States of Fragility 2025

4. Perspectives on fragility

Abstract

In keeping with the agency and drive for resilience identified in Chapter 1, this chapter presents perspectives from communities exposed to high and extreme fragility themselves on how they, governments and stakeholders are finding pathways through and out of fragility.

In Brief

Where perspectives on fragility align

• Fragility is dynamic, evolving across historical, political, economic and social dimensions (the spectrum of fragility). Resilience is the target. Achieving resilience requires consistency and reforms, as well as commitment from both local and external actors.

• Reforms that work are locally led, country-owned and empowered by tailored and adaptable finance are delivering positive outcomes.

• With careful management of peace and integrated thinking on development, progress is possible, including in contexts with high levels of security fragility.

• Development co-operation actors must adapt to appreciate the shifting and evolving needs of youth in increasingly digital societies, especially for young women and girls.

• Fragmented international interventions that fail to address the systemic issues perpetuate fragility but initiatives to address climate and environmental fragility point to potential for building resilience at scale.

• Conflicts and violence distort economies, drive competing incentives, and create new economic centres. Innovative responses in several contexts are findings ways to build resilience under pressure.

• Private sector development does not happen in isolation. With tailored reforms come increased economic opportunities, better understanding of and adaptation to risk, and a clearer case for investment.

• Local fragility unaddressed can quickly become a regional and international challenge through violence, forced displacement, poverty and gender inequality, as different sources of risk and resilience combine to impact stability and development.

• Reforms (such as building fiscal space) require time to produce results. Consistency, commitment and patience are critical features for international co-operation actors to support resilience building.

• Pragmatic approaches are necessary but values are an essential part of the offer by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), especially for women and girls, and should not be compromised.

Resilience as an end: A spectrum approach to fragility and country ownership

Secretary General Helder da Costa and Deputy Secretary General Habib Ur Rehman Mayar (g7+)

The increasing prevalence of polycrises – a confluence of global challenges – disproportionately impacts conflict-affected countries already grappling with significant vulnerabilities. These states, often exposed to extreme fragility, bear the brunt of cascading crises including extreme poverty, hunger and displacement. Ad hoc, fragmented and reactionary interventions in these contexts have done little to foster the resilience needed to withstand and recover from such shocks. The g7+ (Group of Seven Plus), an intergovernmental group of conflict-affected nations, has long championed resilience and stability as the ultimate goals of humanitarian, peacebuilding and development interventions.

Its vision calls for a paradigm shift, one that perceives fragility not as a fixed condition but as a dynamic spectrum. The fragility spectrum provides a nuanced lens, acknowledging the interconnected and evolving challenges that countries face. At its core, this understanding of fragility empowers the principle of country ownership, emphasising that sustainable solutions must originate from within the affected nations themselves.

The fragility spectrum: Moving beyond labels

Traditionally, fragility has been viewed through a binary lens that categorises nations as either “fragile” or “stable”. Such rigidity oversimplifies the complex and shifting nature of fragility, which varies over time and across sectors. The fragility spectrum, conceptualised by the g7+ (2013[1]), offers a more flexible and realistic framework that aligns with the innovations introduced by the OECD in this report. Countries experience varying degrees of fragility shaped by historical, political, economic and social factors. Some nations contend with protracted conflicts and institutional collapse, while others face localised governance or economic challenges. The spectrum approach can tailor interventions to address specific vulnerabilities without undermining national ownership.

By viewing fragility as a continuum, this approach also enables the realisation of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, which is expected to bridge the often siloed domains of immediate humanitarian response, long-term development and peacebuilding. The spectrum approach provides a framework to integrate these efforts, enabling context-specific, multi-sectoral strategies that concentrate on the root causes of fragility while building systems for resilience and self-reliance. This perspective shifts the focus from externally imposed solutions to empowering countries to address their unique challenges. By recognising fragility as a dynamic continuum, interventions can evolve alongside shifting realities, fostering resilience from within.

Resilience as the ultimate goal

In this framework, resilience is the ultimate goal – a state where nations can withstand, recover from and transform in the face of crises. Resilient states are not immune to shocks; rather, they possess the institutional strength, societal cohesion and economic adaptability to respond effectively. For instance, a natural disaster such as a flood has vastly different impacts in Afghanistan’s Baghlan Province than in Spain’s Valencia Province. While both regions may suffer loss of life, the longevity and severity of the socio-economic consequences are profoundly different. These disparities underscore the importance of building resilience tailored to specific contexts.

Drawing from the experiences of g7+ countries that have transitioned from conflict to stability, the Group collectively aspires to global policy reforms aligned with the following pillars of stability and development as reflected in the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (INCAF, 2012[2]):

• Social cohesion and reconciliation. States with high fragility often inherit deep societal divides resulting from wars. These unresolved grievances frequently fuel further conflicts, including proxy wars. Promoting reconciliation, fostering dialogue and addressing historical injustices are essential for building durable peace and social capital, which are prerequisites for sustainable development.

• Inclusive and effective state institutions. Citizens’ trust in state institutions is fundamental to resilience. Decades of conflict erode this trust, which can only be restored through capable and inclusive governance. Strengthening legitimate institutions that deliver essential services ensures citizen participation in statebuilding processes and fosters stability.

• Economic self-sufficiency. Economic fragility exacerbates vulnerability, and reliance on external aid often subjects fragile states to undue geopolitical influence. Resilience pathways must prioritise poverty reduction, sustainable livelihoods and economic diversification to break cycles of dependency. Investments in foundational economic infrastructure are critical to achieving self-sufficiency.

• Climate and environmental adaptation. Many conflict-affected countries are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Climate-induced shocks exacerbate existing fragility, creating vicious cycles of vulnerability. Despite this, these countries receive disproportionately low levels of climate finance compared to contexts with medium to low fragility (Gulati et al., 2024[3]). Recognising this gap, the g7+ has issued a joint call for increased climate financing and the mainstreaming of equitable processes. Integrating climate resilience into national strategies is essential to enable fragile states to withstand environmental shocks (Dickie and Jessop, 2024[4]).

Country ownership: The cornerstone of resilience

Central to the spectrum approach is the principle of country ownership, the cornerstone of resilience building. Resilience cannot be externally imposed; it requires the full engagement and leadership of national stakeholders, including citizens. Country ownership empowers nations to develop homegrown solutions that align with their unique contexts and priorities, ensuring legitimacy and sustainability.

The g7+ emphasises the importance of international partnerships that respect and reinforce country ownership. External actors should play a supportive role, providing resources, technical expertise and solidarity while allowing countries to lead their own development processes. This inclusive approach strengthens the HDP nexus, as it ensures that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts are coherent and aligned with national priorities.

Conclusion: A new paradigm for resilience

The spectrum approach to fragility reframes resilience as both a process and an end goal. By recognising fragility as a dynamic continuum and prioritising country ownership, this framework enables tailored, context-specific responses that empower nations to overcome vulnerabilities. Moreover, the spectrum approach operationalises the HDP nexus, fostering collaboration across sectors and creating cohesive strategies that address both immediate needs and long-term aspirations.

As this and other contributions presented in this chapter show, resilience is not just an aspiration. For some states with high fragility, it is already a transformative reality, one that fosters hope, opportunity and sustainable development for future generations. Through this vision, conflict-affected countries in particular can redefine their trajectories, becoming resilient nations capable of enduring and thriving amid global uncertainties.

Communities rising: Aligning development and peace approaches through equity-transformative actions to address fragility in Colombia

H.E. Francia Márquez (Vice President of Colombia)

This contribution embraces a project for change. Inequalities in Colombia have led to poverty, weak industrial capacity, territorial gaps, population gaps and long-term armed conflicts. Understanding and approaching fragility as a consequence of inequalities inherited from colonisation and its reproduction is the main reason Colombia created the Ministry of Equality and Equity.

Wealth concentration works on different scales, and so do inequalities. According to the Gini index, Colombia is the most unequal country in the region and the third-most unequal in the world. Its Gini index in 2023 was 0.54 (Colombia National Administrative Department of Statistics, 2024[5]). While Colombia is also a middle-income country, 26% of the population faces food insecurity. In addition, 50% of the national budget for the last decade was invested in the Andes region but only 17% in the Pacific region and just 4% in Amazonia (National Planning Department, 2024[6]). At the societal level, while the income gap between men and women has narrowed to 6%, the gap between men categorised as white and women categorised as Afro-descendant is 58%, which means gender and racial-ethnicity gaps are not being addressed with the same effectiveness.

To contribute to total peace in Colombia from a structural perspective, the Ministry of Equality and Equity was created with a people-centred operating model for community-based interventions through transformative strategies. This model implies implementing transformative actions in local and community contexts based on the conditions of the territory so that these local interventions can be added to the required structural transformations of the national order. Thus, as these structural transformations are achieved, the lives of the people and communities most affected by inequality, inequity and their consequences (such as poverty and armed conflict) are already changing. The following are some of the transformative actions underway in different areas that represent short-term material changes of local scope.

Food security

The Zero Hunger Programme prioritises ten sub-regions and 79 of the 1 110 municipalities where the food security situation is critical. As an illustration of what critical means, food insecurity is as high as 95% in informal settlements in Cartagena, Cúcuta, and nearby municipalities in Bolivar and Norte de Santander where implementation of the programme started in 2024; the national rate, by comparison to the baseline, is 26%.

In these communities, the ministry has concentrated its actions on temporary deliveries of food, with transforming actions aimed at strengthening local food production systems, for instance buying from local producers for the delivery of food and delivering productive goods to farmers that allow them to increase and sustain production of traditional food. Another transformative intervention action is aimed at strengthening local food supply systems by building sub-regional food supply centres and networking producers, transport, and/or local carriers and distributors.

These actions will not impact most of the population directly. But they will improve the availability of food in these territories, reducing prices and facilitating the market for producers.

Access to water and sanitation

Similarly, actions have been taken to address gaps in water and sanitation access. It would take 13 billion Colombian pesos to close water gaps in the country. Concrete actions such as reducing bureaucratic barriers to guarantee the construction of water supply and basic sanitation systems in marginalised and excluded territories are concentrated in infrastructure projects in villages, population centres and small municipalities, especially on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Currently, 38 projects are in different phases of implementation, ranging from studies and designs to construction contracting.

The government also designed a special procedure to promote equitable access under which it takes 60 days, not the traditional two years or more, to assess water and sanitation projects before investing public resources. We have also implemented non-conventional community solutions in territories where communities are geographically distant, such as in the Amazon and Orinoco regions.

Transformative, inclusive solutions for youth

In addition to Youth in Peace, the government’s national flagship programme for vulnerable youth, the ministry is working on a local strategy in the north of the Pacific region of Cauca. The Young Guardians of Nature Programme recognises that youth in marginalised and excluded territories are expelled from their communities if they want to access higher education or have a life project based on innovation. This programme is being implemented in 13 municipalities of Cauca and aims to capitalise on the relationship between 1) young people and the territory, 2) the strong social fabric in these communities, and 3) a commitment to productive innovation that contributes to the protection of the environment.

Specifically, the programme strengthens the participation of 2 000 young people in circular economy processes, showing the transforming power of societal and popular bonds. For example, while surveys find that 5.6% of people in Colombia trust people they do not know,16.0% of young people participating in the programme say they trust people they do not know. Trust as a cultural factor has proven to be fundamental to the success of associative initiatives. It is not only useful for enhancing the programme's transforming effect. It also contributes to dismantling racist, classist and regionalist prejudices about the potential of ethnic, peasant and popular communities and especially about the youth of these territories.

Reducing gender inequality

The ministry has programmes to address gender-based violence and strengthen women's political and civic participation nationwide. Nevertheless, given the overlap of racial and gender gaps, actions to promote economic autonomy for women are prioritised in the Pacific and Caribbean coastal areas. For instance, the Afro-descendant Viche women of the Colombian Pacific are a cultural and productive reference point in the country. In 2021, the beverage viche was recognised through Law 2158 as an ancestral, traditional beverage and part of the collective heritage of Afro-descendant black communities. The Ministry of Cultures and Knowledge administers the law, and we in the Ministry of Equality and Equity will strengthen 300 ancestral and traditional productive units of Viche women in Cauca. This project is part of a broader government initiative to strengthen the Vichero landscape of the Pacific and improve distribution channels. For the ministry, supporting this activity is part of recognising forms of production other than by men and making progress in guaranteeing the economic autonomy of women in this territory.

These very local and concrete actions may not seem interesting from a macroeconomic or national perspective, but it is precisely these communities that broader actions have failed to impact. From the collective action theory, changing the lives of people and communities for whom the state has been only a military presence or has not existed at all is the basis for structural change. It is also the opportunity to build total peace based on the living conditions of the civilian population.

Complicated development: Evolving risks and resilience in Bangladesh

Naomi Hossain (School of Oriental and African Studies)

The 2024 uprising that unseated the powerful Awami League regime in Bangladesh shone a spotlight on the pathways to fragility. It highlighted the ways in which extreme political fragility, the result of the Awami League’s increasingly authoritarian rule over the course of 15 years, led to a deepening of fragility in the economic, security and ultimately societal dimensions, the killing of over a thousand protestors, and then a total breakdown of law and order. Sheikh Hasina’s regime fell in August 2024. The next month, excess flooding led to further widespread harm, loss of homes and livelihoods, and billions of dollars of damage. With the Bangladeshi state still in disarray only weeks after the fall of the regime, the disaster response mechanisms were weak, and the limited redress available for those affected showed how quickly political fragility can undermine capacities to cope with ecological fragility. This downward spiral happened in a country that had, until then, been deemed a development success story for its relatively inclusive human development progress and for its effective responses to the effects of the climate crisis. The downfall of the regime demonstrates the necessity of protecting key civic and political rights as a bulwark against just such a descent into fragility, showing how political fragility intersects with other forms of fragility to endanger hard-won economic and social development progress.

The national uprising swept the country over six weeks in July and August of 2024. In addition to the more than 1 000 people killed, tens of thousands were seriously injured in the student-led popular movement (Deepto, 2024[7]). When the army chief declined to shoot any more protestors, Hasina fled the country on 5 August. Within days, a non-party interim government was in place, tasked with instituting governance and electoral reforms and returning the country to multi-party democracy.

The Awami League regime had been in power since 2009, when it won a landslide victory in a free and fair election that was held under a non-party caretaker regime. Subsequent elections under the Awami League government were less free and fair; the main opposition boycotted two of the polls, and the ruling party rigged most of them, including the most recent in January 2024 (Riaz, 2023[8]). Over the years, the government shrunk the space for peaceful debate, dissent and policy advocacy, imprisoning and criminalising the opposition and silencing civil society and the media with threats, enforced disappearances and overt violence (Freedom House, 2023[9]). The descent into political fragility was particularly marked in the two years leading up to the uprising, with sharp downturns in the indicators for democracy and corruption. In this setting of suppressed speech and no freedom of association, the regime had forced itself into a position in which it was unable to manage conflict and fragility through any means other than force and the threat of force, and it was willing to use force because the spoils of the previous years of crony capitalist rule meant there was far too much at stake to relinquish power.

