This chapter examines the operational resilience demonstrated by Ukraine’s justice system during wartime, while assessing the constraints that limit its capacity to translate this resilience into sustained performance and reform. It analyses key management functions, including financing, workforce management, performance, digitalisation, data governance and infrastructure, and explores how these can evolve from ensuring continuity under stress to enabling a more strategic, agile and people-centred justice system.
OECD Justice Review of Ukraine
Delivering Better Justice Outcomes for People
Abstract
Ukraine’s justice system has needed to sustain core operations under pressure brought about by Russia’s war of aggression, while continuing to pursue ambitious reform objectives. While the system has demonstrated considerable resilience, its ability to translate that resilience into stronger performance, greater agility and the development of a people-centred justice system is constrained by fragmentation across budgeting, workforce management, performance measurement, digital systems, data governance and infrastructure.
This chapter examines resources and conditions that affect how the justice system functions, including financial resources, human resource management (HRM), information technology (IT), infrastructure and quality assurance policies focused on the people who use justice services. It assesses how courts and the prosecution service perform according to established indicators and broader inquiries into service quality, with a focus on people-centred justice. This chapter also explores issues essential to modern and resilient justice systems, including the enforcement of civil judgments, digitalisation of justice services and strengthening data governance in the justice sector. Ukraine’s ability to collect, share and use justice data effectively will be critically important to advance evidence-based planning, justice sector co-ordination and the delivery of people-centred justice services.
The chapter ultimately assesses whether Ukraine’s justice system possesses the financial, human, technological, informational and infrastructural capacities to continue operating under stress, modernise in line with the ambitious reform agenda and emerge from the war with a justice system that is more adaptable, modern and resilient.
5.2.1. Financing the justice sector for performance, agility and reform delivery
The preparation, execution and allocation of the budget for Ukraine’s justice sector is a complex process, which involves several judicial and prosecutorial bodies, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (MoJ) and other authorities. The State Judicial Administration of Ukraine (SJA) plays a vital role in the process of budget preparation and allocation of resources for local and appellate courts and certain judicial bodies. The High Council of Justice (HCJ) participates in determining the expenditures for court maintenance and judicial institutions. While the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) is responsible for the funding of prosecutors’ offices, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) has its own independent budget. The MoJ also plays an important role in the budgetary process of institutions and agencies under its competence, such as legal aid, national registers, penitentiaries and bailiffs.
When budget preparation is dispersed among several institutions, it can become difficult to consolidate efforts into a single, coherent push for sector-wide needs, or to prioritise investments and resource allocation properly. In such cases, the justice sector’s ability to translate strategic commitments into financed operational plans may be diminished. A more integrated budget approach that preserves institutional independence could reduce fragmentation and lead to greater stability by linking expenditures to reform priorities. Box 5.1 outlines OECD guidance for performance budgeting.
OECD Good Practices for Performance Budgeting
The rationale and objectives of performance budgeting are clearly documented and reflect the interest of key stakeholders.
Performance budgeting aligns expenditure with strategic goals and priorities of the government.
Performance budgeting systems incorporate flexibility to handle the varied nature of government activities and the complex relationship between spending and outcomes.
Government invests in human resources, data and other infrastructure needed to support performance budgeting.
Performance budgeting facilitates systematic oversight by the legislature and civil society, reinforcing government performance orientation and accountability.
Performance budgeting complements other tools designed to improve performance orientation, including programme evaluation and spending reviews.
Incentives around the performance budgeting system encourage performance-oriented behaviour and learning.
OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance
Medium-term expenditure frameworks are used as a way of moving away from reactive annual budgeting.
Participative and realistic debates are facilitated, including a wide range of groups and individuals on budgetary options.
Performance and evaluation results should inform budgetary choices.
OECD Spending Review Framework
Spending reviews allow for assessments of whether funds are efficiently used and informed decisions on possible resource allocation.
Clearly specified scopes, objectives as well as transparency are necessary for spending reviews to be effective.
OECD Performance Budgeting Framework
Performance information, including goals, outcomes, targets, indicators and benchmarks, is most effective when logically structured and benchmarked to government priorities.
Performance budgeting benefits from an enabling environment, including factors such as programme budgeting, the use of centrally issued guidelines, capacity-building efforts, IT systems and incentive mechanisms.
Moreover, in the context of war and systemic shortages of staff and resources, annual budgeting alone cannot provide a sufficient basis for long-term reform implementation. Thus, a medium-term framework that looks beyond the annual cycle and facilitates stronger links between appropriation and strategic planning could build resilience and allow justice sector institutions to link reform commitments to resource needs over a multi-year period, taking into account war-related risks, investments financed by international donors and reconstruction needs.
5.2.2. Budget of the justice sector
The budget of justice institutions in Ukraine is divided into a general fund for core operating expenditures and a special fund financed by revenues earmarked for digitalisation, infrastructure projects or programmes aimed at enhancing access to justice and institutional efficiency. Table 5.1 below provides an overview of the budget allocation for Ukraine’s justice sector in 2026.
Note: In the State Budget of Ukraine, the budget of the MoJ also includes expenditures related to the State Archival Service of Ukraine. As these functions fall outside the core justice sector, they are not included in this table.
Source: (VRU, 2025[5]).
In Ukraine, the budget of the justice sector is divided into several main components. It includes separate budget lines for the judiciary, covering local and appellate courts, the Court Security Service (CSS), the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJ) and the SJA consolidated under the SJA budget; the HCJ budget; the prosecution service budget under the OPG; the MoJ budget which covers penitentiaries, probation, forensic services, state bailiffs, State Archival Service of Ukraine and the free legal aid system; the budget of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SC); the budget of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU); and separate budgets of specialised high courts, namely the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC), the High Court on Intellectual Property (HCIP), the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).
Moreover, within the broader system of justice oversight and dispute resolution, a separate budget is allocated to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (UPCHR). In addition, under the budget of the State Administration of Affairs, separate funding is provided for the National Service for Mediation and Conciliation of Ukraine, which is responsible for the settlement of collective labour disputes. Within the wider criminal justice apparatus, the National Police of Ukraine also operates under a separate budget.
5.2.3. Spending composition and investment capacity in the justice sector
When comparing Ukraine’s implemented judicial system budget with those of other European countries, exceptional circumstances imposed by Russia’s war of aggression should be taken into account. As of 2024, Ukraine’s judicial budget’s expenditure amounted to approximately 0.62% of GDP (European Commission, 2024[6]), as compared with the 2022 Council of Europe (CoE) average of 0.31% of GDP (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). Yet, according to evidence, the funding for the judiciary is limited, as in 2024 it covered about 57% of its needs (European Commission, 2024[6]). Similarly, available data indicate that approximately 51.4% of the courts’ budgetary needs were met in 2023 and 63.4% in 2022 (Pravo-Justice, 2023[8]).
The distribution and composition of expenditures across the broader justice sector remains heavily oriented towards its core operating functions. A large share of funding is concentrated in institutions responsible for adjudication, prosecution and enforcement, notably the SJA and the courts, the OPG and the prosecution service, and the MoJ. Thus, in 2024, Ukraine allocated 55.7% of its judicial-system budget to courts, 41.2% to prosecution services and 3.1% to legal aid (CEPEJ, 2025[9]). These data show that Ukraine allocates a relatively high share of funding in the justice sector to the prosecution service, as compared with the CoE average of around 25% across surveyed countries (CEPEJ, 2024[7]; CEPEJ, 2025[9]). This may partly stem from the comparatively high number of prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants in Ukraine (see section below on HRM).
The MoJ accounts for the largest financial allocation, largely because of expenditures linked to the penitentiary system and the enforcement of court decisions.
The overall pattern indicates that public spending in the justice sector is directed primarily towards preserving the functioning and continuity of the system. By comparison, more limited resources appear to be available for upstream and people-centred services, including legal aid.
As indicated in Figure 5.1 below, the economic structure of expenditure across the courts (the SJA), the prosecution service (the OPG) and the MoJ indicates that wage-related spending absorbs the greater part of available resources. In the case of the SJA and the OPG, it represents almost 75% of total budgets, leaving limited space for development expenditure, including capital investment, digitalisation and improvement of services.
Note: The SJA category covers expenditures on local and appellate courts, regional SJA offices, the CSS, the NSJ and the HQCJ. The OPG category includes prosecutorial activities, training and professional development, as well as the SAPO. The MoJ category includes central administration, the State Penitentiary Service, probation services, forensic institutions and the free legal aid system. Expenditures related to the State Archival Service of Ukraine have been excluded from the calculations.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on (VRU, 2025[5]).
In a comparative perspective, in 2022, CoE countries spent on average 68.8% of their court budget on salaries. A smaller percentage was allocated to IT infrastructure (5.9%), operations and maintenance of buildings (9.4%) and construction of new buildings (1.8%) (CEPEJ, 2024[7]).
Where development spending is present, particularly within the MoJ (4.7%), it tends to be linked to one-off initiatives rather than system-wide investment. A substantial share of the MoJ’s development budget, estimated at around 70%, has been allocated to the construction of a pre-trial detention centre in Martusivka, Kyiv Oblast (VRU, 2025[5]). While this investment can contribute to improving detention conditions and bringing them closer into line with CoE and European Union (EU) standards, beyond this project, the overall level of development expenditure within the MoJ’s budget remains limited. For instance, the legal aid service under the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision (CCLAP) has not received a dedicated development allocation for 2026 (VRU, 2025[5]). This limitation may constrain the CCLAP’s ability to adapt service delivery models to evolving legal needs and justice problems, particularly in the context of displacement.
In practical terms, the current spending structure can restrict the capacity of the justice sector to improve efficiency, introduce new service models and respond to rising and more complex demand. The judiciary may find it difficult to finance critical improvements in digitalisation, infrastructure, cybersecurity and service improvements. A more strategically focused budget process could improve the accuracy of budget proposals in relation to institutional needs, and ensure that scarce resources are most appropriately allocated. This might have direct implications for the implementation of reforms foreseen under the Rule of Law Roadmap. It also affects the system’s ability to adjust to the pressures generated by the war, where flexibility, innovation and cross-sector co-ordination are increasingly important.
In particular, if digital modernisation is to become more predictable, IT investment may need stronger protection within the budget architecture. This may include creating dedicated lines of funding for certain programmes, as well as the development of new data and digital infrastructure. Strategic IT investments are a critical component of a system’s ability to deliver services effectively. Currently, Ukraine’s justice digitalisation depends heavily on donor-funded projects and fragmented institutional financing. While this funding configuration has so far supported certain progress, it can jeopardise long-term maintenance, ownership, interoperability and cybersecurity. A protected programme line and dedicated budget code for IT in the justice sector would make digital investment more visible and predictable. It would also provide a domestic financing anchor for priority systems such as EUICS, SMEREKA, eCase, enforcement systems and justice data infrastructure, while helping connect IT spending to reform priorities and service delivery.
