This chapter demonstrates how the analysis of unfolding global trends through a fragility lens can drive better strategy and policy responses to peace and development challenges. The OECD multidimensional fragility framework presents analysis on how global risks are connected and how the interplay of risks and resilience are driving positive and negative outcomes at state and subnational levels. These trends are challenging established thinking on development co-operation and the role of international institutions, and place a premium on building new geostrategic approaches that balance instruments of statecraft, especially for development and peace.
States of Fragility 2025
Abstract
Understanding and navigating global trends: The relevance of fragility analysis
Fragility is being instrumentalised to suppress and reverse development gains. State and non-state actors are analysing sources of risk and resilience that shape fragility – not as challenges to be addressed but as situations to be leveraged and exploited as part of local and global strategies. The nature of geopolitics means that ignoring fragility trends is to cede political and economic advantage to others.
While many actors identify violence as a last resort, for others it is a preference – accessible, effective and efficient when compared with alternative options to achieve political, economic or other objectives. In 2023, 27 contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility experienced organised violence (state-based, non-state and one-sided violence).
The benefits of growth have proven harder to achieve where contexts experience higher levels of fragility. Incomes in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility stopped catching up with the incomes of contexts facing medium to low fragility around 2015, undermining the expectation that incomes and living standards would eventually converge. This has been felt even more acutely in the presence of other fragilities; and the post-COVID recovery has been significantly more sluggish in high and extreme fragility contexts than in other contexts.
Global fragmentation and disorder bring opportunities for increased agency and ambition; they also carry significant risk. Across contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, partnerships to secure flows of capital and goods appear to be realigning, taking into account not just geographical distance but increasingly, geopolitical alignment.
Redefining the strategic offer for contexts with high and extreme fragility:
Analysing fragility is essential for designing strategy to address risks, increase resilience and balance processes towards peace and development goals. It is the starting point to inform, organise and prioritise the application of diplomatic, development, humanitarian, peace and security approaches.
There is an urgent need to prioritise conflict prevention and to address building resilience as development and foreign policy objectives. With global violence reaching ever higher levels, support for delivering and protecting peace is declining.
Effective international statecraft will require smarter alignment of foreign, development and peace policies. Development co-operation is inherently political; and while countries hold the primary responsibility for their own development outcomes, creating clear incentives for development partnerships that prioritise political will and leadership is a point of strategic advantage for donors and partners.
In a disordered global system being inclusive will not be sufficient. The capacity to compete amid fluctuating power dynamics will determine the success or failure of multilateral initiatives as will the perceived and actual quality of partnerships with OECD members.
There is broad consensus that current economic, environmental, technological and political trends are driving a return to a fragmented, multipolar world (Cilliers, 2024[1]; US National Intelligence Council, 2021[2]). The disruption of global supply chains, geopolitical tensions and increase in financial and economic restrictions are both reactions to fragility and themselves increase fragility by compromising the interconnectedness of the global economy, the rules-based trading system, and access to global markets (Gaál et al., 2023[3]). This increased fragmentation also heightens the risk of proxy conflicts (Hossain and Islam, 2024[4]) and military confrontations, and erodes the global institutions needed for peace and development (Rodgers, 2020[5]). While technological advances foster new sources of coping capacity and opportunities to address fragility, the technological arms race in artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity is rapidly adding layers of risk by creating asymmetrical threats and new arenas of contestation and mistrust between nations.
Human-induced environmental changes are accelerating rapidly. Ever more frequent and intense extreme weather events, rising sea levels and droughts (Seneviratne et al., 2021[6]), loss of biodiversity and the collapse of ecosystem, to name a few such changes are intensifying and creating new sources of fragility. The transitions required to navigate this space are inherently disruptive. The global transition to renewable energy is reshaping traditional energy geopolitics, disrupting established power dynamics and opening new areas of competition that are likely to create a new set of winners and losers, leading to a greater risk of conflict and humanitarian crises and requiring a fresh approach to local and international justice frameworks (OECD, 2024, p. 25[7]; UNDP, 2023[8]). Communities and states are grappling with resource scarcity and the political and human transaction costs of energy transition. The 2024 United Nations (UN) Biodiversity Conference of the Parties (COP16) and the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) showed how difficult it can be to achieve collective solutions while countries are pursuing individual agendas that exacerbate the fragility of global systems.
Major crises and protracted conflict create fertile ground for terrorism and arms proliferation and make it difficult to achieve peace and recovery. Intended and unintended spillovers from conflict further exacerbate global fragility through migration and forced displacement, with neighbouring communities bearing the greatest responsibility for the forcibly displaced. Even though conflicts across the Middle East and Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, for instance, have produced two of the biggest refugee crises in modern history, leaving millions displaced across Europe and the Middle East, most of the countries receiving forcibly displaced populations are themselves exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility. While the evidence suggests that stopping displacement and migration is almost impossible, it will nonetheless be essential, both for adaptation and prosperity, to manage migration and forced displacement (De Gruyter, 2016[9]; Wolf, 2024[10]; US National Intelligence Council, 2021[2]).
Longer-term demographic changes are altering the parameters for peace and development. Africa’s population is projected to grow from 1.3 billion in 2019 to 2.2 billion by 2050 (Cilliers, 2024[11]). The potential demographic dividend offers opportunities for Africa but also risks for the continent over the coming decades (Weny, Snow and Zhang, 2017[12]; Cilliers, 2020[13]). For example, the large-scale and rapid urbanisation that accompanies population growth will add 2 billion people to cities worldwide by 2050 (Our World in Data, 2023[14]), requiring urgent attention to basic service delivery, infrastructure building and security provision in urban centres.
All of these trends and more are connected. Analysing fragility is a means to understand how those connections matter for effective policy responses.
Societies must continuously adapt to stressors: power shifts, old and new sources of grievance, the latest technologies, environmental changes, economic disruptions, and institutional change at multiple levels. Long-term development success is in large part determined by navigating those hurdles without suffering a major rupture or becoming stuck in a protracted crisis and by ensuring sufficient resilience to counter and minimise multiple risks. Fragility analysis provides valuable insights on how to address risks, increase resilience and balance processes towards peace and development goals. The OECD fragility framework shows that all contexts experience fragility in varying ways and to varying degrees (Chapter 2). But it also demonstrates that fragility poses significantly greater challenges for contexts with a bigger mismatch between risks and coping capacities – that is, those contexts experiencing high and extreme fragility (Box 1.1).