The student movement initially demanded reforms to the civil service job quota system. It was met with disproportionate violence by party thugs, the Bangladesh Chhatra (student) League, which operated with full impunity and government protection. Other students joined the protests, and when the army and police were ordered to shoot protestors, thousands of other people joined. Horrific videos of the killings of unarmed protestors shocked and galvanised people across the nation; preliminary data analysis suggests that protests took place in 25% of all sub-districts across the country, with apparently hundreds of thousands gathering in the biggest cities. The escalation from a specific to a general complaint also highlights the ways political fragilities prevent the peaceful resolution of societal disputes. In this case, the callous brutality of the killings made it clear to the broader public that the regime would stop at nothing to shut down the movement.

Student movements had been big and violently repressed in the recent past. But they had never escalated into a national movement until now. This time, the movement escalated in size and reach because of broader discontent among the general public arising from the cost-of-living crisis (Hassan et al., 2023[10]), ongoing since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. General inflation was running at 10%, with food and energy inflation far higher at times. Although international events were the main causes of rising commodity prices, they were interpreted within the context of domestic politics. Many people believed that commodity speculation by powerful big business interests with political protection pushed up prices and that the government should have acted to protect the population’s basic needs.

The descent into fragility and conflict stems directly from the failure of Bangladesh’s democracy. Political violence is routine; electoral losers lose everything, sometimes going into exile or facing jail or worse. This means that all incumbents have much at stake in staying in power. This was even more the case for Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League regime between 2009 and 2024 because that political settlement was held together through crony capitalism and grand corruption (Al Jazeera, 2024[11]) that included big business, the army and police, and the civil service and co-opted members of civil society as well as political leaders and foot soldiers. In the Bangladesh case, corruption and conflict are closely and causally related. The corrosive effects of undemocratic rule spread gradually to other domains: in contrast to the steady and relatively inclusive development of the 1990s and the 2000s. The latter part of the Awami League regime saw a slowing of progress or decline in some health, education and other social indicators, and the economy failed to generate decent jobs. The contrast between high growth and claims of development success and the actual living standards, in particular the dwindling prospects for the youth of the country, paved the way for the vast movement that unseated the powerful regime.

New revelations of massive corruption and a banking crisis indicate the ways an apparently successful development agenda was actually underpinned by looting on a grand scale. Bangladesh now has an unelected interim government that has limited capacity, little support in the civil service, local governments and some security forces that were aligned with the old regime, and a restive and anxious population seeking resolution and a return to democracy. Meanwhile, political unrest continues, disrupting everyday life and the country’s flagship export industry. The current interim government is attempting to restore law and order; introduce essential political and institutional reforms, in particular to cover governance functions such as the electoral system and anti-corruption; and organise free and fair elections. It would be a daunting task for any unelected group of civil society leaders and technocrats. It is even more so because of the crippling inflation that continues to afflict a population that, despite the country’s high rates of growth and lauded development models, remains close to the poverty line and vulnerable to falling below it. The intersecting social, economic, political, security and ecological fragilities destabilising Bangladesh in late 2024, some emanating from regional powers and global conflicts, mean that the country merits strong international support and close attention over the next few years. Bangladesh stands an excellent chance of recovering its democracy and its inclusive development successes, but it needs aid, leadership and accountability for this to become a possibility.

Gender and fragility: It is time to get serious about online spaces and digital technologies

Deqa Yasin (Human Rights advocate and Social Justice activist, Somalia)

The OECD recognises that men and women experience fragility differently. Among other factors, the combination of gender inequalities and wider crises often means that women face even higher risks of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) in contexts exposed to fragility. For example, we know that sexual, emotional and physical violence peak following the onset of natural disasters (Kaul and Valero, 2023, p. 25[12]) and that such violence is an established feature of armed conflict (UN, 2024, p. 4[13]). This is painfully evident in my country, Somalia: Rampant sexual and gender-based violence ruins lives, fuels the wider conflict, and undermines the potential of women and girls to fully contribute to our country’s recovery. Somalia shows severe fragility in five of the six indicators applied by the OECD fragility framework to monitor risks to and sources of resilience for women and girls. When I was appointed Minister of Women and Human Rights Development in 2017, fighting back became one of my key priorities. On 31 May 2018, the cabinet of Ministers unanimously passed the Sexual Offences Bill (SOB) 2018, which was developed under my leadership and would have provided Somalia’s first dedicated and urgently needed legal protections from sexual and gender-based violence. The bill was fatally compromised by a major blind spot regarding both fragility and women, peace and security debates – that is, the very real transnational effects of online spaces and digital technologies in contexts with high fragility.

On 15 September 2020, while the SOB was before the parliament, the leadership of the parliament made false statements about the initiative being against Islam and singled me out by referring to the SOB as “Deqa’s bill” rather than as a collective project approved by 22 ministers under the leadership of our prime minister. These statements set off an avalanche of online violence and disinformation, often coming from the diaspora. The same day, a member of the diaspora in the Netherlands posted a video on Facebook calling on the terrorist group Al Shabaab to assassinate me in response to my leadership on the bill. Shared hundreds of times, this post fuelled a wave of online and ultimately offline threats against me, my family and other advocates. Due to the wide presence and influence of this group, which assassinates women’s rights advocates on a regular basis (Saferworld, 2023, p. 2[14]), these threats could be carried out easily, at any time.

To send a signal that such online violence is a crime and to highlight its offline consequences for women living in communities compromised by fragility, I decided to take the author of the viral Facebook video to court in the Netherlands. I ultimately won my case, but the proceedings dragged on for three years and the defendant was sentenced to no more than a few hours of community service – a sentence with no relation to the damage that was done to me and to all Somali women. I also followed YouTube procedure by filing a detailed complaint against another Somali Youtuber who had posted another threat to my life on 15 September 2020. This individual produced a video on the SOB 2018 labelling me an infidel, including by posting an image of me next to an icon of a Christian cross – a death sentence in Somalia. In response to my complaint, I received an automated response from YouTube informing me that it was “unable to determine whether the content in question is defamatory” and, therefore, unable to remove it, but that it “encourage[s me] to try to resolve any issues directly with the creator of the content in question”.

These are not isolated incidents. Following remarks construed to be in support of the SOB, the 1^st Deputy Speaker of Parliament Sadia Yasin Samatar faced similar online attacks, particularly by elements within the Somali diaspora. Women in the diaspora are also targets: Hanna Paranta, an anti-GBV advocate based in the United Kingdom, has faced assassination attempts combined with online attacks co-ordinated through “groomed” diaspora women (Mahmood, 2021[15]). While systematic documentation of online GBV in Somalia is extremely limited, respondents in a small initial survey of university students in Puntland reported that politically active women are generally the main targets (Bareedo Platform, 2020[16]). In extreme fragility contexts like Somalia, such online violence has particularly severe consequences, especially where it combines with offline security threats. Armed groups that are highly active on social media (Cox et al., 2018[17]; Grobbelaar, 2022[18]) and responsible for offline violence against women’s advocates also co-ordinate or carry out online threats, increasing the risk of escalation into offline attacks. Women in high and extreme fragility contexts also face a distinct lack of accountability for (online) violence due to weak state institutions and rule of law as well as digital architectures that are blind to context-specific, gender-based threats in local languages (Carlson and Rousselle, 2020[19]; Iyer, Nyamwire and Nabulega, 2024[20]). With large displaced populations participating actively in political debates of their home countries through social media, these threats are often transnational, further complicating responses and accountability.

What does a lack of accountability on social media and online spaces mean for global work on fragility

These developments have important implications and call for three sets of responses. First, get serious about digital technologies and online spaces. Particularly in high and extreme fragility contexts, what happens online has very real consequences. Social media also has great potential to empower women’s movements in all levels of society, but this positive potential won’t just unfold automatically. We need to work actively to make online spaces safe for women, especially those exposed to the highest levels of fragility. Second, it’s time for Western countries to clean up their own backyard. The causes and consequences of fragility never respected national boundaries. With the rise of social media and digital technologies, the idea that fragility is just “out there”, confined to other developing countries, certainly needs urgent updating. In my case, gaps in hate speech legislation in the Netherlands and the procedures of United States-based companies undermined life-saving legal protections for women in Somalia and could have facilitated attacks on advocates in the process. If causes are transnational, responses must be, too. Feminist domestic policies, not just feminist foreign policies, are needed, meaning in this instance the better monitoring of transnational online threats to women, with appropriate common legal standards to enforce protection. Third, get real about supporting and empowering local leadership. Gender equality change often involves dramatic shifts in power. Avoiding backlash requires realism and humility about the risks and timelines involved. Importantly, it requires building on locally driven initiatives and allowing local women’s organisations to guide international actors: They are the experts on local online and offline lives, how to navigate these volatile environments, and the risks of doing harm.

Engagement with the Taliban: Puncturing pragmatism with principles to achieve peace

Mariam Safi (DROPS, Afghanistan)

What does principled engagement with the Taliban look like? The lack of integration between development and peacebuilding in Afghanistan during the international intervention from 2001 to the Taliban takeover in August 2021 has been a significant factor in the securitisation of development and, ultimately, the unsustainability of the democratisation process in the country. Now, with the Taliban as the de facto authority, it has become even harder to envision development and peace working in tandem to meet the needs of the Afghan population, particularly women and girls. This difficulty arises from multiple factors: the Taliban’s oppressive governance, their disregard for Afghanistan’s international legal obligations, and their egregious violations of human and women’s rights. Meanwhile, the international community’s response – pursuing what is termed a pragmatic approach to engagement – has only encouraged the Taliban to continue their approach. Lacking the political will or capacity to use its leverage to compel meaningful change, the international community has failed to shift the Taliban’s course of action. This has led many Afghans to question whether the international community’s role in Afghanistan has been constructive, as it appears to reinforce the Taliban’s authoritarian rule rather than engaging with them to foster a transformation into a representative, transparent and legitimate government that reflects the aspirations of its people.

Since 2021, the Taliban have issued 122 edicts (United States Institute of Peace, 2024[21]), most of which target the fundamental rights and freedoms of women and girls and effectively relegate them to house arrest (Feminist Majority Foundation, 2023[22]). This amounts to the most oppressive situation for women and girls globally today. These decrees were codified on 31 July 2024 in the official gazette of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Shekhawat, 2024[23]). In Afghanistan today, not only are women prohibited from attending school beyond grade six, from working and from leaving their homes without a male relative; they are also required to veil their entire bodies, including their faces, when in public or near men who are not close relatives (Safi and Khan, 2024[24]). Disturbingly, the law equates a woman’s voice with her "private parts" (aurat in Arabic), declaring that women’s voices cannot be heard loudly in public and banning them from singing or reciting hymns (Safi and Khan, 2024[24]).

A survey conducted by the Afghan Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies in January 2024 underscores the dire situation and how Afghan women are viewing their own individual situations. Across 24 provinces, 67% of the 3 640 female respondents described the Taliban’s restrictions as systemic oppression and domination of women and girls (Bishnaw, 2024[25]). Furthermore, 61% believed these restrictions were intended to create a society where women and girls are subordinate to men, and 60% advocated for the UN to formally label the Taliban’s policies as "gender apartheid" (Sobat, 2024[26]). In December 2024, DROPS conducted a survey of 7 223 respondents across 32 provinces to assess the impact of the new PVPV Law on women and their communities. The survey revealed that 55.59% of respondents observed a negative behavioral change among their community members since the introduction of the law (Bishnaw, 2024). Moreover, the Taliban are enforcing the law through men in households, with 33.81% of respondents reporting that the de facto authorities were implementing the law by instructing male community members through local mosques (Bishnaw, 2024). This approach only further reinforces male authority over women, significantly altering gender roles, and stripping women of any autonomy it may have still had left within the home.

Since 2021, Afghan women’s civil society organisations have increasingly called for the codification of gender apartheid as a crime against humanity. This legal framework would impose stronger obligations on states, enabling them to fulfil international commitments on gender equality while holding violators accountable. It would also demand greater responsibility from the international community, whose policy of so-called pragmatic engagement has done little more than enable the Taliban’s erosion of human rights and governance. This should be indisputable, especially now that the International Criminal Court, on 25 January, announced arrest warrants for the Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for committing crimes against humanity, specifically persecution on gender grounds (Abdelaziz and Kent, 2025[27]).

The international community’s focus has largely shifted away from Afghanistan, driven by global crises and fatigue after a two-decade-long intervention. However, without peace, anchored in inclusive governance, equality, and human rights protection, Afghanistan cannot reduce its dependence on humanitarian aid or embark on the path to sustainable development.

Afghan women have persistently called for principled engagement with the Taliban. They define this approach as one grounded in adherence to the UN Charter and respect for women’s rights (including political participation, freedom of speech and mobility). Engagement without these safeguards offers no long-term benefits; it merely allows the Taliban to perpetuate its gender apartheid. The integration of development and peacebuilding, utilising both vertical and horizontal approaches, is essential for bringing Afghanistan back onto the path of stability. By excluding the Afghan people from decision-making further undermining local ownership, and adopting an elite centric and top-down approach, the Taliban are replicating the same mistakes that the international community made during the Republic. Despite this, UNAMA, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, has consistently argued for pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, contending that pushing for women’s rights could provoke harsher restrictions and that principled engagement might alienate the Taliban from negotiations.

For Afghan women, a pragmatic approach devoid of principles will neither restore their rights nor foster legitimacy within the country. Any structured political process, such as the UN-convened Doha talks, must include benchmarks rooted in human rights, such as repealing decrees that violate the rights of women and girls and ending abuses against defenders of women’s rights. Therefore, investing in robust risk assessments for Afghan women is a pressing necessity. The international community must recognise these benchmarks as non-negotiable, reflecting the views of local stakeholders. The voices of Afghan women and civil society actors are not obstacles to peace; rather, they are essential to achieving a legitimate political consensus that balances the needs of peace and development, even in authoritarian regimes.

The costs of crisis and manifestations of fragility: The perspective of one of the millions displaced from Venezuela

Ana María Diez1 (President, Coalicion por Venezuela)

Once a resource-rich nation, Venezuela has experienced unprecedented socio-economic and political decline in recent decades. This collapse has generated a complex humanitarian crisis of epic proportions, the largest in the Americas in the last 50 years, characterised by rampant hyperinflation, food and medicine shortages, the forcible displacement of almost 8 million people, and a significant erosion of democratic institutions. These issues have local and international implications where different sources of risk and resilience combine to impact on stability and development. This article details how the dimensions of fragility are manifesting themselves in Venezuelan society and being experienced by Venezuelans during the current crises.

Political fragility

Political fragility in Venezuela manifests itself in the erosion of the rule of law, the concentration of power in the hands of a few, and the lack of checks and balances. It has been a determining factor in the collapse of democratic institutions and in the deterioration of the quality of life of Venezuela’s citizens. The manipulation of public powers that lack independence, the alteration of the constitutional order and the restriction of fundamental freedoms have undermined confidence in the political system and generated deep repression in Venezuelan society. The resulting political situation has made national dialogue difficult and prevented finding consensual solutions to the country's problems.

The militarisation of power has been another key element in Venezuela's political fragility. The growing influence of the armed forces, politicised in violation of the constitution, in the country's political and economic life has weakened civilian institutions and increased authoritarianism. Dependence on the state apparatus and political clientelism have been used as tools to maintain social control and guarantee the loyalty of the armed forces since Chavez’s era. This situation has generated a deep distrust in institutions and limited the possibility of a democratic transition.