Resource levels can influence operational capacity and the ability of institutions to carry out their mandates effectively over time. In terms of budgetary allocations, relatively limited funding for bodies such as the HACC and the HCJ may warrant consideration in light of their roles in supporting judicial accountability, integrity and public trust. This may be particularly relevant for the recently established Disciplinary Inspectors Service (DIS), which operates within the HCJ Secretariat and is responsible for managing a substantial volume of disciplinary cases (HCJ, 2026[10]). Current financing patterns, therefore, highlight the importance of looking beyond aggregate expenditure levels. The distribution and composition of funding across the justice sector are also important considerations, as they influence institutional capacity and reform implementation.
A broader strategic review of budgeting in the justice sector could also help ensure that the composition of spending is aligned with how people experience legal and justice problems in practice. While maintaining the core functioning of courts, prosecution services and enforcement institutions remains essential, a more holistic view of justice services may help strengthen the balance between downstream adjudication functions and upstream, people-centred services such as legal aid, mediation, outreach, digital access and integrated service delivery. Such an approach could also support greater cost-effectiveness by promoting prevention and earlier resolution of justice problems, reducing unnecessary escalation of disputes and improving the overall responsiveness of the justice system to evolving legal needs.
5.2.4. Remaining challenges
Thus, the judiciary in Ukraine is facing several challenges, including in relation to the available funding to implement the measures set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap for investing in e-justice and strengthening capacity in courts and prosecution services. Despite increases in judicial funding relative to 2023 and 2024, the 2025 budget remained insufficient to fully meet operational needs of the judiciary, covering an estimated 61% of required resources. The war has affected the budgetary situation for the justice sector, due to the damage, losses and the need for repair, reconstruction and construction of justice facilities. The budgetary needs for infrastructure are explained further below.
The ability of the justice system to deliver accessible and reliable services depends on available funding but importantly on how strategically and sustainably these resources are planned, allocated and managed. Systems using traditional budgeting may be less capable of adjusting the budget in view of unexpected changes, such as a sudden increase in caseloads. Principles of performance-based budgeting as used in the Netherlands and described in Box 5.2, offer a practical and resilient model.
After the establishment of the Council for the Judiciary in the Netherlands, a performance-based budgeting model was introduced for the preparation and execution of the budget for the judiciary. In this process, the Council plays an important role in the budget preparation. When preparing an annual budget proposal, the Council must include a forecast of the budgetary situation for the coming four years. The forecast is based on the expected inflow of cases for the coming year and subsequent years, work in progress at the start of the year of implementation and the desired level of progress made by courts in processing cases at the end of a budgetary year. Any differences between the data used by the Council in its budget proposal and those generated by the forecasting model must be explained in the budget proposal.
In the budget methodology a cost-per-case approach is used, which means that for each case type, including civil, criminal and administrative cases, there is a fixed estimated cost. This price is influenced by the price per case of that type in previous years, changes in the ratio of the number of cases per case category, workload measurements of judges and support staff and additional considerations pertaining to quality and efficiency of court services.
The total budget of the judiciary is based on the following components:
an output-related amount
an amount for court costs and expenses such as witnesses, interpreters and translators
an amount for other expenses, including financial contributions to support the court process, support for large criminal case hearings and support for special chambers of the court.
The situation of the justice sector’s budget in Ukraine suggests that the country has prioritised continuity in core justice functions under wartime conditions, but current funding patterns leave little leeway for investment in reforms towards a more people-centred justice system. An important next step for Ukraine would be to strengthen both medium-term planning and prioritisation of funding, as well as connections between expenditures, performance and reforms. Ukraine has not yet implemented a full system of performance-based budgeting. Such a system could establish a link between the budget required and the planned performance, helping ensure that resources will be properly planned and allocated. In Ukraine, this flexible approach could help incorporate justice user information about legal needs and justice problems, and ensure sufficient and resilient justice sector funding mechanisms.
Given the war, Ukraine should also ensure that reconstruction of the justice sector and service redesign are linked to broader recovery co-ordination mechanisms. A dedicated donor dashboard for the justice sector could help map donor-funded infrastructure, digitalisation and service-delivery projects against justice priorities, timelines, responsible institutions and risks related to sustainability. To avoid creating a silo, such a tool should be connected to Ukraine’s broader donor co-ordination architecture, including the Ukraine Donor Platform, described in Box 5.3. Multiple aid-tracking tools and overlapping donor formats could increase fragmentation. A justice dashboard would therefore add most value if it helped tag, monitor and analyse support for the justice sector within Ukraine’s wider aid-tracking, Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management and public investment architecture (OECD, 2026[13]).
The Ukraine Donor Platform, launched in January 2023, serves as a high-level co-ordination mechanism intended to align international support with Ukraine’s budgetary needs, reform agenda and recovery priorities. It brings together Ukraine, the EU, G7 countries, partner countries and international financial institutions and intergovernmental organisations, including the OECD.
For the justice sector, the Platform provides a broad architecture within which donor-funded reconstruction, digitalisation and service-delivery projects could be more transparently mapped. It facilitates policy dialogue, information sharing and co-ordination of external assistance.
The Platform supports the mobilisation and co-ordination of budget support and recovery and reconstruction efforts. It also promotes stronger public investment management, including through the Ukraine Government Project Preparation Facility. As a result, it could be particularly useful for rebuilding justice infrastructure and redesigning justice services, where donor support may finance refurbishment of courthouses and investment in digital tools, legal aid access points, justice service centres or new IT equipment.
Source: (UPCHR, 2026[14]; OECD, 2026[13]).
HRM is central to maintaining the capacity, independence and resilience of justice institutions. In the justice sector, HRM goes beyond filling vacancies. It encompasses such aspects as strategic workforce planning, talent attraction and merit-based recruitment and selection. Moreover, it covers onboarding, continuous professional development, management of workload, mobility and remuneration, as well as working conditions and retention of staff. These elements are closely related to performance and access to justice, as staffing shortages, gaps in skills and difficult working conditions may negatively affect timeliness and quality of decision-making, user experience and institutional resilience in the justice sector.
This subchapter analyses judicial and prosecutorial careers from an HRM perspective. It focuses on workforce planning, staffing levels, recruitment pipelines, deployment, competencies, working conditions and retention. Integrity safeguards and accountability risks associated with these procedures are addressed in Chapter 4.
5.3.1. Recruitment, selection and competency-based assessment
Judiciary
European and international standards highlight that the recruitment, selection, promotion, evaluation and transfer of judges and prosecutors need to be based on clear procedures and objective criteria (CCJE, 2001[15]; CCJE, 2014[16]; CCPE, 2018[17]). From an HRM perspective, in Ukraine, institutional arrangements are important for maintaining workforce capacity, filling vacancies, matching skills to institutional needs and responding to staffing gaps across institutions in the justice sector.
The HCJ and the HQCJ play crucial roles in judicial career management. The HQCJ selects judicial candidates, organises competitions, conducts qualification assessments and provides recommendations for appointments, promotions and transfers. The HCJ is responsible for judicial appointments, transfers, dismissals and discipline, as well as for promoting judicial independence (VRU, 2024[18]). It also adopts model regulations on court staff, provides advisory opinions on laws related to court organisation and judicial status, and summarises proposals on related legislation. From a workforce perspective, the capacity and continuity of the HCJ and the HQCJ directly affect the pace of recruitment, qualification evaluation, deployment and reduction of vacancies.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 2021 reforms introduced the Ethics Council for the HCJ and the Selection Commission for the HQCJ. From an HRM perspective, their relevance lies in ensuring that the reconstitution of judicial governance bodies remains credible while allowing vacancies and qualification backlogs to be addressed in a timely manner. However, institutional disruption and the full-scale invasion delayed the reconstitution of the HCJ and the HQCJ, with significant consequences for judicial appointments, qualification evaluations and possible reduction in the number of vacancies.
Staffing shortages and delays in judicial appointments constitute an operational bottleneck in Ukraine’s judiciary. These factors hinder court efficiency and constrain the capacity of justice institutions to process appointments, evaluations and disciplinary matters in a timely and consistent manner. Fewer judges and overstretched governance bodies may also lead to increased workloads, make career decisions more urgent and reduce the system’s ability to implement reforms in a sustainable manner. This demonstrates the connection between workforce capacity, institutional performance and the credibility of accountability safeguards.
5.3.2. Staffing levels and deployment
As a result of the full-scale invasion, the HCJ remained non-operational for approximately one year and the HQCJ for almost three years. Although some limited functions were temporarily transferred to the SC under martial law, key constitutional responsibilities relating to judicial appointments, transfers, qualification evaluations and disciplinary procedures could not be delegated and therefore remained suspended until the HCJ resumed operations in January 2023 and the HQCJ was reconstituted in June 2023. This disruption significantly slowed the implementation of judicial reforms and contributed to growing structural pressures across the court system, including the accumulation of disciplinary cases, stalled qualification assessments and a sharp increase in judicial vacancies. As of April 2026, the number of vacant judicial positions totalled 2 293 (HQCJ, 2026[19]), indicating a 34.8% vacancy rate and increasing pressure on sitting judges and limiting the system’s capacity to respond flexibly to wartime displacement, uneven caseloads and territorial disruptions. Although the resumption of operations of the HCJ and the HQCJ allowed judicial career procedures and appointments to gradually restart in 2023 and 2024, substantial backlogs and staffing shortages remain.
Given the extensive workload associated with judicial recruitment, qualification evaluation and disciplinary procedures, the effective functioning of the HCJ and the HQCJ depends heavily on adequate administrative and analytical support through their Secretariats. However, both institutions continue to face operational and human resource constraints, including limited staffing capacity and uncompetitive salaries (AntAC, 2024[20]). Important institutional improvements have nevertheless been introduced in recent years. Separate information security systems for the HQCJ were established in 2024 and 2025, and a dedicated analytical unit became operational in 2026. Further strengthening of information security arrangements and refinement of the analytical methodology governing the unit’s activities may still be necessary (DEJURE, 2024[21]).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated pre-existing challenges in relation to court staff, as the support personnel has been displaced, left the profession or, in some cases, joined the military. The departure of qualified personnel, combined with pre-existing resource limitations, has strained institutional capacity, particularly in frontline regions where justice personnel live and work. Challenging working conditions and insufficient remuneration further deter recruitment of new court staff. The war has also imposed a human toll on the judiciary (European Commission, 2023[22]).
Staffing specialised courts and the CCU
Workforce alignment challenges also affect specialised and higher courts, raising distinct capacity concerns. As indicated in Chapter 4, special procedures have been created for the selection and appointment of new judges in specialised high courts and the CCU. CCU judges are selected in an open competition organised by an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE). For the selection process of new judges of the HACC, the Public Council of International Experts provides opinions about the ethics and professional standards of candidates. Moreover, an Expert Council has been established to support the selection of judges to the SDAC and the SACA.
