A core element of SOE governance is how the state exercises its role as a professional and active owner, including through clear rationales for state ownership, institutional and ownership arrangements, and separation between ownership, policy and regulatory functions. This chapter examines the evolution of these arrangements and efforts to strengthen the co‑ordination and professionalisation of state ownership. It further considers how governments oversee and report on their SOE portfolios, with a view to promoting transparency and accountability across the sector.
Ownership and Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises 2026
Abstract
Corporate governance of SOEs is shaped largely by how states, as owners, organise and exercise their ownership responsibilities. Practices observed across the 58 economies covered by this report vary, though they reveal important trends and provide a basis for understanding how practices are evolving relative to the SOE Guidelines. This chapter examines institutional and ownership arrangements, as well as efforts to strengthen the co‑ordination and professionalisation of state ownership, and how governments oversee and report on their SOE portfolios. Key findings include:
Although state ownership policies and legal frameworks are common, they are not always consolidated and may contribute to fragmentation in the exercise of ownership responsibilities. Based on the survey, only 43% of countries have consolidated their SOE policy frameworks into a single ownership policy document or overarching SOE law. In many cases, ownership rationales, roles and governance expectations are dispersed across multiple laws, regulations and policy instruments, potentially reducing clarity, consistency and accountability in how ownership rights are exercised.
Ownership arrangements are becoming increasingly co‑ordinated, reflecting efforts to strengthen the state ownership function. While fully centralised ownership entities remain relatively uncommon (10%), nearly two‑thirds of participating jurisdictions have adopted co‑ordinated, dual, twin-track or portfolio-based ownership models. These arrangements can help reinforce oversight and strategic steering, including through more consistent performance monitoring, board nomination processes and expectation-setting across SOE portfolios.
Overlaps between ownership, policymaking and regulation remain prevalent, underscoring the importance of safeguards and clear institutional boundaries. Among respondents, a majority report some degree of overlap between the ownership function and other state functions. In 33% of jurisdictions, ownership entities perform policymaking functions, while in 11% they undertake regulatory functions, with only 42% of countries reporting separation of these functions. In some cases, the extent of overlap depends on the sector in which SOEs operate. Such arrangements may create conflicting objectives, blur accountability and affect competitive neutrality, highlighting the continued need for clearly defined mandates, transparent institutional arrangements and effective safeguards against conflicts of interest.
Annual aggregate reports are becoming more common and remain an important tool for disclosure, accountability and public oversight of SOE portfolios. Financial information remains the most widely disclosed category, while reporting on governance, sustainability, employment, board composition and public policy objectives remains less systematic. However, compared to past years, reporting frameworks have continued to evolve, with jurisdictions increasingly expanding the scope of disclosure beyond financial performance to encompass broader governance and public policy considerations.
To better understand how these trends materialise in practice, this chapter first examines the legal and regulatory frameworks underpinning state ownership, as a well-designed framework provides the foundation for the effective exercise of the state’s ownership role. Key considerations include whether legal and regulatory frameworks exist that apply specifically to SOEs, whether SOE corporate forms are standardised, and whether ownership expectations are clearly defined. Such clarity can help create a more predictable operating environment and reduce ambiguity in the exercise of state ownership and support more professional ownership practices, such as the articulation and regular review of the rationales for state ownership.
In 86% of reporting jurisdictions, SOEs are governed by a combination of general company law and SOE‑specific legislation. General company law typically provides the foundational framework, covering legal personality, board structures, fiduciary duties and minimum disclosure requirements. SOE‑specific legislation may introduce additional expectations related to public mandates, ownership objectives and governance arrangements. In some cases, SOE‑specific legislation may override or take precedence over general company law, particularly where tailored governance arrangements are required. These frameworks are important where SOEs fall outside standard company law, as they help standardise governance requirements across SOEs of different legal forms, clarify the state’s role as owner, and strengthen transparency and accountability.1 In a few cases (e.g. Norway and Sweden), SOEs generally operate under general company law, complemented by a state ownership policy rather than dedicated SOE legislation. In others, arrangements may differ depending on the level of government concerned. For example, in the United States, arrangements for state‑level entities may differ from those applying at the federal level.
