Egypt’s agricultural policy maintains a strong focus on achieving food security and self-sufficiency, with ambitious goals to increase production as outlined in the 2030 Updated Sustainable Agricultural Development Strategy. However, responsibilities for policy implementation remain fragmented across multiple ministries and institutions, creating challenges for co-ordination and effective policy design. Support to producers mainly comes through market price support and input subsidies, while consumers receive transfers in the form of food subsidies. These interventions, including public stockholding, lead to market inefficiencies. While total support to agriculture is high relative to GDP, expenditures on general services remain relatively small and focused on irrigation infrastructure. Agricultural policy development is constrained by a lack of transparency and gaps in the availability and quality of policy data and information.
Policies for the Future of Farming and Food in Egypt
Abstract
Government strategies including Egypt’s Vision 2030 and the National Structural Reforms Programme highlight agriculture’s central role in Egypt’s structural reform agenda. The 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy sets ambitious targets to increase agriculture’s share of GDP and employment, running against the development trajectory observed in other countries, and to boost production, yields, and self-sufficiency rates for strategic crops.
Responsibilities for agricultural and food policies in Egypt fall across different ministries and agencies, creating challenges for policy co-ordination and implementation. The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, and The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation all oversee some agricultural policies. Other ministries and agencies play important roles related to trade, rural development or the environment.
Despite numerous attempts to reform agricultural policies and open markets in Egypt over the past decades, market interventions and border measures continue to hinder private investment, market efficiency and productivity. Government agencies and state-owned enterprises are active across the entire agrifood value chain, including markets for inputs and outputs, public stockholding, food processing, distribution, and wholesale and retail trade.
Egyptian farmers received support from the government amounting to 10% of their gross receipts in 2022‑24, down from 21% in 2000-02. This level of support is lower than the average across OECD Members of 13% in 2022-24, but above the average of 7% for emerging economies in the OECD Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2025 report.
Most producer support is in the form of prices that are higher than world markets and which benefit mainly grain producers, poultry, sugar and cotton. Fruits and vegetables are not supported, and livestock products are penalised by higher feed costs. Budgetary expenditures for inputs, investment or credit on the farm amount to 1% of gross farm receipts.
On the demand side, the combination of price support to producers and food subsidies provide contradictory policy signals. On the one hand, first-stage consumers saw their consumption expenditures increase by 16% through higher prices provided to producers in 2022‑24. On the other hand, final consumers received food subsidies that reduced consumption expenditures by almost 7%. As a result, on balance, consumers were penalised by agricultural support policies.
Support to general services (GSSE) amounted to 2.6% of the value of agricultural production in 2022-24. This was dominated by investments in irrigation infrastructure (76% of total GSSE expenditures), followed by expenditures on agricultural R&D (14%).
The total burden of government support for the economy – combining producer, consumer and general service support related to agriculture – was 2.8% of GDP in 2022-24, higher than all 54 countries covered in the OECD’s Agricultural Support database.
Low availability of data and information on budgetary expenditures and other transfers from the government, including to state-owned enterprises, significantly constrains the capacity to analyse agricultural policies and hinders transparency in the policy debate. Using OECD methods to estimate agricultural support and compare it with other countries can help improve domestic policy development.
Past market interventions and food subsidies have shaped current agricultural policies
Agrarian reforms after the revolution: 1952-1973
Before the Egyptian revolution of 1952, agriculture was dominated by the private sector and the state’s role was largely confined to investments in irrigation infrastructure, drainage, and land reclamation. The 1952 revolution marked the beginning of a more proactive approach to government intervention in agriculture. The agrarian reform of September 1952 limited individual ownership of agricultural land to a maximum of 200 feddans (84 ha) and saw the introduction of agricultural co-operatives as a mechanism for controlling crop rotations, output pricing, input supply, and marketing (Ikram, 2006[1]).
The public sector expanded after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, with increasing public investment in industry and infrastructure and the introduction of comprehensive economic planning. Construction of the Aswan High Dam began in 1960 and was seen as critical to Egypt’s economic growth and industrialisation strategy. The dam, which was completed in 1970, provided a significant increase in storage capacity through Lake Nasser reservoir, as well as the ability to control the annual flooding of the Nile and generate hydroelectricity.
During the 1960s, agriculture played a central role in Egypt’s development policies. Policy was guided by President Nasser’s “Arab Socialism”, which aimed to promote a more equitable distribution of income and the provision of affordable food to urban areas sourced from peri-urban and rural regions. A wave of nationalisations in 1961 stifled foreign investment and led to the introduction of central planning, with the state taking a more active role in determining agricultural prices. This was particularly visible in the cotton sector, which represented around 80% of Egypt’s commodity exports in the early 1960s. The Alexandria Cotton Futures Exchange – the world’s first cotton futures exchange – was closed down, the state Cotton Authority was given the exclusive right to purchase cotton, and companies trading in cotton were brought under state control.
A series of interventions were implemented, including compulsory crop rotation schedules, regulated prices, crop area allocations, mandatory delivery quotas at prices below international market rates, and subsidised consumer prices. Agricultural co-operatives were promoted at the village level, with responsibilities in overseeing inputs, production, marketing, and credit from agricultural banks. However, interventions promoting industrialisation and import substitution led to an overvalued exchange rate and stagnation of the agricultural sector. Farmers were faced with administered prices far below border prices, resulting in declining yields, distorted cropping patterns, widening gaps between crop demand and production, diminished exports of cotton, and outward labour migration to non-agricultural sectors (Cassing et al., 2009[2]).
Land reform was viewed as an important mechanism for redistributing wealth.1 The maximum farm size was reduced to 100 feddan (42 ha) per family in 1961, and further decreased to 50 feddan (21 ha) per family in 1969 (Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975[3]). The government launched a series of ambitious land reclamation projects following the completion of the Aswan High Dam. Whilst old land remained under private ownership within the ceilings defined under the agrarian reform, new land was largely owned by the state.
The open-door policy: 1974-1986
Starting in the 1970s, new economic reforms were introduced under the open-door policy (infitah), seeking to encourage domestic and foreign investment in the private sector. This was a period of high global inflation which led to rapid domestic inflation, driven by rising prices for imported food commodities. The government attempted to soften the impacts of inflation, for instance, by reducing the size of a loaf of subsidised bread, and adopting a two-tier pricing structure for some commodities, such as sugar. However, fruits, vegetables and livestock products were not subject to price controls, and experienced rapid inflation.
After the sharp rise in international wheat prices in the early 1970s the existing food subsidy programme expanded to protect Egyptian consumers from food price inflation. This led to an increase in the cost of food subsidies which consumed a significant proportion of government expenditures. In 1977 the government announced substantial cuts to subsidies for essential goods as part of IMF requirements (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[4]). Specifically, the government indicated that the price of bread, sugar, tea, cooking oil, and rice would increase by 25% to 50% (Soliman, 2021[5]). As a result, protests erupted in multiple cities across Egypt in opposition to the subsidy cuts. These protests, later referred to as the “bread riots” of 1977, forced the government to reverse course and restore the food subsidies. This episode reinforced the idea that food subsidies to consumers are part of the social contract in Egypt (see Chapter 3).
Law 12 was issued in 1984 declaring water a public good provided by the government to farms at no cost. In addition, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) was entrusted with overseeing the Nile water resources, the accompanying canal system, and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure down to the mesqa (tertiary canal) level.
Liberalisation and structural adjustment: 1987-2013
Starting in 1986 and continuing through the 1990s, there was a shift away from the open-door policy driven by comprehensive economic reform programmes. In response to different challenges posed by the institutional structures, subsidies on farm inputs were increased, food subsidies were extended to rural areas, and land reform laws continued to address the redistribution of land ownership.
At the same time, two key agricultural policy reform programmes were carried out between 1987 and 2002 focused on reducing government interventions in markets and supported by the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Agricultural Production and Credit Project (1987-1995) involved reductions in subsidies for certain agricultural inputs, in controls on area allotments, and in price and marketing restrictions (Baffes and Gautam, 1996[6]; Cassing et al., 2009[2]). It also set the stage for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a new law restructuring public firms into holding companies (Ender and Holtzman, 2003[7]). The Agricultural Policy Reform Programme (1996-2002) which followed was more extensive, encompassing the privatisation of public firms. The structural adjustment programme of 1991 shifted the focus from state-controlled agriculture to a market economy, accelerating market liberalisation and encouraging greater private sector involvement in the trading of agricultural commodities. This involved the removal of most subsidies on agricultural inputs, the elimination of mandatory crop rotations, and the removal of pricing and marketing controls.
Law 213 on water usage was issued in 1994 on the management of public and private sector irrigation and drainage systems, encompassing main canals, feeders, and drains. Article 71 establishes a legal basis for water user associations (WUAs), designating them as specialised associations responsible for water management at the mesqa level. In addition, Ministerial Decree 14900 of 1995 further delineates the functions, rights, and duties of WUAs. These measures aimed to promote an integrated participatory system that involves farmers in management decisions within their hydraulic boundaries, fostering more efficient water use. However, MWRI’s ability to manage and maintain the irrigation canals and the water delivery system was hindered by decreased state intervention and shrinking tax receipts (Gouda, 2016[8]).
Focus on food security and sustainability: 2014-present
Article 29 of the Egyptian Constitution adopted in 2014 (subsequently amended in 2019) recognises agriculture’s importance in the national economy and commits the state to increasing land under cultivation, incriminating encroachments on agricultural land, and developing agricultural and rural areas. The constitution also commits the state to providing the requirements for agricultural production, and purchasing crops at appropriate prices to achieve a profit margin for farmers (Constitute, 2022[9]).
Since 2016, Egypt’s Vision 2030 has acknowledged climate change risks and their impacts on Egypt’s economy and agricultural sector. The government has increased investments in water-saving technologies such as drip and sprinkler irrigation, subsidised field levelling and upgraded the canal system to minimise water losses (Chapter 4).
Agriculture is central to Egypt’s structural reform agenda
Three major government strategies guide agricultural policies in Egypt: two apply to the whole economy and are led by the Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Co-operation (MPEDIC), and one is sectoral and led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).
The National Agenda for Sustainable Development “Egypt’s Vision 2030” by MPEDIC
The National Agenda for Sustainable Development, or Egypt’s Vision 2030, was first launched in 2016 and then updated in 2023. The updated strategy from 2023 provides a clear direction for the country to achieve sustainable development across the economic, social and environmental dimensions. It includes six strategic goals: improve Egyptians’ quality of life and raise their living standards; social justice and equality; integrated and sustainable environmental system; diversified, knowledge-based, and competitive economy; well-developed infrastructure; and governance and partnerships. These are further divided into 32 general goals to support the government in achieving sustainable development (MPED, 2023[10]).
Egypt’s Vision 2030 recognises the importance of providing adequate, healthy and nutritious food for all Egyptians and has identified poverty eradication and food provision as crucial goals. The strategy also aims to expand the scope and coverage of social protection programmes, strengthen inclusion, and promote spatial and local development. Egypt’s Vision 2030 highlights the importance of addressing climate change, which is likely to lead to a decline in crop productivity, increasing impacts from extreme weather events, reduced water availability and high irrigation demands. Other objectives of relevance to agriculture and food security include improving the sustainability of natural resources, strengthening waste management, improving financial inclusion, and investing in infrastructure. The strategy is well aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and provides a comprehensive list of actions for attaining these goals. The actions of relevance to agriculture and food security are outlined in Annex Table 2.A.1.
Egypt’s Vision 2030 also includes an extensive list of development indicators with specific numerical targets for the years 2025 and 2030. Specific quantitative targets related to agriculture include reducing malnutrition and stunting, reducing the share of households covered by the ration card food subsidy programme, increasing incomes and employment in rural areas, and improving water use efficiency (Table 2.1).
Source: MPED (2023[10]), The National Agenda for Sustainable Development: Egypt's Updated Vision 2030, https://mped.gov.eg/Files/Egypt_Vision_2030_EnglishDigitalUse.pdf.
The National Structural Reforms Programme by MPEDIC
The National Structural Reforms Programme was launched in April 2021 as the second phase of a comprehensive national programme for economic and social reform, which had begun in 2016. The programme introduces a package of targeted structural and institutional reforms based around three key pillars: (1) Building macroeconomic resilience and stability; (2) Enhancing competitiveness of the Egyptian economy and improving the business environment; (3) Supporting economic diversification and the green transition.
Agriculture is one of the three priority sectors to diversify Egypt’s economic structure, together with manufacturing and the ICT sector. For the agricultural sector, the programme outlines a series of strategic objectives and key actions:
1. Achieving and sustaining food and water security. The key measures to achieve this objective include expanding the cultivation of high yield, low-water crop varieties; regulating water-intensive crops by limiting their area of cultivation; continuing the transition from flood irrigation to modern irrigation systems; and establishing a unit affiliated with the Council of Ministers to monitor value chains for strategic commodities such as wheat, corn, rice, sugar and oilseeds.
2. Increasing the agricultural sector’s productivity and contribution to the national economy. This is to be achieved through the enforcement of contract farming agreements; by creating collection centres for agricultural products with unified specifications to solve internal marketing problems; and by updating relevant legislation for the agricultural sector.
3. Creating new job opportunities and increasing the incomes of small farmers. This is to be achieved by expanding the implementation of agricultural initiatives (e.g. the national veal project); financing farmers through the Agricultural Bank of Egypt; restructuring agricultural co-operatives; and reforming the Co-operatives Law (No. 122 of 1980).
4. Increasing exports of crops and agricultural industries, by establishing consolidated logistical centres for export products.
5. Enhancing the resilience of the agricultural sector in the face of environmental risks and natural disasters.
The National Narrative for Economic Development was launched in September 2025 and builds on the National Structural Reforms Programme, presenting a new framework to align the government’s action programme with Egypt’s Vision 2030. It’s objectives are to sustain the trajectory of economic reform; pivot decisively toward high productivity, export-oriented sectors; build on Egypt’s advanced infrastructure as a foundation for industrialisation and investment; and redefine the state’s role in the economy to enhance competitiveness and stimulate private sector participation (SIS, 2025[11]).
The 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy by MALR
Egypt’s 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy was developed in 2020 by MALR and is the main strategic document for the agricultural sector. The strategy puts economic growth at the centre of efforts to enhance food security and alleviate poverty and hunger. The strategy’s action plan outlines a vision for “inclusive economic and social development based on fast, sustainable and inclusive growth of the agricultural sector within the framework of integrated rural development to help, in particular, marginalized groups and alleviate rural poverty” (MALR, 2020[12]). In addition, the action plan includes a mission statement, which is to “Modernize the agricultural sector to achieve food security for all citizens and improve nutrition and standards of living of rural population, through improving the efficiency of resources use and capitalizing on the geographic comparative advantage of different agricultural regions.” Six strategic objectives are presented in the action plan:
1. Achieve food security and improved nutrition (to address undernourishment, food insecurity, achieve sustainable agriculture productivity growth, sustainable agriculture growth), focusing on decreasing the imports of agriculture products.
2. Enhance sustainable agriculture (focus: sustainable management of natural resources).
3. Eradicate poverty in rural areas, improve income and standards of living (focus: Upper Egypt).
4. Adapt to climate change and mitigate its impacts.
5. Increase the competitiveness of agricultural products in local and international markets (functioning and inclusive value chains – increase exports).
6. Create job opportunities for employment, especially for youth and women.
The strategy is based on a theory of change that considers growth in agriculture and food systems as the primary engine of growth in the Egyptian economy, and adopts an integrated food systems approach covering the main stages of production, handling, processing and distribution. The strategic objectives for the sector (Annex 2.A.) are closely aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The strategy outlines a number of quantitative targets for the agricultural sector, focusing on increasing the share of the sector in the Egyptian economy, employment and exports, reducing imports, and reducing undernourishment:
Increasing the growth rate of agricultural GDP to 4.5% by 2030.
Increasing the contribution of agriculture to GDP from 11.5% (average of 2015-18) to 15% by 2030.
Lifting a total of 2.56 million people of the rural population above the poverty line and creating 2 million new job opportunities.
Increasing the agricultural sector’s share of total employment from 25.3% (average of 2015-18) to 30% by 2030.
Increasing the share of agricultural commodities and products in total exports to around 30% by 2030, and increasing the value of agricultural exports from USD 5.52 billion in 2018 to USD 8.28 billion in 2030.
Decreasing agricultural imports to save foreign currency and reduce the burden on the state’s budget by reducing expenses on food imports. For example, reducing losses in wheat production by 20% and increasing production to 12.2 million tonnes per annum by 2030 would reduce wheat imports by USD 891 million.
Improving food security by reducing the population suffering from undernourishment by 2.85 million by 2030.
While the strategy’s mission statement aims to “achieve food security for all citizens and improve nutrition”, many of the quantitative targets focus on self-sufficiency of specific commodities. However, self-sufficiency is not equivalent to food security (Box 2.1). Quantitative targets have been developed for the promotion of strategic crops covering cultivated area, yields, total production and self-sufficiency rates (Table 2.2). This includes a particularly ambitious target to increase self-sufficiency for specific commodities such as wheat from 44% in 2019 to 67% in 2030. The targets are to be achieved through a combination of increasing productivity (“vertical development”), increasing the efficiency of natural resource use, reducing production losses, and expanding the cultivated area through the reclamation of new lands in the desert (“horizontal development”). Specifically, the strategy aims to increase the productivity (yields) of old lands (where small farms of less than 3 feddan account for 90% of farm holdings), address the fragmentation of agricultural lands, expand the reclamation of 1.5 million feddan (630 000 ha, or 16% of current agricultural land) of new lands by 2030 using groundwater and surface water, and provide several alternatives of cropping patterns as investment models for the private sector.
The 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action provides a formal definition for food security:
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”
Food security is typically assessed across four dimensions: availability (having sufficient quantities of food, supplied through domestic production or imports); access (having adequate income and resources to acquire food); utilisation (through nutritious and healthy diets, clean water and sanitation); and stability (ensuring resilience to sudden shocks).
Self-sufficiency refers to the ability of a country or region to satisfy its needs for specific food commodities from its own domestic production. The FAO defines the self-sufficiency ratio as the percentage of food consumed that is produced domestically:
SSR = Production * 100 / (Production + Imports – Exports)
In caloric terms across all food commodities, self-sufficiency would entail producing a proportion of the country’s food consumption that approaches or exceeds 100%. However, countries that are self-sufficient may still specialise their food production, while importing some food commodities and exporting others.
There are significant differences between the concepts of food security and self-sufficiency. While self-sufficiency is focused on ensuring that a country is able to produce enough food to satisfy domestic demand, food security is broader in scope, and includes the concepts of affordability, nutrition, and resilience to shocks. In particular, countries can rely on trade to meet the nutritional needs of their population, and do not need to be self-sufficient in order to achieve food security. Furthermore, trade plays an essential role in ensuring the four dimensions of food security.
Source: FAO (2016[13]); FAO (2006[14]); World Food Summit (1996[15]).
1. For these commodities we present two figures for the 2019 status: first the one published in the 2023 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy, which was the benchmark on which the strategy was built; second an updated number for 2019 as provided by CAPMAS in September 2025.
Source: MALR (2020[12]).
Responsibilities for agricultural policies are scattered across many institutions and agencies
Egypt’s agricultural and food policies are administered by a range of different actors, which inevitably creates co-ordination challenges across institutions. Figure 2.1 illustrates the main ministries, agencies, research institutes and state-owned enterprises that are responsible for formulating and implementing policy.
Source: OECD.
National Committee for Food and Nutrition Systems
The National Committee for Food and Nutrition Systems was established in 2023 with the aim of strengthening cross-ministerial co-ordination and developing strategies and action plans to promote sustainable food systems. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes representatives from a broad range of different Ministries. The committee is responsible for developing Egypt’s National Action Plan for Food and Nutrition Systems 2025-2030.
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation
The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) is responsible for formulating and implementing Egypt’s agricultural policies and strategies. This includes the development of laws and regulations pertaining to the agricultural sector, and overseeing the implementation of Egypt’s 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy. The Ministry is divided into a number of sectoral departments, as outlined in the organisational structure below (Figure 2.2). Its responsibilities encompass the management and administration of livestock production, land reclamation, agricultural services (including agricultural co-operatives), agricultural extension, and economic affairs. In addition, the Ministry supports agricultural research and innovation through the Agricultural Research Centre and the Desert Research Centre, and Egypt participates actively in international co-operation on agricultural R&D, including through its membership in the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM).
