This chapter analyses the policy and financing responses to contexts with high and extreme fragility: development finance including official development assistance; the critical questions facing the prevention agenda; emerging ideas on politically constrained environments, economic partnerships and working with the private sector. It concludes with a separate section focused on analytics that explores the potential of new data and methodologies to enhance responses to fragility at the subnational level.
States of Fragility 2025
Abstract
The state of responses to crises and fragility
Donors responded to global crises with record volumes of official development assistance (ODA) and other concessional finance in 2023 amounting to USD 258.4 billion. The volume of aid from all donors to contexts facing high and extreme fragility in 2023 was USD 92 billion.
Within this total, aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries to contexts with high and extreme fragility amounted to USD 70.1 billion, a 2% increase over 2020 and representing 52% of DAC members’ country allocable aid. However, the share of their total ODA allocated to these contexts dropped to its second-lowest level in 20 years.
Of DAC members’ ODA to contexts with high and extreme fragility in 2023, 31% was humanitarian aid, 58.6% was for development and 10.4% for peace. The volume of peace ODA is now at its second lowest since 2004.
DAC donors and their multilateral counterparts gave USD 19.4 billion of humanitarian ODA to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility in 2023, of which 81% was channelled through multilateral agencies and NGOs. They provided USD 60.9 billion of development ODA and 8 billion of peace ODA to contexts facing high and extreme fragility, of which 73% was channelled through mechanisms other than multilateral agencies and NGOs.
In the space of ten years, DAC members’ support for climate-related development finance more than doubled for contexts facing high and extreme fragility, reaching USD 12.7 billion in 2021-22. Multilateral providers more than tripled their support to USD 16.3 billion in 2021-22. A large part of this increase was provided in the form of loans. Borrowing, especially on non-concessional terms, can prove challenging to access and service for contexts with limited fiscal space.
The geopolitical and human security potential of conflict prevention is being ignored. ODA to conflict prevention remains at near-record low levels. In 2023, ODA for conflict prevention to contexts facing high and extreme fragility amounted to less than 4% of total DAC members ODA (USD 1.7 billion).
It is time to make a peace offer to development actors. Fragility analysis supports the view that for conflict prevention activities to succeed, there must be serious economic and development underpinnings. Harnessing and networking progress on data analytics that are adapted to geopolitical realities can drive better engagement on upstream conflict prevention.
The contested geopolitical context is making it harder to support sustainable development trajectories where political dialogue is constrained. Disengaging comes at a cost, but DAC members’ efforts to develop a principles-based approach and strengthen the knowledge base will help improve both decision making and coherence with foreign and security actors in politically constrained environments.
DAC members, international financial institutions (IFIs) and other development partners are looking to new sources of financing and different types of economic partnerships that involve both public and private sectors. These approaches should be considered as strategically important rather than only transactional or technical, and they may provide new entry points for policy dialogue. The success or failure of this shift will depend on how well these new investments and approaches are tailored to and address the different dimensions of fragility.
Evidence suggests that donors may overlook pockets of fragility within countries or areas of subnational conflict. Expanding analysis to the subnational level offers deeper insights and details that are often masked by the so-called tyranny of averages prevalent in cross-country comparisons.
The diversity of fragility profiles identified in Chapter 2 requires cohesive development and peace responses to build resilience, mitigate risks and prevent conflict. The leading role in finding pathways to reduce fragility belongs to the context and society themselves. But international partners and organisations can play important supporting roles in finance, analysis, capacity development, diplomacy and partnerships. Over the last ten years, global policy and financing discussions have evolved significantly, for example in terms of mobilising domestic and international funds for development, implementing the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, undertaking UN reform, evolving (IFIs, and laying the groundwork for progress on conflict prevention. However, as gradual reform has encountered a series of shocks, global financing and policy approaches are challenged to keep pace with the needs of contexts facing high and extreme fragility.
This chapter starts with an analysis of how, where and in what proportion ODA is being provided across contexts with high and extreme fragility. It then looks at two key areas for policy progress in a turbulent world: first, the vital importance of realising the potential of conflict prevention, and second, the benefits of emerging ideas on economic partnership, including through core economic systems and working with the private sector. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the potential of new data and methodologies to inform these engagements through an enhanced understanding of fragility at the subnational level.
ODA has been a generally stable resource for contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility. Volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI), by contrast, are significantly more volatile, especially for contexts exposed to extreme fragility.
From 2020 to 2023, ODA from official donors to contexts facing high and extreme fragility declined. While the donor community increased its historically high commitment of ODA during the COVID-19 crisis, the consistency of ODA, particularly in contexts in high and extreme fragility, has been tested on multiple fronts. The impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a cost-of-living crisis in many DAC member countries and a need for humanitarian assistance that has far outstripped recent donor commitments are just three of the factors that impact financial responses to fragility. The drive to respond to climate and environmental fragility has also been a prominent, and positive, feature of shifting ODA patterns. At the same time, the balance between peace and development policies is increasingly problematic for several reasons discussed in this chapter. This section focuses on the scale of ODA that is targeting fragility, and focuses on the latest three years of data availability; highlighting ODA trends to contexts with high and extreme exposure to fragility including systemic shortfalls in peace ODA.
This report does not yet capture the ODA cuts announced by several OECD DAC members as these are not currently reflected in the Creditor Reporting System, which only includes data up to 2023. These cuts were proposed due to competing domestic priorities, including defence and welfare, and are likely to have serious implications for the foreign, development and economic policies of donors and partners.
As their fragility rises, contexts receive a larger share of ODA as part of their external development financing
ODA remains a critical resource, especially in contexts with extreme fragility, where it accounts for two-thirds of total external financing in 2023 (Figure 3.1). For instance, the aggregate volume of ODA in 2023 to these contexts was more than twice that of remittances and 540 times that of FDI.1 In contexts exposed to high fragility, ODA accounts for only 26% of external financing compared to remittances (53%) and FDI (15%). Within these trends there is significant variation (Chapter 2).
Note: OOF means other official flows. Percentages for contexts in high and extreme fragility were rounded explaining why they do not add up to 100%.
Source: World Bank Group (2024[1]), World Development Indicators (database), https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators; OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
Despite growing volumes of ODA overall, the proportion of country allocable ODA going to contexts in high and extreme fragility declined
Overall ODA from all official providers reached record levels in 2023 of USD 258.4 billion, representing a 23% increase over 2020. Of this total, net ODA to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility from all development co-operation providers, including outflows from multilateral institutions, reached USD 92 billion in 2023. This represents a 9% decrease from the record-high volume in 2020.
Of this USD 92 billion total, DAC countries provided USD 70.1 billion in ODA to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility, accounting for 52% of their country allocable aid2. This was the second-lowest share in the past two decades, after 2022, of DAC countries’ country allocable ODA to contexts in high and extreme fragility. The proportion of DAC countries’ country allocable ODA going to such contexts averaged 64.8% from 2012-21, then declined to about 51-52% in 2022 and 2023. The 2023 decline in DAC assistance to high and extreme fragility contexts stands in stark contrast to the total DAC ODA volume of USD 222.9 billion – an all-time high. From 2019 to 2023, DAC countries nearly doubled their ODA to medium to low fragility contexts, driving most of the increase in their country allocable aid. This is especially the case with Ukraine which received more than one-fifth of all DAC countries’ country allocable aid in 2023. A large portion of DAC countries’ ODA also went to in-donor refugee costs (USD 32.5 billion).
DAC members’ ODA to contexts with high and extreme fragility for peace and development declined from 2020 to 2023 while humanitarian ODA increased
DAC donors and their multilateral counterparts gave USD 19.4 billion of humanitarian ODA to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility in 2023, of which 81% was channelled through multilateral agencies and NGOs. They provided USD 60.9 billion of development ODA and 8 billion of peace ODA to contexts facing high and extreme fragility, of which 73% was channelled through mechanisms other than multilateral agencies and NGOs.
In 2023, 31% of DAC ODA to contexts with high and extreme fragility was humanitarian, 58.6% for development and 10.4% for peace. DAC members’ ODA for development and peace to contexts facing high and extreme fragility has declined since 2020 (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). The combined share of DAC members’ ODA for these two pillars of the HDP nexus fell to a record low in 2023. In contrast, humanitarian aid to these contexts has increased in volume and as a share of the total, reaching an all-time high in 2023 (USD 15.9 billion).
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1; OECD (2025[3]), DAC2A: Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/od.
DAC members’ ODA in contexts facing high and extreme fragility was increasingly allocated for humanitarian purposes and localised ODA declined
DAC donors spent USD 6.3 billion as localised ODA in contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility in 2023. Localised ODA refers to ODA channelled through country-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and subnational and national governments. Most localised ODA (74%) is channelled through national governments. The 2023 volume of localised ODA was almost one fifth less than in 2020 and mainly concentrated in contexts exposed to high fragility. This is critical as much of this assistance is used for building resilience to risks associated with environmental and human fragility (see the Solomon Islands example discussed in Chapter 4). Little more than 1% of localised ODA was channelled through subnational governments, and 25% was channelled to local CSOs, an increase in proportion and an increase in volume compared to 2020. Monitoring these figures in the next ten years will provide an important indicator of the extent to which locally-led approaches to development are being applied.
Sectoral allocations in 2023, in percentage terms, were generally consistent with 2020. The exception was humanitarian aid, which has increased in proportion from a 26% to a 31% share. Social infrastructure and services received the biggest share of any sector (40% or USD 20.5 billion) of total in DAC members’ ODA in 2023, lower than in 2020 share. Economic infrastructure and services received USD 5.3 billion or 10.7%; production sectors USD 4.2 billion or 8.1%, and multi-sectoral and cross-cutting aid amounted to USD 2.6 billion (5.1%).
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
Shortfalls across the peace pillar are undermining resilience in many contexts
The volume of DAC members’ ODA to peace reached an all-time high of USD 26.7 billion in 2023, following increases the previous year mainly allocated to Ukraine, which received USD 9.3 billion in 2022 and USD 10.6 billion in 2023 (Box 3.1). However, this increasing trend is not matched for DAC peace ODA allocations to contexts facing high and extreme fragility, which are at their second lowest level since 2004.
Though Ukraine is classified as experiencing medium to low fragility (Chapter 2), the international response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine has had a highly significant impact on the volume of ODA for Ukraine and a secondary impact on ODA support for contexts facing high to extreme fragility. In the space of a year, official donors’ ODA towards Ukraine increased by more than 13 times from USD 2.2 billion in 2021 to USD 28.8 billion in 2022. This trend has continued into 2023, with total ODA increasing to USD 38.9 billion, of which over 99% is from DAC members. As a result, Ukraine became the largest-ever single country recipient of international aid in a single year. Development ODA accounted for 62.1% of the total volume in 2023, peace ODA for 28.5% and humanitarian assistance for 9.4% (Figure 3.4). In 2023, 49% of total ODA was delivered in the form of budget support and 50% was channelled through the Ukraine government compared with 32% and 38%, respectively, in 2022.
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
In contexts with high and extreme fragility, DAC peace ODA declined by 28% from 2019 to 2023, amounting to USD 5.3 billion in 2023. The persistently low level of peace financing is at odds with today’s diverse and growing peacebuilding needs, with 2023 witnessing the highest number of violent conflicts since 1946. The decline occurred mostly due to secondary peacebuilding3 (OECD, 2023[4]). Among secondary peacebuilding objectives, some of the sharpest declines since 2019 were in critical areas of concern: aid for “public sector policy and administrative management” (-79%), “legal and judicial development” (-66%) and “legislatures and political parties” (-53%). Even within the core peacebuilding strand, there were notable declines in ODA disbursed for “participation in international peacekeeping operations” (-84%) and for “security system management and reform” (-37%).
Decreases in funding for secondary peacebuilding leave important activities for building resilience, such as those associated with governance and justice and crisis management, dependent on a small handful of donors, thereby creating additional risks in terms of long-term and predictable funding. For instance, the largest three donors for legal and judicial development to contexts facing high and extreme fragility – the United States, Australia and European Union (EU) institutions (Box 3.2) – have been responsible for 60% of support over the last ten years.
The design of EU Civilian Common Security and Defence missions is unique
The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the main policy framework that enables the EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. As such, the CSDP is an integral part of the EU's integrated approach to crisis management, drawing on both civilian and military assets. Through the deployment of civilian CSDP missions, EU Member States support and strengthen partner countries' civilian security capacities through monitoring, mentoring and advising national institutions and by taking up an executive role when agreed. Since 2003, the EU has deployed 25 civilian CSDP crisis management operations. The design of civilian CSDP operations is unique in that staff are largely drawn from experts in the justice and home affairs authorities of EU Member States. The EU Council Working Committees, which are part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, take all decisions related to the political control and strategic direction of the civilian CSDP missions. In 2024, the EU maintained 12 civilian CSDP crisis management operations.