SOEs are generally established as joint-stock companies (JSCs), limited liability companies (LLCs) (and their national equivalents), or statutory companies (Figure 2.1). Their legal form is relevant for their governance arrangements, reporting obligations and access to capital markets. JSCs are often suitable for equity listings and allow for fully tradable shares, while LLCs typically face limits on public equity issuance and rely more on debt instruments. Statutory companies are created by specific statute or public law, with their own legal personality and mandate, and often fall outside standard company law and commonly used corporate forms. They often cannot access market-based financing without undergoing corporatisation, which can be a substantial process, often requiring restructuring of governance and ownership arrangements. In some cases, the choice of legal form may reflect an enterprise’s mandate. For example, SOEs entrusted with public policy functions are more likely to take the form of statutory companies, while those with commercial activities are generally established under company law.
Note: The sample comprises 55 jurisdictions (Chile, France and Hungary not included). Multiple responses were allowed.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
While most commercially oriented SOEs have been corporatised, many jurisdictions continue to rely on statutory companies, particularly for public policy-oriented SOEs, which are often established by specific legislation or structured under bespoke or special-purpose legal forms. Examples include:
Business foundations. Sweden has “business foundations” (affärsdrivande stiftelser), including some cultural or research institutions with state involvement, though these are not always classified strictly as SOEs.
Public or administrative entities with commercial functions. For example, in Chile and in India, SOEs may include departmental enterprises, autonomous bodies, trusts and co‑operative societies.
Function-specific entities and categories. Some jurisdictions maintain bespoke arrangements linked to specific policy or economic functions, including distinct legal forms such as Indonesia's Perum (fully state-owned entities without share capital), Norway's Statsforetak and Mexico's State Productive Enterprises. Other jurisdictions employ statutory categories that define the scope of the state's ownership and oversight framework, such as Morocco's Établissements et Entreprises Publics (EEP) and Australia's Corporate Commonwealth Entities (CCE).
Hybrid or other types of corporate forms. In the United States, these include public benefit corporations and federally chartered entities, some of which operate on a non-profit basis.
2.2.1. State ownership rationales
While legal and institutional frameworks define the formal environment in which SOEs operate, effective state ownership depends on clearly articulated rationales for owning SOEs. Clearly defined rationales help ensure that SOEs remain focussed on their intended functions and on their core business, thereby ensuring they continue to deliver long-term value for society. Broadly, these rationales should inform decisions to establish, acquire, maintain, restructure or divest SOEs. They can also be translated into objectives and expectations for individual SOEs, providing a basis for monitoring performance, guiding boards and management, and sending predictable signals to markets and investors (OECD, 2024[2]).
Among countries surveyed, the most frequently cited rationales include the provision of essential public services, such as water, electricity and transport, and the safeguarding of national security or strategic interests, often covering defence activities and the protection of critical infrastructure. Other commonly cited rationales include supporting economic or industrial policy objectives, controlling natural resources or key infrastructure, correcting market failures and fulfilling social or environmental goals (Table 2.1). By contrast, less frequently cited rationales include revenue generation, market stabilisation, legacy factors, and employment and regional development objectives, which points to state ownership being shaped by a combination of context-specific circumstances and needs.
Note: The sample comprises 57 jurisdictions (Canada not included). Multiple responses were allowed.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
2.2.2. State ownership policies
As SOEs are maintained or established to fulfil specific purposes that vary across jurisdictions and may operate under a range of legal forms, a clear ownership policy can help define why the state owns enterprises, what it expects from them, and how ownership responsibilities should be exercised. As a high-level document, it sets out the overall aims, principles and responsibilities related to state ownership, helping to ensure coherence across the SOE portfolio despite differences in legal form, mandates or institutional arrangements (OECD, 2024[2]).2 A robust policy would:
Articulate the overall rationales for state ownership and associated objectives, whether explicitly in a single document or implicitly across multiple sources, and covering social, economic and strategic goals.
Clarify the state’s role as owner and the responsibilities of government institutions, including how different public bodies involved in SOE oversight interact.