MALR oversees the delivery of extension and advisory services to farmers through the Agricultural Extension Sector and the Central Administration for Agricultural Extension and Environment (CAAEE), which is affiliated to the Agricultural Research Centre. Extension services are delivered through a network of four development support and communication centres, nine regional research and extension councils, 60 rural development centres, and over 200 agricultural extension centres at the village level (Diab, Yacoub and AbdelAal, 2020[16]).
MALR also plays a central role in the government’s efforts to convert desert land into arable land for farming. The Ministry formulates long-term strategies for land reclamation, and develops policies to balance agricultural expansion with environmental sustainability. The Land Reclamation Sector is in charge of the planning and management of land reclamation projects across Egypt. It undertakes a range of activities such as conducting land surveys, evaluating soil quality, and designing and implementing irrigation systems. The Land Reclamation Sector collaborates with the General Authority for Land Reclamation, a specialised entity that directly manages the technical, financial and logistical aspects of land reclamation projects.
MALR has taken efforts to enhance co-ordination among ministries and relevant authorities on agricultural policies. This includes co-ordinating with the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to determine annual rice cultivation areas; the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade to set procurement prices for wheat, maize and sugar; and the Ministry of Environment for the management of rice straw residues. A key objective of MALR is to modernise the agricultural sector to achieve food security and improve nutrition and the standard of living of rural populations, by improving the efficiency of resource use and increasing investments across agricultural regions. While the Ministry is ostensibly responsible for rural development policy and efforts to reduce rural poverty, none of its departments are focused on rural development per se.
Source: MALR (2025[17]).
Agricultural Research Centre
The Agricultural Research Centre (ARC) was first established in the early 1970s and is the main body within MALR dedicated to agricultural research and development (R&D). The ARC’s primary objective is to support the application of advanced technologies in Egyptian agriculture in a way that optimises the use of natural resources, meets the needs of the population, facilitates exports, and improves farmers’ incomes. Key functions of the ARC include: (i) conducting applied and academic research to generate a continuous flow of technologies that ensure the improvement of productivity and the reduction of production costs; (ii) transferring new technologies to the farming community through extension services and monitoring their application; and (iii) continuous training and support for human capital development.
The ARC’s agricultural research activities include publishing agricultural research and its applications at the farm level, implementing agricultural research and extension programmes, proposing new legislation, conducting research on biotechnology and its applications in agriculture, and monitoring climate change and its effects on the agricultural sector. The ARC consists of an integrated network of 16 research institutes, 14 central laboratories, and 56 research stations operating throughout Egypt (ARC, 2025[18]). For instance, the Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute, the Cotton Research Institute and the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute undertake important research (Box 2.2). Collaborative efforts with partner agencies in MALR, MWRI, universities, and other affiliated research centres further support the ARC’s endeavours. The current strategy emphasises multi-disciplinarity and a clear definition of research topics tailored to solve specific problems, accompanied by well-defined objectives and the allocation of sufficient physical, human, and financial resources to achieve them.
The activities of some of the leading research institutes under the Agricultural Research Centre are described below:
Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute
The Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute is a key institution for integrated management and conservation of soils, water resources and natural resource management. Its activities include implementing surveys and classifications of soil resources, optimising fertiliser usage, monitoring soil and water pollution, designing on-farm irrigation networks, and developing innovative approaches to improve nutrient use efficiency.
Cotton Research Institute
The Cotton Research Institute aims to maintain the superiority and good reputation of Egyptian cotton worldwide through the continuous development of new high productivity cotton varieties that have improved fibre qualities, early maturity, and are resistant to pest and disease. The institute is responsible for identifying suitable agro-climatic zones, determining adequate crop management systems for different varieties, improving fibre quality assessment, meeting industrial and commercial market requirements, and upgrading cotton classification and grading techniques.
Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute
The Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute aims to advance plant biotechnology for the development of sustainable agricultural systems. Its activities include the adoption of new gene transfer technologies to improve agricultural productivity, developing bio-control agents for pest control, studying the genetic variability of strategic crops, and producing transgenic wheat, barley and maize cultivars that are tolerant to abiotic stress.
Source: Soliman, Ibrahim and Adel (2021[22]).
Desert Research Centre
The Desert Research Centre (DRC) was first established in 1949 and was attached to MALR in 1990. The DRC is an independent scientific and research body, dedicated to the study of groundwater, rainwater harvesting, the nature of desert lands, the desert environment, plant and animal production in arid regions, and human and economic studies. In addition, the DRC seeks to determine the optimal investment methods to ensure the sustainability of Egypt’s deserts for current and future generations.
The DRC’s main objectives include: (i) conducting accurate scientific study of Egyptian deserts; (ii) studying the means of developing, preserving and maintaining the natural and human resources in Egyptian deserts; and (iii) combating desertification, alleviating poverty for inhabitants of desert areas, and monitoring and evaluating desertification across various agricultural ecological regions in Egypt (DRC, 2025[23]). The DRC is structured into four research divisions: Water Resources and Desert Lands Division; Ecology and Dry Lands Agriculture Division; Animal and Poultry Production Division; and Economic and Social Studies Division. In addition, the DRC maintains eleven experimental stations strategically located across Egypt’s desert governorates, including stations on the North Coast, Sinai and Southern Sectors.
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
The Ministry of Irrigation was originally established in 1964 and has undergone numerous changes in its structure and scope of responsibilities. It was renamed to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) in 1999. The current MWRI oversees various entities, including the Irrigation Department, the Mechanical and Electrical Department, the Shore Protection Authority, the Egyptian General Survey Authority, the General Office of the Minister, the Egyptian Public Authority for Drainage Projects, the Egyptian High Dam and Aswan Reservoir Authority, the Department of Mechanics and Electricity, and the National Water Research Centre (Figure 2.3).
Source: MWRI (2025[24]).
MWRI is responsible for designing and implementing government policies and strategies pertaining to water resources management. These include Egypt’s Second National Water Resources Plan 2017-2037, and the Water Resources Development and Management Strategy until 2050 (published in 2017). MWRI therefore plays an essential role in advancing water security for Egypt by improving water quality, rationalising water use, enhancing the availability of freshwater resources, and improving the enabling environment for integrated water resource management. The main activities of MWRI with relevance to agriculture include ensuring water availability for land reclamation and the expansion of agricultural production; implementing irrigation and drainage projects; monitoring surface and groundwater resources; maintaining the Aswan High Dam and Reservoir; and managing transboundary co-operation on water management through the Nile Basin Initiative.
National Water Research Centre
The National Water Research Centre (NWRC) was established in 1975 as the main research agency under MWRI. The mission of NWRC is to conduct scientific research and develop innovative solutions for sustainable water resources management in order to support Egypt’s development and ensure the availability of water resources for future generations. NWRC includes 12 research institutes focused on a broad range of thematic areas including irrigation and drainage, hydraulics, hydraulic structures and machinery, surface and groundwater hydrology, sediment transport, water quality and pollution control, coastal protection, climate change, geo-measurements analysis, and socio-economic impacts of on-farm water management policies. The NWRC provides data-driven research, technical expertise, and policy recommendations to assist MWRI in developing water policies and regulations that promote the efficient and sustainable use of water resources.
Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade
The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT) is a strategic ministry that is central to Egypt’s policies to achieve food security. It was established in 1943 as the Ministry of Supply and has historically been responsible for administering Egypt’s food subsidy system. Between 2005 and 2010 it became the Ministry of Social Solidarity as a result of a merger with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs and assumed responsibility for cash transfers. The name changed to the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Justice after the 2011 revolution, and in 2014 it was renamed to the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade2 (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[4]; Ido, 2018[25]).
MoSIT oversees a number of subsidiary bodies and affiliated agencies, including the General Authority for Supply Commodities, the Holding Company for Food Industries, the General Company for Silos and Storage, the Internal Trade Development Authority, and the Consumer Protection Agency. MoSIT has a broad remit and undertakes a range of activities, including:
Monitoring the implementation of the baladi bread and ration card subsidy programmes.
Ensuring the provision of essential food commodities in MoSIT outlets and expanding the range of available products.
Developing grocery stores and mobile retail outlets across Egypt and in remote rural areas.
Developing the National Silo Project to expand the government’s grain storage capacity and minimise losses. Modernising traditional barns for improved storage of the local wheat crop.
Registering geographical indicators, e.g. for the production of figs, olive oil and grapes in Matrouh governorate.
Developing the companies affiliated with the Holding Company for Food Industries to enable more robust competition in local and export markets.
Expanding the Consumer Protection Agency by opening new regional branches.
Offering commercial developer lands to investors for the establishment of commercial chains and logistics areas (MoSIT, 2025[26]).
General Authority for Supply Commodities
The General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) was established in 1968 as a financially and administratively independent entity, responsible for ensuring the provision of essential food commodities for the Egyptian population and implementing supply management policies. It has been operating under the umbrella of MoSIT since 2011. GASC is responsible for procuring strategic commodities from domestic and international sources and maintaining the government’s strategic food stocks, in accordance with decisions issued by MoSIT. It regulates local markets by overseeing the quantity and pricing of goods, monitoring stocks of strategic commodities, identifying self-sufficiency gaps, and acting to preserve food security. GASC also intervenes in the domestic market during periods of crisis and high food price inflation to ensure sufficient supplies, create competition, and prevent monopolistic practices.
GASC initiates tenders on international markets for a broad range of commodities, including wheat, maize, rice, flour, pasta, sugar, soybean oil, sunflower oil, frozen poultry, and frozen meat. Until December 2024, GASC was responsible for a major share of Egypt’s food imports and was the biggest wheat buyer in the international market. As of December 2024, Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development, an agency under the Egyptian Air Forces, has assumed responsibility for imports of strategic commodities previously undertaken by GASC (Ezz, 2024[27]).
Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Co-operation
The Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Co-operation (MPEDIC) was formed in July 2024 from the merger of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development and the Ministry of International Co-operation. The merger aimed to streamline government operations by combining the responsibilities for drafting long-term economic development plans, setting national development goals, and attracting international investment and partnerships.
MPEDIC plays a leading role in formulating the National Agenda for Sustainable Development: Egypt’s Vision 2030 and ensuring a consistent approach to the implementation of the state’s strategic vision across various development plans. MPEDIC is responsible for co-ordinating the plans of Ministries at the national and regional levels, formulating policies to improve the performance of government services, monitoring the implementation of government projects, and involving the private sector and civil society in policy design.
MPEDIC monitors the implementation of Egypt’s Vision 2030 in co-ordination with other ministries and stakeholders, and ensures alignment with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. In addition, MPEDIC oversees the implementation of the National Structural Reforms Programme, the National Project for Rural Development “Decent Life” (Haya Karima) Initiative, Egypt’s Integrated National Financing Strategy, and the Nexus of Water, Food and Energy (NWFE) programme.
Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade
The Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade (MIFT) was established in July 2024 from the former Ministry of Trade and Industry. The new ministry reflects the government’s strategic focus on improving the investment climate and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The ministry retains primary responsibility for international trade and WTO affairs, and actively participates in regional and international trade agreements aimed at promoting international trade, increasing exports, strengthening Egypt’s position in global markets, and fostering economic co-operation. It is also responsible for formulating and implementing trade measures related to different commodities; measures relating to agricultural commodities are implemented in co-ordination with MALR and MoSIT.
MIFT incorporates various entities such as the Export Development Fund and the Export Development Authority, which work to promote Egyptian exports by assisting firms with marketing, international exhibitions, trade missions and technical support. The Ministry also oversees the General Organisation for Export and Import Control, which manages the registration and issuing of trade permits for importers and exporters, as well as the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, which aims to attract foreign investors by creating a supportive business environment.
Ministry of Environment
The Ministry of Environment (MoE) was established in 1997 and is responsible for formulating environmental policy, preparing government plans and strategies for environmental protection, implementing environmental development projects, and promoting environmental relations between Egypt and other states, as well as regional and international organisations. The Ministry oversees several government strategies with implications for the agricultural sector, including the environmental dimension of the National Agenda for Sustainable Development (Egypt’s Vision 2030) and Egypt’s National Climate Change Strategy 2050. MoE works to reduce pollution, preserve biodiversity and the natural resource base, integrate environmental dimensions in national policies and programmes, and support Environmental Management Units at the sub-national (governorate) level.
Controlling pollution in the agricultural sector falls under MoE’s responsibilities. This includes protecting water resources from nutrient surpluses and nitrogen and phosphorus run-off, by designing regulations to control agricultural run-off, promoting the use of water-saving irrigation technologies, and restoring wetlands and other natural ecosystems. MoE also maintains lists of hazardous pesticides, herbicides and other agricultural chemicals that are not allowed to be imported, sold or used in Egypt.
Agricultural Bank of Egypt
The Agricultural Bank of Egypt (ABE) was founded in 1930 with the objective of developing Egypt’s agricultural sector. Formerly known as the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit, the bank underwent a restructuring in 2016 and was rebranded as the ABE following the adoption of Law no. 84/2016. Today the ABE is one of the largest agricultural banks in the Middle East and North Africa region, operating a network of 1 200 district branches and village banks across Egypt, employing approximately 17 000 staff, and providing services to 3-4 million farmers and rural citizens (Abdulghany, 2022[28]). The ABE is owned by the Egyptian Government and is supervised by the Central Bank of Egypt.
The ABE provides a broad range of loans and financial services to support agricultural and rural development in Egypt. These include concessional loans to finance crop production and agricultural investment activities (Yehia and Soliman, 2022[29]). The ABE increasingly delivers loans via farmer cards to ensure that farmers’ expenditures are restricted for use in agricultural businesses. It also provides storage facilities for local wheat producers, with 392 barns strategically positioned throughout the country. The ABE supports rural development through several microfinance initiatives, issues prepaid cards to rural citizens, and is currently developing a financial inclusion strategy.
Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for the overall financial management of the country, including budgeting, taxation and public debt. MoF provides financial resources to MALR to support the implementation of subsidy and investment programmes. MoF also collaborates with MALR and MPEDIC on the implementation of the NWFE programme, which aims to mobilise climate finance and private investments to promote sustainable development, including in the agricultural sector.
National Food Safety Authority
The National Food Safety Authority (NFSA) was established under Law No. 1/2017, reflecting Egypt’s commitment to improve food safety in the local market, and open new markets for agricultural exports. The NFSA is responsible for establishing mandatory food safety criteria; inspection, control, licensing and handling of food; control of imported and local food; granting certificates for exports of locally produced food; establishing rapid alert and recall systems; establishing risk assessment and analysis procedures; developing a system for food traceability; raising community awareness; and co-operating with national and international organisations on food safety and public health matters (FAO, 2017[30]).
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics
The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) was established in 1964 as Egypt’s official statistical agency, responsible for collecting and processing statistical data and conducting the census. CAPMAS publishes statistical data and indicators relating to the agricultural sector, including data on crop and livestock production, yields, agricultural incomes, activities of agricultural co-operatives, and water used for irrigation.
State-owned enterprises play an important role in the agriculture and food sectors
Numerous state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and military-owned enterprises (MOEs) are active in Egypt’s agriculture and food sectors. These enterprises operate across the entire agriculture and food value chain, and have an important influence on the marketing structure, the competitive environment for private enterprises, and the formation of market prices. State involvement in the agriculture and food sectors stems from the fact that food security is considered an integral part of national security.
The State Ownership Policy Framework Document was approved in December 2022 and outlines the state’s ambition to fully exit from numerous business activities over a period of 3‑5 years, including some activities in the agricultural sector (horticultural and field crops), as well as activities related to food and beverages. At the same time, the government plans to either maintain or increase participation in several other agricultural activities, including land reclamation and farm irrigation projects (Cabinet, 2022[31]).
SOEs and MOEs often benefit from tax privileges, and may receive transfers from the government. Following the adoption of Law No. 159 of 2023, Egypt’s cabinet approved regulations to abolish tax and fee exemptions for SOEs in 2024 (L'Orient Today, 2024[32]). However, SOEs that are not engaged in economic or investment activities are not covered by the legislation.
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises can help policymakers to strengthen the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for SOEs (OECD, 2024[33]). The guidelines underline the importance of ensuring a level playing field and fair competition between SOEs and the private sector, including the principle of applying the same tax system to all enterprises (“tax neutrality”). This principle is reflected in the State Ownership Policy Framework Document and is central to the government’s efforts to ensure competitive neutrality and a favourable business environment (Cabinet, 2022[31]). The government has also established a dedicated SOE unit under the Prime Minister’s office, with responsibility for implementing the state ownership policy, identifying and maintaining a comprehensive database of all SOEs and state-owned assets, determining the optimal exit mechanism from SOEs, and strengthening the governance and management of public assets (Egypt Independent, 2025[34]).
Holding Company for Food Industries
The Holding Company for Food Industries (HCFI) is a state-owned joint stock company that was established in 1991 and transferred to MoSIT in 2014. It is one of the largest companies operating in Egypt’s food sector and oversees the management of numerous subsidiary companies involved in food manufacturing, packaging, transportation, storage, and wholesale and retail trade (Table 2.4). The company has more than 70 000 employees and holds shares in 36 subsidiary companies. In addition, the HCFI also oversees three training and development centres, and an oil reception station in Alexandria (HCFI, 2025[35]).
HCFI is responsible for implementing a large part of the Egyptian food subsidy system, including managing the government’s strategic reserves and distributing flour to bakeries to produced subsidised baladi bread. HCFI also ensures stable food prices for consumers through its network of 13 000 warehouses, 1 060 retail outlets, 8 800 Game’yeti community outlets, and some 30 000 affiliated Tamween grocery stores that provide subsidised commodities through the ration card programme.
The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage
The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage was established by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1682/2002 and is a company wholly owned by GASC. The company’s responsibilities include:
Establishing and operating the silos necessary for storing grains to meet the country’s needs.
Building and developing a system for managing and monitoring the trading of local and imported wheat and flour from the beginning of contracting until the milling stage.
Receiving wheat from citizens and suppliers during the local wheat season and storing it in silos annually for consumption throughout the year.
Maintaining the quality of grains through monitoring and implementing the necessary maintenance to reduce the loss rate.
Creating new areas of attraction and agricultural expansion by encouraging farmers to grow wheat and grains near the areas where silos are established.
Reducing the average purchase price of wheat throughout the year as a result of entering the global market.
In the past, wheat was stored in barns and open warehouses, resulting in an estimated 10% of losses to rodents, birds, and weather-related damage (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[4]). Today EHCSS operates a network of around 50 modern silos, and uses advanced storage technologies to monitor grain stocks and minimise losses.
The General Company for Silos and Storage
The General Company for Silos and Storage is a joint-stock company affiliated to the Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage. The company is responsible for receiving grain shipments, unloading and storing grain in silos at various ports across Egypt. It also monitors the quality and condition of grains in its storage facilities, using modern sensor technologies to measure moisture content and protect grain stocks from pollution and spoiling. The company has the capacity to store 640 000 tonnes of grain in its silos, including 420 000 tonnes of storage capacity in the ports of Alexandria, Dekheila, Damietta, Port Said and Safaga.
National Service Projects Organisation
The National Service Projects Organisation (NSPO) was established in 1979 as a subsidiary under the Ministry of Defense, with the objective of achieving self-sufficiency for the Egyptian Armed Forces and contributing to national economic development. NSPO manufactures both military and civilian products and oversees a diverse portfolio of subsidiaries operating across various sectors, including agriculture and food, oil and gas, mining, domestic and foreign trade, contracting and specialised services, and specialised and heavy industries.
Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development
Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development was established in 2022 by presidential decree and operates as a development arm of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Initially focused on land reclamation projects, its mandate has since expanded to encompass a broader range of responsibilities. In December 2024, the agency took over a number of important functions previously held by GASC, assuming responsibility for imports of strategic commodities through international tenders and direct purchases (Ezz, 2024[27]).
Co-operatives provide an important link with smallholder farmers
Agricultural Co-operatives
Egypt registered 6 035 agricultural co-operative associations with 5.3 million members in 2019-20 (CAPMAS, 2021[37]). Membership in an agricultural co-operative has been compulsory since 1961, with annual membership fees automatically deducted from farmers’ transactions with the co-operatives (Kassim et al., 2018[38]). The agricultural co-operative system underwent a restructuring in 1992, and their primary functions shifted to serving as intermediaries connecting farmers with markets, providing technical assistance, and facilitating the delivery of inputs and concessional loans from the Agricultural Bank of Egypt. However, the complexity of the current legal framework is an obstacle to the development of co-operatives and provides little flexibility for engaging in independent marketing activities and developing contractual arrangements with the private sector (World Bank, 2014[39]; Abdelhakim, 2019[40]; ICA, 2019[41]).
