This chapter examines the application of justice system values in Ukraine, highlighting how independence, integrity, accountability and transparency shape procedural justice, legitimacy and public trust. Set against the context of war, recovery and European Union (EU) accession, it analyses institutional safeguards, reform trade-offs and implementation challenges, showing how people’s experience of justice is central to rebuilding confidence and upholding the rule of law.
OECD Justice Review of Ukraine
Delivering Better Justice Outcomes for People
Abstract
The effective functioning and legitimacy of the justice system depend on the application of mutually reinforcing principles, notably independence, impartiality, integrity, accountability and transparency. These principles shape both the operation of justice institutions and public confidence in the justice system.
In Ukraine, public confidence in the judiciary remains limited despite successive judicial reforms. Survey evidence points to persistent concerns regarding corruption, impunity, limited transparency and the integrity of judges. For example, at the end of 2023, more than 68% of Ukrainians reported distrust in the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SC), while only 16% expressed confidence in it (DEJURE, 2025[1]). Other surveys similarly suggest a gap between strong demand for justice, accountability and reparations and comparatively low confidence in justice institutions (Pravo-Justice, 2023[2]; Vinck et al., 2024[3]).
These findings suggest that the key challenge lies less in the existence of formal safeguards than in whether they are perceived as being applied consistently, transparently and fairly in practice. This issue is particularly important in Ukraine given the legacy of politicised justice, successive reform efforts and the additional pressures created by Russia’s war of aggression.
This chapter therefore examines how safeguards relating to judicial independence, accountability and integrity operate in practice in Ukraine. It assesses the functioning of judicial and prosecutorial governance arrangements, disciplinary and integrity mechanisms, and the operational conditions affecting the credibility, transparency and effectiveness of justice institutions. This chapter refers to selection, evaluation, promotion, discipline and transfers only insofar as they raise integrity, accountability or independence concerns. The workforce, staffing, competency and operational implications of these processes are examined in Chapter 5.
Independence of the judiciary has two primary dimensions: institutional independence and the individual independence of judges to perform their functions with discretion and impartiality. Institutional independence can be mainly framed by constitutional, organisational and financial autonomy. Individual independence, in turn, requires that judges be free from interference in their decision-making, that the material conditions of their work be satisfactory and that legal safeguards ensure impartial adjudication is possible.
4.2.1. Institutional independence of the judiciary
Constitutional and legal guarantees
Institutional independence of the judiciary concerns the extent to which the judicial branch is systemically protected from undue influence by other branches of power and supported by an adequate legal framework and appropriate financial resources. In line with European and international standards, this form of independence requires formal guarantees of autonomy, as well as funding arrangements that enable courts and justice institutions to function independently and effectively. Box 4.1 outlines the key international standards related to judicial independence.
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
The UN Basic Principles set out the key guarantees for judicial independence. They provide that the independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed by the state, secured in the constitution or in law and respected and observed by all public authorities and institutions. They also provide that courts should decide matters impartially, based on facts and the law, free from restrictions and – direct or indirect – improper influence, pressure, threats or interference. Moreover, the Principles underline that courts should have authority over matters of a judicial nature, that judicial decisions should not be subject to revision outside established legal processes and that adequate resources should be provided to the judiciary so it can perform its functions effectively.
OSCE Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia
The Kyiv Recommendations emphasise that the administration of courts and of the judiciary should support independent and impartial adjudication. They stress that arrangements for judicial governance and court administration should be designed in a manner consistent with due process and the rule of law and should not be used to influence the substance of judicial decision-making. The Recommendations also emphasise the importance of transparency in judicial administration, recognising that clear and open governance is an important safeguard against undue influence and a condition for public confidence in the justice system.
Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government
The Latimer House Principles present an independent, impartial, honest and competent judiciary as a central pillar of the rule of law and public confidence in justice institutions. They underline the importance of ensuring transparent and merit-based judicial appointments, security of tenure and protection of remuneration. Furthermore, they emphasise the need to provide sufficient resources for the judiciary so it can operate effectively. The principles also recognise that relations between the judiciary and the executive should be framed so that necessary interaction does not compromise judicial independence.
OSCE Recommendations on Judicial Independence and Accountability (Warsaw Recommendations)
The Warsaw Principles place judicial independence within a broader framework of the rule of law focused on institutional resilience, accountability and responsiveness to people’s needs. They highlight the importance of appropriate checks and balances and the separation of powers, and independent, open and effective justice systems. They also emphasise the importance of the protection of lawyers and professional associations from harassment or improper interference and the value of co-operation in advancing the rule of law. The Warsaw Recommendations therefore connect judicial independence not only to institutional design, but also to people-centred justice, democratic values and societal resilience.
Note: Other European standards are also relevant. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) anchors judicial independence in the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Council of Europe (CoE) Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges further stresses that judicial independence is not a privilege of judges, but a guarantee of fair trial rights, public confidence and the impartial administration of justice.
As outlined in Chapter 3, the Constitution of Ukraine establishes a framework for upholding the independence of the judiciary. It explicitly guarantees the independence and immunity of judges and prohibits any form of undue influence on judicial decision-making (VRU, 2020[8]). These constitutional guarantees of judicial independence have been examined by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). In its jurisprudence, the CCU interpreted Article 126 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states that “any influence on judges shall be prohibited,” as a guarantee of judicial autonomy in the administration of justice (CCU, 2004[9]). This provision, according to the CCU, prohibits any actions directed at judges, regardless of their form, from government bodies, institutions, organisations, local self-governments, officials and private individuals or entities that may interfere with judges’ professional duties or attempt to coerce them into delivering unjust verdicts (CCU, 2004[9]).
Building on the constitutional framework, the Law of Ukraine on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges (LJSJ) sets out core principles safeguarding judicial independence, including the prohibition of unlawful influence or interference in the administration of justice (VRU, 2025[10]). It bars state authorities and officials from actions or statements that could undermine judicial independence, limits liability of judges to proven criminal or disciplinary offences and subjects their arrest or detention to strict legal procedures involving the High Council of Justice (HCJ) (VRU, 2025[10]). In 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) enacted the Law on Restoration of Trust in the Judicial Power in Ukraine, marking an early effort to address concerns about judicial integrity through an extraordinary review mechanism (VRU, 2025[10]). Subsequent reforms increasingly shifted towards more institutionalised safeguards relating to judicial appointments, discipline and integrity screening.
Thus, in broad terms, and as discussed in Chapter 3, when assessed against European standards and compared with frameworks in OECD countries, Ukraine’s constitutional and legislative frameworks provide extensive formal safeguards for judicial independence and are broadly aligned with international standards. This corresponds with the findings of the OECD Fifth Round of Anti-Corruption Monitoring Report, which notes that Ukraine has established an extensive legal and institutional framework for judicial independence and integrity, while challenges remain regarding implementation, institutional trust and operational effectiveness (OECD, 2025[11]).
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 3, Ukraine has developed a comparatively extensive institutional architecture aimed at safeguarding judicial independence. Its constitutional status, unified court system, prohibition of extraordinary and special courts, judicial self-governance arrangements and dedicated governance bodies create a framework intended to protect the judiciary from ad hoc political intervention. Findings from OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PIIs) point in the same direction: overall Ukraine fulfils formal judicial integrity criteria relating to merit-based and objective procedures for the selection and promotion of judges, objective grounds for dismissal, ethics standards, conflict-of-interest and incompatibility rules, asset and interest declarations and whistleblower channels in the judiciary (OECD, 2026[12]).
However, concerns regarding judicial independence persist, indicating that recent and ongoing reforms have not yet fully translated into consistently improved professional perceptions or institutional trust. In the 2025 survey of European judiciaries conducted by the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), judges in Ukraine raised concerns regarding institutional independence within the judiciary.1 The overall perception of judicial independence among judges in Ukraine remained comparatively low, with judges assessing judicial independence at 5.9 on a 10-point scale, compared with an overall average of around 8.5 across the surveyed countries (ENCJ, 2025[13]). The survey also suggested that concerns extend beyond isolated pressure at the level of individual cases to broader institutional conditions affecting independence, including perceptions regarding respect for judicial independence by government and parliament, working conditions, remuneration, workload and the role of judicial governance bodies (ENCJ, 2025[13]). These perceptions should be interpreted in the context of continuing wartime pressures, staffing shortages and ongoing institutional reform processes affecting the justice sector more broadly.
Several factors could affect perceived and actual institutional judicial independence. First, international evidence suggests that institutional independence depends not only on formal safeguards, but also on the quality, credibility and coherence of judicial governance arrangements in practice. In systems where judicial councils and self-governing bodies exercise significant responsibilities over appointments, discipline, transfers and institutional administration, as in Ukraine, their transparency, integrity, accountability and operational capacity become important components of the effective protection of judicial independence. In Ukraine, this means that institutional independence is closely linked to whether the HCJ, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) and related bodies are both perceived as and operate as impartial, professionally capable and resilient to undue influence, including from within the justice system itself.
Yet, the 2025 ENCJ survey indicates that levels of confidence in the HCJ among judges remain comparatively moderate, with judges rating the independence of the HCJ at around 5.5 on a 10-point scale, whereas judicial councils in several higher-performing systems were commonly rated above 8 (ENCJ, 2025[13]). Such perceptions are significant given the central role judicial councils play in safeguarding judicial independence, including through decisions relating to judicial appointments, discipline, career progression and responses to reported interference. In addition, as highlighted in the Fifth Round Monitoring Report, some civil society organisations (CSOs) continue to raise concerns regarding the transparency of appointment procedures and the limited share of non-judicial members within the HCJ, arguing that these factors may affect perceptions regarding pluralism, external oversight and institutional independence in practice (OECD, 2025[11]). At the same time, stakeholders acknowledged positive developments such as the participation of the Ethics Council and the inclusion of non-judicial members in the HCJ’s renewal processes.
In parallel, to enable the effective exercise of judicial independence, international standards emphasise the importance of adequate and stable funding of the judiciary. Among other standards, the United Nations Basic Principles and the Kyiv and Warsaw Recommendations stress that sufficient resources and protection of remuneration are necessary to safeguard courts from undue influence and to support impartial adjudication (UN, 1985[4]; OSCE/ODIHR, 2010[5]; OSCE/ODIHR, 2023[7]) The ENCJ sets out further practical benchmarks for funding arrangements that support judicial independence (ENCJ, 2017[14]) (see Box 4.2).
The ENCJ recommends that judicial funding be based on objective and transparent criteria and protected from inappropriate political interference. Courts should not be funded solely on an annual basis, but should benefit from longer-term financial stability.
The Council for the Judiciary, or an equivalent body, should be closely involved at all stages of the budgetary process, and the judiciary should also play an active role in defining budgetary priorities and managing allocated resources. Court funding should be sufficient to support an effective and efficient justice system, including the capacity to manage caseloads properly.
The ENCJ also underlines that funding should support key conditions for judicial independence and quality, including judicial remuneration, training and the broader functioning of the courts.
Source: (ENCJ, 2017[14]).
At the national level, Article 130 of the Constitution of Ukraine establishes a clear obligation for state authorities to ensure adequate funding and appropriate conditions for the functioning of the judiciary (VRU, 2020[8]). The framework provides that court financing derives from the State Budget of Ukraine, while the Government is responsible for ensuring sufficient allocations to justice institutions. The LJSJ establishes more detailed principles and procedures governing the allocation and management of judicial resources (VRU, 2025[10]). Findings from OECD PIIs support this assessment of the formal framework: Ukraine fulfils criteria requiring judicial authorities to be consulted regarding resource allocation according to publicly available criteria and requiring the judiciary’s budget to be approved directly by parliament (OECD, 2026[12]).