Delays in the selection and appointment of CCU judges have had direct operational consequences for the CCU. After the CCU lost the quorum of its Grand Chamber at the end of January 2025, the quorum was restored only in July 2025. This meant that the CCU operated without the necessary quorum for about five months, while one of its senates had also been blocked for six months because of insufficient judicial membership (ALI, 2025[23]).
The remaining staffing gap continues to pose a risk to the functioning of the CCU. As of April 2026, five positions on the CCU remained vacant, and the VRU had still not finalised the appointment of two judges from among candidates recommended by the AGE since February 2025 (ALI, 2025[23]; DEJURE, 2025[24]). The delays are not a marginal procedural issue. A transparent and merit-based selection procedure for CCU judges, in line with Venice Commission recommendations, has been one of the priorities agreed between the EU and Ukraine in the accession process (European Commission, 2022[25]).
Judicial staffing levels
As shown in Table 5.2 below, there are 4 304 judges working in the courts across Ukraine and 2 293 judicial vacancies as of late April 2026 (HQCJ, 2026[19]).1 These figures point to an overall judicial vacancy rate of 34.8% across all court levels, nearly three times the OECD average (12.3%) (OECD, 2026[26]).
Note: Vacancy ratios were calculated as vacant positions divided by the total number of positions for each court type. The total vacancy ratio was calculated by dividing total vacant positions (2 293) by total positions (6 597). The table covers the ordinary judiciary only and therefore does not include the CCU.
Source: (HQCJ, 2026[19]), as of 27 April 2026.
As of 2024, Ukraine had 12.1 judges per 100 000 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), compared to the 2020 OECD average of 19.3 and 2022 CoE average of 21.9 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). Ukraine’s neighbouring countries also had a significantly higher number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants in 2022, including Poland (28), Slovak Republic (25.7), Hungary (27.7) and Romania (22.9) (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). These comparative figures suggest that Ukraine’s judicial capacity constraints are not limited to temporary pressures of war, but reflect a structural shortage of judges, which – if unaddressed – may affect court accessibility, timeliness and the even distribution of caseloads across the system.
Court staff
Judicial capacity should not be assessed based on the number of judges alone. Court performance also depends on the availability of non-judge staff to support case preparation, administration, scheduling and communication with court users. When the number of support staff is insufficient, judge time is diverted from conducting core judicial activities and resolving disputes, leading to inefficiencies.
Ukraine’s judiciary continues to face a significant shortage of court support staff. This challenge is linked to a combination of factors including low remuneration, difficult working conditions and the broader effects of Russia’s war of aggression on court operations. Wartime conditions have further affected staffing capacity, including through displacement, mobilisation and other security-related impacts on court personnel (Pravo-Justice, 2023[8]).
In 2020, courts in Ukraine were supported by 72.1 non-judge staff per 100 000 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). While in 2022 this number fell to 57.9 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]), in 2024, the figure rose to 58.7, slightly above the 2020 OECD average of 58.2 (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), although below the 2022 CoE average of 67.9 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). According to 2024 data, the ratio of non-judge staff per professional judge in Ukraine was 4.9 (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), a score slightly higher than the 2022 CoE average of 4.0 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). These figures suggest that staffing challenges in Ukraine are not primarily explained by the overall number of support staff relative to judges, but may relate more to issues such as distribution, retention, remuneration and the operational impacts of wartime conditions.
In the current context, where courts continue to operate under exceptionally difficult circumstances, international experiences in addressing staffing challenges may offer useful insights. While institutional and operational contexts differ, examples from OECD countries can help inform measures aimed at maintaining court performance, supporting staff wellbeing and strengthening resilience during periods of sustained pressure (see Box 5.4).
Flying judge brigades, the Netherlands
To ease pressure on overburdened jurisdictions, the Netherlands has introduced a dedicated task force composed of judges and court staff to support municipal and civil divisions of courts with particularly high caseloads. The task force prepares draft decisions and supports case processing. By doing this, it frees up capacity of local courts enabling them to focus on hearings and pending decisions. This mechanism is commonly referred to as “flying judge brigades”.
In addition, it is possible for courts to reassign cases to less busy jurisdictions to balance workloads. Courts can also encourage voluntary temporary or permanent redeployments or transfers of judges from less burdened to overburdened courts. These measures may be underpinned by incentives, such as salary bonuses or cost compensation, to facilitate participation of judges. The application of measures of this kind requires continuous alignment with the principles of judicial immovability and appropriate safeguards for judicial independence.
Employment of retired judges
Several OECD countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States, engage retired judges to help address staffing shortages and court backlogs. In Canada, judges may continue serving with reduced workloads under “supernumerary” status, while some provinces temporarily recall retired judges to support courts facing capacity pressures. Similar programmes exist in several states of the United States, where retired judges may be reassigned to courts experiencing vacancies or excessive caseloads. Comparable mechanisms are also used in some European jurisdictions through the temporary appointment of substitute or retired judges. Such solutions can increase flexibility and resilience within the judiciary, provided that appropriate safeguards preserve judicial independence and accountability.
Source: (OECD, 2023[27]).
5.3.3. Talent attraction, retention, remuneration and working conditions
Attraction and retention of talent in the judiciary has become increasingly difficult during the war. The departure of qualified personnel, mobilisation, displacement and security risks have reduced the capacity of courts to handle increasing workloads. These challenges are exacerbated by low or unpredictable remuneration and difficult working conditions, particularly for court staff and personnel in frontline or high-demand regions.
In this context, HRM policy could give greater attention to how the justice sector attracts, retains and supports qualified personnel, including through more competitive and predictable remuneration, clear career pathways, modernised roles of court support staff, safer working conditions and targeted incentives for service in underserved or high-pressure jurisdictions. A systematically reviewed staff retention strategy could examine other factors affecting staff motivation and wellbeing, including workload, management culture, flexible working arrangements, psychosocial support, professional development and opportunities for mobility or specialisation. Such incentives are relevant not only for judges and prosecutors, but also for court staff, courtroom technologists, disciplinary inspectors and other support functions that are essential to maintaining performance within the justice sector.
Remuneration and working conditions are central to talent attraction and operational continuity across the justice sector. As highlighted in Figure 5.2 below, each year, issues with remuneration affecting judges and court staff are the subject of appeals submitted by local and appellate courts to the HCJ. The data published by the HCJ show that the highest average numbers of such appeals between 2020-2025 were recorded in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (11.7), Kyiv city (8.7), Lvivska Oblast (8.7) and Odeska Oblast (8.5) (HCJ, 2026[28]). The statistics suggest that challenges in ensuring timely and adequate remuneration for judges and court staff may be particularly acute in larger urban centres. Yet, in nominal terms, in 2023-2024, the highest numbers of such appeals were recorded in Mykolaivska Oblast, where the jurisdiction of certain courts was restored following the liberation by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (HCJ, 2026[28]).
The chart shows the average annual number of reports by judges or courts on problems with court financing
Note: The Autonomous Republic of Crimea is excluded from the chart, as it has been under occupation by Russia since 2014.
Source: (HCJ, 2026[28]), elaborated by authors.
Concerns regarding the remuneration of civil servants working in courts were also publicly raised by the SJA and the HCJ in March and April 2026, when both institutions appealed to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for adequate funding and appropriate conditions for the functioning of courts and other justice institutions (HCJ, 2026[29]). The HCJ noted that inadequate remuneration for court staff, particularly in local courts, may affect court operations and public confidence in the justice system (HCJ, 2026[29]). Indeed, shortages affecting remuneration, staffing and infrastructure may not only weaken resilience of institutions, retention of staff and operational effectiveness – they may also affect the overall sustainability of justice sector reforms over time.
Adequate working conditions are also essential for attracting and retaining staff in the judiciary. Under martial law and wartime conditions, ensuring that courts can operate safely and without interruption has become increasingly important (The Kyiv Independent, 2024[30]). In this context, the decision of the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU) of 24 February 2022 recommended that, where the life, health or safety of judges, court staff or court users is at risk, courts should promptly decide on the temporary suspension of proceedings until such circumstances are removed (CJU, 2022[31]). Subsequent guidance from the CJU also recommended remote work for court staff and limiting the number of people present in court buildings for safety reasons (CJU, 2022[32]). Expanded use of videoconferencing technologies has helped further reduce the need for participants’ physical presence in courts. It contributed to continuity of proceedings and, in some circumstances, to enhanced security for judges and court users. In this context, measures supporting continuity of judicial operations, physical security and remote administration became important to ensuring access to justice during the war.
The war has also created specific challenges for constitutional proceedings. According to stakeholders, the use of videoconferencing for deliberations and decision-making has been complicated by attempted cyberattacks. Given current technical limitations relating to information security, the CCU has continued to rely largely on the physical presence of judges for decision-making (WJP, 2025[33]; OECD, 2026[34]).
Working conditions also depend on the safety, functionality and resilience of justice infrastructure. Issues related to courthouse damage, shelters, cybersecurity, videoconferencing and operational continuity are examined in Section 5.6.
5.3.4. Training and competency development
Training
Career progression, promotions and transfers are important incentives over the course of a judge’s career. Training and competency development are also central to HRM in the justice sector. The Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges (LJSJ) requires candidates for judicial office to complete a six-month specialised training programme (VRU, 2025[35]). It also guarantees judges the right and duty to participate in continuous professional development, including regular training offered by the NSJ (VRU, 2025[35]). Existing training programmes could be organised more explicitly in a competency framework for the justice sector, covering legal analysis, ethical judgement, case management, communication with court users, digital skills, trauma-informed practice, leadership and change management.
A connection between competencies, recruitment, onboarding, evaluation, promotion and training would help ensure that HRM supports not only integrity and independence, but also quality, accessibility and responsiveness of justice services. Such a framework could also inform the development of specialised support roles, including case managers, courtroom technologists and communication officers.
Evaluation and professional development
Judicial evaluation is an important tool of HRM. It connects such aspects as competencies, training and career development. The LJSJ establishes specific provisions to identify areas that require improvement and provide incentives for judges to uphold their qualifications and pursue professional growth (VRU, 2025[35]). The LJSJ also establishes a system of regular judicial evaluation, which aims to identify individual training needs of judges and support their continuous professional growth (VRU, 2025[35]).
The evaluation process draws from multiple sources and includes assessments by trainers at the NSJ based on training performance, peer evaluations by judges of the same court and self-assessments by the judge under assessment (VRU, 2025[35]).
Civil society organisations (CSOs) can also conduct independent observations of judges during open court hearings, documenting findings to assess issues such as procedural compliance, duration of proceedings, communication practices and perceived impartiality of judges (VRU, 2025[35]). Such observations may enhance transparency and public confidence in judicial performance. However, methodological clarity and appropriate safeguards are needed to ensure that such observations remain supplementary rather than determinative in the process of judicial evaluation.
