This chapter examines how governance, strategic planning and co-ordination are organised within Ukraine’s justice system. It outlines the institutional framework, including the distribution of roles and responsibilities across the justice sector, and the arrangements that underpin independence, accountability and management of the system. It also analyses strategic planning in the justice sector, including key reform strategies and policy documents, and looks at how these are developed, aligned and implemented across institutions. Finally, it describes the mechanisms for co-ordination and co-operation, covering interactions within government, across justice institutions and with civil society and international partners.
OECD Justice Review of Ukraine
Delivering Better Justice Outcomes for People
Abstract
Sound governance of the justice system requires institutional independence, clarity of mandates, effective co-ordination and coherent strategic planning. In line with the OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems (‘OECD Recommendation’) [OECD/LEGAL/0498], governance frameworks should combine safeguards for independence with strong horizontal and vertical co-ordination across justice institutions and government more broadly. This chapter examines how governance, planning and co-ordination are organised within Ukraine’s justice system. It analyses the institutional architecture of the justice sector, including the distribution of roles and responsibilities, judicial and prosecutorial governance arrangements, and mechanisms for co-ordination and co-operation across institutions, government and civil society. It also assesses the strategic planning framework for justice reform, including the alignment, implementation and monitoring of key reform strategies and the extent to which governance arrangements support a coherent, co-ordinated and people-centred justice system.
3.2.1. Baseline framework: separation of powers
Several core principles are essential to upholding the rule of law and enabling an effective people-centred justice system. Among these are the protection of fundamental rights and the doctrine of the separation of powers, which supports the former by maintaining a distinction between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The effective separation of powers involves dividing institutions according to their respective powers and distinguishing the functions performed and the personnel involved in exercising each power (Waldron, 2012[1]). Within this framework, a sufficient level of checks and balances between the branches of government not only prevents one branch from dominating another but also supports the effective functioning of government at large.
Constitutional framework for the separation of powers
Having superseded the 1978 Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the current Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in 1996, has undergone several amendments, reflecting the evolving political landscape and aspirations of the country (Repetska and Burdyak, 2020[2]). Ukraine is currently governed by a semi-presidential system in which a directly elected president and a government accountable to parliament share executive authority. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Constitution of Ukraine, state power in Ukraine is divided into the legislative, executive and judicial branches, which act within the limits established by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine (VRU, 2020[3]). Box 3.1 summarises the constitutional allocation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of power. The following sections then examine the institutional architecture of the justice system in greater detail.
Executive power
President of Ukraine:
appoints key figures within the judiciary including one‑third of judges in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) (Article 106 (22); Article 148), judges of ordinary courts upon submission by the High Council of Justice (HCJ) (Article 128), as well as the Prosecutor General, subject to approval by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) (Article 106(11); Article 131)
plays a key role in the formation of the judicial system, including submitting draft laws on establishing or reorganising courts (Article 125).
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU):
constitutes the highest executive body and is charged with implementing laws, directing national policies and ensuring the functioning of public administration (Articles 113-117).
Legislative power (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine):
adopts laws, amends the Constitution and determines state policy in legislation (Articles 75-92)
appoints select state officials and exercises parliamentary oversight (Article 85)
performs constitutional appointment and dismissal functions, including consenting to the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General (Article 85(25)) and appointing one‑third of judges in the CCU (Article 85(26))
provides oversight in the field of human‑rights monitoring via the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (UPCHR) (Article 101).
Judicial power
High Council of Justice:
safeguards judicial independence and oversees judicial governance in accordance with the functions set out in Article 131.
Courts:
administer justice independently and exclusively under the law, and exercise judicial control over acts and omissions of public authorities (Articles 55, 124 and 129).
Constitutional Court of Ukraine:
decides on the compliance of laws and other legal acts with the Constitution and provides official interpretations binding on all subjects of constitutional legal relations (Articles 147-151).
Note: The Constitution of Ukraine defines the President as the head of state rather than as part of the executive branch. Nevertheless, within Ukraine’s semi-presidential system, the President exercises significant executive authority, particularly in the areas of foreign affairs, national security, defence and appointments of public officials.
Source: (VRU, 2020[3]).
Constitutional safeguards for judicial independence
In order to prevent unwarranted interventions from the executive and legislative powers in the work of the judiciary, judicial independence must be safeguarded and enshrined in constitutional provisions (ENCJ, 2017[4]). Consistent with practices in most OECD countries, the Constitution of Ukraine includes provisions aimed at safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and individual judges across structural, functional and financial dimensions (see Box 3.2). The Law on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges (LJSJ) further operationalises these safeguards. In this regard, Ukraine demonstrates comparatively strong alignment with OECD Public Integrity Indicators relating to the judicial integrity framework, including formal guarantees for judicial independence.
The Constitution of Ukraine contains several provisions relating to the independence of judicial power:
Article 125. The judicial system in Ukraine shall be based on the principles of territoriality and specialisation and shall be determined by law. The court shall be formed, reorganised and liquidated by law, the draft of which is submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine after consultations with the High Council of Justice.
Article 126. The independence and immunity of judges shall be guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine. Any influence on judges shall be prohibited. (…)
Article 129. When administering justice, judges shall be independent and abide only by law.
Article 130. The State shall ensure funding and proper conditions for the functioning of courts and the activity of judges. Expenditures for the maintenance of courts shall be allocated separately in the State Budget of Ukraine, considering proposals of the High Council of Justice.
Article 1301. A judicial self-government system shall operate in accordance with the law to protect the professional interests of judges and resolve issues pertaining to the internal operations of courts.
Source: (VRU, 2020[3]).
Despite a solid legal framework, challenges in the system of checks and balances persist. The Rule of Law Index (RLI) factor on judicial constraints on government power provides one way to assess whether formal independence translates in an effective separation-of-powers function. As Figure 3.1. illustrates, Ukraine showed gradual improvement in the indicator between 2015 and 2025, from 0.221 in 2015 to 0.317 in 2019, before stabilising and declining slightly to 0.314 by 2025 (WJP, 2025[5]). Despite this progress, the indicator remains low in comparison with the OECD average.
Note: RLI factor 1.2 Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary. Under the RLI methodology, a higher score indicates stronger judicial constraints and adherence to the rule of law.
Source: (WJP, 2025[6]), elaborated by the authors.
This suggests that justice sector reforms since 2014 have strengthened the role of the judiciary in public governance, but have not yet resulted in the consolidation needed for it to operate as a robust check on government power. Recent stagnation may also reflect the impact of martial law and the expanded role of the executive branch during Russia’s full-scale invasion. This assessment is broadly consistent with the findings of the follow-up monitoring report prepared within the framework of the Fifth Round of Monitoring under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, which reflected progress on formal institutional design of judicial independence alongside persistent implementation gaps (see Chapter 4) (OECD, 2025[7]).
Related RLI factors capturing the degree of improper government influence in civil and criminal justice in Ukraine remain relatively weak, fluctuating between 0.26 and 0.38 between 2015 and 2025 (WJP, 2025[5]). These scores remain above the regional average but below the OECD average of 0.72 (2025) and suggest that concerns regarding undue influence over judicial decision-making persist.
3.2.2. Mapping the justice system: Main institutions and functions
Within the constitutional framework, justice governance in Ukraine is carried out through a complex institutional ecosystem involving judicial governance bodies, executive institutions, prosecutorial bodies, the VRU, anti-corruption institutions and professional self-governance organisations.
The OECD Recommendation [OECD/LEGAL/0498] instructs that a justice system that is effective in addressing legal needs and justice problems of people and businesses must be holistically designed. It needs to account for the wide range of stakeholders and institutions engaged in shaping justice policy, allocating resources and designing and delivering justice services. To ensure that justice services are responsive to people’s needs, the system should accommodate trade-offs, make efficient use of synergies and systematically engage people in the design of services.
Annex 3.A outlines the institutional architecture of the justice system in Ukraine, detailing the main institutions involved in justice policy, administration, accountability, and service delivery. It also outlines the core functions and responsibilities of each institution.
Judicial governance institutions
The HCJ is the highest body within the judicial governance structure, tasked with safeguarding the judiciary’s independence and ensuring the accountability and efficiency of justice in Ukraine. The HCJ is responsible for appointing, transferring, suspending and dismissing judges, including through the Disciplinary Inspectors Service, its subordinate body responsible for administering disciplinary proceedings (VRU, 2025[8]).