As further elaborated in Chapter 5, the management of court funding in Ukraine is distributed across several institutions. The State Judicial Administration of Ukraine (SJA) serves as a central budget holder for the general court system, the HQCJ, the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJ) and the Court Security Service (CSS). Separately, several institutions act as independent budget holders, including the HCJ, the SC, the CCU and specialised courts: the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC), the High Court on Intellectual Property (HCIP), the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). Therefore, institutional independence is accompanied, in certain cases, by direct budgetary responsibility, which enhances the financial independence of such institutions as the HCJ and the SC.
Nevertheless, justice sector representatives voiced concerns regarding the practical dimension of judiciary’s financial autonomy. Already before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, courts and prosecutors’ offices were grappling with securing adequate funding to fulfil their mandates. The war has exacerbated these challenges and diminished revenue streams to Ukraine’s budget. Data reveals that only 63.4% of the courts’ operational expenses were covered in 2022, plummeting to 51.4% in 2023 (Pravo-Justice, 2023[2]). In 2022, the SJA estimated financial needs of the judiciary at approximately UAH 26.7 billion (around EUR 685.5 million), while actual allocations amounted to about UAH 16.9 billion (around EUR 433.9 million), indicating a substantial gap between identified needs and available funding for the effective functioning of the judicial system (Pravo-Justice, 2023[2]).
As such, Ukraine does not fulfil the PII practice criterion concerning the absence of reported funding shortfalls or budget reductions (Pravo-Justice, 2023[2]). This illustrates the continuing gap between formal budgetary safeguards and operational resource constraints. The Fifth Round Monitoring Report similarly notes that resource limitations, staffing shortages and operational pressures continue to affect the functioning and resilience of justice institutions despite legal safeguards (OECD, 2025[11]). Resource constraints affecting judges and court staff, including remuneration and working conditions, may create risks for institutional resilience, staff retention and public confidence in the justice system. These issues are examined in greater detail in Chapter 5 as part of the justice sector’s broader challenges related to human resources management (HRM) and workforce capacity.
4.2.2. Individual independence and impartiality of judges
International standards require judges to decide cases impartially, based solely on the facts and the law, and free from any direct or indirect interference or pressure (UN, 1985[4]). The Venice Commission emphasises that reporting illegal interference should be a legal obligation, not merely an ethical one (Venice Commission, 2025[15]). Judges should report both actual and apparent interference, with competent authorities responsible for determining whether further action is warranted (Venice Commission, 2025[15]).
Similar to most OECD countries, Ukraine’s legal framework prohibits any external influence over judges, including through contemptuous acts or disseminating information intended to undermine judicial authority (VRU, 2025[10]). Judges are required to report any interference to the HCJ and the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) within five days of becoming aware of the incident, and failure to do so may result in disciplinary consequences (VRU, 2025[10]). Violations of these provisions also carry defined legal consequences and liability against individuals who attempt to influence judges’ decision-making.
Despite these formal guarantees, safeguarding individual judicial independence and impartiality in practice has remained a longstanding challenge in Ukraine. Concerns regarding political and institutional interference in judicial decision-making were already identified in the 1992 Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform, which recognised the absence of genuine judicial independence as a structural weakness of the justice system (VRU, 1992[16]). The persistence of these concerns suggests that, alongside the existence of formal safeguards, effective implementation, institutional culture and confidence in accountability mechanisms remain important factors affecting perceptions of judicial independence in practice.
Indeed, recent evidence confirms the continued relevance of these concerns. Around 12% of responding judges in Ukraine reported having experienced inappropriate pressure in individual cases, compared with an overall average of around 6% across the surveyed countries (ENCJ, 2025[13]). Particularly notable were comparatively low levels of judges’ confidence regarding respect for judicial independence by government institutions: only around 10% of responding judges in Ukraine considered that their independence was respected by government, compared with an average of around 51% in the survey (ENCJ, 2025[13]). These findings point to continuing concerns regarding the institutional environment in which judges exercise their functions, although they should also be interpreted in the context of wartime pressures, ongoing reforms and broader institutional challenges affecting the justice sector.
Stakeholder interviews suggested a range of factors that may contribute to the gap between the legal framework and perceptions of practice. These factors relate not only to allegations of direct interference in adjudication, but also to broader institutional, disciplinary, operational and informational pressures that may affect how judges perceive their ability to act independently and impartially.
First, although mechanisms exist for judges to report interference with their official duties, questions remain regarding the practical effectiveness and visibility of follow-up measures. Under the LJSJ, judges must report any interference to the HCJ and OPG. As highlighted in Figure 4.1, between 2021-2025, the HCJ received 1 069 reports of alleged interference in judges’ duties (HCJ, 2022[17]; HCJ, 2023[18]; HCJ, 2024[19]; HCJ, 2025[20]; HCJ, 2026[21]).2 However, publicly available information regarding subsequent investigations, sanctions or other follow-up actions remains limited. This may affect perceptions regarding the effectiveness and deterrent value of existing safeguards. In practice, reporting mechanisms alone may therefore be insufficient to ensure confidence in the protection of judicial independence unless accompanied by clear, timely and transparent institutional responses.
There also appears to be a gap between formal safeguards and professional perceptions regarding disciplinary accountability. While the Constitution and the LJSJ aim to protect judges from liability for judicial decisions except in cases of crime, disciplinary offence, intentional legal violation or improper performance of duties, 39% of judges in Ukraine responding to the ENCJ survey reported that disciplinary proceedings, or the possibility of such proceedings, had affected their independence (ENCJ, 2025[13]). In most other surveyed countries this figure ranged between 5% and 10% (ENCJ, 2025[13]). This finding does not necessarily indicate that disciplinary mechanisms are excessive or improperly applied. Rather, it suggests that the design, implementation and perceived predictability of disciplinary arrangements may influence whether they are experienced as legitimate accountability safeguards or as potential sources of institutional pressure. Section 4.3 examines these issues in greater detail.
Another important dimension of the protection of individual judicial independence is the extent to which judges are shielded from undue influence within the judiciary itself, including from court management, higher courts and judicial governance bodies. Some stakeholders identified the internal election of court presidents as a potential source of informal influence within the judiciary, particularly in smaller courts where limited competition and the use of secret voting procedures may reinforce existing administrative hierarchies or informal arrangements (OECD, 2025[11]). As shown in Figure 4.2, Ukrainian judges responding to the ENCJ survey reported the highest levels of perceived respect for their independence from direct court management (83% positive responses), followed by associations of judges (62%)3, the SC (60%) and the CCU (57%) (ENCJ, 2025[13]). The HCJ received the lowest rating (52%) in terms of influence on the individual independence of judges (ENCJ, 2025[13]).
Note: The figure shows the responses of judges in Ukraine to the statement: “During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by [actor].” Results are presented as the share of respondents who agree or strongly agree, are not sure or disagree or strongly disagree with the above statement. The number of judges responding to the questions covered in the figure varied across items, ranging from 337 to 374 judges.
Source: (ENCJ, 2025[13]), elaborated by authors.
Confidence in the HCJ as the principal guarantor of judicial independence remains mixed among judges and external stakeholders (as shown in Figure 4.2), despite acknowledgement of important recent reforms and institutional renewal efforts. This finding is particularly significant given the HCJ’s central role in safeguarding judicial independence and administering disciplinary procedures. Thus, the comparatively limited confidence expressed by judges may reflect broader concerns regarding the predictability, transparency and effectiveness of disciplinary and governance arrangements in practice.
Judicial independence also requires that judges have adequate, stable and predictable resources to perform their functions safely, effectively and without undue pressure. In the ENCJ survey, around 69% of judges in Ukraine reported that remuneration negatively affects their independence, compared with an average of 21% (ENCJ, 2025[13]). Judges from Ukraine participating in the survey also identified workload and broader resource constraints as related concerns (ENCJ, 2025[13]). As further highlighted in Chapter 5, these findings are significant because inadequate remuneration and difficult working conditions may affect morale, recruitment, retention and overall institutional resilience of the judiciary.
Finally, as in many other countries, challenges to individual independence of judges are compounded by a polarised information environment, including reputational attacks amplified through media and social media channels. Digital and media environments can, including inadvertently, facilitate the spread of false or misleading information targeting judges and questioning their integrity. In this regard, 48% of judges from Ukraine reported that judicial decisions are affected by media influence, compared with an average of 19%, while 40% reported influence from social media, compared with 12% on average (ENCJ, 2025[13]). These findings suggest that judges in Ukraine perceive themselves as operating in a particularly challenging informational environment, where heightened public scrutiny and reputational pressures may affect perceptions surrounding independent decision-making.
4.2.3. Functional autonomy of prosecutors
As stressed in Chapter 3, the organisation and autonomy of prosecution services vary considerably across jurisdictions, including among OECD countries. Regardless of whether prosecution services are situated within the executive, linked to the judiciary or constituted as separate institutions, adequate safeguards are required to protect prosecutors from undue influence and ensure autonomous decision-making (OECD, 2020[22]). The OECD has further underlined that the status, organisation, powers and accountability arrangements of prosecution services should be established by law and implemented in a manner that protects prosecutors from undue pressure or interference (OECD, 2020[22]).
In formal legal terms, Ukraine has established a framework intended to protect prosecutorial activity from ad hoc political influence while maintaining a unified institutional structure. Reforms introduced during the past decade aimed to strengthen safeguards against both external political interference and undue internal influence within the prosecution service (Khotynska-Nor et al., 2024[23]). The Law on the Prosecutor’s Office in turn establishes formal safeguards relating to legality, political neutrality, transparency, ethics and protection from unlawful interference (VRU, 2026[24]).
This broadly corresponds with the findings of the OECD Fifth Round of Anti-Corruption Monitoring Report, which notes important progress in strengthening the legal and institutional framework governing prosecutorial autonomy and integrity, while identifying continuing implementation and governance challenges (OECD, 2025[11]). In particular, since prosecutorial self-governance mechanisms in Ukraine were introduced within a traditionally centralised system (Khotynska-Nor et al., 2024[23]), functional autonomy operates under a vertically organised institutional structure rather than independently from it. OECD analysis has long noted that the key issue is not solely the institutional position of the prosecution service, but also the extent to which internal governance structures appropriately balance managerial supervision with prosecutorial autonomy in individual cases (OECD, 2020[22]). The OECD has also stressed the importance of balancing review by superior prosecutors with safeguards supporting impartial and independent decision-making (OECD, 2020[22]).
Moreover, stakeholder interviews and existing analyses suggest that the practical role and institutional capacity of prosecutorial self-governance bodies, particularly the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (CoP), remain evolving, including regarding their ability to contribute to safeguards for professional autonomy and accountability within the prosecution service.
Furthermore, OECD findings indicate that several longstanding governance issues remain unaddressed. In particular, Ukraine has not yet fully addressed longstanding recommendations concerning the appointment and dismissal framework for the Prosecutor General, particularly regarding the establishment of transparent, merit-based selection procedures and objective grounds and safeguards governing dismissal (OECD, 2026[25]). The Fifth Round Monitoring Report emphasises that strengthening predictability, transparency and safeguards in these procedures remains important for reinforcing prosecutorial autonomy and public confidence in prosecutorial governance arrangements (OECD, 2025[11]).
The Monitoring Report also emphasises the importance of transparent appointment procedures, objective career management frameworks and institutional safeguards supporting prosecutorial integrity and autonomy in practice (OECD, 2025[11]). In Ukraine, although some appointments within the prosecution service have involved competitive procedures, OECD analysis indicates that many managerial positions continued to be filled through direct appointment mechanisms (OECD, 2025[11]). In practice, this may affect perceptions regarding transparency, predictability and effective access within prosecutorial career governance and managerial oversight arrangements. Similarly, according to the 2026 OECD PIIs relating to justice and disciplinary systems, Ukraine does not fulfil certain criteria concerning merit-based and objective procedures for the selection and promotion of prosecutors, public announcement of prosecutorial vacancies and objective grounds for dismissal (OECD, 2026[12]).