An overview of fragility
Fragility is analysed by the OECD as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient resilience of a state, system and/or community to manage, absorb and mitigate those risks (OECD, 2016[15]). As fragility is understood as a universal phenomenon, the OECD assesses fragility worldwide through its multidimensional fragility framework, first introduced in States of Fragility 2016 and now in its sixth edition. The framework is an independent, data-driven resource that assesses fragility on a spectrum of intensity across six dimensions: economic, environmental, human, political, security and societal. Using 8 to 10 quantitative indicators in each dimension and 56 indicators in total for all 6 dimensions, the framework analyses sources of risk and resilience across the 177 contexts for which sufficient data are available.
Introducing a new classification of fragility and dropping the label of “fragile context”
States of Fragility 2025 introduces a new system of classifying fragility that addresses the political sensitivity around labelling, while also seeking to strengthen analysis for the states of fragility in today’s world. The analysis remains centred on sources of risk and resilience. However, the label “fragile contexts” is no longer applied. Instead, all contexts are considered as experiencing fragility on a spectrum of extreme, high and medium to low fragility. This change acknowledges the universality of fragility, while retaining the intention that States of Fragility reports and therefore development partners should focus on the contexts that are experiencing high and extreme levels of fragility.
Further information on the methodology of the multidimensional fragility framework, including the indicators and measures, is available in the methodological notes in Annex A and on the OECD States of Fragility data platform. The platform is a one-stop shop for evidence and analysis on multidimensional fragility and resource flows to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, available at https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/.
Note: The OECD applies the term “context” to allow for analysis of territories not officially recognised as states as well as for more adaptable analysis of fragility in all its presentations from subnational to global levels.
Source: OECD (2016[15]), States of Fragility Report 2016: Understanding Violence, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267213-en.
Acknowledging the general consensus on global trends, this section applies fragility analysis to complement and challenge conventional thinking within and beyond OECD member countries, building the case for why development policies and an understanding of fragility are vital for those countries wishing to successfully navigate the geopolitical environment.
Underneath all of this tension and upheaval is agency (Nyabola, 2018, p. 215[16]).
Many contexts with high and extreme fragility are attempting to capitalise on global disorder to strengthen their political and economic agency through traditional and emerging frameworks. Three features of this dynamic stand apart: 1) Established and rising powers are offering more and different options for development co-operation; 2) Many contexts with high and extreme fragility are actively looking for support within the established multilateral system; 3) Patience with the established multilateral system is wearing thin and contexts are increasingly developing alternative sources of resilience with varying economic and political outcomes.
First, rising medium and large powers are seizing the opportunity of a more fragmented international order to compete with established development partners as part of their foreign and development policy engagement (Pomeroy and Akram, 2024[17]). China’s Belt and Road Initiative and African strategy are the most obvious and long-standing examples. Chinese development finance to contexts with high and extreme fragility has declined since 2012 (The Economist, 2024[18]). This is the result of tighter prioritising and a scaling back of investment in areas such as infrastructure as well as a sign of China’s transitioning to a new era of engagement. In 2024, more African heads of state attended the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) than the UN General Assembly (Amare and Vines, 2024[19]). China has established a considerable presence across Africa from which to diversify its future activities, with more than 10 000 active Chinese firms (Jayaram, Kassiri and Sun, 2017[20]). A recent assessment of 3 000 Chinese enterprises invested across the continent found that more than 70% are private sector businesses (Munyati, 2024[21]). Beyond Africa, China has also expanded its commitments across Asia, Central and Latin America (AidData, 2022[22]). The development returns to Chinese partners in the contexts with the highest fragility are mixed. But there are success stories. Objective observation of Chinese outreach also offers valuable lessons in modern partnership building (Chapter 4). From the Chinese perspective, however, this outreach is part of a global strategy that balances an assessment of fragility, including an assessment of China’s own environmental fragility (Igini, 2024[23]), with the application of economic (development), diplomatic and soft military power.
International powers such as India (Gopaldas, 2024[24]) and Türkiye, to name just two, are separately bringing forth initiatives that are changing the landscape for international development, especially in contexts most exposed to fragility. Türkiye, for instance, has taken a distinct security-economic partnership approach: the value of its trade with African countries exceeded USD 40 billion in 2022, and since 2012, it has entered into more than 50 separate security-related agreements of varying scales with contexts such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda (Pinto, 2024[25]). These include defence industry co-operation agreements; in parallel, Türkiye has more than tripled the number of its embassies since 2008 (Yaşar, 2022[26]).
Second, despite the attractiveness of new partnerships, contexts with high and extreme fragility have not substantially disengaged from multilateral systems, economic integration, or the development investments of the past. In 2024, Iraq successfully joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2024[27]), Somalia joined 35 other African countries in the OECD’s Global Revenue Statistics (OECD, 2024[28]), Comoros and Timor-Leste acceded to the World Trade Organisation, while several other countries are going through the intensive multilateral and bilateral negotiations required (WTO, 2024[29]). International Development Association’s IDA21 replenishment saw new donors contribute1, and 17 existing donors increase their national contribution by 25% or more (World Bank Group, 2024[30]). Contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility have on average smaller economies than those exposed to medium to low fragility, and small economies have historically been active advocates for rules-based systems, economic integration, and multilateralism as they rely heavily on them to ensure their interests are protected, and to access the markets they rely on for trade and investment (Lupel, Pitakdumrongkit and Ng, 2024[31]; Georgieva, 2023[32]). Multilateralism is also critical for dealing with debt sustainability issues, with Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia having applied for debt relief under the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (Pazarbasioglu, 2024[33]).
Third, though engagement with multilateral institutions remains, many contexts are actively seeking alternatives to an international order viewed as “unfair, anachronistic or simply not effective enough” (Smith, 2024[34]; Global Policy Watch, 2024[35]). To a certain degree, the apparent loss of faith in the international system can be understood as a byproduct of the loss of momentum for the 2030 Agenda, which is struggling for attention as geopolitical competition diverts political capital and has simply undershot its objectives because of ‘rich countries’ failure to invest in fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (Gowan, 2023[36]). However, through new partnerships, alliances and deals, contexts with high and extreme fragility are finding and developing alternative sources of resilience with varying outcomes depending on their economic and political profiles.
Regional and bilateral economic alliances, coalitions and agreements have proliferated in the last 20 years, including those signed by contexts with high and extreme fragility (Figure 1.1). Over the period of 2008-15, these contexts entered into more comprehensive economic integration agreements with the aim of moving towards more structured economic co-operation. This led to a notable increase over 2016-20 and the emergence of a distinctly regional dimension, for instance with the adoption of large regional agreements such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and the rise of other regional trade blocs.
Note: No agreements were signed after 2020 in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility despite data availability extending until 2022.