Water User Associations
Water User Associations (WUAs) play an essential role in improving water delivery and strengthening participatory water management in irrigated agriculture. WUAs in Egypt operate at three levels: the district, secondary (branch-canal WUAs), and tertiary (mesqa) levels. Mesqa-level WUAs group farmers operating in the same irrigation canal. They were first established under the Irrigation Improvement Project in 1987, and acquired legal status under Law No. 213/1994. The Water Resources and Irrigation Law No. 147 of 2021 and its executive regulations establish a legal framework for civil society participation through WUAs, including by allowing canal and mesqa associations to elect secretaries of WUAs at the district level and general secretaries at the governorate level. WUAs help to manage the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, oversee the equitable distribution of irrigation water among farmers, support the adoption of efficient irrigation methods and water-saving technologies, and facilitate monitoring of water usage (Chapter 4).
This section begins by examining the policies through which transfers are directly received by producers, i.e. included in the measurement of the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), such as price support measures and input subsidies. Trade policies can also provide support to producers, and these are discussed in Section 2.3. Two important policies providing support to the agricultural sector are then discussed: research and development, and infrastructure. These are included in the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE). The final sub-section discusses policies that are provided to consumers specifically for the purposes of reducing the price of the goods they consume. These are included in the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE).
Price support measures are widespread in the grains sector
The government intervenes in domestic markets for grains, primarily through procurement at guaranteed minimum prices and public stockholding. This is done to induce greater production of wheat and maize, to increase self-sufficiency ratios and to reduce the large trade deficit for these key staple commodities, which are viewed by the government as vital for ensuring social protection and safeguarding food security. At the same time, strict prohibitions on rice cultivation constrain the production of this water-intensive crop, which already meets national consumption needs. Interventions are further reinforced by the trade measures discussed in Section 2.3.
Wheat
As the primary staple commodity and the main ingredient in baladi bread, wheat is considered to be an essential commodity for Egypt’s national food security. The General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) under the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT) is responsible for leading large-scale procurement operations. Depending on the year, the GASC may procure between one third and half of domestic wheat production (Figure 2.4). GASC also imported large quantities of wheat from international markets, amounting to 5.5 million tonnes per year over the period from 2020 to 2024 (USDA GAIN, 2025[42]). While previously GASC would publish data on its sourcing of grains and details of tender awards, this information is no longer publicly available, since Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development assumed responsibility for imports of strategic commodities.
Source: Author calculations based on USDA Grain and Feed Updates and WTO (2018[43]).
GASC purchases wheat from farmers at a government-set procurement price. Since 2017, MoSIT has typically announced the procurement price that it will pay for locally produced wheat one month before the start of the procurement season, which usually runs from 15 April to 15 July. The government-set procurement price is based on prevailing international market prices and is derived from a moving average of prices paid by GASC for imported wheat over the previous two months. There is a close alignment between the minimum support price (MSP) and the price received by farmers in recent years (Figure 2.5). The corresponding reference price of wheat in the international markets (based on the import unit value) is observed to be systematically below the price received by Egyptian producers.
Note: MSP = Minimum Support Price.
Source: Author calculations based on USDA Grain and Feed Updates and WTO (2018[43]).
While it is not mandatory for farmers to sell to the government, as the largest buyer in the market, the government’s guaranteed procurement price has an important influence on the market price of wheat. The government views this policy as important to guarantee a “fair price” for farmers, while maintaining domestic production of wheat – an important strategic crop for the nation’s food security. High procurement prices encourage farmers to cultivate wheat instead of other crops such as Egyptian clover (berseem) or sugar beets, leading to an expansion in the land area allocated to wheat production. Several state-owned enterprises are mandated to pay the government-set procurement price upon receipt of the crop, and then deliver it to GASC. For the calendar year 2025, these include the Holding Company for Food Industries, the Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage, the General Company for Silos and Storage, the Egyptian Agricultural Bank, and Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development (USDA GAIN, 2025[44]).
GASC also maintains buffer stocks of wheat, both to ensure food security and to help stabilise fluctuations in market prices. Stocks usually vary between three and six months of supply, with an additional one-month supply of wheat in transit to Egypt. In recent years, Egypt increased its capacity to store wheat and grain in modern silos from 1.6 million tonnes to 4 million tonnes, and modernised old storage facilities with 1.5 million tonnes of capacity. This has enabled the country to increase its strategic stocks of wheat from three to six months of supply, minimise losses due to poor storage, and mitigate temporary shocks to global wheat prices (USDA GAIN, 2022[45]). After increasing sharply to around 5 million tonnes in the late 2000s, the stocks have declined since 2022 due to rapid increases in consumption.
Maize
Maize is the second most consumed grain in Egypt and is also considered to be an essential commodity for Egypt. Yellow maize is used for animal feed while white maize is both used for human consumption and animal feed. Animal feed is a major driver of maize consumption, in particular poultry feed mix which is produced by Egypt’s feed mills and consists of 70% yellow maize. Imports reached an estimated 8.5 million tonnes in 2024-25, representing around 54% of the Egyptian consumption of maize (15.6 million tonnes in 2024-25) (USDA GAIN, 2025[42]). The government of Egypt has purchased maize on the domestic market for many years at prices often exceeding international prices, to encourage increased maize production and fewer imports of animal feed. However, in contrast to wheat, only a small portion of the overall maize production is purchased.
In February 2023, the government announced guaranteed prices of EGP 9 000 (USD 292) per tonne of white maize and EGP 9 500 (USD 308) per tonne of yellow maize (USDA GAIN, 2023[46]). These were established as minimum purchase prices to encourage increased planting of maize by domestic farmers and to build up strategic stocks, which have declined steadily over the past decade. Previously, crop procurement prices were not always announced prior to the start of the planting season, limiting farmers’ incentives to invest significant resources in expanding their production of maize. MALR has also been strengthening the incentives for maize production by improving the procurement price processes, implementing contract farming arrangements, and assisting farmers in developing market channels within the feed sector (USDA GAIN, 2023[46]).
Rice
Rice is a strategic crop in Egypt and is primarily cultivated through flood irrigation. There has been a balance between the production and consumption of rice in Egypt in recent years, with imports representing just 0.5% of consumption in 2024-25. While domestic production is mostly sufficient to meet demand for short and medium-grain rice, imports are primarily focused on varieties such as long-grain, basmati and jasmine rice, which are not grown in Egypt (USDA GAIN, 2025[42]).
As a highly water-intensive crop, cultivation is restricted to nine governorates in the Nile Delta (totalling 1 074 200 feddans, or 451 164 ha) designated by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) (USDA GAIN, 2025[42]). Several decrees have been introduced to further limit the cultivation of rice in areas other than those indicated by MWRI: in 2014-15 a fine of EGP 3 000 per feddan was imposed in case of violation of these limits. Other measures included the payment of further penalties to prevent the recurrence of violations or the payment of the equivalent cost of the misused water.
In 2022, MoSIT issued a decree constraining rice producers that own agricultural land higher than one feddan to supply one tonne of rice per feddan to MoSIT or face fines. At the end of 2022, marketing control was reinforced, with a decree issued to prevent shortages in the market: private stocks were prohibited, and producers, traders and distributors who withheld rice faced prison sentences and large fines. In addition, farmers who did not supply the requested rice quantity were not allowed to grow rice or to receive input subsidies for a period of one year (Ahram Online, 2022[47]). Due to concerns about food security and rapid price inflation, in November 2022, the government designated rice as an essential commodity. This designation was introduced with the objective of safeguarding food security and allowed the government to impose price controls and other domestic measures to prevent shortages, price hikes and monopolistic practices (USDA GAIN, 2023[46]).
Public stockholding
The government maintains silos and grain storage infrastructure with the alleged objective of meeting the country’s demand for staple commodities and “encouraging farmers to cultivate wheat and grains near the areas where silos are established” (GASC, 2025[48]). The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage (EHCSS) is responsible for the storage of Egypt’s strategic food reserve, and is currently expanding its grains storage capacity. These efforts are being undertaken within the framework of the National Silo project, which involves the construction of 50 silos with an estimated storage capacity of 1.5 million tonnes distributed across 17 governorates. This project involves considerable investments amounting to USD 421 million since 2005 (Figure 2.6), which will allow Egypt to store more than 6 months of supply in its strategic reserves. This is seen by the government as a way to mitigate the consequences of future shocks to production and prices.
Source: Data provided by the Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage (EHCSS).
Input costs are lowered by market interventions
Fertiliser subsidies
The Egyptian Government indirectly subsidises the production of fertilisers. There are currently seven factories producing approximately 6.6 million tonnes of fertiliser per year in Egypt. These factories purchase subsidised natural gas at a discount with support from the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and are required to allocate 55% of their production to the MALR, which is then sold to farmers at a below-market subsidised price. In return, fertiliser manufacturers are permitted to sell the remaining 45% of their production – comprising 35% for export and 10% for the domestic market. The subsidised price is updated every few years and has increased in 2022 to EGP 4 500 per tonne, but still remains below market prices.
Subsidised nitrogen fertilisers are targeted to strategic crops – in particular wheat – and are provided exclusively to small-scale farmers with land holdings of up to 25 feddan (10.5 hectares). Agricultural co-operatives are mandated by the government to distribute fertilisers, and each farmer is allocated a quota calculated based on their land size and the crops that they cultivate. Since the turn of the century, the use of fertilisers per hectare has remained stable, albeit at quite high levels. While this is in part due to multiple crops planted per year in Egypt, evidence suggests that the fertiliser subsidies may be contributing to overapplication of fertilisers, leading to nutrient surpluses with considerable negative consequences for environmental sustainability. For instance, nitrogen fertiliser applied to wheat was estimated to be 139 kg per feddan, which is 85% higher than the requirement of 75 kg per feddan set by MALR (Kurdi et al., 2020[49]).
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[50]).
National Seed Production Project
This project aims to increase self-sufficiency by raising the productivity of Egyptian crops and producing high-quality local seeds that are resistant to pests and climate change. The plan of the vegetable crop seed production programme is to increase Egypt's ability to provide vegetable seeds locally instead of importing more than 95% of vegetable crop seeds, in addition to reducing the burden on farmers by making them available at reasonable prices. The programme includes providing farmers seeds at low prices and investment in improved varieties.
The programme succeeded in deriving and registering 26 varieties and hybrids for 10 main vegetable crops: tomatoes, peppers, eggplant, watermelon, cantaloupe, peas, beans, cowpeas, cucumbers, and zucchini. New varieties are characterised by their resistance to disease, soil and water salinity, and drought.
Concessional loans provide support for small-scale producers
Preferential credit from the Agricultural Bank of Egypt
The credit portfolio of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt (ABE) includes several concessional loan products for farmers. Loans are provided to farmers with an interest rate of 5%, significantly lower than the market interest rate of about 22% in 2023. The difference is then compensated by the ABE and the Central Bank of Egypt. These concessional loans constitute about 20% of the bank’s loan portfolio, while the remainder is made up of commercial loans.
Concessional loans are provided to farmers with the aim of boosting domestic production and reducing Egypt’s dependency on imports. The bank also provides financing to farmers for land reclamation, and has supported Egyptian farmers in reclaiming around 4 million feddans in recent years. The ABE currently serves about 5-10% of the 9 million farmers that are eligible to apply for a subsidised loan (tenant farmers are not eligible). To help increase the bank's penetration rate, the ABE has recently developed Agrimisr, an online platform for landowners to apply for subsidised loans.
The National Veal Project
The National Veal Project began in mid-2017 and provides concessional loans at an interest rate of 5%. The programme has provided EGP 9 billion in financing for 44 000 beneficiaries, including small breeders, women and young graduates, to raise and fatten approximately 510 000 heads of cattle. Ministerial Resolution No. 72/2017 was issued to prohibit the slaughter of veal weighing less than 100 kg live weight, by encouraging farmers to fatten the animals until they reach a weight of at least 400 kg, with the aim of increasing the supply of red meat in the local market, raising the incomes of small breeders, and reducing imports.
Investments in irrigation infrastructure are substantial
Large-scale irrigation infrastructure projects, including the construction and maintenance of branch canals up to the mesqa level, are developed by MWRI. In addition, MPEDIC provides support for the rehabilitation and lining of irrigation canals through the Decent Life Initiative (Haya Karima). MALR, through Law No. 213/1994, encourages farmers to develop on-farm irrigation systems. In particular, the law provides for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by water user associations benefiting from mesqa enhancement investments, and loans. The costs associated with pump sets are to be repaid within a 3‑year period, while the repayment of civil works expenses extends over a period of 20 years. These loans are provided to farmers interest-free, with the cost of the loan borne by the government. Until 2013, the cost recovery process was delayed pending a decision on whether the costs of electricity should also be included. In 2013, MWRI and MoF officially decided to include the costs of electricity networks in the cost recovery framework, with repayments scheduled over a 15-year period (World Bank, 2016[51]).
In new lands recently reclaimed from desert to agricultural production, the government provides water to farmers free of charge. Nevertheless, farmers are obliged to bear the costs associated with diesel for water pumps, the initial installation of pumps (whether surface or submersible), and the excavation of wells. However, the expenses related to pumped irrigation water receive indirect subsidies through fuel subsidies. In addition, regulations governing pump usage are not strictly enforced, which has contributed to the prevalence of unauthorised pumping (Soliman, 2024[52]) (Kassim et al., 2018[38]).
Land reclamation is a key focus of agricultural policy
Another key element of the agricultural development strategy of Egypt is the constant incorporation of new lands from the desert to agricultural production. Land reclamation involves significant expenditures on infrastructure, such as extending electricity networks, road construction, wastewater treatment, and the establishment of canals for irrigation. The importance of this systematic expansion is reflected in numerous large-scale projects that have been implemented over the past decades in Egypt.
The main large-scale land reclamation projects implemented by the government are outlined below:
The New Delta Project (launched in 2015), which aims to convert 2.2 million feddans (9 240 km²) of desert west of the Nile Delta into farmland, using pumped groundwater and treated wastewater.
The South Valley Development Project “Toshka El Khair” (launched in 2014), which targets the cultivation of 467 316 feddan (196 273 ha), the development of agri-food industries, and the expansion of agricultural exports, including the establishment of palm plantations for export.
The one-and-a-half million feddans project (launched in 2014), which seeks to expand cultivated land by 1.45 million feddan (0.6 million ha), increase habitable areas, and boost agricultural exports.
The 100 000 feddans of greenhouses Project (launched in 2014), which aims to enhance vegetable production, expand exports, and support agricultural intensification through greenhouse farming.
East Owainat Project, located in the New Valley Governorate, which aims to convert desert land into agricultural production areas using fossil water from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, expanding cultivated land for field crops and horticulture.
As a result of this policy, total cultivated areas have increased from 8.7 million feddans (3.7 million ha) in 2010 to 10 million feddans (4.2 million ha) in 2024 (MALR, 2020[12]). However, this has not been sufficient to compensate for the increase in food demand driven by population and economic growth. Against this background, land reclamation has accelerated considerably since 2016/2017, and there has been a nearly constant increase in the share of new areas in total cultivated areas (Figure 2.8). New lands are more often associated with larger scale market-oriented agriculture when compared with old lands, but they also host many small-scale farmers operating within the framework of governmental programmes.
Source: CAPMAS (2024[53]).
Consumer support includes subsidies for Baladi bread and essential commodities
The modern food subsidy system, called tamween, comprises two elements: a subsidy for baladi bread and ration cards. The price of a loaf of baladi bread was previously set at 5 piasters (USD 0.001) per loaf. On 1 June 2024, the government implemented a four-fold increase in the price of subsidised bread, marking the first such increase in 36 years (Jovanovic and Glauber, 2024[54]). The bread subsidy allows eligible citizens to purchase five loaves of baladi bread per day at a price of 20 piasters per loaf (i.e. EGP 1 or USD 0.02 for five loaves). This is significantly lower than the market price of EGP 1.5 (USD 0.03) per loaf. If the citizen does not consume their full ration of bread, the difference is added as credit on the ration card through which can be redeemed for other subsidised commodities. For the year 2024, expenditures on the baladi bread subsidy reached EGP 98 billion (USD 2.2 billion) and benefited nearly 71 million citizens (USDA GAIN, 2024[55]).
In addition to the baladi bread subsidy, eligible citizens are granted an EGP 50 (USD 1) credit that allows them to purchase from a list of 33 essential commodities at subsidised prices from authorised distribution centres supplied by the Holding Company for Food Industries. The prices are lower in these centres than in other markets but designed to allow for a small profit. For the year 2024, the budget for this programme was EGP 36 billion (USD 798 million). It benefited 61 million citizens, whose eligibility is determined based on a comprehensive database managed by GASC combining a variety of indicators that are frequently updated (MoF, 2025[56]).
Access to land and property rights
Land ownership remains highly fragmented in Egypt as a result of land reform policies adopted after the 1952 revolution, which set ownership ceilings of 200, 100, and then 50 feddans per individual. Over the following decades, high population density and prevailing inheritance laws have led to increasingly small and fragmented land holdings, especially in the Nile Delta (Nada and Sims, 2020[57]).
The protection of property rights is enshrined in the 2014 constitution (amended in 2019). Article 29 commits the state to “protecting and increasing land under cultivation”, “incriminating encroachments thereon”, as well as “the allocation of a percentage of reclaimed lands to small farmers and youth graduates”. Article 33 further underlines the state’s responsibility to protect public, private and co-operative ownership of property (Constitute, 2022[9]). Nevertheless, small-scale producers often face insecure tenure, limited legal protections, and bureaucratic hurdles in acquiring or registering land. While title registration has been applied to agricultural land, only 25% of land parcels are estimated to be accurately recorded in the system (Nada and Sims, 2020[57]).
Additionally, the expansion of land reclamation projects and urban encroachment in old lands have further complicated access, sometimes displacing local communities or restricting traditional land use. Amendments to the Desert Land Law of 1981 were introduced in 2024, allowing foreign investors, particularly Arab nationals, to acquire desert lands for investment projects under specific legal frameworks, and subject to regulatory and security approvals (Manshurat, 2024[58]) (Ahram Online, 2024[59]). While these changes provide pathways for foreign investment in agricultural land, majority Egyptian ownership remains a requirement in many cases.
Agriculture is an important source of employment in rural areas, especially for women. However, only 2% of Egyptian women own land, and only 5.2% of the total agricultural land is owned by women, which is lower than the average for the Arab world (7%) (FAO, 2022[60]). Furthermore, the majority of women are deprived of their rights to inherit land, particularly in border governorates and in Upper Egypt (OECD/ILO/CAWTAR, 2020[61]). The chances of women being denied their inheritance are higher for agricultural land (Khodary, 2018[62]). Strengthening legal frameworks, ensuring equitable land distribution, and improving access to land registration services are essential steps to empower farmers, particularly women, and boost productivity in the sector.
There are limited programmes to improve environmental performance
One important environmental problem in Egypt arises when farmers burn leftover rice straw after the harvest, causing black clouds to fill the sky and exposing rural residents to hazardous air pollution and respiratory diseases. In response, the government adopted the Waste Management and Regulation Law 202/2020, which introduced strict fines and prison sentences for violators. The Ministry of Environment (MoE) leads local committees to monitor and prevent the open burning of agricultural residues, and launched the “Prepare for Green” campaign in September 2024 to raise awareness amongst farmers about the dangers of burning rice straw. In addition, MoE educates farmers about methods for recycling rice straw and using it as fodder, and provides farmers with machinery for compacting and transporting agricultural waste (Farouk, 2024[63]).
Agriculture faces low levels of taxation with several exemptions for smallholders
Historically, agriculture was implicitly taxed via an overvalued exchange rate for exports and domestic price controls. These implicit taxes have been mostly eliminated with the liberalisation measures enacted over the past decades.
The Egyptian agricultural land tax acts as a proxy income tax as it is based on an assumed income stream earned from land. Land tax is assessed on the landowner, who is legally responsible for payment. However, in practice the Real Estate Tax Department collects the tax from whoever is cultivating the land, regardless of whether that person is the owner or the tenant (RTA, 2025[64]).
There are several exemptions to the Land Tax. For instance, Law No. 151/1973 provides a 100% land tax exemption to landholders with total landholdings not exceeding 3 feddan (about 90% of farm holdings), except for fruit orchards or if the taxpayer has non-agricultural sources of income. Reclaimed lands such as desert and fallow lands are exempt from land tax for ten years after becoming productive, and permanent exemptions are granted for agricultural land owned by the state and communal land owned by villages. The overall revenue generated by this tax is negligible and it was suspended in 2017 to encourage farmers and agricultural businesses to increase production (El-Din, 2020[65]). The government extended the suspension of the tax to help mitigate the financial challenges brought on by the COVID‑19 pandemic and it remains under suspension.
