This chapter sets out the foundations for justice governance in Ukraine in the context of rule of law reform, European Union (EU) integration, recovery and resilience. It explains how the rule of law underpins democratic governance, economic development and public trust, and traces the evolution of the justice system since independence. The chapter also examines how Russia’s war of aggression has affected the functioning of the rule of law in practice, placing pressure on justice governance, service delivery and access to justice. In this context, it highlights the role of justice as a public service and the importance of people-centred approaches to connect ordinary justice, accountability for international crimes and the foundations for transitional justice.
OECD Justice Review of Ukraine
Abstract
The rule of law is a cornerstone of democratic governance and a fundamental enabler of economic growth, public trust and societal resilience. In Ukraine, the justice system has been central to democratic consolidation, European integration and recovery reforms. Over the past decade, spurred by the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity,1 Ukraine has pursued an ambitious and comprehensive justice sector reform agenda aimed at enhancing the rule of law and increasing public trust. Russia’s war of aggression has made reforms both more urgent and more complicated, placing severe pressure on institutions.
This chapter provides the foundations for understanding justice governance in Ukraine in this evolving context. It frames the justice sector reform agenda within the broader context of Ukraine’s international commitments to promote a more transparent, accountable and people-centred justice system, aligned with OECD, EU and other regional and international standards. It also establishes two interrelated premises developed in later chapters: first, justice reform depends on effective collaboration and sequencing; and second, progress should be assessed not only in terms of legal change but also by implementation and by how effectively the justice system responds to the needs of people and businesses in Ukraine. This chapter traces the evolution of Ukraine’s justice system from independence in 1991 to the present, including major legal and constitutional milestones, EU integration efforts and the transformation of justice functions necessitated by Russia’s full-scale invasion.
2.2.1. The rule of law as a foundation for democracy and economic growth
For Ukraine, the rule of law is both a democratic governance objective and a central component of economic and social resilience. The rule of law provides for the enforcement of commonly agreed rules and processes in a fair, consistent and transparent manner, with effective mechanisms for accountability. As a value-based system, it contributes to the stability of public governance and strengthens legitimacy and public trust. An effective system of public governance depends on a responsive rule of law, which is delivered through justice systems that are fair, accessible and capable of translating rights into practical outcomes for people, communities and businesses (OECD, 2025[1]).
The rule of law also underpins economic performance. Countries with stronger adherence to the rule of law tend to exhibit stronger economic performance (WJP, 2025[2]). Predictability, transparency, reliability, accountability and fairness, all associated with the rule of law, enable a favourable investment environment (OECD, 2006[3]). With an important role played by the justice system, the rule of law facilitates business transactions and helps ensure effective enforcement of contracts. Conversely, weaknesses in the rule of law, including inefficiencies in procedures, lack of transparency, perceived bias or corruption risks, can discourage investment and broader economic activity. Such challenges may also negatively impact public confidence. OECD research suggests, for example, that delays in court proceedings are associated with lower public trust in the justice system (Palumbo et al., 2013[4]), which may, in turn, weaken confidence in public institutions more broadly. OECD evidence further indicates that perceptions of judicial independence are associated with trust in both national government and the judicial system, highlighting the role of impartial and credible justice institutions in supporting public confidence in democratic governance (OECD, 2024[5]).
Evidence further suggests that adherence to the rule of law correlates with broader development outcomes, including peace and stability, higher educational attainment and longer life expectancy (WJP, 2025[2]). Moreover, the rule of law contributes to peaceful conflict resolution and societal stability by enabling disputes to be resolved through fair and credible processes (OECD, 2025[1]). These correlations are particularly relevant in the context of Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, where strengthening the rule of law is critical to attracting domestic and foreign investment and ensuring the effective use of public resources and social cohesion.