The consequences of political fragility in Venezuela have been devastating. The humanitarian crisis, massive population displacement and regional destabilisation are just some of the most obvious manifestations of this problem. In 2024, the Venezuelan regime broke relations with its close allies in the region including Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico and with other countries such as Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and the United States and has threatened to break relations with still others. In addition, it has besieged diplomatic offices in the country, among them the embassy of Argentina, denying them access to water, food and electricity and preventing free transit for asylum seekers they are sheltering, in violation of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic offices; they even use snipers in nearby houses as a pressure measure (Singer, 2024[28]). The Venezuelan government’s loss of international legitimacy has isolated the country and made international co-operation difficult. To overcome this crisis, a process of democratic transition is necessary to reestablish the rule of law, promote national reconciliation and guarantee respect for human rights.

Authoritarianism and repression

The consolidation of a dictatorship regime has led to political persecution, the arbitrary detention of opponents and the restriction of civil liberties, by its strict definition it is qualified as such (Bobbio, 1998[29]). On 28 July 2024, presidential elections were held, and even though candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia won with 67% of the votes (BBC, 2024[30]), the Maduro regime refused to make the voting records public and Maduro declared himself the winner, generating repression of dissidents and citizens who demanded that the results be respected. The ballots collected by thousands of citizens show the clear victory of González Urrutia and are currently in the custody of the president of Panama after having been verified by a dozen leaders in the region. To date, almost 2 400 political prisoners are being held in Venezuela (Gaviña, 2023[31]). Among them are children and people with disabilities or serious health conditions who are without access to medical care. In El Helicoide, the largest torture centre in the country, some detainees have died under mysterious circumstances, some showing clear signs of torture (Gaviña, 2023[31]).

Weakening of institutions

The judicial system, the legislative branch and electoral bodies have been co-opted by the government, which has undermined the separation of powers and transparency. The branches of the judiciary, headed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, have been the executing arm of commando operations to persecute, imprison and create cases of political origin against opponents, citizens, human rights defenders and humanitarian workers on the premise they committed treason or terrorism, without proper access to justice. The National Electoral Council, another of the public powers, endorsed Maduro's re-election claim without asking for proof and, in parallel, created the so-called justices of the peace to extend its control over future electoral results to community levels for each sector and street in the country. The legislative branch has implemented numerous laws to prevent the functioning of non-profit organisations, control humanitarian actions and threaten anyone who publicly voices support for economic or diplomatic sanctions against the government, with a punishment of up to 30 years in prison.

Social fragility

The social crisis in Venezuela is characterised by deep inequality, a high rate of poverty and a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. The main indicators of this fragility are as follows:

Food insecurity. Millions of Venezuelans suffer from hunger and malnutrition, which has generated an unprecedented health crisis. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food recently reported that 82% of Venezuelans live in poverty and 53% in extreme poverty (UN, 2024[32]). Children and older people suffer the greatest impact, evident in signs of stunting and worsening diseases such as diabetes and cancer (Sociedad Anticancerosa de Venezuela, 2024[33]).

Health crisis. The health system has collapsed, leading to an increase in preventable diseases and a decrease in life expectancy. Amid a serious humanitarian crisis, 88% of the population depends on a public health system that has lost 80% of its capacity. The few transplant units along with specialised cancer care, dialysis and other services do not operate consistently and are inaccessible to most citizens. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States has received 100 requests for “precautionary measures”, and some of their beneficiaries have died while waiting for action (CEPAZ, 2024[34]). These precautionary measures are a protection mechanism of the IACHR through which it requests a state to protect one or more people who are in a serious and urgent situation of suffering irreparable harm.

Mass displacement. The crisis has forced millions of Venezuelans to leave the country in search of better living conditions, generating one of the largest migration crises in the region. The Interagency Platform Response for Venezuelans estimates that 7.8 million Venezuelans have left the country, according to official data (Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2024[35]). Coalition for Venezuela estimates that at least 8.1 million have left, which would make this the largest refugee crisis in the world without armed conflict. In response to the strong repression in the country following the presidential elections, there was a fivefold increase in border crossings into Brazil, and it is estimated that by mid-2025 the total number of displaced persons will have increased to at least 10.4 million, according to the Delphos Institute (CEPyG UCAB, 2024[36]).

Security fragility

Security fragility in Venezuela manifests itself in increasing crime, violence and citizen insecurity. The main factors that contribute to this situation are as follows:

Disarticulation of the security forces and irregular armed groups. The police and the armed forces have been used for political purposes, which has weakened their capacity to guarantee citizen security, and the proliferation of irregular armed groups has generated a climate of violence and undermined the rule of law. Both developments have been documented in reports of crimes against humanity by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (CEPyG UCAB, 2024[36]).

Drug and arms trafficking. There has been a significant increase in drug and arms trafficking that has financed illegal armed groups and destabilised the region. Drug trafficking is the leading illicit activity, with Venezuela going from a country of cocaine transit to a country of cocaine production, according to investigations by Insight Crime (2024[37]). In the most impoverished areas of the country, the presence of human trafficking and smuggling networks has grown since these networks in France and Spain were dismantled in recent operations.

Environmental fragility

The irrational exploitation of natural resources, deforestation and pollution have aggravated the environmental crisis in Venezuela. The loss of biodiversity has led to the destruction of ecosystems, mainly the loss of endemic species, and has jeopardised long-term sustainability. Venezuela lost its last glacier as well as more than 7 million hectares of natural cover, and illegal mining has put at risk the biodiversity of Canaima, its most fragile national park that is home to the oldest mountains in the world. The Orinoco Mining Arc project, covering an area of almost 112 000 square kilometres, exploits minerals – mainly gold, which has caused poisoning and mercury contamination in rivers and Indigenous communities in the south of the country. The damage caused by the extraction is irreversible.

In coastal areas, the presence of the unomia coral (Unomia stolonifera), an invasive species, has devastated at least 700 hectares of seabed, and while national authorities detected it in 2011, no efforts have been made to combat it, leading to the loss of endemic species. The archipelagos of Los Roques and La Tortuga are some of the most fragile ecosystems but, despite being national parks, parts of their land have been devastated for the construction of airstrips or mansions awarded to high-ranking generals in Venezuela (Guerrero, 2024[38]). According to the Red Book of Venezuelan Fauna, there are at least 288 threatened species in one of the most megadiverse countries in the world (Libro rojo de especies amenazadas, 2020[39]).

Undermining resilience to empower a coup: How Nigerien coup leaders suppressed civil society to strengthen military control

The July 2023 coup d'état in Niger, orchestrated by soldiers of the presidential guard, followed coups d'état in Mali (2020) and Burkina Faso (2020 and 2022), creating significant risks for Nigerien civil society.2

Before the coup in Niger, although there were certain regulatory constraints and state control had increased, amendments had been introduced to revise legislation, which fostered a modest climate of dialogue. The presidential administration, emphasising dialogue with civil society and political actors, sought to improve interactions through frequent meetings to promote collaboration rather than conflict. Despite these efforts to engage in dialogue, some demonstrations and civil society initiatives were banned, and attempts by civil society to organise rallies often ended with arrests. In addition, a revision of the laws governing non-governmental organisations and associations was underway before the coup, with the aim of increasing state control over them.

The coup led to the immediate suspension of the constitution, restricting the fundamental legal frameworks of civil society and reinstating strict legal provisions, including on cybersecurity. For example, the cybercrime law, which had been relaxed, was restored to its original version, with the effect of limiting freedom of expression. Military authorities quickly banned public demonstrations, leading to arrests of those who tried to organise them. The post-coup climate is described as an environment of fear and intimidation with severely limited space for free expression. The reintroduction of restrictive laws strengthened military control over freedom of association and expression.

Civil society organisations continue to operate where possible despite the restrictions in place. However, demonstrations remain prohibited, and there are strict controls over humanitarian actions, including a requirement to obtain authorisation to travel. The decentralised administrative structure that allowed local municipalities a certain degree of autonomy has been reorganised. Mayors and local council leaders were replaced by delegated administrators, most of them military personnel, which consolidated military control over various administrative levels. Soldiers were also appointed to positions of responsibility in different sectors, thus changing the functioning of the administration. These changes have led to more rigid interaction between citizens and the state, with the military presence reshaping Niger's civic life and governance.

From the point of view of donors and international partners, the rupture has been significant. After the coup, many donors suspended their activities, distanced themselves from local civil society, and were sometimes surprised to discover that some local organisations did not necessarily share their democratic values. Donors, particularly Western countries, have appeared hesitant, seeking to balance their strategic interests in the region with the need to preserve relations with the junta. Some donors were caught in their own traps; they did not see the coup d'état coming and had encouraged the country to adopt a purely security approach to development. These donors were mainly occupied with their own interests, which were not necessarily aligned with those of local civil society, and as a result, a climate of distrust and distance has grown up between a part of civil society and donors.

The coup also created a diplomatic dilemma, as donors have attempted to maintain their influence without compromising their values or encouraging the junta's authoritarian tendencies. Anti-imperialist and sovereigntist narratives emerged that characterised relations with Western powers as subordination. Overall, the same Western actors are present as well as the Russians, who continue to be involved mainly in the security sector rather than in direct support for civil society. China, for its part, mainly stresses economic co-operation. The emphasis of these partnerships remains state-centric, contrasting with the priorities of Western donors, which traditionally include support for civil society and development projects.

The evolving political economy of Sudan amid conflict

Yasir Zaidan (University of Washington)

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has profoundly reshaped the country’s political and economic landscape. Countrywide, more than 15 000 people have been killed, more than 10 million have been displaced and an estimated 15.8 million are in need of humanitarian aid (International Rescue Committee, 2024[40]). Sudan is classified by the OECD as experiencing extreme fragility, and the OECD multidimensional fragility framework identifies severe fragility across all six dimensions. This fragility is especially visible in Khartoum, Sudan’s traditional economic and manufacturing hub, which has been devasted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since the war began in April 2023. This destruction has led to a forced exodus of capital and skilled labour to the northern and eastern states, where economic transformations are taking root, including growth in the service sector. Despite Sudan’s deepening instability and the catastrophic impact of armed conflict, these changes reveal an evolving economic structure that may hold the potential for new regional development.

Amid the scale and horror of destruction, it is easy to miss the shifting political economy dynamics. The relocation of capital and expertise to less-affected regions has generated new economic opportunities, presenting both hope and significant obstacles. This article examines the potential for a nascent middle class to drive transformation in the face of severe challenges. The chaos has depleted the savings and assets of Sudan’s previous middle class, for example, and the continued conflict poses a threat to any budding recovery. While these shifts could lay the groundwork for political and economic reorganisation, and potentially peace, their sustainability depends on a balanced response encompassing security, economic and social interventions supported by effective policy.

Shifting economic centres and the potential for a new middle class

The movement of displaced professionals and entrepreneurs seeking safer environments outside of Khartoum has created new regional hubs in the northern and eastern regions and stimulated growth in a variety of sectors. Airports in Port Sudan, Dongola and Kassala have opened to support this increased movement and shipping demand. New services, retail businesses and small industries are emerging in these areas, potentially giving rise to a middle class that can drive future economic and social changes.

This emerging middle class could indicate a critical socio-economic shift, but its future remains precarious. The destruction of Khartoum led to significant losses for the established middle class, as savings were depleted and assets were looted or destroyed. However, businesses relocating to Port Sudan and the northern states are beginning to reopen their branches in these areas. During my recent visit to Sudan in November 2024, I observed that banks have resumed operations in safer areas, and online banking, primarily through the widely used Bankak application from the Bank of Khartoum, remains resilient. Telecom services have also moved their headquarters to Port Sudan and are now fully functional in safe areas of northern and eastern states. The unprecedented demand for housing has created opportunities for real estate and construction, benefiting regions with high inflows of displaced people who cannot leave Sudan. While the government plans to replace currency notes (due to the RSF’s destruction of the central bank and printing facilities), these measures alone are insufficient to sustain economic recovery. Without adequate support and protection, the development of this new economic base risks stalling before it can contribute to Sudan’s recovery.

Comprehensive interventions for long-term stability and growth

Achieving Sudan’s recovery requires a multidimensional approach incorporating security, economic and social strategies. Post-conflict recovery in other countries such as Lebanon, Liberia and Rwanda highlights, in different ways, the need to integrate these strategies for lasting stability. The political economy of war recovery suggests that any durable peace must address security while fostering economic empowerment and social cohesion.

Security interventions

Security is fundamental to Sudan’s stability. Without a secure environment, economic and social interventions cannot succeed. In the first instance, efforts must focus on securing safe areas currently hosting displaced people and stabilising active conflict zones to provide immediate relief and set the stage for broader recovery. Secure zones for displaced populations could involve creating safety corridors and bolstering security forces to protect civilians. Stabilising war zones requires a blend of military and peacebuilding strategies to ensure humanitarian aid and safety for local populations. Stability can also be achieved through both localised and broader security efforts, even in active conflict zones (Mukhopadhyay, 2014[41]). An example is the Al Salam Hospital in Soba, south of Khartoum, which continues providing lifesaving services and receives medical aid from Port Sudan despite being in an RSF-controlled areas. Security and safety are foundational for economic and social development, as instability derails intervention efforts (Collier, 2007[42]). By securing key areas, Sudan can prevent conflict spillovers, reduce displacement, and build a foundation for resilient social and economic structures.

Economic interventions

From a political economy standpoint, post-conflict economic policies should support broad-based growth rather than enrich elites. Emphasising equitable economic strategies that empower local actors and build domestic capacity is one (often overlooked) option (Berdal, 2009[43]). In Sudan, this may involve investing in decentralised infrastructure projects that support emerging regional hubs in the northern and eastern regions. Infrastructure projects such as railways, airports and highways are essential for these zones to connect growing agricultural and small business activities. Support for small and medium-sized enterprises could stimulate job creation and economic resilience, reinforcing the safety and prosperity of these areas. International financial assistance, as seen in Rwanda’s recovery, has been shown to bolster resilience when strategically managed. For Sudan, a mix of grants, low-interest loans, and technical assistance could aid infrastructure rebuilding, agricultural support and economic diversification, provided funds are managed transparently and directed towards projects benefiting the broader population.

Social interventions

Long-term stability also demands that the social ramifications of prolonged conflict be addressed, including how economic and political institutions shape social stability (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009[44]). Policies fostering social cohesion are vital for Sudan, especially given the fragmentation from conflict. Education and healthcare programmes targeting regional disparities also are crucial to ensure that displaced people have equal access to services. Health programmes not only enhance the quality of life but also reduce the social grievances that fuel conflict. Community-driven development initiatives empower local communities and mitigate intergroup tensions, as shown in South Sudan and Uganda.

Political and institutional reforms

Comprehensive recovery also requires institutional support for governance reforms. What Paris (2024, p. 2168[45]) calls institutionalisation before liberalisation – that is, ensuring a functioning state for a phase of post-conflict transition that can ultimately lead to a political system capable of managing conflicts peacefully – appears adaptable to Sudan, which will have to address the root causes of conflict and the realities of new socio-economic dynamics. Sudan’s government could strengthen institutions that promote transparency, accountability and a fair political process, thus addressing longstanding grievances. A decentralised approach could empower regional governments, bridging disparities across Sudan's regions. Policies promoting citizen participation and inclusive governance are essential for building state trust and credibility.

