Strategic Joint Evaluation of the Collective International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Response to the COVID‑19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 crisis triggered an unprecedented response from the international development co-operation and humanitarian system. From 2020 to 2022, official providers and philanthropic organisations disbursed USD 126 billion of assistance targeting the COVID-19 response, within an overall international assistance package topping more than USD 886 billion (USD 1.1 trillion gross). Official health assistance increased by 73% from 2019 to 2020 (USD 47 billion committed) and reached a record high of USD 59 billion in 2021. Vaccine assistance totalled USD 1.5 billion in 2022, with the largest commitments going to least-developed countries (USD 334 million) and the Africa region (USD 339 million).

This unique strategic evaluation assesses these efforts from the perspectives of relevance (the extent to which co-operation was designed to respond to partner country needs and priorities); coherence (alignment across different interventions); effectiveness (meeting of objectives); and efficiency (timeliness and use of resources). It draws on a set of case studies, interviews with key informants, a synthesis of evaluation reports, and analysis of international finance flows to identify lessons for the future.

In line with other global studies, the evaluation identifies major weaknesses of current approaches to global co-operation and health crisis management. Most of the stated goals of the pandemic response were not met – demonstrated most starkly by the millions of lives lost. International development assistance efforts were insufficient – in both volume and impact – to overcome these broader failings and were undercut by other government actions. At the same time, many co-operation strategies worked well. No area demonstrates this paradox more starkly than the efforts to support vaccine equity: The pandemic saw high levels of funding for vaccines, an innovative global mechanism, and successful campaigns in some countries. Yet global outcomes were far off target. By the end of 2022, only 34 doses had been administered per 100 people in low-income countries, compared to 212 doses in high-income countries (Our World in Data, 2025; WHO, 2025).

Within this circumscribed context, development co-operation was most effective when the urgency created by the crisis served as a catalyst for co-ordinated, decisive action, reinforced by both high-level political commitment and technical expertise. A “get it done” attitude drove speed, enabled flexibility, streamlined certain bureaucratic processes, and sharpened focus on what really matters.

Development agencies quickly set up internal co‑ordination mechanisms to adjust strategies, ensure ongoing programmes stayed in operation, mobilise new funding, and respond to requests for support. This initial responsiveness was facilitated by using existing channels and partners, and the provision of budget support and other flexible core or pooled funding. At the same time, the evaluation found that most development actors missed the opportunity to make some of these temporary crisis measures permanent.

Over the period examined (2020-2022), Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members largely delivered on their commitments to protect funding for the most vulnerable countries – though the collective effort still fell far short of needs. The DAC average of official development assistance (ODA) to gross national income (GNI), increased from 0.30% in 2019 to 0.33% in 2020, even in the face of major fiscal constraints. Funding to least developed countries and other vulnerable countries rose markedly in 2020.

Resources were provided in timely ways, but not always efficiently and equitably. While using existing channels allowed disbursements to be made with unprecedented speed, it was less able to meet new, crisis-specific needs and, in some instances, was blind to other partners that may have been better placed to respond. Prioritising high-visibility, in-kind support was expensive and at times detracted from more effective systems-focused approaches. There were few examples of ongoing learning to revisit decisions as needed and adjust to changing priorities.

International funding for the social sector increased during the crisis and was particularly effective when it worked through country systems to scale up social protection. There were many good examples of co-ordination at the country-level, especially where national response plans and cross-sector, multi-partner mechanisms enabled not only sharing of information but also aligned decision making.

Finally, the lack of coherence between development co-operation and other policy actions – including closing borders to asylum seekers and hoarding vaccines – undermined stated goals and worsened outcomes. A narrow framing of national interest proved counterproductive, while approaches recognising the mutual benefits of an effective global response delivered better results for all.