Aligning internal and external priorities and resources to stay engaged
At the onset of missions, two strategic-level dynamics have to be balanced: the often-extreme urgency in which the decision making is taking place and the equally strong drive for “doing it right”. These are also weighed against the projected “cost of inaction”. This is an important (albeit non-explicit) element of the decision-making process, which is also contingent upon factors such as the short duration of the deployment (with mandates not exceeding two years at a time, albeit being renewable), the identified needs (which will determine the operational objectives for the mission as agreed with the host state or states), and the continued and highest possible degree of local ownership and buy-in of the host country or countries. This process takes place against the backdrop of the envisaged financial and human investments, which are large: resources are drawn from the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy budget and human resources are drawn from EU Member States’ services. Against this complex backdrop, the civilian CSDP missions endeavour to generate the best possible results in executing their mandates in order to deliver on the political and policy decisions made by the EU Member States. Their experiences provide for some indications of “what works”.
The Ukraine example shows the value of remaining present on the ground
Following the unjustified, full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Council rapidly adjusted the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) to allow it to address the urgent needs and new security context in Ukraine. The decision by EU Member States to not only maintain, but also to scale up the EUAM Ukraine proved to be instrumental for attracting critically needed additional resources for Ukraine. The strengthened dialogue with the national authorities at all levels, including at local level, was essential for co-ordinating international emergency relief efforts and providing to partners the information needed to ensure well-informed and timely policy responses at a time when the war disrupted or compromised established communications channels.
The adjustment in the scope, nature and scale of the EUAM Ukraine’s mission allowed it to better adapt to needs, which emerged at very high speed: Bringing the mission to border crossing points was essential to provide information and the offer to support Ukraine’s Prosecution Service in investigating and prosecuting alleged crimes against humanity became a pivotal part of Ukraine’s efforts to co-ordinate the international response to these crimes etc.
Responding to regional fragility and spillovers: The value of establishing a single operation in neighbouring countries
In December 2023, the EU created the EU Security and Defence Initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea based on the needs identified and formulated by the four concerned countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo). The initiative aimed at boosting regional-level co-ordination and helping local actors more effectively carry out regional or cross-border actions, including both a civilian and a military pillar; it is the first time that the civilian and military CSDP is deploying together at the same time and under the same framework. As such, the two are perceived and conceived as a single entity while being modular and flexible. In its first phase, the civilian side of the initiative will base six advisors in EU delegations across the region to do a contextual analysis of concrete needs and develop advisory and training projects.
Combining technical knowledge and proactive operations for robust engagement
As the mandate delivery progresses, more flexibility or robustness assist missions in taking on tasks that are not expressively foreseen but may emerge. The main mandate of the EU Advisory Mission to the CAR (EUAM RCA) is to help restore state authority and good governance across the country, but actions such as fighting illicit trafficking at some point started to appear as necessary corollaries of the principal mission mandate to help reinstate state authority in the country. By tackling illicit trafficking, the mission contributed to recovering illegal gains that otherwise would have benefited various armed groups that are contesting state authority. The mission works with a number of state bodies, including the customs service (on goods and merchandises) and the water and forest management services (on protected species and mobile inspection brigades). These actions are supported by the mission’s mentoring and advising functions under the rule of law component to streamline internal anti-corruption measures across the above-mentioned services.
Committing to the long term: Building strategic-level commitment
As conflicts become more complex, globalised and intertwined, the EU has refined its strategies to better address crises outside its borders. The EU Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy sets out an integrated approach to the EU’s engagement in external conflicts and crises. A central objective for the civilian CSDP is to maintain strong partnerships with host countries as well as the participation and support of what the strategy calls third states and other partners, including local actors and others present in the field, as part of a joined-up approach. The integrated approach further respects the different roles, legal obligations and constraints of actors in crisis situations with a view to maximising the potential for mutual reinforcement on different levels. The EU Civilian CSDP Compact: Towards More Effective Civilian Missions, published in May 2023, further consolidated this approach, presenting 20 concrete commitments taken by EU member states and institutions to improve the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian CSDP missions.
Source: European Union (2022[5]), The Common Security and Defence Policy: Civilian Compact, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/civilian-compact_en.
A growing role for non-DAC countries and IFIs in aid to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility
ODA from multilaterals to contexts facing high and extreme fragility has increased by 50% since 2015, and ODA from non-DAC countries more than doubled in the same period.4 Multilaterals provided USD 37.2 billion in 2023 to these contexts, and non-DAC countries USD 12.3 billion. The role of non-DAC countries and multilaterals is particularly salient in regard to humanitarian and development ODA, respectively. Non-DAC countries allocated 59% of their development assistance to contexts facing high and extreme fragility as humanitarian ODA in 2023; multilaterals provided mostly development ODA (83%). Most non-DAC countries’ humanitarian ODA (85%) in 2023 went to Syria.5
IFIs provided 71% of the USD 37.2 billion provided by multilaterals to contexts facing high and extreme fragility in 2023, followed by 17% for other multilaterals and 12% from the UN system.6 From 2015 to 2023, IFIs increased their ODA to contexts in high and extreme fragility from USD 16.1 billion to USD 25.4 billion. The increasing use of IFIs and multilaterals is closely correlated with the shifting behaviour of DAC countries: In 2023, they provided 38% of their net ODA to contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility as multilateral outflows, the highest proportion in the past two decades.7 In light of the trends identified in Chapter 1, these changes can be interpreted as a shift on the part of DAC countries that are looking for alternative partners to the governments in these contexts and especially in politically constrained environments.
Acknowledging the significant deterioration in the security dimension since late 2023, the current edition of the OECD fragility framework only picks up on the earliest impact and therefore does not reflect the reality of the current situation. However, for future work in the region, especially work focused on recovery and reconstruction, data availability for the West Bank and Gaza Strip is a significant point of concern. By the end of 2023, the latest analytical year, only 20 of the 56 indicators used by the OECD fragility framework were available in the most recent year, making the capture of recent and future trends and changes more complex, especially in the environmental dimension that accounts for most of the missing data.
ODA to the West Bank and Gaza as a reference point for future engagement
Overall, official donors’ ODA towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained stable from 2014 to 2022 and increased by 53% from 2022 to 2023. The proportion and volume of humanitarian ODA have increased overall since 2017, peaking at 49% of allocations in 2023 (USD 1.7 billion). The volume and proportion of peace ODA decreased between 2020 and 2023 (Figure 3.5). Two non-DAC countries, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, accounted for 28% and 11%, respectively, of humanitarian aid allocations to West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2023. Also in 2023, most ODA (53%) was channelled through multilateral organisations; 20% through donor governments and 13% through NGOs and civil society.
Note: Some percentages for yearly figures of HDP to West Bank and Gaza Strip were rounded to the nearest number explaining why they do not add up to 100%.
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
Climate-related development finance, while seen as an opportunity, can be difficult to access
Climate change and environmental degradation bring impacts across multiple dimensions of fragility. Many contexts have reduced capacities to manage these. To better tailor their financing to needs, donors should (1) adapt funding mechanisms to increase accessibility and debt sustainability; (2) invest in financial preparedness and governance to manage shocks; (3) consider how populations relate to their natural environment and earn a living over the long term; (4) better link financing with policy dialogue and capacity development; and (5) integrate climate considerations across the HDP nexus (OECD, 2023[6]).
Climate-related development finance commitments to contexts experiencing high to extreme fragility increased significantly over the past ten years.8 DAC members’ support more than doubled for these contexts, from USD 5.4 billion on average in 2013-14 to USD 12.7 billion in 2021-22, while multilateral providers more than tripled their support from USD 4.6 billion (2013-14) to USD 16.3 billion (2021-22). A large part of this increase was provided in the form of loans, especially to contexts facing high fragility that had greater access to lending over the period than those facing extreme fragility. Caution is required around the limited fiscal space many contexts have to service their debt and respond to environmental shocks (OECD, 2023[6]). While this shift towards lending has allowed the rapid expansion of climate-related development financing globally, especially for mitigation, it comes at a cost: borrowing, especially on non-concessional terms, can prove challenging in the face of high to extreme fragility.
The more fragility a country experiences, the less climate-related development finance it receives. Despite the overall increase, most climate-related development finance continues going to contexts experiencing medium to low fragility. In 2021-22, DAC members allocated about 25.6% of their climate-related development finance to contexts experiencing high and extreme fragility but only 5.3% to contexts with extreme fragility. For high to extreme fragility contexts, the main multilateral providers of climate-related development finance are traditional multilateral development banks (MDBs) rather than vertical funds.
Note: Only mines visited after 2015 were included in the artisanal and small-scale mining category which covers Eastern DRC. ‘Other’ includes several minerals (amethyst, cobalt, manganese, mixed minerals, pyrochlore sapphire and tourmaline). Climate-related commitments refer to concessional and developmental as well as not concessional or not primarily developmental flows from DAC members.
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1; OECD (2024[7]), Development finance for climate and environment, Related Data - Recipient perspective, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html; EM-DAT (2024[8]), International Disaster Database, https://public.emdat.be/; UNHCR (2025[9]), Operational data portal: Democratic Republic of the Congo, https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/cod; Davies, Engström and Öberg (2024[10]), “Organized violence 1989-2023, and the prevalence of organized crime groups”, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241262912; Sundberg and Melander (2013[11]), “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313484347; IPIS (2025[12]), Open Data Artisanal mining site visits in Eastern DRC, https://ipisresearch.be/home/maps-data/open-data/.
Making the Humanitarian Development Peace nexus work in a fragmented landscape
The rising violence and geopolitical instability discussed in Chapter 1 underscore the importance of striving to ensure that actors across the HDP nexus seek ways to maximise the sum of their parts. As noted in Chapter 2, fragility profiles differ significantly across contexts, and the six dimensions of fragility are highly interconnected. These show the need for tailored, context-specific approaches across the range of humanitarian, development and peace activities. Each context, on the other hand, contends with a changing and diverse constellation of aid channels, donors and donor policies. The interaction of donors and partners through their respective systems can in part be understood through their allocation of resources and their ability to adapt to the requirements of working in contexts with high levels of fragility.
Aid allocation and fragility are not correlated
The allocation of ODA across the HDP nexus does not always align with the degree of exposure to fragility at the regional or context level, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. The mix of ODA across the HDP nexus often highlights imbalances and blind spots in donor approaches, but also signs of progress. The share of humanitarian ODA in DAC members’ total ODA in contexts facing extreme fragility jumped from one-quarter in 2012 to one-half in 2023. A similar trend is playing out in contexts facing high fragility, where humanitarian ODA increased by a third, from USD 4.6 billion in 2020 to USD 6.1 billion in 2023. (Ethiopia and West Bank and Gaza illustrate this shift). These trends align with global ODA increases for humanitarian purposes, which more than tripled from USD 11.9 billion in 2012 to USD 40 billion in 2023, with USD 28.4 billion provided by DAC members.
Several contexts facing extreme fragility that are conflict affected, among them the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia, and receive large volumes of humanitarian ODA, though Somalia’s decreasing fragility suggests that development assistance is addressing crucial elements of resilience (Chapter 4). Protecting such gains, retaining support for the basics of development and enabling the private sector will be significant elements of sustainable transition approaches away from extreme fragility in contexts such as Somalia. Some contexts, for instance Iraq, also appear to be responding to sustained development co-operation, making real progress on building resilience (Chapter 4). Development ODA continues to flow even to some politically constrained environments facing extreme fragility, notably Afghanistan, Myanmar and Syria.
Note: Fragility is ordered in the same order as Infographic 2.1 in Chapter 2.
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
DAC members’ systems are still adapting to be fit for fragility
The way ODA is allocated across the HDP nexus in contexts with high and extreme fragility points to missed opportunities for more joined-up approaches across and between the different pillars of the nexus (Figure 3.6). Outdated and inconsistent practices continue to be an issue, especially where donor co-ordination is lacking. For example, fragmented and transaction-heavy approaches to budgets, resource allocation systems, or accounting and oversight (Institute for State Effectiveness, 2017[13]) often overwhelm and confuse institutions with low capacity in many contexts with high and extreme fragility, generating frustrations and inefficiencies. The changing ambitions of contexts with high and extreme fragility, outlined in Chapter 1, make it imperative to address these issues to support more durable partnerships.