Source: World Bank (2024[37]), Deep Trade Agreements: Data, Analysis and Toolkits (webpage), https://datatopics.worldbank.org/dta/table.html.
Overall, the partnerships needed to secure flows of capital and goods appear to be realigning, taking into account not just geographical distance but increasingly, geopolitical distance. Even though there are costs with some of these arrangements, some governments may prioritise security of access in uncertain times (Gaál et al., 2023[3]). The elite (government) decision making driving these trends varies considerably across contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility. For some, interacting with partners beyond the OECD DAC is the result of careful planning to open new markets or to avoid perceived long-standing structural inequalities in the international financial architecture (Patrick, Sidiropoulos and Hogan, 2024[37]; Global Policy Watch, 2024[35]); for others, decisions were as much opportunistic as strategic, especially where conveniently narrowly defined alliances with external partners can maintain local balances of power (Rampini, 2024[38]). The extent to which the world economy will fragment is impossible to predict, but there are pronounced risks. Small, low-income and open-market economies affected by high and extreme fragility stand to lose the most in a more fractured world economy (Georgieva, 2023[32]).
At the time of the last States of Fragility report, as the world began to exit the COVID-19 crisis, many commentators warned of the risk of a two-track economic recovery (Georgieva, 2021[39]), a risk that has since materialised. In reality, trends of two-track economic gains between and within countries pre-date the COVID shock.
At their best, economic ambitions are key components of development strategies and achieving those ambitions can increase living standards and human dignity, support power-sharing agreements and provide the resources for governance systems to respond effectively to shocks. Globally, economic growth has been the single biggest driver of poverty alleviation over the last 30 years (Patel, Sandefur and Subramanian, 2021[40]). From a peace perspective, inclusive economic opportunities disincentivise conflict by increasing the costs of conflict and it can be easier to share the pie when there is a larger pie to share (Dube and Vargas, 2013[41]).
But these economic growth and poverty reduction gains have bifurcated. First, while there is significant diversity, the benefits of growth have proven harder to achieve in contexts facing higher levels of fragility. On average, incomes in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility stopped catching up with incomes in contexts exposed to medium to low fragility around 2015, undermining the expectation that incomes and living standards would eventually converge (Chapter 2). In addition, the post-COVID recovery in contexts facing high and extreme fragility has been significantly more sluggish than in contexts with medium to low fragility. Median per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stabilised at about 2% for contexts facing high fragility and is negative for contexts facing extreme fragility. Economic and fiscal challenges are compounded with environmental, political, societal, human and security fragilities in idiosyncratic ways; and the impacts of stagnating or reduced incomes are felt more acutely when fragilities in dimensions other than economic are also present.
To meet the aspirations of growing populations of young people and make the most of the global population dividend that they could provide, sustained and sustainable growth is needed in contexts with high and extreme fragility. And this growth must avoid exacerbating – and ideally help address – other types of fragilities.
Within contexts experiencing high or extreme fragility, different populations have access to very different economic opportunities, as shown in Chapter 2. This is particularly prevalent for women and girls who must contend with unique combinations of fragility. More so than in other developing countries or advanced economies, there is a mismatch between the sectors that are the sources of GDP growth and the sectors in which most people work. A relatively small proportion of the population is employed in the highest export-earning sectors, which provide the highest-paying jobs. This means that in many contexts, people stay stuck in underemployment in sectors with limited opportunity, especially low-productivity or subsistence agriculture. Informal employment is pervasive, and while the rate of entrepreneurship is high, many micro-businesses run out of necessity rather than opportunity and have little to no prospects for growth. The persistence of these structural features has complex causes including elite control, a limited business environment, entrenched inequalities in education and access to opportunity, and a high concentration of investment in natural resource and extractive sectors.
At a systems level, the best-understood and most-studied economies – those with the largest safety nets, highest levels of investment and greatest depth of global expertise in successfully implementing reform programmes – tend to be those without high or extreme fragilities.
All economies experience fragilities and imbalances, and taking a big picture view, economies around the world have benefited to varying degrees from advances in economic stewardship at the macro levels – central bank independence, fiscal anchors, debt sustainability disciplines, a rules-based trading system, or global and regional safety nets – or in development programming such as livelihoods, health and education programming, or social safety nets. Many of these advances have come in response to crises and shocks, and some have explicitly or implicitly provided greater support to larger and less fragile economies2. Looking ahead though, fragility is poised to be the next thorny global problem for practitioners and researchers to grapple with.
The structural transformation of the economy that has fuelled long-term opportunity in much of the developing world, often as part of a broader social transformation, has either not yet been realised in many contexts facing high and extreme fragility or has involved measures that weakened or ruptured their social fabric. Factors synonymous with fragility – weaknesses in local economic conditions, poor governance and investment, inadequate infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, and sometimes conflict – have limited the structural transformation process, even when there have been more specific or short-term growth opportunities in certain sectors such as extractives. Control over economic assets and resources are often fault lines of conflict and instrumentalised through conflict. Addressing these challenges will become ever more important to meet the ambitions of youth, to achieve the climate transition; and to sustain growth globally.
There is enlightened self-interest to keeping the focus on fragility
History has shown that economic development is not a zero-sum game – we rise or fall together. Fragility disrupts global trade, increases the risk of market fragmentation, and puts food and energy security at risk. Fragmentation deepens cleavages between economic blocs, hinders growth, access to resources and co-operation on global challenges like pandemics and climate change.
While fragmentation is apparent now, longer-term interdependencies are likely to grow between larger and wealthier economies and contexts facing high and extreme fragility. Many OECD members face the challenges of rising protectionism, responding to population aging, and securing the resources and ecosystem services to support the green transition and digital transformation. By contrast, many of these needed resources and potential economic partnerships – and certainly an increasing proportion of the workers, voters and consumers of tomorrow – are located in contexts facing high or extreme fragility. At a global level, the future population dividend will be in contexts facing high and extreme fragility. Achieving the green transition will depend on the ecosystems and natural resources of contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility.
Many development partners are looking to shift their approach to one based more on economic partnerships (Chapter 3), often with some kind of short-to medium term benefit to the companies or country concerned. To be successful, such approaches will need to address fragility, and the development needs of the partner country – it has to be win-win (Fabre and Spencer-Bernard, 2024[42]). While development remains the end goal in and of itself, there is also an enlightened self-interest to staying engaged. Not developing sustainable economic opportunities and pathways risks creating negative spillover impacts on other dimensions of fragility, including security and conflict. Strong, flexible and inclusive economies are good for peace, and peace is good for business.
