Egypt faces the double burden of malnutrition: the coexistence of chronic undernutrition and overnutrition amongst its population. Policies to tackle food insecurity have traditionally focused on increasing food availability, through measures to support domestic production and imports, and access to food, through a costly and extensive food subsidy system. While evidence indicates that food subsidies have had limited success in reducing malnutrition, reform remains challenging and sensitive. This calls for a comprehensive approach to reform food subsidies, increase dietary diversity, promote nutritional education, and facilitate greater diversification of trade flows.
Policies for the Future of Farming and Food in Egypt
Abstract
Egypt faces the double burden of malnutrition: the simultaneous presence of chronic undernutrition and overnutrition amongst its population. Undernourishment has grown in recent decades to 9.4% in 2022‑24, higher than the levels observed in Morocco and Tunisia, and rates of overweight and obesity are among the highest worldwide.
Egypt is a major importer of agricultural commodities, with particular concentration on cereals from Russia and Ukraine. As a result, Egypt is highly vulnerable to trade disruptions involving these countries, as became apparent during the war in Ukraine, which led to significant supply chain disruptions and fears of potential food shortages.
Food subsidies have been in place for many decades and are part of the social contract in Egypt. Their reform is sensitive and requires the participation of stakeholders to ensure its long-term continuity.
The baladi bread and ration card subsidy programmes, which benefit the vast majority of Egypt’s population, are not well targeted to those in need, and create incentives for the consumption of staple-intensive diets.
Reforming the food subsidy system and better targeting its beneficiaries can support more efficient use of available budgetary resources, which could be used to create incentives for more diversified diets. In particular, reducing the high consumption of subsidised bread, cooking oil, sugar and rice in favour of a diverse range of micronutrient rich foods can help to address some of Egypt’s nutritional challenges.
The Takaful and Karama cash transfer programmes have proven to be more effective at targeting the poorest households. While these programmes have been scaled up in recent years, they are still relatively small, and there is scope to expand them further.
Overall, there is scope to reform the food subsidy system and improve its effectiveness in reducing malnutrition, free up fiscal resources for nutrition-positive investments, enhance the role of the private sector in improving market responsiveness, and diversify trade by commodities and partners.
Food security is the state of having reliable access to a sufficient quantity of affordable, safe, and nutritious food. Food security is multidimensional in nature and may require policy interventions across a range of different areas. Box 3.1 provides definitions for the four pillars of food security (availability, access, utilisation, and stability), and outlines some of the key indicators used to measure food security.
Poverty and inadequate incomes are among the foremost causes of food insecurity globally (OECD, 2013[1]). In 2021, 37 million Egyptians (34% of the population) were classified as poor based on the national poverty measurement methodology.1 Furthermore, 73 million people (66% of the population) were living below the upper middle class poverty line of USD 6.85 per day (World Bank, 2025[2]). There are also significant regional disparities in poverty rates, with higher rates of poverty observed among rural populations.
The 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action provide a formal definition of food security:
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”
This definition was later expanded with the recognition of four key dimensions of food security:
1. Availability: The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid).
2. Access: Access by individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.
3. Utilisation: Utilisation of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.
4. Stability: The ability to ensure food security in the event of sudden shocks (e.g. conflict, extreme weather events) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity).
The concept of food security has evolved over time, with the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition recognising the importance of additional dimensions, such as “agency” and “sustainability”.
Some of the indicators commonly used to measure food security include:
Prevalence of undernourishment (PoU): the percentage of the population whose habitual food consumption is insufficient to provide the dietary energy levels required to maintain a normal, active, and healthy life.
Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity: the percentage of the population who live in households classified as moderately or severely food insecure, based on the FIES.1
Children under 5 years affected by wasting: weight-for-height is more than two standard deviations below the WHO Child Growth Standards median among children aged 0‑59 months.
Children under 5 years who are stunted: height-for-age is more than two standard deviations below the WHO Child Growth Standards median among children aged 0‑59 months.
1. According to the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), a household is classified as moderately or severely food insecure when at least one adult in the household has reported to have been exposed to low quality diets and might have been forced to also reduce the quantity of food they would normally eat because of a lack of money or other resources. A household is classified as severely food insecure when at least one adult in the household has reported to have been forced to reduce the quantity of food consumed, to have skipped meals, having gone hungry, or having to go for a whole day without eating because of a lack of money or other resources.
Access to food and nutrition: The double burden of malnutrition in Egypt
Egypt has been experiencing a rapid nutrition transition since the mid-1970s, and today faces a significant public health challenge in the form of the “double burden of malnutrition”: the simultaneous presence of chronic undernutrition and overnutrition amongst its population (Shokry et al., 2025[6]). Malnutrition imposes a significant economic cost on Egypt, through a combination of productivity losses, reduced educational attainment, and increased health costs.
Food insecurity and undernourishment are rising
Food insecurity has increased in Egypt over the past two decades, with the number of people undernourished rising from 3.6 million in the early 2000s to 10.8 million in 2022‑24. This has outpaced the growth in the overall population, and as a result the prevalence of undernourishment has also increased, from 4.8% in 2000‑02 to 9.4% in 2022‑24 (Figure 3.1). While undernourishment remains below the level observed in India (12%), it is higher than Morocco (7%) and Tunisia (3%) (FAOSTAT, 2025[7]). Moreover, Egypt’s experience runs counter to trends observed worldwide, where the prevalence of undernourishment has been declining.
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
Similar trends can be observed in the number of severely food insecure people in Egypt, which increased from 8.4 million in 2014‑16 to 13.8 million in 2022‑24, while the number of moderately or severely food insecure people increased from 27.6 million to 35.3 million over the same period (Figure 3.2). About 31% of the Egyptian population is moderately or severely food insecure, a level that is higher than the global average of 28%. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Egypt is considerably lower than in Nigeria (75%) and Ethiopia (61%), yet it remains substantially higher than the levels observed in Tunisia (25%), South Africa (21%), Brazil (18%) and OECD Member countries.
