With a fast-growing population concentrated along the Nile Valley and Delta, agricultural production in Egypt is largely dependent on irrigation from the Nile River. Egypt is particularly exposed to the consequences of climate change with rising sea levels in the Delta as well as increasing temperatures and extreme weather events. Although Egypt’s share of area dedicated to cultivated land is among the lowest in the world, agricultural production still contributes 13.7% to GDP and employs around one-fifth of the population. Egypt’s agro-food trade balance is in deficit, with reliance on staple food imports from a relatively limited number of partners. While agricultural productivity has been increasing, the rate of growth has not yet been sufficient to close existing productivity gaps.
Policies for the Future of Farming and Food in Egypt
Abstract
Egypt is a vast country with a fast-growing population of 116.5 million that is projected to reach 160 million in 2050. The population remains highly concentrated along the Nile Valley and Delta.
The Nile represents the main freshwater source for Egypt, but the water supply is increasingly at risk due to population growth, urbanisation, and increasing levels of pollution. Climate change is also increasing the sea levels in the Nile Delta, threatening the main agricultural production area in the country.
Agricultural production contributes to 13.7% of Egypt’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 19% of employment, although these shares are declining. Common among OECD and non-OECD countries, this agricultural sector decline reflects the higher relative growth of other sectors in the economy including services, as the economy develops.
Egypt’s agro-food imports have been systematically higher than exports and the agro-food trade deficit reached USD 9 billion in 2024. Egypt is highly dependent on imports of staple commodities like cereals and vegetable oils from a limited number of trade partners.
Agriculture’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has known a stable but moderate 1.5% annual growth over the past decade, mostly driven by input reduction. Egypt’s agricultural labour productivity has grown and has slowly caught up with other industries. Still, innovation-led productivity growth is currently the main source of output growth in Egypt’s agricultural sector.
A vast country shaped by the Nile
With a total of 116.5 million inhabitants in 2024, Egypt is the third most populous country in Africa. Egypt lies in the northeastern corner of the African continent and has a total surface area of 1 001 450 km2 (Figure 1.1). Its territory spreads over 1 024 km from north to south and 1 240 km from east to west, while its coastline extends for more than 2 900 km along the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Red Sea. A vast desert plateau occupies much of the Egyptian terrain, interrupted by the Nile Valley and Delta which account for just 4% of the country’s surface but host around 95% of the population. The topography ranges from 133 m below mean sea level in the Qattara Depression in the north-west of the country, to 2 629 m above sea level at Mount Catherine in the Sinai Peninsula.
The Nile represents the main fresh water source for Egypt with an annual flow of 55.5 billion cubic metres (BCM) (MoE, 2024[1]). Other sources of fresh water in Egypt comprise of groundwater aquifers, reusing agricultural drainage and treated wastewater, rainfall, and desalination which collectively provide an additional 20 BCM per year (MoE, 2019[2]). However, Egypt is facing significant challenges to its water supply driven by a growing population, climate change risks, and increasing levels of pollution. Additionally, Egypt is increasingly vulnerable to changes in upstream conditions and perceives the newly constructed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a threat to its water supply. There is a possibility that during years with low water levels or prolonged drought, upstream water abstractions will impact Egypt’s water supply.
Source: OECD (https://www.d-maps.com/).
Political and administrative system
The Egyptian constitution separates the levels of government into three main branches: executive, legislative and judiciary. The executive branch is composed of the President of the Republic as the head of state, and the Prime Minister responsible for forming and overseeing the Egyptian Cabinet that shapes the agenda of the government. The legislative branch consists of a bicameral Parliament composed of the House of Representatives (Maglis El Nowwab), and the Senate (Consultative Council, or Maglis El-Shura). The judiciary is an independent branch of the Egyptian government which includes both secular and religious courts. The Supreme Constitutional Court is the highest judicial power. Each type of court has its own budget that is approved by the House of Representatives (SIS, 2025[3]).