The results of evaluation based on training should be formally communicated to judges, who have the right to submit objections, after which revised assessments may be issued. The evaluation materials, along with objections and responses, are included in the judge’s official dossier (VRU, 2025[35]). CSO monitoring questionnaires may also be added to the dossier. The specific procedure and methodology for both evaluation and self-evaluation are regulated by the HQCJ. To strengthen the HRM function of evaluation, these supplementary processes could be connected more systematically with training, competency development and workforce planning, while remaining distinct from disciplinary proceedings, except where serious misconduct is identified through the evaluation process.
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany
In Germany, the administration of courts falls under the responsibility of each federal state. Most states have created formal evaluation systems to inform career decisions such as promotion and assignment to senior posts. The systems rely on detailed catalogues of specific criteria. The federal state of North Rhine‑Westphalia, for instance, uses the following criteria:
Professional competence: Evaluations focus on legal knowledge, the ability to apply the law in new situations, decisiveness, impartiality and the ability to use IT tools, as well as objective data, such as the number of cases decided and the rate of appeal decisions upheld.
Personal and social competence: Evaluations focus on natural authority, sense of responsibility, willingness to perform, organisational skills, resilience to stress, ability to work in a team, clarity of expression and communication with parties. There is also a category pertaining to leadership competence for judges who supervise other judges.
Rovaniemi appellate district, Finland
As part of a project aimed at improving the quality of adjudication, a less formalised and participatory evaluation scheme emphasising self-assessment was implemented in courts under the jurisdiction of the Rovaniemi appellate district. The scheme emphasised self‑assessment with the following aspects of the system:
Annual quality targets chosen by judges: Quality development targets are collectively agreed on by judges each year and working groups are set up to implement them. Progress is monitored and discussed in regular meetings.
Quality benchmarks: A working group developed benchmarks that highlighted the following six dimensions of performance: the judicial process, the decision itself, treatment of parties, promptness, judge’s competence and management. These factors were accompanied by a list of around 40 quality criteria, which are assessed on a point scale and serve as a reference for self‑evaluation and peer review of judges.
5.3.5. Prosecution workforce capacity
The picture in the prosecution service is different. Workforce pressures vary in both scale and character. The comparison can help show where constraints are specific to the judiciary versus those that are shared across institutions.
Selection, appointment and capacity of prosecutors
The selection, appointment, promotion and transfer of prosecutors and heads of prosecution services depends on the type of prosecution office. The Head of the SAPO appoints and dismisses prosecutors of this office in accordance with the procedure established in the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. The Prosecutor General is responsible for the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors to managerial positions and prosecutors of the OPG (VRU, 2026[38]). The heads of regional prosecutor’s offices are responsible for the appointment, promotion and dismissal of prosecutors of regional and district prosecutor’s offices (VRU, 2026[38]). The selection of district and trainee prosecutors falls under the competence of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors. Prosecutors must pass a qualification examination, including knowledge tests in law and European human rights standards (VRU, 2026[38]).
Capacity of prosecutors and support staff
In contrast with the capacity of judges, the number of prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants in Ukraine – 23.0 in 2022 and 20.7 in 2024 – is more than double the CoE 2022 average (12.2) (CEPEJ, 2024[7]) or the 2020 OECD average (10.5) (OECD, 2025[39]). Although there appear to be fewer human resource capacity challenges in the prosecution service, in terms of availability of support staff, Ukraine’s prosecution service is functioning below the 2022 CoE average. In 2024, there were 11.2 support officers appointed in Ukraine’s prosecution service per 100 000 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), compared with a European average of 14.7 support officers (CEPEJ, 2024[7]).
The ratio of prosecutorial support staff points to a possible structural imbalance: relatively strong prosecutorial staffing may not translate into equivalent institutional capacity where administrative, analytical and operational support is weaker. Over time, this imbalance may reduce efficiency of the prosecution service and limit the extent to which prosecutors can focus on core prosecutorial functions. Box 5.6 explains how an OECD Member country strengthened prosecutorial performance in the face of case backlogs and data deficits.
Latvia has faced challenges in addressing complex economic and financial crimes, including due to lengthy pre-trial investigations, low case throughput and case backlogs. In response, the OECD recommended strengthening strategic management and making better use of performance data.
Key reforms implemented in the country included enhanced performance monitoring, notably through annual public reporting by the Prosecutor General and improved data collection and analysis. The aim of these measures was to support greater transparency and provide a basis for more evidence-based management, including identifying bottlenecks in investigations and prosecutions.
The OECD also recommended improving efficiency through better workload management, clearer prioritisation and increased specialisation, particularly in complex crime areas. Moreover, strengthening co-ordination between prosecutors and investigative bodies was identified as a critical step to reduce delays at the pre-trial stage.
Latvia’s experience underlines the importance of linking performance measurement with organisational reforms, including clearer objectives, improved resource allocation and stronger managerial capacity within prosecution services.
Source: (OECD, 2021[40]).
Compared with the courts, the number of vacancies at the prosecution service is significantly lower. Staffing gaps in the prosecution service appear to have narrowed since 2024 and remain significantly lower than in the judiciary. As of February 2024, there were 1 271 vacancies across the prosecution service, including 451 vacancies in the OPG, regional and equivalent offices and 820 vacancies in district and equivalent offices (Government of Ukraine, 2024[41]). By May 2026, this figure had fallen to 848 vacant or temporarily vacant posts, comprising 672 vacant posts and 176 temporarily vacant posts across the OPG, regional-level offices and district-level offices (QDCP, 2026[42]). This represents a reduction of 423 posts, or around one-third, compared with February 2024.
Against the statutory ceiling of 10 000 prosecutors, the 2026 figures amount to an estimated vacancy rate of 6.7% when only vacant posts are counted, or 8.5% when temporarily vacant posts are included. Although these statistics suggest that prosecutorial staffing pressures are less acute than judicial vacancies, they may still affect operational capacity of the prosecution service, particularly at district level and in offices facing high caseloads, war-related crime files or specialised prosecutorial demands.
5.3.6. Remaining challenges
Workforce challenges are not uniform across Ukraine’s justice system. The judiciary appears to have greater staffing needs in both adjudicative and support roles. The prosecution service faces challenges in using its managerial capacity and specialisation to apply available resources to create efficient outcomes.
The staffing needs of judicial and prosecutorial functions in Ukraine indicate that workforce reform should not be only a matter of filling vacancies. There is scope in Ukraine to institutionalise sustainability by streamlining hiring processes for judges, prosecutors and support staff that take account of varying support and administrative needs. Further, Ukraine can develop tools to permit workload balancing among institutions and across jurisdictions. Improving performance will also require active caseload management, mechanisms for the redistribution of workload, better staffing of support personnel and greater transparency in performance reviews. These measures can cement the resilience already demonstrated by the justice sector, reduce backlogs and strengthen the system for future reform implementation.
With the ongoing war, data collection is even more important, since justice institutions are expected to receive new types of cases, such as war- or death-related compensation requests, requests for obtaining personal documents or certificates, war crimes and corruption cases. Furthermore, the temporary occupation of certain territories in Ukraine has led to changes in jurisdiction, reassignment of cases and an accelerated development of IT solutions to ensure access to justice.
The main challenge at this point is not simply to fill vacancies, but to develop workforce models that support sustainable performance under conditions of war and ongoing reforms. A more strategic HRM approach would help align recruitment, deployment, training, retention and staffing of support personnel with changing caseloads, varied territorial needs and reform priorities. These factors require faster recruitment, stronger support and secretariat capacity, workload management and improved measures for staff retention. Without these safeguards, the system risks becoming stuck in persistent institutional overstretch.
5.4.1. What performance indicators show
In comparative practice, the performance and efficiency of justice systems are often assessed through court performance. Highly efficient courts can manage their volume of incoming cases effectively, conduct proceedings according to the principle of “reasonable duration”, as prescribed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and administer justice based on people’s needs.
Performance indicators show that Ukraine’s justice system has not only maintained continuity under wartime conditions, but has pushed ahead with certain reform efforts as well. However, there remain significant variations across jurisdictions, with certain areas facing more pressure and bottlenecks than others. These effects can spill over the system if not properly addressed. Moreover, justice sector performance monitoring should move beyond passive output monitoring to use annual targets, regular reviews and corrective actions to identify and address emerging problems and support more even system-wide performance.
In sum, performance indicators suggest a mixed picture. On the one hand, Ukraine’s courts have remained functional under extreme pressure; on the other hand, certain trends indicate that resilience does not imply an absence of risk. The issue is whether performance is consistent, sustainable and meaningful from the perspective of justice users.
Incoming cases
While available statistics suggest a comparatively moderate inflow of civil and commercial cases, incoming caseloads alone do not fully reflect underlying legal needs. Wartime disruptions since 2022 affected the operation of courts and other public institutions, particularly in temporarily occupied and frontline areas, and may have reduced or redirected the ability of individuals to pursue civil claims through formal court channels even as legal needs increased (CEPEJ, 2025[9]).
Administrative cases show a different trend. In 2024, Ukraine recorded 1.24 incoming administrative cases per 100 inhabitants in first-instance courts, up from 0.81 in 2020 and well above the CoE median of 0.33 in 2022 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]; CEPEJ, 2025[9]).2 This increase may reflect growing interactions between individuals and public authorities during wartime, including disputes related to documentation, legal status and access to public entitlements and social support.
Criminal caseloads also remained comparatively notable. According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) data for 2023, Ukraine recorded 0.29 new incoming criminal cases per 100 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2024[7]), considerably below the 2022 CEPEJ European median of 1.6 received criminal cases per 100 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). At the same time, the absence of more detailed statistics limits assessment of the types of criminal cases contributing to this trend.
Overall, compared with 2018 and 2020, data for 2022 indicate a decline in incoming civil and commercial cases alongside increases in administrative and criminal cases (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). These shifts should be interpreted cautiously, as they may reflect war-related disruption, territorial exclusion from datasets, changing legal needs and uneven access to institutions, rather than changes in overall demand for justice.
Pending cases and clearance rates
Statistics on pending cases suggest that Ukraine’s first-instance courts have not yet accumulated high pending caseloads in comparative European terms. In 2023, Ukraine recorded 0.7 civil and commercial cases pending in first-instance courts per 100 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), below the 2022 CEPEJ European median of 1.50 pending civil and commercial litigious cases per 100 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). In criminal cases, Ukraine’s rate of 0.31 pending cases per 100 inhabitants in 2023 (CEPEJ, 2025[9]) was also below the 2022 CEPEJ European benchmark of 0.47 unresolved criminal cases per 100 inhabitants (CEPEJ, 2024[7]).