2.2.2. Shared commitment to the rule of law
The OECD and the EU share a strong and long-standing commitment to the rule of law. The OECD’s framework for considering prospective members requires that OECD countries form a community committed to democracy based on the rule of law and human rights (OECD, 2017[6]). The rule of law is also one of the EU’s founding values. It forms part of the Copenhagen criteria for countries seeking accession (European Union, 1993[7]) and is strongly embedded in Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the EU acquis (European Commission, 2026[8]). For both the OECD and the EU, the rule of law has a dual function. It expresses a shared institutional identity and serves as a practical benchmark for membership and technical assistance.
That common position is clearly reflected in programming. The OECD promotes the rule of law through thematic standards, peer learning, policy reviews and targeted country support. In Ukraine, the OECD Ukraine Country Programme – through its Good Governance and Transparency pillar – aims to advance the rule of law through broader public governance, justice system and anti-corruption reforms (OECD, 2023[9]). The EU uses enlargement policy and requirements pertaining to the rule of law to support stronger institutions, accountable public power and effective implementation of law, including through financial and technical support to Ukraine provided in the context of the accession process.
Ukraine’s commitment to the rule of law also has its own domestic history. Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has been building a legal and institutional order increasingly aligned with European standards. After 2014, efforts to strengthen the rule of law became more intensive, as reforms had to respond simultaneously to public demand for accountable institutions, the process of European integration and systemic challenges arising from Russia’s war of aggression. The reforms discussed in the next sections are best read against that trajectory.
2.3.1. From independence to gradual institutional separation
When it achieved independence, Ukraine did not begin from a blank institutional slate. The country had to build its own constitutional and judicial order while still relying, for a period, on elements of Soviet legislation. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of 1990 had already set a new direction. It affirmed the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers and linked sovereignty with the construction of a state governed by law (VRU, 1990[10]). The early reform period was therefore defined by two parallel tasks: preserving legal continuity where needed, and moving away from the command-administrative model inherited from the Soviet system.
The Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform of 1992 made that break explicit by linking reform to the construction of an independent judicial power and confirming the separation of legislative, executive and judicial authorities (VRU, 1992[11]). It identified several dysfunctions in the justice system, including court overload, weaknesses in criminal justice and continued interference with the administration of justice (VRU, 1992[11]). The Concept called for enhanced judicial independence, access to courts and judicial specialisation, and ensuring the right of every person to have their case heard by a competent, independent and impartial court (VRU, 1992[11]).
Following the adoption of the Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform, the VRU adopted several key laws, including the Law of Ukraine on the Status of Judges (1992), the Commercial Procedural Code (1992), the Law of Ukraine on the Bar (1993), the Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (1996) and the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice (HCJ) (1998). In 1996, Ukraine adopted its Constitution, which defined the legal architecture of a constitutional state, and – as further analysed in Chapter 3 – reaffirmed the separation of powers in Ukraine.
In the 1990s, Ukraine also advanced its regional and international integration, as outlined in Figure 2.1 below. During this period, it joined key European and international organisations, including the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (later the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), and the Council of Europe, while also gradually developing closer relations with the EU. Regional and international integration gradually helped anchor legal and justice reforms in Ukraine in European and international standards and good practices.
Source: Developed by the authors.
Between the initial post-independence reforms and the reform cycle initiated in 2014, Ukraine’s justice system underwent several rounds of legislative and institutional changes. In particular, reforms focused on adapting the court system to the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, clarifying judicial specialisation and consolidating the organisational structure of the judiciary. This included, among other laws, the adoption of the 2002 Law on the Judicial System of Ukraine, which sought to systematise the court network and define the institutional foundations of judicial organisation (VRU, 2002[12]).
A major reform phase followed in 2010-2013. The 2010 Law on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges restructured the court system and adjusted judicial career arrangements (VRU, 2010[13]). The 2012 Criminal Procedure Code introduced a more adversarial model of criminal proceedings and recalibrated parts of the relationship between prosecution, defence and the courts (VRU, 2012[14]).
External assessments during that period noted that important structural weaknesses persisted during this period, especially in relation to the frameworks for the independence of judicial governance bodies and the role of political institutions in appointments and dismissals in the justice sector (CEPEJ, 2010[15]).