In addition, the Monitoring Report also highlights the importance of transparent and objective case allocation procedures within the prosecution service as a safeguard supporting impartiality, professional autonomy and protection against undue influence in sensitive cases (OECD, 2025[11]). In Ukraine, prosecutorial decision-making continues to operate within a hierarchical institutional structure in which superior prosecutors retain important managerial and supervisory powers, including in relation to case assignment and redistribution. While such hierarchical arrangements are common in many prosecution systems and may support consistency and co-ordination, international standards increasingly emphasise the importance of ensuring that internal allocation decisions are governed by clear, objective and transparent criteria. In practice, the absence of sufficiently transparent or automated allocation mechanisms may affect perceptions regarding the predictability and impartiality of prosecutorial case management, particularly in high-profile or politically sensitive proceedings. Strengthening safeguards surrounding case allocation could therefore further support confidence in the fairness, professionalism and institutional independence of prosecutorial decision-making in practice.
The measures set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap aim to address several of these governance and institutional issues. The Roadmap envisages a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedures for the Prosecutor General, including with reference to European standards and the involvement of the Venice Commission (VRU, 2025[26]). In the longer term, and subject to evaluation of institutional and financial sustainability, further measures are also planned to strengthen the institutional capacity and operational autonomy of the CoP, introduce more transparent and merit-based procedures for appointments to managerial prosecutorial positions and conduct an independent functional review of prosecutorial self-governance bodies (VRU, 2025[26]). Consistent with the Fifth Round Monitoring Report, these reforms may contribute to strengthening institutional transparency, professional autonomy and accountability within the prosecution service, while preserving coherent managerial oversight and prosecutorial effectiveness (OECD, 2025[11]).
Accountability plays a central role in maintaining trust in justice institutions by ensuring that misconduct is identified, addressed and sanctioned, while also safeguarding integrity, procedural fairness and protection against abuse of power. In the justice sector, accountability frameworks must operate in a manner that reinforces, rather than undermines, independence, impartiality and institutional legitimacy. In Ukraine, this balance is particularly important given longstanding concerns relating to corruption, politicisation and public trust, as well as the additional pressures created by wartime conditions and ongoing reform efforts. The following sections therefore examine how disciplinary accountability, performance evaluation and related safeguards operate in practice across the judiciary and prosecution service, with particular attention to procedural fairness, institutional credibility and the balance between accountability and independence.
4.3.1. Disciplinary accountability
Judicial accountability
Disciplinary accountability is a core component of frameworks for accountability and integrity in the justice sector, giving practical effect to professional standards, disclosure obligations and rules concerning conflicts of interest. As disciplinary systems directly affect professional security and career progression of judges, their design and implementation have important implications not only for accountability, but also for perceptions of independence, impartiality and institutional legitimacy. The OECD Fifth Round of Anti-Corruption Monitoring Report similarly emphasises that judicial accountability and integrity mechanisms must operate in ways that strengthen both public trust and safeguards for judicial independence (OECD, 2025[11]).
Ukraine’s legislative framework provides for disciplinary accountability for judges, including for breaches of judicial duties, ethics or integrity rules, unjustified delays, conflicts of interest, asset declaration violations and conduct undermining public trust (VRU, 2025[10]). Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension, transfer to a lower court or dismissal (VRU, 2025[10]).
The preceding analysis showed that where disciplinary mechanisms are perceived as unpredictable, inconsistently applied or insufficiently insulated from improper influence, they may contribute to concerns regarding judicial independence. Accountability frameworks must therefore be carefully designed and implemented to ensure procedural fairness, proportionality and legal certainty, while avoiding undue discretion or ambiguity in enforcement practices.
In Ukraine, the relationship between judicial independence and accountability has been shaped by the legacy of politicised justice, systemic corruption concerns and weak public trust, as well as by successive reform efforts launched after 2014 to strengthen institutional legitimacy. As highlighted in the previous section, judges in Ukraine report comparatively high levels of perceived pressure associated with disciplinary proceedings or the possibility thereof. This suggests that the key challenge is not simply strengthening accountability mechanisms as such, but ensuring that accountability and integrity frameworks are implemented in ways that are transparent, proportionate, procedurally fair and insulated from improper influence. The central consideration is therefore how to ensure that disciplinary arrangements simultaneously reinforce integrity, preserve judicial independence and strengthen public confidence in the judiciary.
In the judicial system, the Disciplinary Inspectors Service (DIS), established within the HCJ Secretariat in late 2024, plays an important role in supporting disciplinary proceedings against judges. The DIS functions as a professional investigative authority responsible for reviewing and processing disciplinary complaints, conducting preliminary examinations, preparing conclusions and recommendations and supporting greater procedural consistency in disciplinary enforcement (VRU, 2024[27]). The establishment of the DIS also forms part of broader reform efforts aimed at strengthening the operational capacity, credibility and effectiveness of judicial accountability mechanisms following prolonged institutional disruption. This corresponds with broader findings in the Fifth Round Monitoring Report emphasising the importance of restoring the operational effectiveness and credibility of judicial governance and accountability institutions (OECD, 2025[11]).
Comparative practice shows that inspection, investigation and disciplinary functions are not always located in the same institution. In France, for example, court inspection is located within the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice of France, n.d.[28]), while the Superior Council of Magistracy is responsible for judicial evaluation and discipline (Superior Council of Magistrates of France, n.d.[29]). In Canada, judicial councils at federal and subnational levels promote professional standards and examine complaints of judicial misconduct (Canadian Judicial Council, n.d.[30]). The creation of the DIS in Ukraine also reflects broader efforts to strengthen the credibility and operational effectiveness of judicial accountability mechanisms following prolonged institutional disruption.
Due to the temporary disruption of the HCJ’s work, disciplinary complaints accumulated over several years. By July 2023, the HCJ reported that more than 9 000 complaints against judges had accumulated since 2021 (HCJ, 2026[31]). Following the resumption of disciplinary review, processing capacity increased. According to the HCJ, by February 2026 the DIS had received 10 630 disciplinary complaints, of which 2 323 had been reviewed by inspectors and 1 967 submitted to the Disciplinary Chambers for decision (HCJ, 2026[31]). These developments suggest that the DIS is contributing to restoring the operational functioning of the disciplinary system. At the same time, the continued volume of complaints and existing resource constraints may continue to affect the timeliness and consistency of proceedings. In this context, further strengthening the institutional capacity and human resources within the DIS may support implementation of the Rule of Law Roadmap measure concerning the 18-month time limit for disciplinary proceedings (HCJ, 2026[31]).
Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia
Accountability of judges and judicial independence in adjudication of disciplinary proceedings
Disciplinary proceedings against judges shall deal with alleged instances of professional misconduct that are gross, inexcusable and bring the judiciary into disrepute and shall not extend to the content of their rulings, judicial mistakes or criticism of the courts.
Independent body deciding on discipline
A special independent body shall transparently adjudicate cases of judicial discipline.
The bodies that adjudicate cases of judicial discipline may not also initiate them or have as members persons who can initiate them.
Disciplinary bodies shall provide the accused judge with procedural safeguards.
Professional evaluation of judges should be conducted.
Warsaw Recommendations on Judicial Independence and Accountability
General principles of accountability
Judicial Councils and other self-governing bodies, entrusted with broad powers, have a high duty to account for them and foster a culture of accountability regarding their actions.
The decision by a judicial council or other self-governing body not to account for something should be taken only in situations where this may jeopardise judicial independence.
Accountability measures
Judicial self-governing bodies should use various instruments to ensure their accountability.
They should publicise as wide a range of information as feasible and make its format accessible.
Disciplinary proceedings should be envisaged for members of judicial councils.
Disciplinary proceedings for judicial council members should be conducted by bodies that do not contain judicial council members and include the procedural guarantees of those for judges.
These bodies may be specially constituted by law, and their decisions should be reasoned and subject to judicial review.
Note: CoE standards on judicial accountability emphasise that disciplinary accountability must reinforce, not undermine, judicial independence. Judges should not incur disciplinary liability for the interpretation of law, assessment of facts or weighing of evidence, except in cases of malice, gross negligence, wilful default or serious misconduct. Disciplinary grounds should be clearly defined by law, proceedings should be handled by an independent authority or court with fair-trial guarantees, judges should have the right to challenge disciplinary decisions and sanctions should be proportionate.
International standards on judicial accountability, summarised in Box 4.3, point to three practical tests that are particularly relevant in the Ukrainian context: whether disciplinary proceedings are timely; whether enforcement of disciplinary sanctions is perceived as independent, fair and proportionate; and whether disciplinary grounds are formulated with sufficient clarity and precision. These considerations are directly linked to the concerns identified in the previous section regarding perceptions among judges that disciplinary mechanisms may affect their independence in practice.
On the first test, in Ukraine, timeliness and procedural effectiveness have been affected by institutional disruption and capacity limitations, including the prolonged non-functioning of the HCJ and the resulting backlog of disciplinary complaints. The establishment of the DIS may contribute to reducing delays and improving procedural consistency. At the same time, disciplinary efficiency must remain balanced with procedural safeguards and due process protections, including opportunities for defence and review. Maintaining this balance is important both for effective accountability and for confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of disciplinary enforcement. The Fifth Round Monitoring Report similarly highlights the importance of operational continuity, institutional capacity and timely procedures in strengthening the credibility of justice sector accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2025[11]). The Report also notes concerns raised by CSOs that disciplinary systems may face difficulties where institutional dysfunctions, including excessive workload, staffing shortages and underfunding, contribute to procedural shortcomings for which individual judges may nevertheless face disciplinary exposure (OECD, 2025[11]).
On the second test, questions relating to the perceived independence and proportionality of disciplinary enforcement also remain relevant. Findings from the 2025 ENCJ survey suggest that disciplinary proceedings are not always perceived by judges in Ukraine as fully predictable or proportionate. This is particularly significant given the earlier finding that a comparatively high proportion of judges reported that disciplinary proceedings, or the possibility thereof, affected their sense of independence. These perceptions suggest that the operation of accountability mechanisms may influence broader perceptions regarding professional autonomy, fairness and institutional trust within the judiciary.
The following sections further examine the third test, namely whether disciplinary grounds are formulated with sufficient clarity and precision to support fair, proportionate and predictable enforcement. This issue is particularly important because vague or overly broad disciplinary standards may create uncertainty regarding the boundaries of acceptable conduct and thereby increase perceptions of pressure or exposure to discretionary enforcement.
Secondary legislation, particularly the LJSJ, establishes a detailed framework governing judicial disciplinary liability. It defines grounds for misconduct and outlines disciplinary procedures. Grounds for liability include failure to report interference in judicial duties, breaches relating to conflicts of interest, corruption-related offences and failures to submit required declarations concerning family relations and judicial integrity (VRU, 2025[10]). The breadth of these provisions reflects legitimate integrity objectives, but also increases the importance of ensuring clarity, consistency and proportionality in their interpretation and application. The Fifth Round Monitoring Report similarly emphasises that effective integrity systems require both robust accountability frameworks and safeguards ensuring fair and predictable implementation in practice. CSOs similarly emphasised the importance of ensuring that disciplinary standards are applied in a context-sensitive and proportionate manner, particularly where delays or procedural shortcomings may be linked to broader operational constraints affecting courts during wartime conditions (OECD, 2025[11]).
Some disciplinary grounds nevertheless remain framed in relatively broad terms, which may create challenges regarding predictability and consistency of interpretation. For example, the concept of an “unreasonable” delay in considering a case or preparing a motivated decision is not defined in detail in legislation. As discussed previously, judges in Ukraine report significant concerns relating to workload, staffing shortages and wartime operational pressures. In this context, disciplinary provisions relating to delays may require careful and context-sensitive application, taking into account institutional constraints affecting case management and court operations. This illustrates the broader need to balance accountability objectives with safeguards supporting judicial independence, proportionality and legal certainty in disciplinary enforcement.
Legislative Decree of 23 February 2006, Italy
In Italy, the Legislative Decree of 23 February 2006 regulates disciplinary sanctions against judges. It provides a comprehensive list of recognised disciplinary offences and differentiates between those committed in and outside the exercise of their judicial functions.
