State-owned enterprises are playing a growing role in the global economy, with the assets of large non-financial SOEs nearly doubling in real terms over the past decade.
In 2024, approximately 33 800 SOEs covered in the OECD Global SOE Dataset held combined assets of USD 141 trillion, equivalent to 126% of global GDP. Financial SOEs represented nearly a quarter of all SOEs and accounted for over 70% of total assets, reflecting their role in channelling capital and financing investment. By contrast, non-financial SOEs represented around three-fourths of all SOEs and of total SOE employment. SOEs are concentrated in emerging economies, which account for 80% of global SOE assets and 83% of SOE employment, and are prominent in mining, manufacturing, energy and utilities.
SOEs are broadly comparable to non-SOEs in terms of median size, sales and employment, but differ in financial performance, leverage and investment. SOEs are less profitable overall, with their median return on equity over 2013-2024 averaging 4.7%, compared with 6.4% among non-SOEs across the six industries examined. SOEs tend to be more highly leveraged and rely more heavily on non-debt liabilities. They generally invest less in R&D and have weaker capital accumulation, although patterns vary across regions and industries. Given SOEs’ growing economic footprint, these differences can have broader implications for productivity, competitiveness and growth.
Countries are professionalising ownership, but fragmented ownership frameworks and blurred institutional boundaries can weaken accountability.
Governments are increasingly professionalising ownership through stronger co-ordination, improved oversight and greater transparency. However, fewer than half of countries (43%) have a single government-wide ownership policy defining the state’s objectives and rationales as an owner. In many others, these remain dispersed across multiple legal, regulatory and policy instruments. This fragmentation can result in less clearly articulated objectives and responsibilities and contribute to inconsistent ownership practices. Ownership models are becoming more co-ordinated, helping to strengthen oversight and strategic steering across SOE portfolios. At the same time, overlaps between ownership, policymaking and regulatory functions remain widespread, with only 42% of countries reporting separation of these functions.
Although SOEs are increasingly expected to compete on market terms, legal exemptions and public service compensation arrangements can undermine a level playing field.
Only 57% of countries apply the same legal frameworks as private firms to SOEs. Where exemptions exist, they often concern areas such as bankruptcy, public procurement, competition and regulatory rules, potentially giving SOEs different operating conditions. At the same time, subsidies, capital injections and other forms of state support remain common, often reflecting public policy mandates, while disclosure practices do not always provide a comprehensive picture of the support received. Public service obligations are also widespread, but only around half of countries tie compensation directly to the costs incurred and require separate accounts, while others use less transparent or more indirect arrangements. Formal dividend policies are also uneven, with 49% setting broad guidance and 32% minimum payout requirements. This underscores the need for transparent and well-defined arrangements that support policy goals and safeguard competitive neutrality.
SOE reporting and audit frameworks are increasingly aligned with international standards, particularly for larger and listed SOEs, but gaps in transparency around governance and control arrangements remain.
Nearly all countries require at least some SOEs to prepare financial statements in accordance with internationally recognised accounting standards or equivalent national frameworks. Disclosure requirements extend beyond financial reporting to cover material risks, risk-management systems, related-party transactions, board and executive remuneration, and commercial and non-commercial objectives. Disclosure of major shareholdings (89%) and corporate group structures (73%) is common, but less consistent for control arrangements such as special voting rights and shareholder agreements. Audit and control requirements are also widespread, with some or all SOEs subject to independent external audit in 93% of countries. Minority shareholder protections are widespread, with over 90% of countries guaranteeing voting rights, access to information and legal recourse, including in non-listed SOEs.
While the importance of board effectiveness has grown, the authority and independence of SOE boards remain uneven across countries.
Requirements aimed at strengthening SOE board independence and effectiveness vary across countries. Only 54% of countries require that boards have a minimum number of independent directors, while 45% prohibit political office holders from serving on SOE boards, highlighting the importance of safeguards to prevent undue political influence. Board authority also differs, as SOE boards have full authority to define corporate strategy in only 43% of countries, while in 47% boards develop the strategy subject to approval by the state shareholder. Audit committees are the most formalised board committee, with around three-fourths of countries requiring them by law or regulation and often applying specific independence requirements. Board evaluations are also widely used, often through self-evaluation mechanisms.
Sustainability expectations for SOEs are becoming more formalised, with further efforts needed to support their integration into risk management, due diligence and reporting.
Most countries set sustainability-related expectations for SOEs through laws, regulations or overarching policy frameworks. In 73% of countries, some or all SOEs are required to report on sustainability. However, their integration into due diligence, risk-management and reporting requirements remains uneven and applies primarily to larger or listed SOEs. Around 60% also integrate sustainability information in aggregate reporting on their SOE portfolios, although the scope and depth of reporting vary.
While anti-corruption and integrity safeguards are established for SOEs, more could be done to strengthen their monitoring and implementation.
Most countries have introduced core safeguards for SOEs, including whistleblower protection mechanisms, restrictions on political contributions, integrity requirements and formal appointment procedures. Reporting on compliance, anti-corruption or integrity matters is common, though only around one-third of ownership entities surveyed systematically monitor the information received from SOEs. Accountability mechanisms are less developed, particularly in the areas of follow-up on audit findings, stakeholder engagement and formal documentation of interactions between the state and SOEs.