Looking ahead: The need for a co-ordinated approach

The experiences of other post-conflict countries show Sudan’s need for a co-ordinated approach. Recognising the conflict economy that has emerged, security interventions must enable economic activity to resume, and inclusive economic policies can help prevent inequalities that fuel conflict. Addressing social needs and ensuring equitable access to services will build cohesion, in turn supporting a sustainable political settlement. Sudan’s future stability and political agreements depend on such interventions, as stability, economic development and social justice are inseparable.

The conflict in Sudan has posed unprecedented challenges but also led to significant transformation. Despite asset losses and ongoing conflict threat, the evolving political economy presents an opportunity to rebuild Sudan as a resilient, inclusive society capable of supporting future growth and peace. A strategy balancing security, economic and social interventions to support new economic hubs could provide a path toward stability.

The challenge of turning the corner from fragility to resilience: A perspective on fragility in Timor-Leste

Joao M. Saldanha3 (Joao Saldanha University)

Timor-Leste is one of a sizeable group of contexts that have consistently experienced medium to high fragility due to the combined effects of unstable economic growth, emigration, and lack of political and social cohesion (vulnerabilities in governance and communal tensions). Among the main sources of fragility has been its overdependence on the now-dwindling Petroleum Fund to finance the state budget. Climate change could be another source of fragility because Timor-Leste is prone to natural disasters. In addition, the flow of young people to other countries may result in a brain drain that would be counter-productive to Timor-Leste’s development in the future.

Key metrics of fragility in Timor-Leste

Debt

The state budget has experienced exponential growth since 2008, with a particularly sharp rise in public transfers. Timor-Leste has relied on its sovereign wealth fund to finance the state budget while also maintaining low public and external debt. It has no domestic sovereign debt. But with domestic revenues declining, the government has turned to external debt to finance infrastructure and social programmes. The government recently stopped (i.e. postponed) three debt schemes from the World Bank. Between 2021 and 2022, external debt rose by 3.98% from USD 278.6 million, or 14.0% of GDP to USD 289.7 million, or 15.2% of GDP. As Timor-Leste’s debt-to-GDP ratio is relatively low – it is three times higher in some other contexts and dropped to 14.0% in 2023 – the country is not fragile from a debt perspective. However, its heavy reliance on the Petroleum Fund is a concern. Government revenues have been flat at about 15% of GDP for more than two decades, and most of these revenues are derived from projects related to the state budget. The Petroleum Fund, which had USD 18 million in 2024, will run out in less than a decade unless new production from other fields in Timor-Leste are discovered and exploited, increasing Timor-Leste’s exposure to fragility.

Conflict and violence

Overall, Timor-Leste is generally stable, having maintained low levels of conflict and violence since the politico-military crisis of 2006. In this sense, it is not fragile when assessed against the metric of conflict and violence. The last relatively significant event occurred during the 2006 politico-military crisis, which led to more than 200 000 refugees, tested the nascent democratic institutions of independent Timor-Leste and caused the economy to contract.

Women’s rights and power imbalance

Women in Timor-Leste do not have much power in decision making. One example relates to the delivery of babies. This is often decided by in-laws rather than by the women who carry the babies. Women are economically dependent on men, which places women in a weak position in discussions with men. Women also tend to have less education than men, which also contributes to the power imbalance. Likewise, there is a salary gap between women and men even when they hold similar positions. Finally, under current social norms, employers prefer to hire men because they believe women will take time off (up to three months or in some cases longer) after childbirth. There are efforts underway to correct the gender imbalance.

Governance

Timor-Leste’s institutional set-up consists of four branches: the presidency, the national parliament, the government and the courts. This democratic arrangement has already survived five tests, namely large demonstrations by the Catholic churches in 2005, the political-military crisis in 2006, the political deadlock of 2017 and 2018, and the COVID-19 pandemic. These crises did not set back the democratic system. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2022 and 2023, respectively, have stabilised the situation up to the present. Thus, governance is improving, although questions remain around the delivery of basic services, which could be a source of fragility.

Political economy

The state dominates the country’s political economy and through the Petroleum Fund can dictate almost all activities in Timor-Leste. Markets and the private sector function, but the prices of construction materials and of consumer goods and services are mostly determined by the state budget. Market demand derived from the consumption of goods and services by the nearly 1.4 million people in Timor-Leste plays a relatively minor role in both price setting and the overall economic behaviour of the country. Government expenditures are based on appropriations by the parliament and signed into law by the president. Government agencies draw up the draft budget, which is submitted to the parliament for approval.

One concern is that there is significant leakage of funds because the state spends a sizeable amount to import both intermediate and final goods and services. This results in a low multiplier effect of roughly 0.1, meaning that every USD 1.00 spent by the government creates only USD 0.10 in the economy, while in high-income countries the multiplier is closer to 4.0. Thus, if the Petroleum Fund goes dry and there are no other sources of revenue for the government, it could set off a political and economic crisis and become a source of fragility.

Corruption

Timor-Leste’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has improved by 7 points over the last 5 years and by 10 points over the last 11 years. Nevertheless, corruption persists in different areas of the government through price mark-ups. The risk areas are customs, procurement, public works and rice distribution. A high level of corruption can retard economic development. On average, Timor-Leste’s economic growth in the last two decades was only about 1.8%, generally too low to make a dent in poverty. Corruption also contributes to this mediocre progress. Therefore, corruption can also be a source of fragility in Timor-Leste in the future if the Petroleum Fund dries up without being replaced by other funds.

Poverty and inequality

Poverty levels have been stubbornly high at above 40% in the last two decades with no indication of a downward trend. No new poverty survey was conducted in 2024, and therefore it is not possible to gauge whether poverty levels have declined or remained high.

In terms of linking poverty to economic growth, a 1.0% increase in income can reduce poverty by 1.1% on average. This depends on the poverty line used, the level of inequality in a country and geographical location – that is, whether the country is in East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, or Eastern Europe. Timor-Leste’s government has launched several policy initiatives to reduce poverty, especially through cash transfers and in-kind support programmes. But their success is still limited, and they have not reduced poverty significantly.

Climate and environmental fragility

Timor-Leste is prone to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change. On 4 April 2021, for instance, Tropical Cyclone Seroja caused major damage, with torrential rains washing away roads, houses, and other properties in cities and towns across Timor-Leste. Among the consequences were a contraction of the economy, the destruction of rice fields and a distortion of the supply chain in many cities. As climate change and the environment are the major sources of fragility in Timor-Leste, special attention must be paid to these now and in the future.

Migration and forced displacement

Regarding the lifetime migration ratio within Timor-Leste, the populations of all municipalities except Dili are declining. The biggest of these decreases is in Viqueque, which has lost more than 20% of its population; the population of Dili, on the other hand, has grown by 36.9%. Overall, Timor-Leste’s net internal lifetime migration is zero, i.e. no loss or gain of population. However, disaggregating population shifts by municipalities shows stark differences across the country. Dili, the capital, receives internal migration from all other cities and towns in Timor-Leste. External migration is mostly characterised by the outflow of youth to other countries, a trend that began with the 2006 crisis and continues today. At the beginning, young people tended to go to Ireland and the United Kingdom through Portugal in search of jobs and opportunities. More recently, people have migrated to Australia and Korea because these two countries also opened up to unskilled workers from Timor-Leste. The outflow is expected to continue, as jobs and opportunities are limited in Timor-Leste. This trend may become a source of fragility for Timor-Leste, as it leads to brain drain.

Perspectives on donor competition

Development co-operation providers have played a critical role in the reconstruction and development of Timor-Leste since the destruction in 1999. Major donor expenditures were recorded between 1999 and 2005, in the early years during the rebuilding of Timor-Leste and then through the transition period under UN administration before oil and gas revenues from exploitation in the Timor Sea started flowing into the newly established Petroleum Fund. Minor differences aside, donors and the government have had good relations over the last 25 years. Therefore, donor engagement is not a source of fragility in Timor-Leste, especially as the volume of support has stabilised at about USD 200 million each year since 2008.

Geopolitical and regional politics

While Timor-Leste faces a delicate situation in terms of its relationship with the outside world, it has maintained good relations with its big neighbours Australia and Indonesia and with the major world powers of China, the European Union and the United States. Australia and Timor-Leste achieved a permanent sea boundary settlement and are in negotiations for the development of the Greater Sunrise gas field, which would provide significant revenues for Timor-Leste in the future. There are residual issues between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, and while they are not significant, they may need to be addressed. Relations with Indonesia have been cordial since reconciliation, and Indonesia has been the main proponent for Timor-Leste to be a member of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). Timor-Leste’s imminent membership in ASEAN will also provide a cushion in its relations with the major world powers and with its immediate neighbours. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste will still need to continuously improve its relations with major powers to address geopolitical concerns, as such concerns could become a source of tensions when major powers, especially China and the United States, enter into conflict. Hopefully, Timor-Leste can play a role in diffusing those tensions by promoting good relations with both countries and with Australia and Indonesia, its immediate neighbours.

Value implications of fragility

Timor-Leste’s fragility profile has not changed over the past few years. For it to decisively turn the corner to more sustainable development and peace, addressing the drivers and sources of fragility identified in this article will be essential. From public finances and preparedness to education and peacebuilding, Timor-Leste will require appropriate and sustained support to build resilience and secure its future.

Addressing Somalia’s multidimensional fragility through macroeconomic policy and actions

H.E. Bihi Iman Egeh (Minister of Finance for the Federal Republic of Somalia)

Somalia has experienced one of the most difficult and prolonged conflicts in modern history, one which we are only starting to fully recover from today. We first entered into civil war in 1991, and the first internationally recognised government was formed in September 2012, when the current president, H.E. Dr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was elected to his first term. Yet, only 13 years later, Somalia is a story of reform, resilience and hope.

After nearly a decade of implementing stringent fiscal and socio-economic reforms as well as delivering on over 90 key benchmarks from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and many more, including from the World Bank and the European Union, Somalia achieved debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in December 2023 on its first attempt. The most significant dividend from the HIPC Completion Point was debt relief amounting to USD 4.5 billion of Somalia’s unsustainable bilateral and multilateral debts at the end of 2023. This brought Somalia’s debt obligations from 64% to less than 6% of gross domestic product (GDP), or approximately USD 557 million.

The historic debt relief journey has normalised relations for the first time in over 30 years with international financial institutions including the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank. It also helped Somalia build an important track record of reform execution that has made available more grants-based financial resources from such institutions and donors to utilise for the key priorities of reducing extreme poverty, creating jobs, enhancing social protection and growing the economy.

The Somali government’s successful economic reforms have resulted in increased domestic revenues, which rose from just 1.2% in 2013 to 2.7% in 2023. This reform trend is continuing, with a clear focus on tax policy and administration modernisation, including increasing the use of innovative digitalisation and public-private dialogue to enhance transparency, accountability and public trust. Moreover, Somalia’s financial country systems are improving at a steady pace with the World Bank, the European Union and other major donors having channelled over USD 2 billion through these thus far. This represents a substantial scale-up from the first USD 50 000 deposited in Somalia’s Treasury Single Account over a decade ago.

Expenditure on basic social services has also increased from roughly USD 8 per person in 2013 to USD 48 in 2023, and the Somali federal government employed 6 000 new teachers for the first time in the last two budget cycles. Moreover, we are making strong progress in further strengthening public financial management, deepening financing, and improving data for decision making and policy action as well as enhancing the private investment environment. These achievements are historic and clearly demonstrate that, despite all the other external challenges and existing multidimensional fragilities identified in the OECD fragility framework, transformative objectives can be achieved in Somalia with national unity, determination and effective international support.

Somalia’s fragility and vulnerability: Navigating post-HIPC challenges

Even with all the successes we have achieved so far, Somalia continues to experience extreme levels of fragility. In fact, our experience is that debt relief does not automatically translate into more fiscal space to invest in resilience building. The post-HIPC environment poses great challenges for countries like ours because our growing domestic revenues are still insufficient to cover the costs of running government, providing basic public services at scale and tackling poverty, which over half of our population is experiencing. The revenue mobilisation challenges are various, and among the most important are a small tax base, high informality across the economy, heavy dependence on customs despite a larger percentage of revenues now coming from inland sources and non-tax revenue, and a weak social contract owing to the more than two decades of civil strife. The reality is that our tax-to-GDP ratio is currently about 3%, among the lowest in the world. We are working tirelessly to increase this ratio each year through our national Medium-term Revenue Roadmap by expanding the tax base through a simpler and more progressive tax system, enforcing compliance, and supporting businesses to shift away from informal employment. But we also know reforms take time to produce results. Consistency, commitment and patience are a must for us and for our international partners.

Somalia continues to grapple with multiple external shocks such as the devastating impact of climate change, regional conflicts and the Red Sea crisis while also fighting international terrorism with limited domestic and external resources and steadily progressing in the political and statebuilding processes. In between recurrent droughts and floods, the Somali government has been actively fighting the international Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab. There have been major gains in liberating multiple cities, towns and villages once under the terrorists’ control, and the government has taken swift actions to stabilise these regions with security, law and order, and the provision of basic public services. The government is also working with its international partners to further strengthen the capacity of its national army to finalise the remaining process of taking full security control of the country. While fighting the remaining pockets of terrorism in Somalia is costly, the terrorist group’s heavy defeats are spurring hope and economic activity that will build resilience across many newly liberated communities and across the country.

Building resilience

Somalia’s preparedness for shocks and the impacts of multidimensional fragility is improving, with more national institutions now established, organised, and collaborating in terms of data collection, sharing and dissemination. These activities are also guided by the new National Transformation Plan that our government is working on with a whole-of-country, society and systems approach.

However, our data collection institutions are still at a nascent stage and are actively supported by bilateral and multilateral partners, including international financial institutions, individual bilateral donors and even the private sector. This collective approach is not only improving our access and ability to use data to inform key decisions. It is also enhancing national readiness and actions after major incidents such as floods and droughts.

Escaping Somalia’s existing multidimensional fragility requires predictable, long-term external financing as we move forward with our government’s efforts to embed and deepen our economic reform successes with a new three-year IMF successor programme and to grow the economy. We have urged bilateral and multilateral partners addressing fragility to be optimistic and ambitious and to truly focus dedicated resources on supporting the most fragile states with tailored, affordable and accessible financing for their unique resilience-building needs, including for social protection, education, health, job creation, infrastructure and energy.

A timely opportunity for partners is to use the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA)21 replenishment to scale up grant financing for fragile countries with limited fiscal space and low debt-carrying capacity such as Somalia. All development partners, dedicated climate funds and international financial institutions must then follow up by scaling grant-based climate financing for adaptation in the most vulnerable countries through the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance, which will hopefully replace the USD 100 billion annual pledge under the Paris Agreement that is expiring in 2025.

It is not feasible for governments in our uniquely challenging situation to continually make the painful policy trade-offs between financing urgent life-saving basic public services to build resilience and responding to the impacts of deep structural external shocks like climate change from meagre domestic resources.