Progress is possible, and efforts spearheaded by the international community in Yemen over the past few years, for example, show how better co-ordination, dialogue and alignment of different approaches to development can help international partners provide financing and expertise that is more strategic and consistent with the needs of the partner government (OECD DAC/INCAF, 2023[14]).
Likewise, many DAC members are adapting their systems to capture the benefits of fragility analysis to drive more informed, targeted and aligned approaches in contexts with high and extreme fragility. Despite the magnitude of the challenges in many such contexts, many OECD DAC members are rising to the task and demonstrating commitment and innovation to find effective responses to the drivers of fragility. A prime example is Korea, which has restructured its development co-operation architecture, partnered with multinational organisations to implement programmes, and increased its budget for support to contexts facing high and extreme fragility by nearly fourfold (Box 3.3).
In 2024, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) introduced transformative changes in its programme for contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility and conflict, recognising that persistent humanitarian needs are deeply embedded in cycles of fragility and require a systemic response. Korea's primary objective was to address the structural drivers of fragility by fully operationalising the HDP nexus across its programme portfolio. To achieve this, three key measures were implemented: a significant budget increase, a comprehensive restructuring of the administrative architecture and the adoption of innovative approaches to programme delivery.
A nearly fourfold Increase in the budget
To respond to the surging demand for humanitarian assistance, it is essential to address the structural issues in high and extreme fragility contexts and prevent conflicts at their root. Stable budget allocation is crucial for ensuring the success of this preventative approach. Korea’s budget for supporting contexts with high and extreme fragility and conflict through KOICA nearly quadrupled in 2024 compared with 2023, rising from USD 25.25 million to USD 94.88 million. By leveraging the expanded budget, Korea has established a foundation for integrated and long-term support to respond to drivers of fragility. This approach not only addresses the persistent shortage of humanitarian funding but also aligns with the OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus.
Comprehensive restructuring of its administrative architecture
In early 2024, KOICA undertook a comprehensive restructuring of its administrative architecture for supporting contexts with high and extreme fragility and conflict. This involved elevating the status of the department responsible for humanitarian aid and the HDP nexus and establishing a team dedicated exclusively to supporting country programmes.
Prior to these changes, KOICA's projects were dispersed across multiple teams based on regional divisions. The absence of a dedicated unit resulted in the lack of a comprehensive and consistent strategy to effectively address fragility in priority contexts. However, with the launch of the new specialised team in 2024, a single team started to manage previously fragmented projects under a unified strategy. This change has also enabled the conceptualisation of new project models integrating fragility considerations.
Additionally, the humanitarian aid division was upgraded from a department to a bureau, with three parallel sub-units established under it: the Humanitarian Aid Office, the Emergency Response Team, and the Conflict, Fragility and HDP Nexus Team. This restructuring laid the foundation for moving beyond conceptual discussions of the HDP nexus and enabling its practical implementation and application within projects.
Comprehensive overhaul of project implementation methods
KOICA also has reformed its project implementation approach to include transitioning to long-term projects, scaling up individual projects, actively utilising multilateral channels and ensuring budgetary flexibility through the formation of regional projects.
Previously, KOICA’s projects in contexts with high and extreme fragility and conflict were conducted in isolated, stand-alone formats that targeted single countries and had an average duration of three years. This fragmented approach limited the effectiveness of interventions, often leading to short-term engagements that ended prematurely. Additionally, there was no dedicated strategy for selecting and concentrating on specific dimensions of fragility where Korea could provide meaningful contributions.
To overcome these challenges, KOICA restructured its project formation and implementation methods starting with new projects in 2024. The first step involved selecting and focusing on six key areas of fragility, with one or two programmes implemented within each area. The six areas are strengthening political, economic, and social integration within communities; enhancing community capacity for conflict prevention and management; reintegration of conflict-affected areas; fostering civil peacebuilding; addressing vulnerabilities in high-risk areas affected by climate change and natural disasters; and, finally, strengthening capacity to respond to food crises.
In total, KOICA has established eight programmes aligned with these dimensions, actively utilising the expertise of multilateral channels to ensure the most effective execution. Specifically, each of the eight programmes has been matched with a key partner organisation for implementation: the International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Population Fund, UN Children’s Fund, World Food Programme, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and International Committee of the Red Cross. KOICA has established strategic partnerships with these eight organisations in consideration of their specialty and comparative advantage in sub-areas.
Each of the eight programmes consists of one or two regional projects, with each regional project supporting up to four countries. Unlike the previous stand-alone projects that focused on single countries, the new programme-based model accommodates cross-border interventions. This approach reflects the fact that fragility transcends national boundaries and also promotes flexibility in budget management across countries by supporting multiple countries within a region. Moreover, each programme adopts a long-term perspective with a focus on preventive approaches to conflict. These long-term programmes have durations of up to nine to ten years and are implemented in three phases. The initial phase lasts two to three years, after which project outcomes are assessed and findings are incorporated into the subsequent phase for continued implementation. KOICA’s shift to a multilateral, programme-based model enhances budgetary flexibility, ensures sustained engagement, and promotes more effective conflict prevention and resilience-building efforts.
Source: Contributed in 2025 by the Conflict, Fragility and HDP Nexus Team at KOICA.
As highlighted in Chapter 1, relationships between development providers and recipients are being challenged by competing political, economic and security approaches. This section considers three areas of engagement with significant implications for how donors and partners respond to drivers of fragility: conflict prevention, working in politically constrained environments and staying engaged in core economic systems, including the private sector.
Despite sustained increases in organised violence and the strength of the arguments and the business case for conflict prevention presented in the Pathways for Peace report by the UN and World Bank (2018[15]), the response has been uneven and underwhelming (World Bank Group, 2023[16]). In particular, there has been little progress on the Pathways for Peace recommendation that security and development approaches should be compatible, aligned and mutually supportive. OECD analysis conducted in 2023 highlighted a range of trends associated with peace and conflict prevention that suggest a substantial rethink is required if the conceptual potential of conflict prevention is to be translated into operational effectiveness (OECD, 2023[4]).
The good news is that there are a number of organisations and individuals examining different parts of the prevention conundrum. The pressure they all face is the urgent need for a political or operational breakthrough. This first subsection identifies the main challenges associated with prevention – measuring impact, resourcing what works, making development work for prevention, and packaging prevention analysis for political and operational decision making. Box 3.5 sets the stage with a review of what conflict prevention entails.
This report broadly adheres to the understanding of conflict prevention as defined by Lund (2023[17]): “any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed force, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflicts for resolving such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those issues and disputes”. It accepts that preventive action can occur at any stage of a conflict cycle and agrees with the view that prevention is uniquely forward looking and focused on anticipating and addressing a crisis before it has fully manifested (Minor, 2024, p. 8[18]).
Distinguishing different and relevant types of action is an often difficult yet essential aspect of effective conflict prevention. Fundamentally, this means acknowledging the conceptual distinction between proactive efforts that are undertaken before significant violence has arisen at all – and where fragility analysis can play an important role in identifying combinations of pressure and resilience – and reactive efforts undertaken after armed conflict has ensued (Lund, 2023[17]). Three generally accepted categories are applied here:
direct conflict prevention including dispute resolution, mediation, ceasefires, peace agreements and incentives without using violence, and immediate measures in the face of crisis to mitigate triggers and drivers of escalation
structural conflict prevention focused on efforts to address the drivers of conflict to ensure that violent conflict does not arise in the first place or if it does, that it does not reoccur
systemic conflict prevention focused on transnational factors such as arms sales, illicit financial flows, and organised crime or environmental degradation.
Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2020[19]), “Exploring peace within the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HPDN)”, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/humanitarian-development-collaboration/issue-paper-exploring-peace-within-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-hdpn.
Alleviating the conundrum of measuring conflict prevention
The collective inability to bring the debate on measuring prevention to an operationally feasible conclusion is a substantial impediment to progress. This issue impacts more on the structural and systemic approaches to conflict prevention, where presenting the case for policy and political support is hardest and where concerns persist about allocating resources to addressing crises that may never happen (Mueller et al., 2024, p. 18[20]). There is nothing new about this, but the reluctance to broaden the debate beyond causation and consider pragmatic options to prevent conflict is leaving many donors and partners struggling to respond or adapt to crisis, ceding initiative to others (as noted in Chapter 1). However, analytical progress is being made and a stronger evidence base is emerging to strengthen arguments for preventive action.
The innovative UN Peacebuilding Impact Hub (UN, 2024[21]) and the UNDP Crisis Offer are conceptually and operationality significant, with the former gathering and synthesising valuable data on impact and effectiveness and the latter clearly pointing to the potential for development actors to play a stronger role. Other equally relevant changes have been introduced: across IFIs, especially within their respective fragility strategies, and among countries including France, the United Kingdom and the United States that are investing in new versions of stabilisation, prevention and development doctrine. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and data analytics for prevention (Mema, Lamont and Diogenes, 2024[22]), including foresight, are also gaining momentum, and much of the analysis points to the potential for more upstream prevention and the associated goods that can go with it including for addressing multidimensional drivers of fragility. For example, there is a possibility to strengthen social safety nets aligned with conflict prevention through employment programmes (Mueller et al., 2024, p. 29[20]). Each of these approaches and ideas connects with thinking on fragility, resilience and development. Together, they provide alternative options to address or work around the measuring conflict prevention impasse.
Fragility analysis as a building block for measuring prevention
Working with the findings of fragility analysis as a means to measure policy impact over time offers a good enough base from which to consider the impact of prevention policies in most contexts. While it is important to acknowledge that analysing fragility has not advanced sufficiently to attribute causation, as analytical capacity improves in areas such as subnational fragility analysis, the potential to provide more nuanced pictures to inform upstream prevention should grow. The application of fragility analysis for conflict prevention can help identify the states of fragility that development actors can most usefully target as a means to alleviate upstream drivers of conflict; this application is consistent with resilience-driven approaches and can complement direct and more traditional structural approaches to conflict prevention.
Even where causation is uncertain, the value of reducing fragility in its own right – including as a public good – should be a sufficient basis for more proactive development action. Reducing fragility helps address the risk from a variety of shocks and types of potential crises, including conflict. While direct conflict prevention approaches are more focused on political and security concerns, fragility analysis has the particular advantage of uncovering upstream drivers across all six dimensions of fragility. In this regard, measures to reduce fragility can be consistent with those applied for structural and systemic conflict prevention. In the current geopolitical context, this matters as much for contexts with no immediate history of violent conflict as for those that appear trapped in generational cycles of conflict.
OECD research conducted for this report found, unsurprisingly, that the political and security dimensions of fragility were most closely correlated to the trajectory of a descent to armed conflict or high levels of violence. As shown in Figure 2.20 in Chapter 2, analysing cross-dimensional intersections helps uncover combinations of drivers of fragility that can matter for conflict in a given context. Addressing risks and building coping capacities across these combinations fall most often within the development sphere. Recent analysis for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also points to this potential, where the assumption “that estimating conflict risk is equivalent to ascertaining the extent to which a country is exposed to fragility” was found to be a valuable way to capture the unique multidimensionality of profiles across a “continuum of fragility from countries which are in stable peace to countries suffering from open violence” (Mueller et al., 2024, p. 8[20]).
Direct conflict prevention: Resources are weakest where the need and evidence for effectiveness are strongest
The international appetite for direct prevention measures appears to be on the decline despite a number of positive outcomes over the last 30 years, among them the Economic Community of West African States diplomatic intervention in Gambia in 2017, the UN deployment of the preventive peacekeeping mission UNPREDEP to the Republic of North Macedonia (then Macedonia) during the 1990s, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations mediation of the territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple between 2008-11, to name just a few.
DAC members’ ODA for conflict prevention, a subset of peace ODA, decreased as a share of total ODA in contexts affected by high and extreme fragility since 2014. In 2023, ODA for conflict prevention to these contexts amounted to less than 4% of total DAC ODA (USD 1.7 billion). A ten-year record low investment in preventing crises was reached in 2022 (with only slightly higher numbers in 2023). This is at odds with the volume of spending from DAC members in reaction to some of the most acute symptoms of crises in developing countries, with around USD 62 billion disbursed on humanitarian assistance and in-donor refugee costs in 2023. Consider that in 2023, the economic cost of violence for the ten most affected countries, among them seven contexts experiencing high to extreme fragility, ranged from 21.3% to 68.6% of their gross domestic product (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024, p. 3[23]). Given the proven cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention and the increasing necessity, why has there been so little progress?
Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
The structural trends outlined in Chapter 1 have undoubtedly complicated thinking on strategic options for peace, creating the potential to overload dependencies on other instruments of foreign, defence and development policy. Additionally, a more diverse set of actors have assumed significant responsibility for peace mediation and peacebuilding – bilaterally, individually and in concert. The motivations of these actors vary, ranging from mirroring UN approaches to more transactional approaches (Hellmüller and Salaymeh, 2025[24]). These trends and practices appear to be driving the decline of support for instruments capable of mitigating the worst impacts of conflict, leaving vacuums that belligerent actors can exploit through the instrumentalisation of fragility.
The decreased appetite for peacekeeping is one example of shifting state preferences despite evidence on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping instrument (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2019[25]; Wane, Williams and Kihara-Hunt, 2024[26]). Funding shortfalls are one of a number of reasons why peacekeeping missions are struggling to fulfil mandates. This is an especially pressing issue for African Union peace support missions, where operational and logistical capabilities are falling short of requirements (UN, 2023[27]).The reliance on a small number of donors to fund the bulk of peace activities is an additional point of vulnerability. The United States (27.89%) is the largest funder of UN peacekeeping, followed by China (15.21%) (UN, 2024[28]). More broadly, already vulnerable peace financing is heavily dependent on the United States, the EU and Germany. Together, these three donors provided almost 58% of DAC members’ total peace spending in 2023. Facing these issues, multilateral organisations, especially the UN, are now challenged to reassert and reimagine their place and function. Addressing the resources shortfalls for direct prevention is one step, and this is an area where mediation, building state capacity and peacekeeping interventions have a proven track record (Hegre and Nygård, 2017[29]; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024[30]). Addressing the untapped potential of upstream systemic and structural conflict prevention is arguably the bigger challenge as it confronts established siloes across development and peace structures.
Structural and systemic conflict prevention: the preventative value of development
ODA can contribute to sustaining peace, a concept developed by the UN as central to a holistic approach to preventing the outbreak and recurrence of conflict.9 By extension, development activities can and should be a central component of upstream (structural) and systemic conflict prevention. Considering structural and systemic pressures and the nature of political settlements is an important step towards adapting policies to deliver growth and development – i.e. the idea “that peace will only succeed if it has serious economic underpinnings” (Dercon, 2023, p. 190[31]) and where development focus is concentrated in areas where the needs of a country’s population, from education to safety nets, are largely unmet (Dercon, 2023, p. 317[31]). Consistent with the structural emphasis on drivers of conflict and fragility, the scope for measures with, or contributing to, preventive impact should thus extend beyond the peace community to development actors. This connects with approaches for building resilience, though both must be adapted to the relevant political narratives for potential donors and partners (Minor, 2024, p. 32[18]). As is the case for financial and economic interventions in contexts with high and extreme exposure to fragility, ensuring the positive peace impact of ODA requires deep contextual knowledge of the drivers of fragility, complemented by conflict sensitivity, real-time political economy analysis and sufficient agility to respond to changing circumstances. For example, addressing the inequalities affecting women exposed to conflict and high and extreme fragility is crucial for preventive measures aimed at building more stable and peaceful societies (Goemans and Loudon, 2021, pp. 6-7[32]). Crucially, peace investments must also acknowledge and as far as possible engage with the reality and potential of local political settlements where legitimate and longstanding issues around local authority and ownership of peace and development processes (Campbell, 2018[33]).
There is a tendency among many donors to see peace funding and policy as distinct from development policy and practices. This distinction is compromising both peace and development effectiveness in addressing fragility. The data on ODA trends in contexts exposed to fragility suggest that any financing and efforts for conflict prevention that were already low in 2017 (UN; World Bank, 2018, p. xxvii[15]) are even lower today. This unwillingness to engage contrasts with growing evidence on the value of approaches in the structural and systemic space where the impact of employment programmes – demobilising and reintegrating combatants (Blattman and Annan, 2016[34]) or youth-focused initiatives such as those highlighted by the Vice President of Colombia, Francia Márquez, in Chapter 4 – can directly challenge the incentives to use violence highlighted in chapters 1 and 2 of this report. In more recent analysis, Mueller et al. (2024, pp. 20-22[20]) present compelling evidence for how macroeconomic policies can support and address these issues by reducing violence in part through employment opportunities that also tend reduce fragility.
Packaging prevention analysis for those in power: changing the peace offer
Clear messaging and well-organised evidence of the value of conflict prevention are essential. Communications will vary according to the context and the type of prevention approach required to reduce the potential for armed conflict and violence. Restating the case for development as a multipurpose instrument of statecraft, and where appropriate as a component of effective foreign policy (Chapter 1), can lay the groundwork for communicating the reasons for supporting conflict prevention. If the analytical potential exists, how can it be used to drive conflict prevention fit for current challenges?
On an analytical level, the ecosystem of frameworks and indices offers a valuable comparable resource to inform the policies of humanitarian, development and peace (including security) actors. There is however a significant organisational challenge: harnessing the upstream value of fragility analysis, the current value of impact analysis and the potential of subnational fragility analysis alongside predictive, foresight, and scenario-based tools. To meet the challenge requires building a complementary and open system capable of producing synthesised analysis to inform and guide policies of all actors.
Again, there are positive developments that point to the potential for more analytically grounded, accessible and impactful approaches for conflict prevention. For example, the introduction of ten-year strategies to prevent conflict and promote stability in six contexts under 2019 US Global Fragility Act considers many of the issues highlighted in this chapter and positions the United States to lead new-era preventive approaches geared to geopolitical realities and increased self-sufficiency for partner contexts. Similarly, the application of risk and resilience assessments by the World Bank and African Development Bank is informing the development of more tailored solutions. Programmes to address crisis prevention (de Greiff, 2024[35]) and UN support for national prevention strategies also are the kinds of innovation that will be necessary to increase the likelihood of a breakthrough (Christianson, Herdt and Nadolny, 2023[36]; Kumskova and Hilbert, 2024[37]).
UN leadership on prevention will also be crucial, especially as it considers the future offer of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund. In this regard, how the UN Peacebuilding Commission develops its prevention offer, including the thinking on national prevention strategies, will be a significant reference point for future implementation of prevention approaches. The conceptual strength of a strategy for conflict prevention rests on its ability to connect with and complement existing efforts that address the form and causes of violence and its ability to identify unattended gaps that require attention. These include identifying what parts of existing structures and approaches have value for preventive effect. Three issues must be addressed if that value of strategic thinking on conflict prevention is to be protected: the bureaucratic burden on countries, conceptual sensitivity around prevention strategies and the need for context-specific knowledge.
Adapting approaches for conflict prevention
First, the capacity to implement policies towards strategic goals varies considerably while acknowledging that some countries, among them Kenya, Timor-Leste and South Africa have enacted or integrated aspects of national prevention strategies (Forcada and Monnier, 2024[38]). In many contexts with high and extreme fragility, there can often be a proliferation of national strategies – on development, economic recovery, security and other issues – that places a bureaucratic burden on already limited capacity at state and local levels with the real risk of diminishing policy returns. Prevention as a stand-alone strategy will often struggle against more established and accepted state and regional processes. To protect the value of the content, it may be necessary to reconceive the offer to make it accessible, acceptable and workable for all actors, donors and partners alike. The application of strategic prioritisation exercises can be a useful way for contexts to ensure the appropriate balance of capacity to strategic goals (OECD DAC/INCAF, 2023, p. 29[14]).
Second, the concept of a prevention strategy can be problematic in some contexts where the perception that such a strategy is needed can be viewed as stigmatising in much the same way that a label of fragile can be perceived. Understanding the political settlement within which a strategy is expected to work is key to building an approach that may not require a formal strategy per se and creating a new framework for either donors or partners (Monnier and Scherrer, 2024, pp. 11-14[39]). In this regard, the idea of prevention strategies as “a system of efforts at multiple levels and stakeholders to address a comprehensive set of risk and protective factors for all forms of violence” has significant potential (Monnier and Scherrer, 2024, p. 16[39]). This would allow the value of prevention to be integrated across established frameworks, which would minimise the risk of unnecessarily adding to the administrative burden through strategy multiplication or duplication; be politically more sensitive; and offer the advantage of diversifying the measurement indicators, especially those associated with structural or systemic prevention.
Third, good strategy depends on tailored approaches for external factors actively opposing or disrupting progress towards desired outcomes: It accommodates the reality that plans rarely proceed in a sequenced manner. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the profiles of contexts with high and extreme fragility are diverse and dynamic. In several contexts, state and non-state economic objectives intersect with violent means, reflecting the fact that violence is not just an outcome but a choice. As seen in the analysis on coups in Chapter 2, the incentives to use violence can be a strong driver in the relationships between violence and economic activity (Blattman and Annan, 2016[34]). It can also be reflected in the loss of political control due to diminished resilience across vital state capacities such as control of territory, fiscal capacity and revenue collection. Strategies must therefore be calibrated to integrate responses to specific issues for certain contexts, such as high levels of gender-based violence, transnational organised crime (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2024[40]), or specific presentations of urban fragility and violence.
Building networks for delivering on conflict prevention
As risks accumulate and resilience degrades, no one factor is responsible for violence (Monnier and Scherrer, 2024[39]). Integrating thinking on prevention across existing policies and strategies, including those focused on resilience in economic, societal, environmental and human dimensions, could significantly help donors and partners move beyond the so-called projectised approaches that treat conflict prevention as something distinct from development.
Operational progress for enacting conflict prevention depends on delivering the right analysis at the right time to the most appropriate actors in the development and peace space. In a competitive geopolitical landscape, networked approaches for conflict prevention can be an integrated part of new development co-operation partnerships. The innovation of the UN Peacebuilding Impact Hub was an important step towards a more networked approach to knowledge and practice for peacebuilding, including conflict prevention. The hub is already proving its worth, including its particularly valuable function for mapping and sharing information on good practices. Scaling that capacity to include new approaches to upstream conflict prevention that can identify and support the prevention value of development approaches could provide the stimulus necessary for more actors within and outside the UN system to respond to prevention analysis.
However, in many contexts, the UN is not in the lead or can have a limited role in influencing conversations relevant to either direct or structural and system prevention. This is most apparent where local actors and their external allies prefer to work in parallel tracks. Adapting networked approaches to conflict prevention in such situations will require bilateral leadership with close support from organisations with relevant access in a given context, such as regional organisations, bilateral actors and financial institutions. This will be an important aspect for finding approaches that address structural prevention as well as systemic prevention and are capable of informing responses to intersecting transnational challenges such as food insecurity, economic stress, climate change, migration, gender inequality and humanitarian needs. Giving political leaders a stake in the process and potential outcomes – i.e. the costs and benefits of acting or not acting (Bernhagen, 2013[41]) – is another way of increasing political visibility, investment and traction.
The pressing need to mitigate the policy and operational dissonance in support to the security sector
The support for security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) stands as a useful point of reference for the current limitations and future potential of conflict prevention. For all contexts, a well-governed security sector can help strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the state and foster trust and societal resilience (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2024, p. 4[40]). Where this dynamic is compromised or absent, supporting SSR/G is a frequently core component of building governance resilience based on how security and justice sectors support sustainable development and peace. For donors, support of SSR/G exemplifies how investing in peace can protect not just sustained engagement on development but also facilitate the effective management of other instruments of state, particular where defence and security assists are being used to delivery security sector assistance.
The delivery of security sector assistance (SSA) without or with insufficient support for SSR/G can lead to unintended consequences. Increased military capacity in the absence of enhanced governance of the security sector may, for example, lead to unconstitutional changes of government, as noted in Chapter 2. The tactical expediency of SSA should not come at the cost of sustainable peace and development objectives. This type of engagement is not limited to the defence sector, and the combination of weak legal, judicial and policing frameworks can also erode the basis for human security in contexts exposed to fragility. In 2023, two-thirds of women in such contexts, and 1.25 billion women worldwide, lacked legal protections against domestic violence.10
Enhancing the funding and operational alignment of SSA and SSR/G activities in contexts experiencing high fragility would serve to mitigate the risk of unintended outcomes (Box 3.6). Progress in this area will depend in part on adapting financial instruments in high fragility contexts to enable better decision making across the security-development nexus. Thinking and practice on ownership of SSG/R also must evolve to address political, operational and financial realities. Existing approaches to building local ownership of peace and development policies frequently fall short due to concerns around donor risk, partner accountability, political will, and competing security and development priorities. The political economy associated with conflict and violence distorts and impedes support for sustainable peace and inclusive development. Constant vulnerability to all forms of violence coupled with limited state capacity undermines the integrity of economic and security systems in contexts exposed to fragility, eroding the basis for peace and development.