2.3.2. The Revolution of Dignity as a catalyst of reforms
The Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) changed both the pace and political logic of reform in Ukraine. After 2014, EU integration became a central organising principle for reforms in justice, anti-corruption and public administration. The Association Agreement with the EU, which was signed in 2014 and fully entered into force in 2017, provided the main framework for legal and institutional approximation with the EU. At the same time, Euromaidan exposed a broader legitimacy crisis within state institutions, generating public distrust in security institutions and parts of the judiciary. Ukraine therefore advanced co-operation with the EU and international partners to support reforms in law enforcement, prosecution and the judiciary, particularly in the areas of anti-corruption and human rights.
In the justice sector, reforms after 2014 were pursued more coherently than earlier attempts. As outlined in Chapter 3, Ukraine undertook large-scale legislative and institutional reforms to strengthen judicial independence, improve efficiency and transparency, and align the justice system more closely with European standards and principles of the rule of law. The 2015-2020 Strategy for Reforming the Judicial System, Legal Proceedings and Related Legal Institutions provided the main policy framework for reform. Key reforms included the re-establishment of the HCJ, the creation of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) under the 2016 justice reform, and the establishment of specialised anti-corruption institutions, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC). Implementation of the subsequent Strategy on the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Proceedings (2021-2023) was disrupted by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The impact of these reforms on Ukraine’s performance in relation to the rule of law was gradual and relatively limited. According to the Rule of Law Index (RLI), Ukraine’s overall score increased from approximately 0.47 in 2015 to 0.51 in 2021, with the country ranking 74th out of 139 countries in 2021, five positions higher than in 2020 (WJP, 2025[16]), before declining slightly following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 (Figure 2.2).
Note: Under the RLI methodology, a higher score indicates stronger adherence to the rule of law.
Source: (WJP, 2025[16]), elaboration by the authors.
As part of the RLI, improvements were recorded in areas such as civil justice, regulatory enforcement and open government, including stronger enforcement in civil justice, lower levels of perceived corruption and improper influence in courts, improved complaint mechanisms and better public access to laws and government data (WJP, 2025[16]). While Ukraine’s overall RLI score on the absence of corruption remained broadly stable, the score relating specifically to corruption in the judicial branch improved from 0.42 to 0.48 between 2015 and 2021, indicating modest progress in judicial integrity (WJP, 2025[16]). A similar trend is reflected in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, where Ukraine’s score improved from 26 in 2014 to 32 in 2021 and further by 2025 (TI, 2026[17]).2 Nevertheless, Ukraine’s RLI scores remained significantly below the OECD average across all rule-of-law dimensions throughout the period.3
2.3.3. Rule of law, resilience and accelerated integration since 2022
Following the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the operating environment changed, although it did not bring reform to a halt. Ukraine’s justice sector remained functional and continued to provide public services, although unevenly across institutions. In the judiciary, after a period of suspension, the HQCJ resumed the selection and qualification evaluation of candidates to the HACC with the participation of the Public Council of International Experts, while the audit of the e-judiciary system was completed.
Wartime conditions placed significant pressure on rule-of-law performance. Ukraine’s overall RLI score fell from 0.500 in 2022 to 0.485 in 2023 and remained below the 2022 level in 2024 and 2025 (Figure 2.2) (WJP, 2025[16]). The decline was driven mainly by deterioration in public order and safety, as well as weaker performance in rights and constraints on government powers, including indicators related to freedom of expression and oversight by independent supervisory and audit bodies (WJP, 2025[16]). Restrictions associated with martial law likely contributed to these trends (see Box 2.1).
Ukraine introduced martial law on 24 February 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has periodically extended it ever since. Under these conditions, the President adopted temporary measures affecting the information space and political landscape, including the consolidation of national television broadcasting into a single platform and the suspension of several political parties due to their ties with the Russian government.
The European Commission’s 2023 assessment noted that martial law has resulted in temporary and proportionate limitations on certain fundamental rights. These include restrictions on privacy, freedom of movement, property rights and certain forms of economic activity. Martial law has also enabled the establishment of military administration tasked with functions normally carried out by regional or local self-government bodies.