Indicators of undernutrition point to deficiencies or imbalances in the intake of energy and nutrients in the Egyptian population. The percentage of children under 5 years of age affected by wasting (low weight-for-height) decreased from 5.2% in 2003 to 3.3% in 2021. This represents a slight improvement, and is in line with global trends as well as the experiences of other North African economies such as Morocco and Tunisia, where rates of wasting have steadily declined. The percentage of children under 5 years of age who are stunted (low height-for-age) declined from 26% in 2000 to 13% in 2024, but remains high (Figure 3.3).2
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
Wasting and stunting prevent children from reaching their physical and cognitive potential, and may be the result of poor socio-economic conditions, poor maternal health and nutrition, inappropriate infant feeding, and recurrent or chronic illness (WHO, 2024[8]). On top of the impacts to child health and well-being, the negative economic effects of child malnutrition stem from productivity losses resulting from reduced physical capacity and higher worker absenteeism, increased educational costs due to school repetitions and dropouts, and health costs from additional cases of child morbidity and mortality. For example, the economic cost of child undernutrition is estimated at 1.9% of GDP in Egypt (Elshalakani et al., 2020[9]).
An examination of subnational data from the 2021 Egypt Family Health Survey shows that the highest rates of wasting among children under 5 years of age were found in South Sinai Governorate (16%), Aswan Governorate (14%), and Suez Governorate (11%) (CAPMAS, 2022[10]). Rates of stunting were also more pronounced in South Sinai (27%), as well as the other Frontier Governorates and rural parts of Upper Egypt (16%) (Figure 3.4).
Note: Based on data for 9 694 children across all governorates, except North Sinai.
Source: OECD based on data obtained from CAPMAS (2022[10]).
Overweight and obesity are among the highest worldwide
At the same time, data on overweight and obesity indicate that Egypt faces broader issues in tackling malnutrition. The percentage of children under 5 years of age who are overweight decreased slightly from 13% in 2000 to 11% in 2024, but remains considerably higher than the global average of 5.5%. The prevalence of obesity in the adult population (18 years and over) also grew rapidly, from 28% in 2000 to 44% in 2022 (compared to a global average of 16%) (Figure 3.5).
Remarkably, in spite of widespread food insecurity and undernutrition, Egypt has the 22nd-highest share of overweight children and the fifteenth highest rate of adult obesity worldwide.3 Rates of overweight and obesity are particularly high among women aged 15‑49: 86% were classified as overweight or obese in 2021, and 56% were classified as obese (CAPMAS, 2022[10]).
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
Obesity was linked to an estimated 113 000 deaths in 2020, accounting for nearly 20% of all deaths in Egypt. It is also a major risk factor for numerous diseases, including type 2 diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, stroke, and several forms of cancer. For instance, the direct health care costs associated with treating diseases attributable to obesity was estimated at EGP 62.4 billion per year in 2020 (Aboulghate et al., 2021[11]). This amounted to USD 4 billion, or approximately 1% of Egypt’s GDP in 2020.
Healthy diets are relatively expensive, resulting in high consumption of staples and nutritional shortfalls
Micronutrient deficiencies are a major cause of childhood mortality and can result from unhealthy diets, insufficient intake of vitamins and minerals, or parasitic infestations. The 2021 Egypt Family Health Survey conducted direct measurements of the prevalence of anaemia4 among children and women. Overall, the survey found that 43% of children under the age of 5 suffer from some degree of anaemia. This rate drops to 34% for females aged 5‑19, and 31% for males aged 5‑19. Furthermore, 38% of women aged 15‑49 were found to be anaemic, which is considerably higher than the level of 25% recorded by the previous Egypt Demographic and Health Survey in 2014 (CAPMAS, 2022[10]).
The proportion of dietary energy available in a country’s food supply that is derived from staple foods such as cereals, roots and tubers provides an indication of dietary diversity. Countries with very high shares of dietary energy derived from staple foods may suffer from lower nutritional quality, as non-staple foods tend to be more nutrient-dense than cereals, roots and tubers. In Egypt the share of dietary energy derived from staple foods reached 64% in 2020‑22, which is significantly higher than the global average of 50%, and higher than the levels recorded in other countries in North Africa, including Morocco (59%) and Tunisia (47%) (Figure 3.6). Unlike most other countries, the share has hardly fallen in Egypt over the past two decades.
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
A “healthy diet” provides adequate calories and nutrients from a diverse range of food groups, helping to meet nutrient intake requirements while preventing malnutrition in all its forms, including diet-related non-communicable diseases. It consists of four key characteristics: diversity (within and across food groups); adequacy (sufficiency of all essential nutrients compared to requirements); moderation (foods and nutrients that are related to poor health outcomes); and balance (energy and macronutrient intake) (Lawrence, 2024[12]); (FAO and WHO, 2024[13]); (FAO et al., 2024[14]).
The cost of a healthy diet in Egypt, comprising the least expensive locally available foods that meet energy and nutritional requirements, was 6.38 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per person per day in 2024 – significantly higher than the global average of 4.46 PPP dollars. In contrast, a diet based on the least expensive locally available starchy staples was substantially cheaper for Egyptians, at just 0.68 PPP dollars per person per day. Healthy diets remained unaffordable for an estimated 66 million people, or 57% of Egypt’s population in 2024 (FAO et al., 2025[15]). In comparison, the prevalence of unaffordability (PUA) of healthy diets was much lower in Morocco (14%) and Tunisia (8%) (Figure 3.7).