For the purpose of public administration and regional development, Egypt is divided into 27 governorates, including urban (4 governorates) and rural/urban (23 governorates) regions. The governorates are grouped into seven economic regions primarily for the purposes of economic and physical planning. Each governorate is administered by a governor, who is appointed by the President of Egypt. Governors hold the rank of Minister and report directly to the Prime Minister, who chairs the Council of Governors and convenes regular meetings. The Ministry of Local Development is responsible for co-ordinating the governors and managing their governorates’ budgets.
Population growth remains high
The Egyptian population is expanding quickly, with the five-year average growth rate standing at 1.6%. Despite falling from 2.3% in 2014 to 1.7% in 2024, Egypt’s population growth rate is higher than the world average of 1.0% (World Bank, 2025[4]). The working age population is expected to expand and reach 104 million in 2050 and 126 million in 2100, according to United Nations projections (Figure 1.2).
Source: UN DESA, (2022[5]), World Population Prospects, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf.
Adverse climatic conditions and water scarcity
An arid country with limited rainfall
Most of Egypt’s land mass is arid desert and the climate is hot and dry, with limited rainfall. The dry summer season starts in May and ends in September. In addition, Egypt is exposed to strong hot windstorms called Khamsin which usually occur between March and May. These storms have severe consequences since they can increase the temperature by an extra 20°C and are dominated by dust. The volume of annual precipitation varies across Egypt as most of the rainfall takes place along the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the south of Egypt is typically characterised by very limited rainfall.
Temperatures and precipitation rates in Egypt have changed significantly. Between 1901 and 2013, average temperatures in Egypt rose by approximately 0.1°C per decade (World Bank, 2021[6]). On the other hand, the volume of rainfall in Egypt has fallen by 22% over the last 30 years. For the future climate outlook, temperatures are expected to continue to rise throughout the century and the precipitation rate is forecast to decrease further causing longer dry spells and higher evaporation rates.
Climate change is causing increases in sea level and extreme weather events, impacting agriculture
Some 15% of Egypt’s population live in the coastal zones in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, areas that are rich in biodiversity and valuable mineral resources and facilitate maritime transportation and trade. However, climate change poses a high risk to these coastal zones, in particular sea level rise and the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. The country is highly susceptible to the impacts of global warming and has a high level of risk to natural disasters.
The Nile Delta is considered one of the world’s three extreme vulnerable mega-deltas directly affected by climate change by 2050 (GoE, 2023[7]). The Nile Delta faces several risks including erosion, seawater intrusion and flooding, as more than 30% of the Delta is located in a lowland area (defined as levels lower than 2 metres above sea level). These consequences are expected to impact Egypt’s agricultural sector, and pose a risk to the low-lying areas of the Nile Delta, through soil erosion and the water logging of crops which will impact soil quality, crop yields and reduce arable land (World Bank, 2021[6]). As over half of Egypt’s food production is from agricultural land located in the Nile Delta, it is a crucial region for food security in Egypt.
Growth has weakened amidst economic challenges
Despite fluctuating GDP growth in Egypt over the past three decades, the country is currently the second largest economy in Africa with nominal GDP representing USD 383.1 billion in 2024, lagging closely behind South Africa (USD 401.1 billion) (IMF, 2024[8]).
Over the last three decades Egypt’s GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity PPP terms) has grown at a faster rate compared to many OECD and neighbouring countries. In 2024, Egypt had a GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) of nearly USD 17 000. This is around one-third of the OECD average and below the average of neighbouring countries in the region (OECD, 2024[9]). In percentage terms, Egypt’s GDP per capita has increased at an average rate of 2.4% per year since 1995, faster than the OECD average of 1.5% (Figure 1.3), yet slower than many other emerging economies.
Economic growth in Egypt has been impacted by numerous economic events and macroeconomic conditions have fluctuated over the last three decades (OECD, 2024[9]). In particular, the global financial crisis and the COVID‑19 pandemic, as well as political events such as the Egyptian revolution in 2011, have weighed on the economy. However, growth has held up better in Egypt until recently than in neighbouring countries in the face of a series of major exogenous shocks. The government’s timely response to the COVID‑19 pandemic resulted in a rebound in investment and exports, which recovered to pre-crisis levels within a few quarters. More recently, economic growth slowed in 2022 as inflation surged following the beginning of the war in Ukraine and massive capital outflows have led to foreign currency shortages and devaluations of the Egyptian Pound (OECD, 2024[9]). The performance of Egypt’s economy has been lagging due to high poverty rates, low female labour force participation rates, and high youth unemployment (World Bank, 2025[10]; World Bank, 2025[11]; Jin and Hofer, 2024[12]). In September 2025, Egypt launched the National Narrative for Economic Development, focused on directing investments towards productive sectors and the role of the private sector (GoE, 2025[13]).