Improving the sustainability and predictability of funding for SSR/G is a fundamental enabler of sustainable development. This includes knowing (as far as is possible) what falls outside of the ODA envelope, including to non-state actors, and what this means for partner states’ decision making on SSR/G and SSA. Integrating the comparative advantage of IFIs can help build expertise, embed competence and foster sustainability for SSR/G and SSA. At national levels, evaluation of the funding landscape for the security sector should include a closer examination of the management of debt, revenue and expenditure needed for building more sustainable security sector systems. Effective financial management is essential for the delivery of SSR/G. However, strategies and programming have frequently failed or struggled to pay sufficient attention to public finance issues.
Cohesive security-development strategies among donors and partners are notably absent in contexts experiencing high to extreme fragility, which undermines conflict prevention and restricts the effectiveness of peace and development initiatives. This is reflected in the steady decline of financing for SSG/R. In high and extreme fragility contexts, SSR financing from official donors has been on an overall downward trend since 2015, with an especially marked decrease from 2021 to 2022.
In 2023, DAC members allocated USD 244 million in ODA to security system management and reform in contexts with high and extreme fragility. This volume amounted to 4.6% of their total peace ODA in 2023. This is the second lowest share of DAC ODA for this objective since 2007. A similar trend is evident in financing for SSG/R by official donors, which include multilateral institutions: these donors allocated only 3.1% of their total peace ODA, or USD 249 million to this objective in 2023. Two multilateral actors were among the top ten official donors for security system management and reform in 2023: the EU and the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Together, these two multilateral actors accounted for 34% of all funding allocated to these objectives by official donors in 2023. ODA for security system management and reform is not the only funding relevant to the security sector, as there can be significant overlap between development programmes and security issues. But blind spots on the connections between security and development are compromising partnerships, effectiveness and achievement of objectives. Building on initiatives such as UN-World Bank Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Partnership and forthcoming OECD work on the future of SSR/G, the time is right for a regenerative discussion to guide practice on SSR/G in the coming decades. Broader and deeper dialogue with partner contexts and channelling the comparative advantages of IFIs will be essential parts of this process.
Source: UN (forthcoming[42]), Challenging Thinking on Policy and Funding for Security Sectors in Fragile and Conflict-affected Contexts; OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
As development co-operation increasingly operates within a global context marked by geopolitical competition, climate-related challenges and greater socioeconomic insecurity (Chapter 1), some governments are implementing policies that influence the nature of their relations with other actors. As a result, opportunities for constructive dialogue can be significantly reduced, which impacts the effectiveness and scope of joint development co-operation efforts. In this context, a politically constrained environment refers to the state of a relationship between political entities, for instance between a DAC member government and a partner government or between other actors involved in development co-operation, where the space for and the quality of political dialogue are severely limited, deficient or non-existent. For partner countries, the environment can include, among other features, an undemocratic or unconstitutional change of government, human rights violations, contested elections armed insurgencies, or corruption at scale. The constraints can also stem from decisions, policies or strategic priorities within DAC member countries that affect the nature and openness of the partnership. It becomes a challenge for DAC members to continue supporting sustainable development trajectories and the needs of the population in these situations.
DAC members have expressed their intention to stay engaged in these complex settings (OECD DAC, 2023[43]). Yet doing so in practice requires a candid assessment of the different options and partnerships available, the trade-offs and risks involved and the main drivers of decision making beyond development objectives, and above all a clear understanding of the overarching objective for the decision to stay engaged. In a contested geopolitical environment, it may be tempting to disengage development assistance from contexts that are challenging to work in. But, as discussed in Chapter 1, disengaging can have a significant political and economic cost for DAC members that their partners’ fragility, directly or indirectly, inevitably will continue to impact (Fabre and Spencer Bernard, 2024[44]). Ongoing efforts among DAC members to develop a principles-based approach should help bring much-needed strategic and operational clarity for more astute engagement by humanitarian, development and peace actors. Such an approach could also establish a valuable communications link to foreign and security actors who grapple with similar questions and are themselves limited by political, legal and operational challenges.
A strong knowledge base is essential for decision making relating to politically constrained environments, especially as most are exposed to high or extreme levels of fragility. In cases where political, economic and civil crises compound with other drivers or risks to challenge sources of resilience, and in situations where everything is a priority, fragility analysis can provide the contextual nuance to support the prioritisation and sequencing of ODA support, especially beyond humanitarian interventions. For example, Switzerland has emphasised the monitoring of trajectories of democratic reversals and increased authoritarianism as a means to inform context-adapted responses. Acknowledging that engaging in politically constrained environments comes with dilemmas and trade-offs, Switzerland considers the need to maintain engagement as “more effective and efficient than withdrawing and re-entering in a country” (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2023[45]). Its approach, framed in eight areas for action,11 is tailored to consider the state of political settlement (e.g. creeping and steep democratic backsliding or democratic collapse) with response options that can range from incremental to bold (including being prepared to freeze programmes) and up to the option of seizing programmes (but with a commitment to maintain a minimum level of communications). Given the fragility trends around political, economic and societal fragility discussed in Chapter 2 and learning from Switzerland’s initial experience, the case for a shared set of principles for staying engaged and peer learning from practical experiences is worthy of careful consideration by OECD DAC members.
Many development partners are looking to shift from traditional humanitarian, development and peace approaches to a greater emphasis on promoting inclusive growth (Collier, Besley and Khan, 2017[46]), using a wider variety of financing mechanisms. The development goal of aid then is in building self-reliance over time (Green, 2025[47]). OECD members have long-term interests in seeing that contexts facing high to extreme fragility become increasingly significant trade and investment partners of the future, often alongside the goal of promoting investment opportunities for their companies. Close to 50% of the EU’s Global Gateway countries, for example, are exposed to high and extreme fragility (Fabre and Spencer Bernard, 2024[44]). Attracting investment and increasing jobs are common priorities for both the leadership and the population in these contexts, though this is often accompanied by caution or even activism regarding potential social, political or environmental risks (Chapter 4). The success or failure of such a shift in approach will depend on how well these new investments and approaches are tailored to and address the different dimensions of fragility. It has to be win-win.
Economic development alone is insufficient to exit fragility (OECD, 2022[48]). Thus, partnerships for economic development should be seen not as a stand-alone exercise but as one part of a broader approach to the different dimensions of fragility. While economic growth is likely more effective in reducing monetary poverty than multidimensional poverty, there can be multiple channels of impact depending on the country or sector. Increased agricultural productivity, for example, can decrease food prices and improve nutrition while also increasing incomes for farmers. Investments in nutrition, health and education directly address resilience in the human dimension of fragility. But these can also be seen as a social investment in human capital, future growth and the ability of individuals to participate in the benefits of growth. Within the economic sphere, private sector approaches cannot do the heavy lifting alone: Some of the most important partnerships are those that support basic economic systems and services through periods of crisis or shock.
As both macroeconomic risk and fragility intensify globally, donors and specialist agencies are working to better tailor their interventions to take account of the different dimensions of fragility and support foundational systems and services. The DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility and the OECD have championed the importance of context-specific knowledge and conflict sensitivity in carrying out and adapting financial and economic interventions in contexts with high to extreme exposure to fragility.
In some contexts, access to public decision making or business opportunities in the private sector can be an important form of control and source of power, often more important than the revenue itself. The governance and security challenges discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, can create perverse incentives for elites to sabotage reforms for a more business-friendly environment. Economic assets and institutions can constitute conflict fault-lines that need to be de-instrumentalised – for example, control over the central bank or high value natural resources – and it is not always clear what the role of the international community should be in achieving this.
Yet the ODA trends analysed in this report show that while grants remain critical, ODA alone cannot shoulder the financing needs of contexts facing high and extreme. There is a direct line of sight between the goals of addressing fragility, supporting economic systems, and the financing for development agenda being discussed in 2025 at the 4th International Conference on Financing for Sustainable Development (FfD4) in Seville, Spain.
There is also plentiful evidence that with an appropriate approach, financing for development interventions can contribute to sustainable peace and development in contexts facing high and extreme fragility. In crisis situations, interventions could prioritise the key economic and financial systems that are essential for basic services and social protection and to reduce the risk of economic collapse (Cliffe et al., 2023[49]).But external ODA flows or private investments also bring their own political economy, incentives and potentially unintended consequences. Without a tailored approach, financing for development interventions can at worst cause actual harm, including triggering or contributing to conflict, and at best can miss opportunities and fail to achieve their potential (OECD, 2024[50]; Sonno, 2024[51]).
Support for economic systems, if done well, can be seen as contributing to structural and systemic conflict prevention. These benefits apply as well to other manifestations of fragility. The scope of such support is potentially very large, extending across domestic and international sources of financing and stimulating economic governance and reform as well as trade and investment linkages. Such support could entail: ongoing capacity development and support for systems; policy and political dialogue; mutually beneficial trade, investment and development agreements; and strategic, ad hoc interventions at key times before during, or after different kinds of shock.
Homegrown financial resilience is one of the most effective mechanisms for managing multiple sources of shock, reducing poverty and building resilience to associated risks. There is evidence, for example, that conflict risk drops dramatically with increases in fiscal capacity (Besley and Mueller, 2021[52]; OECD, 2022[48]). But contexts cannot build up their own fiscal capacity in a short period of time, especially during a period of high debt.
Models for engagement by bilateral donors may be changing, but there are important aspects that should be retained. For example, support for public financial management and tax revenues help support the development of social contracts (OECD, 2022[48]). Certain IFIs and bilateral donors have continued to play an important role in staying engaged through budget support operations, sometimes at the sub-national level, even as most bilateral donors have reduced or ended their use of budget support (Infographic 3.3).
Banking and finance sector questions usually receive less attention, especially in contexts facing extreme fragility, where specific instruments may be needed. It is easy to see interventions in these sectors as sequenced after immediate needs. But financial services provide a critical lifeline to businesses and populations in fragile and crisis settings at all times and are also critical to enable humanitarian action. Indeed, humanitarian cash transfers can be leveraged to help develop the enabling environment for later financial markets development and deepening while informal financial services can help build consumer trust in financial products and institutions (Cook et al., 2024[53]; Murray and Fox, 2024[54]).
Trade- and investment-related partnerships could provide additional support for exiting fragility. While generalisations are difficult, contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility generally trade less and at a lower point in the value chain – meaning they are more likely to export primary products than higher-value intermediary or processed products. Trade-related partnerships could involve preferential trade agreements but also trade financing or facilitation, support for reforms (Fleuriet and Vertier, 2024[55]); assistance meeting standards and managing climate impacts; support for economic integration processes (Chapter 1); or engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Many contexts facing high to extreme fragility are pursuing membership of the WTO, which has established a Trade for Peace Programme.12
Tailoring financial and economic interventions to reduce fragility
A policy focus on growth or exports alone will not be enough. How support is delivered, and the type of growth it encourages, is especially important in contexts experiencing high to extreme fragility. Approaches and measures of success need to be carefully calibrated to prioritise inclusion, the social contract and conflict sensitivity considerations, in discussions of debt issues, private investment, taxation and remittances among others.
Equally, stability does not necessarily equal development. Macroeconomic stability is a central goal of many economic partnerships, and is key to reducing fragility. As organisations such as the IMF work to adapt and refine their role, there will be important strategic lessons to learn on how to pursue macro stability and support long term development in contexts of high to extreme fragility. There are cases of impressive macro stability even through challenging periods, but this commitment to certain policy targets does not necessarily mean the foundations are in place to support long-term growth or for the growth gains to be felt by the population at large. Meeting external debt commitments, for example, can mask a build-up of arrears or domestic debt that crowds out access to finance for the economy as a whole. Fiscal consolidation can exacerbate social or political tensions, or erode the social and economic investments with long-term benefits for growth, human development and the green transition.
It will be important to supplement technical expertise, quantitative measures and traditional frameworks in a given policy area with fragility expertise and qualitative, context-specific knowledge. Transplanting best practices from elsewhere may be ineffective and even damaging, distracting institutions that are thinly spread. Tailoring and adaptability are especially important since these types of interventions – fiscal consolidation, raising taxes, trade openness, job creation, coverage of social safety nets – can be deeply controversial. The payoffs from structural reforms are therefore likely greatest when they are carefully sequenced and reflect a reasonably broad community understanding and social consensus (Budina et al., 2023[56]).
Economic interventions can provide strategic opportunities, and should not be considered purely transactional or technical exercises left exclusively to technical agencies or donor co-ordination groups. Private sector development approaches or large macro packages can provide entry points for policy and political dialogue that may not otherwise be available. And there is a strong case for institutionalising political as well as technical-level discussions on macroeconomic developments between specialist agencies and the donorship at large, in a confidential setting if need be. Important stresses or surprises - the payment of civil servant salaries, the meeting of policy triggers to disperse funds, the impact of shocks on inflation - can have significant knock-on impacts to humanitarian, development and peace systems.