The Unified Income Tax (UIT) is applicable to five categories of non-corporate income, one of which is agricultural land and buildings. Individuals exclusively involved in agricultural production or in the sale of agricultural inputs or marketing agricultural products are taxed as commercial entities. Most landowners and tenants subject to taxation assess their net income based on the use of agricultural lands (including buildings). The tax base aligns with that used for the agricultural land tax, relying on the estimated annual rental value defined by Law No. 113/1939. According to the Ministry of Finance, this value is calculated as the estimated return based on the type of crop multiplied by the number of feddan under cultivation. A presumptive 20% is then deducted for production costs, along with the agricultural land tax obligation; if records are available, this deduction may exceed 20%. For landowners, revenues are set at twice the rental value. This tax is then collected concurrently with the agricultural land tax (MKS Egypt, 2025[66]).
In 2016, the government transitioned from a general sales tax (GST) to a value-added tax (VAT). The new VAT included exemptions for 18 vital food items like wheat, corn, soybeans, and sugar (Wally and Akingbe, 2020[67]). The implementation of VAT on freight began in 2020, which affected private sector imports of soybeans, corn, and corn by-products. VAT exemptions currently apply to 57 items, including tea, sugar and coffee, as well as freight services related to imported grains, beans, salt and spices (PwC, 2023[68]).
Trade in agricultural products, both exports and imports, is heavily influenced by government policy. The Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade (MIFT) is responsible for the formulation and implementation of Egypt’s trade policy, while the Egyptian Customs Authority implements customs procedures and trade-related legislation issued by government ministries. Agricultural trade policy is implemented in co-ordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), which is responsible for setting sanitary and phytosanitary measures. This section outlines the main trade measures affecting imports and exports of agricultural and food products, including tariffs, export taxes, and quantitative restrictions such as import quotas and export bans. It also discusses regulatory requirements such as licensing and quarantine arrangements, as well as multilateral, regional and bilateral trade relations. The main trade policies and corresponding domestic policy measures for specific agricultural commodities are discussed in detail in Annex 2.C.
Import policy measures
Tariffs
Egypt’s tariff policy is based on the Customs Law No. 207/2020. Tariff rates are reviewed by the Supreme Customs Tariff Council, which submits proposals for revised tariff rates to the Minister of Finance. The proposals are then presented to the Council of Ministers, and are ultimately established and modified by Presidential decree. Nearly all tariff lines carry ad valorem duties, which are applied on the c.i.f. value of imports (WTO, 2018[43]). Almost 98.5% of tariff lines for agricultural products (according to the WTO definition) are ad valorem tariffs, while 1.45% of agricultural products face specific tariffs.
Egypt’s simple average applied MFN agricultural tariff decreased from 76% in 2003 to 69% in 2019 (Figure 2.9), and further decreased to 64% in 2022. The high average tariff for agriculture reflects tariff peaks for alcoholic beverages and spirits, many of which are subject to customs duties ranging between 600% and 3000%. Excluding alcoholic beverages from the calculation results in a simple average MFN tariff rate of 16% in 2019, which as for most WTO Members, is still slightly higher than the average MFN tariff for non-agricultural products (12%).
Nearly all agricultural tariff lines (over 99%) are bound in the WTO by an upper limit, with the vast majority of final bound tariffs ranging between 15-100%. Egypt tends to apply tariffs on its agricultural products at levels far below their bound levels. Indeed, more than 70% of agricultural MFN tariff lines are either duty-free or fall within the range of 0-10%. As a result, 72% of the value of agricultural imports entered Egypt duty-free in 2019, and an additional 17% were subject to duties less than 10% (Figure 2.10).
Tariffs on agricultural products remain higher than those applied to non-agricultural goods. The product groups with import tariffs higher than 10% include live animals and meat; fruits and vegetables; cereals and food preparations; sugars and confectionery; and beverages and tobacco (Table 2.6). Aside from alcoholic beverages and spirits, relatively high tariffs of 60% are applied to bananas, oranges, mandarins and citrus fruit, pears, apricots, peaches, plums, cherries, strawberries, chewing gum, crispbread, gingerbread, sweet biscuits, waffles and wafers, rusks, and fruit juices (WITS, 2025[69]).
Note: Simple averages are based on pre-aggregated HS six-digit averages (i.e. duties at the tariff line level are first averaged to six-digit subheadings).
Source: WITS (2025[69]), https://wits.worldbank.org/.
Tariff exemptions, reductions and tax concessions are allowed for under the Customs Law No. 207/2020, the Customs Exemptions Law No. 186/1986, and the Investment Law No. 160/2023 (that amends some provisions of Law No. 72/2017). In addition, the government periodically reduces import duties on agricultural and food products in response to temporary shortfalls in the domestic supply or sudden increases in international market prices. For example, tariffs on raw cane and beet sugar were temporarily lowered from 20% to zero between 15 March and 31 December 2017, in response to a fall in global sugar production and sudden increases in international prices (WTO, 2018[43]). The 30% MFN tariff on imports of frozen poultry was temporarily suspended for six months in October 2023, as prescribed in Prime Ministerial Decree No. 3912/2023, to mitigate the impact of local supply shortages caused by an outbreak of Avian influenza (The Poultry Site, 2023[72]). The Decree was then renewed for an additional six months in 2024.
Egypt does not apply any tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on an MFN basis. However, tariff preferences and TRQs for the imports of some agricultural products were agreed in Egypt’s free trade agreements with the European Union, EFTA and Türkiye.
Import licensing
The General Organisation for Export and Import Control (GOEIC) is an agency under the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade (MIFT) responsible for maintaining a registry of exporters, importers, and commercial agents, conducting inspections to ensure quality control of exports and imports, and issuing certificates of origin for Egyptian exports. According to Law No. 7/2017, all persons or companies importing goods to Egypt are required to register with GOEIC and fulfil a number of criteria including holding Egyptian nationality, practicing commercial business for at least two years prior to registration, and not being subject to bankruptcy proceedings (GOEIC, 2017[73]).
According to Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2992/2016 on “Organising Imports of Strategic Agricultural Commodities”, the imports of certain commodities including wheat grains, feed maize, and soybean seeds for oil extraction are prohibited without written approval from GOEIC. However, this requirement does not apply to imports undertaken by government agencies, such as the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC). Furthermore, certain food products3 for retail sale can only be imported under special conditions outlined in Ministerial Decree 991/2015, including registering with GOEIC, maintaining a quality control system, obtaining an inspection and review certificate, and ensuring conformity with the relevant accredited Egyptian standards (WTO, 2018[43]).
Imports of agricultural commodities are subject to plant health and food safety standards. MALR Decree No. 562/2019 establishes the Central Administration for Plant Quarantine (CAPQ) as Egypt’s national plant protection organisation and the agency responsible for grains and oilseeds inspections. CAPQ’s responsibilities include ensuring that phytosanitary certificates are in order, that products are free from pests and diseases, and that products comply with safety standards for pesticides, chemical residues and contaminants. Egyptian officials from CAPQ are also required to conduct pre-shipment inspections at the port-of-loading of imports of grains and oilseeds (USDA GAIN, 2020[74]).
Livestock products are inspected by the General Organisation for Veterinary Services (GOVS). The National Food Safety Authority (NFSA) is responsible for ensuring food safety, and works in co-ordination with CAPQ and GOVS to ensure that both domestic and imported food products meet Egypt’s food safety regulations.
Standards and labelling
The Egyptian Organisation for Standardisation and Quality (EOS) is responsible for developing, issuing and mandating Egyptian Technical standards. Egyptian Technical Standards are developed by EOS technical committees, which are made up of experts from research institutes, producers, consumers, and civil society organisations. There are 150 technical committees, of which 29 relate to the food industry. In the absence of mandatory Egyptian standard specifications, importers can choose from a range of international and foreign standard specifications, including the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), CODEX or the standardisation systems of the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Trade agreements
Egypt has been a WTO member since 30 June 1995 and is an active participant in the multilateral trading system, granting at least MFN treatment to all WTO members. Egypt is supportive of liberalisation of the agricultural sector within a multilateral framework (WTO, 2018[43]). Egypt is a signatory to the following regional and bilateral trade agreements:
Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement/ Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), signed in February 1997 and entered into force in January 1988.
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), signed in June 1998 and entered into force in February 1999.
Egypt-EU Association Agreement, signed in September 2001 and entered into force in January 2004.
Egypt Türkiye Free Trade Agreement, signed in December 2005 and entered into force in March 2007.
Agadir Free Trade Agreement, signed in February 2004 and entered into force in March 2007.
Egypt-EFTA Free Trade Agreement, signed in January 2007 and entered into force in August 2007.
Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) with duty free status with the US, signed in December 2004 and entered into force in February 2005.
Egypt-MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement, signed in August 2010 and entered into force in September 2017.
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), signed in March 2018 and entered into force in January 2021.
Egypt-UK Association Agreement, signed in December 2020 and entered into force in January 2021.
This section presents a quantitative evaluation of support provided to Egypt’s agricultural sector for the period 2000-24 through the domestic and trade policies discussed in detail in the previous sections of this chapter. It makes use of the OECD’s methodology for measuring the level of policy effort made by governments to support the agricultural sector, through a set of indicators designed to assess the level and composition of support and to monitor how this support compares over time and across countries.
The OECD approach classifies agricultural support policy measures into three main categories: support to individual farmers (through the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) indicator), support to agricultural producers collectively (through the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) indicator) and support to consumers (through the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) indicator). Put together, these indicators provide a comprehensive picture of agricultural support through the Total Support Estimate (TSE). Annex 2.B provides short definitions of key indicators used in this report, while a detailed description of the OECD methodology to estimate agricultural support (OECD, 2016[75]) and a comprehensive database for OECD and selected non-OECD countries is available at http://oe.cd/monitoring.
The method applied in this study is fully consistent with that used for other countries as presented in the OECD reports that monitor and evaluate agricultural policies on a yearly basis (OECD, 2024[76]). While strictly adhering to this method, the PSE calculations in this report are subject to the limitations of the information provided by the government of Egypt. In particular, the budgetary data was fragmented and collected from a number of sources, raising questions about its completeness and consistency. It was also highly aggregated, which required adjustments and assumptions in the allocation of support to categories and to commodities. While considerable efforts were made to share the most detailed and comprehensive information available, the government of Egypt was not always able to provide complete and detailed information on budgetary expenditures for agriculture. These caveats are discussed further in Box 2.4 and should be taken into account when analysing the results.
Support to agricultural producers: farmers mostly benefit from supported market prices and receive relatively less budgetary payments
Government support to producers accounted for 10% of their receipts in 2022-24
The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) measures the monetary value of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers arising from government policies that support agriculture. Transfers generated by agricultural policies are measured in gross terms (as no adjustment is made for costs incurred by producers) and at the farm gate level (to measure support provided only to individual primary producers of agricultural commodities).
The PSE is often presented using the %PSE indicator, which is calculated by dividing producer support by the value of gross farm receipts (i.e. the value of production plus budgetary and other transfers to producers). The level of support provides insights into the incidence that agricultural support policies have on producers (support when PSE is positive or burden when PSE is negative), on consumers (burden when Market Price Support to producers is positive), and taxpayers (budgetary costs).
Egypt’s %PSE averaged 10.1% in 2022-24, indicating that a tenth of agricultural producers’ gross receipts were generated by support policies (Table 2.7 and Table 2.8). Producer support in Egypt essentially reflects market price support measures generated through domestic policy (especially administered prices and procurement of several staple commodities) and trade policies (with significant tariff protection). Market price support, which accounts for 8.8% of gross farm receipts, makes up the vast majority of the total. This means that most of the burden of support is borne by consumers and other first-level buyers of agricultural commodities, who pay prices higher than they would have in the absence of these policies. In contrast, budgetary spending – composed exclusively of input subsidies – represents only 1.4% of gross farm receipts, a minimal share by comparison.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
As it is not affected by the size of the sector or by inflation, the %PSE is a good indicator to compare the level of support across countries and over time. In comparison with countries covered in the annual OECD Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation report, in 2022‑24, the average level of producer support of 10% measured in Egypt is lower than the OECD average of 13%, but higher than the average of 7% for emerging economies. The level of support in Egypt is similar to that in Türkiye (9%) a net exporter of food products but below that of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China) (13%) or the Philippines (20%), both net importers like Egypt (Figure 2.11).
Notes: The OECD total does not include the non-OECD EU Member States. The 11 Emerging Economies include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine and Viet Nam.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
How Egypt supports farmers, market price policies versus budgetary payments
The way in which support is provided largely determines its effects. Governments have a broad range of measures at their disposal to support agricultural producers: for example, they can support domestic prices through tariffs in combination with domestic market interventions or direct price administrations. They can provide subsidies to reduce the cost of variable inputs such as fuel and fertilisers. They can also provide payments on a per animal or per hectare basis, or as a top-up to farmers’ income. Each type of measure has different implications in terms of its impact on market distortions and on the burden faced by producers, consumers and taxpayers. It can also have different impacts for producers of different commodities.
The %PSE declined in Egypt from 24% in 2000 to 12% in 2024 while fluctuating considerably over the period (Figure 2.12). The magnitude of these swings was driven by changes in the relative levels of domestic and international prices underlying MPS. The decline was sharpest in 2008 coinciding with the global food price crisis generated by an overall rise in world commodity prices. High international prices reduced the gap between international and domestic prices. Variations are also sometimes caused by exchange rate fluctuations; for instance, in 2017 the rapid depreciation of the Egyptian pound caused a sharp rise in world prices in local currency, thereby lowering the %PSE. The MPS has closely mirrored movements in the official exchange rate, with significant declines observed during periods of depreciation: a large decrease in the 2000s, another sharp drop at the peak of depreciation in 2017, and a further decline in 2022. In 2023 and 2024, successive devaluations of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar increased border reference prices when expressed in local currency, which reduced price gaps and, in turn, lowered the country’s MPS and overall support level.
Changes in the level of support were almost exclusively driven by MPS (provided by transfers from consumers to producers), while the relative importance of budgetary transfers from taxpayers to producers, according to the data available, is very small. Responding to the long-standing objective of achieving food self-sufficiency, market price support is a continuing feature of support for some of Egypt’s agricultural commodities. The government has aimed to increase prices received by producers to encourage domestic production, particularly of cereals, in order to secure an adequate food supply for the population and to improve farmers’ income. This has led to a level of support to producers that has maintained above 10% of farm receipts in most of the years since 2009.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
How support is delivered has implications for the distribution of costs and benefits. In the case of Egypt, since most of support is market price support, the burden of this support falls on consumers. But this burden is not evenly distributed. Some commodities, especially grains, are supported while other commodities such as fruit and vegetables are not. At the same time, some livestock producers are implicitly taxed due to the support provided to grain, which drives up the cost of animal feed, particularly maize. To a lesser extent, and subject to the available budgetary information, producers are also supported through budgetary transfers by means of input subsidies.
The amount of budgetary support to producers is relatively small
As part of the OECD’s analysis of agricultural support, a comprehensive review of public expenditure is conducted at both the national and sub-national levels. Based on information submitted by national authorities, the level and composition of budget support are analysed through the budgetary expenditures provided by governments to producers individually (as farmers), collectively (as a sector) and to consumers. Each policy measure supporting agriculture is then classified by the OECD according to specific implementation criteria, identifying the economic feature and eligibility conditions for farmers. The review includes:
Producer support measures (classified under the PSE component), covering seven categories: support based on commodity output, payments based on inputs used, three categories of direct payments (linked to current or non-current area, animal numbers, receipts or income, with or without production requirements), payments based on non-commodity criteria, and miscellaneous payments.
General service support measures (classified under the GSSE component), benefiting the sector as a whole. These include six categories: agricultural knowledge and innovation systems, food inspection and control, rural infrastructure development and maintenance, marketing and promotion, public stockholding costs and miscellaneous payments.
Consumer support expenditures (CSE) which include budgetary transfers to first-stage consumers to offset higher prices due to market price support, as well as cash or in-kind consumption subsidies linked to such programmes.
Source: OECD (2016[75]).
Budgetary support to agricultural producers in Egypt is small in comparison to MPS. While it has increased in nominal national currency terms from EGP 3 billion per year in 2000‑02 to EGP 19.7 billion in 2022‑24, the sharp devaluation of the Egyptian Pound means that it decreased when expressed in US Dollars, from USD 764 million to USD 616 million over the same period (Table 2.8). However, the PSE calculations in this report are subject to the caveats and limitations in the data available and provided by the government of Egypt (Box 2.4).
Conducting the analysis of agricultural budgetary support requires access to complete, detailed, disaggregated and consistent budget data. While considerable efforts were made to share the most detailed and comprehensive data available, several challenges were encountered in collecting budgetary expenditure information.
Challenges
Budgetary data used to assess support to agricultural producers and the sector largely come from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). While MALR maintains and shared a detailed list of agricultural support programmes, it was unable to provide time series on annual allocations (only 2024 was available) or complete programme descriptions, which limited the level of detail possible in the review. MoF publishes annual financial statements for the state budget, including data on public expenditures for the agricultural sector. Despite their limitations, these data constituted an indispensable basis for conducting the PSE analysis. At the same time, although all budgetary expenditures from various government bodies and administrative levels should, in principle, be reflected in MoF’s reporting, verifying the completeness of this data remains difficult. A key issue is that publicly available budgetary data, including those related to agricultural policy are highly aggregated, making it challenging to assess the actual amounts allocated to specific policy measures and their implementation criteria.1 As a result, most budgetary expenditure data included in the review are reported at the fund level (e.g. Agricultural Land Fund) or by institution (e.g. Agricultural Research Centre), rather than by specific policy measure or programme. Furthermore, the available data from the MoF included budgeted data rather than actual expenditures, making it difficult to assess the real financial support provided.
MALR provided a list of programmes but only for the most recent years or as totals for the whole period without annual breakdowns, which limited their inclusion in the database. Similarly, MoF did not provide any details (i.e. implementation criteria) on how the funds were allocated, referring to them only in broad terms such as subsidies to food commodities, support for farmers or agricultural production support.
Annual financial statements of the state budget have been made available online by the MoF since 2006. Missing data for the period 2000‑05 were estimated using government expenditure on agriculture based on the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), collected by the FAO in collaboration with the IMF. The series consisted of total government expenditure on agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting. Each expenditure category, classified as PSSE or GSSE, was expressed as a percentage of the total series for each year. The percentages were then averaged over the period 2006‑24 and applied to earlier years.
Additionally, expenditures by local governments from their own resources were entirely unavailable. The government did not provide this information upon request, nor was it accessible through the MoF’s online platform, further limiting transparency and comprehensive analysis. Moreover, the budget does not capture financial activities carried out by economic agencies and other public sector entities, including state-owned enterprises. These entities are often engaged in significant fiscal transfers that are not reflected in the official accounts. Similarly, quasi-fiscal activities in sectors such as agriculture, including subsidies and financial support provided through state-owned fertiliser companies, remain outside the state’s general budget, further obscuring the full picture of public budgetary intervention.
Challenges obtaining information include:
Producer support measures: data includes only payments based on input use. Most budgetary lines were highly aggregated, making it impossible to distinguish expenditures across the various subcategories within input subsidies. As a result, these expenditures were assumed to be evenly distributed among variable input use, fixed capital formation, and on-farm services.
Most of the expenditures on fertiliser subsidies are implicit and not explicitly recorded in the budget, despite their potential significance. Fertiliser subsidies were calculated as the difference between the subsidised price paid by farmers and the reference (non-subsidised) market price (source CAPMAS), multiplied by the estimated volume of subsidised fertiliser (based on FAO data).
General service support measures: includes Research and Development, Inspection and Control, and Infrastructure Development and Maintenance. All data were sourced from the MoF and provided at the institutional level (e.g. investments from MWRI).
Public stockholding expenditures are not recorded in the government budget. They were therefore estimated by multiplying the ending stock of grains (sourced from USDA) by the per-tonne maintenance cost for both locally produced and imported grain, based on data from the Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage.
Consumer support expenditures cover the two main programmes: the bread subsidy and ration card programmes. Budgetary data used to assess support to consumers come from MoSIT. This information is comprehensive and covers the main food subsidy programmes.
Main information gaps
Exclusion of large-scale national projects: several large-scale national agricultural development projects, while representing significant investments in the sector, often as part of land reclamation, are not included in the evaluation of support to agriculture. Along with the state, companies operating in the defence sector, the domestic private sector, and foreign companies all play a major role in these national agricultural and food projects (see section 2.2).
