This section reviews the UPB’s alignment with OECD Principles for IFIs (OECD, 2014[1]), identifying the areas of strength as well as areas where targeted actions could help bring closer alignment.
Table 1 (at the end of this section) provides a comprehensive assessment of the UPB's alignment with the OECD Principles.
The UPB strongly aligns with OECD Principles for IFIs. Its legislation provides a clear mandate, robust independence safeguards, and broad access rights. This helps to establish it as a credible and impartial body. However, three key areas require targeted action to strengthen resilience: leadership appointments, resources, and access to information.
Its mandate is sufficiently wide to cover endorsement of macroeconomic forecasts, monitoring compliance with fiscal rules, and assessing long-term sustainability, while allowing for self-initiated analysis. Independence is reinforced by six-year, non-renewable terms for Council members, remuneration set in statute, and strict incompatibility rules. Access provisions grant rights to relevant government databases. These are supported by a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Economy and Finance and other formal agreements with the Revenue Agency, ISTAT and INPS. These safeguards have bolstered the UPB’s reputation for technical excellence and impartiality. Stakeholders consistently describe the UPB as highly independent and technically rigorous.
Three key areas stand out where further alignment would strengthen resilience and effectiveness:
The UPB is governed by a three-member Council, one of whom serves as President. Its Council members are appointed by decree on agreement between the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Candidates are chosen from a short-list of ten candidates by a qualified majority following a public call for interest. While this design protects independence, it creates a structural vulnerability: all mandates expire simultaneously. This “cliff-edge” turnover risks a loss of institutional memory and operational disruption. It also amplifies the influence of the parliamentary majority at that time, potentially undermining perceptions of independence – risks highlighted as a concern by stakeholders.
A potential solution is to introduce staggered terms through legislative amendment. For example, renewing one seat every two years. Complementary provisions for interim coverage, such as designating a senior official to act until new appointments are confirmed, would further reduce uncertainty. These changes would align Italy with good practice observed in other OECD jurisdictions (see Box 1) and strengthen the UPB’s resilience without compromising independence.
Several OECD jurisdictions utilise staggered terms to preserve institutional memory and prevent the simultaneous departure of all leadership members.
The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council has five members serving four-year renewable terms. To establish the cycle, initial appointments were staggered between two and four years.
The Latvian Fiscal Discipline Council has six members that serve six-year terms. Staggering was achieved by appointing half of the initial members for shortened three-year terms.
The Portuguese Public Finance Council had a transition period with five Senior Board members appointed for varying terms (seven, five, and three years) based on seniority. Currently, all members serve non-renewable seven-year terms.
The Slovak Council for Budget Responsibility avoided simultaneous turnover by appointing its three Board members, normally on one seven-year term, at seven, five, and three years initially.
The fixed nature of the UPB’s legislative budget and staff cap of 40 has become a significant constraint. The budget is fixed in legislation and was only recently increased, while staffing remains capped at 40. These limits, due to their rigid nature, restrict the institution’s ability to cover new requirements and fiscal risks, while inflation has and will likely continue to erode the budget’s real purchasing power.
One potential solution is to replace the fixed budget with a multi‑year appropriation gauged on relevant cost drivers, such as public sector wages. This could be complemented by periodic reviews to ensure resources remain commensurate with the mandate over the long term and it could be subject to parliamentary oversight. Removing the staff cap and setting resources through budgeted headcount would restore flexibility while maintaining accountability. Increasing the share of permanent hires to at least 60% over the next three to five years would reduce reliance on secondments and strengthen institutional continuity. These changes would allow the UPB to meet rising expectations without compromising its independence or technical integrity.
Access to information is a cornerstone of the UPB’s credibility. However, the current legal framework specifies access only to "databases." This wording is potentially restrictive and could allow ministries to deny access to broader analytical models or material deemed outside the strict definition of a database.
