The 2026 edition of the report Ownership and Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises marks an important step in the development of the OECD’s evidence base on state ownership and SOE governance. Building on previous editions, it combines two complementary streams of work undertaken by the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices: the OECD Global State‑Owned Enterprises Dataset and the OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance. The former provides quantitative information on the size, composition and significance of the SOE sector, while the latter offers qualitative insights into the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks that govern state ownership. By bringing these sources together, this edition offers the most comprehensive overview to date of state ownership arrangements and governance practices across participating jurisdictions. The two sources and their respective methodologies are described below.
Ownership and Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises 2026
Annex A. Methodological note
Copy link to Annex A. Methodological noteOECD Global State‑Owned Enterprises Dataset
Copy link to OECD Global State‑Owned Enterprises DatasetThe OECD Global State‑Owned Enterprises Dataset provides firm-level information on 33 834 SOEs. Its development involved a multi-stage process to define the SOE universe and analytical scope; identify and consolidate direct and indirect state ownership links; apply consistent classification and size criteria; and retrieve, clean and harmonise firm-level financial data. The resulting dataset enables policymakers to track how SOEs evolve, compare their characteristics across countries and over time, and analyse their impact on economic outcomes.
To identify SOEs across jurisdictions, the dataset applies a common operational definition designed to approximate that of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises. An enterprise is classified as an SOE when aggregate direct and indirect holdings by domestic or foreign state entities amount to at least 25% of its equity, which is considered indicative of potentially significant state influence.
The dataset draws on Moody’s ORBIS database, which provides information on companies’ legal and financial characteristics, industry classifications and ownership links. Historical ORBIS vintages are used to identify SOEs separately for each year and construct a longitudinal dataset covering 2013-2024. The construction process entailed eight steps, namely:
Identifying state ownership through global ultimate owners, including central and local governments and related public entities.
Calculating the total state ownership shares by aggregating direct and indirect holdings, including holdings exercised by multiple state‑related owners.
Tracing the subsidiaries of identified SOEs through ownership chains of up to ten layers.
Consolidating the different ownership layers and linking potential SOEs back to the originating state entity.
Excluding companies that do not meet the SOE classification criteria, including the applicable ownership thresholds.
Retrieving financial information and defining the analytical sample, which focusses on large SOEs with assets of at least USD 100 million, measured in 2024 prices.
Constructing a panel dataset for longitudinal analysis, allowing the characteristics and evolution of SOEs to be examined across countries and over time.
Addressing missing or incomplete information to improve the consistency and comparability of the resulting dataset.
The findings derived from the dataset are presented in Chapter 1 of this report, which examines the size, composition and evolution of the global SOE sector. The complete methodology, including the detailed algorithms and data-treatment procedures, is set out in Building a Global Dataset on State‑Owned Enterprises (Arikan, Medina and Ruiz Casas, 2026[1]).
Policy questionnaire
Copy link to Policy questionnaireThis publication presents comparative information on the institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks governing state‑owned enterprises (SOEs) across 58 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. The analysis draws on information collected through a survey developed by the OECD Secretariat to support monitoring of the implementation of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises. The objective of the exercise is to identify broad trends, policy approaches and governance arrangements relating to state ownership and the governance of SOEs at the national level. In this regard, the publication focusses on how states organise and exercise their ownership functions, establish governance frameworks and oversee SOEs, rather than on the characteristics or performance of individual enterprises. Reported arrangements reflect prevailing national frameworks and practices, and may not apply uniformly across all SOEs within a jurisdiction.
Sources of data and methodology
The OECD Secretariat developed the questionnaire and accompanying methodology through consultations with delegates of the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices (the Working Party or WPSOPP). Information was collected primarily through the OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance 2026, a structured policy questionnaire comprising 73 questions organised around five thematic chapters: (i) ownership and governance; (ii) SOEs in the marketplace; (iii) disclosure, transparency and accountability; (iv) the composition and responsibilities of SOE boards; and (v) SOEs and sustainability (see Table A A.1). The Secretariat subsequently worked with national authorities to review, clarify and, where necessary, update the survey responses and other information collected. The preliminary findings were presented to and discussed by the Working Party throughout the drafting process and the report benefited from ongoing exchanges with participating jurisdictions and successive rounds of review and consultation.
The publication covers 58 jurisdictions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam. To note, sample sizes may vary across tables, figures and indicators depending on data availability, response rates and the applicability of individual survey questions.
To complement the survey responses, the OECD Secretariat conducted desk research and reviewed publicly available legal, regulatory and policy sources. Where relevant, the analysis also draws on earlier editions of this report, OECD country reviews and comparative studies, the OECD Product Market Regulation indicators, and other OECD data-collection exercises and analytical work. Earlier OECD findings provide context, support comparisons over time and supplement the information collected through the 2026 survey. A dedicated chapter on anti-corruption and integrity draws on findings from the Report on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Guidelines on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in State‑Owned Enterprises, declassified by the OECD Council in February 2025. As the underlying data-collection exercise covered 27 jurisdictions, the coverage of Chapter 7 differs from that of the rest of the publication.