The High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) is responsible for a broad range of functions related to judicial appointments, career management and professional evaluation (VRU, 2025[8]). Its responsibilities include maintaining records on judicial positions and vacancies; conducting the selection of candidates for judicial office, including qualification examinations and special background checks; carrying out qualification evaluations of judges; maintaining judicial dossiers and candidate files; and submitting recommendations to the HCJ regarding judicial appointments and transfers, except where transfers are imposed as disciplinary sanctions (VRU, 2025[8]).
Judicial administrative and support bodies
The State Judicial Administration (SJA) provides organisational and budget support while handling essential tasks for the effective functioning of the judiciary (VRU, 2025[8]). The SJA reports directly to the HCJ and is structured according to territorial departments (VRU, 2025[8]). It also ensures proper working conditions for the courts, the HQCJ, the judicial self-governance bodies and the National School of Judges (NSJ) (VRU, 2025[8]).
The Court Security Service provides security for court infrastructure and staff, and maintains public order in the courts (VRU, 2025[8]).
The NSJ provides professional training for judges and judicial personnel (VRU, 2025[8]).
Judiciary self-governance bodies
Three bodies are responsible for the internal organisation of court activities in Ukraine. These include meetings among the judges of the local courts, the appellate courts, the high specialised courts, as well as the plenum of the SC; the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU); and the Congress of Judges of Ukraine (VRU, 2023[9]).
The Congress of Judges of Ukraine is the supreme body of judicial self-governance. It adopts decisions binding on all bodies of judicial self-governance and judges, and hears reports from the CJU and the SJA, as well as information from the HQCJ and the HCJ on their activities (VRU, 2025[8]).
Prosecution service
The Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) is the central authority in Ukraine’s prosecution system, overseeing prosecutorial activities, establishing reporting procedures and evaluating performance of prosecutors.
The prosecution service is responsible for state prosecutions. Regional offices of the public prosecution and district prosecutors prosecute cases for the state. The OPG supervises regional offices, while the regional offices supervise the district offices (VRU, 2026[10]).
Other prosecutorial bodies
The All-Ukrainian Conference of Public Prosecutors (AUCPP) and the Council of Prosecutors (CoP) serve as self-governance bodies for the prosecution (VRU, 2026[10]). The Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) assesses the professional qualifications of candidates seeking appointment as prosecutors and oversees key aspects of prosecutorial career management. Its functions include decisions related to the disciplinary liability, transfer and dismissal of prosecutors (VRU, 2026[10]). Prosecutor’s Training Centre of Ukraine provides training to prosecutors (VRU, 2026[10]).
Court system
Regular courts
The court system is composed of three tiers. At the lowest level are the local courts, of which there are three types – general courts, commercial courts and administrative courts (VRU, 2025[8]).
General appellate courts, commercial appellate courts and administrative appellate courts sit over the local courts (VRU, 2025[8]). Appellate courts also hear, as first-instance courts, specific case types determined by law (VRU, 2025[8]).
As of May 2026, Ukraine’s court network officially comprises 758 local courts and courts of appeal. As indicated in Table 3.2, of these, 582 courts (around 77%) are currently operational (CJU, 2026[11]). The remaining courts are not functioning due to the temporary occupation of parts of the country, notably in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion in 2022.
During Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the territorial jurisdictions of over 160 local courts and courts of appeal have changed (Ukraine Facility, 2024[12]). In particular, between 2014 and 2024, the jurisdictions of 84 local courts and courts of appeal, including 36 courts from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, 31 courts of the Donetsk Oblast and 17 courts of the Luhansk Oblast, were transferred to non-occupied territories (Ukraine Facility, 2024[12]). In the future, the number of local courts is expected to decrease as they are consolidated into district courts as part of the judicial map reform (see Chapter 6).
The third and highest tier of Ukraine’s judicial system is the SC. The SC is composed of a Grand Chamber, the Cassation Administrative Court, Cassation Commercial Court, Cassation Criminal Court and Cassation Civil Court (VRU, 2025[8]).
Specialised courts
To ensure the effective handling of specialised cases, Ukraine has complemented its system of general, commercial and administrative courts with several specialised courts, including the High Court on Intellectual Property (HCIP) and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) (VRU, 2023[9]). Two new administrative courts formally established in 2025 – the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA) – are also being developed (see Box 3.3).
Background
Until its dissolution in 2022 due to concerns regarding ethics and integrity, the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) acted as the primary court for administrative disputes involving citizens or businesses and central executive authorities. Following its liquidation, the cases previously heard by the DACK have been temporarily reassigned to the Kyiv District Administrative Court, resulting in a significant increase in workload and growing case backlogs.
To fill this gap, the establishment of the SDAC and the SACA is progressing. The legislative acts providing for their creation came into force in October 2025, and an open competition is currently ongoing for 17 judgeships at the SDAC and 10 at the SACA. This reform is necessary for Ukraine to fulfil the demands outlined in the European Union’s (EU) Ukraine Facility Plan and conditions set by the International Monetary Fund in the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility.
Mandate and jurisdiction of the SDAC and the SACA
Under the legislative framework, the SDAC will hear administrative claims against public authorities whose jurisdiction extends to the entire territory of Ukraine, including the CMU, central executive bodies, the National Bank of Ukraine, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and high‑level selection commissions. The SACA will serve as the exclusive appellate instance for cases heard by the SDAC. Territorial jurisdiction is nationwide, with both courts to be seated in Kyiv. The laws introduce eligibility criteria and a two‑tier selection mechanism of judges featuring an Expert Council, composed of three international experts with a casting vote and three Ukrainian judges, to vet integrity and competence.
The legislative creation of these courts is only the first step of the reform. As the establishment of the SDAC and the SACA progresses, it will be essential to ensure integrity‑ and merit-based selection of judicial candidates. Equally important will be securing adequate resourcing and professional staffing to enable their effective functioning once operational. Without these elements, the courts may fill the formal institutional gap without fully restoring the capacity lost after the elimination of the DACK.
The HCIP was formally established in 2017 as part of broader efforts to align Ukraine’s intellectual property framework with EU standards in the context of the EU accession process. However, the HCIP has not yet become operational. While HQCJ initiated a competition for judicial positions at the HCIP, the process was interrupted following the suspension of the HQCJ’s activities in 2019.
According to the authorities, further progress on the selection process remains contingent on the adoption of the necessary legislative and procedural framework to ensure the HCIP’s effective functioning. As of May 2026, the HQCJ had not adopted decisions on the continuation of the competition process. At the same time, the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law, approved in April 2026, identifies the adoption of amendments necessary for the effective functioning of the HCIP as a priority measure (VRU, 2026[20]).
In the past, specialised military courts were responsible for many case types involving service members. With the 2010 judicial reforms all military courts were abolished, and courts of general jurisdiction now examine cases previously handled by military garrison courts and military courts of appeal.
Constitutional Court of Ukraine
The CCU is the body of constitutional jurisdiction responsible for ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution in Ukraine. It reviews the constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, provides official interpretation of the Constitution and considers constitutional complaints alleging that a law applied in a final court decision is inconsistent with constitutional guarantees (VRU, 2020[3]). Through these functions, the CCU plays a central role in safeguarding the rule of law, separation of powers and the protection of fundamental rights in Ukraine.
The executive branch
President of Ukraine
The President of Ukraine has a defined constitutional role in the justice system, mainly through appointment powers and legislative initiative. The President appoints judges upon submission by the HCJ, appoints two members of the HCJ and appoints six judges to the CCU. The President also submits draft legislation to the VRU on the establishment, reorganisation or dissolution of courts, giving the office a role in shaping the institutional architecture of the judiciary.
The Office of the President of Ukraine (OPU) is a standing advisory body of the President of Ukraine. In the justice sector, its role is mainly linked to the President’s constitutional functions, including legislative initiatives, the appointment of judges upon submission of the HCJ and the establishment of courts in the manner prescribed by law (VRU, 2026[21]). The OPU therefore provides the organisational, advisory and co-ordination support through which the President engages with justice reforms, judicial appointments and related processes. In recent years, the OPU has also played a co-ordinating role in the strategic direction of justice reform, including through the preparation of the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2025-2029 (OPU, 2024[22]).
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
The CMU is the highest body in the system of executive power. It is responsible for safeguarding the state sovereignty and economic independence of Ukraine, developing and implementing domestic and foreign policies, executing the Constitution, laws of Ukraine and the acts issued by the President of Ukraine, and adopting documents relevant to the justice sector, including strategies and action plans (VRU, 2020[3]). In this role, the CMU approved the Rule of Law Roadmap. The CMU also holds the constitutional right of legislative initiative, enabling it to submit draft laws directly to the VRU and play an active role in shaping legislation (VRU, 2020[3]).