At the same time, the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SC) indicates that, notwithstanding wartime constraints, the functioning of justice and access to court have been maintained as core guarantees. The SC has emphasised, for instance, that proceedings should not be suspended solely due to a party’s mobilisation where this would unjustifiably delay adjudication, thereby reinforcing the principle of effective access to justice even under martial law (SC, 15 August 2023, case No. 174/760/21). It has also confirmed the continued jurisdiction of Ukrainian courts in sensitive matters arising from displacement, including family and child residence disputes involving persons abroad, ensuring continuity of judicial protection despite wartime disruptions (SC, 11 December 2023, case No. 607/20787/19).
Despite continued reforms, implementation has been hindered by institutional bottlenecks, staff shortages in the justice sector, instances of corruption and periods of slowed reform (European Commission, 2025[20]). Delays in judicial selection procedures led to the suspension of the work of the Grand Chamber and the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and incomplete recruitment for positions at the HACC (ALI et al., 2025[21]). Moreover, large-scale corruption schemes emerged in the justice sector, including at the SC.
While these gaps contributed to stagnation in some indicators related to the rule of law, broader assessments point to the resilience of Ukraine’s public governance reforms during the war. In the 2026 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Ukraine ranked 17th out of 137 countries in governance performance (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026[22]).4 Perceptions of corruption also continued to improve slightly. Ukraine’s Corruption Perceptions Index score further improved – from 32 in 2021 to 36 in 2025 (TI, 2026[17]). OECD analysis similarly indicates that Ukraine’s strategic framework for anti-corruption and public integrity in the justice sector is comparatively strong, although implementation gaps continue to hinder progress in areas such as prosecutorial autonomy and judicial integrity, independence and accountability (OECD, 2025[23]; OECD, 2026[24]), as further discussed in this report.
With broad international support, Ukraine also advanced its external integration in justice and public governance. After applying for EU membership in February 2022, Ukraine was granted candidate status in June 2022 and accession negotiations formally opened in June 2024. Ukraine’s participation in international justice instruments also expanded. The Istanbul Convention entered into force for Ukraine in November 2022. Ukraine also ratified the 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters and the Rome Statute, which entered into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2025.
Given the importance of EU integration, Ukraine’s ongoing public governance and justice reforms are now being structured more explicitly through accession planning. As further analysed in Chapter 3, the Rule of Law Roadmap, prepared within the EU negotiation process, is currently the main strategic framework for reforms under Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis. It sets out priorities in several key areas, including the judiciary, anti-corruption, fundamental rights, security and law enforcement. Its approval by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2025 provided a clearer framework for implementing justice reforms under wartime conditions. The central challenge is no longer defining the direction of reform, but sequencing, financing and sustaining reforms while institutions continue to operate under the pressures of war.
2.3.4. Pressures on justice governance, service delivery and access to justice
Making the rule of law work for people requires attention to how it is expressed in law and, above all, how it operates in daily life (OECD, 2025[1]). The rule of law is realised in practice through people’s ability to understand their rights, navigate services and institutions and obtain fair and timely outcomes. Justice systems play a central role in this process: they are the means through which rights are translated into tangible outcomes. When people, communities and businesses cannot obtain information, challenge decisions, settle disputes or secure remedies in a fair and timely way, the rule of law weakens as a lived experience (OECD, 2025[1]).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has affected the practical operation of the rule of law and access to justice. Damage to infrastructure, displacement and disruptions to institutional functioning have created additional challenges for justice service delivery, particularly in temporarily occupied and frontline areas, while also increasing and diversifying legal needs related to housing, documentation, family separation and access to remedies and protection. These developments have further widened the gap between formal legal guarantees and people’s ability to resolve justice problems in practice, at a time when demand for legal assistance has increased alongside constraints affecting staffing, infrastructure, security and service delivery (see Chapter 6).