The success of the green transition depends on how its associated fragility is managed
Achieving the green transition – comprehensive and systemic shifts towards environmentally sustainable and climate-safe practices (United Nations, 2022[43]) – will depend on the ecosystems and natural resources of contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility. This will in turn depend on addressing the fragilities caused or exacerbated by their extraction. Extractive activity is already exacting a significant and visible environmental toll and affecting trends in poverty and inequality (OECD, 2024[7]), with the effects concentrated in contexts experiencing high and extreme fragility (Global Witness, 2022[44]). Extractive activity is expected to increase rapidly over the next 15 years and with it, the potential for more severe ecological impacts. According to a study for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, by 2040, demand for lithium will have grown by over 904%, for graphite by 385% and for cobalt by 268% (Sturman et al., 2022[45]). Many contexts facing high or extreme fragility provide valuable ecosystem services, but the pollution and biodiversity loss that frequently go hand in hand with the race for renewables and rare earths also compound the negative impacts of climate change and drive fragility across all dimensions (Smith, 2024[34]). Analysis of climate and environmental tipping points for contexts exposed to already high and extreme fragility shows the potential for a series of shocks that will test resilience and preparedness across all dimensions of fragility (Chapter 2).
The green transition is likely to accentuate risks of fragility for contexts with high levels of dependence on fossil fuels. Of the 28 contexts that derive over 20% of government revenues from oil and gas rents, 15 are also exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility (Prince et al., 2023[46]). Peaks in demand for fossil fuels are predicted to occur before 2030 and oil prices are likely to stay at roughly 2023 levels or decrease depending on the specific emissions scenario (International Energy Agency, 2024[47]). These factors could increase risks by causing substantial fiscal shortfalls that would impact the nature of political settlements in these contexts, especially those dependent on fossil fuel revenues and exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility (Sarkar et al., 2024[48]). In many of these contexts, oil revenues are used as a means of political control, as they provide the discretionary funds that feed into patronage-based politics (Sarkar et al., 2024[48]). These contexts also have unique economic risks, as profits from oil and gas can inflate exchange rates and “crowd out non-fuel related economic activities”, making their economies less diversified overall (Peszko et al., 2020[49]). Past examples of decarbonisation, especially among oil producers, show that shocks tend to lead to greater immiseration of populations, as elites search for alternative sources of rents, including through violent means (Sarkar et al., 2024[48]).
To date, the geopolitics of the green transition show how swiftly and effectively China has consolidated its position in the global energy market. The available data on Chinese extraction and processing (i.e. rare earth supply chains) also provide a perspective on the development landscape. China’s pursuit of rare earths and accumulation of a significant geostrategic energy advantage have existed in combination with a development strategy that has been highly effective by its own benchmarks (Zbytniewska, 2022[50]). With climate change impacts (Forster et al., 2024[51]) intensifying alongside geopolitical competition, development and security offer different (and potentially complementary) pathways to achieve more durable and cost-effective energy transitions.
However, it is difficult to see how planetary security can be prioritised sufficiently where geopolitical goals take precedence. Climatic, ecological and geopolitical fragility are increasing. If ideas of science, global public goods and new economic models are to prevail, then development strategies must adapt to compete within the current geopolitical reality. What Lazard (2021[52]) calls “ecological diplomacy” can only work if it is empowered to resonate across geopolitical debates.
Youth are on the front line of the politics of cyberspace, digitalisation and development in high fragility contexts
Cyberspace and digital technologies are providing new arenas of competition, with networked communications becoming the new front line in soft power geopolitics (Douzet et al., 2021[53]; Voelsen, Ruhlig and Seaman, 2019[54]). Youth populations in all contexts are the key target audience for much of this content, as both local and international actors project political information, misinformation and disinformation to secure the support and attention of young people.
This is not just about youth and the digital economy but also about how digitalisation changes the terms on which young populations engage with the environment around them. In keeping with the geopolitical environment (and in some cases because of it), cyberspace and digital frameworks are fragmented and vary across contexts exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility. Such contexts are home to the most unconnected populations: in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, for example, less than 43% of the population uses the Internet (World Bank Group, 2023[55]). These contexts also reflect a cross section of digital divides, which have positive and negative outcomes especially for governance, women and youth inequality (discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 4). For every example of positive change and innovation – mobile payments such as M-Pesa and the National Payment System in Somalia (Bareisaite, Goyal and Karpinski, 2022[56]), for instance, or the growth of low-cost Internet services, digital entrepreneurship, digital education and public services digitalisation – there are unfortunately negative examples such as cybersecurity threats (including data breaches and fraud), job displacement and cost barriers that compound existing drivers of fragility.
Harnessing digitalisation, digital skills and inclusive and sustainable economic growth, as a force for young populations in high and extreme fragility contexts will require its own approach. If the real potential for large-scale job creation in Africa lies in the diffusion of digital innovations from the lead firms to the rest of the economy, then it will depend on how that diffusion responds to the broader networks of risks and resilience that shape fragility. Moreover, the monopolisation of advanced technologies by a few countries further entrenches power imbalances and exacerbates global inequalities. The lack of international frameworks governing cyberspace makes accountability difficult, fostering suspicion among users and unbalancing global relations as the power of cyber technology and digital platforms grows (Pawlak and Géry, 2024[57]). Consequently, technology is becoming a cause and a consequence of fragility. Less technologically advanced contexts are at a significant disadvantage. Their reliance on outdated technology can expose them to cyber threats and digital espionage and limit their participation in global digital economies, including digital banking, e-commerce and other digital services.
Fragility is being instrumentalised to suppress and reverse development gains. State and non-state actors are analysing sources of risk and resilience that shape fragility not into challenges to be addressed but into situations to be leveraged and exploited as part of local and global strategies (The Economist, 2024[58]). This is within a broader dynamic whereby competition and fragility intersect and drive a sustained and escalating cycle across state, community and economic systems (Murphy, Rice and Zapf, 2024, p. 2[59]). This section highlights two such examples: the actions of Russia and of the Houthi regime in Yemen.
The exploitation of fragility as part of Russian strategy
Russia’s armed aggression in Ukraine and interventions in Africa,3 the Middle East and the Western Balkans are – while occasionally opportunistic and transactional in execution – emblematic of a deliberate approach to geostrategic competition with the West. These activities go beyond what Bilal (2024[60]) terms hybrid warfare to include elite-driven commercial and economic interests and calculated interventions in the development space focused on risks and factors of resilience. A template of engagement is emerging that involves linking specific Russian interests with key drivers of risk and resilience in contexts with high fragility. Over the past decade in particular, Russian state and non-state agents have sought to capitalise on opportunities for “quick, transitory gains” (Galeotti, 2021[61]) in contexts that are experiencing high political and security fragility and especially in contexts with significant natural resource wealth and where there is dissatisfaction with Western support (Adibe, 2019[62]). The means of Russian aid range from security sector assistance and sector-specific finance to digital disinformation and geostrategic disruption often aimed at undermining Western or other competitors’ influence.