The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU) supports the CMU in carrying out these functions by providing methodological guidance for the development of strategies initiated or approved by the CMU, preparing draft materials for consideration at CMU meetings and providing expert opinions on draft government acts, including those related to the justice sector. For example, the Strategic Planning Directorate of the SCMU provided support and comments during the development of the National Strategy for Children’s Rights in the Sphere of Justice.
Ministry of Justice
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is a central executive body within the Government of Ukraine, tasked with developing and implementing state legal policies across the justice sector. It is responsible for the formation and implementation of state legal policy and state policy on bankruptcy issues, preventing insolvency of debtors, the organisation of the profession of notaries public and the execution of court decisions and/or decisions of other State agencies. The MoJ handles state registrations, such as the registration of civil acts, property rights, real estate, legal entities and individual entrepreneurs. In the criminal law arena, it is also responsible for the execution of criminal sentences, probation and the detention of prisoners of war.
Unlike in many OECD countries, the MoJ in Ukraine does not exercise a central governance role over the judiciary or prosecution service. Instead, its role in the justice sector includes legislative development, policy co-ordination and support for strategic planning, often alongside the OPU. The forthcoming OECD Public Governance Review of Ukraine further identifies the MoJ as one of the key institutions in the whole-of-government strategic planning system, specifically in its role of reviewing the legal conformity of draft strategic documents submitted to the CMU (OECD, forthcoming[23]).
Legislative branch
Within the legislative branch, the VRU holds the legislative authority in Ukraine. The UPCHR controls the protection of human and constitutional rights and freedoms (VRU, 2020[3]).
The Parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy (PCLP) is an essential parliamentary body dedicated to strengthening the legislative framework for judiciary governance and justice administration.
Specialised anti-corruption institutions
The SAPO supervises the observance of laws through operational and investigative activities, and pre-trial investigations conducted by the NABU. The NABU is the state law enforcement body tasked with the prevention, detection, investigation and solution of corruption offences under its jurisdiction, as well as the prevention of corruption. The NACP is a central executive body which develops and implements the State anti-corruption policy. The HACC, established in 2019, administers justice as the first instance and appellate court in high-level corruption cases.
Professional associations
Several professional associations also exist in Ukraine’s justice field. The Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) is a public, self-governing institution that ensures the provision of legal defence, representation and other types of legal assistance. The National Association of Mediators regulates the profession of mediators. The Ukrainian Judges Association, an association of CCU judges and an Association of Prosecutors are responsible for the protection of legal interests and rights of their members.
3.2.3. Enhancing judicial governance
A common approach to strengthening the organisational and functional independence of the judiciary is to grant judicial institutions responsibility for court administration, judicial careers, training, discipline and, in some systems, budget management. Several OECD countries have established autonomous judicial councils or equivalent bodies entrusted with governance, human resources (HR) and administrative responsibilities (ENCJ, 2017[4]; CCJE, 2021[24]). Box 3.4 below, offers examples of judicial governance models in OECD countries.
Ukraine has a hybrid model of judicial governance involving several institutions with distinct but interconnected responsibilities. The HCJ plays the central role in judicial governance and integrity, while the HQCJ is responsible for judicial selection and qualification procedures. The CJU serves as the executive body of the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, while the SJA manages administrative and financial operations. While this institutional framework is intended to safeguard judicial independence through distributed responsibilities and checks and balances, some aspects of the system remain comparatively complex. In particular, the roles of the HCJ, the HQCJ and the SJA could be assessed further to identify potential overlaps and opportunities to strengthen co-ordination and operational efficiency.
Judicial governance arrangements differ considerably across OECD countries and legal traditions, reflecting varying constitutional structures, legal cultures and approaches to safeguarding judicial independence.
One common distinction concerns the principal institution responsible for judicial administration. Comparative analyses identify several models, including ministry-led systems (e.g. Austria, Germany), judicial council models (e.g. France, Lithuania, Poland), courts service models (e.g. Denmark, Sweden) and hybrid arrangements (e.g. Estonia, Iceland). Even in systems without judicial councils, the judiciary – particularly presidents of supreme and appellate courts – often remains involved in strategic and administrative decision-making for the judiciary.
Among EU-OECD countries with judicial councils, two broad governance approaches are often distinguished. In Southern European systems (e.g. France, Italy, Spain), councils primarily focus on appointments and discipline to safeguard judicial independence. In Northern European systems (e.g. Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands), councils often also perform administrative, managerial and budgetary functions.
Non-European OECD countries also apply diverse governance models. In East Asia, Japan continues to vest judicial administration primarily in the Supreme Court, while Korea combines Supreme Court oversight with consultative conferences of judges. In the Americas, several countries, including Colombia and Costa Rica, have established judicial councils with varying degrees of authority, while other systems continue to evolve through constitutional reform processes.
Overall, there is no universally applicable model of judicial governance. Institutional arrangements continue to reflect different legal traditions, constitutional frameworks and political contexts. Nevertheless, many countries, including Ukraine, have gradually expanded the judiciary’s role in managing its own administration and resources as part of broader efforts to strengthen judicial independence and accountability. The OECD Recommendation similarly emphasises the importance of coherent, effective and independent governance frameworks supporting people-centred access to justice.
Ukraine’s justice system distributes responsibilities for judicial careers, administration, budgeting, operations and self-governance across multiple institutions. This structure reflects important principles such as separation of powers, institutional specialisation and checks and balances. At the same time, intersecting responsibilities – particularly regarding judicial appointments, qualification and administration – can create operational fragmentation.
Ukraine’s judicial governance framework also places strong emphasis on judicial independence. Key institutions, notably the HCJ and the HQCJ, are composed predominantly of judges or former judges, helping to insulate decisions relating to judicial careers, discipline and court administration from undue external influence. The framework is further supported by institutions such as the SJA, the NSJ and judicial self-governance bodies, including the CJU, which plays an important role in court organisation, budget execution and reform discussions.
Ukraine’s judicial governance system remains comparatively complex relative to many OECD countries. Intersecting responsibilities across governance bodies – particularly regarding judicial appointments, qualification, administration and oversight – may complicate co-ordination, lengthen decision-making and contribute to fragmented accountability and reform implementation, especially under wartime conditions and persistent staffing pressures. Table 3.3 illustrates selected areas of overlap across the HCJ, the HQCJ and the SJA and highlights areas where the current model may create duplication or operational inefficiencies despite strengthening independence safeguards.
A dedicated functional audit, as envisaged in the Rule of Law Roadmap, could help distinguish necessary institutional safeguards from avoidable overlap, clarify mandates and identify opportunities to strengthen the efficiency and coherence of judicial governance while preserving judicial independence. In the longer term, Ukraine may also assess whether selected governance functions could benefit from greater institutional streamlining, including within prosecutorial self-governance arrangements, subject to careful impact assessment and broad consultation.
3.2.4. Strengthening prosecutorial governance
Unlike the judiciary, whose independence is generally more clearly defined and constitutionally protected, prosecution services across OECD countries follow a wider range of institutional and governance models. At the global level, public prosecutors’ offices exhibit greater institutional diversity than judicial systems, reflecting a wide range of governance models and political contexts (Voigt, 2021[31]).
In hierarchical systems, prosecution services are often institutionally situated within the executive branch, while safeguards are maintained to preserve the functional autonomy of prosecutors. In many OECD countries, for example, laws seek to prevent or limit arbitrary instructions from supervising prosecutors or interventions from other branches of government in specific investigations and prosecutions (CCPE, 2018[32]).
In systems based on a judicial model, prosecution services operate with greater institutional independence as part of the judiciary, which may also reduce their vulnerability to corruption (Voigt, 2021[31]). Regardless of the institutional model adopted, safeguarding prosecutorial autonomy remains important given the central role of prosecutors in ensuring effective access to justice and the effective functioning of the justice system (OECD, 2020[33]).
Section VII of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine established the prosecutor’s office as a separate institution, reflecting the historically influential role of the prosecution service in the Soviet legal system. The 2016 constitutional amendments moved the prosecutor’s office into Section VIII on “Justice”, signalling closer alignment with a judicial model of prosecution service governance (VRU, 2016[34]). The amendments also narrowed prosecutorial functions by abolishing the broad supervisory role previously exercised by the prosecution service and limiting its mandate primarily to pre-trial investigations, public prosecution and representation of the state’s interests in court proceedings.
Despite these constitutional changes, the prosecution service in Ukraine continues to operate as a hierarchical system characterised by vertical subordination rather than a structure equivalent to the judiciary (Lapkin, 2022[35]). As a result, the governance framework combines elements of institutional autonomy with concentrated influence in the upper levels of the prosecution service.