The Italian legal framework lays out general judicial duties such as impartiality, diligence, reserve and independence. These broad standards are complemented by concrete disciplinary offences concerning matters such as unjustified delays, failure to give reasons, interference with the work of other judges or conflict of interest, among other actions.
Organic Law of the Judiciary, Spain
The Spanish Organic Law of the Judiciary ranks judicial offences into three categories according to their gravity. It differentiates between minor (e.g. unjustified absence from service for one or two days), serious (e.g. obstruction of inspections, unjustified recusals) and very serious offences (e.g. abuse of authority, affiliation to political parties). The severity of legally applicable sanctions depends on the categorisation according to the gravity of a judicial breach.
California Constitution and Government Code, United States
The state of California’s disciplinary architecture renders judicial accountability precise and enforceable through clearly defined procedural obligations. In this sense, offences such as judicial delays are regulated by constitutional and statutory rules. As part of this framework, compliance is ensured through mandatory salary affidavits. A judge may, for example, not receive a salary in case of non-compliance with the legally stipulated 90-day deadline for resolving cases.
The LJSJ also provides that delays in producing motivated court decisions may trigger disciplinary action (VRU, 2025[10]). While reasoned decisions are essential for accountability, transparency and procedural fairness, many courts continue to face severe operational constraints linked to understaffing, wartime disruption and inadequate infrastructure. Under such conditions, judges may experience pressure to prioritise speed and quantitative output over the quality and depth of legal reasoning. This risks negatively affecting both the quality of adjudication and public confidence in the fairness of judicial decision-making.
Another disciplinary ground concerns conduct that “disgraces” the status of a judge or undermines the authority of justice (VRU, 2025[10]). While this provision reflects legitimate objectives relating to judicial integrity, ethics and public confidence, the use of broadly framed concepts may create challenges regarding consistency and predictability of interpretation. Particularly in contexts characterised by heightened public scrutiny and reputational pressure, maintaining clear guidance and consistent application of such standards becomes important for institutional trust and perceptions of fairness. In this context, some CSOs have called for clearer definitions of misconduct and stronger procedural safeguards to support predictability and consistency in disciplinary practice (OECD, 2025[11]).
Overall, disciplinary assessments should be grounded in clearly articulated ethical standards, including those reflected in the Code of Judicial Ethics and international benchmarks such as the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. The Code of Judicial Ethics in Ukraine expressly provides that breaches of ethical rules do not automatically constitute grounds for disciplinary liability (VRU, 2024[37]). Maintaining a clear distinction between ethical guidance and disciplinary offences is important for ensuring that accountability mechanisms support integrity while preserving independent judicial reasoning and legal certainty.
Clear disciplinary grounds, adequate institutional capacity, procedural fairness and transparency are all important components of an effective disciplinary framework. Disciplinary measures should be applied consistently and proportionately, while avoiding perceptions of arbitrariness or improper influence. In practice, disciplinary accountability contributes most effectively to judicial integrity and public trust where accountability mechanisms are perceived as fair, predictable and institutionally credible. Consistent with the findings of the Fifth Round Monitoring Report, strengthening confidence in disciplinary systems depends not only on formal legal safeguards, but also on transparent implementation, operational effectiveness and institutional trust in practice (OECD, 2025[11]).
Prosecutorial accountability
In Ukraine, public prosecutors are subject to disciplinary liability for a broad range of conduct, including failure to perform official duties properly, unjustified delays, unlawful disclosure of protected information, breaches of asset declaration rules, improper interference in the work of other prosecutors, staff or judges, violations of prosecutorial ethics and public statements that undermine the presumption of innocence (VRU, 2026[24]). Sanctions range from reprimand to dismissal (VRU, 2026[24]).
The accountability framework therefore has a broad substantive scope aimed at safeguarding integrity and professional standards within the prosecution service. At the same time, the breadth of disciplinary grounds increases the importance of ensuring that disciplinary proceedings are conducted in a transparent, proportionate and predictable manner. In practice, the credibility of prosecutorial accountability depends not only on the existence of disciplinary mechanisms, but also on whether they are perceived as fair, impartial and protected from undue influence.
International assessments and standards point to several continuing challenges in this regard. The Group of States against Corruption, for example, found that Ukraine had not yet implemented recommendations concerning the random allocation of cases to prosecutors and the need to define prosecutorial disciplinary offences more precisely, while extending the range of available sanctions to ensure their greater proportionality and effectiveness (GRECO, 2025[38]). More broadly, concerns have been raised regarding whether disciplinary governance arrangements provide sufficient guarantees of institutional impartiality and independence from hierarchical or external influence in practice. CoE standards similarly emphasise that prosecutorial accountability mechanisms should be transparent, based on clear legal criteria and implemented by bodies sufficiently protected from improper political or institutional influence (CoE, 2024[39]). The Fifth Round Monitoring Report likewise stresses the importance of transparent governance arrangements, objective career management procedures and safeguards supporting both prosecutorial accountability and functional autonomy in practice (OECD, 2025[11]).
In Ukraine, prosecutorial accountability therefore depends not only on formal disciplinary grounds, but also on the credibility, effectiveness and institutional balance of the bodies responsible for applying them. The Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) and the CoP are key bodies supporting the independence, professionalism, integrity and effectiveness of the prosecution service, including through recruitment, promotion and disciplinary procedures based on merit principles (VRU, 2026[24]). Institutional performance is also monitored through annual performance reports submitted to the VRU and published online. However, according to OECD PII data, Ukraine currently does not fulfil the criterion relating to the existence of a formal evaluation procedure based on pre-determined evaluation criteria following the repeal of the previous framework in 2025 (OECD, 2026[12]). The absence of a structured evaluation methodology and objective performance criteria may affect the consistency, predictability and transparency of professional performance management within the prosecution service.
Questions regarding consistency and institutional balance are also reflected in analyses of disciplinary practice. An expert review observed that the profile of successful complainants has remained relatively stable in recent years, with heads of prosecution offices and other prosecutors accounting for a significant share of complaints leading to disciplinary proceedings, while those subject to disciplinary accountability were more frequently prosecutors without administrative functions or extensive seniority (Petrakovskyi, 2024[40]). Although these findings do not in themselves demonstrate improper disciplinary practice, they highlight the importance of ensuring that disciplinary mechanisms are applied in a manner perceived as even-handed, transparent and institutionally balanced across the prosecution service. In hierarchical institutional systems, maintaining confidence that disciplinary arrangements operate impartially and predictably is particularly important for distinguishing legitimate managerial oversight from perceptions of selective enforcement or improper pressure.
4.3.2. Performance evaluation
Performance evaluation can support professional standards, professional development and public confidence in the judiciary. However, excessive reliance on speed, volume or managerial compliance can distort incentives and create perceptions that assessments are used to exert pressure on judges rather than to improve the quality and delivery of justice services.
Guidelines of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) on evaluating the quality of work of judges emphasise the importance of a dual approach to performance evaluation, incorporating quantitative and qualitative criteria, with sufficient weight placed on the latter (CEPEJ, 2024[41]). This reflects the principle that judicial performance cannot be measured solely through efficiency indicators such as speed or case output, but must also account for the quality, fairness and reasoning of judicial decision-making.
From an accountability perspective, evaluation mechanisms should therefore be transparent, based on clear criteria and supported by procedural safeguards. This is particularly important where evaluation results are included in official dossiers or may influence career progression, promotion, transfers or perceptions of disciplinary risk. Judges should be able to challenge and contextualise evaluation findings so that evaluations are applied objectively, proportionately and consistently. The HRM and aspects of judicial evaluation related to professional development and workforce capacity are examined in Chapter 5.
4.3.3. Removal from office and functional immunity safeguards
Security of tenure and protection against arbitrary removal are essential components of judicial independence. International standards recognise that judges should not be removed from office except on clearly defined grounds and through procedures that guarantee due process and institutional safeguards. These protections are particularly important in contexts where judges may already perceive exposure to external pressure, disciplinary uncertainty or political interference, as discussed in the preceding sections. Without credible guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or coercive action, judges may feel constrained in their ability to decide cases independently and impartially.
The LJSJ regulates the grounds and procedures for removal from office and provides for functional immunity to protect judges from undue pressure related to their judicial decisions (VRU, 2025[10]). Judges are appointed indefinitely unless specific grounds arise for dismissal (VRU, 2025[10]). These grounds may include the inability to perform judicial duties due to health issues, violations of incompatibility standards, the commission of serious disciplinary offences, resignation or voluntary departure from the position and failure to justify the source of their assets (VRU, 2025[10]). Otherwise, a judge’s tenure concludes upon reaching the age of 65, losing Ukrainian citizenship, passing away or being convicted in a court of law (VRU, 2025[10]). The existence of exhaustively defined grounds for dismissal is important because it limits the scope for arbitrary removal and reinforces institutional security for judges. However, as highlighted in the discussion on disciplinary accountability, the practical effect of these safeguards depends not only on their formal existence but also on whether related procedures are perceived as fair, proportionate and insulated from improper influence.
Importantly, the LJSJ also stipulates that a judge cannot be held personally accountable for a court decision made in the course of their judicial duties, except in instances of committing a crime or a disciplinary violation (VRU, 2025[10]). In cases where a judge is detained on suspicion of acts that may incur criminal or administrative liability, they must be released immediately once their identity has been verified, barring specific exceptions (VRU, 2025[10]). These provisions provide important safeguards supporting judicial independence. These safeguards are particularly important for protecting adjudicative independence because they reduce the risk that criminal or administrative proceedings could be used to exert pressure on judges in connection with the substance of their decisions. Functional immunity therefore serves not as a personal privilege, but as an institutional safeguard intended to preserve impartial adjudication and the rule of law.
Moreover, a judge is protected from detention or coercive transfer to any institution or authority other than a court, except as outlined in the aforementioned conditions. Only the Prosecutor General or their Deputy may notify a judge of suspicion of criminal activity (VRU, 2025[10]). A judge may be suspended from performing their judicial functions for a maximum of two months upon a justified request from the Prosecutor General or their Deputy, following prescribed legal procedures (VRU, 2025[10]). Such a decision to suspend a judge from the administration of justice requires ratification by the HCJ (VRU, 2025[10]), ensuring a balance between accountability and the safeguarding of judicial independence. This institutional involvement of the HCJ is intended to preserve a balance between accountability and judicial independence by introducing an additional safeguard against arbitrary prosecutorial or executive interference. However, as discussed earlier, perceptions regarding the independence and credibility of judicial governance institutions themselves remain important for determining whether such safeguards are fully functioning in practice. CSOs also referred to several isolated disciplinary cases involving politically sensitive associations or family ties, while the HCJ stated that sanctions were imposed only in cases involving deliberate refusal to administer justice (OECD, 2025[11]). These discussions further highlight the importance of clear legal standards, reasoned decisions and procedural safeguards in disciplinary proceedings.
This section focuses on integrity safeguards insofar as they affect judicial and prosecutorial independence, accountability, selection, evaluation, discipline and public trust. Broader anti-corruption policies and institutions are examined in the OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine.
4.4.1. International standards
Integrity of judges, prosecutors and civil servants in the justice sector lies at the core of the balance and interaction of justice principles. As discussed in the preceding sections, integrity is closely linked to independence, impartiality and accountability: without credible integrity safeguards, independence may be perceived as corporatism, while accountability may be perceived as selective or coercive. Integrity is also an essential element of efforts to strengthen confidence in the justice system. To be effective, it needs to be supported by a robust institutional and legal framework and strongly embedded in organisational culture and practice.
International standards on judicial integrity are outlined, among other instruments, in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which set out the core values of judicial integrity: independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, competence and diligence (UNODC, 2018[42]). Other standards also require institutional and procedural safeguards to protect courts and prosecutors from improper influence and to ensure fairness, objectivity, accountability and respect for human rights in the administration of justice (UN, 1985[4]).