Improve transparency and predictability by clarifying expectations, governance arrangements and accountability mechanisms.
Among those surveyed, 43% have developed a single ownership policy document (Table 2.2). These are often issued as government policy statements or white papers, or, in some cases, embedded in a comprehensive legal instrument that performs a similar function. These frameworks provide a clear and coherent reference point for the exercise of ownership rights. In recent years, several jurisdictions have undergone reforms aimed at formalising and consolidating ownership policy frameworks. For example, Croatia, Morocco, Peru and Ukraine have developed such frameworks. In Chile, since 2026, the Ministry of Finance, the Public Budget Office (DIPRES) and Sistema de Empresas (SEP) have been implementing a strengthened ownership policy covering all 28 SOEs, which extends the financial planning horizon to 2035, monitors investment programmes, capitalisation needs and contingent liabilities at a portfolio level, and reviews dividend policies company by company (DIPRES, 2026[3]).
Note: The sample comprises 58 jurisdictions.
KEY
■ A There is a single ownership policy in one high-level document
■ B The policy is reflected in various legal sources
■ C There is no ownership policy
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
By comparison, half of the respondents rely on a more fragmented approach, where the objectives, rationale and governance of state ownership are dispersed across a range of legal, regulatory or policy instruments. The prevalence of this approach often reflects underlying institutional and historical factors as, in many cases, state ownership frameworks have developed incrementally over time, resulting in layered legislation and policy instruments. Even in the absence of a single policy document, states as owners often rely on legal anchors and supporting instruments that guide ownership practices. While these do not constitute a formal or unified ownership policy and need to be interpreted collectively, they often define key elements such as the state’s role, governance expectations and accountability mechanisms. In particular, these include:
Core legal frameworks. These include constitutional provisions, SOE framework laws, public finance legislation or company law, which define the legal basis and general conditions for state ownership (e.g. Italy’s Consolidated Act on Companies with Public Participation (Government of Italy, 2016[4]); Brazil’s SOE Law (Government of Brazil, 2016[5]); Spain’s Law 40/2015 on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector (Government of Spain, 2015[6])).
Governance codes and guidelines. For example, these entail corporate governance codes, ownership guidelines or administrative manuals that clarify how ownership should be exercised in practice (e.g. Germany’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance of Federal Holdings (Federal Ministry of Finance of Germany, 2024[7]); Ireland’s Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies (Government of Ireland, 2016[8]); Australia’s Resource Management Guide No. 126 (Government of Australia, 2023[9])).
Strategic and planning documents. Notably, these include portfolio strategies, sectoral plans or government programmes that set performance expectations and strategic priorities (Azerbaijan’s AIH charter and strategic framework, alongside sectoral legislation; Türkiye’s Decree Law No. 233 on State Economic Enterprises, alongside development plans, medium-term programmes and annual SOE reports) (OECD, 2026[1]).
Institutional mandates. In particular, these include the roles and responsibilities assigned to central ownership entities or holding companies, which embed ownership objectives and co‑ordination functions (e.g. Greece’s HCAP/Growthfund (Growthfund, n.d.[10]); Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund (Government of Kazakhstan, 2012[11])).
A number of jurisdictions have no clearly defined ownership policy, either explicit or implicit, with limited articulation of the state’s objectives as owner. While uncommon, in such cases SOEs may operate under general legislation without a clearly established ownership rationale or strategic direction.
At the same time, reforms remain under way in some jurisdictions. Argentina and New Zealand, for example, are developing ownership policy frameworks. Such efforts often form part of broader governance and economic reform agendas aimed at strengthening SOE oversight, improving performance and reinforcing the state’s role as an active and informed owner. A recent OECD study sets out key considerations for jurisdictions developing or revising an ownership policy, including the rationale for ownership, the allocation of responsibilities and the institutional arrangements needed to support effective implementation, as set out in Box 2.1 (OECD, 2026[12]).
Developing an ownership policy entails a collaborative and inclusive process, extending beyond the responsibility of the state ownership entity. Such a process involves consultations with a wide range of public bodies and stakeholders and helps ensure that the policy reflects diverse perspectives and strengthens its legitimacy and effectiveness. Key steps include:
Defining the rationales for state ownership and establishing clear justifications for maintaining state participation in specific enterprises or sectors.
