show low outcomes corresponding to their limited investment. Dashed lines indicate the median investment and outcome levels across the Estonian public sector.
This analysis should be taken with the caveat that most innovations have not been in reality evaluated and most evaluations are theory- or process-based, meaning that causal effects cannot be actually verified (see Chapter 6). However, usually there is a tendency to be more positive in reporting self-perceived outcomes rather than underreporting them.
Annex 2.B. Procurement – overview of analysis
Copy link to Annex 2.B. Procurement – overview of analysisFor the analysis of innovation procurement, the open data from Estonia’s national public procurement register (Riigihangete register) was used, structured in the open contracting data standard (OCDS) format.
The dataset composed of:
Multi-year records spanning historical records from 2018 up through 2024.
Including diverse contracting authorities mapped into broad buyer classifications: ministries, agencies/boards, inspectorates, municipalities (city/rural), state-owned enterprises (companies), hospitals, and universities.
Buyers were mapped into 7 distinct categories, including Ministries, Agencies, Inspectorates and Hospitals.
Data was excluded from analysis if:
Key public spending categories are systematically missing from the register, restricting the "top innovator" baseline to reporting agencies only:
Spending without formal procurement (grants, direct subsidies, in-house deliveries).
Below-threshold procurement (contracts valued under EUR 30 000, which typically capture small-scale pilots and proofs-of-concept).
Security and defence procurement (exempt technological infrastructure like cybersecurity).
R&D and science infrastructure procurement (predominantly routed through separate framework funds).
Text mining through Natural Language Processing techniques was applied and to analyse data quality the following checks were conducted:
Completeness diagnostics: calculated non-missing variables across all records to gauge analytical reliability. Text fields (tender titles/descriptions) and procurement methods demonstrate high coverage (>80%), making them viable for natural language processing (NLP). Award criteria details have moderate coverage.
Financial quality sub-setting: Contract value missingness was audited via an organisation-year heatmap. To eliminate selection or imputation bias, financial analysis is strictly restricted to a "safe subset" where missing data falls below a 50% threshold.
Text data quality & NLP flags: Since the register does not have predefined "innovation tags", a master enrichment pipeline deployed an NLP dictionary mapping technique across normalised text strings:
Innovation-related flag: Triggered by extended keyword stems like innovatsioon, arendus, piloot, prototüüp, eksperiment
AI-related flag: Triggered by tech-specific keyword stems like tehisintellekt, masinõpe, algoritm, robootika, andmeanalüüs
Applied logistic regression, t-test, Lorenz Curve. Variables involved: award criteria, contract value, time to contract, procurement methods. The analysis evaluated the strategic levers, organisational archetypes, and processing friction surrounding innovation procurement using three distinct statistical lenses:
Model A & B: Logistic regressions on the 'value for money' premium:
Concept: Evaluates whether assigning greater weight to quality criteria over price-only options increases the likelihood of capturing innovation.
Specification: Generalized linear models (GLM) using a binomial logit link function.
Variables: The binary outcome variable is the NLP innovation flag. Independent predictors include a normalised continuous quality index derived from parsed tender award text, controlled for aggregated buyer organisational types and strategic "mission orientation".
Model C: The 'ladder of quality' step-change model:
Concept: Examines if moving past a token quality threshold result in a step-change probability shift for finding innovation.
Specification: Logit model categorising the continuous quality weights into three ordinal strategic tiers: 1. Price only (0%), 2. Token quality (1–30%), and 3. Significant quality (>30%). Controlled against buyer category factors and procurement category types (services, goods, works).
Model D: The 'bureaucracy tax' friction analysis:
Concept: Tests the operational friction hypothesis that innovative tenders require significantly higher administrative effort, disincentivising public servants.
Specification: A processing speed comparison utilising Welch's t-test.
Variables: Compares the mean and median administrative lifecycle timeline—measured as continuous "days to contract" from tender initiation to formal contract start date—between standard projects and innovation projects.
Organisational maturity mapping: Cross-tabulates agency-level strategic flexibility (percentage usage of MEAT/quality criteria) against innovation intensity (percentage of innovation tenders) to map buyers into performance archetypes (e.g., "leaders" vs. "bureaucrats").
Annex 2.C. Public sector innovation capacity indexes
Copy link to Annex 2.C. Public sector innovation capacity indexesThe public sector innovation capacity is comprised of four different components – purpose, potential, capacity, impact. Using the survey results these components are evaluated separately and then a composite score developed. The four indexes to evaluate public sector innovation were constructed as follows:
Purpose (Why innovate?)
The purpose score measures the share of 13 potential innovation drivers that respondents rate as active motivators for their organisation. Each driver is coded 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale) and 0 otherwise. The dimension score is the mean of these 13 binary items, equivalent to the proportion of drivers rated as relevant. The 13 drivers are: political mandate, government strategies, global challenges, international standards, citizens' needs, building public trust, public sector reform, technological change, efficiency improvement, staff interests, resilience, media pressure and audit/evaluation pressure.
A higher score means a broader set of contextual factors is perceived as motivating innovation, not that any single driver is stronger. Organisations driven intensely by one or two factors would score lower than those that see many factors as moderately relevant. Measures the strength and breadth of innovation drivers within organisations. Scored as the mean agreement rate across innovation driver variables (political mandate, strategic priorities, global trends, citizen expectations, trust improvement, reform pressure, technology adoption, efficiency gains, staff initiative, resilience, media/public attention, and audit/evaluation pressure).
Potential (What resources and skills exist?)
The potential score measures self-reported confidence across 29 competency items: 22 general innovation skills and 7 AI readiness skills. Each item is rescaled from a 5-point confidence scale to 0-1 and the score is the unweighted mean across all available items. Because items are equally weighted, AI readiness (7 of 29 items, approximately 24%) has a limited effect on the composite. A high score can be achieved with weak AI readiness if general innovation skills are rated highly. Analysts examining AI readiness specifically should use the AI sub-scores directly.
Capacity (What organisational enablers are in place?)
Evaluates the organisational environment for innovation, including organisational culture (18 items covering collaboration, risk management, technology use, learning from failure, etc.), permission to innovate (11 items on autonomy, leadership support, recognition, psychological safety, resources), and psychological safety (7 items on mistake tolerance, risk-taking, help-seeking). Scored as the mean agreement rate. Higher scores indicate a more enabling organisational environment.
Impact (What results are achieved?)
The impact score is constructed at the individual respondent level and aggregated to the organisation as a mean. Non-innovators contribute 0 across all components. Innovators who skipped outcome or evaluation questions are assigned 0 on those components. Each component is described below:
Innovation occurrence (30%): Whether the respondent was involved in an innovation.
Evaluation occurrence (20%): Whether any evaluation took place, measured as a proportion of all respondents (not only innovators) to avoid artificial inflation in organisations with few innovators.
Outcomes breadth (25%): Share of 12 possible outcome types achieved.
Evaluation sophistication (25%): Highest rigour level of evaluation method used: experimental = 1.0; quasi-experimental, CBA, VfM = 0.66; theory-based, process = 0.33. Non-evaluators = 0.
The sophistication component rewards peak rigour rather than number of methods: a single experimental evaluation scores 1.0 regardless of whether other methods were also used.
Composite score
The composite is the unweighted mean of available dimensions, penalised proportionally for missing ones. Organisations are positioned within the composite distribution using percentile bands (0-20th through 80-100th), communicating relative standing without implying absolute thresholds.