Interpretation of results and limitations
The information collected is intended to support broad cross-country comparisons and the identification of international trends and practices in state ownership and corporate governance. The results should be interpreted as indicators of national frameworks, policies and reported practices, rather than as assessments of implementation outcomes, enterprise performance or the governance of individual SOEs. In this context, several limitations should be noted:
The questionnaire primarily captures formal legal, regulatory and policy arrangements applicable to commercially oriented SOEs and may not fully reflect their implementation in practice.
The analysis focusses on the general framework governing the SOE sector and does not document every enterprise‑ or sector-level variation. Arrangements may differ across sectors, enterprises, ownership entities and legal forms within the same jurisdiction. Where multiple arrangements coexist, responses generally reflect the predominant framework or reported practice.
The analysis relies in part on information reported by participating authorities and on publicly available sources.
As national laws, regulations and ownership policies continue to evolve, the information presented reflects the situation at the time of data collection and verification.
Table A A.1. OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance 2026: topics and questions
Copy link to Table A A.1. OECD Survey on State Ownership and Corporate Governance 2026: topics and questions|
1. OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE |
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1.1 Relevant laws and regulations |
1.1.1 Does your country have specific framework laws or regulations governing SOEs or state ownership? |
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1.1.2 What legal forms do SOEs in your country typically take? Multiple options possible |
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1.2 Ownership rationales and policies |
1.2.1 Is there a comprehensive policy detailing the goals and priorities of state ownership? |
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1.2.2 When was the last time the ownership policy was revised? |
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1.2.3 What are the main rationales for state ownership of enterprises in your country? Multiple options possible |
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1.3 Ownership models |
1.3.1 What is the prevailing ownership model adopted? |
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1.3.2 What is the size of the ownership entity (if operating in a decentralised model, indicate the sum of all ownership entities). |
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1.3.3 Does the ownership entity (or entities) have policymaking or regulatory responsibilities beyond its role as a shareholder in SOEs? Multiple options possible. |
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1.3.4 What type of experience is typically sought when hiring employees for the ownership entity? Multiple options possible. |
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1.3.5 What are the funding mechanisms of the ownership entity? |
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1.4 Aggregate reporting |
1.4.1 Are there annual aggregate reports produced for economically significant SOEs? |
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1.4.2 If aggregate reports are produced, what is the main information featured (financial and non-financial)? Multiple options possible |
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2. SOEs IN THE MARKETPLACE |
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2.1 Regulatory treatment of SOEs |
2.1.1 Are there exemptions for SOEs in the following areas? If yes, please explain in which sectors or circumstances for each of the areas selected. Multiple options possible. |
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2.1.2 If there are exemptions, are they adopted through a formal legislative process and periodically reviewed? |
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2.2 State support and SOE financing |
2.2.1 Are there preferential funding mechanisms for SOEs that are not available to private firms? Multiple options possible. |
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2.2.2 Do any laws, regulations, or policies provide SOEs with tax advantages not available to private companies? |
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2.2.3 What are the main sources of financing for commercial SOEs? Multiple options possible. |
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2.2.4 Are there requirements to disclose state support to SOEs? Multiple options possible. |
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2.3 Public policy objectives (PPOs) and public service obligations (PSOs) |
2.3.1 When SOEs are assigned PSOs, are they required to maintain separate accounts for their commercial and non-commercial (PSO-related) activities? |
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2.3.2 Are there requirements to compensate commercial SOEs for fulfilling PSOs? |
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2.3.3 If there are requirements to compensate SOEs for fulfilling PSOs, is there a formal mechanism to ensure that compensation is adequate and transparent? |
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2.3.4 Through what mechanisms are public service obligations communicated to SOEs? |
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2.4 Dividend policies |
2.4.1 Has your country introduced a dividend policy for SOEs, and if so, what is the type of policy implemented? |
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2.4.2 If yes, are those policies disclosed and in what form? |
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2.4.3 Has your country introduced optimal rate‑of-return targets for SOEs, and if so, how are they decided? |
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3. DISCLOSURE, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SOEs |
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3.1 Disclosure requirements for listed and non-listed SOEs |
3.1.1 What reporting and disclosure standard is applicable to SOEs, regardless of legal form? |
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3.1.2 Are the main commercial and non-commercial objectives of SOEs publicly disclosed? |
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3.1.3 When SOEs pursue public policy objectives (PPOs) or public service obligations (PSOs) in addition to commercial objectives, are they required to disclose those in the annual report? |
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3.2 Disclosure of information on control structures of SOEs |
3.2.1 What information are SOEs required to disclose on their governance, ownership, voting, and legal control structures? Multiple options possible. |
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3.3 Disclosure of board composition and remuneration policies |
3.3.1 What information are SOEs required to disclose on board composition? Multiple options possible |
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3.3.2 What remuneration information about senior executives are SOEs required to disclose? |
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3.3.3 What remuneration information about (supervisory) board members are SOEs required to disclose? |
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3.4 Disclosure on material risk factors and risk management systems |