Conducting stakeholder consultations to gather input, build consensus and enhance transparency. Key stakeholders include line ministries, state‑owned holding companies (where relevant), parliamentary or legislative committees, the supreme audit institution, sectoral regulators, and other relevant stakeholders.
Drafting or revising the policy, incorporating feedback and ensuring coherence with national priorities.
Obtaining high-level political endorsement and formal approval to secure legitimacy and commitment at the highest level of government.
Publicly disclosing the ownership policy, ensuring transparency and accountability to citizens and market participants.
Monitoring implementation and revising the policy as needed to assess effectiveness and adapt to evolving circumstances.
While the overall rationales for state ownership should remain stable to ensure consistency and predictability, they may evolve over time in response to changing economic, social, or political priorities. In such cases, the ownership policy should be reviewed and updated accordingly to remain relevant and aligned with current objectives.
Source: OECD (2026[12]), Good practices for strengthening state ownership, https://doi.org/10.1787/b5afe67e-en.
2.2.3. Reviewing the state ownership policy
Regular review and updating of state ownership policies is important to keep ownership rationales, objectives and oversight practices aligned with evolving priorities. It also enables improved oversight tools to inform decisions, such as on future acquisitions or divestments. Sixty per cent of countries surveyed report that their ownership policy or related legal instruments have been revised at some point, with the majority of those revisions taking place within the last five years (Table 2.3). For those that lack a single policy framework, or have newly introduced their ownership policies, systematic review is generally not applicable.
Where ownership policies exist, revisions are often focussed on strengthening governance frameworks. For example:
Estonia updated its ownership policy in 2025, which sought to reinforce the state’s approach to shareholding governance and clarify strategic objectives across the portfolio (Government of Estonia, 2025[13]).
Sweden revised its ownership policy in 2025, which further clarifies the rationale for public ownership, reinforces expectations of commercial performance, and integrates considerations such as sustainability, resilience and long-term value creation (Government of Sweden, 2025[14]).
Korea amended the Act on the Management of Public Institutions in 2024, which further strengthened performance management and oversight mechanisms (Government of Korea, 2024[15]).
Slovenia adopted the Ordinance on the Strategy for the Management of State Assets in 2025, providing a more structured basis for defining and periodically revisiting ownership objectives (Government of Slovenia, 2025[16]).
Thailand updated its Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2025, introducing a stricter “comply or explain” approach and reinforcing expectations for SOE governance practices (Government of Thailand, 2025[17]).
In jurisdictions without a single consolidated ownership policy, the state ownership approach may evolve through changes of varying scope and form. For example, an ownership framework may remain broadly relevant over the longer term, as in Australia, or be periodically reviewed through established mechanisms, as in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In some cases, ownership frameworks may evolve through targeted or incremental updates, such as recent revisions to ownership guidance or governance standards in Austria and Ireland, or continuous legal and institutional adjustments in Spain.
Reporting jurisdictions have also noted more substantial reform – Argentina, Greece and Viet Nam have recently introduced significant legislative and institutional changes affecting the objectives, allocation or exercise of state ownership functions. More general, ongoing government reforms – such as recent initiatives related to digitalisation, transparency and data management in Saudi Arabia and the Slovak Republic – may also indirectly shape state ownership practices (OECD, 2026[1]).
Note: The sample comprises 57 jurisdictions (Canada not included). Some jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, are currently developing ownership policies. Others have recently adopted ownership policies which have not yet been reviewed (e.g. Croatia, Morocco and Peru). Ukraine’s policy, also recently adopted, is already under review.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
2.3.1. Ownership models
While ownership policies define the state’s objectives and roles, their effectiveness ultimately depends on how ownership is organised and exercised in practice. An effective ownership framework requires a delineation of responsibilities for exercising the state’s shareholder role, alongside a strict separation from policymaking and regulatory functions. In the absence of coherent institutional arrangements, SOEs may face overlapping instructions, inconsistent expectations, or conflicts of interest for their oversight.