Water subsidies: Farmers do not pay for the water used on their farms, yet the implicit subsidy associated with free water use has not been accounted for in the support estimates. This is due to the absence of data on on-farm water use (as no meters are in place to measure usage) and the lack of a clear reference price that farmers would pay if water were subject to market pricing. This is similar in a number of OECD countries, where water cost recovery remains partial (Gruère, Shigemitsu and Crawford, 2020[77]).
Another source of agricultural policy information is the notification to WTO. However, the frequency, consistency and quality of Egypt’s WTO notifications on agricultural policies, including domestic support, public stockholding, and trade measures is limited. Improving this will help align Egypt’s practice with international standards and strengthen trust in global trade relations.
Between 2000 and 2024, budgetary expenditures to agricultural producers have fluctuated between USD 0.17 billion and USD 0.85 billion (Figure 2.13). As a share of gross farm receipts, budgetary support to producers has remained low and decreased from 4% in 2000‑02 to 1% in 2022‑24.
For the whole period, budgetary support to producers has been exclusively provided in the form of payments based on input use. In particular, the government provided explicit or implicit payments reducing the price paid by farmers for variable inputs (such as seeds or fertilisers) and other agricultural inputs accounting for most of the budgetary support. Payments supporting fixed capital formation are the second largest category of budgetary expenditures and target investment cost for farm buildings, equipment, or irrigation. A small part of the budget is devoted to on-farm services, mainly in the form of phytosanitary services to prevent cotton diseases and veterinary services. As detailed in Chapter 4, while they bear part of the on-farm irrigation costs such as the cost of diesel for pumping or irrigation pump maintenance, Egyptian farmers do not pay for the cost of water used on their farms. The implicit subsidy linked to the free use of water has not been accounted for in the support estimates as it was not possible to measure the volume of water consumed on-farm (as there are no meters to measure water consumption by farmers) and as it was not possible to identify a counterfactual price (i.e. what farmers would have paid in the absence of free price water policy) (Saleh, 2018[78]) .
Egypt does not provide producer support paid based on factors of production such as land area, animal numbers, income or revenue, nor does it provide payments based on non-commodity criteria (such as long-term resource retirement or payments to preserve biodiversity). There are no government agricultural insurance programmes operating in the country for the moment, although a law on crop insurance is currently under development.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Market price support: Higher prices for farmers, higher costs for consumers
Market price support (MPS) is the predominant form of support provided to farmers in Egypt over the period from 2000 to 2024. Market price support is calculated where there are domestic or trade policies that create a Market Price Differential (MPD) between the domestic and reference price of agricultural commodities. The reference price represents the opportunity cost for domestic market participants at the given world market conditions (or the price that would have prevailed without domestic and trade policies present in the country). Market price support can generate transfers from consumers to producers when farm gate prices are above reference prices (positive price gap) or from producers to consumers when farm gate prices are lower (negative price gap). Price gaps can also exist without any policy measures that affect the transmission of prices but because of poorly functioning markets, weak institutional infrastructure or poor physical infrastructure. In such cases, the OECD assumes no policy impact and sets the MPD to zero.
Consequently, depending on the policies applied, the MPD for the same commodity may be positive in certain years, negative in others, or equal to zero. For the proper assessment of MPDs and, hence, levels of MPS, relevant policies applied for each year and commodity according to the commodities’ trade status (exported, imported or marginally traded) need to be analysed. These policies are described in detail in Annex 2.C which covers the 19 commodities for which the calculation of market price support has been carried out separately: wheat, maize, rice, sugar, groundnuts, tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, mangoes, dates, bananas, oranges, onions, cotton, milk, beef meat, sheep meat, poultry, and eggs. Box 2.5 presents a detailed breakdown of the market price support calculation for Egypt.
Period covered: 2000‑24
Products covered: A total of 19 commodities, accounting for on average 66% of the total value of agricultural output in Egypt in 2022‑24. This includes fourteen crops (wheat, maize, rice, sugar, groundnuts, tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, mangoes, dates, bananas, oranges, onion, and cotton) accounting for 54% of the total value of crop production in 2022-24, and five livestock products (milk, beef meat, sheep meat, poultry, and eggs) representing on average 89% of the total value of livestock production.
Producer prices: Average prices received by producers, sourced from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR). Cotton producer prices from OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook (Aglink database 2024).
External reference prices: Import unit values are used for wheat, maize, sugar, milk and poultry. Export unit values are used for groundnuts, tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, mangoes, dates, oranges, and onion. Rice uses the world price of rice1 defined as the FAO “all rice price index normalised to India, indica high quality 5% broken average 2014‑16 (January/December)” adjusted for international transportation costs to Egypt. Bananas use export unit values for the periods 2004‑10 and 2016‑19 (when exported) and import unit values for the period 2000‑03, 2011‑15 and 2020‑24 (when imported). Cotton uses the world price of cotton1 defined as Cotlook A index, Middling 1 1/8, cfr far Eastern ports (August/July). For beef, sheep meat and eggs, external reference prices were calculated by subtracting the market price differential based on the MFN tariff, from the producer prices.
Price gap estimates: For all of the above listed products, relevant data have been collected and price gaps calculated as follows:
For eight exportable products: groundnuts, tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, mangoes (as from 2000), dates, oranges, and onions, no agricultural trade policies or other domestic market price policies either supporting or taxing producers have been identified. The existence of a negative market price differential (MPD), in some years and for most commodities, might be linked to weaknesses in the physical infrastructure in the producer-to-consumer value chain, especially affecting perishable commodities (“market development gap”). Consequently, in line with the OECD methodology, the price gaps for these products are considered to be zero.
For cotton, exported in 2000‑12, and imported since 2013, negative market price differentials were set to zero as no agricultural domestic or trade policies taxing producers have been identified.
For beef, sheep meat and eggs, the annual average MFN tariff rate was used to estimate the price gap because of quality differences between products imported and products produced domestically (in particular for meat products), making it difficult to ensure that domestic producer prices and reference prices are comparable. For these three commodities, MFN tariffs are identified as the main agricultural policy in place. In the case of eggs, it was not possible to estimate a proper reference price at the border due to the unavailability of trade data. It was also not possible to calculate transportation costs to the Egyptian border in the case a reference price from another country would have been used.
External reference prices were used to calculate MPDs for the remaining commodities: wheat, maize, rice, sugar, bananas, milk and poultry meat. Negative MPDs were retained for rice in 2008 and 2017‑18 to reflect the existence of export restrictions over the period.
Marketing margins: The marketing margin indicates processing, handling and transportation costs for a given commodity. To capture all costs through the value chain, margins were divided into two segments: farm gate to wholesale margins and wholesale to border margins.
For all commodities (except those for which the tariffs have been used to derive the market price differential), the first segment was calculated as the absolute difference between the wholesale prices and the average farm gate prices. These differences were expressed as a percentage of producer prices on a yearly basis then smoothed out using ten-year averages or the average for the whole period, depending on the commodity.
Margins between wholesale markets and the border represent transportation costs and were calculated as a fixed percentage of the farm gate price based on discussions with MALR experts. These percentages vary across commodities.
To bring reference prices to the farm-gate level, transportation costs (wholesale to border) are subtracted from the external reference price for exported commodities, but added for imported ones (except where tariffs are used to calculate the price gaps). In turn, the margins between the producer and wholesale prices are subtracted for all commodities (again except where tariffs are used).
Extrapolation: While the calculation of market price support in Egypt was carried out separately for 19 individual commodities, two groups called “other crops” and “other livestock” comprised all commodities for which an MPD was not estimated individually. “Other crops commodities” includes all fruits and vegetables, other than tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, mangoes, dates, bananas, oranges, and onions, as well as all other crops produced in Egypt. It accounted for 46% of the value of crop production in 2022‑24. “Other livestock commodities” includes all livestock products produced in Egypt, other than milk, beef and veal, sheep meat, poultry and eggs. It accounted for 11% of the value of livestock production in Egypt. An estimated value of MPS was attributed to each of these groups, based on the assumption that the ratio between the MPS for those commodities where an MPD is calculated and their total value of production is the same as the corresponding ratio for “Other crop commodities” or “Other livestock commodities” as groups. The MPS from these two groups are then added together to obtain an aggregate “other MPS” corresponding to all other commodities produced in Egypt (i.e. other than the 19 listed above).
Quality adjustments: No quality adjustments were made.
1. Annex table C11, OECD/FAO (2024), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024‑2033, OECD Publishing, Paris/FAO, Rome, https://doi.org/10.1787/4c5d2cfb-en.
Producer prices in Egypt are affected by a range of domestic and trade policies. These policies include guaranteed prices, procurement operations, public stockholding, and tariffs, which maintain them above reference price levels, thereby generating transfers from consumers to producers. In some cases, domestic restrictive regulations affecting stocking and trading commodities as well as export restrictions (i.e. duties or bans) are keeping domestic producer prices lower than reference prices, which creates transfers from producers to consumers.4 While policy instruments determine the general direction of MPS transfers (from consumers to producers or vice versa), their magnitude and annual variation also depend on several other factors such as movements in world prices, domestic prices and exchange rates, as well as changes in production levels.
In line with Egypt’s focus on increasing domestic self-sufficiency in the production of cereals and also due to their large shares in the total value of agricultural production, grains – especially wheat and maize – is the group of commodities which has received the largest share of positive MPS during the period from 2000 to 2024 (Figure 2.14). This means that Egyptian grain farmers are protected by domestic or trade policies in place and receive transfers paid for by consumers through higher prices for these commodities. Wheat consistently registered a positive MPS over most of the period, mainly due to the procurement price paid by the government to encourage farmers to produce greater volumes of wheat. Maize followed the same pattern as wheat, recording a positive MPS in most years since 2000. Following the war in Ukraine global grain prices surged, and maize producer prices in Egypt rose even more sharply in 2022, generating a large amount of MPS. Domestic prices continued to rise in 2023, but currency depreciation narrowed the positive price gap for maize by increasing border reference prices in local currency terms.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
For rice, another important staple food crop, the situation is different. First, there is more balance between imports and exports, making Egypt almost self-sufficient in most years. Second, as a water intensive crop, rice has been subject to domestic regulations restricting cultivation to specific areas in the Nile Delta (USDA GAIN, 2025[42]). Over the period 2000‑24, rice was subject to different types of domestic and trade policies, including production, import and marketing restrictions by MoSIT, which individually would drive up or down domestic prices, resulting in both positive and negative market price transfers which therefore can partially offset each other. For most of the years covered, domestic producer prices for rice were above reference prices, implying positive MPS. Nevertheless, domestic prices have been below reference prices on some occasions (2008, 2017 and 2018), implying negative market price transfers. Since 2008, export restrictions (including export bans or export taxes) have been implemented for both food security and environmental objectives (to reduce water intensive exports) preventing rice farmers from exploiting opportunities on the world market, hence leading to negative market price transfers to producers in certain years.
MPS has been negative for several livestock commodities (beef meat, sheep meat, milk and eggs) for one or several years. These negatives are due to the excess feed cost element: the MPD was either positive (e.g. for eggs, due to tariffs supporting egg producers) or equal to zero (for beef and sheep meat as tariff protection was removed since 2007). However, the MPS for livestock commodities is always calculated net of the MPS on domestically produced commodities used as animal feed (only maize in the case of Egypt). Maize producers are strongly supported, which acts as a tax on livestock producers, who are consumers of maize and pay higher prices for animal feed. Overall, negative MPS registered for milk, beef, sheep meat and egg producers indicate implicit losses that producers of these commodities incur due to higher prices paid for feed commodities. The year 2022 registered the largest amount of negative MPS due to excess feed costs for livestock products, reflecting a sharp increase in domestic prices for maize. Due to high tariffs protecting poultry producers, market price transfers for this commodity remained positive even after subtracting excess feed costs linked to maize feed use.
Price protection is declining but farmers remain isolated from world market signals
Two other indicators provide specific information that can be used to evaluate changes in policy measures over time: (1) the producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), which shows the level of price protection, measuring the degree to which domestic markets are insulated from the world market; (2) the producer NAC, which shows the level of market orientation or the degree to which the signals guiding production, consumption and trade come from the market (relative to those from policy intervention).
The producer NPC decreased from 1.24 in 2000‑02 (meaning that domestic prices received by producers were 24% above world prices) to 1.13 in 2022‑24 (Table 2.7). This indicates that over the past two decades, the level of price distortion has fallen and that market signals are becoming more important for producers’ decisions. The producer NAC also fell from 1.26 in 2000‑02 (meaning that gross farm receipts were 26% higher than if production were valued at border prices and in the absence of other support policies) to 1.11 in 2022‑24. This indicates a higher share of farm receipts generated in the market at unsupported prices, and therefore lower government intervention and higher influence of market signals on the orientation of agricultural production.
By commodity, support is high for staples, while livestock is penalised with high feed costs
In order to examine the level of support by commodity and to understand to what extent agricultural policies are commodity-specific, the OECD uses the Producer Single Commodity Transfers (SCT) indicator.5 It sums up commodity-specific transfers, such as MPS and payments linked to the production of a given commodity, and expresses it as a percentage of commodity gross receipts (i.e. value of production and budgetary payments specific to the commodity). In the case of Egypt, only cotton receives budgetary payments at commodity level (Other SCT in Figure 2.15) through two programmes, the Egyptian Cotton Improvement Fund and a support programme for cotton pest control. For the rest of the commodities, commodity gross farm receipts are equal to their value of production, and SCT is equal to market price support. There are no output-based payments identified for individual specified commodities or groups of commodities.
Source. OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Variations in levels of support between products translate into incentives or disincentives for producing them. Hence, differing support levels across commodities in a country generate additional market distortions affecting farmers’ production choices. Alternatively, payments may be provided to producers of any commodity in a designated group (e.g. any crop or any livestock producer), or simply to producers of any commodity without distinction. The latter payments give more flexibility to those who receive support to define their production mix, therefore allowing producers to be more responsive to market signals.
Single commodity transfers vary considerably across commodities. In line with MPS developments, commodities can be grouped according to three different patterns in SCT observed in 2020‑24 (see also Annex 2.C. for more details on policies applied by commodity).
First, the group of commodities with positive Producer SCT: wheat, maize, poultry, sugar, cotton, rice and milk (Figure 2.15). These seven commodities were all mostly imported in 2020‑24 and are either subject to trade or domestic policy measures generating positive market price support. As a share of commodity gross receipts (%SCT), support is highest for wheat and maize with the value of transfers representing 37% and 32% of commodity gross receipts in 2020‑24, respectively. These high %SCT reflect the policies implemented by the government to increase self-sufficiency for these staple commodities (through policy initiatives to stimulate production) and to reduce the import bill. Producers of both commodities have benefited from guaranteed procurement prices serving as a price floor, along with large-scale government procurement operations. Cotton producers are supported through at least two schemes that provide payments based on input use and encourage increased production. For maize flour, poultry, sugar, cotton, and milk, steps have been taken to limit competition from imports by imposing MFN tariffs.
Second, commodities with negative SCT: three livestock commodities, beef and veal, sheep meat and eggs. This implicit tax for livestock producers is not the result of a direct policy intervention affecting domestic market prices, but is rather the consequence of the excess feed cost element. Overall, these negative SCT indicate an implicit loss in receipts for livestock producers, who pay higher prices for feed than they would have in the absence of support for maize producers.
Finally, commodities with zero SCT: fruits and vegetables. These are exported commodities with no domestic or trade policies that tax or support producers. This does not mean that there were no price gaps observed between domestic and border prices for these commodities, but these gaps (most of which are negative) were not considered to be an outcome of policies, but rather are due to infrastructure deficiencies that may be impeding market adjustment. Therefore, they were not accounted for when estimating market price support.
Support to consumers of agricultural products: Higher food cost despite subsidies
The Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) is the indicator measuring consumer support, or depending on the situation, consumers’ taxation. The CSE, like the PSE, accounts for both market transfers and budgetary transfers.
Consumers can be considered as both first-stage buyers of agricultural commodities (e.g. a food processor or a livestock producer who purchases grains to feed animals) or as final consumers (e.g. low-income households targeted by food aid programmes). This distinction between first and final consumers is particularly important in Egypt as they are impacted by different agricultural and food policies in place.
Higher prices negatively impact first buyers, but food subsidies benefit consumers
The CSE, like the PSE, can be expressed in relative terms, as a percentage of consumption expenditures (%CSE). When it is positive, consumers are supported. A negative %CSE indicates an implicit tax on consumers who are paying more than they need to in comparison with reference prices. In Egypt, in 2000, with a %CSE of -20%, consumers were, overall, taxed through agricultural and food policies that added costs of 20% of consumption expenditures (Figure 2.16). In 2024, with a %CSE of -12%, the burden for consumers has become lighter, reducing the additional costs imposed by food and agricultural policies. However, this aggregated figure hides the existence of large transfers among consumers, producers, and taxpayers. Egypt’s %CSE is the outcome of two opposing forces:
Negative market transfers: on average, domestic producer prices for several commodities6 are higher than world market prices, increasing costs for consumers and other first-level buyers of these commodities. This implies market transfers from consumers and other first level buyers to domestic producers (grey bars in Figure 2.16) as well as budgetary transfers to taxpayers through tariffs on imported commodities (grey-striped bars). Hence, agricultural support to producers puts a relatively high burden on consumers and first level buyers of agricultural commodities.
Positive budgetary transfers (blue bars) are provided to intermediate and final consumers by the government as a broad effort to combat poverty and food insecurity in the country. As described in Section 2.2, the government has put in place several food subsidy programmes, including the bread subsidy and ration card programme that provides low-income consumers with access to essential food commodities, such as vegetable oils and sugar. As part of the bread subsidy programme, bakeries are compensated by the government for the difference between the price of subsidised bread and the cost of bread production (multiplied by the number of loaves sold).
While during some years (i.e. 2003‑04, 2007‑08 and 2017), positive budgetary transfers have more than compensated for the negative market transfers to consumers, leading to a positive %CSE, this was not the case in most of the years under review. For example, in 2022‑24, budgetary expenditures to consumers increased in comparison to two decades earlier but so did the negative market price transfers to consumers, leading overall to a negative %CSE, effectively taxing consumers that need to pay higher prices for their food.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Baladi bread subsidy mitigates costs, but wheat market policies increase consumer burden
The ration card programme allows poor Egyptian citizens to buy 33 essential commodities, including PSE commodities, but it was not possible to obtain the detail of the support provided to consumers by commodity. Wheat is an interesting example because the baladi bread subsidy is commodity-specific, and a good illustration of the opposed direction of the policies in place for this commodity (Figure 2.17): on the one hand, first level-buyer consumers of wheat (i.e. millers) are implicitly taxed as they pay for the higher prices due to the trade and domestic policies in place supporting producers (e.g. tariffs or procurement operations). On the other hand, intermediate and final consumers of wheat were explicitly supported through the bread subsidy programme.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Market and budgetary transfers provide contradictory signals to consumers
As shown by a negative %CSE, consumers in the majority of countries monitored by the OECD are implicitly taxed by agricultural policies, although to differing degrees (Figure 2.18). In 2022‑24, the tax on consumers, reflected in the negative %CSE varied from less than 1% of consumption expenditures in Chile and Australia to more than 35% in Korea. However, some countries provide net support to their consumers who are supported either through lower prices (e.g. in Argentina, where consumers can purchase agricultural commodities below world market prices) or because of budgetary subsidies received by processors or by final consumers with various forms of food assistance (e.g. in the United States where the government provides food assistance to a specific group of the population). In India, consumers are supported through both low prices and a large food aid subsidy, which allow poor segments of the population to purchase food at prices that are much lower than the already low domestic market prices.
As shown in Figure 2.18, Egypt has a unique pattern of support. A %CSE of -8.9% in 2022‑24 combines a significant burden for intermediate consumers on one side (with high prices paid on average for several agricultural commodities) with support for final consumers through food assistance programmes on the other side. Compared to other countries, the %CSE of Egypt is situated between that of Norway and Türkiye, two countries with limited or no budgetary subsidies to support consumers. However, the analysis of the individual components of the CSE reveal a different policy setting in Egypt: in terms of taxation of intermediate consumers, Egypt is closer to Indonesia or Colombia (grey part of the bars), with market transfers increasing Egyptians’ consumption expenditures by around 16%. In terms of support to final consumers, Egypt is closer to India, with food subsidies reducing consumption expenditures by 7% (blue part of the bars). Egypt, together with Norway, Indonesia and the United States are the only countries that have a combination of positive consumer support from budgetary transfers, and negative consumer support from market transfers. Each of these countries tend to have either a high amount of positive transfers and a low amount of negative transfers, or vice versa. However, Egypt stands out because it has both – high positive transfers and high negative transfers.