The fragility profiles of Russian partner contexts exhibit a number of shared features:
high or extreme security fragility usually involving an ongoing security crisis4 during which beleaguered leaders seek external sponsorship or paramilitary support to exert control over the country;
an abundance of mineral resources or hydrocarbon assets coupled with permeable patronage-based political systems, usually with an authoritarian strongman leader5;
a geographically strategic area (most notably in terms of supply chains or the opportunity to cause and manipulate forced displacement) and a history of military or diplomatic ties with Russia (often with an emphasis on a Soviet-era development legacy);
deteriorating relations between the government and its international partners and/or associated perceived power vacuums.
For example, Russia’s significant involvement in the Central African Republic capitalised on the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western partners. This allowed Russia, as a rival security provider, to step into a sympathetic political settlement through sustained disinformation and select military support (Dukhan, 2020, p. 2[63]; Mazet, 2024[64]). Russia’s partnerships in certain contexts with high and extreme fragility are limited (Droin and Dolbaia, 2023[65]), as was the case in Nigeria, or they are peripheral if Russia perceives the country as still susceptible to Western pressure (Brennan, 2019[66]) or finds that potential partners are reluctant to engage based on their previous experience (Githua, 2024[67]).
Featuring anti-colonial rhetoric and reviving Cold War Soviet networks, Russia’s current strategy instrumentalises fragility for elite-focused gains at the expense of broad-based socio-economic gains, which complicates efforts to advance health, well-being, sustainable development and economic performance in many countries. Developing sources of resilience is key to preventing the negative impact of Russian interventions. Russia’s engagement in Africa, for example, is mostly focused on high and extreme fragility contexts, where its intervention often compromises the space for development and aggravates drivers of fragility, including by undermining social and political cohesion and exacerbating environmental degradation (Siegle, 2021[68]). Russia targets and exploits fragilities, in large part by using a network of (semi)-deniable actors that are not legally recognised as part of the Russian state but are nevertheless closely connected to the Kremlin (Marten, 2019, p. 412[69]; Lanfranchi and de Bruijne, 2022[70]). Of the 16 African contexts identified by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as subject to Russian disinformation, 14 experience high and extreme fragility (Ferragamo, 2023[71]). In the medium to long term, the economic concessions demanded by Russia risk creating a highly “unequal relationship, in which Moscow extracts much more than it offers” (Watling, Danylyuk and Reynold, 2024[72]). In some areas, such as the Central African Republic, the environmental impact will leave generational fragility, as land degradation, deforestation and water pollution combine to undermine resilience across societal and human dimensions (Morin et al., 2021[73]).
With few exceptions, Moscow has not meaningfully engaged in development co-operation in contexts that are exposed to high and extreme fragility, and it remains an insignificant trade partner to sub-Saharan African states in particular.6 However, Russia’s trade with Africa, estimated at USD 17.1 billion in 2021 and focused on food and energy (Droin and Dolbaia, 2023[65]), is growing. Announcements made at the November 2024 Russia-Africa summit in Sochi concerning apparent initiatives on debt relief, development projects and refinancing (TASS, 2024[74]) may be indicative of an evolution in Russia’s strategy and a sign of its willingness to compete with existing development models as part of a more comprehensive approach, particularly in Africa.
The manipulation of fragility at the centre of conflict strategy in Yemen
The strategic logic of instrumentalising drivers of fragility is similarly evident in the choices of the Ansar Allah Houthi regime in Yemen. Acknowledging the regime’s recent attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping, this subsection highlights two examples of such instrumentalisation at different levels: first, the leveraging of a potential environmental disaster associated with the tanker FSO Safer and, second, the calculated degradation of the governance and economic resilience of the internationally recognised government of Yemen (IRGY) in Aden. Both actions can be understood in the context of the Houthis’ war objectives. Like the Russian activities discussed in the previous subsection, they are also examples of direct targeting of sources of fragility, notably in the environmental and economic dimensions.
Given the challenges associated with the conflict prevention agenda, as discussed in Chapter 3, the UN-led response in 2023 to the environmental risks associated with FSO Safer is noteworthy as an intervention where the value of prevention can be clearly measured. Moored off Yemen’s Red Sea coast, the decaying tanker held 1 million barrels of oil – so much that an oil spill from FSO Safer would have been the fifth-largest ever from a tanker, with catastrophic environmental, humanitarian and economic impacts on a context already exposed to extreme fragility and war (UN, 2023[75]). The Houthi regime, intent on extracting concessions, leveraged this multidimensional risk for years. However, the process was impressively monitored from multiple sources and effectively managed by a UN-led effort that successfully mediated an agreement and ultimately oversaw the transfer of oil to a secure tanker in August 2023 (Ralby, Ralby and Soud, 2023[76]; UN, 2023[77]). Aspects of the agreement remain to be completed, but the immediate outcome of the effort was to avoid the compounding of multidimensional drivers of fragility. The marine ecosystem was protected and the already struggling local human environment – including the fisheries sector and critical humanitarian supply chains – was spared the impact of what would have unquestionably been a devastating shock.
The economy is a critical focal point of the conflict in Yemen, intersecting in significant ways with political, human and security fragility (Wennmann and Davies, 2020, pp. 5-7[78]). Actions carried out by the Houthi regime have focused on revenue-generating assets (notably oil) and critical infrastructure (ports and roads) as well as on economic institutions (private banks and state institutions such as the Central Bank of Yemen and government ministries), as exemplified by the de facto existence of two currencies and banking systems (International Crisis Group, 2024[79]). A complex political economy has developed that puts stress on a private sector trying to balance competing elite interests with evolving dictates on tax, customs, currency and real day-to-day security concerns. The Houthi regime has demonstrated its capacity to evolve and innovate despite its relative international isolation, successfully building alliances – most notably with Iran (itself intent on manipulating regional fragilities through Hamas and Hezbollah) and with Russia – and addressing weaknesses in its own systems by improving tax systems, controlling trade and manipulating currency to prevent inflation (Davies and Wennmann, 2022, p. 13[80]). The Houthi regime’s actions also have severely disrupted the IRGY’s infrastructure, including through port attacks and coercive restrictions that further impact the IRGY’s revenue capacity by requiring importers to redirect energy shipments from Aden to Hodeida, the main Red Sea port under Houthi control (Ardemagni, 2023[81]). These activities are clearly aimed at undermining the resilience of the IRGY and increasing the human and economic fragility in IRGY territories, but they also impact the humanitarian response to alleviate the human suffering from the conflict. Disruptions to the response include the targeting of aid workers (International Crisis Watch, 2024[82]).