To mitigate these risks, it is important to have a clearly identified ownership entity, whether located within a central ministry, such as a ministry of finance or economy, established as a separate administrative or corporate entity, or situated within a specific sector ministry. The ownership entity exercises the power, responsibility, or steering ability to appoint boards of directors; sets and monitors objectives; and/or votes on the company shares on behalf of the government. Importantly, it should have the ability to act as an active and informed owner, with the mandate, capacity and professional expertise necessary to fulfil its responsibilities effectively.
While different ownership models exist, centralised approaches can help ensure that ownership responsibilities are concentrated in a single entity, provided that it is sufficiently well resourced and its operations are protected from irregular practices. Its relationships with other public bodies should be transparent, well-defined, and subject to appropriate accountability mechanisms. Where full centralisation is not feasible, strong co‑ordination arrangements, typically led by a clearly mandated entity, are essential to ensure a coherent whole‑of-government approach. Alternative models may include corporatised holding structures or shared ownership frameworks, such as dual or twin-track arrangements distributing responsibilities across multiple entities (Figure 2.2).
Note: Definitions are based on the OECD Ownership and Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises 2024 report and the ownership model categories used in the 2026 Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
Source: OECD (2024[18]), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/395c9956-en; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
Survey responses indicate that while 26% of jurisdictions continue to rely on dispersed ownership arrangements, the majority have introduced some form of co‑ordination. Portfolio-based models, including holding companies, are the most common (22%), followed by co‑ordinating departments that support alignment across institutions exercising ownership responsibilities (19%). Fully centralised ownership entities remain relatively rare, accounting for around 10% of respondents (Figure 2.3). Examples of ownership arrangements are depicted in Table 2.4.
Note: The sample comprises 58 jurisdictions. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
While the overall distribution of ownership models remains similar to that in the 2024 survey, country-level developments point to a gradual shift towards stronger central co‑ordination and greater professionalisation of the state ownership function (OECD, 2024[18]). In several jurisdictions, this takes the form of reinforced central oversight mechanisms. Brazil and Indonesia, for example, have introduced institutional arrangements that strengthen central oversight over SOEs, while India, despite maintaining a formally dispersed system, relies on a central body to set governance guidelines and monitor performance across the portfolio. Some also illustrate a shift towards more structured ownership arrangements, including in systems previously classified as dispersed. Morocco, for example, has established a dedicated state ownership agency. In Croatia and Kazakhstan, institutional arrangements are better understood as twin-track models, with state holding companies operating alongside line ministries, as applicable.
More broadly, recent developments point to growing interest in centralised or corporatised holding entities that group SOEs into portfolios managed with a more commercial and strategic orientation. Austria's ÖBAG and Slovenian Sovereign Holding (SSH) are among the more established examples of this approach. More recently, Indonesia's Danantara has adopted a similar model, while South Africa's 2024 National State Enterprises Bill (B1-2024) proposes the creation of a centralised holding company to strengthen SOE governance and oversight (Government of Indonesia, 2025[19]; Danantara, n.d.[20]; The Parliament of South Africa, 2024[21]). While these models can support more coherent and professional ownership, their effectiveness depends on how well they are established and governed, notably through clear mandates and separation between ownership, policymaking and regulatory functions, fit-for-purpose boards and operational independence.
2.3.2. Resourcing and staffing
The effectiveness of the ownership function also depends on the resources and staffing available to support it. Ownership entities require sufficient capacity and technical expertise to set ownership expectations, monitor SOE performance, support board nomination processes, develop guidance and ensure consistent implementation of the state’s ownership policy. Survey responses indicate that two-thirds of ownership entities have 51 employees or more. Staffing levels vary across jurisdictions, reflecting the relative size of their SOE portfolios and ownership arrangements.
Note: Panel A covers 55 jurisdictions (Hungary, Luxembourg and Malaysia not included), while Panel B covers 52 jurisdictions (Bulgaria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malaysia, New Zealand and Uzbekistan not included). For Panel A, multiple responses were allowed. Results are reported at the jurisdiction level. Where multiple ownership entities are present, staffing arrangements and profiles may vary across entities.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
In terms of staff profiles, 85% report that employees are expected to have experience in public administration or government, consistent with earlier findings on the importance of institutional knowledge and public sector expertise (OECD, 2024[18]). The 2026 results also reveal a growing emphasis on mixed profiles, including private‑sector management or consulting experience (Figure 2.4).