The Somalia government has placed private sector-led development at the heart of our post-debt relief priorities. Somalia, with the longest coastline in Africa and one of the longest in the world, has enormous potential as the gateway of trade between Africa, the Middle East, the Far East and Australasia. We can also become a major player in agriculture, livestock, the blue economy and energy in Africa and globally. Somalia also has substantial untapped human potential. In addition to its strategic location, it has a dynamic young population and a diaspora of more than 2 million across the globe. With these assets and its agricultural and livestock capabilities, Somalia can also become a food-secure nation as well as a regional logistics hub to facilitate global trade. Hence, our government is working tirelessly to create a more conducive investment environment through legislation and enhanced public-private dialogue.

To advance Somalia’s trade ambitions, the government has joined the East Africa Community and is actively working towards World Trade Organization membership. These two foreign and economic policy endeavours will ensure Somalia’s connectivity and centrality to regional trade, economic diplomacy and stability and create national, regional and global opportunities for job creation and growth. Furthermore, these efforts will enhance Somalia’s participation in the Horn of Africa Initiative. Supported by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Union, this initiative aims to foster regional connectivity and resilience through investments in infrastructure and human capacity development.

In conclusion, for a fragile, recovering post-conflict state, Somalia and its people are incredibly resilient and determined to build a better future for themselves that is characterised by inclusive politics, security, trade and economic growth. However, the existing global financial architecture must also be redesigned in a way that supports and rewards this hope and resilience as well as the long-term efforts to build a sustainable, prudent economic base for growth and opportunities at greater scale in fragile states today.

Leveraging the private sector to build resilience: The example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Based on OECD interviews with Paul Ouma and Jules Ndambu, CrossBoundary Advisory

Lessons for developing private sectors as a source of resilience

The private sector can play a role in creating economic opportunities for populations living in conflict-affected areas. It is important for donors to increasingly complement humanitarian emergency programmes with economic development programmes that can help address the root cause of the conflict. Companies that work in these kinds of settings require financial and technical support. It is difficult for them to access these types of support on the investment side as there is always a high perception of risk – and sometimes that perception is overstated. For example, businesses in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been quite resilient, and there are cases of companies active in that area for decades. However, they have had limited access to capital, technical support and international best practices.

Impact investors have a role to play. In Bukavu, South Kivu, we have worked with a company called Pharmakina SA,4 which is the major quinine producer in Central Africa. Through support provided by an investment facilitation mandate, an impact investor committed capital and took a majority stake in the firm, effectively revitalising the company financially and operationally and developing an expansion plan. This is a good example of an investment that will create new jobs and have significant positive effects on the value chain of suppliers to the company.

Business challenges and opportunities in fragile and underserved markets

In fragile and underserved markets, risks and opportunities are two sides of the same coin, and the private sector can bring real, substantive benefits. Investment in sources of sustainable development in the DRC is essential. To unlock growth, six entry points for investment stand out.

First, investing in strategically important infrastructure is both a need and an opportunity in a country with a sizeable extractives sector. The DRC, which is the world’s tenth-biggest country and has a landmass more than four times the size of metropolitan France (My Life Elsewhere, 2025[46]), has seen decades of low public investment in both the maintenance of existing infrastructure and the development of new infrastructure. Existing infrastructure is under ever-increasing pressure due to significant demographic growth. This lack of critical infrastructure in the DRC limits economic, societal and human progress, which are key points of resilience. Roads, airports, bridges, digital infrastructure and sporting facilities are massively underdeveloped.

Second, there are enduring challenges in the energy sector, though these also create opportunities, especially in renewable energy. As of 2022, little more than 20% of the population in the DRC had access to electricity (World Bank, 2024[47]). The electricity sector was liberalised in 2014, but the rural electrification promotion agency ANSER (Agence Nationale d’Electrification et des Services Energétiques en milieux rural et périurbain) and the electricity sector regulator ARE (Autorité de Régulation de l’Electricité) were put in place only in 2021. Significant opportunities exist to use this progress to catalyse growth and human development, but further investments in electricity generation are needed to help address the large energy deficits felt by industry and currently provided by generators run on fossil fuels. According to data from mining companies, the mining sector alone is running an energy deficit of more than 1.2 gigawatts (GW), projected to reach 5 GW by 2030.

Third, there is significant untapped potential in the agricultural sector, for commercial use and food security. Food security in the DRC is critically low. The country currently imports over USD 3 billion worth of food annually (Tschilombo, 2024[48]). The dominant form of agriculture is subsistence agriculture, with a low degree of mechanisation. Investment in both consumption-oriented food crops and export-oriented perennial cash crops, like coffee or cocoa, could provide vital stimuli for the agriculture sector through positive spillovers to other agri-sectors. The recent revival of the coffee and cocoa sectors in the DRC points to the sector's potential.

Fourth, deepening the financial services sector, both banking and non-banking can support a more dynamic private sector ecosystem. Domestic credit to the private sector Is 7% of GDP, one of the lowest rates in sub-Saharan Africa, representing both a challenge to businesses and a highly attractive investment opportunity. Homegrown financial institutions especially, such as commercial banks, have the potential to generate financial returns from a low basis. Investing in the financial services sector to deepen the banking system and develop a greater range of financial services and intermediaries beyond traditional banks can help enable a more dynamic private sector ecosystem.

Fifth, the DRC has the potential to be a leader in the green transition. The country is the world’s largest cobalt producer, home to 74% of the world’s mine production and 55% of world reserves as of 2023. It is also home to 41% of the world’s tantalum production and a significant producer of copper and tin. There is an opportunity to build value chains and move into higher-value activities, thus growing processing capacities. Achieving this requires the aforementioned investments in electricity and infrastructure.

Finally, a better business environment is needed for the DRC to attract investment in sustainable development at scale. The general business environment is not conducive to the functioning or growth of the private sector and presents a cross-cutting issue. For instance, a streamlined tax framework and a land policy (i.e. access or use rights) are needed. In the DRC, more than 90% of all cases going to court relate to disputes over land, and the associated delays disrupt business activity. A poorly functioning business environment can reinforce an uneven playing field, as it opens the possibility of prioritising or easing specific sectors or deals based on prospective returns rather than clear regulations.

Private sector development and conflict sensitivity

When looking at private sector development, immediate impacts such as job creation, tax revenue and profits matter. However, it is also essential to look at interactions between a potential investment and conflict dynamics, often related to actual or perceived situations of exclusion or marginalisation. This can occur around projects in the mining sector but can also happen, for example, in the agricultural sector. While land-intensive activities are often key potential sources of growth, they must be handled carefully, as disagreements over land ownership or use can also breed disputes. When local communities think that they are not benefiting from such activities and that the dividend is going elsewhere, this might pose a risk of conflict.

The relationship between investment and conflict is complex, and the dynamics are difficult to analyse. Having no investment is not always the better option, as the lack of investment and opportunity can exacerbate or create conflict – and this counterfactual needs to be considered. For instance, when a company goes bankrupt for lack of investment, it creates unemployment and could generate conditions that inflame conflict over contested economic resources or other income opportunities.

We at CrossBoundary Advisory have seen both sides of this complexity. With more than ten years of experience working in underserved markets, CrossBoundary Advisory provides contextual, tailored capital solutions, innovative project structuring, and expert advice to ambitious entrepreneurs, investors, corporations, governments and foundations. More than 80% of our team is based in the markets we serve. Our mission is to unlock capital for sustainable growth and strong returns in underserved markets, including fragile and post-conflict settings. We believe that blended finance can be a catalyst for systemic change in markets that are typically overlooked.

There are notable success stories – such as commercial farms that generate mutual benefits for both the company and the local community. However, there have also been instances where investments have led to significant challenges, damaging the company’s reputation and ultimately forcing investors to withdraw.

It is important to be careful about one-size-fits-all approaches. For instance, a large mining company might have the resources to collaborate with the local community and provide public goods and services to it. But small and mid-sized companies, even in the agriculture and mining sectors, might find it difficult to do the same. Trying to do everything by the same playbook that a larger company can follow could be overwhelming for a smaller company. In such cases, it is important to illustrate the benefits on the commercial side but also on the societal side of things. And as companies build their capacities, this hopefully gets ingrained in terms of how they function and operate as businesses and also has a demonstration effect for other companies, not only in a context like the DRC but also elsewhere.

Conflict sensitivity is equally crucial in non-commercial investments. In the DRC, for example, the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries has led to increased humanitarian assistance directed primarily towards these displaced populations. While such aid is essential, it can inadvertently create tensions with host communities that may feel overlooked, especially when they face similar socio-economic challenges. The Global Report 2022 of the UNHCR (2022[49]), the UN Refugee Agency, on the DRC highlights that in Angola, Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, 84 600 refugees from the DRC with specific needs received material non-cash support, and 1.1 million refugees and host community members accessed basic health services. This underscores the importance of inclusive investment strategies that address the needs of both refugees and host communities to prevent social tensions.

In contrast, the DRC’s Eastern Recovery Project (STEP)5, financed by the World Bank, demonstrates how inclusive programming can mitigate such challenges. This initiative emphasises the leadership of local and traditional authorities in fostering sustained refugee integration and inclusion. By involving host communities in decision-making processes and ensuring that development investments benefit all residents, the project helps reduce potential conflicts and promotes social cohesion. This approach illustrates the effectiveness of integrated development strategies in regions affected by displacement.

To ensure a conflict-sensitive do-no-harm approach, it is essential to prioritise transparency, accountability and the fair distribution of resources. These elements can help mitigate conflict and support peace-positive investments. It is important as well to integrate the local community and ensure a cohesive collaboration between its members and the company. Moreover, reinvesting the tax revenue from private companies wisely is paramount. Building local infrastructure and diversifying the economy can contribute to a peaceful setting as communities can see tangible benefits from private sector operations such as preserving and transmitting wealth to future generations.

Green transition and geopolitical shifts are creating new challenges and opportunities in fragile and underserved markets

One key trend that we see is the increasing demand for critical minerals for the renewable energy transition. This represents a great opportunity for the DRC given its large reserves of cobalt and other minerals.

If revenues from the exploitation of these reserves are invested well, they can help build local infrastructure, diversify the economy and preserve this mineral wealth for future generations. Consider the potential of the Congo Basin rainforest, the world’s second-largest tropical rainforest after the Amazon rainforest. It is the world’s largest carbon sink and can play a key role in the fight against global warming. According to a Center for Global Development study, the forest removes 1.1 gigatonnes (gross) of carbon every year from the atmosphere, a service that is valued at USD 55 billion per year (Mitchell and Pleeck, 2022[50]). That is five times the DRC’s annual government budget. Projects around community forest conservation and reforestation of degraded land offer opportunities for carbon finance, leading to additional revenues for the DRC.

Another key trend is the evolving global economic and political landscape, which presents countries like the DRC with a valuable opportunity to diversify their trading partners. Not being reliant on one trading partner is a win-win situation. However, to fully capitalise on this opportunity, it is essential to establish a robust regulatory framework that ensures strict adherence to environmental, social and governance standards. Such a framework is critical to guaranteeing that investments and development efforts deliver equitable benefits, particularly for local communities, fostering sustainable and inclusive growth.

The role of development actors

Donors, development finance institutions (DFIs) and other development actors have an important role to play in developing the private sector and fostering investment in underserved markets. First, it is important that they both support the governments of the countries they work with, including the DRC, by providing technical assistance to implement key reforms and create an enabling business environment for private sector companies to operate in. Second, DFIs can provide blended capital to make transactions feasible through risk-sharing and first-loss facilities. A pertinent example is the Africa Resilience Investment Accelerator (ARIA), anchored by British International Investment and FMO, the Dutch DFI. Investing in fragile markets requires intentionality due to their higher risk perception and smaller ticket sizes relative to other markets. Without such intentionality, the focus will primarily be on larger investment tickets in more market-friendly environments where it is easier to make deals. ARIA’s mission, therefore, is to connect DFIs with investment opportunities in companies operating in fragile markets, especially those without a physical presence in these markets. ARIA provides DFIs’ investment teams with supplementary local knowledge, as the programme has investment professionals embedded in the target markets and supports them on deal origination and due diligence.

The DRC is a country full of opportunities and offers the potential for outsized impact and attractive returns for investors. If we asked for just one thing, it would be to see more risk appetite among investors and a smaller gap between the real risks and how investors perceive the risks. We observe a lot of hesitancy in terms of project size and sector as well as of actual and perceived risks. But in these fragile and underserved markets, a small investment size – be it USD 1 million or USD 20 million – can move the needle. Our work through DRC Invest Activity, a programme of the United States Agency for International Development, has facilitated more than USD 70 million of investment in the past two years. This demonstrates that even in challenging circumstances, including underserved agricultural value chains, it is possible to invest, have a decent return and make an impact. We at CrossBoundary will continue to build on this solid foundation – and we invite others to do the same.

Responding to deforestation and armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

Amin Awad (President of the Foundation Council, DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance)

Sub-Saharan African communities are facing a multidimensional crisis hinged at the intersection of climate and security. Deforestation, armed conflict, and a chronic lack of capacity within local and national forestry services, combined with the aggravating effects of climate change, continue to drive forced displacement at unprecedented levels. Host communities in sub-Saharan Africa rely heavily on forest resources like brushwood and charcoal for firewood and basic energy needs. The United Nations (UN) Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that, by 2050, 65% of the region will still depend on woodfuel for cooking (UN, 2019[51]). Already, mass deforestation combined with rapid urbanisation (OECD, 2022[52]) has led to a significant loss of biodiversity, as evidenced by the near-complete destruction of East and West African forests (Aleman, Jarzyna and Staver, 2018[53]).

Deforestation is only the tip of the iceberg: Low access to finance and weak governance systems have degraded national forestry services’ ability to cope with day-to-day work, let alone provide much-needed monitoring and oversight of large tracts of forest and savannah. This has contributed to the collapse of a fledgling agroforestry industry, inciting fierce competition between herders and farmers over meagre resources, including water and green pastures, and pushing people from their land.

Armed conflict is both a symptom and a cause of the diminishing forests. Forests provide a dual function for armed groups, serving as a staging ground for launching attacks and as a source of exploitable resources. Organised crime and the proliferation of violence have further eroded a strained social fabric, cultivated contempt and grievances between local communities, and uprooted families from their homes. This multidimensional crisis underscores the urgent need for host communities, displaced populations and returnees to collaborate in ways that promote environmental stewardship while fostering social and economic resilience.

Despite the complexity of the crisis, solutions do exist

A new sub-Saharan reforestation alliance is one such solution. Financed by multilateral donors, financial institutions, and environmental and developmental actors and with galvanising support from climate lobbies and advocacy groups, this alliance can become a model for regional forestry governance. With the right programming, finance and political support, a new sub-Saharan reforestation alliance can kick-start a development cycle by facilitating the return of millions of displaced persons to reclaimed forests, reviving local services and providing gainful employment in re-planting forests, restoring biodiversity and protecting wildlife sanctuaries. When it comes to policy co-ordination and convening power, the World Economic Forum (2025[54]) stands out as a prime example of how a successful alliance, in the form of public-private co-operation, can bring multiple regional actors beneath one banner for sustainable change.

Large-scale, paid voluntary service programmes in the environmental and agricultural sectors can also be part of the solution. Paid voluntary work would kick-start forest regeneration and build local capacity in organic and biodynamic farming, agroforestry and other proven nature-based solutions. By creating jobs within the local agroforestry sector, such a programme could better facilitate the return of the displaced persons by providing meaningful and gainful employment while simultaneously building hosting communities’ social and economic resilience.