The narrative of effective autocracies has become more widespread since 2012, infused with ideas of what Repucci and Slipowitz (2022[83]) call an emerging autocratic “order” driven by state and non-state grievances (ideological, resource-based and ethnic) and economic inequality that are enabled and dispersed across increasingly influential digital platforms. Fragility analysis places these popular narratives in context. Autocracies come with significant and often more diverse presentations of fragility than do democratic contexts (Chapter 2). Though some contexts have adapted forms of “authoritarian capitalism” (Gat, 2007[84]) with some success, these often stand as outliers due to significant sources of resilience, mostly based on economic strength and security. Most autocracies, particularly in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, have not brought about development. (Figure 1.2).
In contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, autocratic power is often more transient, as reflected in the frequent occurrence of attempted and realised coups d’état (Chapter 2) and tendency to drift towards high levels of corruption and inequality, low levels of economic growth, unaccountable hierarchies, and higher risks of conflict (Cheeseman, 2024[85]; Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009[86]). One notable departure from this trend is the degree to which autocracies have adapted cyber and digital technologies to build surveillance and information systems that allow them to better monitor and control threats to their power, including by enabling them to influence popular narratives in Western democratic discourse as an extension of autocratic soft power. Autocracies such as Myanmar, for example, have been innovative in the use of force and digital surveillance.
Note: The liberal democracy index contains information on voting rights, the freedom and fairness of elections, freedoms of association and expression, civil liberties and executive constraints. The liberal democracy index and fragility score were rescaled from 0 to 100. A higher fragility score is associated with more fragility while a higher level on the liberal democracy index is associated with a higher level of democracy.
Source: Coppedge et al. (2024[87]), V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v14, https://doi.org/10.23696/mcwt-fr58.
Violence of any type is a cause and a symptom of fragility. Violence is an intrinsic part of human nature and experience, as reflected in the drive for status, for the resources associated with status, for belonging and for the means to protect the gains achieved (Martin, 2018[88]). Consideration of risks and coping capacities across all dimensions of fragility influences the decision, whether by the leader of a drug cartel or by a state, to use violent force. While many actors identify violence as a last resort, for others it is a preference – effective and efficient when compared with other options to achieve political, religious, economic or other objectives.
Global trends associated with violence, whether to project power or in self-defence, are leading drivers of political narratives at multiple levels. There were more recorded state-based armed conflicts in 2023 than at any time since 1946 (Rustad, 2024[89]) and their return to prominence is one of the primary reference points in geopolitical debates. Organised violence (state-based, non-state and one-sided violence) was recorded in 43 contexts in 2023, including 27 that were exposed to high and extreme fragility. Between 2021 and 2023, the conflicts between Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front; between Russia and Ukraine; across the Middle East; and between rival factions in Sudan accounted for the majority of the 600 000 people killed in conflict around the world (Rustad, 2024, pp. 9-10[89]). Though the number of non-state violent conflicts has declined since the last States of Fragility report, from 84 in 2022 to 75 in 2023, the number of fatalities was higher. Globally, fatalities from one-sided violence dropped from 11 900 in 2022 to 10 200 in 2023 across 35 countries (Rustad, 2024, pp. 7-8[89]).
Across these trends, two in particular stand out. First, there has been a notable increase in non-state violence in some contexts experiencing medium to low fragility (Chapter 2), driven by greater violence associated with organised crime. Fatalities resulting from conflicts between organised crime groups in contexts with medium to low fragility exceeded fatalities from conflicts involving rebel groups in contexts with high and extreme fragility (Davies et al., 2024[90]). The second and not unrelated trend of note is the persistently high level of gender-based violence in the world. Globally, approximately 51 100 women and girls were killed by intimate partners or family members in 2023 and an estimated 736 million women, or nearly one in three, have been subjected to physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence, non-partner sexual violence, or both at least once in their life, according to UN Women (2024[91]). No country is on track to achieve gender equality by 2030, and nearly 40% of countries stagnated or declined across indicators of the Gender Index between 2019 and 2022 (Equal Measures, 2024, p. 3[92]); almost all of these countries are contexts exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility.
Support for building and preventing peace is declining when it is needed most
Support for critical coping capacities for mitigating, disincentivising and preventing violence is not adapting to growing challenges or is simply being deprioritised. This trend affects not only peacebuilding, where there are striking shortfalls in ODA to support the areas of conflict prevention and justice, among others (Chapter 3). It is also indicative of the drift of multilateral and regional peace institutions and mechanisms away from the arenas where decisions regarding peace and violence are considered. We are seeing fracturing of peace processes, with parallel processes running “in tandem, in competition, or in complete ignorance of each other” (Peter and Rice, 2022[93]). Building resilience in a fragmented and competitive world will depend on building capacity to achieve and sustain peace. Capacity for this type of resilience is often the missing component in contexts where political and economic elites are focused on short-term gains.
At the same time, regional and international institutions with traditional peace and security roles are facing a crisis of confidence. The criticisms of the UN, an organisation designed to reflect 20th-century power relations and struggling for political traction and finance, are also being levelled at other, similar institutions such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States. Should the loss of faith in the UN force it to scale back its role in crisis management (Gowan, 2023[94]), the peace burden would fall mostly on individual states that are increasingly focused on competition over collaboration and often reluctant to accept the risks that accompany effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding. A likely outcome would be shortfalls in peace capacity (e.g. for operations, mediation, resolution and peacebuilding), meaning that conflicts will be left to run their course at ever higher costs to lives and livelihoods, as observed in the Middle East.
The global cost of violence has failed to drive renewed investment in peace. In 2023, the global economic impact of violence reached USD 19.1 trillion, equivalent to 13.5% of global GDP (Vision of Humanity, 2024[95]), suggesting that new and stronger arguments for peace are needed. It is far from certain that arguments based on the human and geostrategic advantages of peace would be more convincing than financial arguments. But how communities, states and organisations think about peace is fundamental to what happens next. The recent trend away from top-down and towards bottom-up approaches ignores the nested reality and complex political economy of violence and peace. Developing a framework or frameworks to understand and reimagine the connections between “local agreement-making” and national peace processes and also acknowledging the different processes at play would be steps in the right direction (Bell and Wise, 2022[96]).