3.4.1 Are SOEs required to report information on material risk factors? |
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3.4.2 Are SOEs required to report information on risk management systems or frameworks? |
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3.5 Disclosure of related-party transactions |
3.5.1 Are SOEs required to disclose information on material transactions with related parties? Multiple options possible. |
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3.6 Mechanisms to ensure equitable treatment of shareholders |
3.6.1 What rights are afforded to minority shareholders in non-listed SOEs? Multiple options possible. |
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3.7 Internal and external audit practices |
3.7.1 Are SOEs required to conduct independent external audits of their financial statements? |
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3.7.2 What are the requirements and practices concerning the rotation of independent audit firms? |
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3.7.3 Over the past five years, what information has been audited by the state audit body related to the SOE sector? |
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3.7.4 Does every SOE need to have an internal audit function? |
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3.7.5 For those SOEs that have an internal audit function, to whom does the internal auditor report to? |
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3.7.6 Can state audit bodies or control functions be internal auditors of SOEs? |
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4. COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOE BOARDS |
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4.1 Autonomy and authority |
4.1.1 Are SOE boards of directors granted full responsibility and autonomy to define the corporate strategy for the enterprise? |
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4.2 Mandates and objectives |
4.2.1 Which of the following functions can be expected from the board? Multiple options possible. |
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4.2.2 Are specialised board committees mandated by law or regulations to support the work of the board? Multiple options possible. |
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4.2.3 Are there specific independence requirements for the composition of board committees? Multiple options possible. |
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4.2.4 If there are independence requirements on board committee composition, what are they? Multiple options possible. |
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4.2.5 What is the most common board structure for SOEs? |
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4.3 Composition and diversity of SOE boards |
4.3.1 Is there a minimum, maximum and average number of SOE board members mandated by law or guidelines? |
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4.3.2 Are there guidelines or measures to ensure that board members have appropriate skills and expertise? |
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4.3.3 Are there guidelines or requirements for gender and/or other diversity targets? |
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4.3.4 If there are guidelines or requirements for employee representation in SOE boards, how many representatives are part of boards? |
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4.4 Remuneration of key executives |
4.4.1 Does the state owner provide guidelines or limits on remuneration levels for key executives? |
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4.5 Independent board members |
4.5.1 If there are requirements or recommendations for a minimum number of independent members of SOE boards, how many independent members do they imply? |
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4.5.2 If there is a limit to the tenure for independent board members, what is it? |
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4.5.3 Which of the following elements are covered in the legal definition of “independence” used? Multiple options possible |
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4.6 Addressing conflicts of interest and political influence |
4.6.1 What categories of public officials and their deputies are banned to serve on SOE boards? |
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4.6.2 Are there mechanisms to address potential conflicts of interest in SOE boards? |
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4.7 The role of the chair |
4.7.1 Does the chair of an SOE act as the primary point of contact between the ownership entity and the board? |
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4.7.2 Is it common, or is it allowed, that the chief executive officer of an SOE at the same time serves as chair of the board? |
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4.8 Board evaluation |
4.8.1 If SOEs are required to conduct annual board evaluations, who is responsible for conducting the board evaluation? Multiple choices possible. |
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4.8.2 Is there a specific evaluation of the chair? |
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4.8.3 Do the results of the evaluation process play a role in board nominations? |
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4.9 Risk management |
4.9.1 Is there a legal requirement or expectation for SOEs to implement risk management frameworks? |
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4.9.2 Are there mechanisms in place to manage risks at the SOE portfolio level? |
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4.9.3 Are SOEs required to adopt compliance measures, and if so, what are they? Multiple options possible. |
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5. SOEs AND SUSTAINABILITY |
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5.1 Sustainability expectations in ownership policy and practices |
5.1.1 How are sustainability-related expectations assigned to SOEs? Multiple options possible. |
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5.1.2 Are there references in the ownership policy or expectations for SOEs to observe RBC standards? If yes, in which of the following areas? Multiple options possible. |
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5.2 Sustainability-related risks and opportunities |
5.2.1 Are SOEs required to address sustainability risks and opportunities by integrating sustainability within their risk management systems? |
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5.2.2 If economically significant SOEs are encouraged or required to engage in due diligence practices on RBC of their business operations and value chains, which of the following measures are taken? Multiple options possible. |
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5.3 Disclosure of sustainability information |
5.3.1 Are SOEs required to report on sustainability-related issues? |
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5.3.2 Does the state as owner report on sustainability as part of its annual aggregate report and/or similar reporting mechanisms? |
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5.3.3 Is SOE sustainability reporting subject to independent external assurances? |
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References
[1] Arikan, G., A. Medina and A. Ruiz Casas (2026), “Building a global dataset on state-owned enterprises”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 29, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/41a26c09-en.