The knock-on effects are manifold: By decongesting over-populated urban areas, kick-starting vibrant rural-urban connectivity, and re-forging meaningful connections between communities and the land, a co-ordinated reforestation programme can also help build solidarity and prevent the proliferation of armed groups, thereby empowering natural resource governance institutions. The Facility for Refugees, Migrants, Forced Displacement and Rural Stability (FARMS), an initiative of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (2023[55]), provides a practical example of how offering employment in sustainable land use and reforestation creates long-term job opportunities that benefit both displaced populations and local communities, thus promoting social and economic integration while contributing to environmental recovery.

Community and women-led reforestation initiatives can directly support those fragile and displaced communities most affected by deforestation and energy insecurity. Women play a central role as traditional managers of wood and energy supplies. For example, in West Africa, 80% of Benin’s population relies on firewood and charcoal for cooking, and women are primarily responsible for collecting and managing these resources (Global Forest Coalition, 2019[56]). The direct involvement of women will ensure equitable natural resource governance and support effective monitoring and income generation. Women’s active participation en masse in grassroots reforestation projects will also mutually reinforce their collective voice and their physical safety and protection.

Building capacity and skills within environmental services at the village, regional and national levels is essential to ensure effective natural resource governance. Without the know-how and the tools to plan and mobilise, effective governance and monitoring mechanisms will struggle to take off. National forest departments and environmental services must build operational capacity and resilience from within to sustain operations and prevent illegal logging while remaining sensitive to local demand and fragility. Once national frameworks are established and complemented by operational strategies that include field presence, then fully equipped forest rangers and technical staff can be deployed for reforestation and effective monitoring and protection. This will facilitate the conditions for economic growth and trust in domestic institutions.

Nurturing community resilience and reducing competition over increasingly scarce forest resources are essential and deserve a 360-degree stakeholder approach. Including community leaders of aggrieved groups, women and displaced communities in reconciliation and peace processes can generate much-needed legitimacy among local authorities, fostering a strong social contract. The Global EverGreening Alliance (2024[57]), the Great Green Wall of Africa (UN, 2024[58]), the Bonn Challenge (Restore our Future, 2020[59]) and the Trillion Trees (2024[60]) initiative are widely supported by DAC members and partners and offer insights into how reforestation can be achieved at scale.

Building on grassroots climate initiatives and associated consortia for reforestation will also support agroforestry initiatives, a vital tool in achieving greater food and energy security. This can encourage the rehabilitation and restoration of grassland, savannah and wildlife sanctuaries via controlled grazing, restore ecosystems, enhance habitat connectivity, and improve living conditions for fragile communities.

Reforestation at this scale invites development finance actors, climate lobbies and policy makers to lean into sustainable approaches, cohesion and resilience at the local, institutional and government levels. By leveraging Indigenous knowledge systems and women’s leadership at the grassroots level, development and finance actors can achieve more effective forestry governance, monitoring and stewardship of the land.

The time to address deforestation and forced displacement is now. By empowering local host communities, especially women, and strengthening forestry governance, reforestation efforts can regenerate ecosystems, reduce conflict and restore livelihoods while nurturing vital resources. Investing in these solutions will help displaced populations return to revitalised land while fostering peace and long-term stability.

Solomon Islands’ Local Climate Adaptive Living Facility: Making use of the provincial capacity development fund model to invigorate climate resilience

Wayne Ghemu,6 Momodou Swawaneh7 and Derek Futaiasi8 (Ministry of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening, Solomon Islands)

Solomon Islands is a stunning archipelagic nation neighbouring Papua New Guinea and nestled in the heart of the Western Pacific region. This remarkable country in the Pacific consists of a diverse array of islands, each with its own unique landscapes, cultures and ecosystems. Like many Pacific Island countries, it faces a multitude of challenges stemming from its geographical position, socio-economic conditions and political landscape (Dinnen, 2008[61]; Mcdonald, Miller and Smets, 2024[62]). According to the OECD fragility framework, the Solomon Islands experiences high fragility, with notable risks in the human and societal dimensions and severe fragility across the environmental dimension (OECD, 2025[63]). Additionally, 80% of the land is customary, and 68% of the population resides less than one kilometre from the coast, meaning most of the population is vulnerable to sea level rise, king tides and storm surges (World Bank Group, 2021[64]).

Climate change now constitutes a crisis

The Solomon Islands bears the brunt of climate change’s most severe and devastating impacts, which threaten not just the environment but also the livelihoods and cultural heritage of the islanders (Solomon Islands Government, 2023[65]). As one of the nations most vulnerable to climate impacts globally, Solomon Islands grapples with rising sea levels, increased frequency of severe weather events, and ecological shifts that jeopardise its biodiversity and socio-cultural environment (World Bank Group, 2021[64]). Recognising these profound threats, state and non-state actors and other relevant stakeholders in the Solomon Islands, in collaboration with international actors, are undertaking crucial efforts to craft and implement robust strategies focused on enhancing climate resilience. By embracing innovative approaches and building on local knowledge, the nation aims to safeguard its future and protect the well-being of its people amid the looming challenges posed by climate change.

Underpinning most of these stakeholders’ activities is the goal to develop their respective frameworks to implement multiple climate programmes, each with distinct modalities, including to facilitate the transfer of financial resources from donors to subnational levels. One such notable initiative is the Local Climate Adaptive Living Facility (LoCAL), launched in the capital, Honiara, on 1 November 2024.

LoCAL complements existing systems to strengthen provincial government and institutional capacity

LoCAL was initiated by the government and the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) with initial funding support from the government of New Zealand and the European Union of approximately USD 15 million (Solomon Islands Government, 2024[66]). The UNCDF designed and manages the LoCAL in co-operation with local institutions. As a mechanism to integrate climate change response into local authorities’ planning and budgeting systems, the facility combines performance-based climate resilience grants with technical and capacity-building support to create a scalable system for delivering climate finance through local governments and also to increase the flow of climate finance reaching local communities.

Importantly, LoCAL is embedded in the Solomon Islands’ Provincial Capital Development Fund (PCDF), which underscores the close relationship between the new facility and the Provincial Government Strengthening Project (PGSP). This approach complements the PCDF’s existing performance-based grant system within the PGSP framework, as LoCAL’s grant financing for locally led climate resilience projects is entirely performance-based. Though it can finance 100% of adaptation projects, the facility serves mainly to top up approved projects with finance for their adaptation components. During the launch of LoCAL, the Minister of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening predicted that LoCAL would spur more local adaptation interventions and investments by helping provincial governments access climate funding for resilience-building projects.

The Local Climate Living Facility, […] is aimed at unlocking financing that empowers local communities and the provincial governments to take the lead in climate adaptation in the most critical areas. The initiative […] will not only upscale the existing Provincial Capacity Development Fund (PCDF) but also assist our nine provincial governments in accessing essential climate funding for resilience-building projects. The project will ensure there is increased awareness and capacity of provincial governments to respond to climate change adaptation. Climate change adaptation shall be integrated into provincial governments’ plans, and there will be an increased number of local adaptation interventions and investments. (Solomon Islands Government, 2024[66])

The government instituted a performance-based grant system in 2008 with the aim of building provincial capacity to effectively deliver services to the people of Solomon Islands. The system is built on three mutually reinforcing pillars. First, discretional development grants are designed and transferred to the provinces for investment in eligible social and economic infrastructure. Second, a performance assessment system is used to ensure that provinces have the basic fiduciary safeguards in place and are therefore eligible to receive the grants; an incentives process rewards provinces that perform well on key elements of the investment management process, governance and public financial management. And third, institutional strengthening and capacity development support are provided to address provincial capacity gaps, especially those identified during the performance assessment process.

Since the system was established, the nine provinces of Solomon Islands have delivered over 1 683 solid projects. Central to the success of these efforts is a focus on key sources of resilience and a deliberate effort to co-ordinate delivery with other donor-funded programmes. For example, working with the World Bank-funded Integrated Economic Development and Community Resilience project, launched in 2022, provincial governments have started to adopt and comply with the national environment and social framework, which aims to encourage risk-informed planning at the subnational level (Solomon Islands Government, 2024[66]). LoCAL builds on these initiatives to ensure that local economic and social infrastructure projects are designed to adapt to and withstand the impacts of climate change (Solomon Islands Government, 2024[66]).

Despite limited capacity and other constraints, all provinces have submitted financial statements to the Office of the Auditor General by the annual due date for the past ten years. This 100% submission rate is a remarkable achievement for the performance-based grant approach especially when measured against the situation from 1993 to 2008, when only two financial statements were submitted by the nine provinces for audit. This institutional resilience building is powering operational service delivery. Since the inception of this approach, provincial institutions have enhanced their efficiency not only through stronger financial statements and better-quality audit reports but also in terms of 1) better ownership, commitment and institutionalisation of the PCDF modality; 2) greater trust in the PCDF modality on the part of development partners, as reflected in their transfer of development grants to provincial governments;9 3) enhanced oversight of the PCDF by the Provincial Fiscal Grant Coordination Committee and Joint Oversight Committee; and, most importantly, 4) their delivery of the 1 683 economic and social infrastructure projects over the last 16 years under the mandate of provincial governments.

These achievements also reflect the collaboration and networking of different stakeholders at the international, national and local levels. Such networking between the various stakeholders is decisively important because it has developed at a particularly critical period for the Solomon Islands government, which is facing ongoing challenges in addressing its fiscal situation. Moreover, the success of the PGSP has significant implications for the reform and enhancement of the 1997 Provincial Government Act in that it could build legislative support for strengthening other mechanisms to leverage funding for the provincial governments as a complement to the efforts of the national government. However, the process is still vulnerable to risks that may impact on the long-term sustainability of the performance-based grant system. Various factors – among them, the global COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 Honiara riots, the South Pacific Games and the general elections in 2024 – have prompted reservations on the part of stakeholders, with significant adverse effects on the national budget. Consequently, there is an urgent need for strategic financial interventions for programmes related to climate change. In addition, the lack of consistency of government contributions often raises concerns about long-term sustainability. Since 2022, donor funding seems to have replaced the mainstream government contribution, which undermines any prospects of sustainability.

Blending high-level support with local initiative

The collaboration underpinning LoCAL and the PCDF highlights the importance of a community-centric approach that establishes multiple interconnected nodes to effectively tackle urgent issues and challenges. By leveraging platforms that are specifically tailored to the needs and context of a community, we at the Ministry of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening can more effectively confront pressing challenges in a locally sensitive way, ensuring that solutions are both relevant and sustainable. It is against this background that the Ministry, through its programmes, is engaging to ensure the capacity building of the Ward Development Committee, a tier of local governance that exists close to the villages and communities in rural areas. The policy blueprint is designed not only to institutionalise community participation in local development management decision making but also to keep the communities engaged through the fiscal grants being provided by provinces for micro-project implementation in the communities.

The positive impacts of the LoCAL initiative co-ordinated with the World Bank integrated Economic and Community Resilience programme are likely to be significant and multifaceted. In addition to enhancing institutional capability and unlocking local access to critical climate funding for resilience-building projects, the facility also fosters the potential for more partnerships aimed at addressing climate change challenges that affect rural populations throughout Solomon Islands.

Conclusion

The climate crisis in Solomon Islands is severe and, as with any modality, there remain governance challenges to be addressed. But the PCDF-LoCAL initiatives represent a significant positive step towards delivering effective adaptation policies that respond to impacts across all dimensions of fragility. The Solomon Islands government and our ministry recognise that progress must be sustained through learning from policy delivery. Hence, a review of the PCDF core systems and procedures will be initiated shortly to drive future reforms. They will aim to consolidate achievements to date and rejuvenate stakeholders’ commitments to the Solomon Islands’ established and widely appreciated approach, one that is seen to allocate capital grants fairly and with regard to both established needs and verified performance.

Coastal erosion and beach loss in the Comoros

Carola Klöck and Ibrahim Mohamed (Science Po & University of the Comoros)

The Comoros10 is an archipelago in the Channel of Mozambique. A small island developing state, the Comoros is classified by the OECD as experiencing high fragility, with severe fragility in the political and economic dimensions that compounds the existential risks associated with the environmental dimension (OECD, 2025[63]). The Comoros belongs to all three country groups (Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries, African countries), considered particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change such as sea level rise, coastal erosion and beach loss. Coastal erosion is already clearly visible and is having dire consequences. About half of the country’s sandy beaches have been lost (Mamaty and Bandar Ali, 2018[67]), and more are at risk of disappearing (Vousdoukos et al., 2020[68]). The coastal erosion leads to saltwater intrusion, threatening freshwater supply (Mohamed, 2012[69]). The population of the Comoros is heavily concentrated along the exposed coastline and very conscious of these impacts. In surveys, residents highlight, among others, both the regular flooding of houses and roads and their worries that these could completely disappear in as little as five to ten years.11 Relocation is indeed an issue and may be inevitable. Nearly 20 years ago, in 2006, the government was already estimating that up to 10% of the population might have to relocate by 2050 (Union des Comores, 2006[70]).

Coastal erosion and beach loss have multiple causes, although climate change and especially sea level rise make these worse. One factor is the so-called coastal squeeze: building houses and infrastructure close to the coastline, that is, in areas at risk. Another key contributing factor is sand mining, which has been illegal since 1994 but remains widely practised. Driven by poverty and lack of resources, people often turn towards the use of beach sand for building, as good-quality, alternative materials, notably crushed volcanic rock, are too expensive.

Paradoxically, the local population and, even more so, local bureaucrats and decision makers are conscious of the negative effects of sand mining. Nevertheless, the local population in particular considers seawalls to be an important response to coastal erosion and beach loss and asks for more seawalls to be built. Seawalls, however, do not address the issue of sand mining. In addition, they are often badly built and not maintained and thus fall apart shortly after construction – a problem that is also widespread in other island countries such as those of the Pacific (Nunn, Klöck and Duvat, 2021[71]).

Alternatives to building and rebuilding seawalls, and why they are not used

Many local people would support efforts to uphold existing laws that prohibit sand mining. Yet, as a respondent aptly explained, “The mayor is unable to put in place a mechanism to ensure compliance.” Law enforcement is difficult in a context like the Comoros which is exposed to fragility and where the national government has limited reach at the local level, where institutions are generally weak and have limited capacity, and where political will is lacking.

Non-state action in the Comoros seems more promising, consistent with the findings of the OECD fragility framework, which shows societal resilience to be associated with high levels of trust and civil society participation. The Comoros has a vibrant civil society at the local level and (informal) village groups and associations that are also actively engaged in environmental management. Communities have shown they are capable of deciding to protect their resources, including their beaches. Ratter, Petzold and Sinane (2016[72]) reported on two villages on the island of Anjouan/Ndzuani that collectively decided to stop sand mining and were able to enforce that decision in their villages. Similar examples of successful local resource management can be found in fisheries (Freed et al., 2016[73]; Hauzer, Dearden and Murray, 2013[74]). Local associations and village councils can fill gaps left by the national state, and the state should in turn discuss and consult with local actors.