The highest administrative organisation in the prosecution service of Ukraine remains the OPG. This office oversees the work of regional and territorial prosecutor offices, co-ordinates prosecutorial activity and develops methodological guidelines. Several bodies have also been established to supervise appointments, transfers, promotions and disciplinary matters, including the CoP, the AUCPP and the QDCP. The CoP ensures the independence of prosecutors, addresses issues relating to their legal and social protection, examines complaints regarding threats to their independence and monitors the implementation of decisions taken by the prosecutorial self-government body. The AUCPP elects members of the HCJ and approves the Code of Professional Ethics and Conduct for Prosecutors. The QDCP is responsible for determining the level of professional training required for prospective prosecutors; it also decides on prosecutors’ disciplinary liability, promotion, transfer and dismissal.
This architecture reflects a gradual attempt to move prosecutorial governance towards a more rules-based and professional model. Competitive selection, recertification and the opening of prosecutorial careers to candidates from outside the traditional pool were important early steps in that direction. The re-certification process launched in 2019-2021 reshaped the prosecution service and appears to have improved selectivity, particularly at the level of the OPG and regional offices. At the same time, the model remains institutionally uneven. The hierarchy sits alongside self-governance bodies whose practical capacity and institutional weight are still limited. Given the CoP’s important role in safeguarding prosecutorial independence and self-governance, operating pro bono may limit its capacity and long-term commitment to reforms.
The key governance challenge lies in ensuring that institutional design supports professionalism, predictability and independence. Stronger and more stable support for self-governance bodies, reducing influence over appointments and ensuring disciplinary accountability would all go a long way to advancing these goals. In this context, the reform priorities agreed upon by Ukraine and the EU in December 2025 are particularly relevant. Priority 3 calls for a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedure of the OPG, aligned with European best practices and prepared with the involvement of the Venice Commission (European Commission, 2025[36]). Priority 4 calls, in turn, for legislation to ensure transparent, merit-based selection, appointment and transfer procedures for managerial and other prosecutorial positions across the OPG and regional and district offices, along with clear criteria and competence and integrity assessments (European Commission, 2025[36]). These priorities underscore that the next stage of reform should strengthen institutional guarantees for resilient prosecutorial governance and protection against undue influence.
Strengthening prosecutorial governance in Ukraine thus requires both institutional and operational follow-through. In the medium term, increasing operational support, creating durable budgeting mechanisms and, where appropriate, professional membership arrangements, would help reinforce prosecutorial self-governance. Reforms should aim to ensure that appointments, promotions and transfers across the prosecution service are governed by stable, transparent and competitive procedures that support professional quality and institutional independence.
3.2.5. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Ukraine’s legal framework for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has developed progressively and now supports multiple ADR mechanisms, including mediation, judge-led dispute resolution and international commercial arbitration. Mediation is currently the most developed and promoted ADR mechanism, though its use remains limited. Arbitration remains concentrated primarily in commercial and investment disputes. In parallel, certain restorative justice and diversion programmes have also been piloted, particularly for minors in conflict with the law.
In 2016, amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine established that the law may require a pre-trial dispute resolution procedure (VRU, 2016[34]). In 2017, Ukraine introduced a new ADR procedure of dispute resolution with the participation of a judge (Chapter 4, Civil Procedure Code). In this process, the judge acts as a mediator, holding both joint and separate meetings with each party to encourage a peaceful settlement (VRU, 2026[37]).
The 2021 Law of Ukraine on Mediation established a framework for mediation as a voluntary process with legally recognised and enforceable agreements. It outlines key principles such as voluntary participation, confidentiality and impartiality (VRU, 2021[38]). Separate norms regarding mediation are also included in the Civil Procedure Code, the Commercial Procedure Code, the Code of Administrative Procedure and other laws. In addition, the National Mediation and Reconciliation Service performs a distinct role in the prevention and settlement of collective labour disputes.
Arbitration is primarily regulated by the 1994 Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the Civil Procedure Code, developed in line with international standards. These laws enable dispute resolution in commercial and investment matters, with arbitration decisions enforceable both domestically and internationally.
Mediation services are provided primarily by individual mediators and civil society organisations (CSOs), notably the Ukrainian Academy of Mediation (UAM), which has operated court-based mediation offices in Odesa since 2018 and delivers training, awareness-raising and professional development activities. Many mediators work on a pro bono basis, often through mediation networks or donor-supported initiatives.
Arbitration functions mainly in the commercial and investment sphere through the International Commercial Arbitration Court and the Maritime Arbitration Commission at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Despite this range of mechanisms, ADR services remain concentrated in larger urban centres, public awareness is low and usage is limited across all types of mechanisms – challenges that have been further compounded by the war. Chapter 6 analyses these constraints in detail.
Source: Developed by authors.
Despite gradual development of the ADR system in Ukraine, its governance remains fragmented. Responsibility is distributed across several actors, without a single institution responsible for policy development, co-ordination and oversight. The MoJ plays an important role in designing the legal and policy framework for ADR. At the same time, the practical development of mediation services has been driven largely by CSOs and professional mediation networks. CSOs, notably the UAM, have contributed to the development of professional practice, training and raising awareness around ADR. Current arrangements have supported the development of mediation in specific areas. However, they have also produced a dispersed governance landscape, with uneven standards, limited co-ordination and no comprehensive approach across the wider ADR system.
Moreover, mediator registers are decentralised and managed by several organisations. Separate registers are maintained by the UAM, the National Association of Mediators, the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue, the Association of Family Mediators of Ukraine, the legal aid system, the Intellectual Property Office and the Kyiv Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This creates a patchwork system marked by inconsistent verification and complaint procedures, and weak overall visibility.
To address this fragmentation, the MoJ prepared a draft reform concept. It envisages the establishment of a single register linked to common standards for admission, training, quality assurance and handling of complaints. The concept note gives particular attention to the creation of a self-governing model centred on a National Association of Certified Mediators of Ukraine (NACMU), which would act as the core professional governance body for the sector (MoJ, 2026[39]). Under such an approach, NACMU could maintain the unified register, oversee certification and professional standards, handle complaints and disciplinary matters and generate more reliable information on the functioning of mediation (MoJ, 2026[39]). The MoJ, in turn, could retain a co-ordinating role by setting the regulatory framework, managing the transition into the new model and ensuring that mediation governance supports broader objectives related to access to justice (MoJ, 2026[39]).
The model proposed by the MoJ offers a promising route for strengthening the governance of mediation in Ukraine. A self-governing structure, supported by a regulatory and co-ordinating role for the MoJ, could help improve the consistency of professional standards, registration, quality assurance and complaints handling across the sector. A key issue moving forward will be the financing of this reform. The implementation of any more coherent governance model, including the establishment of supporting administrative and oversight functions, will require predictable resources if it is to be carried through effectively in the coming years. OECD countries typically centralise their mediator registers, as shown in Box 3.6.
National Register of Mediators, Poland
While Polish law already regulates who may be a permanent mediator, the country is currently developing the National Register of Mediators to unify dispersed lists of mediators and professionalise mediation. A corresponding pilot project co-financed by the European Social Fund ran from January to December 2024 under which the Polish Ministry of Justice tested information systems, examined data security and collected feedback.
During the pilot phase, the possibility of applying to the list of mediators was restricted to already registered permanent mediators (for civil cases) or mediators included on the lists of institutions and persons authorised to mediate in criminal cases. Applications were submitted through an interactive form between January and June 2024 and the Minister of Justice decided on entries within 30 days.
Lists include mediators’ names, education, training, specialisation and contact details. The president of the district court enters mediators on the list and may remove them for failure to meet eligibility criteria or for improper conduct.
National Register of Mediators, Türkiye
In Türkiye, a central national register of mediators exists under the country’s Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes and provides an exhaustive overview of mediators that are allowed to provide court-ordered mediation services. Only mediators included in the register are allowed to conduct court‑ordered mediation. Settlement agreements concluded through a registered mediator are enforceable. Parties may either choose a mediator from the register themselves, or the court might do so in case of disagreement between the parties.
Within Türkiye’s framework, approved mediators are required to use the national judicial informatics system to record their activities and send information on outcomes to the Ministry of Justice, which administers the register. Mediators must also notify the Ministry of changes in their status and periodically engage in activities aimed at advancing their professional development. The registry is public and parties are encouraged to consult it.
Recent justice reform strategies included measures to promote pre-trial and out-of-court dispute resolution, including mediation, arbitration and restorative approaches. However, the practical availability, accessibility and use of ADR services remain uneven across Ukraine, particularly outside major urban centres. Chapter 6 further examines the functioning of ADR services in practice, including issues related to geographical coverage, public awareness, legal aid integration and user access.