The war has also affected the governance and functioning of the justice system. Courts and the prosecution service continue operating under constraints arising from damaged infrastructure, security risks, displacement and increased operational demands, including investigations of war-related crimes. Justice services have adapted through expanded digital tools, remote service delivery and community-based outreach, while legal aid providers have experienced increased demand from war-affected populations. At the same time, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and multidisciplinary justice service centres remain unevenly available and limited in scale, which highlights the importance of investing in more integrated and accessible justice pathways, as discussed in Chapter 6.
2.3.5. Justice as a public service: A people-centred justice system in times of war
Responding to these challenges requires viewing justice as a public service. From this perspective, justice encompasses the full range of interactions through which people access rights, obtain information, receive support and resolve problems. It extends beyond courts to include administrative bodies, legal aid providers and other public and non-public actors. Justice, in this sense, is a cross-cutting public service responsibility that requires co-ordinated, accessible and responsive delivery and governance across the state, even under disruption, in line with the OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services [OECD/LEGAL/0503] and the OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems [OECD/LEGAL/0498]. Justice as a public service also recognises that people experience legal problems in interconnected ways. For example, issues related to housing, employment, family or income often overlap. Effective justice systems are therefore organised around user pathways, prevention and early intervention and proportionate responses, rather than institutional silos.
This framing is particularly relevant for Ukraine, where legal and administrative challenges arising from the war are closely linked across sectors such as housing, employment, social protection, veterans’ affairs and compensation for loss. Addressing these interconnected needs requires adaptive and co-ordinated public services across central and local levels, simplified administrative processes and effective referral pathways so that people and businesses understand how to interact with and navigate public authorities (OECD, 2026[25]; Business at OECD, 2026[26]).
The justice system in Ukraine therefore faces a dual challenge: maintaining ordinary justice functions under wartime conditions while responding to emerging needs linked to the war. This includes addressing everyday legal problems and emerging needs of underserved populations and ensuring accountability for war crimes and other war-related violations. These functions are interrelated, as individuals affected by the war may require support across multiple legal and administrative pathways at the same time.
Ensuring that justice functions effectively as a public service also depends on strong integrity and accountability frameworks. The legitimacy of these functions depends on safeguards for independence, the integrity of decision-making and credible, consistent accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2025[23]) (see Chapter 4). A people-centred justice system therefore complements institutional safeguards by linking justice governance with the way people experience rights, remedies and public authorities.
Under conditions of martial law, Ukrainian authorities have prioritised the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations, increasing the workload of prosecutors and justice institutions more broadly. Civil society organisations have also played an important role in documenting violations, collecting testimonies from victims and witnesses and supporting accountability processes, which may contribute to future truth-seeking, reparations and memorialisation (Sherpa and Van der Lugt, 2024[27]).
In war-affected settings such as Ukraine, ordinary justice and transitional justice mechanisms must operate simultaneously and coherently throughout the war and recovery phases. Victims and affected communities may need to engage with courts, reparations mechanisms, accountability processes and administrative services at the same time, which may create governance and co-ordination challenges. Integrating transitional justice mechanisms – including truth-seeking, accountability, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence – with ordinary justice institutions can help support coherent pathways to redress, continuity of legal protection and institutional trust. Evidence from other war-affected contexts also highlights the importance of integrated approaches across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. In Ukraine, this underscores the need to align justice responses with broader public governance reforms and service delivery, while adopting a people-centred approach to transitional justice that recognises victims and survivors not only as recipients of justice, but also as participants in the design, implementation and oversight of justice responses (OECD, forthcoming[28]).
References
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← 1. The Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Euromaidan movement) was a series of nationwide protests that began in November 2013 following the government’s decision to suspend preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the EU. The protests broadened into a larger civic movement calling for democratic governance, respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and addressing systemic corruption. The events culminated in early 2014 with a change of political leadership and a renewed strategic commitment to EU integration, which subsequently shaped Ukraine’s reform agenda across multiple policy areas.
← 2. In the Corruption Perceptions Index, scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Higher scores indicate lower perceived levels of corruption.
← 3. The RLI comprises eight core factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice.
← 4. In the Bertelsmann Transformation Index ranking, countries are ordered from best to worst governance performance, with rank 1 indicating the strongest performance and rank 137 the weakest.