For villagers to take informed decisions and implement them, they need information and resources. Capacities in the Comoros, whether financial, human or institutional, are generally weak and particularly so at the local level. Many of our respondents, for example, point to a lack of resources to implement adaptation measures. They may primarily have financial resources in mind, but we also have limited knowledge. Respondents tend to know little about different adaptation measures beyond seawalls or their respective costs and benefits. As we mentioned, our respondents recognise the negative effects of sand mining and at the same time strongly favour seawalls as a solution. In this context, information and exchange would be extremely helpful, in particular the sharing of experiences and learning about the successes and failures of other communities. Such exchange is made difficult by a degraded transport infrastructure that makes travelling between communities inconvenient, expensive and unsafe, especially travelling between the three islands of the archipelago. As a result, most people know little about how communities in other parts of the country, let alone in other islands in the Indian Ocean or beyond, respond to coastal erosion and beach loss. Thus, the successful community beach management in Anjouan/Ndzuani and examples elsewhere remain largely unknown, although they offer valuable lessons for other communities.

Exchange requires resources, which typically come from outside, certainly in the environmental realm. In 2023, Comoros received USD 127 million in official development assistance for development objectives (OECD, 2025[75]), but donor funding has its own well-documented problems. For example, it is difficult to access and often channelled to the central state rather than to the local level, even when local stakeholders may be better able to govern and implement decisions. Locals thus regret that “millions of francs”, as respondents put it, have arrived in the country without much visible effect on the ground. In this context, it may help to simplify access to funding and to channel more funding to non-state actors, including the local university (which would help build local capacities), community actors and the private sector. The private sector could help find and implement solutions such as crushed volcanic rock – subsidised through donor funding – to make sand mining less attractive. In addition, the private sector could offer job opportunities in a context in which employment and success are often conditioned on personal networks rather than merit.

Resources are clearly important, including to improve the overall situation in which environmental protection in the Comoros operates. Resources, for example, are needed to improve the country’s infrastructure and transportation as well as education and capacities more generally. Yet it is important to point out that many things can also be done with limited to no resources. The community beach management in Anjouan/Ndzuani did not require any specific funding but simply relied on existing collective decision making and enforcement. Similarly, not building in highly exposed areas is an easy measure to reduce vulnerability, although some funding may be required for concerned families to acquire land elsewhere. Nevertheless, at the local level, even small sums of money can go a long way.

Building pathways to resilience in Iraq

Neam Alqaseer (Ministry of Environment, Iraq)

Though Iraq continues to be classified as experiencing extreme fragility in the OECD fragility framework, it is showing notable signs of improvement. As a country emerging from an era of conflict, it is now turning its attention to addressing critical points of resilience, especially those associated with the impact of climate and environmental fragility.

Iraq is exposed to severe levels of fragility in the economic, societal and environmental dimensions. This is reflected in national statistics that show a complex demographic picture: The population is growing at a rate of 2.3% and is projected to reach nearly 80 million people by 2050. With 50-60% of the population under the age of 30, real concerns exist around extreme inequality and high unemployment rates. There is a risk that a youth dividend could turn into a liability, contributing to severe social and economic challenges without investment in both essential services and new employment opportunities to ensure a sustainable future for the expanding population. The central issue cutting across all of these factors is Iraq’s ability to manage three intersecting challenges: its unfolding climate crisis, access to energy and urbanisation.

Climate change has made the lack of water resources an existential threat. The inefficient use of scarce water resources compounds the problems of reduced transboundary flows and increased pollution, with 87.8% being used for irrigation, which further exacerbates the water crisis. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers are critical for water and agriculture, and they are declining due to upstream infrastructure and climate change. Globally, Iraq accounts for about 0.68% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Iraq also faces significant challenges in energy access. Approximately 50% of the population lacks sufficient access to energy, and consequently, diesel generators have become an essential yet inadequate solution for approximately 60% of urban residents. These generators are costly, environmentally high emitting and ultimately unsustainable. Energy pressures intersect with the economic dimension of fragility as Iraq struggles with limited economic diversification due to its overdependence on oil revenues, limited non-oil sector development, weak private sector participation, infrastructure deficiencies, and economic instability and security concerns. Iraq's oil revenues are also vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices.

Unplanned urbanisation is characterised by minimal public transport infrastructure, widespread use of diesel generators, heavy reliance on air conditioning, limited green spaces, and inadequate sewerage and water supply systems. Iraq’s rapid urbanisation has also contributed to the extreme risk of pollution, including waste, plastic, dust and chemical pollution. Over 70% of the population now lives in urban areas. In light of Iraq’s 2.6% annual urban growth rate, focusing on these urban challenges is an urgent necessity.

Overall, addressing sources of fragility is essential to ensure the well-being of the population, promote sustainable development, and safeguard the natural heritage and cultural diversity of the area. It requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account climate change, economic development and social equity.

Climate-induced displacement and building climate security

Climate security refers to the impact of the climate crisis on peace and security. All climate scenarios show that Iraq is going to face severe climate change impacts, especially in the likely event that the collective effort to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C fails. Climate change can trigger competition for natural resources, make livelihoods less secure and cause mass displacement, thus increasing the risk of social tensions and instability. It constitutes a significant threat to national security. Iraq is one of the countries in the world worst affected by climate change. Approximately 92% of Iraqi land is threatened by desertification and high temperatures, which are increasing at a rate seven times faster than the global average.

Climate-induced displacement has already been increasing in the central and southern regions of Iraq with each passing year. As of June 2024, according to Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), approximately 147 000 individuals remained displaced due to drought, land degradation, and other climate and environmental factors. They represent a large, growing and unplanned influx of people into host communities, which are often urban areas. The influx creates tensions over access to limited services and resources; growing competition over access to limited natural resources, especially water, is sparking tribal conflicts. In Iraq, climate change, including its impact on human mobility, is closely linked to fragility and conflict. Therefore, climate action needs to build strong synergies with peacebuilding and conflict recovery efforts while ensuring human security for the Iraqi people through development efforts.

Moving from policy to implementation: Building resilience to multidimensional fragility

Mitigation action and the energy sector

Recognising that environmental and economic dimensions of fragility intersect, Iraq has developed a series of strategies and initiatives to mitigate high-priority risks in the energy sector. These include the Zero Routine Flaring Initiative by 2030, supported by the World Bank, which aims to improve the reporting of gas flaring and includes a commitment by Iraq to reach zero routine flaring by 2028. Under this programme, Iraq decreased flare volume by 0.2 billion cubic metres between 2022 and 2023. Iraq has also stepped up its commitments on issues such as methane reduction. It was the first member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries to endorse the Global Methane Pledge, thereby contributing to a collective effort to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030 from 2020 levels.

Working with the private sector is an essential aspect of this process, including on commitments to develop best practices to respond to notifications of the Methane Alert and Response System (MARS). In this regard, the Iraqi ministries of oil and environment have initiated a number of projects on methane reduction that are implemented with oil companies in Iraq. These efforts have benefited from Iraq’s collaboration in methane tracking, detection and reduction with the UNEP-convened Climate and Clean Air Coalition, the UNEP International Methane Emissions Observatory, the Clean Air Task Force, and the International Energy Agency. Efforts also are ongoing to foster co-ordination between the Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Supreme Council for Environment of Bahrain, focusing on a persistent source of methane emissions in the country. Iraq is also finalising its National Appropriate Mitigation Action, which consists of all mitigation processes in Iraq in every related sector over the coming years.

Renewable energy

In response to the need for efficient transition processes, the Iraqi government is working on a renewable energy regulation law, a draft of which is currently under review in the parliament’s Electricity and Energy Committee. The proposal would update existing laws to support the renewable energy sector and stimulate investment in a way that contributes to achieving sustainable development and enhances national energy security. The Ministry of Electricity is leading the effort to increase renewable and clean energies in the country’s energy mix by developing solar energy projects in different Iraqi regions, with the aim of achieving a total of 12 gigawatts a year from solar energy by 2030. The World Bank, the International Energy Agency, the Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, and the UNDP are providing invaluable technical and commercial support to Iraqi regions in the implementation of utility-scale solar power generation and solar installations on the rooftops of residential buildings.

Using development to prepare for future shocks and crises

In the Iraq Vision 2030 strategy document, the government highlights the benefits of integrating environmental objectives into development plans and policies to improve the quality of life of its citizens, ensure the sustainability of production and consumption patterns, and reduce the impacts of environmental pollution and climate change. A national adaptation plan (NAP) is also being developed to work in tandem with the 2030 strategy as a part of Iraq’s commitments towards the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement, which aim to reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience. The NAP will include a Climate Vulnerability Index that considers baseline and future Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (RCP 2.6, 4.5, 7.0 and 8.5 scenarios). The NAP will consist of climate change risks and adaptation options for Iraq focused on key environmental and socio-economic sectors. Options to be presented include the following areas:

• Agriculture – introduction of drought- and salt-resistant crop and fodder varieties, education and training for farmers on better agricultural practices, and provision of financial resources to upgrade their equipment

• Public health – early warning systems for hazardous weather, education on the health risks of climate-related phenomena, and better access to clean water and stable energy supply in times of extreme heat

• Livelihoods – support for farmers through re-training and diversification of incomes, provision of loans and grants to stimulate new private enterprises, and development of new industries including clean energy

• Water resources – more efficient agricultural irrigation practices, upgrading of urban water supplies, reduction of water pollution from agriculture and industries, incentivising of water saving with metering and appropriate tariffs, co-ordinated management of water resources across governorates, and collaboration with neighbouring countries for a more joined-up approach

• Land resources – scaling-up of restoration of degraded land and prevention of further desertification with technological and nature-based solutions, restoration of the marshlands with sufficient water flows, and development of stronger regulatory frameworks on land use, urban planning and protected areas including the prime minister's initiative to plant 5 million trees and palm trees in Iraq to combat desertification

• Human mobility – financial support to internally displaced persons to return to home regions, training for jobs in the new communities, and support to get safe housing and access to clean water, health facilities and education

• Energy – update of health and safety regulations in running energy facilities, improvement of efficiencies in the use of water, regulation of water and air pollution from energy facilities, and assurance of stable access to electricity for all people.

Financing development and resilience

With the Iraq Development Fund, the government aims to attract investment to Iraq in order to develop non-oil economic resources; launch sustainable economic and social development; and find solutions to economic, social and environmental crises by expanding modern technology and attracting capital and financial resources from the private sector. The government has succeeded in obtaining investments worth up to USD 100 billion. The Central Bank of Iraq has supported this effort through a series of initiatives aimed at promoting economic growth, providing support for financing small and medium-sized enterprises, and stabilising the general level of prices. It has also driven the Renewable Energy Support Initiative to finance the purchase of electric power generation units from renewable sources, allocating 1 trillion Iraqi dinars (USD 750 million).

To address human capital needs, the Riyada Initiative for Development and Employment, launched by the prime minister, aims to develop the skills and talents of young people and job seekers by training them and preparing them for the economic market. The initiative provides an opportunity for young people to learn how to set up their own projects; the state provides financial support for these projects in addition to certificates of participation for trainees.

Once again, financing climate initiatives is at the forefront of the government’s efforts. The Climate Investment Plan is preparing an investment document to tackle climate change impacts and drive economic diversification, with the support of the United States Agency for International Development and the UNDP The National Green Growth Strategy 2024 commits to building a brighter, greener and more prosperous Iraq and benefits from international support to implement projects, national documents and programmes to combat climate change. The National Investment Commission targets opportunities for private sector companies to invest in a range of sectors; a technology needs assessment analyses climate change mitigation and adaptation in Iraq’s most vulnerable sectors and the association action, barriers and the enabling framework, the market, and climate impacts and associated benefits.

Implementation is underway on several projects, including 1) a project to build the resilience of the agricultural sector to climate change (BRAC) in the four poorest governorates in Iraq (Dhi Qar, Maysan, Diwaniyah and Muthanna) funded by Adaptation Fund in conjunction with a larger project called Encouraging Smallholder Farming, which is financed by a USD 16 million loan from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and 2) a project to enhance the resilience of the population of Hor al-Hawizeh and increase their resilience to climate change in Maysan Governorate/Hor al-Hawizeh, which is funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and implemented through UNDP. Other projects are under development with the Green Climate Fund allocation of USD 38.5 million, the governorates of Muthanna, Najaf and Karbala; and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Separately, projects are being implemented with the allocation USD 10 million in Basra and Dhi Qar with the Green Climate Fund and in Qadisiyah with the World Food Programme.

Migration and displacement

The recently launched 2024-30 National Strategy for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in Iraq is the main strategy followed by the Ministry of Environment to deal with environmental issues, including climate-related displacement, within the national frameworks of development policy. Working with the International Organization for Migration and others, the government aims to address the intersection of climate change, peace, security and human mobility in Iraq by focusing on the intersections that matter for delivering climate action plans and policies, including the next generation of nationally determined contributions and the migration chapter of the NAP. These actions are closely aligned with the National Security Advisory’s work on integrating climate security as part of the new national security strategy (based on the understanding that climate security is national security).

Conclusion

Iraq is on the front line of climate change. The impacts of climate change will exacerbate water scarcity and affect livelihoods while simultaneously transforming the economy as the country seeks to diversify away from fossil fuels in a gradual and just fashion. After years of conflict, Iraq has demonstrated a strong commitment to the international efforts to reduce climate change globally and nationally. By taking action to reduce GHG emissions and increase resilience, it has logged some early results. The journey from years of war and conflict and from an oil-dependent economy to a more sustainable, peaceful and green future will be long, but it has definitely begun.

References

[27] Abdelaziz, S. and L. Kent (2025), International Criminal Court seeks warrants for Taliban leaders for gender-based crimes, CNN World, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/23/world/international-criminal-court-taliban-arrest-warrants-gender-intl/index.html.

[11] Al Jazeera (2024), How a Bangladesh minister spent more than $500m on luxury property, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/20/how-a-bangladesh-minister-spent-more-than-500m-on-luxury-property (accessed on 10 November 2024).

[53] Aleman, J., M. Jarzyna and A. Staver (2018), “Forest extent and deforestation in tropical Africa since 1900”, Nature Ecology & Evolution, Vol. 2, pp. 23-33, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-017-0406-1.

[16] Bareedo Platform (2020), “Online harassment and violence emerging as new forms of gender based violence in Puntland, Somalia”, https://bareedo.org/online-harassment-and-violence-emerging-as-new-forms-of-gender-based-violence-in-puntland-somalia/.

[30] BBC (2024), EE.UU. reconoce por primera vez a Edmundo González como ’presidente electo de Venezuela’ [U.S. recognises Edmundo González as “president-elect of Venezuela” for the first time], https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cly2p4wgxplo (accessed on 2 December 2024).

[43] Berdal, M. (2009), Building Peace After War, Routledge, Oxford, UK.

[25] Bishnaw (2024), “Women’s Peace Brief: Afghan women’s opinions on disputes over guiding principles in intra-Afghan talks”, https://bishnaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Women-Peace-Brief-April-2024.pdf.

[29] Bobbio, N. (1998), Dicionário de política, Editora Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, https://biblioteca.utfpr.edu.br/acervo/194856.

[19] Carlson, C. and H. Rousselle (2020), “Report and repeat: Investigating Facebook’s hate speech removal process”, First Monday, Vol. 25/2, https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i2.10288.