Note: The cost of a healthy diet indicator is the cost of purchasing the least expensive locally available foods to meet energy and food requirements, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per person per day. The Prevalence of Unaffordability (PUA) indicator estimates the percentage of individuals in a population whose disposable income, net of the amount needed to acquire all basic non-food goods and services, is lower than the least-cost healthy diet.
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[16]).
Food availability: Import dependence and vulnerability to trade disruptions
Egypt is a major importer of agricultural commodities. With a population of 116.5 million growing at 1.7% in 2024, Egypt has become increasingly dependent on imports to ensure its food supplies and remains highly vulnerable to trade-related shocks. This is reflected in the cereal import dependency ratio, which indicates the share of net imports of cereals in the available domestic supply of cereals (Figure 3.8). Egypt’s cereal import dependency ratio is very high at 43% in 2021‑23, and has increased steadily over the past two decades. Although this is lower than Morocco (65%) and Tunisia (87%), the large size of the country makes Egypt a large importer in absolute terms and particularly vulnerable to trade disruptions.
Source: FAOSTAT (2025[7]).
Egypt is one of the world’s largest importers of wheat. Over the past decade, wheat imports have averaged 11.4 million tonnes per year, representing about 50% of the country’s total wheat consumption. The government – previously through the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC), and since December 2024 via Mostakbal Misr Agency for Sustainable Development – is responsible for about half of the country’s wheat imports, while the remainder is imported by private trading companies (Abay et al., 2023[17]). Despite the government’s efforts to diversify its sources of imports, Russia and Ukraine still represent the vast majority of wheat imports, with the two countries together accounting for over 70% of Egypt’s wheat imports between 2014 and 2023 (Figure 3.9). This dependency represents an important strategic vulnerability which has led to recurring fears of food shortages, particularly during acute periods of stress such as the 2007‑08 global food price crisis, the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine.
Million tonnes
Note: Imports from Russia reported by Egypt were used to complete missing data for 2022‑23. EU members reporting wheat exports to Egypt include Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.
Source: UN Comtrade (2025[18]).
Egypt’s vulnerabilities are particularly visible since the war in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine created severe disruptions in commodity markets with negative consequences for grain supplies, fertiliser markets and global food security (Glauber and Laborde, 2023[19]). The crisis posed an acute threat to net food importing countries such as Egypt, simultaneously impacting consumers through food price inflation and the government’s budget through higher spending on food subsidies and the need for foreign currency to finance imports. Furthermore, within the first two months following the onset of the war, some 16 countries imposed export restrictions on food, representing about 17% of total calories traded globally (Glauber, Laborde and Mamun, 2023[20]). These measures, introduced with the objective of insulating domestic consumers, led to additional upward pressure on international prices and increased risks for net food importing countries. Indeed, food prices in Egypt grew much quicker than average wages in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, limiting access to food for vulnerable households (FAO et al., 2025[15]).
The situation was especially critical in 2022 when the war led to blockades of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, causing a sudden halt in maritime trade and obstructing a critical route for some three-quarters of Ukraine’s agricultural exports. In July 2022, Russia and Ukraine agreed to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, an agreement brokered by the UN and Türkiye allowing shipments to resume from three major ports in Ukraine. The agreement helped to restore Egypt’s access to Ukrainian wheat and stabilise supplies. However, it faced considerable uncertainties and following several extensions, the agreement ultimately expired in July 2023. The establishment of EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes has also helped to keep exports flowing, transporting around 40% of Ukraine’s grain and oilseeds via road, rail and inland waterways (European Commission, 2025[21]).
Initially, there were widespread fears that international sanctions might obstruct Russia’s food exports. In response, Egypt attempted to diversify its trade partners by increasing purchases of wheat from Romania and France. Ultimately, however, Russian wheat exports were less directly affected by the conflict, and by the end of 2022 they had regained their previous pace (Jovanovic and Glauber, 2024[22]).
Egypt’s policy approach to food security seeks to guarantee the availability of sufficient quantities of staple grains by encouraging domestic production through price support measures, and by importing significant quantities of strategic commodities, in particular wheat and maize. In parallel, the government aims to ensure access to food for the population at affordable prices through the food subsidy system.
Food subsidies have evolved from emergency food relief to a fundamental entitlement
The origins of Egypt’s food subsidy system date back to the early 1940s. Household rations were issued for basic necessities such as sugar, kerosene, coarse cotton textiles, edible oil and tea, initially provided on a universal basis to the entire Egyptian population (Ahmed et al., 2001[23]). Spending on food subsidies remained relatively restrained during the 1950s and 1960s and represented just 0.4% of GDP in 1970, but it grew rapidly to a peak of 8.1% of GDP in 1975, driven by surging international food prices (Figure 3.10). The expanded scope of the food subsidy system also contributed to fiscal pressures, with a broader range of 18 commodities being covered by 1977 – including beans, lentils, rice, yellow maize, frozen fish, meat and chicken (Ahmed et al., 2001[23]).
In January 1977 the government proposed substantial cuts to food subsidies following negotiations with the IMF over a package of economic reforms. The measures included increases to regulated prices for fino bread, fino flour, sugar and rice, cancellation of the tea subsidy, and increased prices for gasoline and household cooking gas5 (Alderman, 1986[24]). The announcement sparked riots and violent unrest in Cairo, Alexandria, and numerous major cities across Egypt. Although the price increases were rescinded almost immediately, the 1977 “Bread riots” left a lasting legacy of caution towards food subsidy reforms.
Percentage of GDP
Source: Data for 1970‑1999 from Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy (2018[25]); 2000‑2009 from Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy (2010[26]); 2010‑2024 from Ministry of Finance financial statements on the draft state budget.