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity [OECD/LEGAL/0435] provides a further reference standard pertaining to public integrity, as measured by the OECD PIIs.4 It extends beyond individual ethics obligations and promotes a system-wide framework for building integrity across public institutions through clear responsibilities, risk management, enforcement, transparency and organisational culture. This system-wide perspective is particularly relevant for Ukraine, where earlier analysis showed that weaknesses in appointments, disciplinary practice, resources and public communication may interact to affect both the reality and perception of judicial independence.
4.4.2. Overall state of integrity in the justice sector
In the last decade, Ukraine strengthened integrity safeguards in the judiciary and established a comprehensive system of anti-corruption institutions, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU; 2015), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO; 2015), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP; 2016) and the HACC (2019). Merit- and integrity-based procedures5 have been introduced for the selection of judges across all court levels, including the SC, the CCU and the HACC, as well as for members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. A revised Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted in 2024, with a dedicated Commentary approved by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU) in March 2026 (SC, 2026[43]). Moreover, rules on conflicts of interest and incompatibilities, as well as asset and interest declaration systems, have been established under the Law on Prevention of Corruption (OECD, 2025[44]).
Notwithstanding this progress, OECD analysis points to the need to move from the establishment of formal safeguards towards their consistent, transparent and credible implementation in practice, particularly in relation to appointments, promotion, disciplinary proceedings and institutional leadership in the justice sector (OECD, 2025[44]).
Ukraine has built comparatively strong formal frameworks for judicial and prosecutorial integrity (OECD, 2025[44]). According to the data gathered for the OECD PIIs, areas of strength in judicial integrity regulation and practice include formal integrity frameworks, interest and asset declarations, certain merit-based review procedures, disciplinary procedures and whistleblower protection within the judiciary (OECD, 2026[25]). Yet, judicial integrity reform remains incomplete, as implementation challenges affect the judicial appointment and career progression, whistleblower protection and public confidence in the justice system (OECD, 2025[44]; OECD, 2026[25]). These implementation gaps matter because they can affect not only integrity outcomes, but also the perceived impartiality and independence of judges selected, promoted or disciplined under those frameworks.
In the prosecution service, integrity indicators reveal a somewhat different situation. Ukraine has adopted regulatory safeguards relating to standards of conduct, the management of conflicts of interest, whistleblower protection for reporting prosecutorial misconduct, recruitment, discipline and professional ethics (OECD, 2026[25]). However, certain gaps remain in the regulatory framework, notably the absence of safeguards such as objective evaluation criteria and random case allocation. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings are decided not by a court but by the QDCP, whose composition does not allow autonomous operation as less than half of its members are prosecutors elected by their peers.
In practice, the prosecution service performs relatively well in areas such as adequate budgeting, training, conflict-of-interest declarations and public reporting (OECD, 2026[25]), despite a lack of well-established institutional mechanisms for providing ethical guidance. Other challenges also remain, such as the major corruption scandal that led to the resignation of the Prosecutor General in October 2024 (European Commission, 2024[45]), which highlights the need to strengthen integrity and regulatory safeguards within the prosecution service.
Moreover, despite Ukraine’s reform efforts and regulatory safeguards, the ENCJ survey suggests that integrity concerns continue to affect how judges perceive the judiciary. Only 14% of responding judges from Ukraine expressed confidence that corruption does not occur in the judiciary, while 19% considered that corruption occurs at least occasionally (ENCJ, 2025[13]). By contrast, in higher-performing systems, confidence that corruption does not occur exceeded 75% (ENCJ, 2025[13]). This reinforces the earlier argument that trust depends not only on the adoption of safeguards, but also on whether those safeguards are experienced as credible in everyday institutional practice. Ukraine appears to recognise this issue, as evidenced by its focus on improving trust in the judiciary through the National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025.
Note: Under the Rule of Law Index (RLI) methodology, a higher score indicates stronger adherence to the rule of law.
Source: (WJP, 2025[46]), elaboration by the authors.
As shown in Figure 4.3 above, there is a sizeable gap between Ukraine and the OECD average in perceptions of freedom from corruption in the areas of civil and criminal justice. Ukraine recorded gradual improvements between 2015 and 2025, rising from 0.35 to 0.42 in civil justice and from 0.28 to 0.33 in criminal justice (WJP, 2025[46]). However, these gains were not sufficient to narrow the gap with OECD countries in a meaningful way. In 2025, Ukraine’s civil justice score remained 0.36 points below the OECD average, while its criminal justice score was 0.43 points lower (WJP, 2025[46]).
The RLI factors show that Ukraine’s criminal justice system is perceived as more affected by corruption than its civil justice system, mirroring the pattern visible across OECD averages but at a much lower level of perceived integrity (WJP, 2025[46]). The data on perceptions suggest that, despite incremental progress, Ukraine remains well below OECD benchmarks. This underlines the need to advance reforms that connect integrity, accountability and independence in practice, rather than treating them as separate reform tracks, with the goal of bringing about a cultural shift. Further reforms may be less important than ensuring consistent implementation of the existing regulatory framework already in place and ensuring that its elements translate into a broader culture of integrity within the judiciary that will in turn inspire public confidence that judges and prosecutors perform their functions independently and with integrity.
4.4.3. Integrity safeguards in judicial selection, evaluation and career progression
Integrity safeguards in the selection of judges and members of judicial governance bodies
Judicial selection, evaluation and career progression are relevant both to workforce capacity and to the integrity of the justice system. The HRM and staffing implications of recruitment and selection are examined in Chapter 5. This section focuses on the integrity dimension: whether selection, evaluation and promotion procedures are transparent, merit-based, resistant to undue influence and capable of building public confidence in judicial governance.
Clear and objective procedures for selecting, appointing and promoting judges, supported by consistently applied integrity checks, are central to judicial independence and accountability (OECD, 2025[44]). Over the past decade, Ukraine has developed a relatively comprehensive legal framework governing judicial careers, aimed at reducing the scope for favouritism and political influence by placing key decisions on judicial careers within judicial governance bodies rather than the executive branch.
The LJSJ sets out merit- and integrity-based procedures for the selection, appointment, promotion and transfer of judges. The HQCJ assesses judicial candidates, while the HCJ takes decisions on appointment, transfer and discipline (VRU, 2025[10]). Candidates for membership of the HCJ and the HQCJ are also subject to ethics and integrity screening by the Ethics Council and the Selection Commission, respectively. Both bodies were established as part of the 2021 reform to strengthen external assurance and public confidence in judicial governance.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 interrupted the operation of the HCJ, the HQCJ and their adjacent selection bodies, delaying the application of integrity review mechanisms. The HCJ regained its full composition in January 2023 (HCJ, 2023[47]), allowing it to resume its work and enabling the Ethics Council to continue screening candidates for HCJ membership.
The Selection Commission for the HQCJ also resumed its work in early 2023 (HCJ, 2023[48]). Following the appointment of HQCJ members by the HCJ on 1 June 2023, the HQCJ became fully operational again (HCJ, 2023[49]). However, the mandate of international experts in the HQCJ Selection Commission expired on 1 June 2025, which created a risk that prospective vacancies in the HQCJ could be filled without external integrity assurance (DEJURE, 2026[50]). Recognising this risk, Ukraine and the European Commission agreed to ensure that the involvement of international experts in the Selection Commission will be extended (European Commission, 2025[51]). Maintaining credible external assurance during this phase is important not only for integrity control, but also for sustaining confidence that judicial governance bodies are capable of protecting independence rather than becoming sources of internal pressure. Stakeholders have also pointed to uneven transparency in certain judicial selection and interview procedures, including concerns regarding accelerated timelines, limited public access and the availability of recordings, which may affect perceptions of openness and effective public scrutiny (OECD, 2026[52]).
At present, certain positions in the judiciary are only partly covered by merit-based integrity arrangements. Court presidents are elected by judges within their court, but there are no defined criteria for selecting candidates nor any requirements for a competitive selection process (OECD, 2026[25]). Without the application of objective criteria or a competitive process, the appointment of court presidents may become a means of rewarding loyalty within the judicial hierarchy (OECD, 2025[44]). This risk is particularly relevant given that court management can influence working conditions, case organisation and internal judicial culture, all of which may affect the practical exercise of individual independence, as well as the reality and the perception of judicial independence.
Moreover, in recent years, the SJA has emerged as a high-risk institution as two successive SJA chairpersons were implicated in corruption-related proceedings (NABU, 2020[53]; NABU, 2023[54]). The existing requirement for a “competitive” selection procedure for the position of the SJA’s chairperson is not supported by a detailed set of objective criteria or transparency safeguards. Given their influence over the functioning of the court system and public confidence in the judiciary, integrity checks should therefore also apply to court presidents and the Head of the SJA, including at promotion stage (OECD, 2025[44]). Strengthening these safeguards would help address the link between administrative governance, operational conditions and judicial independence.
In sum, Ukraine has strengthened integrity safeguards in judicial selection and governance appointments, but their credibility depends on consistent application, transparent procedures and adequate safeguards against undue influence. Remaining gaps concern the uneven coverage of integrity safeguards across judicial leadership positions, the sustainability of external assurance mechanisms and the transparency of some selection and interview procedures. Addressing these issues would help ensure that selection and appointment processes support both judicial independence and public confidence.
Auxiliary selection bodies
In addition to the Ethics Council at the HCJ and the Selection Commission at the HQCJ, several auxiliary bodies are tasked with supporting integrity control in the judicial selection process, as set out in Table 4.1.
The gradual establishment of auxiliary selection bodies has strengthened external scrutiny, enhanced public participation, including of CSOs, and improved methodological discipline in judicial appointment processes. However, the capacity and structure, including the ratio of international experts, influence on final selection decisions and the methodologies used, vary across these bodies. As a result, structural inconsistencies may arise in the broader judicial selection system (OECD, 2025[44]). This may potentially lead to an uneven application of integrity criteria and inconsistent quality assurance within the wider judicial selection framework. Such unevenness may also weaken confidence that judicial careers are governed by coherent merit and integrity standards, and affect perceptions of judicial independence and impartiality.
In the longer term, there may be scope to continue strengthening national ownership of the judicial selection process. However, any future reduction in the role of international experts in auxiliary selection bodies should not come at the expense of professionalism, transparency or public confidence in the process. The involvement of international experts may also entail prolonged reliance on external financing, which can be beneficial in a context of fiscal strain, but, over time, may also limit the domestic ownership of judicial selection processes. The key challenge is therefore to transition towards stronger national ownership without reducing the credibility of integrity safeguards that currently help protect judicial governance from politicisation or corporatism.
Integrity criteria and professional ethics standards
Amendments to the LJSJ adopted in 2023 sought to streamline judicial recruitment and appointment procedures while also envisaging the development of uniform integrity criteria for judges (VRU, 2023[62]). From the perspective of this chapter, the key issue is whether more efficient procedures remain accompanied by credible, transparent and consistently applied safeguards for integrity, ethics and professional conduct. The workforce-capacity implications of these reforms, including their role in addressing judicial vacancies, are examined in Chapter 5.
In November 2023, the HQCJ and the Public Integrity Council (PIC) developed an initial list of integrity indicators for evaluating the integrity and professional ethics of judges and judicial candidates (HQCJ, 2023[63]). The HQCJ–PIC indicators were subsequently revised and compiled into the list of Unified Indicators for Assessing the Integrity and Professional Ethics of a Judge, approved by the HCJ in December 2024 (Box 4.5) (HCJ, 2024[64]).
The Unified Indicators for Assessing Integrity and Professional Ethics of Judges and Judicial Candidates provide a common framework for assessing whether judges and candidates meet core standards of integrity, ethics and professional conduct:
Independence concerns the ability to perform judicial functions and take decisions free from unlawful influence, pressure or interference. It includes both actual independence and conduct that would appear independent to an ordinary reasonable person.
Impartiality relates to the ability to act without favour, prejudice or personal interest. It covers recusal and conflict-of-interest situations.