The relationship between defence and development is not an “either or”: it is a “both and”. Carsten Staur, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee
Tailoring the application of peace, security and development policies is a central element of statecraft. In many states, including OECD member countries and contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, foreign policies that were initially securitised in response to terrorist attacks in the early 2000s are now evolving to confront challenges associated with geopolitical rivalries. Greater priority is being given to military capabilities and to security-focused missions and partnerships that are often centred on varying types of security sector assistance (but not on UN peacekeeping, which has itself become more securitised through the application of stabilisation doctrine) as well as to border security and economic security, in particular energy and technology security (Farinha and Youngs, 2024[97]). In many cases, the trend towards increased investment in defence and security corrects the security deficits that developed following the end of the Cold War (Posaner and Kayali, 2024[98]). The evolution in foreign policies is also driven by state-centric motivations that in some cases go hand in hand with moves to adopt more nationalistic policy frameworks, which in turn trigger international competition on a host of issues (Wilson, 2019[99]).
Within this overall securitising trend, there are reasons for optimism as well as concern. The moves by the United Kingdom to revisit the strengths of stabilisation policies based on lessons identified from experiences of the last 20 years and the evolution of Germany’s stabilisation policy and moves towards greater emphasis on prevention and peace are two examples that reflect an interest in developing instruments that acknowledge the complementarity of foreign, security and development approaches in addressing interdependent challenges in high and extreme fragility contexts (Rynn, 2022[100]; Germany Federal Foreign Office, 2022[101]). Similarly, the United States Global Fragility Act is an innovative response to previous security-led approaches that in many cases delivered sub-optimal outcomes (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2021, pp. 14-18[102]). It remains to be seen if these initiatives will be outliers or the vanguard of a new era of development and peace cohesiveness but early evidence on implementation in contexts such as Mozambique and Papua New Guinea, points towards the potential of better alignment of development, peace and security approaches (U. S. Government, 2025[103]).
The comparative scale of global investment in defence and development underlines the difficulty of finding balanced strategic approaches across development, foreign and security policies. According to calculations by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world military expenditure reached a record total of USD 2 388 billion in 2023, the ninth year of consecutive increases (Tian et al., 2024[104]). As Figure 1.3 shows, the contrast with development assistance is stark: Total combined ODA in 2023 (gross disbursements) amounted to USD 288.5 billion in 2023, which was more than 10% of military expenditure that year (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024[105]; OECD, 2024[106]).
Source: OECD (2024[106]), CRS: Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1; SIPRI (2024[107]), Military Expenditure Database, https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685.
The disproportionality between security and development is not in itself problematic, however there is a tendency in some countries to draw a false equivalence between security and development spending that overlooks their complementarity. Public attitudes on development assistance can vary significantly (Yanguas, 2018[108]) for example, in a recent survey by Focus 2030 (2024[109]), 58% of French respondents favoured increasing or maintaining the amount of French ODA. Older surveys conducted in the United States have found that respondents overestimated government spending on foreign aid by a factor of about 30:1 (DiJulio, Norton and Brodie, 2016[110]; Wu, 2022[111]). Other research suggests that perceptions of ODA are closely aligned with respondents’ economic preferences for domestic policy and level of interest in foreign affairs (Prather, 2024[112]).
These perceptions carry political weight and therefore influence how foreign, defence and development policies are balanced, constructed and directed. The current correlations between rising defence expenditure and fewer resources for development and humanitarian support (Andrés, 2024[113]) in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility need to be carefully tracked, especially where projected cuts in ODA in 2025 could drive an even larger gap that would further undermine their complementarity. For example, embedded within the military expenditures presented in Figure 1.3 are substantial (though mostly unverifiable) expenditures on security sector assistance, sometimes called ‘train and equip’ support; such spending comes at a time when record low amounts are going to security sector governance, according to the latest ODA data (Chapter 3). This in part indicates a failure to protect the substantial investments in security made over the years with complementary support for governance, especially in contexts with high and extreme fragility. This risks repeating the mistakes of the recent past where the subordination and in some cases appropriation of international development (including security sector reform and governance) to defence priorities (Adams, 2012[114]) led to reduced effectiveness of security and development approaches and to unsustainable peace (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2021, p. 66[102]).
In 2024, the UN Security Council, Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) alone organised 148 separate events at ministerial level or higher that focused on international development and related issues such as climate, finance, gender and health (Focus 2030, 2024[115]). These were just a fraction of the events for high-level political attendees that are scheduled in any calendar year, a surfeit that leaves most countries having to select which events to prioritise with political representation and which to have administrative staff attend. Assessing the quality of outcomes emerging from these international development events is difficult. Many political figures and analysts suggest that mistrust, especially between the Global North and contexts in the Global South, is undermining the effectiveness of such events, which frequently deliver abstract conclusions and where increasing participation is not always matched by improved performance across a host of peace and development issues (Gowan, 2024[116]; International Peace Institute and Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024[117]).
In other cases, many fora where political leadership was considered essential for implementing outcomes, development and peace policy are being left to technocratic or apolitical expertise “with no skin in the game” (Opalo, 2023[118]), thereby denying it legitimacy and credibility among politicians and in the eyes of sceptical publics, regardless of their exposure to fragility. As seen with initiatives such as FOCAC, business is increasingly being conducted beyond established multilateral frameworks, with political energy and momentum emerging from other points in the global order where alliances and agreements are more easily forged. Arguably this is leading to a drift towards a preference for transactional development over the transformational potential inherent in sustainable development. The lack of high-level political support for the potential of country platforms and the disparity between support for security sector assistance and security sector governance are cases in point (Chapter 3). Development co-operation is inherently political; and while countries hold the primary responsibility for their own development outcomes, creating clear incentives for development partnerships that prioritise political will and leadership is a point of strategic advantage for donors and partners alike (Matthys, 2024[119]).
The global trends highlighted in this chapter show the scale of the development challenge to address entrenched fragility in an environment where there is less international co-ordination, greater competition among development models and diminishing confidence in the ability of the multilateral system to effect positive change. The trends do not necessarily suggest that the post-Second World War order is being rejected wholesale. Nor do they foretell its demise. But they signal to those invested in development and sustaining peace that traditional formulas and approaches need to be reassessed.
Realising the potential of development as an instrument of international statecraft
The trends highlighted in subsequent chapters of this report show that ODA and development co-operation are most effective when they are consistent, sustained and tailored to the specific needs and priorities of a context. They also show that where donors are increasingly risk-adverse in their engagement, especially in contexts with extreme fragility, development assistance can be reactive and short term (Murphy, Rice and Zapf, 2024, p. 3[59]) and in some cases superficial, leading to a low-risk, low-return dynamic. In a geostrategic environment with multiple development assistance offers, being more competitive means being smarter about building development co-operation and responding not just to the risks associated with fragility but to the specific means of building resilience for the long term. Taking the lead on strengthening resilience could be seen as a fundamental element in a renewed approach to conflict prevention and also as a complement to foreign and national security policy (Murphy, Rice and Zapf, 2024, pp. 14-15[59]).