Effective justice systems require a long-term, unified and agile vision. Instead of focusing solely on ad hoc institutional reviews and strengthening the capacity of justice institutions, it requires a coherent and strategic whole-of-state and whole-of-sector approach to planning, implementation and monitoring.
In Ukraine, strategic planning in the justice sector has evolved through successive waves of reform since independence, particularly following the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity and the acceleration of EU integration efforts. Since 2014, justice reforms have focused on strengthening judicial independence, accountability, integrity, digitalisation and institutional capacity, while also modernising prosecution services, enforcement systems and legal professions. These reforms intensified following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which increased pressure on justice institutions while simultaneously reinforcing the strategic importance of rule-of-law reforms for recovery, resilience and EU accession.
Successive justice strategies have reflected these evolving priorities. The Strategy for the Reform of the Judiciary, Legal Proceedings and Related Legal Institutions (2015-2020) focused on judicial independence and accountability, reform of prosecution services, optimisation of the judicial system and the expansion of e-justice tools (VRU, 2015[43]). It also introduced significant constitutional and institutional reforms, including the simplification of the court system and changes to judicial governance arrangements. The subsequent Strategy on the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Proceedings (2021-2023) built on these reforms by strengthening judicial governance and integrity mechanisms, promoting ADR, improving judicial administration and introducing additional reforms concerning constitutional justice, disciplinary systems and legal professions (VRU, 2021[44]). However, implementation gaps persisted across both strategies, particularly regarding judicial governance reform, court remapping, judicial staffing, enforcement of court decisions and integrity-related reforms. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, several planned reforms were delayed or suspended due to operational disruption, including interruptions affecting the HCJ and the HQCJ.1
Against this backdrop, the current reform framework continues a longer reform trajectory but places much stronger emphasis on EU accession and institutional alignment with the EU acquis. In the absence of an adopted overarching justice strategy, the Rule of Law Roadmap approved by the CMU in May 2025 functions as the central framework for ongoing and planned reforms across Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the EU acquis (VRU, 2025[45]). The Roadmap contains 124 strategic outcomes and 529 reform measures to be implemented by the end of 2027 across four thematic areas: judiciary, fundamental rights, justice/freedom/security and anti-corruption. It therefore acts not only as an accession instrument but also, in practice, as the interim framework for sequencing and monitoring justice reforms until a new justice strategy is formally adopted.
The Rule of Law Roadmap reflects a broader and increasingly integrated understanding of justice reform. In addition to judicial governance, integrity and court performance, it includes reforms concerning digitalisation, legal education, ADR, prosecution services and the Bar. The Roadmap also places greater emphasis on implementation, interoperability and institutional co-ordination. Measures concerning IT governance, judicial statistics, case management systems and legal education indicate recognition that sustainable justice reform requires institutional capacity across the wider justice ecosystem and not only within courts. Box 3.7 provides more details on the Roadmap’s provisions in the area of the judiciary.
The EU accession process has also strengthened the role of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the Government Office for Co-ordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration in steering cross-government reform priorities. This development is directly relevant for justice sector planning. In December 2025, several reform priorities for 2026 were agreed upon between the Deputy Prime Minister and the European Commissioner for Enlargement. Priority reform plans concern criminal procedure, prosecutorial governance, appointments to the CCU and the HCJ, extension of international experts’ involvement in the HQCJ Selection Commission and integrity declarations for judges (European Commission, 2025[36]). This parallel agreement underlines the need to align MoJ-led sectoral planning, OPU-led strategic initiatives and justice institutions’ reform commitments with the EU accession co-ordination architecture.
The ‘Judiciary’ section of the Rule of Law Roadmap outlines a broad reform agenda with targeted measures seeking to address structural weaknesses in judicial governance, capacity, integrity, performance and service delivery across the justice sector.
General reforms
General reforms included in the Roadmap pertain to strategic planning in the justice sector and institutional restructuring, including a new justice strategy, optimisation of court network, stronger resource planning and reviews of the roles and functioning of judicial governance and self-governance bodies.
Independence and impartiality
This area addresses core safeguards for fair and independent decision-making. It focuses on judicial appointments, career progression, integrity checks and disciplinary liability. It also seeks to reduce risks of interference and strengthen the credibility of judicial and prosecutorial governance.
Quality and efficiency of justice
Measures in this area include the reduction of court backlogs, further procedural reforms, improvement of judicial statistics, ensuring a more active role for the SC in promoting coherence and implementing reforms to improve access to justice in specific areas.
Digitalisation of justice
Digitalisation reform in the Roadmap is treated as an enabler of wider institutional change. The Roadmap connects IT governance, case and document management, judicial dossiers and data integration with a broader objective of advancing efficiency, transparency and oversight of the justice system.
Training of judges and prosecutors
This area seeks to align professional development more closely with the evolving needs of the justice system and with European standards. It places particular emphasis on ethics, integrity, EU law, groups with vulnerabilities, digitalisation and the institutional capacity of training providers.
Legal education reform
The Roadmap treats the reform of legal education as a long-term foundation of justice reform. Envisaged measures aim to improve the quality and integrity of legal education, strengthen the links with professional requirements and enhance standards for entry into legal professions.
Other components
Reforms included in the Roadmap are not confined to formal justice institutions. The inclusion of the Bar and ADR indicates a broader view of justice system performance, including the enforcement of rights and the availability of more accessible and effective mechanisms for settling disputes.
Source: (VRU, 2025[46]).
Several complementary strategic documents continue to operate alongside the Roadmap (Table 3.4). These include the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice (2025-2029), the Comprehensive Strategic Plan and Action Plan for Law Enforcement Reform (2023-2027), the Roadmap for the Development of IT Solutions in the Judiciary (2024-2029), the Concept for the Unified Judiciary Information and Technology System (UJITS; 2025-2027), the National Strategy for Protecting Children’s Rights in the Justice System (2025-2028) and sectoral strategies related to anti-corruption, human rights and enforcement of court decisions.
Source: Developed by authors.
In particular, the draft Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice (2025-2029) was developed in the context of both the unrealised objectives of previous reform strategies and the growing importance of EU accession requirements (OPU, 2024[47]). As such, it seeks to consolidate ongoing reforms across the justice sector while addressing persistent structural challenges affecting judicial governance, integrity, staffing, constitutional justice and court administration. The draft Strategy continues several reform priorities already identified under the 2021-2023 strategy, including measures related to judicial accountability and integrity, digitalisation, court performance and judicial governance, while also introducing a stronger focus on higher legal education reform and the functioning of constitutional justice.
A dedicated section of the draft Strategy concerns reform of the CCU, including measures aimed at strengthening the continuity and institutional capacity of the CCU, improving constitutional proceedings, developing the constitutional complaint mechanism, ensuring implementation of CCU decisions and reinforcing integrity safeguards for CCU judges. The draft Strategy also reflects several recommendations linked to Ukraine’s EU accession process, including the continued involvement of foreign experts in appointments to the CCU through the Advisory Group of Experts, further digitalisation of justice services and measures to improve court efficiency (European Commission, 2024[14]). In addition, comments from CSOs were reportedly taken into account during drafting, contributing to improvements in the structure and coherence of the document.
The draft Strategy illustrates several broader challenges affecting strategic planning in the justice sector. Many reform measures repeat priorities identified in previous strategies, reflecting persistent implementation gaps rather than entirely new reform directions. Several institutional and operational issues also remain insufficiently addressed, including the organisational independence of the OPG and prosecutorial self-governance bodies, the backlog of disciplinary complaints against judges, corruption risks affecting the SC, the need to strengthen prosecutors’ self-governance arrangements and reforms concerning periodic judicial evaluation and prosecutorial disciplinary systems. Despite the inclusion of e-justice reforms, further improvements remain necessary regarding automated allocation of cases within the renewal of the UJITS, as well as sustainable investment in court infrastructure and IT systems (European Commission, 2024[14]), among others.
Moreover, financing remains one of the principal implementation challenges for the draft Strategy. Several envisaged reforms, particularly modernisation of UJITS and broader digitalisation measures, require substantial long-term investment. Given the parallel implementation of the Rule of Law Roadmap, the effectiveness of the future Strategy will therefore depend on its alignment with the Roadmap, clearer prioritisation, sequencing and implementation arrangements, and stronger links between strategic planning, financing and monitoring. As of April 2026, however, the Strategy has not yet been formally adopted. Consequently, the Rule of Law Roadmap currently functions as the de facto framework for sequencing and monitoring justice reforms.