Source: Sonno (2024[51]), “Globalization and conflicts: The good, the bad and the ugly of corporations in Africa”, https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae103; Mueller et al. (2024[20]), "The urgency of conflict prevention – A macroeconomic perspective", https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400293832.001; Thompson and Brien (forthcoming[57]), “Resilience, peace, and private sector development”; Data source for bottom graph; Elgin et al. (2021[58]) Understanding informality”, https://cepr.org/publications/dp16497; OECD (2024[2]), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/z1.
DAC members increasingly use private sector instruments and partnerships to complement more traditional approaches to development co-operation, using aid to support enabling environment reform as well as private investments13 (de Mello e Souza, 2021[59]). Meanwhile, contexts facing extreme to high fragility need investment and high-quality employment opportunities (Basile and Neunuebel, 2019[60]; Thompson, 2020[61]).
Most development finance institutions (DFIs) and private sector tools were developed for stable middle-income countries (Infographic 3.3). Consequently, even when applied to high fragility contexts, they tend to focus on certain types of transactions in the most stable locations. DFIs tend to have limited opportunities to invest in fragile contexts: economies are small, economic activity is limited, large investments are few, and environmental, social and governance and business integrity risks can be high. Unlike other forms of development co-operation, many private sector or blending operations cannot simply be wound down. An equity stake, guarantee or lending agreement generally implies a long-term relationship.
Despite these challenges there is wide recognition that the private sector is a critical source of resilience, facilitating access to key basic services even when government services are limited. Moreover, local firms persist even in extreme circumstances, and OECD research suggests there is a high degree of private sector dynamism and opportunity in many if not most contexts facing high to extreme fragility. The example of leveraging the private sector to build resilience in the DRC discusses some of the opportunities and challenges in (Chapter 4).
Local knowledge is key and can be supported by local partners or humanitarian, development and peace actors with substantial field presence. There is significant variation in opportunity and risk between contexts and within the same context. Analysis of risk, for example, illustrates that country-level risk premia are not good indicators and that subnational and sectoral analysis can be a more accurate way of assessing risks (Sonno et al., 2024[62]). Generalised and inaccurate perceptions of risk have real financial consequences, affecting access to capital, the price of financing, and the volume of FDI flows (Wilke et al., 2024[63]; Sonno et al., 2025 (forthcoming)[64])
Private sectors facing high to extreme fragility are not monolithic phenomena, and they are not all good or all bad, appropriate or inappropriate as partners. (Box 3.7) They are complex social phenomena that serve a variety of distinct functions and that can vary hugely in activities and actors between locations and sectors. Even in situations of active violent conflict, economic activity does not come to a halt. Rather, the economic structure evolves, and its agents adapt to the needs, opportunities and necessities of the circumstances. For example, different experts distinguish between the “coping economy” that sustains the livelihood of the population; the “shadow economy” that is unregulated and may be illicit, the “combat economy” that directly supports the conflict itself (Goodhand, 2004[65]; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005[66]); and the “legitimacy economy” (Huddleston and Wood, 2021[67]) where the mobilisation of economic resources by authorities is used to enhance local legitimacy. Huddleston and Wood (2021[67]) for example argue that economic activities should be evaluated and enabled or inhibited depending on three criteria: whether they are exploited by security and political actors to reinforce their dominance over society without accountability, whether they enable activities that promote peace, and whether they provide value to people in terms of income and life essentials.
Not all growth is equal. The kind of private sector that are most effective for reducing fragility and poverty is a matter of debate, and these opportunities will vary from context to context (Box 3.7). DAC members are supporting fundamental research into public policy and economic growth to reduce fragility and conflict (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2024[68]).
Private sector dynamics vary significantly by context and sector, and the analysis in this box should be read as a summary of general trends only. While challenges are often significant, OECD research reports a high degree of private sector dynamism in many if not most contexts facing high to extreme fragility and a clear prioritisation of private sector development by leaders.
According to OECD research, in contexts facing high to extreme fragility contexts, agriculture and industry make up an even larger proportion of the economy than in other developing economies and services make up a smaller proportion. In economies facing high and extreme fragility more than in economies facing low to medium fragility, there is a mismatch between the sectoral composition of the economy and sectoral composition of the workforce (Thompson and Brien, forthcoming[57]).
In contexts with fragility, 40% of the total workforce is employed in (usually low productivity) agriculture – double the share in other developing contexts. In high and extreme fragility contexts, on average more than 60% of employment is informal compared with just over 40% in other developing contexts experiencing medium to low fragility, and in 19 high and extreme fragility contexts, more than 80% of the workforce is employed in the informal sector (Thompson and Brien, forthcoming[57]).
This means that people stay stuck in underemployment in low productivity sectors with limited opportunity, especially subsistence agriculture. On average, informality is more pervasive in contexts facing high to extreme fragility compared to contexts facing low to medium fragility (Thompson and Brien, forthcoming[57]). Across all types of contexts, women as well as relatively younger, older and less educated workers are more likely to be employed informally, and informal firms rarely formalise, despite this being a common policy priority (Ohnsorge and Yu, 2022[69]).
OECD research suggests that even within similar industries, firm size is smaller in contexts with high and extreme fragility than in developing contexts with medium to low exposure for reasons that are more likely related to distortions in their economy than their level of development or income (Thompson and Brien, forthcoming[57]). In contexts facing high and extreme fragility, many businesses are coping capacities for people who are underemployed due to a lack of quality employment opportunities, and who may undertake a mix of wage work, agriculture and self-employment (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007[70]). Outside of state-owned enterprises, there is also a missing top of large firms that in other economies are more likely to export, be off-takers for primary and intermediate goods from smaller firms, and invest more and pay their workers more (Ciani et al., 2020[71]).
In World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank Group, 2024[72]),14 access to finance is among the major obstacles most frequently identified by respondents in contexts with high and extreme fragility, with more than 40% of companies in high fragility contexts and more than 60% in extreme fragility contexts at least partially credit constrained. Lack of reliable electricity and political instability also rank as among the biggest obstacles, with more than 70% of firms saying they experience electrical outages compared with 50% in other developing contexts with medium to low fragility. Businesses in contexts facing high and extreme fragility also report confronting higher levels of corruption across the board than businesses in other developing contexts with lower fragility. More than 20% of businesses reported at least some bribery incidence; nearly one in five reported that a gift or informal payment is required to secure government contracts, for operating and import licences and construction permits, or to obtain electrical and water connections (Thompson and Brien, forthcoming[57]).
Source: Thompson and Brien (forthcoming[57]), “Resilience, peace, and private sector development”; Ohnsorge and Yu (eds) (2022[69]), The Long Shadow of Informality: Challenges and Policies, https://hdl.handle.net/10986/35782; Ulyssea (2020[73]), "Informality: Causes and consequences for development", https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082119-121914; Banerjee and Duflo (2007[70]), "The economic lives of the poor", https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.1.141.
Donors, DFIs, and local partners and governments have high momentum and commitment. This is evidenced by the fact that despite the obstacles, some investments are being made. Public investments in support of the private sector and mobilisation of private sector funds become more limited the more fragile the context – but they do still happen (Infographic 3.3). Many multilateral and bilateral DFIs and MDBs have made policy commitments to increase their portfolios in contexts of high to extreme fragility, and specific initiatives or instruments have been established in recent years, such as the IDA-IFC-MIGA Private Sector Window (IDA, 2024[74]), the UNHCR-IFC Joint Initiative (UN Refugee Agency, 2022[75]) and the African Development Bank’s work on Peace Finance (Box 3.8). Humanitarian actors are looking to alternate financial mechanisms, included blended finance approaches, in a bid to complement or replace traditional grant funding by private investors or pension funds (Farber et al., 2024[76]; Overseas Development Institute, 2024[77]). DAC members have put forward ambitious roadmaps for mobilising private capital and supporting trade and economic transformation (UK International Development, 2023[78]; European Commission, 2023[79]). Bilateral DFIs such as British International Investment, FMO and Proparco have become vocal about the need to undertake investments into contexts facing high and extreme fragility and the challenges associated with doing so (Proparco, 2024[80]), supported by initiatives such as the Humanitarian and Resilience Investing Initiative initiated by the World Economic Forum (2025[81]) and the Africa Resilience Investment Accelerator15 (Infante and Kucharski, 2024[82]).
As noted, new forms of economic partnerships in contexts with high and extreme fragility can succeed only if they are designed with a context’s features and fragilities in mind. A common theme is the need to work within the specificities and opportunities of the individual context and adapt the development co-operation product offer to fit the context as it is, rather than the other way around. While risks may be high for international investors and donors, considerable economic life is already underway, and existing businesses have found a way to survive.
There is an opportunity to think more strategically about how private sector initiatives and investments contribute to addressing fragility. In practice, the gap between fragility expertise and private sector development practice can be large. For instance, DFIs often bring a naturally transactional focus, with well-defined operational policies, product offers, and risk appetites, requiring grant financing in higher risk contexts that may not always be available (DFI Working Group on Blended Concessional Finance for Private Sector Projects, 2023[83]). Connecting the dots between different actors could support more realistic, principles-based conversations about the trade-offs, challenges, what is achievable, what risks to take on, and donor and partners’ roles in a specific context. Bridging this gap could help make both types of actors more effective in terms of both contextual knowledge and contribution to longer-term development. At the context level, those investing in the private sector may have a certain level of access to decision makers and policy dialogue that in some contexts is becoming harder to achieve for other donors.
While private sector development is often framed in terms of increasing the volume of private financing, in contexts with higher levels of fragility this may not necessarily be the immediate goal when working within the existing economic ecosystem. Responses aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and people’s ability to get products to market even within the informal sector are likely to make a critical difference for incomes in high and extreme fragility contexts in the medium term. The International Finance Corporation’s Africa Fragility Initiative, for example, aims to use advisory and investment support to foster business development and local market champions and improve the delivery of goods and services (International Finance Corporation, 2022[84]).
Support from donors, as partners and shareholders, can help bridge the gap between the types of intervention or investment that investors or IFIs are more readily equipped to offer, and the kinds of investments that are possible and impactful for the general population. In Mozambique, for example, while investment is focused on large-scale infrastructure or extractives projects, some development partners are working to find ways to link small-scale local producers and intermediaries as suppliers to those or other industries. Grant-based activities can do things that investments cannot – for example support improvements in the enabling environment, livelihoods or even humanitarian plus interventions – but the two types of intervention are often disconnected from one another.
The nature and development of the state, basic systems, and the nature and development of the economy are inextricably linked. Some studies have found, for example, that the relationship between private investment and conflict incidence may depend not only on the nature of investment but also on the governance environment and rule of law, level of investment in local human capital and the number of politically unrepresented ethnic groups (Sonno, 2024[51]). This finding challenges the idea of private sector development as simply an alternative activity and underscores the need for co-ordination across types of interventions (for example, policy reform and financial investments).
Conflict sensitivity and analysis of the political economy are vital even when there is no current conflict. While ambition for private sector investment is high, there is also a significant literature on the risks posed by inflows of investment. Disputes over land use and distribution of benefits are commonly cited explanations when things go wrong. In addition, running a successful company in a context with high fragility, where being politically connected is often essential, requires different skills and approaches than developing a well-governed company elsewhere.
Even while the overall goal is to increase the private sector contribution to resilience, regretfully, sometimes the right decision will be to not engage. There may be incentives that push against such as decision even when it is the right one – for instance, staff incentives around deal volume or a partner country’s focus on boosting jobs even if this means unwise investments.
In addition to the broader goals of building resilience, there can be specific roles for economic interventions and investments in building peaceful societies, whether in outright conflict situations or in terms of localised tensions and grievances. In post-conflict reconstruction, public and private sectors are critical partners since even before a conflict is over, it is necessary to start rebuilding the economy.
A breakdown in political channels or even eruption of violence does not necessarily mean a breakdown in economic channels and linkages, either with the international community or sometimes even between belligerents. The linkages or partnerships involved in delivering economic support, whether in the public or private sectors or through third parties, can help preserve connections to the international community that might otherwise erode, providing an entry point for potential future progress.
DAC members rely heavily on the mandates, expertise and/or financial firepower of IFIs, the UN system and NGOs, especially in politically constrained contexts. Economic agencies such as the IMF and MDBs continue to work on tailoring their offer for contexts with higher levels of fragility – work that will be a key test of the MDB evolution and the upcoming Bretton Woods at 80 initiative. For many multilateral and bilateral partners, remaining engaged through conflict and crisis is one of their key development strategies and policy goals. There is great diversity in mandates across organisations and depending on the type of fragility and the specific context concerned. Different mandates or permission space for engagement – in particular, whether local authorities are recognised as legitimate or direct financial arrangements are possible – also can depend on the view of the international community as expressed through board decisions. These differences can have significant implications on the opportunity set available in high and extreme fragility contexts, which may be impacted by the degree of strained political relations; the reason for the crisis, conflict or instability; the emergence of significant policy concerns (notably corruption, terrorist financing or macro-level crisis); and political or policy developments in the donor capital or organisation’s headquarters.