Consistent with previous survey rounds, the majority of countries continue to resource their ownership entities through government budget appropriations (nearly two‑thirds of surveyed jurisdictions). A smaller share of jurisdictions report mixed funding arrangements that combine public funding with self-financed mechanisms, while fully self-funded arrangements, relying primarily on dividends or other revenue streams, remain uncommon (Table 2.5).
While aggregate data provide an overview of ownership arrangements across jurisdictions, a closer examination may reveal variation in governance structures, resourcing, staffing and funding arrangements across ownership entities operating under different institutional models. For example, in Greece, some SOEs are owned through the Ministry of National Economy and Finance, while others form part of the HCAP/Growthfund portfolio and, as a result, differences may arise in areas such as staffing levels and funding models. Notably, the ministry relies primarily on government budget appropriations, whereas HCAP/Growthfund is financed largely through its own revenues (OECD, 2026[1]).
Note: The sample comprises 57 jurisdictions (Bulgaria not included). Results are presented in aggregate form at the jurisdiction level. In some jurisdictions, ownership responsibilities are shared across multiple entities with different functions and funding arrangements. For example, ownership units within ministries are often funded through government budgets, whereas holding companies may rely partly or entirely on their own revenues, including dividends and fees.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
2.3.3. Separation of ownership from policymaking and regulatory functions
Note: The sample comprises 57 jurisdictions (France not included). Multiple responses were allowed. In some jurisdictions, ownership responsibilities are exercised by multiple entities, and reported arrangements may vary across institutions, sectors or enterprises.
KEY
■ A Yes, the ownership entity (or entities) also performs sectoral policymaking functions (e.g. setting national energy policy while owning energy SOEs)
■ B Yes, the ownership entity also performs regulatory functions (e.g. setting tariffs, issuing licences, or overseeing competition in the same sector as the SOEs it owns)
■ C No, the ownership entity is functionally separate from policymaking and regulatory bodies
■ D It depends on the sector and enterprise
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
While these ownership models define how responsibilities are allocated, their effectiveness depends on the extent to which the state’s ownership role is clearly separated from its policymaking and regulatory functions. This separation helps prevent conflicts of interest, promote competitive neutrality, and ensure transparent and accountable governance. In practice, however, ownership and policy functions may still overlap, even under centralised or co‑ordinated arrangements, and sector ministries may retain ownership roles while regulating the same sectors. Such arrangements can potentially create conflicting mandates, blur accountability, and give rise to perceptions of preferential treatment, highlighting the importance of clear institutional design, well-defined roles and independent regulation.
Survey responses indicate that overlaps between ownership and other state functions remain common, with over half of the respondents reporting some degree of overlap (Table 2.6). The extent and nature of these overlaps depend in part on how the ownership function is organised. In more centralised, portfolio-based or strongly co‑ordinated systems, clearer delineation of roles is generally easier to achieve (Table 2.7). Some economies, such as Chile, Finland, Israel, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom illustrate this pattern – while overlaps may occur, they tend to be limited, structured and mitigated through clear mandates, internal separation or independent regulatory functions. By contrast, in some systems, such as Colombia and Korea, overlaps may occur on a case‑by-case basis (OECD, 2026[1]).
In dispersed or dual ownership systems, line ministries may simultaneously exercise ownership, policymaking and, in some cases, regulatory functions, leading to more intertwined arrangements, with an increased risk of conflicts of interest and reduced clarity in the state’s different roles. These risks can be mitigated through independent regulators and through internal organisational arrangements that clearly separate potentially conflicting functions. Denmark illustrates this approach – ownership and regulatory roles are located within the same ministry but handled by different divisions (OECD, 2026[1]).
Note: The sample comprises 57 jurisdictions (France not included). Multiple responses were allowed, including across ownership entities, and some jurisdictions may appear more than once. Results are presented at the jurisdiction level and may not fully reflect variations across sectors, enterprises or ownership entities within the same jurisdiction.