Observance of ethical standards and impeccable behaviour in professional and personal life covers compliance with professional ethics and generally recognised moral standards, both in office and outside of it. It also includes civic conduct, patriotism and behaviour that does not undermine the authority of justice.
Honesty concerns truthfulness, integrity and sincerity in both personal and professional life. It includes the reliability of declarations and other information provided in judicial or disciplinary procedures, as well as behaviour consistent with the rule of law and judicial status.
Diligence pertains to disciplined, thorough and responsible performance of duties. It includes timely handling of cases and documents, professional motivation, continuous learning and properly reasoned decisions.
Incorruptibility concerns the ability to resist undue influence and improper advantages. It includes the absence of corruption-related acts, inappropriate contacts outside of proceedings, misuse of status and tolerance of corrupt conduct by others.
Lawful origin of property assesses whether the origin of rights to property and other civil-law objects of the judge or candidate and their family members, gives rise to reasonable doubt as to legality. It covers acquisition methods, pricing, disclosure and compliance with relevant legal requirements.
Correspondence of standard of living to declared income examines whether a judge’s or candidate’s property status and expenditures can reasonably be explained by declared lawful income. It links asset declarations, expenditure patterns and market values.
Correspondence of lifestyle to judicial status considers whether public and private behaviour is consistent with the standing of a judge or judicial candidate. It includes ostentatious display of wealth, inappropriate use of judicial status and public behaviour that could undermine confidence in the judiciary.
Source: (HCJ, 2024[64]).
The Unified Integrity Indicators reformulated the previous negative indicators of non-integrity developed by the HQCJ and the PIC into a more generalised and standardised framework of positive assessment criteria. Most of the issues captured in the earlier list remain covered, although often in a less explicit and less case-specific manner.
Overall, the Unified Integrity Indicators constitute a comprehensive set of criteria intended to harmonise integrity assessment standards across judicial selection processes. However, certain procedural gaps may limit their effectiveness in practice. In particular, the current framework does not allow substantiated anonymous whistleblower reports to be considered as evidence, nor does it permit previously completed integrity screenings to be reopened where new evidence subsequently emerges. These limitations may weaken the responsiveness and credibility of the integrity assessment process. To strengthen the practical value and reliability of the indicators, the procedure should therefore be amended to address these gaps.
In addition, some CSOs have raised concerns regarding the practical role and effectiveness of the PIC within judicial integrity and selection processes (OECD, 2025[11]). In particular, concerns were expressed that negative PIC opinions are, in some cases, overridden by the HQCJ without sufficiently detailed public reasoning, which may affect perceptions regarding the transparency and credibility of integrity assessments. Stakeholders also pointed to accelerated interview schedules and uneven transparency in certain selection procedures, which they argued may limit effective public scrutiny and the ability of oversight actors to provide timely input. These concerns do not necessarily indicate deficiencies in the legal framework itself, but rather highlight the importance of ensuring that integrity review mechanisms operate in a transparent, predictable and well-reasoned manner in order to strengthen institutional trust and confidence in judicial governance processes.
In 2025, the HQCJ adopted two new regulations aimed at further standardising the qualification evaluation of judges. The Regulation on the Procedure and Methodology of Qualification Evaluation introduced a presumption of integrity, under which a judge or judicial candidate is deemed to meet the integrity criteria unless this is rebutted by proper, sufficient and substantiated evidence (HQCJ, 2025[65]). The Regulation on the Regular Assessment of a Judge, in turn, introduced a new procedure for the periodic assessment of judges’ professional performance, to be carried out once every three years (HQCJ, 2025[66]).
These examples illustrate a broader challenge in the justice system. Pressure to accelerate appointments, evaluation, digitalisation and case processing may improve efficiency, but these elements will only contribute to strengthening legitimacy if they preserve transparency, fairness and integrity.
In view of persistent staffing shortages and war-related disruptions, judicial transfers and temporary secondments have been deployed as mitigation measures. OECD PII findings confirm that Ukraine fulfils the formal criterion requiring judicial transfers to take place only with the judge’s consent or upon their request, except for specific reasons grounded in law and on the basis of pre-determined criteria (OECD, 2026[12]). In such circumstances, the implementation of transparent criteria, procedural safeguards and effective avenues for appeal are of central importance to reduce perceptions that transfers may be used in ways that affect judicial independence or create indirect pressure within judicial hierarchies. This is especially important in a system already facing concerns about workload, institutional pressure and uneven trust in judicial governance bodies. Career decisions are also directly relevant to independence: where promotion, transfer or secondment are perceived as dependent on loyalty, informal influence or opaque criteria, they may create incentives that negatively affect judicial behaviour.
Moreover, capacity development can also strengthen integrity where training addresses professional ethics, conflicts of interest and the practical responsibilities of judicial office. This preventive function of training is key, as integrity in the judiciary also depends on the extent to which ethical principles are embedded in legal education and translated into practice through professional training (Shuklina and Ishchenko, 2025[67]) Ukraine demonstrates commitment to supporting judges in this area through the organisation of regular trainings on ethics, integrity and corruption prevention for all judicial ranks, including local judges. In 2025 alone, NSJ provided training on: conflicts of interest and procedures for the submission of declarations; preventing conflicts of interest and violations of other anti-corruption restrictions; the interest declaration process for higher ranking and specialised judges; and disciplinary liability of judges for local court judges in Lviv (OECD, 2026[25]; NSJ, 2026[68]).
4.4.4. Public integrity standards
Public integrity standards play a complementary role in guiding the conduct of judges and prosecutors. In line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity [OECD/LEGAL/0435], clearly articulated codes of ethics, aligned with international standards, provide a benchmark against which the behaviour of judges and prosecutors can be assessed in a manner that supports both accountability and independence (judges) or functional autonomy (prosecutors).
In 2013, the Congress of Judges of Ukraine adopted a Code of Judicial Ethics. The Code was subsequently revised, and its updated version was published in 2024 (VRU, 2024[37]). The Code of Judicial Ethics draws on, among other standards, the ECHR, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the European Charter on the Statute of Judges. It defines judges’ public integrity obligations and provides guidelines for maintaining judicial integrity and independence, emphasising the importance of the rule of law, respect for court participants and ensuring fair and impartial legal proceedings (VRU, 2024[37]).
In March 2026, the CJU approved the Commentary on the Code of Judicial Ethics (SC, 2026[43]). The document aims to support a more uniform understanding and application of public integrity standards across the judiciary. The Commentary also places the Code in a wider constitutional and international context and underlines that judicial ethics concerns not only conduct in office but also conduct outside the courtroom (SC, 2026[43]).
The CCU also adopted a separate set of Rules of Professional Ethics for its judges in July 2025 (VRU, 2025[69]), in light of the distinct role of constitutional adjudication in Ukraine. However, external review has identified several areas for improvement of the public integrity framework. Notably, clearer rules could be developed on the appearance of impartiality, more precise limits on public statements concerning pending cases, fuller regulation of gifts and hospitality and the establishment of a confidential advisory ethics mechanism separate from disciplinary procedures (OSCE/ODIHR, 2025[70]). From the OECD’s perspective on public integrity, these issues matter because ethics rules are most effective when they are operationalised through practical guidance, training and confidential advisory support, rather than functioning only as a basis for disciplinary control. For the CCU, the priority should therefore be to translate the new ethics rules into clear, preventive guidance on impartiality, public communication, gifts and hospitality and conflicts of interest, while keeping advisory ethics support institutionally distinct from disciplinary procedures.
In the prosecution service, the Code of Professional Ethics and Conduct for Prosecutors approved in April 2017 provides a parallel integrity framework. The document sets out a broad group of principles, including legality, respect for human rights, independence, political neutrality, impartiality, confidentiality, prevention of conflict-of-interest situations, professionalism and respect for judicial independence (OPG, 2024[71]). Therefore, the regulation has a scope wider than courtroom conduct alone – it links prosecutorial ethics more explicitly to corruption prevention and to public confidence in the prosecution service.
The Commentary on the Code of Professional Ethics and Conduct for Prosecutors provides additional guidance on the application of the ethical framework. It explains the Code through examples and draws on disciplinary and judicial practice (OPG, 2022[72]), which makes the framework more operational. The Commentary also states clearly that the Code is not an exhaustive list of permitted and prohibited acts, but a set of ethical benchmarks that often go beyond minimum legislative requirements (OPG, 2022[72]). Within an already dense legal framework, such guidance can help bridge the gap between formal compliance and professional judgement. It can also support more consistent interpretation of conflicts of interest, integrity expectations and standards of conduct outside the workplace.
The adoption of integrity standards in the ordinary judiciary, the CCU and the prosecution service indicates the efforts within the justice sector to align professional standards with European and international guidelines. In practice, however, whether those standards strengthen public trust depends also on whether they are applied consistently and linked to accountability mechanisms. Such measures are vital in enhancing Ukraine’s status as a democratic society governed by the rule of law.
4.4.5. Asset and interest declarations, conflicts of interest and whistleblower protection
Asset and interest declaration systems, including for judges, are a key integrity mechanism that countries can use to manage conflict-of-interest systems. To be effective, interest and asset declaration tools cannot exist in a vacuum: clear institutional mechanisms are required for providing guidance on mitigating conflict-of-interest situations, verifying declarations, investigating potentially false declarations and detecting illicit wealth. Appropriate sanctions can help ensure compliance.
The OECD has stressed that judicial integrity reform also depends on the day-to-day operation of conflict-of-interest management and whistleblower protection frameworks (OECD, 2025[44]). OECD analysis also noted that, although Ukraine has introduced important safeguards in these areas, further improvements would be necessary if integrity standards are to reinforce public confidence consistently in practice (OECD, 2025[44]).
Ukraine’s judicial integrity framework set out in the LJSJ combines asset and interest declarations, disclosures of family ties, integrity declarations, lifestyle monitoring and anti-corruption checks (VRU, 2025[10]). Thus, it creates a broad framework for identifying risks of undue influence, conflicts of interest and unexplained wealth (VRU, 2025[10]). Its effectiveness, however, depends on verification capacity, institutional co-ordination and whether declared risks lead to timely preventive or corrective action.
The LJSJ also provides for lifestyle monitoring of judges in order to assess whether their standard of living corresponds to declared assets and income, and for comprehensive examination of judges’ public declarations by the central anti-corruption authority responsible for checking truthfulness, asset valuation, conflicts of interest and signs of illicit enrichment (VRU, 2025[10]). In parallel, the personal file of a judge may include information on compliance with professional ethics and integrity, copies of declarations submitted under anti-corruption legislation and the opinion of the PIC (VRU, 2025[10]). Thus, integrity review is embedded in external oversight, but also in career and qualification assessments.
With regard to the regulation of conflicts of interest, the LJSJ requires judges to comply with anti-corruption legislation and to submit a declaration as a person authorised to perform state or local government functions, alongside a declaration of family ties and a declaration of integrity (VRU, 2025[10]). These instruments have been created to identify risks of undue influence, incompatible interests and hidden connections that may affect judicial impartiality in practice. OECD analysis has noted, however, that the practical effectiveness of this framework depends on disclosure and notification by judges themselves, which may leave gaps where conflicts are not reported or are difficult to detect through formal mechanisms alone (OECD, 2025[44]).
According to PIIs data, Ukraine’s formal compliance with conflict of interest-related disclosures is strong (OECD, 2026[25]). The NACP has issued recommendations for the resolution of conflicts of interest in all cases detected from 2021 to 2024. The NACP also verifies interest declarations, through three primary forms of control: control of timeliness, control of correctness and completeness, and logical and arithmetic control. According to the Law on Corruption Prevention, the full verification procedure should also include checks for monitoring the lifestyle of judges and prosecutors. However, the operationalisation of this procedure is still pending until the adoption of relevant NACP regulations for the application of such controls for judicial declarations. This suggests that the reporting framework is formally established, but it does not by itself demonstrate how effective the NACP is at verifying declared information, or whether the controls are connected across institutions or translated into timely preventive action when risks arise.