The Comprehensive Strategic Plan and Action Plan for Law Enforcement Reform (2023-2027) complements the broader reform architecture by focusing on the strategic and operational capacity of law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service (CMU, 2024[48]). The Strategic Plan includes several elements aligned with a people-centred justice approach, including measures aimed at strengthening accountability, protecting human rights, improving interaction with civil society and enhancing protection and support for victims and witnesses. It also promotes alternative responses within criminal proceedings, including diversion, mediation and restorative justice mechanisms, alongside broader digitalisation and results-based management reforms.
The Strategic Plan is relatively comprehensive within the law enforcement sphere, particularly in relation to criminal policy, digitalisation, civil oversight and victims’ issues. However, it is not designed to function as a substitute for a broader justice-sector strategy and therefore works best as a complementary pillar within the wider reform architecture. Its effectiveness will largely depend on how coherently it is aligned with the Rule of Law Roadmap, future strategies for the justice sector and related reforms concerning enforcement, digitalisation, anti-corruption and human rights. Box 3.8 highlights the main priorities of the Strategic Plan.
The Comprehensive Strategic Plan and Action Plan for Law Enforcement Reform (2023-2027) sets out the following reform priorities:
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement through various activities such as the development of international co-operation, harmonisation with EU legislation and strengthening interaction with civil society
creating consistent criminal policies and strategic plans through the development and execution of a national plan for crime prevention, setting priority areas for combating crime and the introduction of a unified media policy for the criminal justice sector
improving the efficiency of criminal proceedings through the development of alternative measures for resolving criminal cases and the introduction of restorative justice mechanisms, ensuring the legal certainty of the functions of the prosecutor in organising pre-trial investigations
creating a results-based management system through the strengthening of the co-ordinating role of the OPG, defining key performance indicators to measure the performance of law enforcement agencies and prosecution service
advancing digital transformation through innovative IT solutions, including the implementation of an electronic criminal proceedings management system, improving the accessibility of law enforcement agents and prosecutors to State registers and databases
strengthening the mechanisms of democratic civil control through promoting active interaction between civil society, law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor’s office.
Source: (ESBU, 2023[49]; UNBA, 2023[50]).
3.3.1. Governance and implementation challenges
The current strategic planning landscape therefore remains fragmented. Different strategies operate under separate timelines, governance arrangements and implementation cycles. While institution-specific strategies may strengthen ownership among lead institutions, fragmentation may also reduce the consistency and continuity of reform implementation across the sector.2 In practice, consultation processes during strategy development remain largely ad hoc and institution-specific, often taking place through written consultations rather than through standing planning and co-ordination mechanisms. This limits opportunities for longer-term prioritisation, integrated planning and sequencing of reforms across the sector.
This challenge is particularly important because the strategic direction of justice reforms has so far been mainly shaped by the OPU, in co-ordination with the MoJ and key justice institutions, including the HCJ, the HQCJ, the SJA, the OPG and judicial self-governance bodies. The OPU’s role reflects the political and strategic significance of justice reforms, particularly in the context of EU accession and wartime recovery. However, the absence of a clearly formalised institutional framework means that co-ordination, prioritisation and accountability continue to depend significantly on political practice rather than stable institutional arrangements.
Clarifying the respective roles and co-ordination arrangements of the OPU, the CMU, the MoJ and other relevant actors within the strategic planning framework for the justice sector would strengthen continuity and coherence across justice reforms. Clearer arrangements would support the development and monitoring of justice reform strategies and alignment of the justice strategy with other key national reform and governance priorities, while preserving institutional independence, ministerial responsibility and the constitutional balance between institutions. The purpose of such formalisation should not be to centralise implementation authority or interfere with institutional autonomy, but rather to clarify co-ordination functions, responsibilities and reporting arrangements across the justice sector. Safeguards such as transparent mandates, clearly defined institutional roles, regular reporting on implementation and continued involvement of the CMU, the MoJ and independent governance bodies would be important to maintain this balance.
A more integrated strategic planning framework would also improve temporal coherence across reforms. In recent years, strategic documents concerning justice, prosecution, law enforcement, anti-corruption, digitalisation and enforcement of court decisions have often operated under different timelines or expired without full implementation. This reduces opportunities to leverage synergies, creates uncertainty for implementing institutions and risks weakening reform momentum. Better alignment of timelines, implementation cycles and monitoring frameworks would therefore support more sequenced and mutually reinforcing reforms.
Moreover, while existing strategies broadly identify institutional reform priorities, they do not yet articulate a fully coherent people-centred vision for the justice system. In line with the OECD Recommendation [OECD/LEGAL/0498], future strategies could more explicitly identify the legal needs and justice problems of individuals and businesses, explain how institutional reforms will improve justice outcomes and link reform priorities to implementation, financing and measurable indicators. This would help move from institution-centred planning towards a more integrated and people-centred justice reform cycle. Costa Rica’s judiciary provides one example of how strategy, implementation, financing and monitoring of reforms can be linked in practice (see Box 3.9).
The judiciary of Costa Rica offers an example of how strategic planning can be institutionalised within the justice system while preserving judicial independence. The judiciary is organised across three spheres: the Judicial Sphere, the Auxiliary Sphere of Justice and the Administrative Sphere. Within this structure, the Planning Directorate provides technical stewardship across planning cycles.
Key features of the strategic planning model include:
Linking strategy to implementation: The Institutional Strategic Plan 2025-2030 sets the medium-term objectives and priorities for the judiciary, which are translated each year into an Annual Operational Plan with specific targets, activities and responsible actors.
Connecting plans and budgets: The Annual Operational Plan forms the basis for budget preparation, helping ensure that resources are linked to operational targets and planned activities.
Maintaining permanent planning capacity: The Planning Directorate provides a standing technical function for strategic planning, reducing reliance on ad hoc initiatives or externally funded support.
Supporting management and monitoring: A Strategic Management Model guides implementation of institutional priorities, while Annual Operational Plan targets are monitored on a half-yearly and annual basis to identify deviations and support course correction.
Costa Rica’s experience shows how judicial planning can connect long-term priorities, annual targets, resources and monitoring in a single cycle. For Ukraine, this example may offer a useful lesson for strengthening implementation of future justice strategies, linking reforms to resources and improving monitoring across the justice sector.
Source: (Judiciary of Costa Rica, 2026[51]).
A key dimension of this shift is connecting strategic planning to the actual distribution of legal needs and justice services across the territory of Ukraine. Strategies focused primarily on institutional reform – judicial governance, prosecution structures, legislative alignment – do not yet systematically address where people encounter justice problems, which services exist in specific regions and where access gaps are most acute. In line with the approach set out in Chapter 6, future planning cycles could draw on regular legal needs and justice problems surveys to ground reform priorities in evidence about people’s lived experiences, and should be supported by a national justice services map that covers not only courts and prosecution offices but also legal aid, ADR, Community Justice Centres (CJCs), victim support services and relevant administrative entry points (see Chapter 6). This kind of territorial, needs-based approach to planning would allow Ukraine to design a justice system whose service footprint responds to demand – including in war-affected, frontline and remote areas – rather than being shaped primarily by existing institutional geography. It would also strengthen the basis for resource allocation decisions and help identify which services need to transition from financing by international donors or CSOs to sustainable domestic funding as recovery progresses.
3.3.2. Evidence-based justice planning and evaluation
Robust justice planning and evaluation require a combination of different types and sources of evidence, used regularly across all stages of reform design, implementation and monitoring. This includes institutional performance data, disaggregated administrative data, legal needs surveys, user feedback, service-level evaluations and information from related sectors such as social protection, health and local governance. Combined, these sources can help assess not only institutional outputs, but also whether justice services are accessible, timely, fair, cost-effective and capable of producing meaningful outcomes for users.
In Ukraine, there is scope to strengthen the regular and transparent collection and use of such evidence in justice sector planning. This includes building a clearer understanding of legal needs and assessing whether the current service offer – including courts, legal aid, ADR, CJCs and other providers – responds to those needs efficiently and fairly. Periodic evaluation of individual services could help identify gaps in coverage, quality, accessibility and outcomes, while also supporting better allocation of resources across the justice system.
These evidence streams should feed directly into reform monitoring, including under the Rule of Law Roadmap, where the scale and complexity of the reform agenda make continuous evaluation particularly important. Evaluations of previous strategies have been limited and have not systematically informed subsequent reform cycles. Strengthening the evidence-based approach would require institutionalising evidence collection and evaluation as regular functions, supported by transparent reporting, clear indicators and mechanisms for using findings to adjust implementation over time.
3.4.1. Horizontal co-ordination and co-operation
Effective justice systems require sound governance, incorporating a whole-of-state approach and supported by participatory co-ordination mechanisms.