Inflation in Egypt has been particularly volatile and elevated over the past decade due to both high food prices and depreciation of the currency. Inflation spiked to more than 30% in 2017, coinciding in time with the devaluation of the Egyptian Pound, and then fell to single-digit rates in 2020‑21 (Figure 1.3). Throughout 2022 and 2023 inflation in Egypt remained elevated due to the rise in global food prices aggravated by supply chain uncertainty and price rises in international markets as a result of the war in Ukraine. Over the first three months of 2023 core food items accounted for approximately three-quarters of the rise in headline inflation on average, according to Central Bank estimates (OECD, 2024[9]). More recently inflation has fallen significantly from its peak exceeding 40% p.a. in 2023, with data from the Egypt Central Bank reporting headline inflation at 14.9% p.a. as of June 2025 (CBE, 2025[14]).
Note: GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2021 international dollars.
Source: World Bank (2025), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/. Inflation data is from the Central Bank of Egypt.
Egypt’s economy is characterised by a large public sector and the predominance of the informal economy. The public sector represents on average an estimated 22% to 26% of total employment in Egypt (OECD, 2024[15]). This is partly attributed to the employment guarantee scheme, dating back to 1962, that guaranteed university graduates a job opportunity in the public sector (Ikram, 2006[16]). The scheme was later phased out in the 1990s as growth in the government labour force became unsustainable, however, the consequences persist to this day. Most notably, the government faces large near-term financing needs and commitment to fiscal consolidation is key, as is improving public financial management (OECD, 2024[9]). The informal economy continued growing to the extent that it represented more than 50% of Egypt’s economy in 2019, and as of 2024 represents 67% of all workers (Egypt Today, 2019[17]) (ILO, 2025[18]). However, rates of informal employment vary considerably by sector, with informal employment within the agricultural sector reaching 97% in 2025 (ILO, 2025[18]).
Egypt has run a current account deficit since the late 2000s, but the current account balance has recently improved with an increase in remittances which reached a record of USD 36.5 billion in FY 2024/25 (CBE, 2025[19]). Remittances received by Egypt averaged more than 5% of GDP over the past two decades, almost fully offsetting the trade deficit over the same period (OECD, 2024[9]). Only two neighbouring countries, Jordan and Morocco, received a larger contribution of remittances as a share of total GDP. However, the inflow of remittances relative to GDP has not always been increasing; it peaked at approximately 10% of GDP in 2017 and then decreased to approximately 5% in 2023 (Figure 1.4).
Egypt has historically attracted the largest amount of foreign direct investment in Africa, although the proportion of stock inflows as a share of GDP remains low (OECD, 2024[9]). These capital inflows have increased from 1990 and, although volatile, have been significant in Egypt. For example, in 2022 FDI inflows more than doubled to USD 11 billion due to a rise in cross-border merger and acquisition sales (UNCTAD, 2023[20]). The World Investment Report reported that Egypt recorded a 30% increase in the value of greenfield investment projects and an increase in FDI inflows to USD 47 billion in 2024, largely driven by the Ras El-Hekma Development Project (UNCTAD, 2025[21]).
The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) continues to operate a managed exchange rate regime based on interventions in foreign exchange markets when exposed to shocks including COVID‑19 and the war in Ukraine (OECD, 2024[9]). In 2022, the CBE intervened to devalue the exchange rate in steps resulting in a loss of half the value of the Egyptian Pound (EGP) against the US dollar by March 2023 (Figure 1.4). The currency depreciated substantially in early 2024, when the CBE took steps to move towards a more market-determined system. The currency has fluctuated within a very limited range since then.