Percentage of consumption expenditure at farm gate
Notes: Countries are ranked according to percentage CSE levels. A negative percentage CSE is an implicit tax on consumption. The OECD total does not include the non-OECD EU Member States. The 11 Emerging Economies include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine and Viet Nam.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Support to general services for agriculture
The General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) encompasses all types of public financing of support to the agricultural sector. As opposed to support provided to individual producers measured by the PSE, the GSSE measures support that benefits the primary agricultural sector collectively. Support for general services includes agricultural research and development, agricultural training and education, inspection and control, infrastructure, marketing and promotion, and public stockholding. Unlike the PSE and CSE transfers, GSSE transfers are not received by producers or consumers individually, and do not directly affect farm receipts or consumption expenditures.
General services can boost agricultural productivity, but they remain relatively small and focused on irrigation infrastructure
Relative to the size of the sector, the share of GSSE in the value of agricultural production in Egypt declined from 3.5% in 2000‑02 to 2.6% in 2022‑24 (Figure 2.20). This mirrors the broader downward trend observed internationally: in OECD Members the share fell from 5.5% of the value of agricultural production in 2000‑02 to 3.5% in 2022‑24, while across eleven emerging economies it declined from 3.6% to 1.9% over the same period (OECD, 2024[76]). In nominal terms, GSSE expenditures in Egypt fluctuated between USD 0.3 billion and USD 0.9 billion from 2000 to 2020 before increasing in 2021‑23. The growth in general services expenditures reflects the government’s focus on investments in public goods and services that can increase the sector’s production capacity. While more effective for productivity than market price support or input subsidies, their overall level remains relatively low.
As part of its policy to manage freshwater resources (as described in Chapter 4), the most important category of GSSE in Egypt is rural infrastructure, which is dominated by investments in the development and maintenance or rehabilitation of irrigation systems. Public spending on hydrological infrastructure has remained the largest component of GSSE, rising from 65% of total GSSE expenditure in the early 2000s to more than 76% in 2022‑24. This high share reflects the dependence of the sector on scarce water resources and its increase relates to the government’s growing concerns regarding water availability due to pressures from other sectors’ demand and from climate change (Chapter 4).
Expenditures on agricultural R&D, extension and other forms of knowledge transfer jointly represented 14% of GSSE expenditures in 2022‑24, and ranged between 9% and 39% of GSSE expenditures over the period 2000‑24, depending on the year. Payments included budgetary expenditures covering wages and investment from three leading governmental research centres, namely the Agricultural Research Centre, the Desert Research Centre and the National Water Research Centre, all involved in thematic research such as innovation, environment or agricultural productivity growth under desert conditions. The research centres also cover agricultural training and extension activities to encourage the use of modern agricultural technologies.
Expenditures on inspection and control systems, including those related to pests and diseases, corresponded to around 1% to 4% of GSSE expenditures over the past 20 years. Costs related to the depreciation and disposal of public storage of agricultural products are important given the government’s large wheat procurement operations and broader grain stocking policies, and in some years have accounted for more than 18% of total GSSE expenditures.
The share of GSSE in total agricultural support reflects the relative importance of these transfers within the overall policy mix. Between 2022 and 2024, general services accounted for approximately 12% of total support to agriculture in Egypt. This was lower than the shares reported by OECD Members (15%) and across eleven major emerging economies (19%), reflecting a lower relative emphasis on broader, sector-wide investments.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Total support to agriculture: A heavy burden on the economy driven by budgetary support to consumers and market price support to producers
The Total Support Estimate (TSE) provides a comprehensive picture of support in Egypt, based on the elements already discussed in the previous sections. The TSE represents the sum of transfers to agricultural producers (the PSE), transfers to general services (the GSSE), and budgetary transfers to consumers from taxpayers (the consumer subsidies)7 (Figure 2.20). The entire value chain is supported in Egypt, from producer to final consumer, though to a varying extent across commodities and through a range of different policies.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Food subsidies and price support dominate total agricultural support
Consumer subsidies are a major component of TSE. They encompass food aid programmes delivered by the government to support consumers of agricultural commodities. Hence, transfers from taxpayers to consumers were the most important category of transfers in several years, exceeding all the other transfers combined. The government’s budgetary support to consumers varied between 12% to as much as 80% of the total support estimates during the period 2000‑24.
Market price support was the second most important category of transfers supporting producers through market and trade interventions which most of the time encouraged or protected domestic production but simultaneously implicitly harmed food processors such as wheat or maize processors or other first level buyers such as livestock producers. Hence, price support to producers is a constant characteristic of some of Egypt’s agricultural markets (especially grain), in line with the goal to achieve food self-sufficiency.
On average, GSSE expenditures were higher than budgetary PSE expenditures, but significantly smaller than budgetary expenditures on consumer subsidies. Investing in agricultural knowledge generation, rural infrastructure, and inspection and advisory services, rather than in input subsidies, is a positive development as GSSE expenditures benefit the whole sector by enhancing its overall productivity, sustainability and resilience. Nevertheless, the share of GSSE in total support (TSE) remains small.
Egypt bears the highest economic burden of agricultural support among countries monitored by OECD
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the %TSE provides an indication of the cost that support to the agricultural sector places on the overall economy. Its value depends on the level of support, the size of this sector and its importance relative to the overall economy. Egypt’s TSE averaged EGP 301 billion (USD 10 billion) per year in 2022‑24, representing 2.8% of GDP, with consumer subsidies alone accounting for 1.1% of GDP. This makes Egypt the country in the OECD PSE/CSE/GSSE database with the highest economic burden of support, followed by the Philippines (2.1%) and China (1.6%).
Note: The OECD total does not include the non-OECD EU Member States. The 11 Emerging Economies include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine and Viet Nam.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
This high burden for the economy reflected by the %TSE underlines the need to ensure that policy measures are well designed and meet national objectives. It is critical that the measures in place are effective and efficient in reaching the intended beneficiaries while enhancing the productivity, sustainability and resilience of the sector. Greater consideration needs to be given to the potential unintended consequences of existing support policies in Egypt. While budgetary expenditure to producers and final consumers aims to provide adequate supplies of food at affordable prices, the use of market price transfers (linked to domestic and trade policies) inevitably means that support to producers comes at the detriment of first stage buyers and consumers of agricultural commodities. Strong market interventions generate inefficiencies that neither promote innovation nor contribute to increase productivity. This may ultimately compromise the effectiveness of consumer subsides and the overarching objective of food security.
Achieving food security has long been an important agricultural policy objective for the government of Egypt, and guaranteeing the availability of food is considered essential to reduce poverty and prevent social unrest. However, despite previous attempts to reform agricultural and food policies, heavy market interventions and border measures continue to reduce private investment, market efficiency and productivity. The policies applied to achieve, on the one hand increased production and self-sufficiency, which is considered a food security lever by the government, and on the other hand access to cheap food by consumers, have led to contradictory policy and market signals and inefficiencies.
In recent years, in addition to increasing production and subsidising consumers, emphasis has been placed on improving the productivity and sustainability of the sector. In 2020 the government of Egypt proposed in its 2030 Updated Sustainable Agricultural Development Strategy a comprehensive approach to modernise the agricultural sector, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and increase the efficiency of resource use. It fixes ambitious self-sufficiency targets, in particular, for wheat, 67% in 2030 compared to 44% in 2019. It also includes a target of increasing agriculture’s share of GDP from 11.5% in 2015‑18 to 15% in 2030, running counter to the typical development trajectory observed in other countries, where agriculture’s contribution to the economy tends to decline as the shares of industry and services grow.
The complex institutional landscape is a challenge for policy co-ordination, despite efforts by Egypt to improve coherence
The design and implementation of agricultural policies remains fragmented across several Ministries and governmental institutions. This makes it harder to have a holistic vision and may lead to inconsistent and contradictory policy actions across the agricultural and food sectors. The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) is the main Ministry overseeing the agricultural sector, including subsidies for fertilisers and credit, agricultural R&D, and extension and advisory services. MALR also leads the government’s efforts to reclaim desert lands into production. However, the most significant policy levers that affect agricultural resources, production and markets are in the hands of other Ministries.
The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade administers the largest area of government support: food assistance through government’s bread subsidy and ration card programmes, and comprehensive government interventions in food markets through the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC). The Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade implements Egypt’s trade policy, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation is responsible for the development and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure. The Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation is also responsible for the rehabilitation and lining of irrigation canals, as well as rural development through the Decent Life Initiative (Haya Karima).
Recent efforts have been taken to strengthen inter-ministerial co-ordination, including through the newly established National Committee for Food and Nutrition Systems. Nonetheless, the institutional landscape remains complex and there is ample scope to strengthen the co-ordination of agricultural and food policy.
Estimating agricultural producer support in Egypt with the OECD methodology is challenging but is helping to inform policy development
In this context, the analysis of Egypt’s agricultural support policies using the OECD’s Producer Support Estimate approach is particularly useful and relevant. It sheds light on how government support is implemented across different commodities, the net impact of policy efforts, and the potential contradictions between different policy signals. However, data gaps constrain the analysis in some ways – in particular, the limited data on budgetary expenditures and government transfers to state-owned enterprises related to agriculture may lead to an underestimation of the producer support estimate (PSE). Complete and disaggregated data on budgetary expenditures for agriculture, as well as state procurement of grains, would further enrich the debate and help to design better policies.
Producers have traditionally been supported through policy instruments to increase self-sufficiency including Market Price Support (MPS), input subsidies, and the expansion of irrigation infrastructure for land reclamation. Tariff protection was high until recently and border measures remain a main tool of trade policy, along with interventions in input and output markets for some commodities. These interventions, including large-scale domestic procurement and imports of commodities, public stockholding and extensive participation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) across the entire value chain (outlined in Section 2.2), contribute to contradictory incentives and market inefficiencies, rigidity and lack of innovation in the markets that are not responsive to demands for quality, consumer’s expectations and world market signals.
The level of support to producers has fallen but remains high relative to GDP
Developments in agricultural policy can be evaluated by changes in support levels as measured by the %PSE (Producer Support Estimate as a share of farmers’ gross receipts) and the %TSE (Total Support Estimate as a share of GDP). As outlined in Section 2.4, both indicators have trended downward since 2000 signalling a decline with large fluctuations in overall support for agricultural producers and a reduced fiscal burden on the economy. The %PSE decreased from 21% in 2000‑02 to 10% in 2022‑24, less than the OECD average (13%), but higher than the average of 7% for emerging economies and on par with levels observed in Türkiye. However, Egypt’s %TSE, at 2.8% of GDP in 2022‑24, is the highest among the 54 countries covered in the OECD’s annual Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation report. This underscores the economic reality that, for a country with a relatively low GDP per capita and a large agricultural sector, even a moderate level of producer support can translate into a substantial burden on the overall economy.
Most support to producers is provided in the form of market price support
Almost all of producer support comes from market price support, a form of support that does not involve actual spending but results from government policies creating a gap between domestic and international reference prices for specific commodities. This form of support is potentially most distorting because it impedes the dynamic adjustment of agriculture responding to market signals. Hence producers are supported not by the government budget, but mostly through policies to protect producers that result in higher prices paid by consumers. In Egypt, market price support is driven by a combination of domestic and trade policy measures (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
In terms of domestic policies, the government implements guaranteed prices and procurement operations, primarily for wheat but also, in recent years, for maize (until 2023), rice, and sugar. Egypt also engages in public stockholding of grains to stabilise supply and prices. Furthermore, government agencies like GASC and state-owned enterprises are major players in agri-food markets.
On the trade front, market price support includes tariffs, which apply to imports of most agricultural commodities, and other import requirements such as licences. Government agencies and state-owned enterprises are also major importers of some commodities, particularly grains and meat. Export restrictions, such as export taxes, bans, and quotas, have been implemented primarily on rice. State trading enterprises play a significant role, particularly in the meat sector, where they dominate imports of beef and sheep meat.
Budgetary payments to producers are minimal and focused on input subsidies
In Egypt, according to the available data provided by the government, direct support to agricultural producers through budgetary transfers is very low, constituting only 1% of gross farm receipts in 2022‑24 (Section 2.4). During this period, these budgetary transfers averaged EGP 19.7 billion (USD 616 million) annually. This support was exclusively in the form of input subsidies, encompassing variable input subsidies, fixed capital formation support, and on-farm services. Variable input subsidies included substantial subsidies for fertilisers and programmes providing preferential interest rates for plant production. Support for fixed capital formation targeted investment costs related to farm buildings, equipment, and irrigation infrastructure. On-farm services support included assistance for cotton pest control and veterinary services.
However, assessing the full extent of these transfers is challenging due to limited data availability; while efforts have been made to improve transparency, further work is needed to ensure comprehensive reporting. Overall, a precise assessment of these programmes remains difficult, as budgetary expenditures are often allocated to various institutions and SOEs without detailed breakdowns of actual programmes and implementation criteria. For instance, it was not possible to analyse the magnitude of support provided for large-scale land reclamation projects, and there are also implicit subsidies for irrigation water that have not been computed in the producer support estimate. Following the adoption of Law No. 159 of 2023, SOEs are now required to report their financial statements and expenditures on various programmes, which should contribute to greater transparency going forward.
Efforts to support the sector as a whole focus on irrigation infrastructure
General Services Support (GSSE), which finances activities benefiting the agricultural sector as a whole, averaged EGP 37 billion (USD 1.3 billion) annually in 2022‑24 (Section 2.4). Public investment in agriculture-related projects remains a key policy tool for achieving the government’s development objectives and represents a substantial component of budgetary support to the sector, far exceeding the level of budgetary transfers directed to individual producers. A major share of these expenditures is allocated to investments in hydrological infrastructure, irrigation systems, and maintenance, with programmes managed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI). Additionally, long-term investments also target areas such as agricultural research and development (R&D) and food safety inspection services.
Despite high expenditure on food subsidies, consumers are penalised by agricultural policy
Budgetary transfers to consumers represent the largest component of agricultural budgetary support in Egypt, averaging EGP 117 billion (USD 3.9 billion) annually in 2022‑24. These expenditures are primarily allocated to two key food subsidy programmes: the baladi bread subsidy and the ration card programme. However, agricultural policies in Egypt have contradictory effects on consumers: they are negatively impacted by the market price support measures that hinder the efficiency of Egyptian domestic markets and their response to international prices, while at the same time they benefit from food subsidies. As outlined in Section 2.4, consumers were penalised on average in 2022‑24 with expenditures on agriculture that were 8.9% higher due to policy interventions (%CSE). Recent reforms and policy developments such as the increase in the price of baladi bread and partial removal of tax privileges for SOEs could open an opportunity for improving Egypt’s policy package on agriculture and food.
Egypt’s 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy was developed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) in 2020. The strategy includes six strategic objectives, which are outlined in detail below.
Achieving food security and improved nutrition
Egypt’s 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy views agriculture and food systems as the main engine for achieving economic growth, with a direct impact on reducing undernourishment and enhancing food security. The strategy recognises that achieving these developmental outcomes requires increases in productivity, greater interactions among partners, access to inputs (including fertilisers, seeds, pesticides and finance), the provision of post-harvest processes, and access to markets.
The strategy highlights the importance of science, technology and innovation, especially digital agriculture, in agricultural development. This will play an important role in enhancing efficiency, connecting small farmers to markets, and unlocking the untapped export potential of agricultural commodities and products, ultimately increasing the competitiveness of agriculture, farmers’ income and the food system value chain. Consequently, the action plan of the strategy includes programmes and national projects to develop information technology and communication, facilitate digital transformation in the agricultural sector, establish agricultural databases and information technology, and bolster agricultural research and technology transfer. The strategy also gives special emphasis to agricultural extension and technology transfer. This is based on agricultural extension services playing a pivotal role in disseminating technology and modern innovations, including digital agriculture, to small farmers.
Enhancing sustainable agriculture
The strategy notes that rapid population growth is exacerbating the problem of water scarcity in Egypt. This is a serious obstacle to the development of the agricultural sector, which accounts for 80% of total freshwater consumption. In addition, competition for water is expected to intensify across various sectors, and hence agriculture’s share of Nile River water is expected to decrease over time. Consequently, there is a need to expand the use of modern irrigation technologies to reduce water consumption for irrigation. Therefore, the action plan of the 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy prioritises the sustainable use of irrigation water by improving water and irrigation management systems and scaling up the adoption of modern irrigation technologies. The strategy aims to increase the proportion of lands irrigated with modernised methods (modernised surface, sprinkler, and drip) to approximately 31.7% by 2030. Additionally, it seeks to enhance the efficiency of field irrigation for 2.2 million feddan in the El-Wadi El-Gedid and Delta regions. Furthermore, the Strategy aims to contribute to saving an additional 0.6 billion cubic metres of irrigation water through the rehabilitation and improvement of field irrigation management in reclaimed lands. This is to be achieved by converting approximately 2.1 million feddan of sugar cane and orchard plantations from flood irrigation to modern irrigation systems. The Strategy also aims to reduce agricultural products’ losses by 50% by 2030.
Eradicating poverty in rural areas
Agriculture accounted for 19% of total employment in 2023, providing livelihoods for a large share of Egypt’s rural population. It is also the main source of income for the majority of the rural poor. According to the strategy’s theory of change, there is a direct link between achieving agricultural growth and the alleviation of poverty and hunger. The government estimates that increasing agricultural GDP by 1% is associated with a 3% reduction in poverty. In order to achieve sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty, the strategy highlights the importance of providing an enabling political environment, an appropriate governance system, and supportive macroeconomic policies. This requires focusing on the value chain of post-harvest processes and the non-farming rural economy, in addition to primary agricultural production.
Adapting to climate change and mitigating its impacts
The strategy recognises the importance of addressing the impacts of climate change on agriculture, in response to Egypt’s obligations under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. Specifically, it aims to develop a strategic framework for risk management and adaptation to climate change in the agricultural sector. The main expected outcomes from these national programmes and projects are enhancing and developing new crop varieties, establishing a comprehensive insurance system for safeguarding agricultural crops, strengthening early warning and seasonal weather prediction systems to mitigate risks, diversifying sources of farm income by incorporating additional agricultural activities, and increasing public awareness regarding climate change and its implications for agriculture.
Increasing competitiveness of agricultural products in local and international markets
The strategy estimates that Egypt’s agriculture and food systems have an untapped export capacity of at least USD 10 billion per annum, but this capacity has not been realised due to institutional and organisational barriers. Fruits, vegetables and dairy products present the highest export opportunities. The strategy’s action plan aims to double the quantities of vegetables available for exports, increase the exportable quantity of major fruit crops to 15%, and increase the exportable quantity of drought-tolerant fruit crops. This is anticipated to increase the share of agricultural exports to 30% of Egypt’s total exports by 2030.
Attracting and encouraging investments in agriculture and food systems is seen as critical to address the sector’s financing gap and realise the untapped potential in production and exports of fresh and processed food products. Egypt is home to the largest consumer market in the Middle East and North Africa region, and benefits from ease of access to major markets in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as access to an advanced infrastructure network for ports and maritime transport. A combination of institutional and legislative reforms together with public investments must be made to address the barriers to investment. Moreover, the agricultural sector accounts for a very small share of foreign direct investment in Egypt, representing just 0.1% of the total in 2017‑18.
Creating job opportunities for youth and women
Creating job opportunities for the growing labour force is a major economic challenge for Egypt. The strategy notes that while unemployment stood at 8% in 2019, it was especially high among the youth (around 30%) and among women (38.3%). According to the strategy, the agricultural sector can play a pivotal role in creating new job opportunities, especially for the youth and women in rural areas. The strategy aims to build human resource capacities and create more than 2 million job opportunities by 2030. This is to be achieved by implementing several targeted programmes to support land reclamation, develop agricultural marketing and processing, promote agricultural investment and competitiveness, reduce food losses, and support rural development.
Producer Support Estimate (PSE): The annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income.
Percentage PSE (%PSE): PSE transfers as a share of gross farm receipts (GFR, i.e. the value of production plus budgetary and other transfers to producers).
Producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (producer NAC): The ratio between the value of gross farm receipts (including support) and gross farm receipts valued at border prices (measured at farm gate).
Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (producer NPC): The ratio between the average price received by producers at farm gate (including payments per tonne of current output), and the border price (measured at farm gate). The producer NPC is also available by commodity.