At the central level, horizontal co-ordination in Ukraine’s government is guaranteed in the Constitution, which describes the roles and responsibilities of the CMU (VRU, 2020[3]). The CMU ensures state sovereignty and economic independence, the execution of the Constitution and the acts of the President. It also directs and co-ordinates the operation of ministries and other bodies of executive power (VRU, 2020[3]).
Governmental policies related to EU integration and strategic policy development guide efforts toward horizontal co-ordination. As mentioned earlier, in the process of creating a new justice strategy, the OPU consults various justice stakeholders such as the MoJ, the HCJ, the SJA, the OPG, judicial self-governance bodies, CSOs and donor representatives. This creates opportunities to receive input from government and the public. However, reportedly, the PCLP was not involved in these consultations or in drafting the new strategy, which may undermine co-operation between the Government of Ukraine and the VRU in the judicial reform process.
Co-ordination often takes place at a more operational level. For example, the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision, justice institutions and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) have collaborated to expand access to mediation and restorative justice for juveniles (ALI et al., 2024[52]). Moreover, co-ordination often occurs as part of dedicated working groups (see Box 3.10). This practice suggests that co-operation might be more effective where roles are concrete, with clearly defined delivery chains and where multiple stakeholders co-ordinate on a specific reform or service. While this practice broadens communication and perspective, it does not guarantee co-ordinated implementation. When multiple partners engage on overlapping agendas, the absence of a formal framework can result in duplication and uneven follow-through.
Justice reforms in Ukraine have been supported through thematic working groups, including related to:
Strengthening judicial independence
A working group was established in 2023 by the HCJ to support the fulfilment of its constitutional mandate of safeguarding judicial independence. It brought together representatives from the HQCJ, the PIC, the CJU, the OPG and the UNBA.
Addressing staffing and operational capacity under martial law
In 2024, the HCJ convened a working group focused on staffing challenges during martial law and the post-war period. Its mandate includes developing standards for court staffing, as well as financial, logistical and operational support. Participants include representatives from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), the SC, the SJA and the CJU.
Developing integrity and ethics standards for judges
A dedicated working group was formed in 2024 to elaborate unified criteria for assessing judicial integrity and professional ethics. It includes members of the HCJ, the HQCJ, the CJU and the PIC, as well as judges and representatives of international projects, notably supported by the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the United States Agency for International Development.
Preparing for EU accession negotiations (Chapter 23)
Also in 2024, a working group was established to prepare Ukraine’s participation in negotiations with the European Commission on Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights). The group brings together representatives from the MoJ, the HCJ, the HQCJ, the SC, the CCU, the HACC, the SJA, the OPG, the NACP and the Ministry of Education and Science. While the MoJ co-ordinates the process, the HCJ serves as the lead institution for the working group.
Harmonising legislation with international criminal law standards
The OPG has established an interagency working group to support the alignment of Ukraine’s legislation and law enforcement practice with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC; entered into force in January 2025). The group focuses on identifying operational and legal challenges, analysing compliance with international law and preparing proposals to harmonise national legislation. It also facilitates targeted engagement with international experts and organisations to draw on comparative experience in implementing the Rome Statute.
Furthermore, co-ordination does not always function effectively in practice. CSOs point to weaknesses in co-ordination between the state authorities and judicial institutions, parallel reform processes undertaken by different teams without sufficient alignment and limited analysis of earlier reforms (ALI et al., 2024[52]). For example, not all draft CMU acts prepared by the SJA are considered by the CMU as the SJA is not designated in CMU Regulations as a developer of draft acts. Therefore, the SJA recommended the adoption of a draft resolution of the CMU “On Amendments to the Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, according to which the SJA of Ukraine would be able to properly exercise the powers defined by law.
During the drafting of the Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Justice for 2025-2029, the OPG submitted consolidated proposals to the OPU setting out priorities for strengthening the role of the prosecution service within the justice system. These proposals called for the full integration of the prosecution into the justice system in accordance with Section VIII of the Constitution, including adequate organisational, financial and logistical support for prosecution bodies and a non-discriminatory remuneration framework for prosecutors. The OPG also proposed strengthening the effectiveness of the prosecution’s constitutional functions, introducing a system of random case allocation among prosecutors based on clear, objective and specialisation-based criteria, and developing a framework for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work (Government of Ukraine, 2025[56]). The OPG noted that these proposals aimed to be consistent with, and complementary to, the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming Law Enforcement Agencies (2023-2027), which forms part of the broader architecture for modernising the law enforcement and prosecution sector in line with EU membership requirements.
As strategies such as the Rule of Law Roadmap and donor-supported initiatives take root, the justice system would benefit from a systemic method for monitoring activities, financing and institutional responsibilities against reform priorities. Institutionalising such a mechanism could help reduce duplication and identify areas to enhance efficiency.
This is particularly relevant given the level of international support to Ukraine’s justice sector. Donor-funded initiatives have been critical to maintaining reform momentum, supporting digitalisation, strengthening institutional capacity, enhancing integrity and sustaining service delivery during the war. However, this support operates within a wider recovery architecture affected by fragmented co-ordination, parallel engagement channels and multiple aid-tracking tools. A dedicated donor dashboard for the justice sector, linked to Ukraine’s broader aid-tracking and recovery co-ordination mechanisms, the Roadmap and other justice reform strategies could help address these risks. Such a dashboard could map donor-funded projects and technical assistance against reform priorities, EU accession commitments, responsible institutions and timelines to identify overlaps, financing gaps and areas where donor-supported reforms should transition to domestic financing or institutional ownership.
Box 3.11 offers some examples of co-ordination that Ukraine’s justice sector institutions engage in during wartime.
Russia’s war of aggression has intensified the need for co-ordination between justice institutions, law enforcement, international organisations and development partners, including in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The OPG has established an interagency working group of prosecution and law enforcement actors to co-ordinate the recording and investigation of war crimes. The working group includes the heads of the Security Service of Ukraine, the MIA, the National Police of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and intelligence agencies. According to the Prosecutor General, its current priority is collecting, systematising and analysing data to facilitate its transfer to a future Special Tribunal. More than 44 terabytes of information have already been stored in a centralised digital repository, and a new strategic plan for the prosecution of international crimes is being developed for 2026-2028.
This domestic co-ordination is closely linked to international justice co-operation. Justice institutions in Ukraine, including the prosecution service, co-operate with Eurojust, Europol and the ICC. In March 2023, the OPG signed a co-operation agreement establishing an ICC country office in Ukraine. Ukraine also receives technical, policy and financial support from – among other organisations – the EU, the CoE, the UNDP, the World Bank and the OECD, including through initiatives such as the EU-funded Pravo-Justice project, support for constitutional justice, the Register of Damage for Ukraine and work related to the creation of a Special Tribunal.
In most forms of international co-ordination, the OPU and the CMU play central roles. Depending on the subject matter, other justice institutions may also be involved, including the MoJ, the HCJ, the HQCJ and the OPG. The example illustrates both the value of Ukraine’s wartime co-ordination arrangements and the need to connect operational, donor-supported and EU accession-related work through clearer institutional responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms.
3.4.2. Vertical co-ordination and co-operation
Vertical co-ordination may be challenging as it requires structured communication between institutions with substantial autonomy (Adam et al., 2019[63]), which is a particular characteristic of the justice sector.
In Ukraine’s judiciary, the LJSJ structures relations between courts, bodies of judicial governance, judicial self-governance bodies and administrative support institutions. Vertical co-ordination concerns judicial staffing, selection and qualification procedures, the distribution of judges across courts, disciplinary and integrity-related processes, and the administrative and financial support necessary for courts to function (VRU, 2025[8]). For example, the HCJ and the HQCJ co-ordinate on matters related to judicial selection, qualification assessment and other career-related decisions (VRU, 2025[8]). The HCJ and the courts interact on disciplinary and integrity-related matters, while the CJU engages with courts on issues of judicial self-governance and the internal organisation of courts (VRU, 2025[8]). The SJA, in turn, works with the HCJ and the courts on court administration, staffing, budgeting and logistical support (VRU, 2025[8]).
In the prosecution service, the Law of Ukraine on the Prosecutor’s Office defines co-ordination between the OPG, lower-level prosecutors and bodies of prosecutorial self-governance. In practice, vertical co-ordination concerns the organisation and direction of prosecutorial work, the allocation of authority across levels of the prosecution service, appointments to administrative positions, personnel management, disciplinary processes and the resolution of internal institutional matters (VRU, 2026[10]). Within this framework, the OPG co-ordinates with prosecutors at lower levels on the implementation of prosecutorial functions and the organisation of work across the system (VRU, 2026[10]). Moreover, the OPG interacts with the CoP on matters affecting the functioning of the profession, while the AUCPP and the CoP contribute to the resolution of internal governance, professional and organisational issues within the prosecution service (VRU, 2026[10]).