Ukraine appears to be managing the workload of its first-instance courts relatively well in terms of pending cases. This picture may reflect a lag effect: Ukraine’s relatively low stock of pending cases could be partly an inheritance from the period of strong clearance performance between 2018 and 2022. With clearance rates now below 100%, the pending case position is likely to deteriorate unless caseflow management is strengthened.
Clearance rate data help explain that risk. Overall, clearance rates for the first-instance courts in Ukraine decreased between 2018 and 2023. This is especially true for civil cases, which dropped from 112% in 2022 to 89% in 2023 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). This trend also holds true for criminal cases, where there has been a gradual reduction of clearance rates for the years 2022 and 2023. The growing retirement rate among judges and the suspension of new judicial appointments due to the non-functioning of the HQCJ between 2019 and 2023 likely contributed to an imbalance in judicial workload distribution. As a result, the workload of sitting judges has effectively doubled. This challenge is further compounded by delays in the timely redistribution of cases between courts with varying levels of caseloads, highlighting structural inefficiencies in the first-instance judicial map.
Figure 5.3 below shows the evolution of clearance rates for first-instance courts in Ukraine for civil and commercial cases between 2012 and 2024.
Source: (CEPEJ, 2024[7]; CEPEJ, 2025[9]).
When looking at the civil and commercial first-instance courts, there was a downward trend between 2012-2021. In 2022, however, there was a positive spike in court performance; clearance rates rose sharply to 112% during the first year of Russia’s invasion. One potential reason for this might be that the number of incoming civil and commercial cases dropped and courts therefore had more time to resolve active pending cases. This changed in 2023, when clearance rates dropped to 89%. However, in 2024, the clearance rate for civil cases rose back to 91% (CEPEJ, 2025[9]).
Indeed, the issue of court performance has been addressed in the Rule of Law Roadmap, which envisages several measures aimed at reducing the backlog of pending cases, such as conducting an audit of cases to identify those not subject to judicial review, improving cassation filters through legislative amendments, expanding the use of exemplary cases and using the Unified Judiciary Information and Technology System (UJITS) to monitor case intake and pending caseloads (VRU, 2025[43]).
At present, courts may function within acceptable parameters, but decreasing clearance rates suggest that pressure could accumulate over time unless caseloads are monitored regularly and mitigation measures are implemented promptly.
Disposition time
Data on disposition times present a more positive picture than clearance rates, but they should not be read in isolation. Even though the clearance rates for civil, commercial and criminal cases in the first-instance courts of Ukraine dropped, especially after 2022, this did not immediately translate into longer disposition times. Between 2018 and 2023, the disposition time for civil and commercial cases in Ukraine fluctuated between 122 days in 2020 and 169 days in 2023 (CEPEJ, 2025[9]). These scores remained below the 2022 CEPEJ European median of 239 days for first-instance civil and commercial litigious cases (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). In criminal cases, disposition time in first-instance courts in Ukraine fell from nearly 300 days between 2018-2020 to 54 days in 2023 (CEPEJ, 2025[9]), well below the 2022 CEPEJ European median of 133 days for first-instance criminal cases (CEPEJ, 2024[7]).
These scores indicate a relatively strong performance of Ukraine’s judiciary in terms of timeliness. Disposition times in civil, commercial and criminal cases appear broadly consistent with European benchmarks for reasonable duration. Even in times of war, the Ukrainian courts delivered justice in a timely manner. However, with diminishing clearance rates and an increase in pending cases, this situation may change in the future. Therefore, the performance of first‑instance courts should be carefully monitored in the coming years to mitigate growing disposition times and ensure timely access to justice for people in Ukraine.
Notably, it is expected that the efficiency of criminal proceedings will be further enhanced following new legislation in 2024 allowing for certain criminal cases to be heard by a single sitting judge. Other legislative changes in the Criminal Procedure Code from 2023 should have a positive impact on the duration of proceedings, due to the removal of time limits for criminal investigations and the mandatory closure of criminal investigations when the time limits have expired.
At other court instances, the picture is uneven. The disposition time for civil cases increased at appellate courts from 109 days in 2020 to 169 days in 2022 (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). On the other hand, in criminal cases and criminal appeals the disposition time was substantially reduced. The same is true for administrative first-instance courts where the disposition time was reduced from 2020-2022 by almost 100 days (CEPEJ, 2024[7]).
Taken together, these indicators suggest that Ukraine was – in many cases – able to preserve timely adjudication despite the war. Yet, as mentioned, clearance rates below 100%, combined with high judicial vacancy rate and shortage of support staff, suggest that pressures may be accumulating beneath the surface. Current performance may therefore be more fragile than data on disposition time alone suggest, particularly if pending cases continue to grow or war-related legal needs generate new demand.
Efficiency of prosecution services
The efficiency of prosecution services can be measured through statistics regarding the number of cases received per prosecutor, the ways cases are processed – discontinued, concluded through a negotiated penalty or measure, or brought before the court – and the reasons why cases are being discontinued.
In 2020, the average workload per prosecutor was 234 cases, while in 2022 it was 204 cases (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). In 2022, approximately 83% of cases were discontinued and only 17% were brought before the court (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). The main reasons why cases were discontinued were the lack of an established offence or a specific legal situation (in 77% of all discontinued cases).
While caseflow indicators are essential, they do not capture the full scope of justice quality. A broader performance assessment framework must consider whether services are fair, understandable, accessible and responsive to people’s needs, and whether institutions are equipped to learn from feedback and improve over time. Attention to the quality of justice is therefore essential to assess whether a justice system generates outcomes that are not only timely, but also equitable, reliable and trusted. As discussed in Chapter 6, this also requires treating justice interventions as public services and linking institutions through referral systems and structured collaboration among providers.
5.4.2. From caseflow monitoring to quality assurance
A well-functioning justice system must deliver quality services, ensuring that processes are fair, decisions are well-reasoned and accessible, and justice users are treated with dignity and respect. Efficiency of justice sector institutions alone is insufficient if outcomes are not understandable, consistent or responsive to people’s legal needs. Attention to the quality aspect of justice is therefore essential to assess whether a justice system generates outcomes that are not only timely, but also equitable, reliable and trusted.
Court quality assurance policies are gaining popularity worldwide. European guidelines and standards have been developed to assist justice systems; for example, with tools for judges and courts covering the measurement of quality of justice, court user satisfaction surveys, guidelines for communication between courts and the media and the implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) in courts (CCJE, 2025[44]). Similar standards have been developed for public prosecutors and published by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCJE, 2025[44]) and the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP, 2025[45]). Box 5.7 describes various approaches to quality assurance frameworks and tools in justice systems.
OECD Member countries have developed a range of quality assurance frameworks and tools to support the delivery of high-quality justice services. The existing frameworks typically combine performance measurement, user feedback and institutional quality management systems.
Across jurisdictions, commonly used tools include court user satisfaction surveys, performance indicators, such as case duration, clearance rates and backlog, quality charters and service standards, as well as peer review and inspection mechanisms. Increasingly, digital case management systems also contribute to improving transparency, consistency and access to justice.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the judiciary has established a comprehensive quality assurance framework through the RechtspraaQ model. This system defines standards across key dimensions of judicial performance, including legal quality, timeliness, consistency and user orientation. It is supported by regular court self-assessments, peer reviews and audits, alongside the systematic use of user satisfaction surveys. By combining quantitative indicators with qualitative assessments, the model enables continuous monitoring and improvement of court performance.
CEPEJ
At the European level, CEPEJ has developed a set of practical instruments to support the quality of justice. These include the CEPEJ Checklist for Promoting the Quality of Justice and Courts, guidelines on user satisfaction surveys and tools addressing court communication, time management and the use of digital technologies, including AI. These instruments provide structured guidance for designing and implementing quality assurance policies in justice systems.
Source: (CEPEJ, 2008[46]).
5.4.3. Quality assurance policies in Ukraine
In recent decades, Ukraine has taken steps to invest in quality assurance measures within the judiciary. In 2008, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Ukraine Rule of Law Project implemented a pilot programme to survey court users with Citizen Report Cards (CRC). This methodology, globally applied for measuring citizens’ satisfaction with the quality of municipal services, was adjusted to measure the level of court user satisfaction in a selected number of courts. The survey included the following topics: territorial accessibility of courts; level of comfort in a courthouse; accessibility of court information; affordability of payments; timeliness in considering cases; court staff performance; and the quality of judicial performance.
During the pilot, more than 2 300 court visitors were interviewed during three rounds of CRC surveys. In all, over 7 500 citizens provided their feedback on court performance and quality of service delivery (based on surveys conducted in 15 pilot courts) (USAID, 2009[47]). The overall assessment of the quality of service delivery was presented through an Integral Court Performance Perception Index Score outlining the general level of satisfaction with the performance and quality of the courts (USAID, 2009[47]). The highest score under this assessment (0.96) was recorded in the Lokachi District Court in Volyn Oblast during the third round of interviews (USAID, 2009[47]). The lowest (0.71) was recorded in courts in Kolomiya (twice) and Lutsk (USAID, 2009[47]). Among 14 courts surveyed, scores increased for nine courts and decreased for five courts, while one court remained unchanged (USAID, 2009[47]).
The successful piloting of the methodology resulted in the introduction of a more thorough framework for assessing the quality of justice and efficiency in the 2015 Court Performance Evaluation (CPE) Framework, which was officially adopted and recommended for use in courts by the CJU.
Court Performance Evaluation Framework
Ukraine has progressively developed a court performance evaluation framework aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of court services. Since its adoption in 2015, the CPE Framework has introduced standards, indicators and evaluation methods focused on timeliness, quality of court decisions and service delivery, aligned with judicial values, procedural requirements and public expectations. Table 5.3 presents major components of the CPE Framework.
Source: (CJU, 2015[48]).
The CPE Framework offers several data collection methods, ranging from the use of court performance statistics, internal surveys of judges and court staff and a questionnaire for surveying visitors on the quality of court functions. Although the CPE Framework includes many necessary elements for measuring court performance and quality of service delivery, it is unclear whether it has been applied by all courts after the adoption of the model by the CJU.
Model Court Initiative
In 2018, another court quality initiative was launched with the support of the EU-funded Pravo-Justice project: the Model Court Initiative (MCI) (Pravo-Justice, 2019[49]). The MCI focused on introducing modern court management principles, standard operating procedures for court staff, design requirements for modern court buildings, customer service, improved case file processing and increased court security. The MCI adopts bottom-up principles and emphasises investing in capacity building for court leadership and administrators to facilitate the self-transformation of courts by implementing best comparative practices, all without requiring significant financial investments.
The MCI applies a different approach compared with the CPE Framework. Whereas the CPE Framework focuses on collecting information about performance and measuring quality of service delivery, the MCI invests in modern court management principles, streamlining work processes and enhancing accessibility of courts.