[34] CEPAZ (2024), “La grave crisis del sistema de salud en Venezuela fue expuesta ante la CIDH [The serious crisis of the health system in Venezuela was exposed to the IACHR]”, Center of Justice and Peace (CEPAZ), Bello Monte, Venezuela, https://cepaz.org/la-grave-crisis-del-sistema-de-salud-en-venezuela-fue-expuesta-ante-la-cidh/.

[36] CEPyG UCAB (2024), “Encuesta CEPyG UCAB/Delphos: Edmundo González cuenta con 59,1% de intención de voto y Nicolás Maduro 24,6%”, PolítiKa UCAB, https://politikaucab.net/2024/07/17/encuesta-cepyg-ucab-delphos-edmundo-gonzalez-cuenta-con-591-de-intencion-de-voto-y-nicolas-maduro-246/.

[42] Collier, P. (2007), The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

[5] Colombia National Administrative Department of Statistics (2024), “En 2023, en el total nacional, la pobreza monetaria fue del 33% y la pobreza monetaria extrema fue del 11,4%”, Press release: Poverty measurements, https://www.dane.gov.co/files/operaciones/PM/cp-PM-2023.pdf?os=ios&ref=app.

[17] Cox, K. et al. (2018), Social Media in Africa: A Double-edged Sword for Security and Development, United Nations Development Programme, New York, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/africa/UNDP-RAND-Social-Media-Africa-Research-Report_final_3-Oct.pdf.

[7] Deepto, A. (2024), Student movement: 17,000 cases of casualties found so far, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/student-movement-17000-cases-casualties-found-so-far-3694536 (accessed on 12 November 2024).

[4] Dickie, G. and S. Jessop (2024), “Exclusive: Fragile countries make $20 billion climate finance push at COP29”, Reuters, 15 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/fragile-countries-make-20-bln-climate-finance-push-cop29-letter-says-2024-11-15/.

[61] Dinnen, S. (2008), “State-building in a post-colonial society: The case of Solomon Islands”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 9/1, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol9/iss1/4/.

[22] Feminist Majority Foundation (2023), “A timeline of horror: 100+ Taliban edicts, orders and directives denying Afghan women and girls their human rights and existence”, Ms. Magazine, 15 August 2023, https://msmagazine.com/2023/08/15/list-timeline-taliban-orders-women-girls-afghanist/.

[9] Freedom House (2023), “Bangladesh”, in Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for Democracy, https://freedomhouse.org/country/bangladesh/freedom-world/2023.

[73] Freed, S. et al. (2016), “Enhancing small-scale fisheries management through community engagement and multi-community partnerships: Comoros case study”, Marine Policy, Vol. 63(C), pp. 81-91.

[1] G7+ (2013), Note on the Fragility Spectrum, https://www.g7plus.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/fragility-spectrum-in-english.pdf.

[31] Gaviña, S. (2023), “Visita virtual al Helicoide, el mayor centro de torturas de Venezuela [Virtual visit to the Helicoide, the largest torture center in Venezuela]”, ABC Internacional, 29 August 2023, https://www.abc.es/internacional/helicoide-mayor-centro-torturas-venezuela-20230626130816-nt.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.es%2Finternacional%2Fhelicoide-mayor-centro-torturas-venezuela-20230626130816-nt.html%3Fref%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.

[57] Global EverGreening Alliance (2024), About Us: Member Organisations (webpage), https://www.evergreening.org/about-us/members/ (accessed on 5 December 2024).

[56] Global Forest Coalition (2019), “Bioenergy in West Africa – Impacts on women and forests”, Forest Cover, Vol. 59, https://www.women2030.org/forest-cover-59-bioenergy-in-west-africa-impacts-on-women-and-forests/.

[18] Grobbelaar, A. (2022), “Media and terrorism in Africa: Al-Shabaab’s evolution from militant group to media mogul”, Insight on Africa, Vol. 15/1, https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087822111437.

[38] Guerrero, I. (2024), “Entre represión y explotación avanza la pista que abrirá Los Rouques a más turistas VIP [Between repression and exploitation, the track that will open Los Rouques to more VIP tourists advances]”, ARMANDOINFO, https://armando.info/newsletter/el-reportaje-en-tu-correo-entre-represion-y-explotacion-avanza-la-pista-que-abrira-los-roques-a-mas-turistas-vip/?frame=0.

[3] Gulati, M. et al. (2024), “Climate change, conflict and fragility: A recipe for disasters”, ODI Global Insights, https://odi.org/en/insights/climate-change-conflict-fragility-recipe-for-disasters/#:~:text=Fragile%20and%20conflict%2Daffected%20countries'%20climate%20adaptation%20funding%20received%20vs,costed%20needs%20in%202022&text=In%20terms%20of%20per%20capita,ca.

[10] Hassan, M. et al. (2023), The State of Bangladesh’s Political Governance, Development, and Society: According to Its Citizens 2022, Asia Foundation, San Francisco, https://asiafoundation.org/publication/survey-of-the-bangladeshi-people-a-democracy-perception-survey-2022/.

[74] Hauzer, M., P. Dearden and G. Murray (2013), “The effectiveness of community-based governance of small-scale fisheries, Ngazidja island, Comoros”, Marine Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 346-354, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.012.

[2] INCAF (2012), The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/INCAF%282011%294/en/pdf (accessed on 12 November 2024).

[35] Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2024), Key Figures (webpage), https://www.r4v.info/en (accessed on 18 October 2024).

[55] International Fund for Agricultural Development (2023), Facility for Refugees, Migrants, Forced Displacement and Rural Stability, https://www.ifad.org/en/initiatives/refugees-migrants-rural-stability.

[40] International Rescue Committee (2024), “Fighting in Sudan: What you need to know about the crisis”, 2024 Emergency Watchlist, https://www.rescue.org/eu/article/fighting-sudan-what-you-need-know-about-crisis.

[20] Iyer, N., B. Nyamwire and S. Nabulega (2024), African Feminist Research for a Feminist Internet: Alternate Realities, Alternate Internets, Pollicy, Kampala, https://pollicy.org/projects/alternate-realities-alternate-internets/.

[12] Kaul, S. and S. Valero (2023), Disasters, Crises and Violence Against Women: Evidence from Big Data Analysis, UN Women, New York, https://data.unwomen.org/publications/disasters-crises-and-violence-against-women-evidence-big-data-analysis.

[39] Libro rojo de especies amenazadas (2020), Categoría: Casi Amenazado [Category: Near threatened], https://especiesamenazadas.org/categorias/casi-amenazado.

[15] Mahmood, L. (2021), Somali feminist: Facebook is being used to silence me, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58355603.

[67] Mamaty, I. and D. Bandar Ali (2018), Etude de vulnerabilité aux effets du changement climatique aux Comores, Union des Comoros, Moroni, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/troisi%C3%A8me%20communication%20nationale%20des%20Comores.pdf.

[62] Mcdonald, P., C. Miller and L. Smets (2024), Solomon Islands - Country Economic Memorandum: Unlocking New Sources of Economic Growth, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099091324035518530/P18025412ebb7b02118e9812a81a1b465d2.

[50] Mitchell, I. and S. Pleeck (2022), How Much Should the World Pay for the Congo Forest’s Carbon Removal?, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/how-much-should-world-pay-congo-forests-carbon-removal.

[69] Mohamed, I. (2012), L’eau en Grande Comore : étude de cas d’un petit espace, abondamment arrosé mais en situation de pénurie d’eau (PhD thesis), Université de La Réunion, La Réunion, https://theses.fr/2012LARE0019.

[41] Mukhopadhyay, D. (2014), Warlords, Strongmen Governors, and the State in Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

[46] My Life Elsewhere (2025), Country Size Comparison: Democratic Republic of the Congo vs. France, https://www.mylifeelsewhere.com/country-size-comparison/democratic-republic-of-congo/france.

[6] National Planning Department (2024), National Planning Department (DNP) (unpubished).

[44] North, D., J. Wallis and B. Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

[71] Nunn, P., C. Klöck and V. Duvat (2021), “Seawalls as maladaptations along island coasts”, Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 205, p. 105554, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.105554.

[75] OECD (2025), States of Fragility Platform, https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/ (accessed on 10 January 2025).

[63] OECD (2025), States of Fragility Platform, Fragile context profiles, https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/countries/SLB/.

[52] OECD (2022), Africapolis: Visualise urbanisation in Africa (webpage), OECD/Sahel and West Africa Club, Paris, https://africapolis.org/en (accessed on 11 October 2024).

[45] Paris, R. (2024), “The future of UN peace operations: Pragmatism, pluralism or statism?”, International Affairs, Vol. 100/5, pp. 2153-2172, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae182.

[72] Ratter, B., J. Petzold and K. Sinane (2016), “Considering the locals: Coastal construction and destruction in times of climate change on Anjouan, Comoros”, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 403/3, pp. 112-126, https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-8947.12102.

[59] Restore our Future (2020), The Bonn Challenge (webpage), https://www.bonnchallenge.org/ (accessed on 16 November 2024).

[8] Riaz, A. (2023), Pathways of Autocratization: The Tumultuous Journey of Bangladeshi Politics, Taylor & Francis, London.

[14] Saferworld (2023), Addressing Gender-Based Violence Against Women Activists in Somalia: Violence Observatory Systems, https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/publications/1433-addressing-gender-based-violence-against-women-activists-in-somalia-violence-observatory-systems.

[24] Safi, M. and A. Khan (2024), “New morality law in Afghanistan is not just silencing women’s voices: It’s gender apartheid”, ODI Global Insights, https://odi.org/en/insights/new-morality-law-in-afghanistan-is-not-just-silencing-womens-voices-its-gender-apartheid/.

[23] Shekhawat, S. (2024), “Codifying ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’: Institutionalisation of the Taliban’s rule”, Observer Research Foundation Expert Speak, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/codifying-virtue-and-vice-institutionalisation-of-the-taliban-s-rule.

[28] Singer, F. (2024), “Venezuelan opposition figures at Argentine embassy request global assistance amid Maduro’s siege”, El País, 16 December 2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-12-16/venezuelan-opposition-figures-at-argentine-embassy-request-global-assistance-amid-maduros-siege.html.

[26] Sobat, T. (2024), “The rising call to codify gender apartheid: Epistemic resistance and international accountability”, Contending Modernities, https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/global-currents/gender-apartheid-afghanistan/.

[33] Sociedad Anticancerosa de Venezuela (2024), “SAV: En casi 30% incrementarán las muertes por cáncer de mama en Venezuela a finales de año”, 10 October 2024, https://www.sociedadanticancerosa.org/actualidad/en-casi-30-incrementaran-muertes-cancer-mama-venezuela/.

[66] Solomon Islands Government (2024), “Statement by the Minister of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening at the launching of Local Climate Adaptive Living Facility”, https://solomons.gov.sb/solomon-islands-launches-financing-initiative-for-community-led-climate-adaptation-with-support-from-new-zealand-eu-and-uncdf/.

[65] Solomon Islands Government (2023), “Solomon Islands National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 2023-2032 and Long Term Low Emission Development Strategy (LT- LEDS)”, https://solomons.gov.sb/solomon-islands-national-climate-change-policy-nccp-2023-2032-and-long-term-low-emission-development-strategy-lt-leds/.

[60] Trillion Trees (2024), Trillion Trees (webpage), https://trilliontrees.org/ (accessed on 16 November 2024).

[48] Tschilombo, F. (2024), Speech of his Excellence Sir Felix-antoine Tshisekedi Tschilombo President of the Democratic Republic of Congo on the state of the nation, https://presidence.cd/uploads/files/VF%20DISCOURS%20PR05%20NATION%202024%20copie.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[13] UN (2024), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SG-2023-annual-reportsmallFINAL.pdf.

[58] UN (2024), The Great Green Wall Initiative (webpage), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, New York, https://www.unccd.int/our-work/ggwi (accessed on 18 November 2024).

[32] UN (2024), “Venezuela: UN expert calls for human rights, not charity, to end hunger and malnutrition”, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/venezuela-un-expert-calls-human-rights-not-charity-end-hunger-and.

[51] UN (2019), “Urgent action needed to address biomass in Africa, says UNEP study”, https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/urgent-action-needed-address-biomass-africa-says-unep-study.

[49] UNHCR (2022), Global Trends Report 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2022 (accessed on 3 February 2025).

[70] Union des Comores (2006), Programme d’Action National d’Adaptation aux changements climatiques (PANA), https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/comoros-programme-daction-national-dadaptation-aux-changements-climatiques-pana (accessed on 26 November 2024).

[21] United States Institute of Peace (2024), “Tracking the Taliban’s (mis)treatment of women: An interactive graphic illustrating how the Taliban are attempting to erase Afghan women from public life”, https://www.usip.org/tracking-talibans-Mistreatment-women.

[37] Venezuela Investigative Unit (2024), “ELN, ex-FARC mafia drive rising cocaine production in Zulia, Venezuela”, InSight Crime, 15 February 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/eln-ex-farc-mafia-drive-rising-cocaine-production-zulia-venezuela/.

[68] Vousdoukos, M. et al. (2020), “Sandy coastlines under threat of erosion”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 10, pp. 260-263, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0697-0.

[47] World Bank (2024), World Bank Indicators: Access to electricity (% of population) (database), https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS (accessed on 12 November 2024).

[64] World Bank Group (2021), Climate Risk Country Profile: Solomon Islands, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/703271468001148993/Solomon-Islands-country-risk-profile.

[54] World Economic Forum (2025), About Us - Our Mission (webpage), https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum/ (accessed on 12 January 2025).

Notes

← 1.  Ana María Diez is a Venezuelan lawyer forcibly displaced to Spain. She is the president and co-founder of Coalicion por Venezuela, the largest network of non-governmental organisations led by Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the world. Her specialisations are in public management, human rights and migration, and she has a master’s degree in international relations and diplomacy. She is also a Refugees International Alumni Fellow, winner of the McCall-Pierpaolli Humanitarian Award (in 2024) and advisor of several international UNHCR mechanisms. She can be reached at [e-mail], [e-mail], X: @AnaMariaDiez – LinkedIn.

← 2.  The contribution was made on condition of anonymity.

← 3.  Joao Saldanha University, December 2024.

← 4.  For more information on Pharmakina, see https://www.pharmakina.com/.

← 5.  See https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P145196.

← 6.  Minister of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening in Solomon Islands.

← 7.  Chief Technical Advisor for the Ministry of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening in Solomon Islands.

← 8.  Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening in Solomon Islands.

← 9.  These development grants include the World Bank Integrated Economic Development and Community Resilience project’s performance-based grants; the UNCDF performance-based climate resilience grants; and the European Union-funded PGSD project that uses the PCDF modality to deliver sector grants to provinces.

← 10.  This contribution is based on the 2023 research paper by Klöck available at https://www.afd.fr/fr/ressources/ladaptation-cotiere-aux-comores-le-role-des-perceptions-et-le-risque-de-mal-adaptation.

← 11.  All references to perspectives of the local population are from the authors’ surveys, which were conducted in several villages across the Comoros. For more information, see https://www.afd.fr/fr/ressources/ladaptation-cotiere-aux-comores-le-role-des-perceptions-et-le-risque-de-mal-adaptation and https://doi.org/10.4000/11pd7.