Source: World Bank (2025), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
Until recently, Egypt has met its energy demands through the usage of natural gas, petroleum, hydropower, coal, and wind and solar power. However, rising energy demand, also driven by substantial energy subsidies, is placing stress on Egypt’s energy sector. Energy subsidies have been significantly reduced over the past decade but were increased again following the rise in global energy prices. In addition to the increased demand, there was also a notable decrease in the production of petroleum products in the last three decades while natural gas production has increased (OECD, 2024[9]).
The share of agriculture in employment and GDP is high but declining
Agriculture remains one of the most important sectors in Egypt and contributes large shares to both GDP and employment. However, similar to developments in other countries, agriculture’s share in GDP has been in a steady decline, from 15.7% of GDP in 1995 to 10.6% in 2023, according to World Bank data (Figure 1.5). In 2024, agriculture’s share in GDP has risen to 13.7%. Similarly, the share of employment in agriculture has been declining, from 35% in 1995 to 19% in 2023. These shares differ across regions; Upper Egypt governorates tend to employ more labour in agriculture while Lower Egypt governorates tend to result in a higher share of the GDP coming from the sector (Kassim et al., 2018[22]).
Source: World Bank (2025[10]); World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
The evolution of agriculture’s share in GDP in Egypt reflects the experience of neighbouring countries in the region, with agriculture’s share in employment and in GDP both in steady decline. Figure 1.6 highlights the change over time of the importance of agriculture in different economies: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, emerging countries and OECD Members. The same direction of change towards lower shares of agriculture in Egypt from 2000 to 2020, also took place in India, Italy, Ethiopia, Spain and Türkiye. All these countries faced a decrease in both the share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing to their GDP and a decrease in the labour dedicated to agriculture. This pattern is frequent among all countries experiencing growth and development, typically reflected in higher growth rates in manufacturing and services.
Note: Agriculture value added includes the primary sector (i.e. forestry, hunting, and fishing).
Source: World Bank (2024), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
Farm structures are diverse
According to Scheltinga et al. (2022[23]), there are three production systems in Egypt: traditional, transitional and modern or high-tech. The traditional food system primarily consists of smallholder farmers, constituting the majority of the farming population, with farms between 1 to 3 feddan (0.4 to 1.3 hectares) in area constituting 62% of the farming population as of 2018. Within this traditional system, the individuals who produce the food are essentially the same individuals who consume it. Accordingly, agricultural production primarily caters to personal and family consumption, as the land holdings are too modest to support commercial crop cultivation. These farmers typically rear their livestock for milk and meat, and cultivate crops like wheat, vegetables, and maize for household consumption.
Individuals within the transitional food production system, on the other hand, are typically farmers with relatively higher incomes, making up approximately 24% of Egypt’s total population of farmers. These farms range in size from 3 to 20 feddan (1.3 to 8.4 hectares) and their farmers cultivate food not only for their own consumption, but they also have good access to domestic markets through intermediaries, facilitating food trading (Scheltinga et al., 2022[23]).
The modern food production system encompasses new farming practices that are typically situated in desert regions near oases and often in newly reclaimed land. These systems yield substantial quantities of agricultural products and involve the use of patented crop varieties. They are characterised by well-structured supply chains and employ international consultants and experts to gain knowledge of more modern farming practices. This system exhibits a significant reliance on imports, both in terms of production and consumption, including agrochemicals, services, and equipment for cultivating food. Within this food system, income levels are relatively high and approximately 13% of Egypt’s farms fall within this group (Scheltinga et al., 2022[23]).
GHG emissions from agriculture are falling
The biggest contributor to GHG emissions in Egypt is the energy sector, which accounted for 66% of emissions in 2022 (Figure 1.7). Industrial processes and product use (IPPU) accounted for 14% of GHG emissions, followed by agriculture, forestry, and other land uses (AFOLU) at 11%, and waste at 10% (MoE, 2024[1]).
Source: MoE (2024[1]), “Egypt’s First Biennial Transparency Report”, Ministry of Environment, Arab Republic of Egypt, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Egypt%20BTR1%20Final%20Master%20Report_v3_30DEC24%20AMR.pdf.