5.4.4. Remaining challenges
Quality in justice delivery is not merely a measurement of timeliness. Sustainable improvements require management systems that track consistency, procedural safeguards, quality services targeting user needs and organisational learning through feedback. Quality assurance frameworks can help connect daily experiences in prosecution and court services with broader institutional objectives such as integrity, professional development and public trust. To maximise their impact, quality assurance frameworks should be integrated into regular management and appraisal processes, rather than used as standalone assessment tools.
Ukraine already has a foundation for a broader approach to justice quality, which can provide the basis for ensuring consistent application and integration into regular management, appraisal and improvement processes. The remaining challenge is to move from a largely descriptive and court-centred performance model towards a broader framework combining efficiency, quality, user experience and justice outcomes for people. This would allow performance management to support not only continuity, but also investment in a more people-centred, consistent and sustainable justice system.
Addressing this challenge also requires treating legal and justice interventions more clearly as services. Performance management should capture whether users can move easily between courts, legal aid, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), enforcement, administrative services and other support providers. Limited referral systems, uneven collaboration and insufficient service diversity make it more difficult to assess whether the justice system functions as a coherent continuum for people with legal needs.
5.5.1. Why enforcement matters
The enforcement of civil judgments is a fundamental component of an effective justice system and a critical access to justice issue. When court decisions are not enforced in a timely and predictable manner, the justice system fails to deliver on its core objective, the rule of law is undermined and people can lose faith in the judicial process. The present section focuses on enforcement as a performance and institutional-capacity issue, while Chapter 6 considers its implications for users, particularly those in vulnerable situations.
Since 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has received numerous complaints regarding the non-enforcement of court decisions in Ukraine. The country has not yet been able to effectively address this systemic challenge. According to the ECtHR, execution must be seen as an integral part of a trial for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR. Therefore, administrative authorities have an obligation to comply with court orders and judgments.
Recent analysis of judicial review of enforcement in Ukraine confirms that enforcement is not only an administrative stage after judgment, but part of effective judicial protection (ProJustice, 2026[50]). Judicial oversight of enforcement is especially important when decisions are directed against public authorities, but its effectiveness varies across administrative, civil and commercial jurisdictions. Addressing these differences requires clear procedures, effective sanctions, stronger follow-up mechanisms and greater institutional consistency.
5.5.2. Enforcement institutions and operational constraints
State bailiffs execute most court decisions in Ukraine. To improve the efficiency of civil enforcement, in 2016 the VRU adopted a new law to regulate the profession of private bailiffs (VRU, 2024[51]). In contrast with state bailiffs, the authority of private bailiffs was more limited by law, although this has gradually expanded in recent years with the development of the profession. State bailiffs remain responsible for the execution of several categories of cases, including those involving the state or other public bodies, administrative court decisions and ECtHR judgments, evictions, property confiscation and cases involving children or persons with limited or no legal capacity.
To support the work of bailiffs, the MoJ developed an automated enforcement system and a Unified Register of Debtors. These reforms offer a vehicle for improvement, but Ukraine has not yet studied their effectiveness. As a result, the country lacks clear evidence regarding the current balance between state and private enforcement and whether it contributes to improving timeliness, fairness and recovery.
5.5.3. Monitoring gaps and reform priorities
Ukraine has seen legal challenges to its delayed or non-enforcement of court decisions (e.g. Burmych and Others v. Ukraine). In 2020, the Government of Ukraine adopted the National Strategy for Resolving the Problem of Non-Enforcement of Court Decisions for 2020-2025. The Strategy envisaged revised legislation, additional enforcement mechanisms related to state-owned enterprises, the improvement of enforcement procedures, the expansion of private bailiffs’ powers and the creation of a register of court decisions rendered against state entities. Most of the measures proposed in the Strategy (see Box 5.8) have not yet been implemented.
Recent reforms have included the adoption in December 2024 of the Law on Judicial Oversight of the Enforcement of Court Decisions, aimed at strengthening judicial control over enforcement proceedings. Additional reforms remain under discussion, including measures relating to the digitalisation of enforcement proceedings, strengthened enforcement of monetary and non-monetary obligations, expanded data collection systems on enforcement performance and further development of the legal status and powers of private bailiffs (European Commission, 2025[52]).
The Strategy for Resolving the Problem of Non-Enforcement of Court Decisions (2020-2025) set out Ukraine’s medium-term approach to addressing the non-enforcement of court decisions. It outlined key policy priorities aimed at strengthening the legal, institutional and financial conditions necessary to ensure the timely and effective execution of judgments:
eliminating regulatory and legal barriers that impede the enforcement of court decisions
strengthening the institutional capacity of bodies and persons that enforce court decisions and decisions of other bodies
ensuring adequate financing of expenses for repayment of debts under court decisions
introducing effective remedies in connection with non-execution and long-term enforcement of court decisions.
Source: (VRU, 2020[53]).
In 2022, the number of new enforcement cases dropped by more than 50% due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, from 4.1 million cases to 1.7 million cases (European Commission, 2023[22]). In 2022, a law was adopted to prohibit the opening of enforcement proceedings in the temporarily occupied territories and in the war zone. In addition, in 2023, another law was adopted to ensure a minimal protected amount on debtors’ bank accounts. Currently, there are more than 15 moratoria in effect in Ukraine concerning the enforcement of decisions, and over 10 in bankruptcy procedures, limiting people’s ability to enforce decisions.
Substantial monitoring and information gaps persist with regard to enforcement proceedings. There is no routine, published data on enforcement timelines, success rates, costs or outcomes. Recent analysis also points to fragmented digitalisation, unclear procedural deadlines, limited access to data and insufficient accountability for non-compliance (ProJustice, 2026[50]). Developing more systematic data collection systems on enforcement proceedings, including information relating to timelines, enforcement outcomes and compliance rates would permit analysis of bottlenecks and whether reforms, including the expanded use of private bailiffs, are resulting in improvements. Without such evidence, it is impossible to comprehensively assess enforcement practice in Ukraine.
Judicial oversight can help make non-compliance visible, but cannot resolve enforcement failures caused by budgetary shortages, unclear institutional responsibility or weak enforcement capacity. Reporting requirements may also become formalistic if courts repeatedly request debtor reports without bringing the claimant closer to actual enforcement. Oversight mechanisms should therefore distinguish between deliberate non-compliance and cases where enforcement may be impeded by legal, budgetary or organisational constraints.
Moreover, certain decisions of the CCU have not been implemented.3 This is the case for certain normative acts adopted by the VRU, which the CCU declared unconstitutional. A concrete example is the CCU’s decision in the case upon the petition of the UPCHR regarding the constitutionality of provisions allowing for the forced psychiatric hospitalisation of individuals considered legally incompetent upon the approval of their guardian or trusteeship body (CCU, 2018[54]).
5.6.1. Digitalisation to strengthen continuity and service delivery
Digitalisation has become an important tool for maintaining continuity of justice services during wartime. The key challenge now is to move from emergency adaptation and fragmented solutions towards a more coherent digital architecture that would support resilience, accessibility and effective management of the justice sector.
Ukraine has pursued digitalisation in the justice sector for more than a decade. The 2015-2020 Strategy for Reforming the Judicial System, Legal Proceedings and Related Legal Institutions identified e-justice as a key reform priority, including measures to strengthen court information systems, interoperability, online court services and performance monitoring. These priorities were further developed in the 2021-2023 Justice Reform Strategy and the Rule of Law Roadmap, which continue to emphasise digitalisation, integrated document management, case monitoring and interoperability across justice institutions, including through systems such as UJITS, SMEREKA and eCase.
Ukraine continues to invest in IT solutions to support the operation of the justice sector and improve digital access to justice, largely with support from international donors. At the same time, wartime budget pressures and limited domestic resources continue to constrain IT financing in the long term. CEPEJ data indicate that Ukraine’s level of court IT expenditure remains below the European average, both per inhabitant and as a share of court budgets (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). Limited and unstable financing may therefore affect the functionality, interoperability, cybersecurity and long-term sustainability of digital justice systems.
CEPEJ data also suggest that digital deployment in Ukraine is uneven across different functions. The strongest progress has been achieved in the development of case-management systems, while deployment remains more limited in areas such as tools supporting decision-making and user-facing digital access services (CEPEJ, 2024[7]). These findings highlight that the effectiveness of digital justice systems depends not only on the existence of digital tools, but also on their usability, interoperability, financing, security and accessibility for justice institutions and court users.
In terms of the specific tools, Ukraine is developing a new-generation court IT system – the EUICS – intended to support core judicial administration and service delivery functions. The system is expected to include applications such as electronic court document management, videoconferencing, judicial registers, personnel and financial management tools, judicial dossiers, e-learning modules and whistleblower processing functions (USAID Justice4all, 2025[55]). Box 5.9 describes some of the major parameters established to guide the development of the next generation court IT system.
The new system to support the work of the courts should include the following applications:
electronic court document management system
videoconferencing system
web portal of the judiciary
Unified State Register of Court Decisions
Unified State Register of Enforcement Documents
a subsystem for managing personnel, financial and economic activities of the judiciary
judicial dossier
learning management subsystem
digest and comments subsystem
subsystem for processing whistleblower appeals.
Source: (USAID Justice4all, 2025[55]).
URPTI, SMEREKA and eCase
Ukraine has progressively expanded the digitalisation of criminal justice processes. Following the adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code in 2012, Ukraine established the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations (URPTI), an automated system managed by the OPG for recording, storing and analysing information on criminal offences and pre-trial investigations. The system supports unified registration of criminal proceedings, operational oversight of investigations and nationwide analytical monitoring, while access is restricted to authorised law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies due to the confidential nature of the information.
More recently, Ukraine has begun developing SMEREKA, a new electronic pre-trial investigation information and communication system for the prosecution service and law enforcement agencies. Since 2024, pilot deployment and testing have been underway within the OPG, the prosecution service and selected investigative bodies, including in relation to investigation of war crimes. The system is intended to support electronic criminal proceedings, improve co-ordination between prosecutors and investigators, strengthen analytical capacity, including through AI-supported tools, and standardise procedural documentation.
In parallel, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the SAPO and the HACC continue to implement the eCase electronic criminal case management system aimed at digitising pre-trial investigations and criminal case management processes. At present, electronic exchange of information between SMEREKA, eCase and UJITS remains limited. However, future development of the EUICS is expected to support greater interoperability and more streamlined electronic interaction between courts, prosecution services and law enforcement agencies in criminal proceedings.
These initiatives illustrate both the scale of Ukraine’s digital justice reforms and the importance of ensuring interoperability, coherent system architecture, clear institutional responsibilities and sustainable long-term investment across justice-sector IT systems. Box 5.10 offers examples of digital justice solutions in OECD Member countries and Ukraine.