Attempts to reform food subsidies at the end of last century were only partially successful
A series of gradual or “quiet” reforms were implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1981 the government divided all ration card holders into two categories: partially subsidised red ration cards for high-income beneficiaries and landowners with more than 10 feddans (4.2 hectares), and fully subsidised green ration cards intended to target the poorest citizens. The share of the population eligible for ration cards was reduced from 99% in the early 1980s to around 78% in 1994. However, some three-quarters of the Egyptian population continued to hold green ration cards, while the number of red ration card holders remained relatively small, representing less than 3% of the population in 1994 (Adams, 2000[27]).
The government also increased the price of a subsidised loaf of baladi bread from 1 piaster to 2 piasters in 1984, and to 5 piasters in 1989. These measures were met with limited public opposition, as the approach adopted was to offer higher quality bread at higher prices in some outlets, while gradually phasing out the cheaper, lower-quality loaves. In parallel, the size of a loaf of baladi bread was progressively reduced, from 168 g per loaf to 160 g in 1984, and to 130 g in 1991 (Ahmed et al., 2001[23]).
Food subsidy expenditures were further disciplined under the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, concluded with the IMF and the World Bank in 1991. The government removed the subsidies for frozen meat in 1990‑91, fish and tea in 1991‑92, rice in 1992‑93, fino bread and fino flour in 1992, and shami bread and shami flour in 1996. By 1996‑97, only four subsidised food items remained: baladi bread, baladi flour, sugar, and cooking oil (Adams, 2000[27]). These efforts reduced the fiscal burden of food subsidies from 15% of government expenditures in 1980 to 6% in 2000, without sparking major civil unrest (Ecker et al., 2016[28]).
The declining trend in food subsidy expenditures reversed in the 2000s, driven by a sharp rise in international food prices and a 30% exchange rate depreciation in January 2003 following the flotation of the Egyptian pound. In 2008 the dual ration card system was phased out and ration cards were extended to those born between 1988 and 2005, adding more than 23 million beneficiaries to the system (Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy, 2010[26]). Although the cost of the system surged again during the 2007‑08 and 2010‑12 global food price crises, in part due to rising prices for imported wheat, food subsidy costs remained relatively restrained compared with the 1980s, and did not exceed 3% of GDP (Figure 3.10).
Important reforms were introduced after the 2011 revolution
During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, citizens took to the streets calling for “bread, freedom, and social justice”. The call for bread reflected deep frustration over repeated shortages of baladi bread in the preceding years and persistent complaints about its quality (Barnes, 2022[21]). Following the 2013 military-led change in government, increasing demands for equality and improved living standards led to significant structural reforms and a comprehensive redesign of the baladi bread and ration card programmes.
First, a new system to improve the baladi bread supply chain was piloted in Port Said for a period of one year, before being rolled out nationwide in 2014‑15. The government stopped distributing subsidised wheat flour to bakeries, forcing bakeries to purchase flour from mills at market prices. A new pricing system was introduced by the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT), which reimbursed bakeries based on the difference between the real cost of a loaf of baladi bread and the subsidised price of EGP 0.05 (allowing for a small profit margin for the bakery). Wheat flour quotas were removed for bakeries, along with restrictions on their hours of operation. These reforms helped to reduce leakage of wheat flour (estimated at 30‑50% in 2009) and limit black market trading, encouraged competition among bakeries and improvements in quality, and significantly reduced queuing times (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[25]).
Second, MoSIT also consolidated the baladi bread and ration card programmes by replacing paper-based ration cards with electronic smartcards allocated to each eligible household. The smartcards, which had first been piloted for ration card holders in 2006, helped to monitor bakeries’ financial transactions and beneficiaries’ consumption of baladi bread, and allowed for the automation of financial transactions between MoSIT and bakeries (Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy, 2010[26]). The new electronic smartcard system provided each household with a monthly cash allowance of EGP 15 per person, and access to more than 100 commodities including chicken, meat, fish and dairy products (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[25]).
A third crucial dimension of the reform was to cap benefits by setting a maximum limit of five baladi bread loaves per person per day, and introducing a points-based system to reward consumers for each loaf of baladi bread saved. The savings could then be used to purchase subsidised commodities under the ration card system, creating incentives for consumers to reduce or stabilise their bread consumption.
The reforms introduced in 2014‑15 led to several improvements to the food subsidy system, including reductions in leakage and wastage, improvements in quality, fewer shortages, increased market competition, reduced waiting times and greater consumer choice. However, the new system also attracted more beneficiaries, and over time, the Egyptian population has come to perceive food subsidies as a legitimate civil entitlement (Ecker et al., 2016[28]).
The current food subsidy system accounts for a significant share of government expenditure
The current food subsidy system, called tamween, includes two main components: a subsidy for baladi bread, and a ration card programme. The baladi bread subsidy allows eligible citizens to purchase five loaves of bread per day for EGP 1 (USD 0.02), with a maximum of four beneficiaries per household. This equates to a subsidised bread price of EGP 0.20 (USD 0.004) per loaf. In June 2024, the government increased the price of subsidised baladi bread four-fold from EGP 0.05 to EGP 0.20, representing the first price increase since 1989. Nevertheless, the subsidised bread price remains considerably lower than the market price of EGP 1.5 (USD 0.03) per loaf, resulting in a government subsidy equivalent to 84% of the cost of production (Jovanovic and Glauber, 2024[22]). The government also introduced measures to reduce the fiscal burden of the subsidy, by further reducing the loaf size to 80 g and including maize flour in the recipe. In spite of these efforts, the baladi bread subsidy still accounts for the largest part of the food subsidy system – it cost about USD 2.2 billion in 20246 (0.7% of GDP) and benefited 71 million citizens (61% of the population) (USDA GAIN, 2024[30]). It requires about 9 million tonnes of wheat annually – about half of Egypt’s total wheat consumption and three-quarters of wheat imports.