The budgetary process for the judiciary, further analysed in Chapter 5, offers a good example of vertical co-ordination. The budgets of local and appellate courts are prepared by the SJA with input from individual courts. Monitoring budget execution is left to judicial self-governing bodies. For example, the Head of the SJA reports to the CJU about the execution of the judicial budget. The HCJ participates in determining the allocation of the State Budget for the maintenance of courts, as well as justice system bodies and institutions, and approves redistributions of budget expenditures between courts, excluding the SC.
3.4.3. Co-ordination with CSOs
Often focused on local issues, CSOs can make a useful contribution to the resolution of legal needs and the promotion of important social values (Rajabi, Ebrahimi and Aryankhesal, 2021[64]). Given the budgetary constraints in the public sector and broad expertise of CSOs in addressing social and justice problems, the already important role of CSOs in Ukraine has increased since the beginning of the war in 2014.
Several channels exist for co-ordination between the Government of Ukraine, the justice sector and CSOs in the process of planning and, in some cases, implementing justice services. State authorities and CSOs co-ordinate in a wide range of policy areas. As a result of the consultative process, for example, the development of the Rule of Law Roadmap was co-ordinated between state authorities, CSOs and international technical assistance projects (ALI et al., 2024[52]). The Law on Public Consultation from June 2024 is expected to further strengthen participation of CSOs in policymaking (European Commission, 2024[14]), although it will enter into force only after the end of martial law (European Commission, 2024[14]).
At the same time, there are reports that co-ordination is not consistently conducted in a transparent manner (ALI et al., 2024[52]) and often dependent on ad hoc arrangements. This can limit opportunities for more systematic engagement of CSOs in the design and delivery of justice-related reforms and services. Given the role CSOs play in areas such as advocacy, outreach, service delivery, documentation and community engagement, more structured forms of co-operation could help strengthen continuity, clarify expectations and support information exchange. For example, memoranda of understanding or similar instruments could systematise CSOs’ input while preserving their independence. Box 3.12 offers an example of how the judiciary co-ordinates with CSOs as part of the PIC.
The PIC was created in 2016 to assist the HQCJ in determining whether judges or judicial candidates meet standards of professional ethics and integrity. It consists of 20 members, serving two-year terms, appointed by CSOs that are active in the areas of anti-corruption, human rights or institutional reform.
To fulfil its tasks, the PIC can participate in interviews with candidates for the judiciary and present its conclusions on the integrity of candidates to the HQCJ. In August 2025, 20 new members of the PIC were elected. Most were representatives of CSOs and the UNBA.
The establishment of the PIC has become an important element of the institutional framework for ensuring judicial integrity. The HQCJ’s procedure has granted full access of PIC members to judicial dossiers and dossiers of candidates for judicial office. Further strengthening of the PIC’s role may primarily concern its analytical capacity and resource support.
In view of the assessment, Ukraine may wish to consider the following recommendations:
1. Strengthen sectoral governance of the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendations
Conducting an independent functional audit of judicial governance arrangements, as envisaged in the Rule of Law Roadmap, notably the HCJ, the HQCJ and the SJA, to map mandates, decision-making powers and accountability arrangements and identify opportunities to strengthen coherence, co-ordination and operational efficiency while preserving safeguards for independence. This could include consideration, in the longer term and subject to broad consultation and careful impact assessment, of whether selected governance functions may benefit from greater institutional streamlining.
Streamlining roles and decision-making powers across judicial governance bodies, through targeted legislative amendments informed by the functional audit, focusing on eliminating duplicated competences and clarifying accountability across these institutions.
Completing the establishment of specialised administrative courts by securing sustainable resourcing and staffing of the SDAC and the SACA to strengthen the administrative justice system and improve access to justice for complaints against executive authorities.
Clarifying the respective roles and co-ordination arrangements of the OPU, the CMU, the MoJ and other relevant institutions in developing and monitoring the implementation of justice reform strategies, ensuring coherence between the justice strategy and other key national reform and governance priorities.
Supporting recommendations
Clarifying institutional responsibilities, financing arrangements and governance frameworks for CJCs within the justice system
Professionalising the CJU and the CoP by reviewing membership rules, introducing full-time membership where appropriate, ensuring sustainable budgets and improving transparency of selection and decision-making.
2. Advance strategic planning for the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendation
Using the Rule of Law Roadmap as the basis for sequencing and monitoring reforms, ensuring ownership and managing risks related to budget allocations, until a new justice strategy is adopted, while enabling the development of a justice service map that links planning to legal needs, service distribution and performance outcomes.
Supporting recommendations
Strengthening the link between strategic planning, performance management and justice outcomes by developing more integrated planning approaches across the justice system and aligning institutional priorities, resource allocation and service delivery with identified legal and justice needs. This could include greater use of data and legal needs evidence to support planning of the overall justice service offer, including courts, legal aid, ADR and community-based services.
Aligning future strategies for the development of the justice system and constitutional justice with strategies on law enforcement and prosecution, enforcement of court decisions, digitalisation and human rights to identify synergies and ensure co-ordinated strategic planning for the justice sector.
Sequencing justice sector reforms in line with institutional absorption capacity, operational continuity and available financial and human resources, including through periodic assessment of implementation burdens and sustainability risks.
3. Enhance justice sector co-ordination and co-operation. This could include:
Key recommendations
Strengthening the co-operation between the MoJ and providers of justice and legal services at the community level through more systematic engagement of CSOs in outreach, legal empowerment and feedback on the services provided, including in areas affected by the war.
Tracking justice reform initiatives financed by international partners and the broader donor support for justice reforms by developing a dedicated justice sector dashboard, as a module of Ukraine’s broader aid-tracking and recovery co-ordination architecture. The dashboard could map projects and funding sources against justice sector priorities, EU accession commitments, responsible institutions, timelines and expected results. It would thus help to assess the extent to which justice sector reforms rely on external funding and provide guidance on dependencies and sustainability risks.
Supporting recommendations
Creating an Inter-Agency Data Governance Board, led by the MoJ and aligned with cross-government data governance initiatives, to develop the justice data dictionary for the sector, set interoperability and quality standards, oversee ethics, security and data-sharing protocols and align open justice initiatives.
Strengthening partnerships between the government and CSOs, including for pilot projects, to extend impact, strengthen legitimacy and test reforms before their implementation.
Assessing long-term financial sustainability and institutional ownership of externally supported justice reforms, including operational, staffing and maintenance implications beyond donor funding cycles.
4. Strengthen evidence-based planning and evaluation. This could include:
Key recommendations
Strengthening evidence-based planning and evaluation across the justice sector through the systematic use and combination of data, such as administrative data, legal needs information, user feedback and service performance assessments to support better prioritisation, resource allocation and improvement of justice outcomes.
Monitoring user satisfaction with the justice system through surveys and feedback mechanisms across courts and other justice service providers.
Monitoring the accessibility, continuity and effectiveness of justice pathways, including referral systems, territorial accessibility, digital accessibility and user experiences across institutions and justice service providers.
Using people-centred and territorial data for strategic planning by systematically applying evidence on legal needs, accessibility, satisfaction and trust to inform long-term strategies, reforms of judicial and prosecution maps and resource allocation.
Supporting recommendations
Integrating cross-government evidence by combining justice, health and other social and administrative data to inform policy responses to the ongoing war, displacement and changing socio-economic conditions.
Developing interoperable and people-centred data systems capable of supporting integrated planning and co-ordination across justice, social, administrative and victim-support services.
Consolidating war-related justice data by systematically documenting war crimes and victim-related information to track cases and needs, supported by joint training for CSOs and justice professionals on data collection and verification.
1. Legally established but not yet operational.
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← 1. Examples include institutionalising the PIC, creating a separate chamber in the Criminal Court of Cassation to review decisions of the HACC, improving enforcement of court decisions and advancing legal education reform (DEJURE, 2021[69]). Moreover, in early 2022, both the HQCJ and the HCJ were unable to obtain the necessary quorum to operate properly. Therefore, several reform measures for streamlining the process of selection, appointment, promotion, transfer and discipline of judges were put on hold (DEJURE, 2021[69]).
← 2. This challenge is not unique to the justice sector. The OECD Public Governance Review of Ukraine identifies comparable fragmentation at the whole-of-government level, where the absence of a formal hierarchy of planning documents and clear coordination mechanisms results in strategies operating in silos across ministries (OECD, forthcoming[23]).