Integrated Information System of Penal Process, Lithuania
In Lithuania, the Integrated Information System of Penal Process is used to support all aspects of criminal proceedings, including the registration of a criminal act by the police or criminal investigators, penitentiaries, financial crimes units and customs. Electronic information is exchanged between the police and the public prosecutor regarding criminal investigations and prosecution. Indictments and other procedural information are electronically sent to the courts. The system includes the use of electronic signatures, a system for monitoring the criminal (investigation) process and data exchange with other systems/registers.
The courts use the Liteko system, a unified information system of the Lithuanian courts. At the time of its launch (2004-2005), Liteko included six modules: case registration, exchange of case-related information between courts, case search, court decision templates, statistical records and online publications of court decisions. Subsequently, additional modules were developed, such as the automated issuance of court orders, unified case numbering, electronic notifications and a system for the random assignment of cases. In 2013, the possibility of remote access to case files and online submission of documents were introduced.
All court services are accessible through the electronic portal e.teismas. Access to the system can be done through a process of authentication via electronic banking, identity cards and electronic signatures. Parties to judicial proceedings are obliged to submit their documents electronically. Liteko also offers audio recordings of court proceedings. For the enforcement of court decisions, electronic tools are being applied as well, such as for the organisation of auctions and the electronic distribution of relevant enforcement documents. Moreover, discussions are ongoing about using AI to provide final court decisions.
e-File, Estonia
e-File is Estonia’s central information system for criminal, civil, misdemeanour and administrative proceedings. The system enables the simultaneous exchange of information between different parties and avoids duplication by ensuring that information only needs to be entered once. It can subsequently be used across the workflows of various relevant institutions. In this context, the system represents a case of strong interoperability and co-ordination considering that its data are provided not only to the court information system but also other relevant institutions like the police and prosecutors.
JustizOnline, Austria
JustizOnline is the main digital access point to the Austrian judiciary for citizens, businesses and members of the justice system. The interface and services provided are tailored to the specific role of the user to ensure efficiency and usability. Its functions include electronic submissions, digital file inspection, case‑status queries and access to land and business register documents, among other functions. The platform is integrated with other digital government services and offers secure login.
Digital Justice Tools in Ukraine
Automated enforcement and debtor information: The MoJ operates the Automated Enforcement Proceedings System and the Unified Register of Debtors, which support enforcement officers’ access to relevant registers and provide real-time information on outstanding debtor obligations.
Remote hearings and eCourt: Videoconferencing and the eCourt mobile application have supported participation in hearings and access to case documents, particularly for users in remote or temporarily occupied areas.
Diia justice services: Diia allows users to receive notifications about court cases, read court decisions, obtain electronically signed court documents and access other public services relevant to justice pathways.
Legal aid and accessible information: Online legal aid tools connect users with legal assistance providers. For example, the Pravovsim platform provides free legal aid to people in Ukraine and Ukrainians abroad.
Access to court decisions: The Unified State Register of Court Decisions gives citizens and legal professionals free access to court decisions.
Other digital justice tools
The tools highlighted in Box 5.10 show that Ukraine’s digital justice ecosystem extends beyond management of court cases to enforcement, remote participation, legal aid, administrative services and access to court decisions. These digital solutions have helped preserve continuity and expand access during wartime. However, their value will depend on whether they are integrated into a coherent digital architecture with shared data standards, secure interoperability, stable financing and clear institutional ownership.
5.6.2. AI use in the justice sector
Ukraine has established an emerging policy and strategic framework for AI use in the public sector. In 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation adopted the AI Regulation Roadmap in Ukraine outlining a “bottom-up” approach to AI governance, which combines non-binding instruments in the short term with the planned development of comprehensive legislation aligned with the EU AI acquis (MDT, 2024[65]; OECD, 2025[66]).
At the level of the justice sector, the Code of Judicial Ethics sets out professional standards for the use of AI in the judiciary. Amendments to the Code introduced in 2024 explicitly permitted the use of AI by judges, provided that such use does not affect judicial independence or impartiality, does not involve the assessment of evidence and does not interfere with judicial decision-making. While these amendments establish a clear principle that AI may support, but not substitute, judicial functions, the CJU provided further guidance in the updated commentary to the Code of Judicial Ethics, published in March 2026 (CJU, 2026[67]).
The commentary presents AI as a potentially useful support tool for improving the efficiency and accessibility of justice, while warning against excessive reliance on AI, including the risks of skewed data and algorithms and the gradual loss of independent judicial reasoning (CJU, 2026[67]). According to the commentary, AI may assist judges with technical tasks such as organising materials or analysing structured data, but it cannot determine the outcome of a case, make legal findings of fact, assess the credibility or weight of evidence or substitute for the human, reasoned and accountable exercise of judicial decision-making (CJU, 2026[67]). The ethical standards and guidance provided by the CJU are complemented by specialised training on digitalisation and AI use delivered by the NSJ and internal training initiatives within the SC focusing on practical applications and ethical considerations of using AI (Bernaziuk, 2025[68]).
The application of AI in Ukraine’s justice sector has so far focused on supporting administrative efficiency and legal analysis rather than automating adjudication. In particular, machine learning and natural language processing are increasingly used to analyse case law, identify patterns and support evidence-based improvements in judicial performance (Izarova et al., 2024[69]).
At the institutional level, the SC, in co-operation with the EU-funded Pravo-Justice project, has developed an upgraded database of legal positions incorporating AI-enabled search and analysis functions (Pravo-Justice, 2025[70]). This tool supports faster identification of relevant jurisprudence and can improve efficiency in legal research. It can also build on Ukraine’s advanced digital infrastructure, including the Unified State Register of Court Decisions.
In parallel, the All-Ukrainian Association of Court Employees has promoted the practical use of AI in court administration, including through the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the use of generative AI tools in tasks such as drafting documents, summarising materials and conducting legal research (Pravo-Justice, 2024[71]).
Planned reforms envisage the integration of AI solutions into the UJITS, including through functionalities such as automated text recognition, summarisation of case materials, advanced legal search, generation of draft decisions, transcription of hearings and virtual legal assistants (Bernaziuk, 2025[68]). Such a development could help address persistent challenges related to workload, delays in case processing and resource constraints.
5.6.3. Data governance as a management and strategic function
Digitalisation alone does not automatically result in better governance. To support planning, prioritisation and people-centred service delivery, digital tools must be matched by stronger rules and capacities for collecting, sharing, analysing and using data across the justice sector. Ukraine’s justice sector could go a step further and build structural links with other systems of public data, including health, social protection and other administrative data. Expanding the scope of data collection, while ensuring appropriate safeguards, could generate a more realistic and holistic understanding of justice needs, pathways and outcomes.
Modern IT can improve the performance and efficiency of individual justice institutions, stimulate the electronic exchange of information between justice institutions and promote interaction between justice institutions and users. To fill access to justice gaps created by the war, Ukraine rapidly developed digital tools that build on justice data, including e-court systems, digital document exchange and remote access platforms. The modernisation of justice sector IT is ongoing; new plans and solutions have been developed for 2026 and beyond. These include online civil registrations, e-Apostille and e-Notary services, bankruptcy and insolvency systems, a digital register of normative acts, online information on deported children and an app directing users to free legal aid (MoJ, 2025[72]).
These developments create important opportunities. However, they also expose governance risks. Digital justice tools are being developed across different institutions, registers and service channels, often for specific operational needs. Without common data definitions, shared identifiers, rules for interoperability and clear responsibility for data quality, these systems may reproduce fragmentation in digital form. The same case, user or service interaction may be recorded differently across courts, prosecution services, enforcement bodies, legal aid providers and administrative registers. This, in turn, could create duplication, additional transaction costs and weaker evidence for planning of justice reforms. From a people-centred justice perspective, such challenges can limit the justice sector’s ability to understand how people navigate the system, where bottlenecks arise and whether digital tools improve outcomes in practice.
Ukraine’s digital adaptations during wartime demonstrated the importance of continuity and stability in justice services. The next challenge is to consolidate these innovations into a coherent justice data governance framework. This would require secure and predictable financing, clear data standards, a common data dictionary, shared protocols for data exchange and inter-institutional co-ordination. It would also require linking digitalisation more directly to performance management and people-centred service delivery, so data can be used to operate systems, identify needs, monitor pathways, reduce duplication and improve outcomes.
5.6.4. Remaining challenges
Data are essential not only for proper management of justice institutions, but also for strategic purposes. In certain areas, there is a need to implement key performance indicators to allow for measurement, analysis and reporting of data, as well as the use of data for management purposes. Data across agencies must be comparable, complete and regularly updated to support management and planning. Strong data governance also contributes to transparency and accountability. Effective governance increasingly depends on interoperability of data systems; fragmentation can undermine holistic consideration of legal needs, weaken monitoring and make co-ordination more difficult. Data co-ordination agreements that establish common standards and clear responsibilities can improve governance of the justice system.
Creating a common data dictionary for the justice sector would be a practical step towards interoperability. Different institutions and IT systems may record case numbers, party information, procedural statuses, enforcement data and information on how services are used, without necessarily aligning the format or classification of that data. This creates risks of duplication, limits any institution’s ability to track cases across the sector and increases transaction costs for courts, prosecutors, the MoJ and users. Common definitions, identifiers and metadata standards would help synchronise information across systems, reduce the need to reconcile data and support stronger analysis of service delivery and outcomes.
The SJA can play an important role in this process, as it is responsible for data collection and reporting in the judiciary. The MoJ and the OPG also have roles to play. For the MoJ, better data must be collected concerning legal aid, ADR mechanisms and the enforcement of court decisions, whereas the OPG can enhance data collection, analysis and reporting of criminal statistics.
The implications of data governance vary by institution. For the judiciary, it contributes to monitoring and resource allocation. For the MoJ and other sector services, it can improve transparency for specific elements such as enforcement, legal aid and the use of ADR. In the prosecution service, it can enhance systematic analysis to inform decision-making around practices such as dismissals, charging and case duration. As a whole, improving data governance would offer a more empirical basis for strategic planning. Box 5.11 offers context on why and how data governance can advance goals of people-centred justice.
Effective governance of justice data is a core enabler of people-centred justice. It supports the systematic collection, management, use and sharing of data to better understand people’s legal needs and experiences, and to design, deliver and improve services that respond to those needs while reducing barriers to access.
Robust governance frameworks for justice data place strong emphasis on data that capture the experiences and needs of justice system users, rather than focusing solely on those of individual institutions. In this context, these frameworks must also consider possible risks and legal limitations regarding data collection when it comes to the protection of privacy as well as security limitations.
A key goal regarding data governance is overcoming fragmentation, which requires strong leadership and vision accompanied by coherent implementation and co-ordination across responsible agencies.
The OECD identifies three complementary levels for strengthening justice data governance:
Strategic level: Establish clear leadership and a shared vision for justice data across branches of government, including the judiciary and the executive. This involves setting common priorities, standards and accountability frameworks to guide the development and use of data in support of people-centred justice.