In addition, the government provides eligible households with an electronic ration card with a monthly allowance of EGP 50 (USD 1) per person, that can be used to purchase from a list of 33 essential commodities.7 Subsidised products are available from a network of over 1 000 retail outlets operated by the stated-owned Holding Company for Food Industries, 8 800 Game’yeti community outlets, and some 30 000 affiliated Tamween grocery stores.8 Ration card holders are allocated a monthly quota of 1 kg of sugar per person (with a maximum of 6 kg per family card), and one 800 ml bottle of cooking oil (with a maximum of four bottles per family card). In addition, families of less than four individuals can choose between 1 kg of rice or one 800 g pack of pasta per month, while larger families can choose between 2 kg of rice or two packages of pasta (Ahram Online, 2023[31]). Furthermore, beneficiaries are awarded points on their smartcard for consuming less than their daily allowance of baladi bread, which can then be redeemed for other subsidised commodities. Spending on the ration card programme reached USD 800 million in 20249 (0.3% of GDP) (Figure 3.11), with an estimated 62 million beneficiaries (53% of the population) (USDA GAIN, 2024[30]).
Source: Data provided by the General Authority for Supply Commodities, Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade.
Spending on food subsidies has averaged around USD 5.3 billion per year since 2010, consistently representing about one-quarter of total expenditures on “Subsidies, grants and social benefits” (Figure 3.12). Food subsidies are the second-largest programme (after fuel subsidies) among Egypt’s subsidies and social protection polices, although in some years they have been the largest programme due to fluctuations in international commodity prices.
“Commodity subsidies” include six sub-categories: (1) food subsidies (included in the Consumer Support Estimate in Chapter 2); (2) farmers’ subsidies (included in the Producer Support Estimate in Chapter 2); (3) fuel subsidies; (4) electricity subsidies; (5) subsidies for medicine and children’s milk; and (6) transfers to public water companies. The allocation for “Subsidies, grants and social benefits” in the state budget reached EGP 573 billion (USD 18.7 billion) in fiscal year 2023/24, amounting to 4.1% of GDP and 18.8% of total expenditures (MoF, 2025[32]). Of this, the category “Commodity subsidies” amounted to EGP 305 billion (USD 10 billion), representing 53% of social expenditures (the remainder was spent on subsidies and grants for social services, development areas, and economic activities).
Source: Ministry of Finance Financial Statements on the Draft State Budget.
Domestic and trade policies aim to support the food subsidy system
In addition to the food subsidy system, the government of Egypt intervenes in markets through a number of domestic and trade policies with the view to achieve its own national food security goals. These policies aim to guarantee the availability of a large supply of staple crops by providing support to farmers, primarily through market price support and input subsidies (described in detail in Chapter 2). The government also manages an extensive grain storage infrastructure, with the aim of ensuring stability in the food supply.
Price support and input subsidies aim to increase the production and availability of key staple crops
As outlined in Chapter 2, the government implements policies to support domestic production and boost the availability of wheat, maize and sugar cane – key strategic crops for the bread subsidy and ration card programmes. For wheat, market price support is implemented through guaranteed minimum prices and the procurement of significant quantities of production from Egyptian farmers, ranging between one-third and half of domestic production. Although farmers are not officially required to plant wheat or sell their production to the government, the guaranteed procurement price plays an important role in determining the domestic price and farmers’ production decisions. Furthermore, fertiliser subsidies account for the vast majority of budgetary support to producers, and evidence suggests that priority for the allocation of subsidised fertilisers is often given to wheat producers, creating additional incentives for farmers to plant wheat (Kurdi et al., 2020[33]).
Maize is considered an essential commodity for Egypt’s food security, both for human consumption and animal feed. The government sets minimum guaranteed prices for purchasing maize to encourage farmers to plant maize and to build up strategic reserves. In addition, procurement prices for sugar cane are announced before each season to support domestic production and protect sugar producers from fluctuations in market prices.
Investments in storage infrastructure have reduced inefficiencies and aim to strengthen stability in the food supply
MoSIT maintains stocks of staple commodities to ensure stability in the food supply, protect consumers from supply chain disruptions and unexpected price volatility, and increase resilience against external shocks. The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage (EHCSS) under MoSIT is responsible for maintaining strategic reserves of key staples including wheat, maize and rice (Figure 3.13).
Wastage was previously a major issue for the food subsidy system, with an estimated 10% of wheat lost to rodents, birds and weather damage due to the storage of local wheat in open barns and infrastructure deficiencies. In response, a national project to upgrade and expand the country’s grains storage capacities was launched in 2014. The government invested in concrete construction and improved ventilation systems, and additional silos were built to increase the overall wheat storage capacity and reduce dependency on open barns. In addition, smart tracking systems were installed to monitor the storage of wheat and minimise leakage (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[25]). It is estimated that these measures will allow Egypt to store more than 6 months of wheat consumption (about 10 million tonnes) in its strategic reserves.
Source: USDA FAS (2025[34]).
Food subsidies generate substantial fiscal outlays and are not sufficiently targeted to those in need
The current food subsidy system generates a high fiscal burden and is a significant cost for the economy, averaging 1.4% of GDP over the past decade (MoF, 2025[32]). Despite efforts to remove ineligible beneficiaries from the ration card system, food subsidies still benefit nearly two-thirds of the population, or 60‑70 million people annually, and do not efficiently reach those who need them the most. There is widespread agreement among policymakers, donors and other stakeholders that food subsidies must be reformed to address structural inefficiencies and better target the poorest segments of the Egyptian population.
However, food subsidy reform remains challenging and sensitive, and this has often prevented the government from implementing politically feasible reform pathways. Evidence suggests that Egypt’s food subsidy system plays an essential role in shielding vulnerable households from the impacts of global food price shocks and trade disruptions. It has an important impact on reducing poverty and food insecurity: an estimated 9% of Egyptians would have fallen into poverty in the absence of food subsidies in 2008‑09 (Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy, 2010[26]). In 2010‑11, while food subsidies accounted for just 4% of household expenditures on food consumption, they represented 22.5% of the population’s total calorie consumption (WFP, 2013[35]).