On the financing side, some multilateral institutions are already responding to this message. Informed by their respective fragility strategies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have both moved to adapt their practices over the past five years. Arguably, some regional development banks have moved even faster, with both the Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank showing a willingness to innovate and share risk with partners in contexts exposed to high and extreme levels of fragility (African Development Bank Group, 2024[120]).
The picture is different on the political side. The UN and the African Union, for instance, are struggling for traction in an environment of multipolar side deals (Gowan and Forti, 2023[121]). This has a global as well as localised impact as it risks diminishing the potential for UN and collective responses to global aspects of complex issues such as climate, cyber security and trade (Smith, 2024[34]). Contexts experiencing high and extreme fragility have more options for partnerships today. The capacity of multilateral institutions to compete amid the emerging power dynamics of a multipolar world will determine the success or failure of multilateral initiatives as will the perceived and actual quality of the partnerships (reflected in repeated calls from all sides for more inclusive partnerships). Failing to compete risks losing hard-won gains, principles and values to geopolitically driven expediency.
Strategic engagement: Staying engaged and more equal accountable partnerships
The severity of fragility vary across contexts from year to year but for many people in the world, high and extreme fragility is and has been the norm. In 2023, Gambia and Timor-Leste, though still exposed to high fragility, showed notable improvements, and Moldova stood out for its progress in the medium to low fragility category. The indicators that capture human fragility have been showing improvement, a valuable sign of development effectiveness in the most challenging of circumstances. But for 29 contexts, exposure to high and extreme fragility is chronic. In 25 years of OECD analysis and 10 years of applying the OECD fragility framework, there are not many examples of contexts that have navigated a path to greater resilience. This sobering reality raises fundamental questions for those who promote peace and development about the soundness and flexibility of their strategy, policy, financing and approaches. But it does not necessarily reflect the failure of their efforts.
Every context is responsible for its own development trajectories and, as Chapter 2 highlights, the nature of some political settlements leaves insufficient political will to address drivers of fragility. It is important in these situations to stay engaged with these contexts so that, when an opportunity arises, it can be seized and supported. For contexts where engagement is easier, recognising their agency and options will require reimagining partnerships. Being inclusive will not be sufficient. Responding to the accountability of local partners through more equal partnerships looks set to be a significant indicator of whether peace and development actors can rise to the challenge (Campbell, 2018[122]). Finally, development co-operation is a small component of international activity and a relatively small feature of the economic landscape in most contexts experiencing high fragility. While managing expectations is always important, protecting and developing the catalytic value of humanitarian, development and peace assistance is essential for contexts with high and extreme fragility.
Analysing fragility highlights the urgent need to prioritise conflict prevention and to address building resilience as development and foreign policy objectives
The trends identified in this chapter and developed in the rest of the report show that increases in violence and the willingness to use violence need to be countered but that international, state and community capacity to respond is in most cases diminishing. Nowhere is this more apparent than on questions around conflict prevention. Each of the perspectives identified above demonstrate in different ways how security and development questions are deeply entwined in contexts with high or extreme fragility – across climate, cyber, politico-economic and youth issues. Security-led responses alone will not address all these challenges, therefore making development work for conflict prevention is essential for balanced responses that respect the resources and interests of donors and partners. Finding a mechanism for packaging prevention analysis that works for development has been a key challenge for donors and partners and this will be considered in Chapter 3.
Finally, the trends in political fragmentation and instrumentalisation outlined in this chapter are part of a wider conversation around resilience that threads through the following chapters. The discussion in Chapter 2 recognises that declining or diminishing resilience equally drives fragility and increases risks. Chapter 3 shows how the World Bank, the UN, the United States and others are adapting resilience frameworks even as ODA to support resilient capacities, especially those within the peace pillar, is in decline. Finally, Chapter 4 shares perspectives on the pursuit of resilience by contributors from Comoros, Iraq, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. For these and other contexts, developing more effective approaches to resilience includes linking state and institutional capacity to drivers of fragility across all dimensions. As autocracies and democracies present different strengths and weaknesses, considering political settlements and capacities for reform is just as important as considering what will enable long-term growth and poverty alleviation (Papoulidis, 2023[123]): an effort in one area, such as poverty, is unlikely to succeed unless it is balanced with an approach that recognises the interplay of risk and resilience capacities. Without fragility analysis, policy responses may be too narrowly defined and strategically flawed.
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← 1. The final number of new donors is unclear. One report suggests 16 new donors had made commitments as of December 2024. See Aloo (2024), “World Bank nears $100bn target as 16 new donors join IDA replenishment drive”, https://www.theafricareport.com/370447/world-bank-nears-100bn-target-as-16-new-donors-join-ida-replenishment-drive/.
← 2. For example, while both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are embracing a larger role in contexts facing medium to low fragility, and have pursued Voice and Reform initiatives since the 2000s, the USD 650 billion issuance of special drawing rights (SDR) in 2021 inevitably favoured larger members, as the issuance was based on shareholding. Several members have since reallocated a portion of their SDR allocation to provide concessional support through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. For more information, see https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/special-drawing-rights-sdr and https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/08/23/pr21248-imf-managing-director-announces-the-us-650-billion-sdr-allocation-comes-into-effect.
← 3. At a July 2022 press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he expected Africa would play a growing role in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept because of both long-term and short-term interests and as “a result of what the West is doing in respect of Russia”. For more details, see https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1824012/.
← 4. The Normandy Index (NI) measures the level of threat to peace, security and democracy across the world and gives an indication of a country's level of resilience to the global threats set out in the European Union Global Strategy such as terrorism, energy insecurity, disinformation and crime. Countries most at risk in terms of peace and security are those with lower NI scores. Russia's presence and influence are most evident in countries with NI scores of five or lower out of ten. See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2024)762368.
← 5. Freedom House’s average freedom index for the African countries where Russia is active is almost half that of the other African countries. See https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/.
← 6. The value of Russia’s trade with Africa, for example, is just one-tenth that of China’s, according to International Monetary Fund data (https://data.imf.org/?sk=9d6028d4-f14a-464c-a2f2-59b2cd424b85&sid=1514498277103). For more information, see also https://www.csis.org/analysis/great-power-competition-implications-africa-russian-federation-and-its-proxies.