Whistleblower protection is another important part of the integrity framework. It can bring to light misconduct that would not necessarily be visible through declarations, regular oversight or case-related procedures. In Ukraine, whistleblower protection has been introduced as part of broader anti-corruption reforms in both courts and the prosecution service, including safeguards for personal security, access to legal assistance and the possibility of protective measures where a whistleblower or family members face threats linked to reporting. Ukraine’s whistleblower protection provides a relatively robust framework for reporting corruption (OECD, 2026[25]). Even so, effective whistleblower protection depends not only on legal guarantees, but also on trust in reporting channels, institutional co-ordination and confidence that reporting will not trigger retaliation or reputational pressure. In practice, whistleblower protection also requires clear follow-up procedures, safeguards for confidentiality and accessible support mechanisms, all placed within a broader organisational culture that encourages reporting in the public interest in the first place.
4.4.6. High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine
The HACC was established in 2019 as part of the broader reform that created specialised anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. It is composed of a first-instance court and an Appeals Chamber (VRU, 2026[73]). Its jurisdiction covers criminal proceedings assigned by law to high-level corruption and related offences investigated by the NABU and prosecuted by the SAPO (VRU, 2026[73]). Basic safeguards help promote enhanced integrity for HACC judges, including integrity checks, higher ethical standards and ongoing monitoring.
The HACC provides a dedicated judicial venue for complex corruption cases that were previously adjudicated within the ordinary court system, where they often encountered institutional capacity constraints and procedural inefficiencies. Among Ukraine’s specialised anti-corruption bodies, OECD noted that the HACC has become an important adjudicative component of the anti-corruption infrastructure in Ukraine (OECD, 2025[44]). The HACC also received a strong CSO assessment regarding effectiveness and independence (TI Ukraine, 2023[74]).
However, more than six years after the HACC began operating, it still lacks permanent premises that would meet the needs of both the first-instance court and its Appeals Chamber. This issue has become more acute as the number of judges and staff has increased and further recruitment has continued. The HACC raised this problem repeatedly with executive authorities, including the President of Ukraine, asking to intervene urgently so that the court could be provided with permanent premises (Mezha, 2026[75]). In practice, inadequate and unstable working conditions are not merely an administrative inconvenience. Over time, this issue may also affect the court’s institutional resilience and have implications for the conditions in which judicial independence and impartiality are exercised.
4.4.7. Integrity and professionalism across the broader justice system
The sustainability of justice reform depends not only on disciplinary and integrity safeguards within judicial and prosecutorial institutions, but also on the broader professional system through which justice actors are trained, regulated and socialised. Legal education, judicial training and governance of the legal profession directly influence professional ethics, understanding of judicial independence and the institutional culture across the justice sector at large.
In recent years, the reform of legal education in Ukraine has become tied to objectives related to the rule of law and EU accession. CSOs and international partners have raised concerns regarding fragmentation of the legal education system, uneven mechanisms for quality assurance and the continued role of institutions oriented at law enforcement in the training of legal professionals (New Eastern Europe, 2024[76]; DEJURE, 2026[77]). Critics have argued that these arrangements may hinder the development of analytical skills, professional ethics and legal culture, which are expected from EU member states (U4, 2024[78]).
Concerns have also been raised regarding the governance of the legal profession as well as its reform process. The EU has pointed to the reform of the Bar as one of the conditionalities in justice sector reforms, to “improve qualifications, admissions, disciplinary liability, financial management and continuous training systems” (European Commission, 2025[79]).
These debates suggest that challenges pertaining to integrity and independence within the justice system cannot be addressed solely through measures related to disciplinary or anti-corruption regimes for judges and prosecutors. They also depend on the quality, credibility and professional culture of the wider system. In this respect, reforms relating to legal education, judicial training and professional self-governance may have important long-term implications for public trust, institutional resilience and the sustainability of justice reforms.
4.5.1. Fairness, voice and legitimacy
Procedural justice is an important outcome of people-centred justice systems. People’s experiences of justice are influenced not only by the outcome of a case, but also by whether proceedings are perceived as fair, impartial, respectful and transparent. OECD evidence also indicates that people’s sense of dignity in their interactions with public institutions is an important dimension of public governance, including the extent to which institutions treat people respectfully, respond to their needs and apply rules fairly (OECD, 2025[80]). Fair procedures influence whether people feel heard, understood and able to participate meaningfully in proceedings. In this sense, procedural fairness constitutes an important dimension of access to justice and of the quality of justice services more broadly (OECD, 2025[81]).
Procedural justice depends on the sound balance and interaction between judicial independence, impartiality, integrity, accountability and transparency. Judicial impartiality is of particular importance as proceedings cannot be perceived as fair where courts or judges are believed to be influenced by political interests, corruption, personal bias or external pressure. High risks of corruption and improper influence on judicial decision-making, evidenced by survey data (ENCJ, 2025[13]), highlight challenges for perceptions of procedural fairness in Ukraine. Conversely, stronger perceptions regarding impartiality in criminal justice (WJP, 2025[46]) indicate that progress in strengthening fair adjudication may contribute to improving the quality and legitimacy of justice processes.
Judges’ own perceptions reinforce this concern. As discussed, the 2025 ENCJ survey points to comparatively low perceived judicial independence and elevated concerns about pressure, disciplinary threats, media influence and insufficient respect for judicial independence by government. These internal perceptions matter for procedural justice because public trust is less likely to improve where judges themselves experience the institutional environment as fragile (ENCJ, 2025[13]).
Procedural fairness also requires the effective implementation of judicial accountability mechanisms. Judicial accountability frameworks, disciplinary procedures and ethical standards can strengthen fairness and consistency where they operate in a transparent, proportionate and impartial manner, while respecting judicial independence. Accountability systems that are perceived as arbitrary, politicised or inconsistently applied may undermine perceptions of fairness. Conversely, well-functioning disciplinary and integrity systems can reinforce procedural safeguards by ensuring that judges are held to appropriate professional and public integrity standards (OECD, 2025[11]). The relationship is therefore circular rather than sequential. Accountability mechanisms influence the perceptions of independence, while the perceived independence of disciplinary bodies affects the legitimacy of accountability itself.
Procedural fairness also depends on how people experience judicial processes in practice – whether court users can understand proceedings and decisions, whether hearings are conducted within reasonable timeframes, whether parties are treated respectfully and whether procedural safeguards are applied consistently. As further examined in Chapter 6, the OECD emphasises that justice systems should be designed around people’s legal needs, justice problems and lived experiences, including through accessible information, people-centred procedures and mechanisms enabling meaningful participation in proceedings (OECD, 2025[81]).
Transparency directly contributes to procedural fairness. Public reasoning in judicial decisions, open hearings, where appropriate, and clear communication regarding procedural rights can strengthen perception of neutrality and fair treatment. However, transparency must be balanced with safeguards protecting privacy, judicial deliberation and procedural integrity. As noted earlier in this chapter, reforms aimed at strengthening judicial governance, ethics and disciplinary oversight are most effective where they are implemented consistently and supported by credible institutional practice.
Strengthening procedural justice in Ukraine therefore requires continued efforts to reinforce judicial impartiality, improve the consistency and fairness of accountability mechanisms, increase transparency and ensure that court processes are responsive to people’s needs and experiences.
In Ukraine, perceptions of fairness are in part shaped by long-term governance legacies. Low trust in public institutions partly reflects the Soviet legacy, in which courts were often perceived as instruments of state authority rather than independent venues to protect individual rights. This reinforces the importance of visible impartiality, respectful treatment and clear reasoning in judicial proceedings. The Rule of Law Roadmap recognises and attempts to address the need to measure whether reforms improve public confidence in the judiciary. Regularly measuring public trust and perceptions of fairness could help Ukraine assess whether procedural and integrity reforms improve people’s experiences, rather than only institutional outputs (VRU, 2025[26]).
The right to a fair trial is intrinsically linked to judicial independence and impartiality. Only an independent tribunal can effectively fulfil the judiciary’s role in protecting fundamental rights. The ECtHR has repeatedly clarified the scope of judicial independence in its interpretation of Article 6 of the ECHR, highlighting requirements such as independence from the executive and from the parties to the proceedings. These principles have been articulated in cases such as Findlay v. the United Kingdom and Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Findlay v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR noted that to establish whether a tribunal can be considered "independent", regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence. As to the question of "impartiality", there are two aspects to be considered. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.
In Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ECtHR reiterated that in determining in previous cases whether a body could be considered as “independent” – notably of the executive and of the parties to the case – it has had regard to such factors as the manner of appointment of its members, the duration of their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence.
Source: (ECtHR, 1997[82]; ECtHR, 2013[83]).
4.5.2. Fair and impartial treatment
Fair and impartial treatment before courts and tribunals is a core component of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. International standards, notably the ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guarantee the right to a fair and public hearing before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal (Human Rights Committee, 2007[84]). In Ukraine, these principles are reflected in the Constitution, which guarantees fair treatment before the law and courts (VRU, 2020[8]).
4.5.3. Access to effective remedies and enforcement
In Ukraine, ensuring access to effective judicial remedies is particularly critical given the extraordinary strain placed on the justice system by Russia’s war of aggression. Legal needs have taken on added complexity, and the system’s ability to provide timely redress is strained. Formal guarantees of rights are insufficient if institutions lack capacity to deliver services in line with those guarantees.
Ukraine has also expanded the use of digital tools to preserve access to justice under wartime conditions. Online justice services, electronic document management, videoconferencing and user support systems have reduced the need for physical travel and enabled more continuous contact between people and justice institutions. While these measures show adaptive capacity, they have not yet eliminated more profound barriers such as unreliable internet connectivity, electricity disruptions and uneven implementation of digital services.
As further explored in Chapter 5, a major obstacle to effective access to remedies in Ukraine is the persistent non-enforcement of court decisions. While court proceedings may result in fair and legally sound judgments, shortcomings in enforcement significantly limit their practical impact. As a result, the effectiveness of remedies is undermined and public confidence in the justice system as a whole may weaken. Public expectations, as revealed through survey data, also point toward tangible remedies. The Ukraine Justice & Accountability Survey found that reparations were more important than trials and truth-telling, for city residents, internally displaced persons and national respondents alike (Vinck et al., 2024[3]). Thus, justice processes linked to concrete redress should be seen as high-priority reform areas.
Tension between efficiency and integrity is apparent in the access to remedies. Measures that streamline access or reduce delay are designed to improve efficiency, but they will not strengthen trust if issues relating to digitalisation, staffing shortages or uneven implementation persist. Sustaining access to effective remedies remains a central component of procedural justice and a critical determinant of public trust in the justice system. Such access depends on both formal guarantees and institutional capacity to deliver timely outcomes and enforce decisions.
4.6.1. Access to court information
Ukraine’s constitutional and legal framework is designed to foster transparency and ensure access to information and judicial decisions. Constitutional guarantees of openness are supplemented by legislation governing access to court decisions and by digital tools that allow users to track proceedings and find case-related information. These mechanisms are designed to promote transparency, predictability and public understanding of judicial activity. The operation of integrity and disciplinary mechanisms also affects transparency in justice systems. Strengthening public trust requires clear communication from institutions about how complaints, misconduct and disciplinary procedures are addressed.
Public availability of justice-sector data is another important dimension of transparency. OECD PII findings indicate that Ukraine makes a range of court and prosecution data publicly available, providing a baseline for public scrutiny of justice institutions and more evidence-informed communication on performance, accountability and reform implementation (OECD, 2026[12]).
Digital tools have become critical in expanding access. Through the web portals of judicial institutions and the Unified State Web Portal of Electronic Services, as well as Diia, users can obtain information about the court handling their case, the parties involved, the subject matter of the dispute, the procedural status and the date, time and venue of hearings, subject to legal limits.