The toolkit for using economic interventions and linkages is more extensive than is often supposed and does not rely entirely on IFIs, even in severely politically or economically constrained environments. DAC members do deploy their own toolkits, though there is often less clarity and transparency regarding either their interventions or the triggers to engage before different kinds of shocks, staying engaged during the shock, or re-engaging after. Economic provisions in peace agreements, financial incentives and formal or informal revenue sharing agreements, and policy conditionalities linked to inclusion and addressing horizontal inequalities have all been used as partial mechanisms to address the contributing economic factors, which are context specific.
Conflict sensitivity and contextual tailoring are needed well before and well after the hottest part of a conflict or other rupture is over. There are potential tensions between staying engaged in support of core economic systems, and exercising the incentive effect of large-scale financing, for example. Maintaining dialogue can be perceived as legitimising, and economic institutions, sectors, and aid spending itself can be highly contested.
In terms of the private sector, there are areas where a focus on understanding and supporting peacefulness and resilience can help improve outcomes for both the companies and the society. Especially in land-intensive sectors, the main risks deterring investment are often related to peace, meaning peacebuilders and investors share a common interest in reducing risks to projects and increasing the benefits from the projects to the surrounding communities. It is important to have right-sized expectations: the private sector cannot replace the other critical investments and interventions outlined elsewhere in this chapter. Investments in contexts facing high to extreme fragility are already challenging, and in some cases past mistakes could undermine trust.
Nevertheless. there are promising initiatives underway to increase the peace-positive impact of private sector development, by increasing positive social impact and reducing risk. Examples include:
There are proposals to establish overall standards and develop the market for peace-positive investments or peace finance, for example as outlined by the Finance for Peace Initiative (2023[85]).
The Investing for Peace initiative outlined a proposed investment vehicle that focuses on peace first, considering conflict dynamics and the interaction between peace and private sector development in a given context. This would mean that business partnerships and investments are sought second and based on the assessment of community needs and the potential for the private sector to increase resilience (German Federal Foreign Office, 2020[86]).
Commercial risk assessment methodologies can link specific transactions to peacebuilding mechanisms such as community dialogues and mediation. Benefit- sharing mechanisms also could be introduced into a transaction once a (likely) profitable investment has been found to help reduce and better price risk and increase both profitability and social benefit.16
The piloting of new types of sustainable investment, for example the Security-Indexed Investment Bonds (SIIB) proposed by the African Development Bank as part of its partnership with the peacebuilding community (Box 3.8).
Increasing insecurity and conflict across the globe, including in Africa, underlines the importance of treating peace and stability as regional and global public goods.
The Sahel crisis has expanded since it started in 2011, stalling development gains, diverting scarce domestic resources towards preserving security, and now threating to spill over to coastal West Africa. It is just one example of why the international community, including Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), need to mobilise their expertise and resources to contribute to preventing the conflict from spreading further.
The African Development Bank was the first Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) to recognise that the challenge of fragility is not limited to a set of what were once termed fragile states, but applies to all countries and it has adapted its business model accordingly over the past ten years. The Bank understands fragility as political, economic, social and environmental pressure points to which countries, societies and markets are exposed. It thus focuses its support on strengthening sources of resilience so that these contexts are better able to cope with shocks and prevent the outbreak of conflict.
Fragility and resilience were considered as cross-cutting issues in the African Development Bank’s first Ten-Year Strategy for 2013-22. This ensured that the preparation of its regional and country strategies and investments in all African countries would be guided by an assessment of the internal and external drivers of fragility and sources of resilience. For this purpose, the Bank has effectively mainstreamed this agenda in its business model, drawing on its deep contextual knowledge as a regional development bank and leveraging the trust it has among African stakeholders to engage in policy dialogue, promote solutions to prevent conflict and find solutions to protracted crises.
In the years since, the Bank has continued to refine its strategies and approaches for this purpose, learning lessons from both the international community and, thanks to independent evaluations, from its own engagement.17 The Bank has developed quantitative and qualitative analytical tools to assess the pressure points, including a Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment tool, and thereby ensures that its investments are geared towards building resilience and preventing conflict.
The recently approved Ten-Year Strategy for 2024-33 consolidates this approach and leverages the Bank’s “High 5” priorities for implementation: “Light Up and Power Africa”, “Feed Africa, Industrialise Africa”, “Integrate Africa”, and “Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa”. In addition to maintaining fragility and resilience as a cross-cutting dimension that is mainstreamed across its investments, the Bank now considers regional peace, stability and resilience as a public good to which it aims to make an explicit contribution.
Accordingly, the African Development Bank is moving beyond the mitigation of negative externalities of its activities, which underpins the do no harm agenda, and towards an agenda that intentionally aims to generate positive and measurable externalities on peace. For this purpose, it is partnering with the peacebuilding community in support of the UN New Agenda for Peace, which calls on IFIs to be agents for peace, and is exploring the potential of peace-positive investment approaches and how to mainstream peace-enhancing mechanisms into its activities to enhance its peace impact.
Drawing on its experience of carrying out fragility and resilience assessments for the past ten years, many of them conducted jointly with other partners, the African Development Bank also puts great emphasis on the links between analysis, investment and impact. As a complement to its guidance on how to operate in environments exposed to fragility, the Bank is identifying a pipeline of public and private investments that have the greatest peace impact and is leveraging its suite of financial instruments to pioneer this shift.
Recognising that countries exposed to fragility and conflict require more resources, the Bank created in 2004 the predecessor of the Transition Support Facility (TSF), which has since mobilised over USD 7.1 billion – predominantly via the replenishments of the African Development Fund – to finance more than 400 operations in low-income countries facing conflict, fragility and adverse climate impacts.
The TSF allows the Bank to finance investments that focus on the key areas of its Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa: building effective institutions, promoting inclusion with a focus on communities, and catalysing the private sector in recognition that peace and prosperity go hand in hand.
The operating modalities of the TSF continue to evolve with the aim of enhancing its effectiveness in preventing conflict, responding more flexibly to crises, and achieving synergies with humanitarian and peacebuilding partners through the nexus approach. The Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility was created in 2015 to allow the Bank to make more private investments in these markets, which are characterised by higher risks. In 2023, a Climate Action Window was introduced to enhance the capacity of vulnerable low-income countries to attract climate finance from existing sources and channel additional resources for climate adaption into investments at the climate-peace nexus.
Encouraged by the successes of these financial innovations, the African Development Bank is currently spearheading the development of an innovative instrument and approach that directly responds to the growing insecurity on the continent: the Security-Indexed Investment Bonds (SIIB) initiative.
In co-ordination with the African Union, regional economic communities and African countries, and building on its lessons from engaging in these environments, the Bank is developing the SIIB to leverage ODA to raise additional resources at scale, including from capital markets, and to deploy them through holistic investment strategies that involve the public sector, private sector and civil society.
The African Development Bank is therefore pursuing an ecosystem approach to contribute to achieving the regional and global public goods of peace and security in Africa. Its emphasis is on developing strategic long-term partnerships across the HDP nexus and leverage the private sector.
Note: The 2008 strategy focused on enhanced engagement in contexts experiencing fragility in line with the 2007 OECD Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States. The 2014 and 2022 strategies focused on addressing the complementary theme of resilience.
Source: African Development Bank Group (2024[87]), The Ten-Year Strategy 2024-2033, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/ten-year-strategy-african-development-bank-group-2024-2033.
The wider application of a subnational lens on fragility would address a knowledge and analytical gap in ODA allocation. Evidence suggests that development actors may not always target pockets of fragility within countries or areas of subnational conflict (Custer et al., 2017[88]). This may be due to the reluctance of partner governments to engage on such issues when they threaten elite political interests and/or due to the importance of country ownership in jointly deciding resource allocation. Nevertheless, donor interest in this agenda has increased, particularly among the MDBs; the Inter-American Development Bank, for one, is developing a strategy that incorporates a subnational lens. The emerging focus on subnational fragility also ties in with other agendas of growing interest to the donor community such as localisation and locally led development and remaining engaged in politically constrained environments where subnational entities can sometimes serve as entry points.
Subnational fragility manifests through diverse phenomena:
Pockets of fragility at subnational level, particularly in middle-income contexts, can persist even in relatively stable and functional states that are experiencing GDP growth. For instance, certain areas of the Philippines have GDP per capita and institutional weakness that are similar to those of low-income contexts with high fragility (Barron, 2022, pp. 48-51[89]).
Cross-border dynamics may not always be captured nationally. These may include phenomena such as forced displacement, conflict intensity, and environment-related factors (e.g. natural disasters, water stress and shared ecosystems beyond national boundaries). For instance, porous border regions such as Liptako-Gourma between Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali experience particularly high conflict intensity.
The effects of subnational fragility may persist for long periods of time. Subnational laggards that often suffer from processes of historical, political and economic marginalisation are at risk of being left behind. For instance, recent evidence shows that areas under rebel control in El Salvador from 1985-1992 now experience worse economic outcomes than adjacent state-controlled areas (Bandiera et al., 2023[90]).
Islands of stability can exist in subnational areas of contexts exposed to extreme fragility, where the central state has limited territorial control and low state capacity. Some of these regions, such as Kurdistan in Iraq, have historically had higher levels of stability than surrounding regions in the same context. One reason can be that “bounded rulers” governing these regions have a long time horizon because of their limited possibilities for upward mobility (i.e. due to their ethnicity and/or religion), which leads them to establish an informal social contract with the population for “protection … in return for information and support to the government” (Harsch and Troy, 2024[91]).
The OECD fragility framework is designed to provide a macro-level understanding of fragility trends but has limited capacity to demonstrate the fragility that exists at subnational levels. Expanding its analysis to the subnational level offers deeper insights into macro trends by unveiling granular details that are often masked by the “tyranny of averages” prevalent in cross-country comparisons (Custer et al., 2017[88]). A broader spectrum of analysis that can be adapted to different levels of decision making in donor and partner institutions is important and could also help provide a more balanced analytical picture, especially in conflict-affected contexts where local analysis is often driven by security needs and therefore often off limits to development and humanitarian actors who could benefit from enhanced local insights. Indeed, high and extreme fragility contexts experience important spatial inequalities in relation to conflict, poverty rates, access to basic services, income, gender, minorities and environment-related factors. For instance, within-country income and wealth inequality has increased in many contexts though it has decreased between countries (Qureshi, 2023[92]). Using alternative data sources and inference will also fill the existing data gaps in several contexts; data on Kosovo, for instance, are not currently included in the OECD multidimensional framework. In 2025, the OECD will continue to collaborate with the European Space Agency (ESA) and European Investment Bank (EIB) to explore how to measure fragility at subnational levels in Ethiopia and Myanmar. Following this pilot project, the long-term ambition is to provide a comprehensive and integrated analytical framework. Adopting fragility analysis that seamlessly combines earth observation (EO) and non-EO data will enhance the understanding of drivers of risk and resilience in subnational level contexts. This will ensure the delivery of timely, actionable insights that also enable more effective and informed decision making and operations.
Piloting the measurement of subnational fragility: Ethiopia and Myanmar
The OECD pilot tested measuring fragility at a subnational level in two regions of Ethiopia (Amhara and Tigray) and two regions of Myanmar (Shan and Rakhine) using EO and non-EO data (Figure 3.9) in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). This analysis builds on an initial data fusion pilot project conducted as part of the ESA’s Global Development Assistance (2025[93]) fragility, conflict and security initiative, whose objective was to identify fragility across all its dimensions combining EO and non-EO data in co-operation with the Asian Development Bank (European Space Agency, 2023[94]).
Methodology and timeline
This pilot focused on the subnational economic, environmental, security and societal dimensions of fragility from 2018 to April 2024, with data collection and analysis conducted at the end of 2024. Data sources include EO data from ESA satellites18 complemented by non-EO data.19 Integrating physical-related parameters derived from EO imagery with layers of non-EO information, the fragility analysis provides localised evidence of risks and resilience, including identifying their potential drivers. The methodology addresses the challenges of combining complex and multifaceted information to better understand the context as well as interconnections between historical and present drivers of fragility. In this pilot, the combination of data was used as a proxy for identifying the fragility of subnational regions, for instance nightlights intensity and industrial air pollution (economic fragility); land use changes, vegetation health and rainfall data (environmental fragility) and displacement and conflict data (security fragility).