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
To support effective ownership, governments increasingly rely on structured reporting tools to monitor performance and ensure accountability. Annual aggregate reports remain the most common mechanism, providing a consolidated view of the SOE portfolio, including financial and non-financial performance, governance arrangements and achievement of ownership objectives. Survey responses indicate that over half of respondents use aggregate reports covering the full SOE portfolio. Findings also suggest that reporting mechanisms are often complementary rather than substitutive. New tools, such as inventories, dashboards and digital platforms, are increasingly used alongside traditional reporting (Table 2.8).
Note: The sample comprises 58 jurisdictions. Multiple responses were allowed. The entries should not necessarily be interpreted as equivalent or directly comparable, as reported mechanisms may in some cases cover only a subset of SOEs, rather than the sector as a whole. The underlying inventories may also differ in scope, including in their coverage of central and subnational enterprises. *Ukraine’s SOE reporting system has been suspended, and a new reporting framework is currently being developed.
KEY
■ A Aggregate report for all SOEs
■ B Aggregate report for some SOEs
■ C Online inventory
■ D Ad hoc reports
■ E No aggregate reporting system
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
Compared with 2024, several jurisdictions report broader or more developed aggregate reporting practices (Figure 2.5). For example, Argentina, Malaysia, the Slovak Republic and Thailand have introduced ad hoc reporting where no system was previously in place; Brazil and the Philippines maintain online inventories; and some, such as Croatia, Morocco and Romania produce aggregate reports. These findings should nevertheless be interpreted with caution, as the reported practices may cover only SOE portfolios within a particular oversight remit, even when described as applying to all SOEs. The Netherlands is the only jurisdiction reporting a shift in the opposite direction, from reporting on all SOEs in 2024 to ad hoc reporting.
Note: The 2026 survey covers 58 jurisdictions, compared with 53 jurisdictions in the 2024 sample. As some jurisdictions reported using multiple mechanisms to disclose aggregate information on state‑owned enterprises, totals may exceed the number of surveyed jurisdictions.
Source: OECD (2024[18]), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/395c9956-en; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
The quality of aggregate reporting depends not only on whether reporting takes place, but also on what information is disclosed. Overall, reporting practices in 2026 remain broadly consistent with those observed in 2024, with only limited variation across categories. Among respondents with some form of aggregate reporting in place, financial information remains the most consistently reported element, followed by information on individual SOEs (Figure 2.6). Although non-financial disclosures remain less systematically reported than financial information, the scope of aggregate reporting nevertheless appears to be broadening. The growing use of more comprehensive reporting reflects increasing recognition that systematic and comparable information is essential for accountability, performance monitoring and informed decision making across the SOE sector.
Note: The 2026 survey covers 57 jurisdictions (excluding the Netherlands), while 2024 results are drawn from the Ownership and Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises 2024, comprising 43 jurisdictions. For comparability, categories introduced in the 2026 questionnaire, including “Other” and “Not applicable”, are not shown.
Source: OECD (2024[18]), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/395c9956-en; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance.
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[12] OECD (2026), “Good practices for strengthening state ownership”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 100, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b5afe67e-en.
[1] OECD (2026), “OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance”.
[2] OECD (2024), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18a24f43-en.
[18] OECD (2024), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/395c9956-en.
[21] The Parliament of South Africa (2024), National State Enterprises Bill (B1-2024), https://www.parliament.gov.za/bill/2316700.
← 1. Statutory companies are often created by specific legislation or public law, with their own legal personality and mandate. They typically operate under enterprise-specific legislative frameworks rather than general company law, in some cases reflecting deliberate policy choices related to their mandate, functions or public policy objectives. As a result, they may not always fall within the scope of definitions, reporting frameworks or governance requirements that apply to corporatised enterprises.
← 2. In some cases, differences in institutional arrangements may reflect policy choices, taking into account factors such as an enterprise's mandate, functions, size, risk profile or specific public policy objectives. Accordingly, variations across the portfolio may, in certain circumstances, be justified by the distinct characteristics and requirements of individual SOEs.