Over time, subsidised baladi bread has become a powerful symbol of the social contract between the government and the population. While reforms to the system have been implemented in the past, sustaining the reform momentum has often proven difficult, as the government periodically uses food subsidies to mitigate the impacts of food price shocks and economic crises. Moreover, the political economy of food subsidy reform requires balancing important policy priorities, including fiscal sustainability, social protection, and public acceptance, while navigating potential trade-offs. This reduces the likelihood of the government undertaking large-scale reforms to the food subsidy system, and underlines the importance of identifying reform pathways that are politically acceptable and feasible (Gutner, 2002[36]).
Targeting subsidies to groups that are poorer and more vulnerable to malnutrition can improve the efficiency of public spending and the system’s effectiveness in improving food security. Recently there have been attempts to further restrict the eligibility for ration cards, with the government targeting beneficiaries using indicators such as electricity consumption in excess of 1 000 kW per month, ownership of more than three vehicles per household or a new car model released after 2014, high-level public sector employment (e.g. governors, chairpersons, Ministers), ownership of more than 15 feddans (6.3 ha) of agricultural land, and enrolment of children in private schools (Tharwat, 2019[37]). Developing a unified social registry that integrates detailed household data on assets, income, and other socio-economic indicators can facilitate the targeting of disadvantaged groups (Shokry et al., 2024[38]). The experience of Indonesia demonstrates that transitioning from in-kind assistance to electronic vouchers can improve the efficiency of social assistance, while an approach based on a unified social registry and proxy means testing can help to more effectively identify and target eligible households (Box 3.2).
In 2017 Indonesia began a large-scale reform to replace Rastra, an in-kind food programme that delivered 10 kg of free rice per month to 15 million households, with BPNT, an electronic voucher-based programme that provided households with a debit card allowing for the purchase of a similar value of rice and eggs from participating private-sector providers.
The government randomised the transition to BPNT across 105 districts with a combined population of 53 million: 42 districts were randomly assigned to receive the programme in 2018, and the remaining 63 districts were randomly assigned to receive the programme in 2019. The experiment found that switching from in-kind transfers to electronic vouchers led to significant improvements in targeting: poorer households received 46% more assistance in voucher areas than in in-kind districts. Concentrating benefits led to large reductions in poverty, with the share of households below the poverty line falling by 20% for households in the bottom 15% at baseline. Voucher recipients also received higher quality rice, and increased their consumption of eggs by about 4.3%.
The targeting of beneficiaries required detailed use of administrative data: the Unified Targeting Data Base (UDB) was constructed in 2015 and contains social, economic and demographic information on 24.5 million households or over 96 million individuals across Indonesia. The UDB was used to calculate a proxy-means test (PMT) score to determine each household’s predicted percentile in the national per-capita consumption distribution, based on household assets and composition. This allowed the Ministry of Social Affairs to determine a final list of beneficiaries in each district and effectively target households eligible to receive social assistance.
Source: Banerjee et al. (2022[39]); OECD (2021[40]).
Food subsidies contribute to Egypt’s nutritional challenges and import dependence
The design of the food subsidy system may be hindering nutritional progress and aggravating Egypt’s nutritional challenges (Ecker et al., 2016[28]). Food subsidies have been effective in preventing rapid increases in poverty during episodes of high food prices and economic crises. However, the persistently high rates of chronic child undernutrition, as well as overnutrition among the population, implies that the food subsidy system has had limited success in reducing these forms of malnutrition. The USDA’s WIC programme demonstrates how targeted nutritional interventions can help to address child malnutrition (Box 3.3).
Egypt’s food subsidies encourage the overconsumption of energy-dense foods and prevent shifts toward more balanced diets. In particular, the baladi bread subsidy encourages the consumption of bread, while the vast majority of support provided under the ration card programme is used to purchase subsidised cooking oil, sugar and rice. The consequent dietary patterns developed in Egypt have significant costs linked to food insecurity, malnutrition, as well as hidden health and environmental costs linked to non-communicable diseases and GHG emissions. These costs are projected to reach USD 103 billion annually by 2030 (FAO et al., 2021[41]). Furthermore, current consumption patterns exacerbate the dependence on imports of a reduced number of commodities from few trade partners.
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Programme for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) is administered by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service. WIC provides supplemental foods, nutrition education (including breastfeeding counselling), and referrals to health care and other social services to pregnant women, postpartum women, infants, and children up to age 5 who meet certain eligibility requirements. In particular, the participant’s household income must be less than 185% of the Federal poverty guidelines, and applicants must be at nutritional risk (as determined by a health professional). WIC participants are typically certified for a 6- to 12‑month period, after which they must have their eligibility for WIC benefits reassessed.
WIC food packages are supplemental, and are not intended to be a primary source of food for beneficiaries. The foods included are high in nutrients: examples include infant formula; cereal, fruits and vegetables, juice, milk, eggs, and whole-wheat bread. In addition, participants receive vouchers that can be used to purchase a variety of fruits and vegetables.
The programme served more than 6 million people in FY 2022, including about 40% of infants younger than 1, 22% of children aged 1‑5, 18% of pregnant women, and 24% of postpartum women. Total spending on WIC amounted to USD 5.7 billion in FY 2022, or 3% of total federal spending on food and nutrition assistance.
Source: Hodges et al. (2024[42]).