The project’s choice of geographies was motivated by several factors:
Variability in the severity of fragility. Ethiopia’s fragility peaked in 2020-21 during the Tigray war, according to the OECD multidimensional fragility framework, though political and security fragility remain at high levels. Myanmar’s fragility increased rapidly across all dimensions from 2021 onwards, coinciding with the February 2021 military coup, particularly in the political, security and societal dimensions. In both countries, looking at subnational fragility enables a more nuanced analysis of aggregate national fragility.
Centre-periphery tensions and subnational violence. Several subnational conflicts co-exist in Ethiopia and are mostly, though not exclusively, related to nationalism, local competition for power and intra-ethnic disputes (ACLED, 2024[95]). In Ethiopia, one of the most salient was the 2020-22 Tigray war between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, estimated to have caused hundreds of thousands of fatalities (International Crisis Group, 2023[96]) including deaths from starvation and disease. Also in Ethiopia, violence has engulfed the Amhara region over the past two years involving Fano militias and the federal government. Myanmar has been marked by subnational violence in the uplands since its independence in 1948 (Horsey, 2024[97]), which has accelerated and spread to the Bamar-populated heartlands following the 2021 military coup (Mon, 2024[98]).
Data availability and security volatility. The Amhara and Tigray regions were chosen for the pilot as they are the most conflict-affected regions in Ethiopia, without conflict increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. Rakhine and Shan were chosen to illustrate the diversity of subnational risks and coping capacities as they rank among the most volatile regions in Myanmar over a range of different indicators.
Findings from the pilot test
Economic dimension
Earth observation, with its timely insights and granular detail, allows for an enhanced understanding of the linkages between security and economic fragility. For instance, methane emissions sharply increased following the 2021 coup in Myanmar and from 2020 to 2022 in Ethiopia, albeit to a lesser extent; the effects in Rakhine and Tigray were more pronounced than national averages. This suggests there was a shift back to natural resource-based livelihoods, such as agricultural activities, in these areas. Similarly, reduced aerosol emissions in Myanmar suggest a decrease in the use of vehicles and transportation, which can be used as proxies for economic activity (i.e. infrastructure and means of transportation).
Timeseries from 2017-23 on nightlights intensity show that nightlights intensity is lower in Rakhine and Shan than in other regions of Myanmar and lower in Tigray and Amhara than other regions in Ethiopia. This suggests a lower level of economic development in the four regions analysed, which may be due to pre-existing differences and/or the effects of conflict. These regions also show a reduction in nightlights intensity coinciding with the COVID19-pandemic that is significantly greater than the mean value of other regions in the same contexts. After the pandemic, the four regions experienced a recovery of nightlights intensity that is greater than average despite being conflict affected. Interestingly, Shan State shows a particularly high level of radiance in 2022-23, that exceeds average trends in Myanmar for 2023. This seemingly positive insight on Shan is mitigated by high volatility in nightlights intensity, with rapid changes that suggest limited steady and predictable growth.
Environmental dimension
Coping capacities in terms of environmental fragility show that Shan has more water reservoirs per inhabitant than Rakhine, but the volatility of water reservoirs is six times higher in Shan. This is a likely consequence of Shan’s greater exposure to volatility in rainfall levels and thus drought risk, which is compensated for by using water reserves. The drought that hit Shan in 2020 reduced water reserves by over 50%, for instance, and climate change could intensify its significant exposure to drought risks.
Security and societal dimensions
Conflict intensity and levels of displacement at the subnational level are highly correlated in most cases. After the coup (2021-23), conflict casualties in Shan increased fivefold and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased sevenfold over levels prior to the coup (2018-20). These phenomena are correlated with a decrease in urban growth, which slowed to 2.99% over 2021-23 compared with 4.94% growth over 2018-20. This suggests a significant slowdown in urbanisation as the population growth rate remained roughly the same. The magnitude and spread of displacement in Myanmar and Ethiopia is striking. Ethiopia has significantly more IDPs (e.g. 1.1 million in Oromia); Rakhine stands out in Myanmar for the large-scale population outflows of the Rohingya to Bangladesh starting in 2016 (almost 1 million refugees), while conflict between the Arakan Army (an ethnic armed organisation) and Myanmar military has internally displaced approximately 570 000 people in Rakhine as of January 2025.
Implications for donor programming
EO allows for detailed vulnerability mapping and monitoring risks (with AI predictive analysis). When EO is integrated with other socioeconomic data, fragility can be analysed at a granular level and by time (past and present), location and indicator, providing insights and identifying trends and patterns. This methodology can inexpensively and rapidly inform targeted interventions, complement other analyses in complex environments, and improve transparency. It is a powerful approach for understanding and addressing environmental, social and infrastructural challenges in contexts exposed to high to extreme fragility along the project lifecycle. The methodology may also be particularly useful in contexts that are experiencing rapid changes and are politically constrained, have weak central governments, lack reliable data sources such as regular censuses and surveys, and are inaccessible or remote.20 Other situations where analysis using EO can enhance providers’ understanding of context-specific fragility include the following:
Engagement in politically constrained environments. Development co-operation is always challenging without political dialogue with national authorities, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Channelling aid deliveries through alternative mechanisms requires engaging at the local level, potentially through non-state actors (e.g. ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar). EO is a viable proxy when it is impossible for donors to have eyes on the ground. The ESA satellite remote sensing observations provide information on various environmental parameters including rainfall, temperature, vegetation health, soil moisture conditions, and crop development to monitor food production, for example. EO also can enable providers to observe population movements, conflicts and the impact of natural hazards without directly engaging with authorities.
Switching modalities of aid delivery. Donors often allocate a large share of humanitarian aid to contexts experiencing high to extreme fragility and conflict. For instance, in 2019, humanitarian aid accounted for 14% and 8% of allocations to Ethiopia and Myanmar, respectively, but rose to 29% and 22%, respectively, in 2023. At the same time, donors tend to reduce overall ODA volumes and suspend budget support in conflict-affected settings, as seen with the EU’s suspension of budget support to Ethiopia due to the Tigray conflict (Gerth-Niculescu, 2020[99]). Fragility analysis with EO enables monitoring and evaluation, both before and after implementation, of the impact of humanitarian programmes and projects such as food distribution, health or education support and small infrastructure projects.
Rapidly changing contexts. Subnational conflicts create fluid and rapidly changing situations, reinforcing the need for granular and timely insights. This has implications for the delivery of aid, access to these areas and the choice of partner. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army had captured most of the State’s territory except for a few towns by the end of 2024. This offensive has been accompanied by trade blockades imposed by the ruling Myanmar junta, a 37% decline in cultivated areas between 2018 and 2023 (as gleaned from EO data), skyrocketing prices for essential goods, and a significant increase in the number of IDPs (from 196 400 in October 2023 to 570 000 in October 2024) – all of which could lead to Rakhine facing acute famine (UNDP, 2024[100]). EO versatility enables timely geo-intelligence, which facilitates effective integration of conflict implications into development partner programming and allows for targeted interventions.
Next steps
The ESA, EIB and OECD pilot project will continue until the end of March 2025. It will focus on incorporating additional data sources (e.g. urbanisation), assessing subnational fragility more holistically by leveraging machine learning and AI-based models, and identifying lessons learned and recommendations. The results of this preliminary project will support a forthcoming publication on subnational fragility.21
Notes: Land use was extracted from Sentinel-2 (satellite) while nightlights were extracted from Suomi NPP (satellite). UCDP data was taken from 2018 and 2019 for the first panel (2019) and from 2023 to September 2024 for the second (2024).
Sources: Earth Engine Data Catalogue (2025[101]), Dynamic World V1, https://developers.google.com/earth-engine/datasets/catalog/GOOGLE_DYNAMICWORLD_V1; NASA (2025[102]), VNP46A1 - VIIRS/NPP Daily Gridded Day Night Band 500m Linear Lat Lon Grid Night, https://ladsweb.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/missions-and-measurements/products/VNP46A1/; Davies, Engström and Öberg (2024[10]), “Organized violence 1989-2023, and the prevalence of organized crime groups”, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241262912; Sundberg and Melander (2013[11]), “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313484347.
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← 1. The discrepancy between FDI and ODA in 2023 is due to the fact that there were large outflows of FDI for one recipient (Iraq).
← 2. Country allocable aid here only includes contexts on the OECD multidimensional fragility framework: contexts exposed to high and extreme fragility (61) and medium to low ODA eligible contexts (63).
← 3. See the annex for an explanation of the difference between core and secondary peacebuilding.
← 4. The year 2015 was taken as a reference point for this calculation as it is the first reporting year for many non-DAC countries in the Creditor Reporting System. Only Monaco and Qatar started reporting after 2015.
← 5. Syria data include large ODA flows that the Republic of Türkiye reported to the OECD in 2023 and that mainly consist of support to Syrian refugees in Türkiye.
← 6. A full description of UN, other multilaterals and international financial institutions is available in the annex.
← 7. See the annex for definitions of gross ODA and net ODA.
← 8. Climate-related development finance refers to concessional and developmental as well as not concessional or not primarily developmental flows.
← 9. The UN introduced the concept as a holistic approach based on preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.
← 10. This statistic refers specifically to the legal survey of the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index to determine whether these contexts have a law or laws that specifically address violence against women.
← 11. The eight areas are security (put staff safety first), understand the changing context, define principles of engagement, reinforce co-ordination, review programme orientation, review the relationship with the government and other partners, review funding modalities, and invest in staff capacity. For more information, see https://www.sdc-pge.ch/en/news-staying-engaged-authoritarian-contexts.
← 12. For information on the WTO programme, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/tradeforpeace_e.htm.
← 13. The OECD has published guidance for blended finance, available at https://doi.org/10.1787/ded656b4-en. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation’s Kampala Principals also provide guidance for effective private sector engagement, available at https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/action-area-21-private-sector-engagement-pse.
← 14. This analysis used surveys conducted since 2013, using the most recent survey available for each context.
← 15. The Humanitarian and Resilience Investing Initiative, or HRI Initiative, brings together partners from public and private sectors and NGOs to catalyse private investment and build the resilience of the most vulnerable communities and economies. The HRI Initiative aims to cultivate investments, build and mature markets, and increase transparency around the financial performance and impact of deals. The Africa Resilience Investment Accelerator initiative, or ARIA, was launched in 2021 by British International Investment and FMO as a collaborative platform to identify potential investments and improve investment readiness through collective support for country reforms. Currently, ARIA operates in Benin, DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
← 16. See for instance the Peace Invest methodology at https://peaceinvest.net/our-methodology/.
← 17. In 2012 and 2020, the Independent Evaluation Department of the African Development Bank published its findings of the implementation of the Bank’s 2008 and 2014 strategies that had been guiding the Bank’s engagement in contexts exposed to fragility. In 2022, the evaluation department published the findings of its review of the Transition Support Facility. These independent evaluations are crucial to not only ensure accountability but also to promote learning in this complex area. In 2025 the African Development Bank will prepare the mid-term review of its 2022-26 Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa.
← 18. EO data was extracted from satellites including Sentinel 2, Open Meteo, Modis, Sentinel 5p and Suomi NPP.
← 19. These include data from the UNHCR, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project or ACLED, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as well as census data for population figures.
← 20. Background notes to Infographic 3.4. First, several ethnic armed organisations have been conducting a military offensive (Operation 1027) in Shan State since October 2023 and took control of most of the state by mid-2024, including border crossings with China and the State capital of Lashio. See https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/how-operation-1027-transformed-war-against-myanmar-junta.html. Second, Myanmar’s instability following the 2021 coup explains the increase in organised crime and criminal markets (https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ocindex-2023/). This includes significantly increased drug production (opium and methamphetamines), extraction of critical rare earth minerals and illegal mining (the latter especially in Kachin State), and the establishment of scam centres in border regions. Third, Shan State’s criminal-oriented political economy, organised around the production of opium and methamphetamines, and ethnic conflicts there preceded the 2021 military coup. See https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/299-fire-and-ice-conflict-and-drugs-myanmars-shan-state.
← 21. In parallel, the ESA is funding an 18-month project partnering with the Asian Development Bank, the EIB and OECD. This project leverages AI technologies to analyse EO, open-source intelligence, social open-source intelligence and contextual data and will derive and assess tailored fragility indicators across geographical and thematic dimensions. Under this project, the OECD will focus on fragility dimensions at the subnational level to enhance the existing OECD multidimensional fragility framework and the States of Fragility series. This effort will lead to the development of an import-export mechanism and an online dashboard for detailed analysis.