To safeguard future effectiveness, access rights should be codified to explicitly cover all information necessary to fulfil the mandate, including estimates and models. Establishing clear timelines for responses and escalation mechanisms would further lock in co-operative arrangements and prevent future disputes.
|
OECD Principle |
Assessment |
Detailed Notes |
|---|---|---|
|
1. LOCAL OWNERSHIP |
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|
1.1 Broad national ownership |
✔ |
The UPB was established through broad political consensus as part of constitutional reform. The enabling legislation received cross-party support, demonstrating national ownership rather than external imposition. |
|
1.2 Tailoring to local needs |
✔ |
The institutional model selected for the UPB reflects Italy's institutional arrangements and traditions, notably the distinction between the two chambers and the Italian tradition of independent authorities. The bicameral appointment process is uniquely Italian. |
|
2. INDEPENDENCE AND NON-PARTISANSHIP |
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|
2.1 Non-partisanship |
✔ |
The mandate of the UPB does not include the provision of policy advice. Its analysis is widely perceived to be based on sound data and technical analysis and free from partisan bias. The exclusion of policy advice is a deliberate design choice that has proven effective. |
|
2.2 Merit-based leadership |
✔ |
Legislation states leadership candidates must be qualified in economics and public finance. Shortlisted candidates must be approved by at least two-thirds of the members of each Parliamentary budgetary commission. Council member salaries are determined in legislation. However, the appointment remains a political process and continued vigilance is needed to ensure merit-based selection in practice. |
|
2.3 Fixed terms and dismissal |
⚠ |
Members of the Council serve terms of six years, non-renewable. However, their terms are not staggered, presenting a risk to the institution. Dismissal procedures are specified in legislation (serious violations of duties, proposed by parliamentary commissions, approved by Presidents of both chambers). This provides strong protection against arbitrary removal. Substitution procedure is not foreseen in legislation. The six-year mandates of Council members are not aligned with the electoral cycle, as elections are to be held every five years constitutionally. This is one of the strongest design features for ensuring independence, as leadership cannot be replaced immediately following elections. |
|
2.4 Remuneration and conflict of interest |
✔ |
Remuneration of the President of the Council is set at the same level as that of the President of the Market and Competition Authority, whilst that of the other two members is set at 80% of that amount. Legislation prohibits Council members from engaging in other remunerated activities, ensuring full-time commitment and avoiding conflicts of interest. |
|
2.5 Staffing autonomy |
✔ |
Articles 16 and 17 of the legislation provide the UPB with the required autonomy to select and hire qualified staff independently. The mandatory secondment provision further strengthens this autonomy by preventing other institutions from refusing staff requests. |
|
2.6 Merit-based staff selection |
⚠ |
Article 17 of the enabling legislation states that functional needs, merit, and competence are the basis for selecting and hiring staff. Staff hired through public competition meet this standard. However, the heavy reliance on seconded staff introduces some risk in terms of institutional resilience. In practice, staff are perceived as highly competent and non-partisan. |
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3. MANDATE |
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3.1 Clear mandate in legislation |
✔ |
Sections 16 and 18 of its legislation define the Office’s mandate. Section 18 stipulates that parliamentary committees competent in public finances can request additional analysis and reports. The mandate is clear, comprehensive, and legislatively entrenched. |
|
3.2 Autonomy in work programme |
✔ |
The UPB has that level of autonomy, notably through Article 18, Section 1(f), which explicitly grants the power to self-initiate analyses. This is a critical feature that distinguishes the UPB from purely responsive research services. |
|
3.3 Link to budget process |
✔ |
The mandate of the UPB explicitly states that its role is to analyse and evaluate compliance with budget rules, as well as macroeconomic and public finance forecasts which are typically included in the Budget. The endorsement function creates a direct, formal link to the budget process. |
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4. RESOURCES |
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4.1 Adequate and protected resources |
⚠ |
The UPB’s benefits from a stable funding model. However, this nominal level of funding should be updated regularly to take account of main cost drivers, ensuring resources remain commensurate with its mandate. The UPB’s budget is treated as an independent line item, comparable to other constitutional authorities. |
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5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE |
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5.1 Accountability and sufficient time |
✔ |
The three members of the Council are appointed by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and their dismissal can only be decided by the same bodies. The UPB and its leadership are required to respond to requests from parliamentary committees. The Italian budgetary calendar has provided adequate time for the UPB to conduct its mandatory analyses and respond to parliamentary requests. However, deadlines are being tightened from almost two weeks to less than one week with the national implementation of the new EU framework. No significant timing constraints were identified by stakeholders as UPB was ultimately able to carry out its tasks despite the tighter timeline. |
|
5.2 Clarity around support role |
⚠ |
Legislation establishes that parliamentary committees competent in public finance can request analysis. However, the role vis-à-vis other committees and individual members is less clearly defined. The relationship with technical bodies supporting budget oversight at parliament requires clarification to avoid confusion. |
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6. ACCESS TO INFORMATION |
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6.1 Full access to information |
✔ |
Legislation states the UPB has the right to access all databases relating to the economy or public finances created or maintained by ministries and agencies. Information exchanges with the main stakeholders are governed by a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) and other formal agreements. In practice, UPB and stakeholders did not report significant access issues. |
|
6.2 Limits and safeguards to information |
⚠ |
The restrictions are not explicit but rather implicit, as legislation indicates the UPB has access to databases relating to the economy or public finance. As such, an institution could refuse to provide information that is not in a database or that it deems not to be related to the economy or public finance. Recommendation: Explicitly define any legitimate restrictions (national security, personal privacy) whilst creating presumption of access. |
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7. TRANSPARENCY |
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7.1 Transparent operations |
✔ |
The UPB has its own website detailing its work and operations. All reports, methodologies, and organisational information are publicly available. The UPB demonstrates exemplary transparency in operations. |
|
7.2 Publication of reports |
⚠ |
All opinions and reports are published and made available on the UPB's website. Staff are available to explain and discuss methodologies and answer questions from stakeholders, including parliamentarians and the media. However, whilst methodologies are explained, underlying data and detailed technical models are not always fully published. Greater transparency in this area would enhance credibility and allow for external replication and validation. |
|
7.3 Timely release of reports |
✔ |
Major reports (forecast endorsements, fiscal compliance assessments, budget law assessment) are released on established schedules coordinated with government budget releases. This ensures parliamentary relevance and media attention. |
|
7.4 Reports in own name |
✔ |
Under the current institutional arrangements, UPB reports are presented under its own name and independently of the government. The UPB has established a strong independent identity and brand. |
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8. COMMUNICATION |
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|
8.1 Stakeholder communications |
⚠ |
The UPB maintains communication channels through its website, parliamentary testimonies, participation in seminars, and some media engagement. However, stakeholders indicated opportunities for enhanced communications to reach broader audiences whilst maintaining independence. The UPB could develop more systematic communication strategies, including shorter, plain language pieces, stronger visuals, increased social media presence, video content, and public events. |
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9. EXTERNAL EVALUATION |
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|
9.1 External reviews |
✔ |
The Council established an outside Scientific Committee to provide methodological indications and recommendations. Additionally, the UPB is conducting its first comprehensive external review in 2025-2026. This demonstrates strong commitment to accountability and continuous improvement. Best practice: Continue regular external reviews (every five years) with public reporting of findings and responses. |
The UPB rests on strong foundations, yet structural rigidities regarding leadership turnover, funding, and data access now pose risks to its resilience. To future-proof the institution, the Review recommends three targeted reforms: staggering Council terms to ensure continuity, reviewing the UPB’s nominal funding model regularly to reflect relevant cost drivers, and broadening legal access rights to cover all relevant analysis. These changes will equip the UPB to navigate increasing fiscal complexity with sustained independence.