Producer Single Commodity Transfers (producer SCT): The annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy measures directly linked to the production of a single commodity such that the producer must produce the designated commodity in order to receive the transfer.
Producer Percentage Single Commodity Transfers (producer %SCT): The commodity SCT expressed as a share of gross farm receipts for the specific commodity (including support).
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE): The annual monetary value of gross transfers to (from) consumers of agricultural commodities, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on consumption of farm products. If negative, the CSE measures the burden (implicit tax) on consumers through market price support (higher prices), that more than offsets consumer subsidies that lower prices to consumers.
Percentage CSE (%CSE): CSE transfers as a share of consumption expenditure on agricultural commodities (measured at farm gate), net of taxpayer transfers to consumers.
Consumer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (consumer NAC): The ratio between the value of consumption expenditure on agricultural commodities (at farm gate) and that valued at border prices (measured at farm gate).
Consumer Nominal Protection Coefficient (consumer NPC): The ratio between the average price paid by consumers (at farm gate) and the border price (measured at farm gate).
Consumer Single Commodity Transfers (consumer SCT): The annual monetary value of gross transfers to (from) consumers of agricultural commodities, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy measures directly linked to the production of a single commodity.
Indicators of support to general services for agriculture
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE): The annual monetary value of gross transfers to general services provided to agricultural producers collectively (such as research and development, training, inspection, infrastructure, marketing and promotion, and public stockholding), arising from policy measures that support agriculture regardless of their nature, objectives and impacts on farm production, income, or consumption. The GSSE does not include any transfers to individual producers.
Percentage GSSE (%GSSE): GSSE transfers as a share of Total Support Estimate (TSE).
Total Support Estimate (TSE): The annual monetary value of all gross transfers from taxpayers and consumers arising from policy measures that support agriculture, net of associated budgetary receipts, regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or consumption of farm products.
Percentage TSE (%TSE): TSE transfers as a percentage of GDP.
This annex reviews the market price transfers (to producers) element for major commodities or group of commodities included in the PSE database for Egypt. It analyses the market price differential by looking at the difference between domestic prices at the farm gate level and reference prices at the border level. It provides, in parallel, an overview of the main domestic and trade policies targeting specific products according to their trade status. Whether positive or negative, market price differentials (MPD) are supposed to reflect domestic and trade policies in place (a positive MPD meaning an implicit support to producers and a negative MPD an implicit tax). When this is not the case (for reasons mentioned earlier), the market price differential is set to zero. This analysis is at the centre of the OECD methodology for the measurement of agricultural support and is key to understand transfers between producers, consumers (understood here as first stage buyer of agricultural commodities) and taxpayers.
Wheat is considered as an essential commodity for Egypt’s national food security. In this context, the government is entitled to set market control to regulate the trading of this commodity for a specific period of time as per the country’s consumer protection act (Article 8 of Consumer Protection Law No 181 of 2018).
Main domestic market policies
The General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC), affiliated to the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade leads large procurement operations. Depending on the year, between one-third and half of domestic production is procured. It is not mandatory for farmers to sell to the government; however, as the largest buyer in the market, the government’s guaranteed price has an important influence on the market price. Guaranteed procurement prices are announced before planting season every year to encourage domestic production and to maintain the strategic food stocks.
Milling of wheat into flour produces two sorts of flour marketed through two distinct channels: baladi flour, used for the subsidised baladi bread and fino flour8, used for other processed products. The GASC is the main body responsible for the supply and distribution of wheat grain and flour used for the production of subsidised baladi flour and bread. It determines each year the quantity of wheat delivered to public or private mills and the quota for bakeries and warehouses. These mills in turn supply flour to around 30 000 bakeries producing subsidised baladi bread nationwide. While the GASC remains the key body in supplying baladi flour, the private sector plays an important role in importing, producing and marketing fino flour. Fino flour is allowed to be produced only through imported wheat, as all domestic wheat is required for the production of baladi bread.
The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage is responsible for the storage of imported wheat. In 2023, the storage capacity reached 5 million tonnes (Food Business, 2022[79]). Egypt’s wheat ending stock was estimated at 4.5 million metric tonnes in 2025‑26 (USDA GAIN, 2025[80]).
Main trade policies
GASC is one of the largest importers of wheat worldwide. An ad valorem tariff of 1% was applied on wheat (HS 1001) in 2000‑02, 2% in 2004‑06, and no tariffs have been applied since 2007. An ad valorem tariff of 5% was applied on wheat flour (HS 1101) in 2000‑03 and was subsequently reduced to 2% in 2004‑22. An export ban was in place for three months in 2022 (March-May) following the war in Ukraine, and was extended for three more months (June-August 2022) to cover the demand that was expected to increase during the period of Ramadan. Exports from domestic markets surplus were allowed with the approval of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Trade status and market price differential
Wheat has been consistently imported over the period 2000‑24. The market price differential was positive during most of the period under review (except in 2002‑04 and 2007‑08) in line with domestic support policies in place (procurement operations, guaranteed prices, public stockholding) and trade policies in place (trade dominated by the public sector and import tariffs in place for wheat or wheat flour). In 2002‑04 and 2007‑08, MPD was set to zero, as no restrictive policies could explain the calculated negative gap.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Maize is considered as an essential commodity for Egypt. Yellow maize is used as animal feed while white maize is both used for human consumption and animal feed.
Main domestic market policies
The government set guaranteed prices for purchasing maize to encourage farmers to increase the areas planted and to build up strategic stocks. Egypt’s maize ending stock were estimated at 1.6 million metric tonnes in 2023‑24 (USDA GAIN, 2023[46]).
Main trade policies
An ad valorem tariff of 1% was applied to maize (HS 1005) in 2000‑03, 2% in 2004‑06 and no tariffs have been applied since 2007. An ad valorem tariff of 5% was applied on maize flour in 2000‑03 and 2% in 2004‑22. Similar to wheat, an export ban was in place for three months in 2022 (March-May) following the war in Ukraine, and was extended for three more months (June-August 2022) to cover the demand that was expected to increase during Ramadan. Exports from domestic market surpluses were allowed with the approval from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Trade status and market price differential
Maize has been consistently imported over the period 2000‑22. The market price differential was positive during most of the period under review (except in 2003‑2008 and 2017‑18) in line with domestic support policies in place (procurement operations, guaranteed prices, public stockholding) and trade policies in place (import tariffs in place for maize or maize flour). In 2022, the six months export ban, did not depress the domestic prices as wheat was massively imported and procurement prices were on the rise, with the government seeking to stimulate production in order to reduce maize imports. Hence, the positive market price differential was maintained for 2022, as for the rest of the period. In 2003‑08 and 2017‑18 the MPD was set to zero, as no restrictive policies could explain the calculated negative gap.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Rice has been historically regulated by the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT), which controls the production and marketing of rice as well as by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI), which controls the area cultivated.
Main domestic market policies
Each year, the MWRI determines and limits areas where rice can be grown as per the Law 31 of 1961. As rice is water intensive, these areas are limited to specific regions (mostly in the Northern part of the Nile Delta). Several decrees were introduced to further limit the cultivation of rice in areas other than those indicated by the MWRI: in 2014‑15 a fine of EGP 3 000 per feddan9 was imposed in case of violation of these limits. Other measures included the payment of further penalties to prevent the recurrence of violations or the payment of the equivalent cost of the misused water. In 2016, the government set procurement prices to encourage rice production. These were set much lower than market prices and the government was not able to purchase the volume it targeted as farmers were selling to the private sector. In 2022, the MoSIT issued a decree (Decision No. 109 of 2022) constraining rice producers that owns agricultural land higher than one feddan4 to supply one tonne of rice per feddan to the MoSIT, with fines imposed in case of non-respect. At the end of 2022, marketing control was reinforced, with a decree issued to prevent any shortage in the market: rice private stocks are prohibited, and producers, traders and distributors who withhold rice face prison sentences and large fines. In addition, farmers who do not supply the requested rice quantity are not allowed to grow rice or to receive input subsidies for a period of one year. In 2023, rice was declared an essential commodity (as designated by the Consumer Protection Law No. 181 of 2018), making it illegal to withhold it from the market. All non-household holders (farmers, suppliers, distributors, traders) must also declare their stocks to the MoSIT.
Main trade policies
MFN tariffs of 20% were applied in 2000‑03, lowered to 9% in 2009 and to 0% since 2010. Over the period 2008‑22, Egypt imposed intermittent export restrictions on rice to preserve its stocks for domestic consumption and for environmental purposes due to pressure on water resources. Policy instruments included export taxes, export quotas or export bans. Export bans in place since 2016 made exports drop dramatically.
Trade status and market price differential
Rice was exported over the period 2000‑10 and has been imported since 2011.
The market price differential has been mainly positive over the period 2000-22, although it was negative for some specific years (2008 and 2017‑18). This reflects both the domestic policies that limit the areas where rice can be grown, pushing up the prices (explaining the positive MPD) and the export restrictions in place since 2008 which exert a downward pressure on prices (explaining the negative MPD). In 2022‑24, the positive market price differential was set to zero as restrictive domestic policies were set to discourage rice production through the measures mentioned above (compelling farmers to sell their production to the government, or forbidding them to stock rice).
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
High-value horticultural crops, including fruit and vegetables are key drivers for agricultural development in Egypt. The export value of fruit and vegetables has been increasing significantly over the last two decades. In 2020‑22, fresh and prepared fruit and vegetables together accounted for more than half of total agricultural exports, against 33% in 1995‑97. This was mainly achieved thanks to the dynamic growth of the fruit sector.
Main domestic market policies
Throughout the period, fruit, vegetables and groundnuts have not been subject to price controls or other market interventions. Fruit and vegetables are important cash crops. However, in April 2018, Egypt adopted a law to allow the government to limit or ban the cultivation of crops requiring a large quantity of water, such as bananas. While bananas’ cultivation could continue in existing farms, its cultivation would not be allowed to expand beyond current plots allotments.
Main trade policies
Throughout the period 2000‑19,10 imports of horticultural products were subject to MFN tariffs. Except for a few products (including bananas or grapes), the trend has been for the level of tariffs to decline. Tariffs for fruit were in general higher than tariffs for vegetables. For example, in 2000, fruit had a tariff ranging between 23 and 40% (1 and 30% for vegetables), 5‑40% in 2004 (2‑32% for vegetables), 10‑30% in 2014 (0 and 10% for vegetables), and 10‑60% in 2019 (0 and 10% for vegetables). Bananas tariffs are high, ranging between 40% in 2000 to 60% in 2019.
Trade status and market price differential
Most fruit and vegetables under review, i.e. tomatoes, potatoes, grapes, dates, oranges, onions as well as groundnuts have been consistently net exported each year in 2000‑24. For each commodity, the market price differential has been negative throughout most of the period with domestic farm gate prices being below reference prices. No domestic nor trade-related policies have been identified for these exportable commodities; therefore, the MPD is considered to be zero over the whole period. Negatives likely reflect poor infrastructures for fresh horticulture products such as lack of cold storage, processing and packaging facilities combined with a lack of modern and refrigerated transports and poor road conditions (IFAD, 2008[81]).
Bananas trade status alternates between net import periods (2000‑03, 2011‑15 and 2020-24) and net export periods (2004‑10 and 2016‑19). Positive MPD were retained during net import periods (as bananas were subject to high tariffs) and set to zero during net exported period (as no export subsidies neither domestic support policies were in place).
Mangoes have been marginally traded until 2009 (implying in the PSE methodology to be treated as an imported commodity). Tariffs were in place during this period (30% in 2000, 10% in 2009) and used to calculate the market price differential. As from 2010 the market price differential was set to zero as for other exported commodities.
Egyptian cotton, which is known for the quality of its Extra Long Staple and Long Staple, has long been called “white gold of Egypt”, as it represents an important source of income for Egyptian growers and a major source of export revenue for the country. However, Egypt’s cotton production is now in decline: three decades ago, Egypt produced 248 000 tonnes of cotton lint which dropped to 90 000 tonnes in 2022. In 1995‑97, cotton was the third largest export, after oil and aluminium. In 2020‑22 cotton accounted for 3% of agro-food exports.
Main market domestic policies
Until 2014, the government provided direct payments to the textile industry to allow it to pay farmers a guaranteed fixed price set each year before the harvest season. The government used to pay the spinning companies the price difference between prices of local cotton and prices prevailing in the international market. The subsidy was created to encourage domestic industries to purchase local production and to encourage farmers to continue growing cotton. In 2014, the system was reformed and guaranteed prices were replaced by a direct payment to Egyptian farmers who received EGP 1 400 (USD 184) per quintar11 of extra-long staple varieties and EGP 1 200 (USD 171) per quintar of short/medium varieties harvested during the 2014 season. This payment was in place for one year. From 2015, government announced indicative prices prior to the beginning of the planting season. This measure was supposed to incite the domestic industries to buy cotton from farmers at the indicative price, which, unlike the guaranteed price, is not a support price and does not commit the government to buy the crop. In 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, the government did not announce indicative prices for cotton. In 2021, as part of the state plan to revitalise the cotton industry, the government launched a cotton trading system via auction to buy the cotton from farmers. In 2023, the government reintroduced a guaranteed price to support farmers who failed to sell their crops to private companies within the auction system. In 2024, the government approved proposals from the MALR to maintain a guaranteed price for the 2024‑25 cotton season.
Main trade policies
In 2000‑03, Egypt imposed a 5% import tariff on cotton not carded or combed (HS: 520100) and no tariff is applied (0%) since 2004. A 5% import tariff on carded or combed cotton (HS: 520300) has been in place since 2004.
In 2014‑15, exporters obtained a subsidy of EGP 200 (USD 26) by quintar exported.
Trade status and market price differential
Cotton has been net exported over the period 2000‑12 and has been net imported since 2013.
Domestic market prices were mainly in parallel with the development of reference prices over the period though we can observe successively small negative or positive market price differentials. Positive market price differential were retained in line with domestic support policies (guaranteed prices) and with trade policies (import tariffs) in place. The negative market price differential was set to zero as no domestic or trade restrictive policies were in place.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Egypt produces both sugar cane and sugar beet. Sugar cane is mostly grown in Upper Egypt, while sugar beet production is mostly concentrated in the Delta region, across desert and reclaimed lands. The share of sugarcane in national sugar production has fluctuated over time. In 2020‑22, sugar cane accounted for most of the national sugar production (60%) but more recent estimates indicate a rising dominance of sugar beet, reaching about 78% of total sugar production in 2025‑26 (USDA GAIN, 2025[82]). Most of Egypt’s sugar refineries (all eight sugar cane mills and four of the seven sugar beet mills present in the country) are state run companies affiliated to the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade’s Holding Company for Food Industries (USDA GAIN, 2022[83]). Sugar is one of the essential commodities in Egypt, as designated by the Consumer Protection Law No. 181 of 2018.
Main domestic market policies
Sugar procurement prices are announced before each planting season to offer a measure of protection to sugar producers against market fluctuations. Sugar is mostly being purchased by state owned sugar processors but sugar growers are allowed to sell their harvest to molasses producers, who pay higher prices than state owned enterprises.
The country builds up strategic reserves to prevent any shortage in the market, equivalent these last years to several months of domestic consumption. As part of a large distribution programme, sugar is sold at government supply outlets to consumers through ration cards.
Main trade policies
Most sugar is imported through the Egyptian Sugar and Integrated Industries Company (ESIIC), affiliated to the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade.
Import tariff rates on raw cane and beet sugar (HS 170112, 170113, 170114) fluctuated between 2% and 25% during 2000 and 2015 and have been of 20% since 2016 (except from May to December 2016 where the tariff on raw sugar import was set to zero). On several occasions, Egypt introduced provisional safeguard measures (e.g. as prescribed in Ministerial decree No. 21/2009), and increased MFN applied tariffs on raw sugar from 2% to 20% (as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 25/2016). In 2020‑21 Egypt imposed a three-month import ban on white and raw sugar.
Since 2016 sugar exports are subject to an export tax (Ministerial Decree No. 455/2016) to safeguard the country strategic reserves from high world prices and to ensure a sufficient domestic supply of sugar in the country. An export ban initially in place for three months in 2023 (Ministerial resolution 88 of 2023) was extended on several occasions, most recently for six months according to Ministerial Decree No. 111 of 2025.
Trade status and market price differential
Sugar has been consistently net imported over the period 2000‑24.
The market price differential was positive in 2000‑02, 2005, 2007, 2010‑11 and 2014‑21 in line with domestic policies (guaranteed price, public stockholding) and trade policies (import tariff, safeguard measures). For the remaining years, the negative MPD has been set to zero, as although the presence of export tax or bans was noted for certain years, overall, sugar is net imported and strongly supported through the domestic and trade policies in place.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Raw milk in Egypt is mostly produced from buffalo and cow (and to a lesser extent from goat, sheep, and camel). The sector is largely dominated by subsistence and traditional systems with a majority of micro and small-scale farmers, accounting for more than 80% of milk production in the country. The dairy value chain is characterised by a limited use of technology, low productivity, quality issues and challenges in post-production activities (ILO, 2020[84]). A modern commercial milk sector coexists alongside the subsistence and traditional sector with milk produced by large modern dairy farms.
Milk has been added to the list of strategic commodities in December 2023.
Main domestic market policies
Until 2009, raw milk producer prices were fixed by a committee composed of representatives from MALR, large scale farmers and milk’s processors. The committee recommended the pricing according to a diverse range of factors including feed prices or world price of skim milk powdered (ILO, 2020[84]). No policies regulating milk prices at the farm gate level have been identified over 2010‑24.
Main trade policies
Dairy products (HS 0401 to 0406) were on average subjected to a 18% tariff in 2000‑03, 6% in 2004‑13, 5% in 2014‑19 and 7% in 2022. Skim milk powder (HS 040210) tariffs were subject to a 9% tariff in 2000‑02, 3.5% in 2003‑06 and 0% in 2007‑22. Butter (HS 040510) was subject to a 10% tariff in 2000‑03, 9% in 2003‑06, 6% in 2007‑09, 1.25% in 2010‑15 and 2.5% since 2016.
Since 1 October 2021, milk and milk products exported to Egypt require halal certification from ISEG Halal, the state entity managing the imports of food products in Egypt (Ministerial Decree No. 35/2020). However, the entry into force of this procedure has been delayed several times – most recently the delay was further extended to December 2025. In response to significant concerns raised by several countries regarding the difficulties associated with Halal certification for milk and dairy products, the Egyptian Government has excluded milk and dairy products from the scope of Halal certification requirements since March 2025.
Trade status and market price differential
Milk has been consistently imported since 2000.
During 2000‑24, the market price differential for milk has been positive for most of the years in line with trade policies in place (tariffs) for dairy products. Market price differentials for 2017‑18, 2022 and 2024 have been set to zero as no domestic or trade policy have been identified to explain the calculated negative MPD.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Beef meat, sheep meat and poultry are grouped together for the purpose of the following analysis as they present the same characteristics in terms of trade status and domestic market and trade policies applied. However, an individual market price differential has been calculated for each of these commodities.
As agricultural land is limited in Egypt, small producers dominate livestock production. Limited availability of feed in Egypt and high prices for feed imports (essentially maize) have constrained meat production.
Main domestic market policies
No policies regulating livestock prices at the farm gate level have been identified during 2000‑24.
Main trade policies
Egypt imposed a 5% tariff on meat of bovine animal, fresh, chilled or frozen (HS 0201 and HS 0202) in 2000‑06 and a 0% tariff since 2007. Egypt imposed a 5% tariff on meat of sheep, fresh, chilled or frozen (HS 0204) in 2000‑06 and a 0% tariff since 2007. Egypt imposed an 80% tariff on meat of poultry, fresh, chilled or frozen (HS 0207) in 2000‑02, 64% in 2003, 32% in 2004‑06 and 30% tariff since 2007. An import ban was in place before 2007.
Although the private sector is allowed to import meat in Egypt, government authorities (such as the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the Ministry of Defense) are Egypt’s largest importers. The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade offers imported beef at below market prices through a range of partner private grocery stores and of public outlets operated by the Holding Company for Food Industries. The government also supports meat demand by providing beef at subsidised prices through the Ministry of Defense stores.
Importers of meat products must provide several certificates before products are allowed to enter into the country including, a veterinary certificate, a certificate of origin and a halal certificate according to the 2023 Halal Standards, the reference document for “general requirements of halal food according to Islamic Sharia”. The Halal certification is required for all imported food products entering Egypt and must be issued by ISEG Halal, the official Halal certification authority in Egypt. The General Organisation for Veterinary Services (GOVS) under MALR requires that imports of meat, poultry and their products be accompanied by a Halal certificate issued by the relevant certification bodies approved by GOVS.