Tactical level: Strengthen co-ordination across institutions to enable coherent data ecosystems. This includes developing interoperable systems, common methodologies and robust data stewardship arrangements, alongside investing in institutional capacities such as analytical, research and data management skills.
Operational level: Ensure effective implementation through appropriate processes, tools and safeguards. This covers the full data lifecycle, including collection, storage, protection, sharing and publication, in line with standards on data quality, privacy, security and ethics.
For a people-centred justice system, it is important that data on people’s legal needs and justice problems are collected regularly and satisfaction with justice service delivery is measured by using online and offline surveys. Thus, justice data should extend beyond information generated through justice sector IT systems to include data collected through complementary sources, such as legal needs surveys, court user satisfaction surveys and measures of public trust. Moreover, in defining a new vision for justice sector data, to ensure alignment with EU standards, Ukraine’s framework should account for the General Data Protection Regulation, and protect IT systems responsible for data collection, analysis and reporting against cyberattacks.
The next phase of reform could therefore focus on using digitalisation as a foundation for integrated governance. This would require a clearer justice data strategy, stronger interoperability standards, safeguards for cybersecurity and privacy and a more intentional use of data indicating user needs and service quality along with administrative data. Without these safeguards, Ukraine risks building more digital tools without gaining the full management and people-centred justice policy benefits they can support.
Justice infrastructure has experienced significant damage and disruption since 2014, particularly in temporarily occupied and frontline areas. Some courts and prosecution offices ceased operations, while others continued functioning under difficult security and operational conditions. Justice institutions relocated case files, archives and operations to safer regions, although losses of files and equipment were also reported in some instances.
During the war, about 150 courthouses were either damaged or destroyed, with shelters available in 62 courts representing 9.3% coverage of all court locations (Judicial and Legal Newspaper, 2024[73]; The Journal, 2025[74]). According to the Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, the justice and public administration sector accounted for more than USD 459 million in damages and USD 3.3 billion in losses, including damage to over 900 buildings belonging to the justice sector and the loss of essential equipment used for case management and service delivery (World Bank et al., 2026[75]).
Courts receiving relocated cases and personnel continue to face operational pressures due to increased caseloads, infrastructure constraints and pre-existing staffing shortages (OECD, 2024[76]). The CSS has also played an important role in maintaining the safety and functioning of courts during wartime, including by securing court premises, maintaining public order and providing protection for judges, court staff and litigants (VRU, 2025[14]). At the same time, operational and funding challenges affecting the CSS, including issues related to remuneration and financing during wartime, have created additional pressures for the judicial system and illustrate the broader implications that constraints affecting auxiliary judicial institutions may have for the continuity and sustainability of justice services (Pravo-Justice, 2023[8]). More broadly, the impact of the war extends beyond physical infrastructure to disruptions in institutional continuity, accessibility of services, file security and working conditions.
Reconstruction and recovery needs for the justice and public administration sector over 2026-2035 are estimated at nearly USD 985 million (World Bank et al., 2026[75]). While preparatory reconstruction efforts are underway, large-scale rebuilding across the justice sector remains limited.
Reconstruction creates an opportunity to reconsider how justice services are organised and delivered, including through more integrated service models, digital tools and multifunctional justice service centres that could improve accessibility, operational continuity and people-centred service delivery. Existing standards and guidance already support greater physical accessibility, integrated front-desk services and improved working conditions for justice professionals. A strategic approach connecting reconstruction, operational continuity, accessibility and service design could therefore help strengthen the long-term resilience and accessibility of the justice system.
In view of the assessment, Ukraine may wish to consider the following recommendations:
1. Strengthen the financial resilience and agility of the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendations
Establishing a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for the justice sector, with a consolidated, implementation budget adjusted for risks and aligned with the external financing instruments and measures set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap
Rebalancing expenditure within the justice sector towards IT by establishing protected programme lines and a dedicated budget code for justice modernisation to ensure predictable financing of reform priorities
Assessing the long-term sustainability of donor-supported reforms, digital systems and operational arrangements
Reviewing the composition and allocation of expenditures in the justice sector to better align funding with the legal and justice needs of people, including by strengthening support for upstream and people-centred services such as legal aid, mediation, digital access and integrated service delivery, while ensuring cost-effective use of resources across the justice system
Supporting recommendations
Formalising participatory budget preparation with judicial governance bodies and frontline institutions
Strengthening the links between budgeting, operational planning and people-centred service delivery objectives.
2. Improve the human resource capacity of the justice sector. This could include:
Key recommendations
Stabilising staffing pipelines for judges, prosecutors and court staff by investing in accelerated recruitment procedures and introducing more continuous and flexible recruitment procedures to reduce bottlenecks in the selection processes
Reviewing statutory staffing caps for prosecutors in view of evidence of growing workload and considering adjusting ceilings where workloads can exceed sustainable levels
Assessing the long-term sustainability of wartime staffing arrangements, including temporary reallocations and emergency measures, and progressively integrating priority workforce needs into stable institutional and financing frameworks
Integrating territorial and accessibility considerations into workforce allocation, judicial remapping and staffing policies to address regional disparities, wartime displacement and evolving patterns of demand across regions
Supporting recommendations
Continuing to modernise court support roles, including case managers and courtroom technologists, by strengthening their career frameworks and increasing the amount of judicial time spent on case merits
Strengthening managerial and change-management capacity across judicial and prosecutorial institutions, including for crisis management, digital transformation and performance governance.
3. Strengthen the performance of the justice sector. This could include:
Key recommendations
Strengthening performance management frameworks across courts and prosecution services through jointly agreed objectives, regular performance reviews and transparent monitoring of indicators such as clearance rates, disposition times and case backlogs, while safeguarding judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy and the quality of justice outcomes
Instituting active management of caseflows, including early case screening, to help courts maintain timeliness in civil and commercial cases and sustain improvements in processing of criminal cases at first-instance courts
Reviewing and balancing workloads across jurisdictions through rules for case reallocation between courts and temporary secondments to ensure a more even distribution of cases and prevent local bottlenecks
Strengthening the ADR system by introducing quality standards for mediators, clearly defined case categories for any mandatory elements and procedural safeguards to prevent misuse.
Expanding justice performance frameworks beyond efficiency indicators to include accessibility, user experience, continuity of services and justice outcomes, in line with requirements of a people-centred justice system
Supporting recommendations
Introducing regular, transparent performance evaluation and self-evaluation frameworks for judges and prosecutors to promote continuous improvement for these professional groups
Ensuring that court and prosecution self-assessments under excellence frameworks feed directly into annual performance reviews, resource planning and leadership appraisal
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of constitutional justice through strengthened case management and operational planning at the CCU.
4. Enhance quality and enforcement of justice. This could include:
Key recommendations
Addressing structural bottlenecks in enforcement of judgments by reviewing the allocation of responsibilities, incentives and safeguards applicable to public and private bailiffs, with a view to improving timeliness, fairness and recovery rates under wartime conditions
Strengthening safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals in vulnerable situations during enforcement proceedings, in line with European guidance, supported by targeted training for bailiffs
Supporting recommendations
Applying court excellence frameworks and piloting corresponding frameworks for prosecution services, within appraisal processes, supported by annual self‑assessments and peer reviews that are made publicly available
Systematising the monitoring of enforcement proceedings by tracking timeliness, outcomes and compliance rates, and costs of civil execution, with dedicated dashboards disaggregated by party type and region
Digitising execution tools by building interoperable registers with automated functionalities, including for asset discovery, and considering the establishment of an online platform for uncontested payment orders aligned with European good practice
Integrating enforcement performance more systematically into broader justice sector planning and evaluation frameworks.
5. Advance data-driven justice. This could include:
Key recommendations
Gathering routine statistics on enforcement of judgments and uptake and outcomes of ADR, particularly mediation, including through consolidation of existing mediator registers and improved centralised data collection
Improving interoperable data exchanges, including the use of common justice-sector data dictionary, case identifiers and metadata standards to enable co-ordinated case handling across institutions and reduce fragmentation in the delivery of justice services
Supporting recommendations
Strengthening governance and interoperability frameworks for digital justice systems, including safeguards relating to cybersecurity, interoperability, ethical use of AI, data protection and institutional accountability
Publishing performance dashboards with indicators for courts and prosecution offices, while ensuring data protection, to support transparency and internal performance management
Piloting analytical tools to examine prosecutorial decision-making, including factors linked to discontinuance and disposition time, to inform improvements in investigative quality and support targeted training.
6. Enhance the infrastructure and operational continuity of the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendations
Developing a multi-year justice reconstruction and modernisation programme, informed by the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, and considering the measures under the Rule of Law Roadmap, to prioritise investment based on need, risk and standards for service delivery
Strengthening operational and cybersecurity resilience of justice infrastructure by investing in secure IT infrastructure, supported by strong cybersecurity governance
Integrating the evidence on territorial accessibility, patterns of displacement and evolving service demand into infrastructure and reconstruction planning, particularly in underserved regions and regions directly affected by the war
Supporting recommendations
Strengthening power and connectivity resilience at justice facilities by expanding backup power solutions and diversified connectivity options
Standardising security, accessibility, safety and energy efficiency specifications for new buildings and refurbishment of existing infrastructure, reflecting modern building standards and accessibility requirements
Promoting operational continuity planning across justice institutions, including contingency planning for emergencies, cyber incidents and prolonged disruption of infrastructure.
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← 1. This figure refers to the number of judges in post calculated from the court-type breakdown published by the HQCJ. It differs from the total number of judges shown in the register of judges maintained by the HQCJ, which appears to capture a broader population than the court categories used for vacancy calculations in Table 5.2.
← 2. Comparisons in this subchapter should be interpreted with caution. They are not always fully like-for-like, as they may combine different reference years. In the case of Ukraine, differences may also stem from war-related variations in case registration, court access, institutional capacity and territorial coverage. The figures should therefore be read as indicative of broad comparative patterns rather than as direct measures of underlying legal demand or system performance. Further analysis would be required to assess the effects of wartime shocks on case inflows, clearance rates, disposition times and the resilience of case processing across courts and case types.
← 3. For example, legislative follow-up to CCU Decision No. 8-r/2018 of 11 October 2018 was delayed. In that decision, the CCU found unconstitutional certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Citizens’ Appeals” of 2 October 1996, No. 393/96-VR, as amended, concerning the exercise of the right of appeal by persons declared incapacitated by a court. The CCU held that the unconstitutional provisions ceased to have effect from the date of the decision and recommended that the VRU bring the Law into line with its decision. However, a draft law aimed at aligning the Law “On Citizens’ Appeals” with CCU Decision No. 8-r/2018 was registered in the VRU only on 11 December 2019, more than a year after the CCU decision.