There is scope to diversify diets and improve nutritional education
A national programme to fortify baladi bread wheat flour with iron and folic acid to improve nutrient intake was run between 2008 and 2012, before being discontinued due to a lack of sufficient funding (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby, 2018[25]). In March 2025, the National Flour Fortification Programme was revived by MoSIT, the Ministry of Health and Population, and the National Nutrition Institute, with support from UN World Food Programme (WFP). The objective of the programme is to tackle high rates of anaemia in the population, particularly among children and women (WFP, 2025[43]).
Egypt’s Ministry of Education currently operates a national school feeding programme in collaboration with the WFP, providing schoolchildren with fortified snacks such as date bars that secure an estimated 25% of their daily caloric needs (WFP, 2025[44]). The school feeding programme is also increasingly being linked to local production, providing farmers with new sources of income (WFP, 2025[45]). While an evaluation of the school feeding programme demonstrated improvements in cognitive function and academic outcomes, the analysis did not find a significant impact of school meals on the children’s nutritional status (Metwally et al., 2020[46]). Furthermore, the coverage across schools remains incomplete: about 5.7 million children benefited from the programme in 2023, out of an estimated 28 million students enrolled in pre-university education (Wafaa, 2023[47]; The Egyptian Gazette, 2023[48]).
Chile’s Programa de Alimentación Escolar provides a successful example of a school feeding programme, while Japan’s Shokuiku initiative demonstrates the importance of integrating nutrition education into school meal programmes (Box 3.4). Furthermore, Egypt is a member of the School Meals Coalition, and can benefit from the experiences documented in national school meals case studies developed by the Research Consortium for School Health and Nutrition.
Chile’s school feeding programme (Programa de Alimentación Escolar)
The National Board of School Aid and Scholarships (JUNAEB) provides healthy and nutritious meals free of charge to students from the lowest-income households attending state-funded schools. The programme aims to improve educational outcomes, reduce dropout rates, and address child malnutrition and food insecurity.
Around 20 nutritionists are involved in setting minimum standards for meals relating to food calories and nutritional content, food structure, quality thresholds of ingredients, and minimum acceptable operating conditions and food service infrastructure. Efforts are taken to restrict salt and sugar content in the school meals. The programme benefited around 1.6 million students across 8 116 schools in 2022, with an annual budget of USD 865 million.
Japan’s school feeding and nutrition education (Shokuiku) initiative
Japan has a long history of school feeding programmes, with all elementary and junior high schools being required to provide nutritious and subsidised school lunches for their students. In 2005 the “Basic Act on Shokuiku” was enacted, establishing the principles of the national school feeding and nutrition education initiative.
The Shokuiku initiative has been internationally recognised for its success in integrating school lunches and nutritional education into the school curriculum. The initiative employs nutritionists and dieticians to plan and develop school menus that meet national dietary guidelines and reflect cultural food traditions. Teachers actively engage with students to share knowledge and information about good nutrition, how food is produced, the importance of hygiene, and how to make healthy food choices. Local ingredients are prioritised, with limited use of ultra-processed and sugary foods.
The programme benefits from active support and participation from students and their families. At many schools, children are required to serve meals to their fellow students, clean up afterwards, and learn proper dining etiquette. The cost of the programme’s management is funded by schools while meal ingredients are paid for by families. Low-income families can benefit from an allowance to cover the cost of meal ingredients through Japan’s social welfare services.
Source: Giner and Placzek (2022[49]); GCNF (2022[50]); GCNF (2024[51]).
Cash transfers are more effective at targeting the poor, but still represent a small share of social assistance
The Ministry of Social Solidarity launched two new programmes in 2015: the Takaful (“solidarity”) conditional cash transfers and the Karama (“integrity”) unconditional cash transfers. Takaful provides cash transfers to poor families conditional on children’s attendance in school and at health check-ups, while Karama provides unconditional cash transfers to orphans, the elderly poor, and people living with disabilities (Shokry et al., 2024[38]). These programmes are more effective at targeting the poor and have been scaled up in recent years. However, as cash transfers are not periodically adjusted for inflation, households may not trust that they will maintain their value over time (Abay et al., 2023[52]).
As of June 2025, some 5.2 million households were receiving cash transfers, including 4.6 million households (approximately 17 million individuals) from the Takaful and Karama programmes and 66 000 households under Daman, the former social pension programme (World Bank, 2025[53]). These programmes are also complemented by initiatives such as the Forsa Economic Inclusion Programme, which links poor individuals of working age with employment and income-generating opportunities. The objective is to help individuals to escape poverty and graduate from dependence on cash transfers (MoSS, 2025[54]).
Overall, cash transfers still represent a relatively small share of total expenditures on social protection, accounting for 6% of public expenditures on subsidies, grants and social benefits in 2023‑24 (Figure 3.14). While evidence suggests that shifting spending from food subsidies to cash transfers would improve the welfare of the poorest, there are also potential trade-offs with the welfare of middle income households (Breisinger et al., 2023[55]).
Note: These expenditures correspond to cash transfers (“social solidarity pension”) provided by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, including the Takaful and Karama cash transfer programmes. The line corresponds to the percentage of cash transfer expenditures in total public spending on subsidies, grants and social benefits.
Source: OECD calculations based on Ministry of Finance Financial Statements on the Draft State Budget.
Diversifying agricultural imports can help to improve supply chain responsiveness
A comprehensive approach to food security requires improving the productivity of the domestic food supply while ensuring access to diverse sources of imports. However, Egypt remains heavily reliant on imports from the Black Sea region, and short-term responses to seek alternate suppliers have had limited success in addressing the underlying structural dependencies (see Figure 3.9 and Section 1.3). The overwhelming reliance on a small number of global suppliers became especially evident during the COVID‑19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, when sharp increases in food prices and supply chain disruptions created concerns around Egypt’s food security. Despite these disruptions, so far Egypt has managed to avoid widespread food shortages.