In 2022, the AFOLU sector accounted for 11% of Egypt’s total GHG emissions, amounting to 41.6 Mt CO2e. GHG emissions within the AFOLU sector primarily originate from enteric fermentation, manure management, rice cultivation, agricultural soils, and burning field residues. The largest contributor to the overall GHG emissions includes combined sources from agricultural land, which make up 56% of the total, followed by emissions from livestock, constituting 44% (MoE, 2024[1]).
The growth in GHG emissions due to the AFOLU sector fluctuated from 2015 to 2022 but has fallen since 2016 (Figure 1.8). Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions represent the largest share of AFOLU emissions, at 58% in 2022, followed by methane, which accounts for 38% of emissions. A sharp decline in AFOLU emissions occurred in 2019, with emissions falling to 35.9 Mt CO2e, reflecting a decline in methane (CH4) emissions from enteric fermentation in livestock and rice cultivation. Overall variability in emissions since 2000 largely reflect changes in agricultural inputs, changes in livestock numbers and the amount of fertiliser used in agricultural production.
Figure 1.9 shows the distribution of GHG emissions from the AFOLU sector by category. In 2022, the main contributing activity to the production of GHGs is direct N2O from managed agricultural soils, representing 31% of the total. This is followed by enteric fermentation with a share of 25% of GHG emissions. The other activities that have a lower share, but are still relatively significant, include manure management (19%), rice cultivation (11%), and indirect N2O emissions from manure management. Emissions from other activities are small in comparison and only produce a total of approximately 8% of GHG emissions (MoE, 2024[1]).
Source: MoE (2024[1]), “Egypt’s First Biennial Transparency Report”, Ministry of Environment, Arab Republic of Egypt, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Egypt%20BTR1%20Final%20Master%20Report_v3_30DEC24%20AMR.pdf.
Source: MoE (2024[1]), “Egypt’s First Biennial Transparency Report”, Ministry of Environment, Arab Republic of Egypt, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Egypt%20BTR1%20Final%20Master%20Report_v3_30DEC24%20AMR.pdf.
Agro-food trade deficit and import dependence
Despite the large relative size of its agricultural sector, Egypt imports a significant portion of its agricultural products (Figure 1.10). Egypt remains the world’s biggest importer of wheat (representing 16% of total Egyptian food imports in 2023) and is increasingly reliant on imports of other major grains and vegetable oils, key staple foods in the Egyptian diet. The value of agro-food imports has more than tripled since 2007 in US dollar terms to USD 19 billion in 2024 increasing Egypt’s food dependence on other countries. Exports have also risen to historical highs in 2024, reaching USD 10 billion by value, resulting in an agro-food trade deficit of USD 9 billion.
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2025[24]), https://comtradeplus.un.org/.
The composition of Egypt’s agro-food trade has significantly changed over the last few decades (Figure 1.11). Exports of fruits and nuts, fruit and vegetables preparations, edible preparations, sugar, and cereal flours and preparations have expanded, and exports of vegetables, cotton and other products have fallen. The share of Egypt’s fruit exports increased from 5.1% in 1995‑1997 to 25.1% in 2022‑2024 whereas the share of vegetables decreased from 26.9% to 19.8% over the same period. In addition, the share of exports of other agricultural products fell by over half over the same period, with cereals and live animals contributing the most to this fall. The group of commodities under fruit, nuts, and vegetables and their preparations represents more than half of the agro-food exports of Egypt in 2022‑2024.
The composition of Egypt’s agro-food imports has not shifted significantly. The share of durum wheat has decreased from 26.0% in 1995‑1997 to 20.9% in 2022‑2024, while imports of soybeans, maize, meat and vegetables have expanded: the share of imported soybeans increased from 0.9% to 11.1% and the share of imported meat increased from 4.5% to 5.0%. The group of commodities under cereals, soya and palm oil represents more than half of Egypt’s agro-food imports in 2022‑2024.
Note: The category “Other” is the residual of import or export commodities and is not the same group for import than for exports.
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2025[24]), https://comtradeplus.un.org/.