Trade status and market price differential
Beef meat, sheep meat and poultry have all been imported during the period 2000‑24. Poultry has not (or marginally) been traded in 2000‑07 and, as indicated by the PSE methodology, is treated as an imported commodity for calculating the MPD.
As for other countries, it is not always possible to make an appropriate “like with like” comparison between the producer price and the reference price for meat products, preventing the use of the price gap method for calculating the MPD. In the case of Egypt, the price of domestic beef (or sheep meat) produced at the farm gate level is available in fresh carcass and the price of beef (or sheep meat) imported (IUV) is available as frozen meat, making the ‘like with like’ comparison difficult.
Hence, the market price differentials for beef and sheep meat have been derived from the tariffs applied to these products, in line with the fact that tariffs have been the main policy in place for most of the period covered by the PSE calculations. For both commodities, since 2007 tariffs have been set to zero, which translates into a market price differential equal to zero. The use of tariffs as the appropriate way to assess the market price differential relies in this case on the following considerations:
State trading of beef and sheep meat was effectively in place, but with the objective to facilitate imports (rather than restricting them) in order to maximise consumer welfare by selling meat at subsidised price in state outlets.12
Moreover, it is considered that halal measures in place are not implicitly supporting domestic producers, as domestic and foreign producers are facing the same requirements in this area.
In the case of poultry, it was not possible to use the tariff to derive the market price differential as poultry import have been banned for several years. The ban also prevented us to use IUV at the border to compare with producer price. Therefore, the choice has been made to use the world price of poultry adjusted to the farm with transportation cost (estimated using difference between IUV and EUV between Brazil and Egypt) and margins. The result obtained (i.e. a positive gap for all years) is in line with the high tariff in place.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
As a low cost source of protein, eggs are consumed regularly by Egyptians. Egypt is self-sufficient in eggs.
Main domestic market policies
No policies regulating egg prices at the farm gate level have been identified during 2000‑24.
Main trade policies
Egypt imposed a 25% MFN tariff on eggs in shell, preserved or cooked (HS 0407) in 2000‑03 and 5% since 2004.
Trade status and market price differential
Eggs have been marginally traded over the period 2000‑24. Depending on the years there were either no exports or imports, or a very small amount of exports. The situation of marginal trade is treated as an import status for calculating the MPD in the PSE methodology.
As it was not possible to use neither trade data to calculate IUV or EUV (given the small amounts traded), nor international transportation costs, making it difficult to use prices from another country to calculate the MPS, the choice of tariffs as proxy for the MPD was made.
Moreover, as tariffs are the only policy in place supporting egg producers in Egypt, the use of the tariff is representative in calculating the market price differential for eggs.
Source: OECD (2025), "Producer and Consumer Estimates", OECD Agriculture Statistics Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Note: Trade and domestic measures reported in the table refer to 2000‑24 period, though not always covering the entire period. Unless otherwise specified, each measure covers one or several years.
References
[40] Abdelhakim, T. (2019), “Agricultural cooperatives in Egypt and its role as important actors in agricultural and rural development”, ENPARD South Support Programme (ESSP) II, https://hal.science/hal-02146744/document.
[28] Abdulghany, A. (2022), “Agricultural Bank Of Egypt”, Egy-Africa, https://egy-africa.com/en/2020/12/26/agricultural-bank-of-egypt/ (accessed on 19 March 2025).
[59] Ahram Online (2024), Egypt’s parliament grants foreigners right to own land for investment, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/515089.aspx (accessed on 12 September 2025).
[47] Ahram Online (2022), Supply ministry urges farmers to deliver mandated 25% of barely rice harvest this season, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/480334.aspx (accessed on 9 September 2025).
[4] Alderman, H., U. Gentilini and R. Yemtsov (eds.) (2018), The Tamween Food Subsidy System in Egypt: Evolution and recent implementation reforms, World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/398281507803030509.
[18] ARC (2025), About ARC, http://www.arc.sci.eg/AboutARC.aspx (accessed on 3 March 2025).
[20] ARC (2025), “Institutes”, Affiliated Institutions of the Agricultural Research Center, http://www.arc.sci.eg/ARCInstituteList.aspx?TabId=1&lang=ar (accessed on 3 March 2025).
[19] ARC (2025), “Laboratories”, Affiliated Institutions of the Agricultural Research Center, http://www.arc.sci.eg/ARCLabList.aspx?TabId=1&lang=ar (accessed on 3 March 2025).
[21] ARC (2025), “Research Stations”, Affiliated Institutions of the Agricultural Research Center, http://www.arc.sci.eg/ResearchStations.aspx?TabId=1&lang=ar (accessed on 3 March 2025).
[6] Baffes, J. and M. Gautam (1996), “Price Responsiveness, Efficiency, and the Impact of Structural Adjustment on Egyptian Crop Producers”, World Development, Vol. 24/4, pp. 765-771, https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(95)00164-8.
[31] Cabinet (2022), State Ownership Policy Framework Document - The Arab Republic of Egypt, https://idsc.gov.eg/upload/DocumentLibrary/AttachmentE/7764/State%20Ownership%20Policy.pdf (accessed on 5 September 2025).
[53] CAPMAS (2024), “Annual Bulletin of Lands Reclamation 2022/2023”, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=5104&Year=23539.
[37] CAPMAS (2021), “Annual Bulletin of Cooperative Activity in Agricultural Sector 2019/2020”, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), https://censusinfo.capmas.gov.eg/Metadata-en-v4.2/index.php/catalog/746/download/2187 (accessed on 3 April 2025).
[2] Cassing, J. et al. (2009), Arab Republic of Egypt, World Bank.
[9] Constitute (2022), Egypt’s Constitution of 2014 with Amendments through 2019, https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019.pdf (accessed on 14 July 2025).
[16] Diab, A., M. Yacoub and M. AbdelAal (2020), “An Overview of the Agricultural Extension System in Egypt: The History, Structure, Modes of Operation and the Future Directions”, Sustainable Agriculture Research, Vol. 9/4, pp. 30-42, https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.309790.
[23] DRC (2025), “Vision & Mission”, Desert Research Center, https://drc.gov.eg/en/vision/ (accessed on 4 March 2025).
[34] Egypt Independent (2025), PM reviews steps to establish central unit for state-owned companies, https://www.egyptindependent.com/pm-reviews-steps-to-establish-central-unit-for-state-owned-companies/ (accessed on 29 October 2025).
[65] El-Din, G. (2020), Egypt’s Parliament Approves Suspending Tax on Agricultural Land for Two Years, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/369554/Business/Economy/Egypts-parliament-approves-suspending-tax-on-agric.aspx.
[7] Ender, G. and J. Holtzman (2003), Does Agricultural Policy Reform Work? The Impact on Egypt’s Agriculture, 1996-2002, Abt Associates Inc. and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
[27] Ezz, M. (2024), “Exclusive: Egyptian military agency takes over wheat buying from decades-old supply group”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-mostakbal-misr-takes-over-gascs-role-commodities-importer-2024-12-06/ (accessed on 27 March 2025).
[60] FAO (2022), “Country Gender Assessment of the Agriculture and Rural Sector: Egypt”, Country gender assessment series – Near East and North Africa, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb7909en.
[30] FAO (2017), “Law No.1 of 2017 establishing the National Food Safety Authority (NFSA)”, FAOLEX Database, https://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC165614/ (accessed on 19 March 2025).
[13] FAO (2016), “Food self-sufficiency and international trade: a false dichotomy?”, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ea722624-2814-4cc5-ba44-90a79a2c2de5/content (accessed on 11 April 2025).
[14] FAO (2006), “Food Security”, Policy Brief, https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2025).
[50] FAOSTAT (2025), “Fertilizers by Nutrient”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/RFN.
[63] Farouk, N. (2024), “Fighting the black clouds”, ahramonline, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/535137.aspx (accessed on 11 March 2025).
[79] Food Business (2022), Egypt bolsters national reserves with acquisition of 175,000 tonnes of Ukrainian wheat, https://www.foodbusinessafrica.com/egypt-bolsters-national-reserves-with-acquisition-of-175000-tonnes-of-ukrainian-wheat/.
[48] GASC (2025), “Partners”, General Authority for Supply Commodities, https://gasc.gov.eg/partners/en (accessed on 17 October 2025).
[73] GOEIC (2017), Law No. (7) of 2017 Amendment of some provisions of Law No. (121) of 1982 Regarding the Importers Register (unofficial translation), https://www.goeic.gov.eg/upload/online/2017/03/documents/files/en/1510.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[8] Gouda, D. (2016), Social Capital and Local Water Management in Egypt, American University in Cairo Press.
[77] Gruère, G., M. Shigemitsu and S. Crawford (2020), “Agriculture and water policy changes: Stocktaking and alignment with OECD and G20 recommendations”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 144, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f35e64af-en.
[3] Hansen, B. and K. Nashashibi (1975), Basic Characteristics of Egyptian Agriculture, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4055.
[35] HCFI (2025), “Affiliates”, Holding Company for Food Industries, http://hcfi-egy.com/ (accessed on 11 March 2025).
[41] ICA (2019), Rapport national: Analyse du cadre juridique des coopératives en Égypte dans le cadre du partenariat ACI-UE, https://coops4dev.coop/sites/default/files/2020-07/Egypt%20Legal%20Framework%20Analysis.pdf (accessed on 9 September 2025).
[25] Ido, Y. (2018), “The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reforms in Egypt since 2000s: Swinging between universalism and targeting?”, Institute of Developmen Countries (IDE-JETRO), https://www.ide.go.jp/library/Japanese/Research/Project/2016/pdf/c13_06.pdf.
[81] IFAD (2008), Egypt: Smallholder contract farming for high-value and organic agricultural exports, International Fund for Agricultural Development, https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39135645/egypt.pdf/eed7f2cf-e8a6-4ceb-822c-28ec714f6947.
[1] Ikram, K. (2006), The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000. Performance, policies, and issues., Routeledge.
[84] ILO (2020), Developing the Dairy Value Chain in Egypt’s Delta. Market System Analysis, International Labour Organization, https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40africa/%40ro-abidjan/%40sro-cairo/documents/publication/wcms_754764.pdf.
[54] Jovanovic, N. and J. Glauber (2024), “Higher wheat prices push Egypt to increase price of subsidized bread for first time since 1989”, IFPRI Blog: Issue Post - Development Strategies and Governance, https://www.ifpri.org/blog/egypt-increases-price-of-subsidized-bread-for-the-first-time-since-1989-implications-for-nutrition-and-food-security/ (accessed on 11 July 2025).
[38] Kassim, Y. et al. (2018), “An Agricultural Policy Review of Egypt: First Steps Towards a New Strategy”, Working Paper 11, IFPRI Egypt Strategy Support Program Working Paper Series, https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/132788/.
[62] Khodary, Y. (2018), “What Difference Can It Make? Assessing the impact of gender equality and empowerment in matters of inheritance in Egypt”, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, Vol. 9/2, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2018.1499336.
[49] Kurdi, S. et al. (2020), “Too much of a good thing? Evidence that fertilizer subsidies lead to overapplication in Egypt”, IFPRI Middle East and North Africa, Vol. Regional Program Working Paper 27, https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133652.
[32] L’Orient Today (2024), Egypt cabinet approves ending state enterprise tax privileges, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1366481/egypt-cabinet-approves-ending-state-enterprise-tax-privileges-.html (accessed on 5 September 2025).
[17] MALR (2025), “Ministry structure”, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, https://moa.gov.eg/ar/about/ministry-structure/ (accessed on 3 March 2025).
[12] MALR (2020), “Egypt 2030 Updated Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy (Executive Summary)”, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation.
[58] Manshurat (2024), Law No. 11 of 2024 Amending Certain Provisions of Law No. 143 of 1981 Concerning Desert Lands, https://manshurat.org/content/tdyl-bd-hkm-qnwn-lrdy-lshrwy-blqnwn-rqm-11-lsn-2024 (accessed on 9 October 2025).
[66] MKS Egypt (2025), Law No. 187 of 1993 Amending some provisions of the Income Tax Law Issued by Law No. 157 of 1981, https://www.mksegypt.org/ar/laws/23770.
[56] MoF (2025), “Financial statement on the draft state budget for the fiscal year 2025-2026”, Ministry of Finance, https://assets.mof.gov.eg/files/c00e6560-2ff4-11f0-98a2-abcafccf59cc.pdf (accessed on 31 May 2025).
[26] MoSIT (2025), “Ministry Strategy”, Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, http://msit.gov.eg/?p=5072 (accessed on t March 2025).
[10] MPED (2023), “The National Agenda for Sustainable Development: Egypt’s Updated Vision 2030”, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, https://mped.gov.eg/Files/Egypt_Vision_2030_EnglishDigitalUse.pdf (accessed on 6 March 2025).
[24] MWRI (2025), “Organisational structure of the ministry”, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, https://www.mwri.gov.eg/?page_id=9637 (accessed on 4 March 2025).
[57] Nada, M. and D. Sims (2020), Assessment of Land Governance in Egypt, World Bank Group, Washington, D.C., http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/809671644219582056.
[36] NSPO (2024), National Service Projects Organisation (NSPO), http://www.nspo.com.eg/partner_detail/products/english.pdf (accessed on 17 April 2025).
[76] OECD (2024), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2024: Innovation for Sustainable Productivity Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/74da57ed-en.
[33] OECD (2024), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18a24f43-en.
[75] OECD (2016), OECD’s Producer Support Estimate and Related Indicators of Agricultural Support, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/agricultural-policy-monitoring/producer-support-estimates-manual.pdf.
[85] OECD (2001), State Trading Enterprises in Agriculture, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264192362-en (accessed on 15 April 2025).
[61] OECD/ILO/CAWTAR (2020), Changing Laws and Breaking Barriers for Women’s Economic Empowerment in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, OECD Publishing, Paris,, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac780735-en.
[68] PwC (2023), “Egypt Overview”, VAT and indirect taxes in Africa - A Guide 2023, https://www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/vat-in-africa/egypt-overview.html.
[64] RTA (2025), “Agriculture Land Tax”, Real Estate Taxation Authority, https://www.rta.gov.eg/en/agriculture-land-tax.
[78] Saleh, E. (2018), “The economic value and cost recovery of water in the Egyptian irrigated agriculture”, Egyptian Journal of Agricultural Research, Vol. 96/2, pp. 787-813, https://doi.org/10.21608/ejar.2018.136213.
[11] SIS (2025), “National Narrative for Economic Development: Policies Supporting Growth and Employment”, State Information Service, https://us.sis.gov.eg/Story/213031/National-Narrative-for-Economic-Development-Policies-Supporting-Growth-and-Employment?lang=en-us (accessed on 9 October 2025).
[52] Soliman, A. (2024), Collective Action and Local Irrigation Management: A Comparative Study of Collective Irrigation Systems in the Nile Delta of Egypt, https://doi.org/10.18452/30003.
[22] Soliman, M., H. Ibrahim and H. Adel (2021), Agricultural Research Center: Innovation Towards Agricultural Sustainability.
[5] Soliman, N. (2021), Remembering the 1977 Bread Riots in Suez: Fragments and Ghosts of Resistance, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-social-history/article/remembering-the-1977-bread-riots-in-suez-fragments-and-ghosts-of-resistance/90D562133785571D28F1FB1532A78C90.
[72] The Poultry Site (2023), Egypt suspends tariff on imported chicken, https://www.thepoultrysite.com/news/2023/10/egypt-suspends-tariff-on-imported-chicken (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[44] USDA GAIN (2025), “Egypt’s Domestic Wheat Procurement -- 2025”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2025-0023, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Egypt%27s%20Domestic%20Wheat%20Procurement%20--%202025_Cairo_Egypt_EG2025-0023 (accessed on 11 September 2025).
[42] USDA GAIN (2025), “Grain and Feed Annual”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2025-0009, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain%20and%20Feed%20Annual_Cairo_Egypt_EG2025-0009.pdf (accessed on 3 September 2025).
[80] USDA GAIN (2025), “Grain and Feed Update”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2025-0024, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain+and+Feed+Update_Cairo_Egypt_EG2025-0024.pdf (accessed on 8 December 2025).
[82] USDA GAIN (2025), “Sugar Annual”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2025-0015, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Sugar%20Annual_Cairo_Egypt_EG2025-0015.
[55] USDA GAIN (2024), “Egypt Increases Price for Subsidized Bread for First Time in 36 Years”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2024-0013, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Egypt%20Increases%20Price%20for%20Subsidized%20Bread%20for%20First%20Time%20in%2036%20Years_Cairo_Egypt_EG2024-0013.pdf (accessed on 11 September 2025).
[46] USDA GAIN (2023), “Grain and Feed Annual”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2023-0003, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain%20and%20Feed%20Annual_Cairo_Egypt_EG2023-0003 (accessed on 28 February 2025).
[45] USDA GAIN (2022), “Grain and Feed Update”, Global Agricultural Information Network report EG2022-0025, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Grain%20and%20Feed%20Update_Cairo_Egypt_EG2022-0025 (accessed on 27 February 2025).
[83] USDA GAIN (2022), “Sugar Annual”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report EG2022-0012, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Sugar%20Annual_Cairo_Egypt_EG2022-0012.pdf.
[74] USDA GAIN (2020), “Egypt Reintroduces Government Pre shipment Inspections for Grain Imports”, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Egypt%20Reintroduces%20Government%20Pre%20shipment%20Inspections%20for%20Grain%20Imports_Cairo_Egypt_01-22-2020 (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[67] Wally, A. and O. Akingbe (2020), Egypt Imposes Value Added Tax on Freight of Agricultural Commodities, United States Department of Agriculture.
[69] WITS (2025), World Integrated Trade Solution database, https://wits.worldbank.org/ (accessed on 1 April 2025).
[51] World Bank (2016), Implementation Completion and Results on a Loan in the Amount of US $120 Million to the Arab Republic of Egypt for an Egypt-Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project, The World Bank.
[39] World Bank (2014), Egypt - Principal Bank for Development and Agriculture Credit (PBDAC) Restructuring Program, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/754571468247461535/egypt-principal-bank-for-development-and-agriculture-credit-pbdac-restructuring-program.
[15] World Food Summit (1996), “World Food Summit Plan of Action”, Rome Declaration on World Food Security, https://www.fao.org/4/w3613e/w3613e00.htm (accessed on 11 April 2025).
[71] WTO (2024), “Egypt”, World Tariff Profiles 2024, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_tariff_profiles24_e.pdf (accessed on 31 March 2025).
[70] WTO (2021), “Egypt”, World Tariff Profiles 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles21_e.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[43] WTO (2018), Trade Policy Review: Egypt, World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s367_e.pdf.
[29] Yehia, A. and D. Soliman (2022), “The Impact of Restructuring Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) on Financing the Agricultural Sector in Egypt”, Indian Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 21/1, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5913025.
← 1. Prior to the agrarian reform in 1952, approximately 2 000 out of 2.8 million landowners held 20% of the land, while more than 2.6 million owners held 36% of the land. By 1965, about 4 000 out of 3.2 million landowners held 7% of the land, while about 3 million held 57% of the land (Ikram, 2006[1]).
← 2. There is also a Ministry of Social Solidarity, which retains responsibility for cash transfers and social protection.
← 3. The food products included in Ministerial Decree 991/2015 include milk and milk products; preserved and dried fruits; oils and fats; chocolates and products containing cocoa; sugar confectionaries; pastas and prepared foods from cereals and bread products and pastries; fruit juices; natural and mineral and aerated water.
← 4. For commodities not affected by such measures, the market price differential is set to zero.
← 5. A %SCT of 25%, for example, indicates that the value of transfers that are specific to the commodity is equivalent to one-fourth of the commodity’s gross farm receipts.
← 6. Depending on the years, wheat, maize, rice, sugar, cotton, bananas, mangoes, beef and veal, milk, sheep meat, poultry and eggs.
← 7. In order to avoid double-counting, market transfers associated with market price support policies in the CSE component are not taken into account in the TSE, given that they are already included in the PSE component.
← 8. Flour for subsidised baladi bread is milled at higher extraction rates (about 82‑87%), while fino and other non-subsidised bakery products use 72%-extraction flour.
← 9. 1 feddan=0.42 ha.
← 10. Data extracted from the UN TRAINS database, at the HS 6 digits level, available from 2000 to 2019.
← 11. 1 quintar = 157.4 kg.
← 12. In the absence of other policy instruments, state trading enterprises on their own may not be able to influence the domestic market (OECD, 2001[85]).