Recent OECD research shows that countries with strong vertical trade links to major foreign economies may be more exposed to shocks in international supply chains (OECD, 2025[56]). As a major importer of food commodities, Egypt’s trade policies could focus more on diversifying agricultural imports, opening new markets, and improving private sector participation and responsiveness to evolving market developments. In particular, imports of strategic food commodities remain heavily centralised and controlled by state-owned and military-owned enterprises. Complex customs procedures and difficulties with import licensing also raise costs for private sector importers, and undermine the capacity of the private sector to develop more flexible and responsive supply chains.
Egypt suffers from the double burden of malnutrition
Egypt is facing the double burden of malnutrition, with chronic undernutrition and overnutrition both posing threats to public health, productivity and educational outcomes (Shokry et al., 2025[6]). The prevalence of undernourishment has surged since the early 2000s, and nearly one-third of the population remains moderately or severely food insecure. Child stunting and wasting have improved but remain significant challenges. At the same time, Egypt has some of the highest rates of overweight children and adult obesity worldwide.
Staple foods account for a major share of dietary energy in Egyptians’ food consumption, potentially contributing to nutritional shortfalls. In addition, the cost of a healthy diet remains substantially higher than the global average, and is hence unaffordable for more than half of the Egyptian population.
As a major importer of staple commodities, Egypt is vulnerable to trade disruptions
Egypt has become increasingly reliant on imports to ensure its food security, as its population has grown at a faster pace than its food production. As one of the world’s largest importers of wheat, Egypt is particularly dependent on the Black Sea region, with Russia and Ukraine jointly accounting for over 70% of Egypt’s wheat imports over the past decade.
This strategic dependency on wheat makes Egypt highly vulnerable to trade disruptions, and has led to recurring fears of food shortages during economic crises and periods of rapid food price inflation. Egypt’s vulnerabilities were exposed in 2022 with the onset of the war in Ukraine, when blockades of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports caused a sudden halt in maritime trade. While Egypt has attempted to seek alternative sources of food imports, with the government granting approval for wheat imports from 22 countries, the country has had limited success in significantly diversifying its trade partners.
While providing basic staples at affordable prices, food subsidies are costly and have had limited success in curbing malnutrition
The current food subsidy system has evolved over the past century and plays an important role in securing Egypt’s social contract and providing a safety net for the population. However, they are not effectively targeted to the poorest households that need them most. Food subsidies benefit nearly two-thirds of the Egyptian population, or 60‑70 million people annually, and represent a high fiscal burden, averaging 1.4% of GDP over the past decade (MoF, 2025[32]).
Furthermore, the design of the food subsidy system encourages the overconsumption of energy-dense foods, including bread, cooking oil, sugar and rice. This has created incentives for less balanced diets, with significant costs to productivity, health and the environment. While the deficiencies in Egypt’s food subsidy system are widely acknowledged, reform remains complex and challenging. This underscores the importance of identifying feasible reform pathways to strengthen nutrition and encourage healthy diets, while freeing up fiscal space for social protection to support the transition.
Domestic and trade policies sustain the current food subsidy and production system but reduce market responsiveness
The current range of domestic and trade policies create incentives for the domestic production of several strategic commodities that underpin the food subsidy system, including wheat, maize, and sugar. Guaranteed minimum prices and the procurement of significant quantities of domestic production plays an important role in influencing farmers’ production decisions. In addition, the government has made significant investments to upgrade the network of silos and grain storage infrastructure, which has helped to reduce losses and wastage from the storage of key staple commodities. However, growing grain reserves risk becoming very costly and can have unintended impacts on domestic and international markets (OECD, 2018[57]). All of this results in substantial government interventions that maintain the existing food subsidy system. Promoting greater diversification of agricultural imports, facilitating trade, and increasing co-ordination with the private sector can enhance the food system’s resilience and capacity to respond to market signals.
Cash transfers offer a more effective means for providing the poor with targeted assistance
Cash transfers have proven to be more effective than food subsidies in providing targeted assistance to the poorest households. The Takaful and Karama cash transfer programmes launched by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in 2015 have demonstrated positive impacts on household consumption, the quality of diets, and child nutrition. While these programmes have been scaled up in recent years, they still represent a relatively small share of total government spending, and there is scope to expand them further.
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← 1. Poverty rates are estimated by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), based on the Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS). The official measure is constructed from the calculation of household-specific poverty lines that consider (1) household composition and thus household-specific caloric requirements; and (2) regional variation in costs per calorie and non-food allowance (World Bank, 2025[2]).
← 2. Despite the fact that some authors have found measurement errors in stunting calculations (Figueroa and Kurdi, 2019[58]), these indicators are still an international reference for comparison.
← 3. Out of 161 countries and territories for which data is available on overweight children, and 197 countries and territories for which data is available on adult obesity (FAOSTAT, 2025[7]).
← 4. Anaemia is a condition characterised by a lack of healthy red blood cells or insufficient concentration of haemoglobin in the blood, which is needed to transport oxygen to the body’s tissues. Anaemia can result from deficiencies in iron, vitamin B-12, and other micronutrients, infections and chronic diseases, among other causes. Iron deficiency anaemia can affect cognitive and physical development in children and reduce productivity in adults. Young children and women are particularly at risk of anaemia, and more severe cases can lead to an increased risk of mortality (WHO, 2025[59]).
← 5. Notably, the price increases did not extend to baladi bread, beans, lentils, rationed sugar, or cooking oil.
← 6. According to data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).
← 7. Subsidised food commodities include sugar, oil, chicken stock, pasta, rice, lentils, beans, flour, artificial ghee, tea, tomato paste, shredded tuna, jam, ultra-processed and fresh cheese, powdered milk, vinegar, salt, halva, four types of biscuits, tahini, coffee (Jovanovic and Glauber, 2024[22]).
← 8. Based on information provided by the Holding Company for Food Industries (HCFI).
← 9. According to data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).