Trade partners are diverse, but there is higher dispersion among export partners compared to higher concentration in few import partners (Figure 1.12). Export partners are led by Saudi Arabia with 9.1% of agro-food exports, followed by the Russian Federation (hereafter “Russia”) with 5.8% of total agro-food exports, with the rest of the main trading partners each receiving less than 5% of Egypt’s agro-food exports. Fruits and vegetables represent the biggest export commodity for Egypt’s main trading partners and represent more than 90% of Egypt’s exports to Russia. Other export products include oilseeds (to the United Arab Emirates and the United States), cereal flours and sugar (to Sudan), fruits and vegetables preparations, and oil products such as soybean oil.
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2025[24]), https://comtradeplus.un.org/.
Egypt’s agro-food imports are concentrated in fewer countries compared to its agro-food exports. Russia, Brazil, the United States and Ukraine together represent one-half of total agro-food imports, followed by Indonesia, India, Argentina, Romania, Malaysia and France, which collectively account for a further 23% of agro-food imports. Each of these trade partners typically deliver imports concentrated in one main commodity or group of commodities. For instance, more than 80% of imports from Russia are cereals. Other countries that mainly export cereals and represent more than half of all agricultural commodity exports to Egypt are Romania, Ukraine, Argentina and France. The United States and Indonesia concentrate their exports to Egypt on oil products. India, and to lesser extent Brazil, focus on meat.
Agricultural productivity is the main driver of output growth
Labour productivity has grown, but the gap with other countries remains
Output per worker in the Egyptian economy has significantly increased in the last two decades, but the gap with OECD Members remains. Labour productivity in Egypt is still significantly below the OECD average, due to lower overall investment, particularly a declining share of private investment (OECD, 2024[9]). Additionally, low levels of innovation and R&D investment continue to contribute to low productivity growth in Egypt (Thiemann, 2024[25]). As a portion of GDP, Egypt spends less than 1% on R&D investment, below the OECD average of 2% (OECD, 2024[9]).
Within the Egyptian economy, labour productivity in the agricultural sector has increased compared to the industry sector where it has been stagnant, reducing the (still large) labour productivity gap between the two (Figure 1.13). However, productivity within the services sector has grown significantly and the gap with agriculture has remained largely unchanged. In 2023, labour productivity from both the services and agricultural sectors rose by 3%, with the industry sector falling by 3%. Egypt’s value added per worker in the agricultural sector is almost double the world average, and has remained consistently above the world average since 2000 (Figure 1.13). Additionally, labour productivity in the agricultural sector has remained above other countries such as Ethiopia and Morocco, and similar to Tunisia (Figure 1.13).
Value added per worker (USD constant 2015)
Source: World Bank (2025), World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/.
Agricultural output growth has slowed in recent decades, but TFP has maintained a steady rate of 1.5%, above the global average
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measures the change in the ability of the agricultural sector to produce more with less and is an important indicator of performance to achieve a diversity of policy objectives. TFP growth is measured as the residual of output growth that cannot be explained by the growth in the inputs used in agriculture (Bureau and Antón, 2022[26]). Agricultural output in Egypt expanded by 4.8% per year in the decade following 1991, mainly driven by the use of more inputs such as land from land reclamation projects, and fertiliser (Figure 1.14). Annual agricultural output growth has declined in the subsequent two decades to 3.4% in 2001‑10 and 1.4% in 2011‑22. This has been driven by less growth in opening new agricultural lands and smaller growth in the use of inputs: stagnant use of fertiliser in the decade 2001‑10, and reductions in labour in 2011‑22. Under these conditions, Egypt was able to increase its annual agricultural TFP growth from 0.8%, well below the world average in the 1990s, to 1.5% in the most recent decades, driven by the reduction of labour and animal feed inputs. TFP has therefore become the main source of growth in total output, well beyond the expansion of land.
Source: USDA (2025[27]) International Agricultural Productivity Database, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity.
The productivity of Egypt’s agricultural sector has developed more positively than in many other countries, most of which have experienced significant declines in TFP growth over the past decade (Figure 1.15). However, TFP growth in Egypt started from relatively low levels in the last decades of the 20th century and is still low compared to world historical levels and compared with some emerging economies. Between 1980 and 2010, TFP growth in some emerging economies ranged between 2% and 3%, which is still higher than Egypt's current TFP growth in the agricultural sector.
Source: USDA (2025[27]) International Agricultural Productivity Database, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity.
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