Access to judicial outcomes is further supported by the Law on Access to Court Decisions and the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. The Register provides free electronic access to court decisions while preserving safeguards for privacy and confidentiality in cases involving protected information or closed hearings. This framework contributes to legal certainty and more consistent application of judicial practice, even if implementation challenges remain.
The judiciary has increasingly embraced online justice standards, aiming to broaden access to the legal system and minimise the need for citizens to travel to court, particularly in light of the challenges resulting from the war. Citizens can file electronic complaints and request consultations. A videoconferencing system has significantly enhanced communications between parties in legal proceedings and justice authorities. By November 2024, more than 140 000 users had registered in the videoconferencing system, through which courts have conducted over 2.5 million hearings. Nevertheless, the war has created obstacles as courts grapple with unreliable internet connectivity and limited electricity supply, complicating efforts to maintain transparency.
Furthermore, according to the SJA, since the Unified State Register of Court Decisions was implemented in December 2018, more than 454 000 users, 124 000 of which are legal entities, have registered. The users have sent over 6 million applications to the courts electronically using the service (SJA, 2025[85]). These figures underscore the judiciary’s dedication to adapting to the unprecedented challenges arising from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and ensuring that justice remains accessible and effective (HCJ, 2022[86]).
4.6.2. Public court hearings
Public court hearings play a significant role in reinforcing procedural fairness and public confidence. Ukrainian law provides for public access to court proceedings, subject to clearly defined exceptions established by procedural legislation. However, the practical operation of open justice has been shaped by wartime constraints, procedural rules and uneven digital capacity. Open justice must account for the tension between transparency and security. Public access to proceedings is vital to enhancing trust and legitimacy, but conditions of war, as well as risks to participants and infrastructure, may justify certain limits on openness. The challenge is to ensure that the limits remain proportionate and clearly explained to the public.
Ukrainian judges have used remote hearings and related tools to preserve continuity in proceedings during the war, but the absence of a clear legislative framework, combined with electricity outages and unreliable internet connectivity, has created risks for openness.
People, including media representatives, are permitted to capture photos, videos and audio recordings in courtrooms with portable devices without needing separate authorisation, although such activities are still subject to certain legal restrictions. Live broadcasting of court hearings requires prior court approval.
In criminal proceedings, the regulatory framework introduces additional complexity. While audio recording is generally permitted, photography, video recording and broadcasting are subject to judicial authorisation, taking into account the views of the parties and the need to safeguard the integrity of proceedings. In practice, judges may request formal applications in advance, which can result in missed opportunities for timely media documentation of hearings (VRU, 2025[10]).
This situation highlights a legal tension between the LJSJ and the Criminal Procedure Code. While the former provides a more permissive framework for recording court proceedings, the latter is sometimes treated as a more specialised provision, leading to inconsistent judicial practice. As a result, media access to courtrooms may depend on the individual interpretation of judges, creating uncertainty and limiting the predictability of open justice arrangements.
4.6.3. Media and communication
Effective communication is an essential component of transparency, public understanding and institutional legitimacy. In Ukraine, communication by justice institutions has gained importance in the context of the war, reforms and heightened public scrutiny. Judicial and prosecutorial institutions have undertaken efforts to enhance communication with the media and public through guidance on media access, internal policy changes and training.
However, legal frameworks governing media access in Ukraine remain uneven. As noted above, while Ukrainian law generally permits public court access and allows journalists to record proceedings, tensions persist between principles of openness and rules governing procedure, especially in criminal cases. Media access may depend on individual judge preferences rather than an equitably applied principle. Greater coherence in the framework, along with continued training and institutional guidance, could help reduce inconsistencies and support transparency and public trust.
Ukraine has introduced an innovative role to institutionalise stronger communication practices: the judge-speaker. This position is designed to act as a conduit between the judiciary and stakeholders, including the media, civil society and the public. The NSJ has incorporated the topics of judicial communication and access to information into professional training programmes. These developments indicate growing acknowledgement that transparency is not merely a legal obligation but an institutional practice requiring adequate skills, consistency and public-facing capacity.
The Rule of Law Roadmap also envisages the drafting of a General Communication Strategy for the Judiciary (VRU, 2025[26]). Its development could help make judicial communication more consistent across courts, clarify how reforms and disciplinary processes are explained to the public and strengthen resilience against misleading narratives. Communication is also central to accountability for war-related crimes. Survey respondents identified a need for clearer information on crimes under investigation, prosecutions and support for victims and witnesses (Vinck et al., 2024[3]). This suggests that communication strategies should focus on delivering information the public needs regarding war-related crimes, including updates on investigations, prosecutions, victims’ rights and available support services.
4.6.4. Civil society participation
Civil society plays an important role in enhancing transparency and accountability within the justice system. In Ukraine, CSOs contribute to oversight by monitoring judicial processes, reporting on court practices and providing feedback on institutional performance. This role appears to be particularly valuable in areas where formal accountability mechanisms remain incomplete or unevenly implemented. DEJURE, for instance, regularly publishes updates on the latest developments in judicial reform, ensuring that the public remains informed about ongoing changes (DEJURE, 2018[87]). Transparency International Ukraine has conducted successive monitoring of the HACC, including analysing hearings, organisational and functional issues, judicial decisions and how recommendations are implemented. Its most recent report identified both positive developments and unresolved problems, including procedural delays, abuse of procedural rights and the need to balance restrictions on access to court decisions with transparency in the judicial system (TI Ukraine, 2024[88]).
4.6.5. Information integrity
Co-ordinated misleading or manipulative information campaigns targeting the judiciary can distort perceptions of judicial integrity, intensify public criticism and affect confidence in court decisions. Such campaigns may focus on judges or high-profile cases and can influence broader perceptions regarding the credibility, impartiality and legitimacy of the judiciary. This tension is heightened in wartime, when the need to protect procedural security and integrity could lead to justifiable limitations on openness. Without clear information, misleading narratives can take root. Strategic transparency is not contrary to security; in fact, it is a fundamental element of maintaining trust when court users and justice service users live under insecure conditions.
For example, in a well-documented scenario, some media outlets have used misleading headlines, taken procedural details out of context or reported subjectively (Judiciary of Ukraine, 2020[89]). Such reporting can pressure parties to the proceedings and misinform the public. Observers and international groups have criticised such practices and underscored the need for careful and responsible reporting about the work of the justice system.
To build resilience against these practices, courts need to strengthen their credibility through consistent and transparent communication with the public and the media. This includes engaging through online platforms and in-person initiatives, as well as efforts to explain core judicial principles such as due process, fairness and judicial independence. Significant concrete steps Ukraine has taken include the introduction of the positions of judge-speaker and press secretary, to institutionalise accountability for clear public communication (CJU, 2016[90]; CJU, 2018[91]). By fostering dialogue and co-operation with CSOs, legal professionals and interest groups, courts can better counter the spread of false or misleading information and reinforce public trust in the justice system.
In view of the assessment, Ukraine may wish to consider the following recommendations:
1. Enhance the balance between independence and accountability. This could include:
Key recommendations
Strengthening safeguards for internal judicial independence, including those relating to court leadership, distribution of administrative powers within courts and protection against any undue external or internal influence. This could include strengthening collegial governance arrangements and improving transparency of internal decision-making processes within courts
Enhancing independent disciplinary enforcement by consolidating the DIS’s role, adopting clear professional standards for inspectors and factoring in the statute of limitations in prioritising cases, to reduce disciplinary case backlogs and enhance the culture of accountability
Strengthening follow-up mechanisms and institutional co-ordination in response to reported interference with judicial decision-making, including to ensure greater transparency regarding enforcement outcomes
Enhancing the implementation of safeguards for judicial transfers, including on appeal rights, thereby strengthening the protection of judicial independence in practice
Strengthening the protection of judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, witnesses and court staff by adopting risk-based security protocols, mechanisms for reporting incidents and preventive measures against intimidation and interference, including in regions affected by the war
Supporting recommendations
Implementing tailored training on judicial independence, accountability and ethical use of artificial intelligence in line with international standards to ensure continuous training among members of the judiciary, prosecution service, legal community and other justice professions
Clarifying disciplinary grounds for judges and prosecutors, including by ensuring more precise description of offences, to support effective accountability
Strengthening procedural fairness, transparency and reasoning requirements across disciplinary and accountability procedures to reinforce institutional legitimacy, legal certainty and public trust while safeguarding judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy.
2. Increase accountability and integrity in the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendations
Applying integrity, transparency and merit-based safeguards consistently in the selection, promotion and tenure of judges, SC judges and court presidents, particularly for positions associated with a high risk of corruption
Reviewing procedures for selection of the SJA’s leadership by introducing objective criteria and competitive, integrity‑ and merit‑based selection procedures that include an element of external scrutiny
Amending Unified Integrity Indicators to allow consideration of evidence from verifiable anonymous whistleblower reports and to enable follow-up reassessments of prior integrity screenings, particularly in high-profile cases where new information may raise concerns about integrity
Strengthening transparency and objectivity of prosecutorial case allocation and managerial reassignment procedures, including through automated allocation tools, where appropriate, to reduce the risk of undue influence and promote integrity in prosecutorial decision-making
Strengthening procedural fairness, predictability and transparency in disciplinary, selection and evaluation procedures for judges and prosecutors, including for decisions overriding integrity-related opinions or recommendations to support institutional credibility and trust in justice sector governance
Supporting recommendations
Assessing how to balance international participation and domestic ownership in auxiliary selection bodies, while preserving integrity safeguards, institutional credibility and continuity of expertise. This may include considering the scope, sequencing and institutional conditions for any gradual adjustment in the involvement of international experts, taking into account budgetary implications and ensuring that members of auxiliary selection bodies meet high standards of professionalism
Expanding the use of transparent and merit-based procedures for appointments to managerial prosecutorial positions to strengthen predictability, professionalism and institutional confidence in prosecutorial governance.
3. Improve transparency and openness of the justice system. This could include:
Key recommendations
Providing regular public updates on selection, evaluation, transfers and disciplinary procedures and outcomes for judges, to support transparency and public trust
Strengthening institutional capacity related to information integrity and strategic communication within justice institutions, including by monitoring and responding to misleading narratives, improving public access to legal information, engaging with media and conducting proactive outreach to support public understanding and trust
Supporting recommendations
Improving transparency and stakeholder engagement by providing clearer explanations of governance, disciplinary and selection decisions and expanding public access to relevant procedural information
Expanding open-justice data governance to improve the availability, clarity and accessibility of information for the public, thereby strengthening transparency and accountability across the justice system
Promoting procedurally fair and people-centred justice processes, including accessible communication, respectful treatment of court users and clear information on procedural rights and remedies
Publishing periodic summaries and key indicators relating to disciplinary proceedings, follow-up actions, referrals and enforcement outcomes, while respecting confidentiality and procedural safeguards where applicable.
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← 1. The ENCJ survey from 2025 captures how judges perceive judicial independence in practice across Europe. The survey collected responses from 19 136 judges across 30 European countries, covering EU Member States, Moldova, Norway, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and select Western Balkan countries. Ukraine participated for the first time, with 431 responding judges. The survey measures judges’ perceptions across institutional, professional and contextual dimensions of independence.
← 2. The comparatively lower number of interference reports registered in 2022 should be interpreted with caution. It reflects, at least to some extent, the suspension of the HCJ’s work following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which limited the registration and examination of such reports.
← 3. The ENCJ survey does not specify which association of judges is referred to in the question on perceived respect for judicial independence. In the Ukrainian context, however, this reference is understood to concern the Association of Judges of Ukraine.
← 4. On 25 March 2026, the CMU approved a draft letter of adherence to the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (CMU, 2026[92]).
← 5. Comparative literature sometimes refers to extraordinary integrity review or screening procedures for judges and prosecutors as “judicial vetting”, particularly in post-transition contexts.
← 6. For future compositions there will be no inclusion of international experts, with three members being selected by the CJU and one each by the Bar Council, CoP and the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine.