This chapter begins by deepening the concept of the justice value ecosystem and its relevance for Moldova’s democratic and institutional context. It analyses how core values, such as independence, impartiality, accountability, integrity and transparency, are embedded in Moldova’s legal and institutional frameworks, and identifies strengths, gaps and reform priorities. Building on the institutional overview, this chapter analyses how governance mechanisms – including vetting procedures, judicial performance evaluation and disciplinary accountability – shape the practical balance between independence, integrity and accountability within Moldova’s judiciary. It looks into value-based dimensions of judicial evaluation and the implications for independence, legitimacy and quality of justice, particularly when evaluations rely on quantitative outputs in resource-constrained environments. The chapter explores the foundational role of judicial governance structures, financial autonomy and professional standards before turning to questions of transparency and communication.
OECD Justice Review of the Republic of Moldova
Abstract
Justice institutions are a cornerstone of democratic governance, economic stability and the protection of rights. Their legitimacy and effectiveness depend on their formal design, as well as on how core values are translated into institutional practice through judicial governance. In this sense, justice governance provides the connective tissue between constitutional principles and the everyday functioning of justice institutions.
This report adopts a justice value ecosystem perspective, recognising the interdependence of values such as independence, impartiality, accountability, integrity, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. These values operate as an ecosystem: when they reinforce one another, they strengthen legitimacy and trust; when pursued in isolation or applied unevenly, they can generate fragmentation, opacity or politicisation. Justice governance, therefore, plays a critical role in mediating trade-offs, aligning incentives and ensuring that these values are embedded coherently across legal frameworks, policies and institutional practices.
Each value operates across multiple dimensions. Independence, for example, encompasses both institutional autonomy from other branches of government and individual safeguards protecting judges from personal or political pressure. Accountability similarly includes institutional oversight mechanisms, as well as individual responsibility through disciplinary and ethical frameworks. Justice systems must, therefore, navigate inherent tensions e.g. independence versus accountability, integrity versus efficiency, or transparency versus confidentiality. Well-designed institutional mechanisms, including judicial and prosecutorial councils, performance evaluation systems and codes of ethics, can help manage these tensions and foster public synergies between values (Kramer and Ferejohn, 2002[1]; CCJE, 2015[2]).
While performance evaluation and disciplinary accountability mechanisms are important tools for strengthening professional standards and integrity within the judiciary, their design must carefully balance accountability with safeguards for judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy. In practice, mechanisms intended to enhance transparency and oversight may also generate risks if evaluation criteria, disciplinary procedures or governance structures are not sufficiently clear, predictable and insulated from undue influence. Ensuring that such mechanisms reinforce rather than undermine judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy is therefore a central element of a well-functioning justice value ecosystem.
Within this ecosystem, the incorporation of a people-centred approach is essential. A people-centred justice system requires more than technical efficiency or legal formality; it depends on how justice is perceived and experienced by people. Procedural fairness, neutrality and dignity are foundational to building public confidence or trust (Cohen, Lind and Tyler, 1989[3]; Grimes, 2006[4]). People assess judicial service by reading several signals at once: whether decisions are insulated from external pressure (independence), reasoned and open to scrutiny (transparency), delivered by neutral and honest actors (impartiality and integrity) and subject to correction when errors occur (accountability) (Cohen, Lind and Tyler, 1989[3]; Grimes, 2006[4]; Kramer and Ferejohn, 2002[1]). Trust is, therefore, not built by strengthening a single principle in isolation but by demonstrating, case after case, that the justice system can uphold its core values together in a balanced manner.
Moldova’s reform trajectory reflects the challenge of advancing judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy, integrity and accountability in parallel, in line with European standards and heightened domestic expectations. Reforms such as the vetting of judges and prosecutors, restructuring of the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) and strengthening of integrity frameworks aim to address systemic weaknesses and long-standing trust deficits while aligning governance arrangements with rule of law commitments. Indeed, OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) show that in the areas of judicial and prosecutorial integrity, Moldova demonstrates strong regulatory performance, reflecting the country’s efforts to rebuild confidence in the justice system and to implement international guidance on integrity safeguards. However, the PII reveal a large implementation gap between regulations and practice (36 percentage points for judicial integrity and 44 percentage points for prosecutorial integrity) (OECD, 2026[5]). This gap can be attributed to the recent adoption of reforms, which require time to become fully effective. At the same time, translating reforms into practice is a common challenge across OECD countries, highlighting the need for stronger operational arrangements to ensure that rules are consistently implemented (OECD, 2026[5]).
Implemented under limited institutional capacity and growing civic scrutiny, these reforms have highlighted the difficulty of sequencing and balancing values in practice, as well as the risks of fragmentation when governance mechanisms are pursued in silos. Against this backdrop, justice governance emerges as a central lever for consolidating reform efforts and strengthening institutional resilience.
4.2.1. Reinforcing independence through value-based safeguards
The OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems emphasises the foundational requirement for the leadership of a country and the justice sector to adopt, commit to and establish a justice system culture rooted in core values, with judicial independence as an underlying principle (OECD, 2023[6]).1 Indeed, the principles of judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy lie at the heart of the rule of law. They ensure that courts and judges can adjudicate and that prosecutors conduct investigations impartially, free from undue influence and grounded solely in law. These are not privileges conferred upon them, but a functional necessity to guarantee rights, uphold constitutional balance and maintain democratic governance (CoE, 2010[7]; United Nations, 1985[8]).
Independence and autonomy, however, are not sufficient on their own. To prevent opacity, politicisation and institutional capture, they must operate in balance with impartiality, efficiency, accountability, integrity and transparency (Magalhães, 2020[9]; Burbank, 2008[10]).
In practice, judicial independence is multidimensional. At the institutional level, it requires constitutional guarantees, operational autonomy and protection from undue interference by other branches of government. At the individual level, it demands that each judge be able to decide cases free from fear, favour or reprisal, supported by secure tenure, transparent appointments and adequate working conditions (Venice Commission, 2010[11]; ECtHR, 1984[12]).
Similarly, prosecutorial autonomy has emerged as a critical area for reform. Prosecutors act on behalf of society and the public interest. Their decisions, particularly in criminal justice, have profound implications for human rights and the rule of law. They must be protected from political interference, while remaining accountable for the legality and fairness of their actions (CoE, 2000[13]; United Nations, 1990[14]).
4.2.2. Constitutional and legal foundations
The OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems recognises judicial independence not as an end in itself, but as a precondition for a justice system that is fair, trusted and capable of delivering people-centred outcomes. In this regard, robust constitutional and legal frameworks play a central role in safeguarding and sustaining judicial independence.2
Similar to most OECD countries, the Constitution of Moldova explicitly enshrines the independence, impartiality and irremovability of judges across all court levels, including the Supreme Court of Justice, courts of appeal and first instance courts (art.116) (Government of the Republic of Moldova, 1994[15]; OECD, 2026[16]). This provision aims to safeguard their ability to dispense justice without external influence or pressure. It designates the SCM as the principal “guarantor” of judicial independence (art.121/1), tasked with overseeing the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (art.123). The Constitutional Court is designated as an independent body, accountable solely to the Constitution (art.134).
These constitutional provisions are complemented by primary legislation that further articulates and operationalises the principle of judicial independence. Law No. 947/1996 on the Superior Council of the Magistracy, Law 514/1995 on Judicial Organisation, and Law No. 544/1995 on the Status of Judges assert that the independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches and define the institutional framework within which the judicial authority is exercised.
Building on this foundation, Moldova has undertaken significant reforms to strengthen its judicial independence and reduce political influence, many of which have been developed in consultation with the Venice Commission. Notably, the 2021 constitutional amendment in relation to judicial careers and the functioning of the judiciary as a whole, eliminated the five-year probationary period for judges, consolidated judicial appointment procedures and removed parliamentary involvement in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). Additionally, the structural composition of the SCM was revised to exclude ex officio members, in view of strengthening its institutional autonomy.3
Despite this solid legislative framework and continued reform efforts aligned with international standards, challenges remain in ensuring consistent and effective implementation of these laws. Gaps remain between the legal provisions and their implementation reflecting structural and institutional challenges, limited administrative capacity and perception of occasional political interference (see below). Bridging this implementation gap is essential to translating legislative progress into meaningful, lasting improvements in the functioning and credibility of the justice system.
4.2.3. Institutional independence
Public perceptions of judicial independence and institutional autonomy reveal a complex picture. 2025 Survey data show that over 80% of judges and prosecutors attribute low public trust in the judiciary mainly to political interference and negative media portrayals, while only a small minority (15–22%) see internal conduct as a key factor (LRCM, 2025[17]).4 However, further disaggregation of the data reveals a more nuanced view: while few respondents attribute low trust to the behaviour of the majority of judges, a larger share acknowledges that the conduct of some judges contributes to public scepticism. This distinction underscores the importance of addressing individual integrity risks without undermining institutional credibility.
Perceptions of impartiality also diverge across the legal community. According to the same study, 94% of judges, 67% of prosecutors and 42% of lawyers agreed that judges apply the law equally to all individuals. However, when asked about prosecutorial impartiality, nearly 70% of lawyers disagreed that prosecutors consistently uphold the same standard. These findings suggest a broader trust gap not only between the public and the judiciary but also among legal practitioners themselves.
Judicial independence in Moldova continues to face both structural and contextual pressures. Despite legal safeguards, judges’ associations at the domestic and regional levels have raised concerns about growing public attacks against the judiciary. These often take the form of generalisations or inflammatory rhetoric that target individual judges or question the legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole.5 In the current polarised political and media landscape, such dynamics may contribute to a chilling effect, discouraging judges from exercising their mandate. Over time, this environment may fuel public scepticism about the judiciary’s impartiality and lead to self-censorship or excessive caution within judicial ranks.
Justice institutions in Moldova increasingly recognise the need to balance openness to public scrutiny with effective safeguards for judicial independence. Courts are constitutionally accountable to the public and must remain open to legitimate critique as part of democratic checks and balances.
At the same time, the Council of Europe (CoE) and other international bodies underline the importance of distinguishing between legitimate public commentary and undue pressure that may impair judicial integrity or chill judicial independence.
In response, Moldovan justice actors have emphasised the importance of reinforcing institutional communication, judicial ethics and professional solidarity. Judges and their associations continue to advocate for a public discourse that acknowledges the judiciary’s role as a co-equal branch of government rather than portraying it as an adversary in political contestation.
This evolving approach is also reflected in broader reform efforts. Moldova’s judiciary is increasingly aligning its reform vision with a value-based governance approach. This includes strengthening internal accountability, improving transparency in judicial decision making and ensuring that communication strategies help bridge the gap between justice institutions and the public. Going forward, ensuring consistent communication, addressing both external pressures and internal integrity risks, and fostering a more balanced public narrative will be critical to reinforcing institutional legitimacy over time.
4.2.4. Individual independence
Criminal liability and judicial decision-making
Individual judicial independence - the ability of judges to decide cases impartially, free from external or internal pressures - is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. In Moldova, the interaction between judicial accountability mechanisms and safeguards for judicial independence has attracted increasing attention from legal professionals, judicial associations and international observers. In particular, the application of criminal liability provisions to judicial decision-making has been the subject of debate, especially in cases involving politically sensitive matters or decisions that diverge from prosecutorial requests. Some judges and prosecutors expressed concern that broadly formulated or ambiguously applied liability provisions may create uncertainty regarding the boundaries of legitimate judicial discretion, potentially affecting perceptions of judicial autonomy.
Evidence from a 2024 analysis by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), supported with consultations with national stakeholders, suggests that some judges perceive heightened exposure to professional or legal scrutiny when issuing decisions that diverge from prosecutorial positions. Investigative judges, who frequently rule on coercive measures such as pre-trial detention, have reported particular sensitivity to these dynamics. While these perceptions do not necessarily reflect systemic misuse of accountability mechanisms, they may contribute to uncertainty about the limits of judicial discretion. Several provisions have prompted discussion among legal professionals and international observers regarding their alignment with international safeguards.
Particular attention has been drawn to Article 307 of the Criminal Code No. 985/2002, which criminalises the “wilful rendering of a judgment, sentence, decision or ruling in breach of the law”.6 The Article was amended in 2024, making its wording more precise through the inclusion of a mandatory subjective element (the intent to create an advantage or disadvantage for another person must be established). Apart from this, the sanctions related to the offence were significantly increased. While in 2021 two judges were sentenced based on Article 307 in a case regarding accusations of involvement in money laundering schemes (Moldova 1, 2025[18]), the authorities noted that in the period 2023-2024 there were no cases of the SCM granting consent to the criminal prosecution of judges under Article 307 of the Criminal Code, the strengthening of criminal liability for delivering judicial decisions could negatively affect judicial independence (OECD, 2025[19]).
While similar provisions exist in other countries, they are generally interpreted narrowly and applied only in exceptional circumstances involving intentional misconduct or manifest abuse of judicial authority. As a result, their impact depends largely on the surrounding legal safeguards, interpretive practice and institutional culture (ICJ, 2019[20]). The formulation of Article 307, combined with the potential for severe penalties, including imprisonment and disqualification from office, has prompted concerns about its potential misuse7 (Constitutional Court of Moldova, 2017[21]; CoE, 2017[22]).
The Constitutional Court has provided important interpretative safeguards in this regard. It has emphasised that judicial independence constitutes a cornerstone of the rule of law and that judges must remain free from external interference in their decision-making process outside the procedures established by law (Constitutional Court of Moldova, 2017[21]). The Court has further clarified that judicial errors or divergent legal interpretations should primarily be addressed through appellate review and that criminal liability may arise only where there is evidence of intentional wrongdoing or manifest gross negligence. These principles are consistent with broader international standards, which limit criminal liability for judges to cases of intentional misconduct or abuse of authority and recognise that judicial errors or contested legal interpretations should normally be addressed through appellate review rather than criminal proceedings (United Nations, 1985[8]; CCJE, 2002[23]; Venice Commission, 2010[11]).
At the same time, available evidence suggests that these safeguards have not always been consistently reflected in practice. Reports from the ICJ and other observers indicate that decisions contrary to prosecutorial preferences have, in some cases, triggered investigations under Article 307 (ICJ, 2019[20]).8 The OECD Anti-Corruption Monitoring Follow-Up Report has noted that, although Article 307 formally provides for criminal liability of judges, sanctions have not been applied in practice for judicial decisions alone, meaning that criminal liability has not been imposed solely on the basis of the content of a judicial ruling in the absence of additional elements such as intent or misconduct (OECD, 2025[19]). This underscores the importance of safeguards ensuring that criminal liability mechanisms are not used to interfere with the exercise of judicial functions.
The German Criminal Code
In Germany, judges are not subject to criminal sanctions for mere errors or negligence. For the personal liability of a judge to be given in Germany, he or she would have to commit actions that “pervert the course of justice”. According to Section 339 of the German Criminal Code, this refers to instances of judges knowingly passing a wrongful judgement for the benefit or detriment of a party and is subject to imprisonment for at least one year. Furthermore, a deliberately wrongful judgement triggers criminal prosecution and automatically leads to removal from office. Conversely, in cases that do not involve criminal offences, state liability applies.
Criminal and Civil liability in Italy
According to Italian law, it is possible to prosecute magistrates for any violation of criminal law. To ensure the independence of magistrates despite this pathway to criminal liability, criminal trials concerning magistrates cannot be conducted in the appeal district where the magistrate is in service and are automatically moved to the competent first instance court in the neighbouring appeal district if this is the case. While a 1988 Law also introduced the civil liability of judges and prosecutors, it can only be applied to cases where judges act maliciously or grossly negligent, thus, ensuring that the merits of judicial decisions are protected from liability.
Source: Law No. 117/1998; (MEDEL, 2012[24]; Terry, 2015[25]).
Procedural safeguards governing the initiation of criminal proceedings against judges also play a key role in protecting judicial independence. Under Moldovan law, the Prosecutor General must obtain approval from the SCM to initiate proceedings against judges, except in cases involving specific crimes, such as corruption or money laundering, where no such approval is required. In 2023 and 2024, the SCM considered several requests, approving 6 and rejecting 1 (Table 4.1).9 In 2025, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office investigated and brought to trial 4 high-profile criminal cases involving judges (for issues related to influence peddling, fraud) (Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office of Moldova, 2025[26]). These figures suggest a cautious approach, reflecting both the sensitivity of initiating proceedings against judges and the importance of preserving independence safeguards. At the same time, the operation of this mechanism has raised questions regarding transparency, consistency and the robustness of procedural protections.
Note: Out of 6 requests submitted, 1 authorisation to initiate proceedings and 5 for investigative actions were granted; the 6 requests were eventually rejected with no judges suspended.
Source: Data provided by SCM.
Justice institutions in Moldova increasingly acknowledge the need for clearer boundaries between legitimate judicial accountability and undue influence. Judicial actors, supported by civil society and international organisations, have called for reforms that reinforce the principle that judges must not be sanctioned for the substance of their legal reasoning, provided it is made in good faith and within their discretionary authority.
Further efforts could focus on clarifying the scope and application of Article 307, ensuring closer alignment with Constitutional Court jurisprudence and international standards. Improving transparency in the SCM’s authorisation process, including greater public access to anonymised statistics and decisions could also bolster confidence in the fairness and objectivity of oversight mechanisms.
Beyond legal reforms, fostering a professional culture that supports judicial independence remains essential. Continued investment in judicial training, particularly on professional ethics, decision-making standards and the scope of criminal liability and judicial discretion, can help judges navigate complex cases with confidence. Reinforcing public understanding of the judiciary’s constitutional role, especially in politically sensitive proceedings, is also important to building long-term trust.
Ensuring that accountability mechanisms are applied in a manner consistent with judicial independence will remain critical as Moldova advances its broader reforms. Individual independence concerns the ability of judges to decide cases impartially and free from undue influence. This autonomy is also shaped by the institutional environment in which they operate, including the effectiveness of governance structures and judicial self-governing bodies.
Tenure and conditions of service as safeguards of judicial independence
Secure tenure and stable conditions of service are recognised as foundational to the independence of individual judges. They provide the assurance that judicial decisions will be made on the basis of law, not out of concern for career progression or fear of reprisal. According to international standards, including those of the United Nations and the CoE, the authority responsible for decisions related to judicial selection, promotion, transfer and dismissal must function independently from political influence to protect judicial autonomy and impartiality, and avoid politicisation and capture (ECtHR, 1984[12]; Venice Commission, 2010[11]; United Nations, 1985[8]).
In Moldova, legal professionals and judicial stakeholders affirm the value of these guarantees. Constitutional provisions ensure that judges are appointed until the mandatory retirement age of 65 and recent reforms have further insulated the appointment process from political interference. For instance, the 2021 Constitutional amendments eliminated the initial five-year probationary period and removed parliamentary participation in the appointment of Supreme Court judges. These reforms have been broadly welcomed as important safeguards for judicial independence and as contributors to greater public confidence in the judiciary.
However, recent developments have tested the resilience of these safeguards in practice. The external evaluation (vetting) process has had significant systemic implications, notably triggering a wave of resignations, including, in early 2023, 16 Supreme Court judges and several others from appeals courts in Chișinău, Cahul and Comrat. According to stakeholders, this situation risked critical staffing shortages across several courts, prompting the SCM to rely on temporary transfers of judges to maintain operations. While judicial transfers in Moldova, both permanent and temporary, are regulated by the law and specific derogatory rules were introduced in 2023 to allow the temporary transfer of judges from lower to upper courts10 in response to exceptional vacancies, the scale and pace of these developments have tested the robustness of the existing framework. This situation draws attention to the need for greater predictability, clarity in procedures and conditions and strengthened safeguards to ensure that such transfers do not undermine judicial independence, legal certainty or the principle of irremovability.
The legal framework governing temporary transfers sets out clear eligibility criteria, including minimum judicial experience, integrity requirements and demonstrated professional competence11 to ensure that only qualified candidates are selected. However, the current framework provides limited guidance on the full set of rights, responsibilities and working conditions applicable to judges during temporary assignments. This may create uncertainty for transferred judges, particularly regarding their status, career trajectory and applicable benefits. In addition, involuntary transfers are limited in scope and used only in exceptional circumstances; yet, their existence reinforces the need for clear legal safeguards and strict conditions to prevent any perception of undue influence or indirect pressure. Temporary transfers to higher courts may also place judges in more vulnerable positions if not accompanied by clear protections, particularly in periods of systemic reform or judicial reorganisation.
These pressures are reflected in developments at the Supreme Court of Justice. Following the resignations in early 2023, only 8 of the 33 judicial positions were filled, creating significant operational challenges (Ziarul de Gardă, 2023[27]). Despite subsequent reforms reducing the number of positions to 20 (Law No. 64/2023),12 understaffing persisted13 (IDEA, 2024[28]; Radio Moldova, 2023[29]).
More broadly, concerns remain regarding the legal and institutional clarity of Moldova’s framework on judicial tenure and transfer. Although the Constitution guarantees judges’ irremovability and requires their consent for transfers, secondary legislation outlines grounds for dismissal, such as failed integrity checks, disciplinary sanctions or insufficient performance evaluations, that require clear interpretation and consistent application.14 The absence of robust definitions or procedural safeguards can give rise to perceptions of discretionary or politically motivated decisions.
Transfers, if not carefully regulated, may be perceived as a form of indirect pressure or reprisal, potentially undermining the principle of irremovability and the credibility of judicial proceedings. These risks are not unique to Moldova and have been flagged by the Venice Commission, which emphasises that transfers without consent must be strictly limited to exceptional cases and governed by objective legal standards to prevent misuse (Venice Commission, 2014[30]).
In response, the SCM initiated a competitive process in April 2023 to temporarily fill 12 vacant positions through transfers, for a period of six months with the possibility of extension. This measure contributed to maintaining the functioning of the Court and ensuring continuity in the administration of justice. It also illustrates the system’s capacity to respond to exceptional pressures, while underscoring the importance of ensuring that such mechanisms are supported by clear legal frameworks and safeguards.
Moving forward, Moldova would benefit from adopting a robust legal framework for all types of judicial transfers that balances institutional flexibility with strong protections for individual judges. This framework could define the specific conditions under which temporary or permanent transfers may take place, incorporate objective criteria, ensure procedural transparency and include timelines and review mechanisms (Venice Commission, 2014[30]).
Furthermore, consistent application of dismissal criteria, supported by transparent evaluation and disciplinary processes, can help ensure that tenure protections do not shield misconduct, but also do not open pathways for undue interference. Investing in training, clear communication of procedures and oversight by independent judicial bodies will be essential to maintaining public trust and the integrity of judicial careers.
By reinforcing tenure protections with operational safeguards and a well-regulated transfer policy, Moldova can further consolidate its judicial independence and resilience, ensuring that judges are empowered to act impartially and in accordance with the law, even in periods of institutional transition.
4.2.5. Strengthening the role and legitimacy of the Superior Council of Magistracy in upholding independence
A robust institutional framework safeguarding the principle of judicial independence is fundamental to the judiciary’s administration and governance and various categories of judicial governance models exist. Across Eastern Europe, judicial councils represent a widely adopted model to ensure such institutional independence. These autonomous bodies, typically composed of judges and lay members, depending on countries, hold broad powers over judicial careers, disciplinary proceedings and aspects of court administration. Their design and functioning are considered critical to safeguarding judicial independence, promoting accountability, and avoiding both corporatism (excessive judicial self-regulation) which may insulate the judiciary from accountability and political capture where legislative or executive actors exert inappropriate influence over judicial appointments and careers. International and regional standards, including the European Charter on the Statute for Judges and UN guidance, recommend that judicial councils operate independently from the executive and legislature and include a majority of judges elected by their peers, alongside lay members selected through transparent, merit-based processes (Venice Commission, 2007[31]; United Nations, 2018[32]; CoE, 2010[7]; CoE, 1998[33]).
In Moldova, the SCM serves as the key institution responsible for ensuring judicial self-governance and protecting the judiciary’s independence (see Chapter 3). It holds broad responsibilities, including the appointment, evaluation, training and discipline of judges, and plays a decisive role in shaping both the integrity and performance of the judiciary.
The effective functioning of the specialised boards under the SCM is essential for ensuring transparent and merit-based judicial career management. These bodies, including the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board and the Disciplinary Board, play a key role in processes related to judicial recruitment, evaluation, promotion and accountability processes. In recent years, however, the operationalisation of some specialised bodies has been affected by broader integrity assessment reforms and the gradual appointment of members following vetting procedures. As a result, certain judicial career management processes have advanced more slowly than anticipated.
There has been progress with regard to appointments to the Selection and Evaluation Board of Judges which is fully constituted, with the last vacant position having been filled in March 2026 (Moldpres, 2026[34]), while the Disciplinary Board currently has five out of seven members in place (European Commission, 2025[38]). Ensuring that these specialised boards are fully constituted, adequately resourced and able to operate effectively will be important to strengthen the efficiency of judicial governance and reinforce the institutional legitimacy of the SCM. This issue is also reflected in the European Commission’s monitoring under the EU accession process, which has emphasised the importance of ensuring the timely operationalisation of judicial governance bodies responsible for judicial careers (European Commission, 2025[35]).
The effectiveness of judicial self-governance also depends on the administrative and analytical capacity of supporting institutions. In Moldova, the Secretariat of the SCM plays a key role in preparing decisions, managing procedures related to judicial careers and supporting the functioning of the Council and its specialised boards. However, staffing constraints and limited institutional resources have affected its operational capacity in recent years. Strengthening the Secretariat’s human and analytical resources would help enhance the SCM’s effectiveness by supporting more consistent procedures, improving the quality of preparatory work and ensuring greater institutional continuity across judicial governance mechanisms.
The SCM composition reflects a commitment to transparency and broad-based participation, consistent with European standards on judicial governance (CoE, 2010[7]; Venice Commission, 2007[31]). It consists of 12 members, 6 judges and 6 lay members selected from among legal professionals of recognised integrity and expertise, none of whom may hold positions in the legislative, executive or judicial branches, or have political affiliations.15
It is important to note that the Law on the SCM underwent a significant reform in the selection process for the six lay members of the SCM. These members are to be chosen by the Legal Committee on Appointments and Immunities. The selection process encompasses a thorough examination of candidates' files, followed by an opportunity for the committee to hear each candidate personally. Based on this assessment, the committee will then put forth its recommendations to Parliament, which is tasked with appointing the candidates by a decisive vote, a requirement set at three-fifths of the elected members (Law No. 103/2021).
Overall, this process in the selection of the six lay SCM members is a positive reflection of government's commitment to upholding standards of openness, transparency and public participation (Venice Commission, 2020[36]). Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the political dimensions of the lay member selection process (Venice Commission, 2020[36]). As the committee overseeing the competition is a parliamentary body, its decisions may be subject to political dynamics. Its responsibilities include reviewing the candidates' profiles, conducting interviews with applicants and submitting these to Parliament for consideration (Venice Commission, 2020[36]).
There could be a risk that political considerations affect nominations, particularly in the absence of institutional safeguards to ensure impartiality. Although political involvement at the nomination stage does not necessarily compromise independence, the perception of politicisation may affect the SCM’s legitimacy. Survey data illustrates this ambivalence: According to a 2025 survey, 72% of judges believe that the SCM effectively defends judicial independence, an improvement from 50% in 2023. Some 79% consider the SCM’s decisions to be well-reasoned and 72% believe its communication with the judiciary is effective. However, only 58% of judges believe the SCM operates independently from political influence (LRCM, 2025[17]). These findings point to a need to strengthen transparency and reinforce safeguards against perceived politicisation.
In line with international standards, further reflection may be warranted on the authorities involved in administering, interviewing, selecting and appointing lay members. One option could be to introduce structured consultation between the Committee for Legal Affairs and the General Assembly of Judges during the screening phase. Such an approach could improve procedural legitimacy, increase buy-in among judicial actors and signal a commitment to shared ownership of governance reforms.
4.3.1. The complementary values of judicial independence and accountability
Accountability is often viewed as a competing value with judicial independence or prosecutorial autonomy. Yet in practice, they are complementary and interdependent principles that serve a shared purpose: upholding the rule of law, ensuring the integrity of justice and fostering public trust. Independence or autonomy protects judges or prosecutors from undue influence, while accountability ensures they exercise their powers transparently, lawfully and in the public interest. An imbalance in either direction can distort justice: unchecked independence risks impunity or corporatism, while accountability without safeguards invites political interference or retaliation (Burbank, 2008[10]; Smith, 2017[37]).
Beyond institutional structures, judicial accountability also shapes individual conduct. Judges are bound by law and must provide reasoned decisions, subject to appeal and ethical review. Accountability thus acts as a check on arbitrary behaviour and reinforces the judiciary’s legitimacy. At the same time, it must be carefully designed to avoid chilling judicial independence, particularly in contexts where justice systems face political pressure or low public trust (Griffen, 1998[38]; CCJE, 2015[2]).
These tensions are acute in reforming and politically contested justice systems, where effective judicial governance is essential in balancing these values. As such, a range of governance mechanisms including disciplinary systems, performance evaluations, asset declarations and public engagement can support this equilibrium when properly designed and implemented.
Moldova’s own experience underscores the need for governance mechanisms that protect judicial independence while ensuring performance and accountability. Embedding both values through clear legal frameworks, institutional safeguards and transparent procedures strengthens judicial legitimacy and builds lasting public trust.
4.3.2. Strengthening integrity through appointment processes
The method of selecting and appointing is a cornerstone of judicial independence and the rule of law. International standards emphasise that appointments should be based on objective, merit-based criteria and conducted by bodies insulated from political influence, in order to ensure that judges possess the integrity, competence and impartiality required for the exercise of judicial function (Venice Commission, 2010[11]; CCJE, 2007[39]; United Nations, 1985[8]). To safeguard the candidates’ quality and integrity, the procedure should promote competitiveness and provide equal opportunity for all qualified individuals. Moreover, the body entrusted with selecting and recommending judges must be insulated from external pressures e.g. from the executive and legislative branches. In line with international standards, such body should mostly comprise members from the judiciary, legal practitioners, especially members of the bar and academia (Venice Commission, 2020[36]).
In Moldova, the legal framework governing judicial appointments broadly reflects these principles. The selection, appointment and promotion of judges are regulated in Law No. 544/1995 on the Status of Judges (as last amended by Law No. 34/2025 and currently in force)16 and implemented through structured procedures led by the SCM. The process is competitive and merit-based, with vacancies publicly announced in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova and other media and competitions organised twice a year (Law No. 544/1995). Candidates must be registered in the SCM Candidates Register, which centralises applications and supporting documentation (SCM, 2025[40]). Eligibility criteria are defined in law and include requirements relating to citizenship, legal education (bachelor’s and master’s degrees in law), professional capacity, integrity, absence of criminal record, language proficiency in Romanian and medical fitness (Laws No. 544/1995 and No. 3/2016). Entry into the judicial profession is typically preceded by training at the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), following the competitive admission process (Box 4.2).
According to Article 2 of Law No. 147/2023, the main principles guiding the selection of judges are:
legality
non-discrimination
objective and impartial selection and evaluation
equity
transparency
confidentiality
protection of personal data and privacy
respect for human dignity.
These principles are further elaborated to specific selection criteria, which include the following:
results of the graduation exam of initial training courses;
experience in legal specialty positions and type of activity carried out in those positions;
participation in non-formal education activities, projects or initiatives;
knowledge of one of the official languages of the Council of Europe;
possession of personal qualities, such as verticality, fairness, ability to manage stressful situations, analytical capacity and ability to make decisions, attested by the result of psychological testing;
ability to understand and solve complex legal situations; and
other aspects established by SCM regulation.
Source: Law No. 147/2023.
The application process for the NIJ entails a comprehensive selection procedure. Upon completion of their studies at the NIJ, these individuals, “attendees” advance to participate in recruitment competitions organised by both the SCM and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP). During this period, they hold the official status of "candidates" for judicial and prosecutorial positions.
Candidate evaluation is based on a multi-stage and weighted assessment system combining academic performance, professional evaluation and institutional review. In particular, final scores typically reflect: (i) results obtained at the NIJ or relevant professional examinations (60%); (ii) assessments by the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board (20%); and (iii) evaluation by the SCM (20%). This framework is complemented by integrity checks conducted by the National Integrity Authority and the National Anti-Corruption Centre, which verify asset declarations, ethical standards and professional conduct (Law No. 544/1995).17
Following the completion of the competition and integrity checks, the SCM prepares a proposal for judicial appointment, which is submitted to the President of the Republic. The President may reject a nomination only once and must provide a reasoned decision in cases of incompatibility, breach of legal requirements or procedural irregularities (art. 11, Law No. 544/1995). In such situations, the SCM may re‑submit either the same or a different candidate for the vacancy, with a two-thirds majority vote of its members (art. 19, Law No. 947/1996). Additionally, the Judicial Inspection is tasked with reviewing the grounds for the President’s rejection and informing both the SCM and the candidate concerned (art. 7/1, Law No. 947/1996). Upon receiving a repeated proposal from the SCM, the President is required to issue a decree appointing the candidate within 30 days (art.11, Law No. 544/1995).
The Constitutional Court has clarified the legal nature of this co‑decision mechanism and its implication for the separation of powers (Constitutional Court of Moldova, 2013[41]). In line with the Court’s decision, the President of the Republic has a constitutional obligation to appoint candidates proposed by the SCM once it is confirmed that all legal requirements are fulfilled. Accordingly, the appointment of judges to ordinary (non-constitutional) courts should not be subject to discretionary approval by the President as this could create a risk that political considerations may take precedence over the objective criteria required for selecting candidates. The Court further emphasises that any interpretation of the President’s role that extends beyond these limits would undermine constitutional values and principles relating to the separation of powers and judicial independence.
Overall, the President’s role in this process has been in line with practices across a number of OECD countries, where formal executive involvement is common. However, it has been reported that in Moldova, the implementation of these safeguards has raised concerns in practice. The 2022 OECD Report on the Fifth Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan found that, while the SCM has primary responsibility for the selection and appointment process, in practice the President retained some level of discretion (OECD, 2022[42]). Notably, the report found that in most cases where the President rejected the proposed appointments for life, the SCM mostly did not repropose the candidate.18 Moreover, despite legal requirements for the publication of the President’s reasoning, this was not consistently implemented.
The 2024 OECD Monitoring report noted some improvements but concluded that Moldova remained non-compliant with benchmarks related to limiting the discretion of political bodies in judicial appointment. According to 2022 data, the President rejected 24 out of 39 proposed candidates, making such rejections non-exceptional. Moreover, the reasoning for the President’s decisions was considered vague and lacking factual references (OECD, 2024[43]).19
According to the 2024 Annual Report of the SCM, the President carefully examined a broad range of proposed candidates for judicial appointments, rejecting 5, which were subsequently re‑submitted (SCM, 2025[44]). Among the nominations, 4 judges were appointed to the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), 19 to the courts of appeal and 24 to district courts. Overall, 38 out of 42 proposed judges were appointed indicating an improvement in the application of the appointment framework and a more limited use of executive discretion.20
Despite this progress, further safeguards could enhance transparency and accountability in the appointment process. In particular, systematically providing detailed and publicly accessible reasoning for presidential refusals would help strengthen public trust. This is especially relevant given that such refusals are not subject to judicial review, whereas decisions of the SCM’s specialised bodies can be appealed within the SCM and subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court of Justice (Law No. 147/2023).21 These challenges are not unique to Moldova. In a 2021 ruling, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) underlined that appointment processes must avoid even the perception of external influence and be subject to effective legal remedies to safeguard judicial independence (ECJ, 2021[45]; European Parliament, 2024[46]).
These developments should also be considered in the context of a broader period of institutional reform and transition. Between 2022-2024, Moldova implemented two parallel procedures: the “reconfirmation” of judges whose probationary period had expired, and a newly introduced procedure for judicial appointments, which eliminated probationary periods for judges. With the conclusion of reconfirmation process, the new procedure adopted in 2022 is now fully in force and has strengthened the role of the SCM. The role of the President of the Republic has been more clearly defined, with refusals of SCM’s proposals limited to specific legal grounds, including i) undeniable evidence of incompatibility; ii) violation of the law by the candidate and iii) violation of the legal procedure for selecting the candidate. The effective implementation of this framework will be critical to ensuring the credibility, consistency and transparency of the judicial appointments system going forward.
4.3.3. Standards of conduct and ethics
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[47]) defines public integrity as:
“The consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector.”
In practice, this requires clear and enforceable standards of conduct that guide behaviours and support a shared understanding of ethical expectations across the public sector and among citizens (OECD, 2020[48]). Codes of conduct or ethics are a common tool in this regard, translating essential rule of law values into behavioural norms. Codes of conduct clarify expected standards and prohibited situations, whereas codes of ethics identify the principles that guide behaviour and decision making. Most national regulatory frameworks combine both approaches, which present public service values with guidance on how to apply the expected standards and principles of conduct. Such combinations offer a balance between general core values and practical guidance for day-to-day decision making (OECD, 2020[48]).
Enhancing the implementation of judicial and prosecutorial ethics
Drawing from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, the European Charter on the Statute of Judges, and various declarations and recommendations from European institutions, Moldova's General Assembly of Judges adopted a Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for Judges (2015). This Code of Ethics is a public document that outlines principles and conduct norms that judges must adhere to both in their professional duties and outside the courtroom (General Assembly of Judges, 2015[49]). The core principles outlined in the Code are:
Independence
Impartiality
Integrity
Professionalism
Fairness
Collegiality
Confidentiality and transparency
In addition, the Code establishes the disciplinary liability of judges in case of violations (art. 10 of the Code). The implementation of the Code is supported by the Commission on Ethics and Professional Conduct of Judges, which operates under the SCM and is responsible for issuing, upon request or ex officio, opinions/recommendations for judges regarding ethical dilemmas or problems related to the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Code (SCM, 2018[50]). The Commission’s opinions and recommendations are advisory and cannot refer to ongoing litigation or to past or ongoing disciplinary procedures. Moreover, the Commission’s work is confidential. This approach is a positive feature in Moldova’s judicial integrity framework and in line with a preventive approach to anti-corruption, which requires a clear distinction between advisory and sanctioning functions22 (OECD, 2020[48]).
As regards prosecutors, the Code of Ethics adopted in 2016 is complemented by a comprehensive commentary published in 2021 by the SCP (General Assembly of Prosecutors, 2016[51]; SCP, 2021[52]). The commentary provides detailed explanations to guide prosecutors in interpreting the Code and applying it in the exercise of their duties. Each principle and provision of the Code is analysed in the commentary with reference to the national legal framework and to international standards. Moreover, the analysis includes specific guidance on prosecutors’ expected behaviour, as well as their rights and duties. As a notable feature, the commentary addresses issues related to emerging concerns regarding prosecutorial integrity, such as the use of electronic and social networks.
The commentary on the Code of Ethics of Prosecutors is a good practice that could be considered for judges as well. Indeed, codified standards of behaviour can never fully capture and direct how decisions should be made in the face of diverse ethical issues. Therefore, it is useful to provide concrete guidance on how these standards and values can be translated in public officials’ daily activities. Practical examples included in codes or supplementary documents, such as guidelines, help achieve this goal. This type of guidance is currently not available in the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct of the Judge. Judges could benefit from receiving institutional support to help them navigate ethical dilemmas and situations that may present conflicts of interest. In its Strategic Development Plan for 2025-2029, the SCM already envisages the revision of the Code to address emerging challenges and ethical dilemmas arising from judges’ interactions in a digital environment (SCM, 2025[53]). In revising the Code, the SCM could consider following the SCP’s approach to develop a commentary with practical guidance on the application of the Code to support its implementation. In addition, judges could receive targeted training and confidential advice. Given the increasing scrutiny of judicial conduct and the importance of maintaining judicial integrity and independence, a dedicated confidential service is considered a vital professional resource. This service would enable judges to proactively address and resolve issues early, effectively and authoritatively (CoE, 2012[54]).
In the case of prosecutors, the SCP could consider strengthening the institutional framework for the implementation of the Code of Ethics of Prosecutors by establishing ethics advisory channels. In this regard, the SCP could draw inspiration from the Commission on Ethics and Professional Conduct of Judges. According to stakeholders, the Code of Ethics provides the development and implementation of an ethics advisory mechanism. However, this has not been implemented yet although the SCP is currently exploring options with international partners on developing such a mechanism.
The ethical rules for state prosecutors in Croatia are defined by the State Prosecutor’s Office Act, which governs the adoption of the Code of Ethics for State Prosecutors and Deputy State Prosecutors. This Code ensures the integrity of prosecutors as independent officials. The Ethical Committee of Prosecutors, an independent body, plays a central role in providing ethical opinions, recommendations and guidelines. It acts upon requests from prosecutors, complaints or on its own initiative, promoting integrity in the profession.
The committee consists of seven members, elected for five-year terms, drawn from various levels of the prosecution service. Members are selected through nominations by their respective prosecutorial bodies, ensuring representation from different levels of the State Prosecutor’s Office. Importantly, members of the State Prosecutor’s Council cannot serve on the Ethical Committee.
In practice, the committee addresses a range of ethical concerns raised by prosecutors, including appropriate conduct outside the courtroom, social interactions and potential conflicts of interest. Its approach is informal and its opinions are non-binding. However, if a complaint is deemed well-founded, the committee submits its findings and recommendations to the relevant prosecution offices. While breaches of ethical rules are not directly sanctioned by the committee, violations of fundamental ethical principles can constitute disciplinary offenses that affect a prosecutor’s evaluation and professional standing.
4.3.4. Enhancing judicial performance evaluation
Public confidence in the judiciary, often described as “functional legitimacy” depends on the quality, timeliness and integrity of judicial decision-making (CCJE, 2002[23]). Judicial performance evaluation plays a key role in supporting these objectives, by assessing professional competence, the quality of decision-making and the overall functioning of the judiciary (CCJE, 2014[57]). Within the governance value ecosystem, performance evaluation sits at the intersection of independence/autonomy and accountability. While it can strengthen professionalism and public trust, it also carries risks if not carefully designed. Evaluation mechanisms must therefore ensure that judges are held accountable for their conduct and performance without undermining their independence or exposing them to undue pressure. International standards therefore emphasise that judicial evaluation frameworks should be based on clearly defined, transparent and uniform criteria, with a primary emphasis on qualitative assessments of professional capacity and conduct (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights & Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2010[20]).
In Moldova, judges are subject to both ordinary and extraordinary evaluation. The legal framework governing judicial evaluation was substantially revised through the adoption of the 2023 Law on the Selection and Performance Appraisal of Judges, which replaced the 2012 legislation and introduced updated procedures and evaluation criteria (Law No. 147/2023).23 Ordinary evaluations are conducted every five years by the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board and are based on criteria approved by the SCM: professional competence (weighting 50% of the total evaluation; organisational competence (20%) and integrity (30%) (SCM, 2018[50]). These criteria combine quantitative indicators, such as case resolution rates and appeal outcomes, with qualitative elements, including reasoning quality and professional development.
Professional competence, for example, is primarily evaluated through quantitative metrics and select qualitative criteria. Key indicators include the percentage of decisions or conclusions upheld during appeals, excluding those annulled for reasons unrelated to the judge's performance. Additionally, the assessment considers the number and proportion of decisions or conclusions overturned after a thorough examination, supported by a detailed extract from the Integrated Case Management System. Further factors include identifying any violations of the ECHR, as determined by rulings from the ECtHR. The clarity and coherence of verbal and written presentations play a vital role in the evaluation, alongside the quality and thoroughness of the reasoning underpinning court decisions. Judges' professional development and training are also assessed, as is their proficiency in leveraging modern information technologies to enhance legal processes.
Organisational competence is evaluated primarily through a comprehensive set of quantitative indicators that provide insight into their efficiency and effectiveness in administering justice. Key measures include the rate at which cases are resolved compared to the number of files assigned for examination, reflecting their ability to manage caseloads effectively. Adherence to reasonable deadlines throughout the justice process is another critical benchmark, illustrating timely decision making. The evaluation also considers the proportion of judicial decisions drafted within the legally mandated timeframes, highlighting the judges’ commitment to meeting statutory requirements. Moreover, average timelines for examining cases are assessed based on complexity, indicating how well judges navigate more intricate challenges. Lastly, the frequency of hearings postponed by the judge relative to the overall number of hearings indicates their reliability and commitment to maintaining a smooth judicial process.
The operationalisation of these criteria, including the methodology used to translate indicators into scoring and their application in practice, raises important questions regarding consistency, proportionality and transparency. As part of larger digitalisation efforts, the evaluation of the mentioned criteria is increasingly conducted with the help of digital tools. The governmental decision to approve the JUSTAT information system in December 2025 was a milestone in this regard. The platform collects, processes and analyses statistical data on court activity and is intended to provide an overview of judicial performance by providing information on metrics such as case intake, resolution rates, the duration of proceedings and appeal outcomes. JUSTAT is interoperable with pre-existing judicial information systems and generates comparative reports and visualisations, enabling easier monitoring of caseloads and timelines. It is administered by Moldova’s e‑Governance Agency, while data is supplied by courts, the SCM and the Ministry of Justice. It is being implemented during 2025–2027, with funding from the state budget and external partners (Moldova 1, 2025[58]).
Although the evaluation criteria are further elaborated in secondary legislation, the operationalisation of the framework raises important questions regarding consistency, transparency and the risk of arbitrariness. Evaluation criteria are translated into numerical scores through a methodology that remains insufficiently transparent in practice. Each criterion is scored on a scale of 0 to 100, yet the methodology for translating qualitative and quantitative indicators into numerical scores remains difficult to discern. For instance:
Under professional competence, the percentage of upheld judgments in contested cases is one factor, but there is no clear formula for translating this percentage into a score.
For organisational competence, indicators such as the judge’s case resolution rate are included, though these are heavily influenced by broader institutional conditions, such as the number of judges in a court or the overall caseload, which are beyond an individual judge’s control.
Integrity is assessed using five sub-criteria, yet here, too, the scoring logic is unclear, except in cases where the absence of disciplinary sanctions automatically yields a maximum score.
These issues are particularly important given the significant consequences attached to evaluation outcomes. Following assessment, judges are assigned one of five ratings: excellent, very good, good, insufficient or failed. A failed rating leads to immediate suspension and dismissal (Law No. 544/1995). Judges rated as "insufficient" must undergo an extraordinary evaluation after a minimum one-year interval (Law No. 147/2023).24 If that also results in an "insufficient" rating, the judge is dismissed. While performance ratings also influence the awarding of judicial qualification grades and, thereby, salary progression, the financial impact is minimal as this component represents less than 1% of the total salary
A draft law under discussion proposes to increase the weighting of the integrity criterion to 40%, reducing the professional competence component to 40%. In the absence of clear and transparent scoring methodology, this adjustment could amplify risks of discretionary or arbitrary evaluations
The implementation of the framework has also faced institutional and operational challenges. The strong reliance on quantitative indicators, especially in assessing organisational competence, may not fully capture the quality and complexity of judicial work. European standards emphasise the need to balance quantitative and qualitative criteria (CEPEJ, 2024[59]), yet efficiency metrics remain predominant. As courts in Moldova continue to face operational constraints, including substantial case backlogs, shortages of judicial and administrative staff, outdated infrastructure and limited access to training in areas such as legal reasoning and judicial writing, this imbalance may place undue emphasis on productivity and create incentives to prioritise speed over the quality or tackling complex cases.
Moreover, challenges relate less to the legal design of the CSEJ than to its effective functioning in practice. The law provides for a balanced composition of nine members: five judges and four representatives of civil society (Law No. 147/2023). However, the CSEJ has operated with a reduced membership, due in part to delays in appointments linked to the integrity assessment (vetting) process. In practice, the board has functioned with six members (five judges and one lawyer) which limits the intended participation of lay members (SCM, 2025[60]).
These delays have affected the timely and effective operation of judicial career management processes, including evaluation, recruitment and promotion. The European Commission has noted that the full operationalisation of judicial governance bodies has been slowed by ongoing reforms and the gradual appointment of members following integrity checks (European Commission, 2025[35]).
Moldova has recognised the importance of performance evaluation as a tool for strengthening accountability and improving judicial quality. The existing framework provides a foundation for structured assessments and has the potential to support professional development and institutional performance. However, ensuring that evaluation mechanisms function effectively will require closer alignment with the realities of judicial work, including improved working conditions and resources to ensure that evaluation mechanisms do not become counterproductive.
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission in New Mexico, United States
In several U.S. states, Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE) Commissions structure evaluations around both quantitative data (caseload numbers, clearance rates) and qualitative assessments (peer reviews, courtroom observations, attorney and litigant surveys). These commissions are composed of diverse panels exemplified by New Mexico’s 15-member Commission composed of seven lawyers and eight members of the public. To avoid institutional capture or the monopoly of a state power over the Commission, members of New Mexico’s Commission are selected from nominations by the Governor, Chief Justice and legislative leaders. Their work involves structured data collection, codified evaluation criteria and clear public reporting, while maintaining confidentiality of some evaluative inputs.
Judicial Appointments Commission of England and Wales
Established in 2006 as an independent body, the Judicial Appointments Commission of England and Wales (JAC) is responsible for selecting judges for courts and tribunals in England and Wales. Its governance structure includes lay members, including the Chair, who have no prior legal background, ensuring that judicial appointments are not solely controlled by the judiciary or government. The JAC applies a competency-based framework that combines qualitative and quantitative measures. Candidates are assessed against clearly defined criteria, such as intellectual capacity, integrity and communication skills. Evaluation methods include structured interviews, situational judgment tests and written exercises, which provide measurable performance indicators. At the same time, panels consider qualitative aspects, such as ethical judgment and interpersonal skills, ensuring a holistic view of each candidate’s suitability. Lay members play a critical role in this process by bringing an external perspective, challenging assumptions and promoting fairness. Their involvement helps guarantee that appointments reflect not only professional excellence but also societal expectations of impartiality and accountability. The JAC publishes annual reports and diversity statistics.
4.3.5. Disciplinary accountability: Strengthening judicial and prosecutorial responsibility
An effective system of disciplinary accountability is essential to upholding judicial and prosecutorial integrity and public trust, provided it is designed and implemented in a manner that respects judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy. Principles of professional conduct are distinct from their enforcement through disciplinary systems, yet both are closely linked to the legitimacy of the judiciary and prosecution service. Judges and prosecutors are expected to uphold high standards of conduct in both their professional and private lives and to be held accountable where behaviour falls outside accepted norms. (CCJE, 2002[31]). At the same time, disciplinary systems must not become instruments of political pressure or mechanisms for challenging judicial decisions made in good faith.
International standards, including those of the CoE, the United Nations and the OECD, require that disciplinary proceedings against judges and prosecutors must adhere to fundamental rule-of-law safeguards. These include clearly defined legal grounds for disciplinary liability, separation between investigative and adjudicative functions, due process guarantees, including the right to be heard and represented, proportional sanctions established by law and the possibility to appeal decisions before an independent authority (CCJE, 2024[65]).
The disciplinary framework broadly reflects these principles in its formal structure. Disciplinary proceedings may be initiated based on notifications submitted to the Judicial Inspection. Eligible submitters include individuals whose rights may have been affected, members of the SCM, judicial inspectors, the MoJ or the CSEJ. The Judicial Inspection, comprising seven inspectors, conducts preliminary inquiries. If a potential violation is identified, the case is referred to the Disciplinary Board. If not, the notification is dismissed. The Board adjudicates disciplinary cases and reviews appeals against decisions of the Judicial Inspection rejecting complaints. Its decisions may subsequently be appealed before the SCM and then challenged before the Supreme Court.
In Moldova, the legal framework for disciplinary liability of judges was significantly strengthened with the adoption of Law No. 178/2014. This law introduced key structural safeguards and clarified procedural steps, including the distinction between complaint verification and investigation phases, expanded standing to file complaints, refined the definitions of various disciplinary offences,25 extended the limitation period for disciplinary actions and introduced mandatory justification of dismissals by the Judicial Inspection. The goal was to ensure a system that is transparent, proportionate and protective of judicial independence while enabling accountability for misconduct.26 At the same time, the law reaffirms that disciplinary liability does not depend on whether the judicial act was challenged or on the outcome of appellate review,27 thereby protecting judges from sanctions based solely on the substance of their decisions. Similar principles apply to prosecutors under Law No. 3/2016 on the Prosecution Service, with disciplinary cases examined by the Disciplinary and Ethics Board under the SCP.
Institutional reforms have further strengthened the integrity and functioning of the disciplinary system. The Judicial Inspection has been empowered to prepare and present disciplinary charges before the Disciplinary Board and procedural changes have streamlined the handling of disciplinary cases. However, the Disciplinary Board, composed of four judges and three representatives of civil society, operates with fewer lay members due to vacancies during the reform period, resulting in a temporary composition of five members (four judges and one lawyer) (Law No. 178/2014). While judicial majority in disciplinary bodies is common to safeguard judicial independence, in the context of Moldova limited participation of non-judicial members may affect perceptions of transparency and increase the risk of corporatism.
Despite a sound formal structure, the system faces several implementation challenges. According to data from the SCM, between approximately 1200 and 1 700 disciplinary notifications are received annually, yet only 1.7% proceed to formal hearings before the Disciplinary Board. The SCM attributes this low rate to a common misuse of the complaint process: many notifications are filed by losing parties in judicial proceedings seeking to contest outcomes rather than report genuine misconduct. A large number of appeals are lodged against the rejection of such complaints, but they are rarely successful.
These dynamics highlight both the importance and the limits of the disciplinary system as a tool for accountability. Although strong filtering mechanisms are essential to protect judges from undue pressure, the low proportion of cases reaching formal adjudication and the limited range of sanctions may affect perceptions of effectiveness and responsiveness.
Source: Data provided by the SCM.
Even fewer cases result in the application of disciplinary sanctions. In 2024, the Disciplinary Board issued only one warning, and in 2023, just four. However, in 2023, 10 decisions of the Disciplinary Board (over 50% of its caseload) were appealed. Of these, half resulted in the imposition of more severe sanctions by higher instances: three warnings, one reprimand and one dismissal. This dynamic suggests that initial disciplinary rulings may be subject to variation in interpretation and severity – raising questions about the consistency and robustness of first instance adjudication.
These findings point to three key areas for improvement:
Filtering and triage: A significant proportion of complaints may be outside the disciplinary scope. Enhancing complaint filtering mechanisms and public communication about the legitimate grounds for disciplinary action could reduce caseload pressure and improve procedural efficiency.
Range and proportionality of sanctions: Expanding the range of available disciplinary measures, such as temporary suspensions, monetary penalties or mandatory training, would allow for more nuanced responses to misconduct and align Moldova’s system more closely with European standards.
Transparency and consistency: Clearer guidelines on the thresholds and evidence required for initiating proceedings, along with consistent reasoning in disciplinary decisions, could help enhance the legitimacy and predictability of the system.
Overall, Moldova’s disciplinary accountability framework for judges is broadly aligned with international standards in its design, but its effectiveness is constrained by challenges related to implementation, the range of sanctions available, and the processing of complaints. Strengthening this framework is essential not only for ensuring accountability, but also for reinforcing public confidence in judicial institutions, particularly in a period of extensive reform and institutional stress. Similar concerns have been highlighted in the context of the European Commission’s monitoring of Moldova’s justice reforms, which noted that delays in the operationalisation of specialised disciplinary bodies during the vetting process have slowed the examination of disciplinary cases and underscored the need to ensure their full functionality. While these bodies are operational as of 2026, there are still some vacancies to be filled. To facilitate a stronger enforcement of disciplinary liability, their resources and capacities would also need to be enhanced (European Commission, 2025[35]; OECD, 2022[66]; European Commission, 2023[67]).
4.3.6. Management of conflicts of interest
While disciplinary mechanisms provide sanctions where judges fail to comply with their professional obligations, the primary safeguards for preventing conflicts of interest operate through procedural mechanisms such as disclosure obligations and judicial recusal.
A core principle of judicial and prosecutorial integrity is the need for judges and prosecutors to prevent and manage conflicts of interest that may affect the impartiality of their decisions. For example, a judge could be related to one of the parties or have personal or financial interests in the outcome of the case. A conflict-of-interest system should include regulations both on how to resolve conflicts arising during a case through recusal mechanisms and regulations requiring the disclosure of financial and non-financial interests. Recusal mechanisms provide rules on when a judge or a prosecutor is prohibited from acting and must recuse her or himself from a case. These rules help judges and prosecutors to proactively avoid conflicts of interest, whereas the disclosure of financial and non‑financial interests is useful for the detection of violations and the enforcement of sanctions (UNODC, 2020[68]).
Improving procedural consistency in judicial recusals
An important safeguard for managing conflicts of interest in judicial or prosecutorial proceedings is the institution of recusal and abstention. These mechanisms ensure that cases are adjudicated by judges who are impartial and free from circumstances that could reasonably raise doubts about their objectivity. Clear and predictable procedures for examining recusal requests are therefore essential to maintaining confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. In Moldova, these safeguards apply to judges as well as prosecutors or experts, particularly in criminal cases (although the present analysis focuses on recusals concerning judges only). They operate alongside broader integrity mechanisms, such as financial disclosure requirements, disciplinary liability frameworks and the ongoing vetting processes, aimed at strengthening public trust in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
The legal framework governing judicial recusals is set out in the procedural codes for civil, criminal and administrative proceedings (e.g. Civil Procedure Code in arts. 50, 52-53; Criminal Procedure Code in arts. 33-35 and Administrative Code in arts. 49-52 and 202). These provisions aim to ensure that cases are adjudicated by judges who are independent and free from conflicts of interest. Judges may withdraw on their own initiative where circumstances could affect their impartiality, while parties may also request that a judge be removed from a case on the grounds provided by law. However, the procedural rules governing recusal procedure are not fully identical across the different codes (Box 4.5).
Civil Procedure Code
Under the Civil Procedure Code (arts. 50, 52-53), judges must abstain from hearing a case when circumstances may affect their impartiality. Grounds for recusal include situations where the judge:
previously participated in the case in another procedural capacity (e.g. as witness, expert, mediator or representative);
has family relations with one of the parties, their representatives or other judges involved in the case;
has expressed an opinion on the merits of the dispute; or
has a direct or indirect personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
Judges may declare their own abstention, while parties may request recusal. Recusal requests are assigned through random distribution via the Integrated Case Management System and examined by another judge within the same court or by the superior court if a panel cannot be formed.
Criminal Procedure Code
Under the Criminal Procedure Code (Articles 33-35), judges must withdraw from adjudicating a case where circumstances could reasonably raise doubts about their impartiality. Grounds include situations where the judge:
has a personal or family interest in the outcome of the case;
previously participated in the investigation or in decision-making related to the case;
is personally involved in the proceedings (e.g. as an injured party); or
where other circumstances exist that may create justified doubts about impartiality.
Recusal may be initiated by the judge or requested by the parties. Requests for recusal or declarations of abstention are assigned randomly through the Integrated Case Management System and examined by another judge or judicial panel.
Administrative Code
The Administrative Code (Articles 49-52) establishes similar grounds for recusal in administrative litigation, including situations where judges:
have personal or family connections with the parties;
have professional or financial relationships with a party; or
face circumstances that may reasonably cast doubt on their impartiality.
The examination of recusal requests follows the procedural rules established in the Civil Procedure Code, as provided by Article 202 of the Administrative Code.
Source: Based on Codes No. 225/2003, 122/2003 and 116/2018.
Across the civil, criminal and administrative frameworks, the grounds and procedures for judicial recusal are substantively aligned. Judges must refrain from participating in cases where they have a personal or financial interest in the outcome, where close family relations exist with parties or other participants in the proceedings or where their prior involvement in the case could affect their impartiality. Judges may also withdraw on their own initiative if they consider that their impartiality may reasonably be questioned, while parties to the proceedings may request the recusal of a judge on the grounds provided by law. Variations mainly reflect differences in drafting techniques and procedural specificities, such as the more detailed enumeration in civil proceedings, the broader and context-specific formulation in criminal cases and the reliance on civil procedure rules in administrative litigation.
These differences do not appear to affect the overall coherence of the system nor undermine the basic safeguards of impartiality embedded in Moldova’s procedural legislation. However, greater alignment of recusal procedures across the various procedural codes could improve legal clarity and consistency in the management of conflicts of interest within the judiciary. Harmonising certain procedural aspects, such as time limits, the allocation of recusal requests and the stage of proceedings at which recusals may be raised, could help ensure that similar standards apply regardless of the type of proceedings.
Failure by a judge to abstain from participating in a case despite the existence of circumstances requiring recusal may also entail disciplinary liability. Under Law No. 178/2014 on the disciplinary liability of judges, intentional or grossly negligent failure to withdraw in such circumstances constitutes a disciplinary offence and may result in sanctions. This reinforces the role of recusal mechanisms as part of the broader framework safeguarding judicial integrity and impartiality.
Box 4.6 presents examples from other European jurisdictions of institutional arrangements designed to ensure that decisions on judicial recusals are taken without the involvement of the judge concerned.
Numerous European countries have developed solutions for deciding on a motion for a judge to recuse themselves without that judge’s involvement. While the solution is not always the same for criminal, civil, administrative and other types of cases, some examples from criminal law include:
Austria – The court president decides. If the request concerns the court president, a panel of three other judges in the same court decides (arts. 44‑45, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Belgium – The court immediately higher in rank than that to which the judge in question belongs decides (art. 838, Judicial Code).
France – The court immediately higher in rank than that to which the judge in question belongs decides (arts. 669‑672, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Germany – The same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (art. 27, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Italy – For judges in first instance courts the court immediately higher in rank (Court of Appeals) decides. For higher courts, another chamber of the same court decides (art. 40, Code of Criminal Procedure)
Netherlands – A multi-member panel of the same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (art. 518, Code of Criminal Procedure)
Poland – A multi-member panel of judges in the same court decides without the judge in question’s participation (art. 42, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Romania – In civil cases, the same court decides without the participation of the recused judge (art. 50, Code of Civil Procedure). A similar procedure is instituted in criminal cases by art. 68, Code of Criminal Procedure.
Spain – There is a two-tiered system whereby one judge decides on the admissibility of the motion and another decides on recusal. While these arrangements vary from court to court, both judges generally come from the same court as the judge in question (arts. 221‑225, Organic Law on Judicial Power).
However, judiciaries in several European countries have observed increases in abuse of motions for a judge’s recusal, thereby requiring clear and specific provisions governing the admissibility of such motions
Source: (Sonnemans et al., 2016[69]; Giesen et al., 2012[70]) and listed laws.
Strengthening the capacity of the National Integrity Authority for effective oversight
In Moldova, various requirements for the disclosure of financial and non-financial interests of judges and prosecutors are part of “financial integrity” checks conducted at different stages of a judge’s and prosecutor’s career. For example, these checks take place as part of the selection process before entry into judicial and prosecutorial office (art. 9, Law No. 544/1995 and art. 22, Law No. 3/2016, respectively). Certain categories of judges and prosecutors are required to undergo further financial integrity checks as part of the ongoing vetting process, which is analysed in detail in the section below.
More broadly, Law No. 133/2016 on asset and personal interest declarations provides regular disclosure requirements for public sector employees, including civil servants, public office holders, management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and others. Article 3 of the law requires those who hold a public office, including judges of all levels of general courts, judges of the Constitutional Court, members of the judicial governance bodies, as well as prosecutors at all levels and in prosecutorial governance bodies, to declare their assets and personal interests. Declarations are submitted periodically upon employment, mandate validation or appointment (within 30 days of employment) and termination of appointment (within 30 days from the date of termination). Declarations are submitted electronically and their accuracy is checked by the National Integrity Authority (NIA). In terms of transparency, the declarations are publicly available online (National Authority for Integrity Moldova, n.d.[71]).
Interviews with stakeholders indicated that judges and prosecutors are compliant with these obligations. This is further supported by recent evidence from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (OECD PIIs), which look into the submission rate of asset and interest declarations from members of the highest bodies of the judiciary. The data show a submission rate of 100% for this category of judges for the past five years (2021-2025), which is the best possible outcome for this indicator on the basis of the data submitted (OECD, 2026[72]).
However, the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) show that the verification of declarations could be improved. The indicators require that at least 60% of declarations filed during the latest two full calendar years are verified by the responsible authority. This indicator is not fulfilled in Moldova. The main reason for this is that the NIA does not have the legal mandate to carry out in‑depth verifications and this is not required by the regulations. As well, the NIA receives annually approximately 65 000 to 70 000 declarations of public officials, including judges and prosecutors. The fulfilment of this indicator would require that the NIA verifies annually at least 39 000 to 42 000 declarations, which is practically impossible considering its capacity and resources. Moreover, stakeholders explained that there is no legal need to verify such a high number of declarations (OECD, 2024[73]). In terms of resources, stakeholders reported at fact-finding interviews that these were recently reduced, with many of the NIA’s technical experts re-assigned to the Vetting Commission to conduct controls on financial integrity.
The OECD PIIs further indicate that Moldova implements a risk-based approach for the verification of declarations. Indeed, according to Article 27(3) of Law No. 132/2016, it is required that the verification of at least 30% of verified declarations concern categories of high-risk officials, including the President of the Republic, ministers and other members of government, as well as judges and prosecutors. According to the 2024 Report on the implementation of justice sector strategy, the verification rate of declarations is quite high for judges and prosecutors, but these numbers could be improved when it comes to members of the SCM and the SCP, considering the wide decision-making powers of their role (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2024[74]). In addition, and as explained above, the NIA conducts compliance checks and not full in-depth verifications.
Considering its strained resources, the NIA has limited capacity to undertake in‑depth verifications and effectively detect possible irregularities. While full in‑depth verification of all submitted declarations is neither realistic nor desirable, detailed controls could be conducted for particularly high-risk categories of public officials. This is an integral factor for the effectiveness of any declaration system to combat corruption. Therefore, Moldova could consider strengthening the capacity and resources of the NIA with a view to improving the verification of submitted declarations of judges and prosecutors, and enable more in-depth checks. As a positive step, in 2025, Moldova introduced amendments to Law No. 132/2016, aiming to strengthen the role of integrity inspectors in verifying personal assets and interests. To support this reform, Moldova is in the process of digitalising the work of the NIA through methodologies for the random distribution of complaints to integrity inspectors and the operationalisation of a new version of the NIA’s automated information system.
4.4.1. International standards for judicial vetting
Judicial or prosecutorial vetting is a relatively new concept that is not yet fully addressed in international standards governing judicial independence, transparency and accountability. It is an extraordinary, time-limited anti-corruption mechanism that aims to ensure the integrity and accountability of judges and prosecutors. According to the Venice Commission, vetting “involves the implementation of a process of accountability mechanisms to ensure the highest professional standards of conduct and integrity in public office” (Venice Commission, 2022[75]).
At the same time, vetting processes are intended to increase trust in a justice system that is free from corruption. While still a novel instrument, vetting is broadly recognised as a useful reform in countries facing systemic judicial corruption. Nevertheless, vetting processes should be fit-for-purpose, pursuing a legitimate aim, adhering to proportionality standards, addressing an identified necessity in a democratic society and respecting due process. All these aspects could be considered when designing and implementing vetting processes which, if not approached cautiously, can be instrumentalised and politicised (CCJE, 2021[76]).
The feasibility and sustainability of these reforms are other aspects that countries should consider. Before implementing vetting processes, it is recommended to conduct an impact assessment of the planned reform considering the length and complexity of the vetting process, the time required to establish the vetting bodies, resources, as well as contingency plans to ensure that courts and prosecution services are operational throughout the vetting process.
In principle, vetting is an exceptional assessment of judges’ and prosecutors’ integrity, competence and professionalism. These processes are conducted by ad hoc convened bodies that are not part of the regular justice system and can consist of international and national individuals. Depending on the context, the scope of vetting exercises can vary. For example, it can cover the evaluation of self-governing bodies of judges’ and prosecutors' assessments of high-level courts, and comprehensive valuations of all participants in the justice system (CEELI Institute, 2024[77]).
A key factor in safeguarding the integrity of the vetting process of judges and prosecutors is to ensure the independence and impartiality of the vetting body itself. The criteria used by the ECtHR to assess independent and impartial tribunals established by law under the ECHR can be used to evaluate independence and impartiality. These criteria look into members’ appointment process, duration of their tenure and measures to safeguard against external pressures that can contribute to the overall independence of the body. Overall, a merit-based selection of members of vetting bodies not only ensures the body’s technical capacity to carry out its duties, but is also essential to enhance public confidence (ECtHR, 2023[78]).
In terms of content, vetting processes usually focus on the ethical and financial integrity of their subjects. The ethical integrity evaluation examines whether judges or prosecutors have breached ethical and professional conduct rules and whether there are suspicions of engaging in acts of corruption. The financial integrity evaluation assesses compliance with asset and interest declarations focused on wealth acquired over time and, in particular, possible sources of inexplicable or illicit wealth. This type of evaluation relates mostly to compliance with tax obligations, methods of acquiring property, sources of income and the existence of loans or donations. To conduct these evaluations, the vetting bodies collect relevant information and materials from the subjects of the evaluation, as well as from public or private entities, depending on the powers of the body.
In recent years, as mentioned above, reports and perceptions of political pressure and inappropriate influences have prompted government authorities to consider a unique mechanism for selecting and appointing judges and prosecutors. This extraordinary evaluation, or vetting process, aims to enhance judges’ integrity and accountability, and restore public confidence in national courts.28 Although the Venice Commission recognises that extremely high levels of corruption may warrant equally radical solutions, such as assessing the performance of current judges, any claims of a critical and atypical situation within the judiciary must be objectively demonstrated (Venice Commission, 2023[81]).
The vetting process in Moldova is part of a broader judicial reform aimed at enhancing the integrity and professionalism of the judiciary and the prosecution service. It is linked to Strategic Direction 1 on “Independence, administration, integrity and accountability of justice sector stakeholders” of Moldova’s Strategy for Ensuring the Independence and Integrity of Justice Sector for 2021-2024 (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2020[82]). It contributes to the implementation of the following strategic objectives:
Strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor's office;
Strengthening integrity and accountability in the justice sector.
In Moldova, there are two types of “external evaluation” processes. First, pre‑vetting is a preliminary integrity assessment for candidates seeking positions in self-administration bodies of judges and prosecutors, namely the SCM and the SCP. This stage is governed by Law No. 26/2022 (the Pre-Vetting Law) and ensures that only candidates with a clean financial and ethical record enter the system. Second, vetting is a thorough assessment of the integrity of sitting judges, prosecutors and high-ranking judicial officials to determine their eligibility to continue holding office (see below). Those who fail this evaluation are removed from office and barred from holding public positions for a defined period. Vetting is regulated by Law No. 65/2023, which primarily addresses measures concerning the selection of candidates for roles in the self-administration bodies of judges and prosecutors. The parliament further introduced Law No. 252/2023 on the vetting of judges and prosecutors in high-level positions, which was consulted on with the European Commission and broadly aligns with Venice Commission recommendations.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Vetting process in Moldova
This section will focus on the analysis of the vetting process of Laws No. 65 and 252 of 2023, which is currently ongoing.29 Vetting is conducted by the Judges Vetting Commission and the Prosecutors Vetting Commission. Each Vetting Commission (VC) consists of six members assisted by a Secretariat. The Commissions are not public authorities within the meaning of the Administrative Code and their activity is not public, with exceptions established by the law and applicable regulations. The VCs include six members appointed by a 3/5 vote of elected parliamentary deputies. Of these, three members are citizens of the Republic of Moldova proposed by parliamentary factions with proportional representation of the majority and the opposition. The remaining three are international members proposed by development partners. In May 2025, the membership of the two Vetting Commissions was expanded to speed up the vetting process (European Commission, 2025[35]).
The vetting process begins with the receipt of lists of candidates from the SCM and the SCP, respectively. With this, the vetting process is officially initiated and the VC starts to collect information. This includes an ethics questionnaire completed by the subject of the evaluation, declarations of assets and personal interests encompassing family members and close persons, as well as any other relevant information which may include data from public and private entities, e.g. banks. The collected information is reviewed and analysed in closed meetings. Following this, the VC invites candidates to a public hearing. If the candidate refuses to attend the hearing, the VC can decide based on the written information received and collected. After the public hearing, the VC prepares a reasoned decision, which is then published and shared with the SCM or the SCP for review. The SCM/SCP review determines whether the candidate has passed the evaluation or not. Candidates can appeal the SCM/SCP decision at the Supreme Court of Justice.
4.4.2. Upholding integrity without compromising efficiency
Efforts to embed and operationalise judicial integrity through mechanisms such as judicial vetting can create tensions with other key governance goals, notably efficiency, institutional continuity and operational capacity. These tensions are especially pronounced in settings marked by limited resources, case backlogs or heightened public pressure for swift reform. In such environments, integrity-focused reforms may disrupt workflows, delay proceedings and weaken systemic performance if not carefully calibrated.
These challenges are visible in Moldova’s vetting process, which aims to rebuild public trust and reinforce the integrity of the judiciary and prosecution services. Large-scale judicial resignations have compounded already existing capacity constraints, disrupted continuity and intensified backlogs, putting additional strain on court operation. This has had the effect of undermining the reform’s own legitimacy and efforts to align with European standards.
Justice representatives noted that the cumulative effect of these pressures has been a marked decline in the judiciary’s ability to function effectively. The shortage of human resources, including judges, law clerks, and administrative staff, has constrained the courts’ ability to maintain core services and uphold their standards. In 2024, Moldova reported 131 unfilled judicial vacancies out of 489 authorised positions (SCM, 2025[83]). These pressures have also interacted with transitional legal arrangements following the 2021 constitutional amendments, which removed the initial five-year appointment period but required the reconfirmation of judges previously appointed under the former system. Judges awaiting reconfirmation were unable to hear cases, while their salaries were paid throughout the entire period, in some instances for up to two years, exacerbating HR pressures. Despite the above limitations and the absence of two-thirds of members of the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board, the SCM has proceeded to select and evaluate judges for vacant positions (GRECO, 2024[84]).30
Moldova has continued to advance reforms and judicial/prosecutorial appointments despite operational challenges. Yet, their effectiveness will depend on complementary measures to support institutional resilience, such as adequate resources, transitional arrangements and safeguards to ensure institutional stability. There could be workforce planning, flexible resource re‑allocation and communication strategies that support transparency. Moreover inefficiency, delays and inconsistency in the justice system can erode public confidence, not because of corruption but a perception of dysfunction and institutional challenges (see Chapter 5 for more development).
4.4.3. Reinforcing the legitimacy of the vetting process by addressing public perceptions and judicial safeguards
The implementation of the vetting process in Moldova has been accompanied by significant challenges in public perception and professional confidence within the justice system. The high number of judicial resignations has fuelled public suspicions and, in some cases, led to assumptions of misconduct, thereby affecting the reputation and dignity of justice professionals. However, stakeholders emphasise that the motivations behind these resignations are more complex. While some judges may have stepped down to preserve pension rights,31 others reportedly resigned to shield themselves and their families from intense scrutiny and public exposure, rather than to avoid accountability.
Stakeholders noted that, despite adopting justice reforms and implementing this extraordinary mechanism since 2021, persistent narratives framed authorities as inherently “corrupt” and in “urgent” need of “cleansing”. While demands for integrity and accountability are both legitimate and necessary, overly simplistic or accusatory narratives risk undermining institutional trust and weakening the morale of ethical actors within the system. These dynamics highlight the importance of promoting a more nuanced understanding of the vetting process and its implications, including respect for the presumption of innocence, which remains a fundamental principle applicable to all individuals, including judges.
Understanding these nuances is important for ensuring a balanced perception of the vetting process and judicial resignations. Judges, like all individuals, are entitled to the presumption of innocence, which is essential to safeguarding both individual rights and the legitimacy of the reform. As an extraordinary measure to address systemic corruption, the effectiveness of vetting depends on its outcomes as well as on sustained public confidence in the independence and fairness of the judiciary. This requires that the process be conducted with integrity and transparency, and that its objectives and safeguards are clearly communicated.
Stakeholders have identified limited communication on the purpose and expected outcomes of the reform as a key challenge in the implementation of Moldova’s vetting process. In particular, more could have been done to inform both the public and vetting subjects about the safeguards in place to ensure integrity and fairness. While the vetting process remains a central pillar of Moldova’s justice reform agenda and has the potential to restore confidence and rebuild institutional legitimacy, it represents only an initial step in a broader reform trajectory. Its long-term success will depend on maintaining a careful balance between addressing systemic corruption and preserving continuity, fairness and respect for judicial safeguards.
4.4.4. Improve accountability and independence of the Vetting Commissions: Clarifying liability and sanctions for members
VC members are granted functional independence and enjoy immunity for opinions expressed while exercising their duties under Laws No. 65/2023 and No. 252/2023. Although the laws clarify that VCs are not public authorities under the Administrative Code and that their activities are not considered public functions, VC members exercise de facto public responsibilities for which they receive monthly compensation equivalent to twice the basic salary of a Supreme Court judge ( (SCM, 2025[85]) and Law No. 252/2023). This functional reality may justify the introduction of a tailored disciplinary regime for VC members, particularly in the absence of a formal employment relationship with the state. Criminal liability can only be initiated by the Prosecutor General upon consent of the respective evaluation committee, except in cases of flagrant offences. However, the circumstances of criminal liability are not determined in the laws and the term “flagrant offences” remains undefined in the legislation (Laws No. 65/2023 and No. 252/2023). In addition, the current framework appears to focus exclusively on serious criminal law violations without providing mechanisms to address cases of gross negligence or professional misconduct. Although VC rules of procedure contain general rules of conduct and outline core values expected of VC members, these provisions do not amount to a comprehensive misconduct regime and lack explicit sanctions for breaches of integrity. This gap raises concerns about accountability and may limit the system’s ability to respond effectively to improper conduct that falls short of criminal behaviour.
Despite the importance of safeguarding the independence of VC members, neither Laws No. 65/2023 and No. 252/2023 nor the VC Rules of Procedure (SCM, 2022[86]; SCM, 2023[87]) currently include explicit provisions for sanctioning misconduct or integrity violations. While functional immunity is a legitimate safeguard to protect members’ independence in the exercise of their duties, this immunity cannot extend to proven cases of corruption or serious breaches of integrity. The legal framework would benefit from clearer definitions of the grounds for criminal liability and an exploration of mechanisms for disciplinary responsibility in cases of serious misconduct.
Moldova could consider drawing on existing frameworks such as Chapter VI of the Law on Integrity, which provides clear and enforceable lists of acts that may give rise to criminal or disciplinary liability in both the public and private sectors.
4.4.5. Safeguard Vetting Commissions’ integrity with clear and enforceable mechanisms for the monitoring and verification of asset and interest declarations
Another key concern identified by justice professionals is integrity safeguards for VC members compared to those required of judges and prosecutors undergoing vetting. While vetting candidates must comply with rigorous asset and interest disclosure obligations, these requirements are not consistently applied to VC members. Insufficient symmetry in integrity standards could create a perception of double standards, potentially undermining public trust in the process and raising concerns about impartiality, transparency, consistency, coherence and overall credibility. There are concerns that these processes may be vulnerable to undue influence and pressure, possibly resulting in the penalisation of judges for unpopular or unfavourable decisions made within the normal course of their judicial duties (FES/AJAM, 2025[88]).
Law No. 252/2023 establishes the obligation of national VC members to complete asset and interest declarations.32 These declarations are filed upon appointment annually and upon termination of appointment, and are published on the website of each VC. Additionally, VC Rules of Procedure include general obligations to avoid conflicts of interest. While Law No. 252/2023 specifies that the content of declarations is aligned with Law No. 133/2016, there are no regulations on monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and it is unclear from the text of the law whether the regulations of Law No. 133/2016 apply also in the case of national VC members. A review of published declarations on the websites of the Judicial and Prosecutorial VCs indicates that these are submitted in the form of a public self-declaration. The verification procedure of these declarations, as well as sanctions in case of non-compliance, could be clarified either in Law No. 252/2023 or with a specific expansion of the scope of Law No. 133/2016 to include national VC members. To strengthen transparency and accountability, the results of these verifications could be made available on the website of the NIA, which maintains a register on submitted declarations and the results of their verification (NIA, 2025[89]). Clear monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for the declarations of VC members modelled on the regime set out in Law No. 133/2016 would not only reinforce public trust in the vetting process, as well as among participating judges and prosecutors, but demonstrate that VC members are held to the same high standards of integrity as judges and prosecutors. Finally, Moldova could consider expanding this obligation to international VC members as a way to ensure consistency in the implementation of integrity safeguards and enhance reliability in the work of VCs.
A similar approach was implemented, for example, in Albania, where members of the re‑evaluation institutions are required to declare and avoid any conflict-of-interest situation, in compliance with the law on prevention of conflict of interest. In addition, their financial activity is monitored by the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering and their electronic communications subject to oversight by the Special Investigation Unit, based on prior consent provided for the duration of their term (Venice Commission, 2021[90]).
4.4.6. Improving access to data that supports the Vetting Commission’s assessment
Members of the Vetting Commission raised various challenges related to the availability of data to support the vetting process. One significant issue highlighted was the lack of access to relevant documents and information sources. Additionally, members noted limitations in co‑ordination and co‑operation with the authorities involved in the process, including both public and private sector institutions. To expedite the vetting process and assessment of candidates, it is crucial to strengthen legal frameworks for co‑operation and the timely delivery of information from competent authorities. This framework could encompass institutions, such as banks, private schools, health services and border inspection agencies, ensuring they provide necessary information promptly. Experience indicates that private institutions have not been as responsive as required by law. A similar observation applies to criminal investigations, where the law permits authorities to share information with Vetting Commission members.
Council of Europe Recommendation on Judges: Independence, efficiency and responsibilities
The Recommendation stresses that all decisions concerning the careers of judges should be based on objective criteria, free from considerations outside their professional competence. Furthermore, the Recommendation recognises the essential role of independent authorities established to decide on the selection and career of judges. While in some member states the appointing authority is not obliged to accept the recommendations of the independent authority, it is desirable that its recommendations are followed in practice.
Judicial Councils with the competence of issuing binding opinions on the appointment of judges: Country practices
Hungary
In 2023 Hungary adopted a new law strengthening the powers of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and ensuring that the Council gives a binding opinion on several important matters related to the administration of the justice system as regards both individual decisions and general regulations issued by the National Office of the Judiciary (NOJ) President. Furthermore, the law aims at limiting the risk of arbitrary decisions as regards the career of judges. The law ensures that the NJC provides a binding opinion on the regulation laying down the point system for the evaluation of applications for judicial posts and on other decisions of the NOJ president. These decisions include the annulment of appointment procedures for judicial and court executive positions where there is at least one eligible candidate who has been supported by the judges of the given court; the transfer of judges, including secondments, to another court and the removal of judges without their consent from the pool of judges that hear special cases, including administrative cases. The NJC also issues a binding opinion regarding the suitability of candidates for the post of president and vice-president of the NOJ, who can be proposed by the President of the Republic or the president of the NOJ, respectively.
Ireland
Ireland passed the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill, which establishes a new JAC for selecting and recommending candidate judges to judicial office in Ireland, and in EU and international courts. While the final appointment decision lies with the government, under this act adopted in 2023, the government must only consider persons who have been recommended by the JAC. The European Commission recognised that these reforms significantly improve Ireland’s judicial integrity framework by reducing political influence in the judicial appointment procedure.
Romania
Competitions for judges’ (and prosecutors’) selection are organised at least once a year, depending on needs, and are based on a Regulation by the Higher Judicial Council. The competition is usually spread out over several months and consists of substantial knowledge tests, a psychological test and evaluation, interview and integrity checks. The Higher Judicial Council, in plenary session, appoints the commissions involved in the exam: the managing commission, commission that drafts the topics, interview commission, grading commission and appeal commission. They consist of members of the Judicial Council and members of the National Magistracy Institute. A compulsory integrity check is performed by the managing commission of candidates who passed the exam, according to criteria spelled out in the Regulation.
4.4.7. Looking ahead: Expanding SCM and SCP mandates to institutionalise the vetting process
While the vetting process has laid important foundations for improving judicial integrity, it cannot, by itself, prevent future misconduct or unethical behaviour. Looking forward, Moldova intends to institutionalise the vetting process by mainstreaming vetting mechanisms into the ordinary functions of judicial self-governance. Specifically, following the conclusion of the current (external) vetting commissions' work, the new law assigns responsibility for the continued evaluation of judges and prosecutors to the SCM and the SCP (Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 2025[94]).
This continuity could reinforce internal ownership and the legitimacy and sustainability of the reform, especially as both Councils are composed of members who have themselves undergone integrity screening and operate under comparable integrity standards. However, the effectiveness of such a transition will depend heavily on institutional capacity. Key structures within the Councils such as the Selection and Evaluation Boards and Disciplinary Boards are at different stages of operationalisation. Despite progress, capacity impediments related to expertise and financial support remain, raising a risk that the expanded responsibilities will overwhelm already constrained governance bodies.
To mitigate these risks, any future reform expanding the SCM and SCP’s mandates needs to be accompanied by robust workforce planning and budgetary support. Dedicated resources will be essential to sustain the integrity and credibility of the vetting process within ordinary governance structures. In particular, stakeholders interviewed during this review raised concerns about the technical complexity of financial integrity assessments, which require specialised expertise beyond the legal competencies traditionally found within the Councils. To support these efforts, the SCM and SCP could consider integrating extended-term technical staff with financial investigation experience, potentially drawing from experts previously engaged by the Vetting Commissions. The SCP has already received donor support to hire two financial analysts, contracted for a six-month period to provide financial and analytical assistance to the SCP (September 2025 - March 2026). Another viable option would be to formalise institutional co‑operation with the NIA, which already plays a key role in monitoring financial disclosures and asset declarations across the justice sector. Such partnerships could strengthen the capacity of judicial councils to implement integrity controls, while ensuring consistency with existing standards and procedures.
The Security Clearance procedure for judges at Slovakia’s Special Criminal Court
Judges appointed to Slovakia’s Special Criminal Court (the national anti-corruption court) must undergo a thorough security clearance process. This clearance, conducted by national security and intelligence authorities, examines the candidate’s background, which includes financial history, to ensure they have no vulnerabilities (such as unexplained wealth or connections to criminal networks) that could make them susceptible to blackmail or improper influence. The requirement is codified in law and carried out in co‑operation with security experts.
Annual asset and interest declarations in Latvia
In Latvia, all judges (along with ministers, Members of Parliament (MPs) and senior civil servants) are legally required to submit annual asset and interest declarations, which are subject to systematic verification. The country’s independent Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) uses a risk-based verification system to review these declarations, cross-checking judges’ declared assets against tax records, property registries and other databases to flag inconsistencies or signs of illicit enrichment. Notably, Latvia boasts a 100% compliance rate for conflict-of-interest declarations in recent years.
The Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique (HATVP) in France
France has recently extended its transparency and anti-corruption framework to the judiciary, integrating financial experts into the vetting of judges. Since 2016, administrative and financial magistrates (such as judges of audit courts) have been required to file declarations of interests before taking office, with information on their assets forwarded to the HATPV. The HATVP, which acts as an independent body staffed with financial auditors, systematically checks these asset and interest declarations for accuracy and completeness. It has legal powers to investigate inconsistencies (including accessing tax data) and can refer serious irregularities for prosecution, with sanctions of up to three-year imprisonment for false declarations.
4.5.1. Securing judicial values through adequate resourcing
Ensuring core judicial values relies not only on sound legal and institutional frameworks, but the availability of adequate operational resources. Financial autonomy, in particular, constitutes a cornerstone of judicial independence. It underpins the ability of courts and judicial self-governance bodies to fulfil their mandates free from undue influence, while enabling judges to carry out their functions with impartiality, security and resilience.
Secure and competitive remuneration for judges and justice professionals serves as a safeguard against external pressure, reduces vulnerability to corruption and promotes institutional stability. However, despite broad international consensus on these principles, many judicial systems continue to face significant resource constraints. Inadequate funding, frozen salaries and opaque budgetary processes can undermine both performance and public confidence in the justice system.
Moreover, delayed or discretionary resource allocation, in particular, may jeopardise the judiciary’s ability to function independently and can have a chilling effect on judicial decision making. International and regional instruments, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the CoE, affirm the responsibility of countries to ensure that justice institutions are financed in a manner that secures their independence and effectiveness. A specific risk in this regard is Moldova’s reliance on recurring mid-year supplementary budgets. Moldova routinely runs two to three supplementary budgets per year, with a supplementary in July having become a de facto norm. This provides the executive with regular opportunities to adjust and potentially reduce judicial allocations mid-year, outside the main budget cycle (OECD, 2024[99]).
In Moldova, these dynamics are particularly relevant in the context of ongoing reforms aimed at strengthening independence, integrity and accountability. While legal and institutional safeguards have been reinforced (see Sections above), their effective operation depends on the capacity of institutions to deliver in practice, thanks to adequate resources, transparent planning processes and financial safeguards. However, Moldova’s justice budgeting remains in a transitional phase. For instance, performance and programme budgeting as provided in the legal framework have not yet been fully institutionalised across the justice sector, though this challenge affects Moldova's budget in general and is not unique to the justice sector (see below).
Strengthening the operational foundations of its justice system will be key for Moldova to sustain recent reforms and translate constitutional guarantees into meaningful, people-centred justice. This challenge is compounded by documented challenges in Moldova’s broader budget calendar. In 2022, the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework was finalised in October rather than in June as required, and the draft budget was submitted to Parliament on 7 December, nearly two months late, leaving Parliament with only two weeks instead of six to debate it (OECD, 2024[99]). Such systemic delays directly affect the judiciary’s ability to plan ahead and secure funding, representing a structural risk to financial autonomy that the legal framework alone cannot address.
4.5.2. Independent and adequate funding: Safeguarding judicial performance through financial autonomy
In Moldova, the process of allocating funds to the judiciary is formally embedded within the national budget cycle, with the SCM playing a central role in this process. Under current legal provisions, the judiciary’s budget constitutes a distinct line within the broader state budget and is developed and managed according to principles set out in the Law on Public Finance and Budgetary Fiscal Responsibility.
Similarly, Moldova’s justice sector operates within a comprehensive and defined budgetary framework, governed by Law No. 181/2014 on public finance and budgetary-fiscal responsibility (Parliament Constitution No. 1/1994). Within this context, the SCM is empowered to provide an advisory opinion at each stage of the budgetary process, including drafting, approval and amendment, and to make formal recommendations to Parliament. This framework is intended to ensure that resource allocation decisions are informed by the judiciary’s operational requirements and strategic priorities, thereby strengthening its independence and institutional effectiveness.
In a comprehensive analytical study published in 2022, experts revealed that in 2020, Moldova allocated a notable sum of EUR 106.9 million for its justice system, which encompasses courts, state-guaranteed legal aid and the Prosecutor’s Office. Specifically, EUR 43.8 million was earmarked for the courts alone, representing a modest 1.2% of the total public expenditure for that year. This allocation aligns precisely with the median figure reported among 47 member countries surveyed by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (Gribincea, Nasu and Meureta, 2022[100]).
When compared to 2018, the financial resources devoted to the judicial system and its components witnessed an increase of EUR 5.5 million. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the proportion of the budget allocated to the justice sector in 2020 experienced a slight decline relative to 2018. This indicates a troubling trend: while funding for justice has risen, it has not kept pace with the growth of other budgetary expenditures.
Given the country’s relatively modest overall budget, another telling metric is the share of judicial budget per GDP. Moldova's expenditure on justice stands at 0.35% of its GDP,33 compared to Georgia with the lowest share (0.23%) and Montenegro the largest (0.76%) among CoE countries with GDP per capita below EUR 10 000 (CEPEJ, 2024[101]). The average percentage of GDP in this group stands at 0.44%.
However, stakeholders consulted during this review consistently noted that the judiciary in Moldova faces significant underfunding for basic operational needs, facility maintenance and the deployment of digital tools and infrastructure. Service providers have also drawn attention to the lack of adequate resources to attract and retain qualified personnel, including judges, law clerks and administrative staff. These human capital deficits further constrain courts’ capacity to address rising caseloads and to meet standards of timeliness and quality (see Chapter 5).
The budget allocation process in Moldova leverages the SCM as the judicial self-governing body. While the process is channelled through the SCM, the individual courts could benefit from accessing information on budgetary cycles (e.g. at the level of court presidents who relay information to judges). This would help ensure that the process is explained and consulted, and that judicial needs are, in turn, adequately communicated to Parliament or reflected in final allocations. For example, the president of the Supreme Court is explicitly authorised to present the annual budget draft to the Supreme Court’s plenum, alongside the advisory opinion of the SCM.
Stakeholders underlined they would like for their needs to be better communicated and heard. Improving transparency on the budgeting process inside courts, with the sound involvement of judges, beyond the SCM, could strengthen institutional ownership, improve budget alignment with operational realities and reinforce the judiciary’s capacity to manage resources effectively.
In line with regional standards, Moldova could consider developing specific guidelines to clarify and reinforce the role of the judiciary in financial planning and budget execution. This includes expanding the participation of court leadership and judicial representatives in defining priorities, preparing justifications and engaging in budget negotiations with the Ministry of Finance and the parliament. However, the effectiveness of such engagement will depend in part on the Parliament's capacity to scrutinise judicial budget proposals meaningfully. The 2023 Open Budget Survey (OBS) assigns Moldova a legislative oversight score of 53 out of 100 (“limited”) (International Budget Partnership, 2023[102]). Any recommendation to strengthen SCM engagement with Parliament on judicial budgets should therefore be complemented by capacity-building measures for the relevant parliamentary committee on justice sector budgeting.
Institutionalising such practices could help ensure that resource allocations reflect real needs and strategic goals rather than being vulnerable to political or administrative discretion. It would also protect the judiciary from potential financial manipulation, such as delayed or selective funding, that can serve as a subtle but powerful form of external pressure. By enhancing transparency and ownership in the budget process, Moldova would further consolidate judicial independence and improve the effectiveness and credibility of its justice institutions.
4.5.3. Safeguarding judicial integrity through competitive compensation and conditions
Adequate, secure and legally guaranteed salaries are essential to attract and retain qualified professionals, but also to shield them from external pressures and risks of corruption. The Venice Commission and other international bodies underscore that judicial compensation must be aligned with the dignity and responsibilities of the profession and should be legally protected against arbitrary reductions (Venice Commission, 2010[11]). In newer democracies, these guarantees are particularly vital to ensure continuity, stability and resilience in the justice sector.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights also affirm that adequate remuneration, including pension rights and sick leave, is critical to upholding judicial independence. Salaries should be predictable, adjusted to inflation and benchmarked against other senior civil service positions to preserve the judiciary’s integrity and authority (CoE, 2024[103]). Importantly, remuneration should be based on objective and transparent criteria, not discretionary performance appraisals, to avoid risks of politicisation.
Although judicial salaries and conditions of service in Moldova have increased over the past decade, they remain low by European standards. According to data from the CEPEJ, a Moldovan judge at the end of their career earns approximately EUR 19 270 per year, one-fifth of the European median salary of EUR 100 367. This gap, as noted above, underscores the economic constraints facing Moldova’s judiciary and highlights the difficulty of attracting and retaining qualified professionals under current compensation conditions. Justice sector representatives have consistently suggested that remuneration levels do not reflect the status, workload or public responsibilities of the judiciary and fall short of ensuring an adequate standard of living. Judges have therefore called for the enforcement of Constitutional Court Decision No. 21/2022, which requires annual adjustments to judicial salaries in line with national wage increases. This decision represents a fundamental safeguard for protecting the financial independence of the judiciary and limiting vulnerabilities to undue influence (SCM, 2025[104]; SCM, 2025[85]) but has so far not led to improvements regarding judicial remuneration.
Moldova’s constitutional framework provides that judges’ remuneration is set by law, but it does not explicitly link this to independence or outline principles to guarantee adequate, consistent compensation. As a result, Moldova has faced ongoing challenges in maintaining judicial capacity and morale.
In terms of incentives, in 2025, a significant shift in the compensation structure for judges was implemented, distinguishing between those who have successfully completed vetting and those who are still navigating or waiting for this process. For first instance judges who have successfully passed the vetting, the annual starting salary is set at EUR 21 859, 2.5 times the national average salary for the year 2024. In contrast, first instance judges who remain in the vetting process receive a lower annual salary of EUR 15 288, which equates to 1.75 times the average salary of 2024.
A similar differentiation applies at the level of the Supreme Court. Judges who have completed the vetting process earn an annual salary of EUR 34 091, four times the average salary, emphasising the value placed on judicial integrity, expectations and expertise associated with this role.
Note: Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and CoE Median data from 2022; Moldova data from 2024-25. National average salary for 2024 was MLD 14 096.7 (https://statistica.gov.md/en/statistic_indicator_details/2). The rules for salary calculation are established in the Law on the Unitary Payroll System in the Budgetary Sector (Annex 2 and 4) as well as the Law No. 310/2024.
A comprehensive study conducted by the Legal Resources Centre of Moldova charts significant trends in judicial remuneration between 2014 and 2020, revealing both progress and ongoing challenges. One of the most notable developments was the adoption of Law No. 270/2018, which reformed the remuneration framework across the public sector. This legislative shift marked a move away from the previous system that pegged judges’ salaries to the national average wage. Instead, it introduced a more structured and predictable approach aimed at better aligning judicial pay with the responsibilities and constitutional role of the judiciary.
Following the implementation of the new framework, early-career judges experienced a 60% salary increase in 2018 compared to 2014, reflecting a significant step toward more competitive remuneration. The upward trend continued in 2020, with an additional increase of 16.2% relative to 2018 levels. However, this trajectory slowed substantially by 2022, when judges’ salaries rose by only 2.9% compared to 2020, falling below national averages and trends in other sectors. This stagnation is continuing, with increases in salaries merely covering the effects of inflation in 2023, a lack of increases leading to real-term salary erosion in 2024 and changes falling below the threshold needed to cover inflation levels in 2025. These developments are indicative of a growing disconnect between judicial salaries and broader wage dynamics in the Moldovan economy, raising concerns about the sustainability of previous gains. They are particularly problematic considering that the negative effects of exceptionally high inflation in 2022 were, at the time, not met by salary adjustments and continue to affect the purchasing power of members of the judiciary.
Transparency and openness are foundational values for judicial legitimacy and public trust. Transparency also supports judicial independence by enabling public scrutiny of judicial institutions while ensuring that accountability is exercised through lawful and institutional mechanisms rather than external pressure or political influence. They underpin judicial independence, foster accountability and enable the public to understand and engage with judicial institutions and court processes. International monitoring has also underscored the importance of transparency and public accountability in strengthening the rule of law in Moldova (European Commission, 2025[35]; European Commission, 2024[112]). In Moldova, further embedding these principles is essential to improve access to legal information. It also contributes to building resilience against misleading information and encouraging greater civic participation in justice processes.
4.6.1. Transparency and open justice
Embedding transparency across judicial governance processes, from the appointment, evaluation and discipline of judges to the allocation of cases and publication of court decisions is essential to uphold accountability and legitimacy of the justice system. Open justice, a core element of transparency policy, ensures public access not only to judicial rulings, but to broader aspects of judicial functioning. It promotes informed civic dialogue, deters misconduct, enhances accountability and fosters confidence in the rule of law (CCJE, 2002[23]). Strengthening public trust in judicial institutions through transparency has also been identified as a key objective of justice reforms in Moldova in the context of the European Union accession process (European Commission, 2024[112]; European Commission, 2025[35]).
The judiciary in Moldova has made notable efforts to enhance transparency of the judicial process and access to information. Judicial decisions are increasingly published online through official websites and shared via digital platforms, broadening public access to legal information. Access to a searchable database of judgments from courts across the country enables users to consult judicial practice, follow developments in case law and improve legal research, contributing to greater transparency and consistency in the application of the law. Public hearings are recorded in accordance with legal standards and in some cases, due to technical limitations in hosting content on institutional websites, hearings have been made available via platforms such as YouTube. In addition, meetings of judicial governance bodies, such as the SCM, are often publicly accessible, and recordings or summaries are published online. This practice contributes to transparency in both adjudicative and governance functions and enable oversight by civil society and the media.
Transparency is further supported by the publication of statistical data on court activity, including caseloads, clearance rates and case duration. This information enhances public oversight of judicial performance and supports accountability in the allocation and use of judicial resources. Courts also publish hearing schedules and summons notices, improving access to practical information for litigants and the broader public.
Digital tools play an increasingly important role in enabling these transparency practices. Platforms such as the National Courts Portal (Portalul Național al Instanțelor de Judecată), which functions as a unified digital gateway to information on the activity of all courts and systems like the Integrated Case Management System (ICMS) facilitate access to judicial information and support procedural safeguards, including the automated random allocation of cases. These tools contribute to both transparency and fairness in judicial proceedings, while also supporting data-driven oversight of judicial activity. Their operational role and associated challenges are explored further in Chapter 5.
As transparency and digital openness expand, it must be careful balanced with the protection of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Publishing judicial decisions or hearing recordings can advance open justice, but indiscriminate disclosure, particularly in sensitive cases, may risk violating ethical boundaries or re‑traumatising vulnerable individuals. OECD standards highlight the importance of proportionate, rights-based transparency that is guided by clear legal frameworks, anonymisation protocols and independent oversight. In Moldova, the development of privacy-conscious digital tools, combined with ethical guidance for judges and court staff on information disclosure, will be essential to ensuring that transparency strengthens rather than compromises trust in judicial institutions.
4.6.2. Engagement with civil society and the media
Public confidence in the judiciary depends on access to information as well as meaningful opportunities for citizens and stakeholders to engage with justice institutions. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and media play essential roles in ensuring oversight, promoting legal literacy and communicating the role of the judiciary. Civil society participation is also embedded within certain judicial governance mechanisms. For example, representatives of civil society serve as members of specialised boards operating under the SCM, including the Disciplinary Board and other bodies responsible for aspects of judicial career management. Their participation contributes to transparency in judicial governance and introduces external perspectives into oversight processes. Moldova’s judiciary has taken steps to increase outreach, including through social media, press releases and judicial bulletins. However, engagement remains ad hoc and under-resourced.
Major justice reform initiatives are often accompanied by public consultations organised by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), which bring together legal professionals, civil society organisations, academic experts and international partners. These consultations provide opportunities for stakeholders to comment on draft legislation and policy proposals, contributing to more inclusive and transparent reform processes.
Strengthening structured engagement with civil society and the media is also aligned with Moldova’s commitments under the EU accession process, where transparency, accountability and stakeholder participation are recognised as key elements of sustainable rule of law reforms. However, when it comes to civic participation in the overall budget process, it is worth noting that the OBS 2023 assigns Moldova a public participation score of 18 out of 100, which remains below the 61 out of 100 threshold considered “sufficient” and places the country in the lower tier of surveyed countries. This result points to broader, systemic challenges affecting meaningful civic participation in the budget process beyond the justice sector, and suggests that achieving the level of civil society engagement targeted will require sustained institutional efforts and investment over time (International Budget Partnership, 2023[102]).
Civil society organisations in Moldova have also played an active role in monitoring justice sector reforms, publishing analytical reports on judicial governance, integrity reforms and court performance. Such monitoring initiatives contribute to public debate and provide independent assessments that can support evidence-based policymaking and accountability.
In recent years, justice institutions have also established consultative mechanisms with civil society organisations. For example, the Anti-Corruption Platform co-ordinated by the MoJ brings together representatives of civil society, professional associations and public authorities to discuss justice reforms, monitor implementation and promote dialogue between institutions and the public (see Chapter 3). The recently established Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation includes representatives of justice institutions, professional bodies and civil society. The council aims to promote co-ordination of digital initiatives and facilitate stakeholder engagement in the development of justice information systems. The NIJ has also contributed to public engagement by organising conferences, public lectures and training programmes involving judges, prosecutors, civil society and academic institutions, helping to foster dialogue on judicial reforms and professional ethics.
At the same time, engagement efforts remain uneven in practice: multiple platforms and initiatives exist, yet, they are not always embedded in structured and predictable processes, which can limit continuity and the effective integration of stakeholder input into policymaking and reform implementation. Similarly, engagement with the media tends to remain reactive rather than strategic. Journalists have called for improved access to the judiciary, including regular briefings and workshops to build understanding of judicial processes and responsibilities. A more structured and proactive communication strategy could strengthen transparency and clarify judicial work for the broader public.
More broadly, the potential of civil society engagement is not yet fully leveraged. While CSOs actively monitor reforms and contribute to public debate, stronger institutional linkages could enhance the use of this evidence in decision-making processes. In addition, civil society participation in judicial governance bodies would contribute to transparency, only with the full operationalisation of these bodies and the meaningful inclusion of external perspectives.
To fulfil its educative role, the judiciary could continue a proactive stance in promoting legal awareness and access to justice. The CCJE recommends that courts disseminate user-friendly information on proceedings, timelines, costs, available legal remedies and significant jurisprudence (CCJE, 2004[113]). Such efforts could include simplified printed guides, public reports, court information desks and interactive digital portals.
Moldova is currently developing its Open Government Partnership (OGP) Action Plan, presenting a unique opportunity to align judicial transparency goals with broader public sector openness initiatives. The integration of justice-related commitments, such as open data on appointments, vetting and statistics, can further institutionalise transparency and improve public accountability.
4.6.3. Building information integrity
In a rapidly evolving, complex and challenged information environment, justice systems are increasingly vulnerable to misleading information, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases (OECD, 2021[114]). Such content can distort legal narratives, fuel division and erode trust in courts. In Moldova, these risks have already materialised and demand more co‑ordinated and proactive responses. These risks have been particularly visible during debates surrounding judicial reform and integrity assessment processes. As mentioned above, public discussions related to the vetting of judges and prosecutors have sometimes been accompanied by misleading or incomplete narratives circulating on social media and other online platforms, which may distort public understanding of the objectives and procedures of these reforms.
Taking a systematic approach to fostering information integrity34 is therefore necessary to strengthen democratic resilience. To that end, the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity provides guidance for policymakers in democratic governments under three mutually reinforcing building blocks focused on: 1) strengthening societal resilience, including through promoting media literacy and building individuals’ capacity to navigate the information environment effectively, as well as through working with stakeholders across society to build understanding of the evolution of the information landscape; 2) enhancing the transparency, accountability, and plurality of information sources by focusing on the role played by digital platforms and traditional media and journalists; and 3) upgrading institutional architecture by providing strategic guidance, clear and transparent mandates, and capacity building and sufficient resources to upgrade governmental institutions to respond effectively (OECD, 2024[115]).
To that end, civil society organisations specialising in media monitoring and fact-checking can contribute to addressing misleading information related to judicial reforms and high-profile cases, providing analysis and explanatory materials that help contextualise judicial decisions and institutional developments.
Moldova’s justice system can further strengthen information resilience by promoting legal and media literacy through educational materials, civic campaigns and school programmes, in partnership with Moldovan institutions active in this area, such as the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. Ensuring that judicial decisions, statistics and procedural information are published in timely, accessible and user-friendly formats is also critical. Institutions need to create partnerships with trusted intermediaries to disseminate accurate legal content. These efforts must be grounded in a rights-based approach that protects freedom of expression, while reinforcing institutional integrity and democratic resilience.
Courts and judicial authorities may also benefit from partnerships with fact-checking organisations and media literacy initiatives, which can help counteract false narratives and foster public confidence. A co‑ordinated and transparent approach to information integrity, anchored in OECD principles, can enhance judicial legitimacy, help reinforce democratic resilience, and uphold freedom of expression.
4.6.4. Public communication for trust and resilience
Communication within judicial institutions and justice sector governance bodies is a strategic lever for reinforcing legitimacy, responsiveness and democratic accountability. In Moldova, as in many OECD countries, judicial communication must adapt to a rapidly evolving digital landscape marked by competing narratives, reduced trust in traditional media and information overload. Several justice institutions, including the SCM, the Ministry of Justice and some courts, have designated communication officers or spokespersons responsible for media relations, press releases and public information activities. Courts have also organised open court days and public information events, aimed at familiarising citizens, students and journalists with court procedures and the functioning of the judiciary. These efforts are taking place in the broader context of Moldova’s ongoing justice reform and EU accession process, which emphasises transparency, accountability and public trust in judicial institutions as key components of democratic governance.
Public communication should not be treated as a secondary or reactive function but embedded as an integral part of policymaking and reform implementation (OECD, forthcoming[116]). Moldova’s judiciary has made efforts to expand its communication channels, including through public-facing websites and social media. In addition, judicial governance bodies have taken steps to strengthen institutional communication. Institutional efforts to strengthen communication have also been formalised through strategic planning. In November 2025, the SCM adopted a Communication Strategy for the SCM and the courts, establishing a comprehensive framework for modernising communication across the judiciary (SCM, 2025[117]). The strategy promotes proactive, co-ordinated and transparent communication with citizens and the media, emphasising public trust, accessibility of legal information and alignment with European communication standards. It also foresees mechanisms for crisis communication, responses to misleading information, the simplification of legal language and the development of digital information platforms. The strategy will be implemented through a phased action plan and monitored by the SCM to ensure consistent communication practices throughout the judicial system.
These efforts reflect a growing recognition within the judiciary that professional and proactive communication is essential for maintaining public trust explaining complex judicial reforms to the broader public and responding to misleading or inaccurate narratives surrounding judicial processes. In several high-profile judicial proceedings in recent years, justice institutions in Moldova have issued public statements or clarifications in response to misleading information circulating in the media or on social networks. These responses illustrate the growing recognition that judicial institutions must actively communicate to preserve public trust while respecting the limits imposed by judicial independence and ongoing proceedings. However, the communication efforts remain constrained by limited professional staff, inconsistent practices and resource gaps across institutions.
Building institutional resilience requires reactive communication and proactive strategies. Proactive communication explaining reform objectives, procedures and outcomes can help contain misleading information while preserving the independence of ongoing judicial or integrity assessment procedures. Ensuring that institutional communication remains factual, transparent and accessible can help maintain trust in, and safeguard the independence of, judicial proceedings. Institutions increasingly need to move beyond one-way communication approaches by developing more people-centred, evidence-informed and audience-sensitive communication strategies. Initiatives such as the communication strategy adopted by the SCM represent an important step toward strengthening the judiciary’s capacity to respond to such challenges through co-ordinated and professional public communication.
Courts can play a pivotal role in strengthening sound information by building communication strategies grounded in evidence and transparency. This includes establishing internal response protocols and clarifying public misconceptions, as well as equipping judicial spokespersons with the tools to explain legal outcomes and articulate the justice’s role in a democratic system. Partnerships with independent fact-checkers, media literacy organisations and civil society can further support institutional credibility and safeguard public trust (OECD, 2021[114]). Justice institutions may also need to diversify the channels and formats through which they engage with the public, recognising that traditional media alone may no longer be sufficient to effectively reach different audiences. It will also be important to secure digital infrastructure that ensures the authenticity and accessibility of official communications
Aligning more broadly with OECD guidance on public communication, Moldova could further strengthen judicial communication by embedding it as a strategic function within the judiciary, supported by clear mandates, ethical safeguards and governance structures to avoid politicisation. Investing in professionalisation, including training, digital infrastructure and cross-institutional co-ordination is essential. This may also require strengthening the use of audience insights, evidence, evaluation and analytics to support more data-driven and people-centred communication approaches. Communication strategies would be informed by audience insights, tailored to different groups, including children, and evaluated based on engagement and public understanding. Communication efforts could be designed from the outset to be digital and accessible and privacy-conscious. It will also be important to develop more agile and adaptive communication models, including stronger cross-functional collaboration, experimentation with digital formats and responsible use of emerging technologies such as AI (OECD, forthcoming[116]). Moreover, building regular channels of dialogue with civil society and the media, supported by training and feedback mechanisms, would reinforce trust and create trusted intermediaries.
4.6.5. Looking ahead
Moldova has made progress in embedding transparency within judicial institutions, yet important challenges persist, particularly in digital infrastructure, institutional communication capacity and structured public engagement. Moving forward, transparency should be understood beyond a simple reporting requirement, but a dynamic component of democratic governance. Strengthening institutional frameworks, building communication capacity and embedding justice in broader public dialogue are critical to ensuring that Moldova’s judiciary is open, trusted and resilient. Continued investment in digital transparency tools, professional communication capacity and structured engagement with citizens and civil society will be important to ensure that Moldova’s judiciary remains transparent, accountable and resilient as the country advances its justice reforms and European integration agenda.
Based on these findings, potential pathways and policy levers that could help reinforce Moldova’s efforts to sustain a judicial value ecosystem:
1. Ensure coherence and effective implementation of judicial and prosecutorial reforms grounded in a value-based governance approach. This could include:
Further institutionalising co‑ordination between the SCM, the SCP, the MoJ and other justice sector actors to align reform objectives, operational planning and performance monitoring;
Strengthening the operational capacity of the SCM and the SCP, particularly regarding resource allocation, workload analysis and implementation of the judicial and prosecutorial maps;
Embedding public trust and legitimacy as central indicators of reform success, with participatory mechanisms and systems for collecting and responding to user feedback.
2. Clarify the legal and institutional framework addressing judicial liability. This could include:
Narrowing and clarifying the grounds for criminal liability in line with international best practice to ensure provisions are precise, objective and resistant to misuse or arbitrary interpretation;
3. Review regulatory frameworks governing judicial transfers and performance evaluation of judges and prosecutors. This could include:
Continuing to ensure that ordinary and exceptional transfers are clearly distinguished by law and, when enforced in practice, accompanied by robust safeguards for judicial independence;
Undertaking a review of judicial performance evaluation frameworks to ensure they adequately reflect and account for prevailing working conditions, in line with international standards.
4. Strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability in the selection and appointment of judges. This could include:
Publishing decisions rejecting appointment proposals from the SCM as a means to reinforce procedural safeguards, promote transparency, uphold judicial independence and balance the role of powers in the appointment process;
Establishing an institutional mechanism within the SCM and the SCP to support judges and prosecutors on accountability matters as a preventive measure against disciplinary actions.
5. Support implementation of judicial and prosecutorial ethics frameworks. This could include:
Developing additional guidance on the application of the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct of Judges;
Creating an ethics advisory mechanism for prosecutors to support ethical decision making;
Aligning recusal procedures across civil, criminal and administrative proceedings;
Ensuring ongoing efforts to strengthen the capacity and resources of the NIA to enhance the verification of asset and personal interest declarations.
6. Consolidate and build on current vetting processes to establish strong foundations for a transparent, accountable and integrity-driven recruitment and promotion framework for judges and prosecutors. This could include:
Strengthening accountability of VC members, including by clarifying circumstances for disciplinary and criminal liability;
Introducing clearer and enforceable mechanisms for the monitoring and verification of asset and interest declarations of VC members;
Improving the capacity of the SCM and SCP to implement integrity controls, while ensuring consistency with existing standards and procedures by formalising institutional co‑operation with the NIA and other relevant institutions;
Strengthening and implementing the legal framework and operational protocols for inter-institutional co‑operation and ensuring the timely provision of information, including on ongoing criminal investigations, by competent state and non-state authorities in accordance with legal safeguards. This could encompass banks, educational and health institutions, and border and customs agencies to provide relevant data to the vetting bodies within specified timeframes.
7. Enhance judicial transparency, openness and communication to improve public trust in the justice sector. This could include:
Developing a proactive communication strategy and response protocols, including further engaging with media;
Linking open government initiative in the justice sector to Moldova’s Open Government Partnership Action Plan beyond 2025;
Expanding civic education and public awareness initiatives on judicial processes and rights;
Ensuring user-friendly language in court proceedings and judicial drafting.
Administrative Code No. 116 of 19 July 2018, Administrative Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150447
Civil Procedure Code No. 225 of 30 May 2003, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150766
Code No. 985 of 8 April 2002, Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/134866.
Criminal Procedure Code No. 122 of 14 March 2003, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/153183
https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/125045
Law No. 34 of 13 March 2025 on the amendment of certain normative acts (declaration of assets and personal interests), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/147738.
Law No. 310 of 26 December 2024 on the State Budget for 2025, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150344.
Law No. 147 of 9 June 2023 on the selection and evaluation of the performance of judges, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/144920Law No. 252 of 17 August 2023 on the external evaluation of judges and prosecutors and amendments to some regulatory acts, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/140481
Law No. 65 of 30 March 2023 on the external evaluation of judges and candidates for the position of judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/138837
Law No. 64 of 30 March 2023 Law on the Supreme Court of Justice, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/140453.
Law No. 26 of 10 March 2022 on measures related to the selection of candidates for the positions of members in the self-administration bodies of judges and prosecutors, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150153.
Law No. 103 of 24 August 2021 on the amendment of some normative acts, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/127804.
Law No. 270 of 23 November 2018 on Unitary Payroll System in the Budgetary Sector, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/153622.
Law No. 133 of 17 June 2016 on Asset and Personal Interest Declarations, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/152995.
Law No. 132 of 17 June 2016 on the National Integrity Authority, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150449
Law No. 3 of 25 February 2016 on the Prosecutor’s Office, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/120703
Law No. 181 of 25 July 2014 on Public Finances and Budgetary Fiscal Responsibility, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=142656&lang=ro
Law No. 178 of 25 July 2014 on the disciplinary liability of judges, Law No. 947 of 19 July 1996 on the Superior Council of Magistracy, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/111770
Law No. 117 of 13 April 1998 on Compensation for damages caused in the performance of judicial duties and the civil liability of judges, https://www.normattiva.it/eli/id/1988/04/15/088G0172/CONSOLIDATED/
Law No. 544 of 20 July 1995 on the Status of Judges, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/152532
Parliament Constitution No. 1 of 29 July 1994 on the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/145723
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← 1. It calls on countries to ensure the independence of justice institutions and actors through constitutional, legal and institutional safeguards, while balancing this with transparency, accountability and participatory engagement.
← 2. This aligns with universal and regional frameworks, and universal and regional standards, including the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985) and the CoE Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12. These affirm countries’ obligation to guarantee judicial independence through constitutional and legal frameworks, ensuring its paramountcy in the governance system.
← 3. 2021 amendments to the Constitution.
← 4. See more in Chapter 2. For comparison, in the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard Eurobarometer (that does not include Moldova), among respondents expressing low confidence in the independence of their national courts or judges, the most frequently cited reason (28%) was perceived interference or pressure from government and political actors.
← 5. For more information on this see: (MEDEL, 2024[121]), (tv8.md, 2025[119]) and (Atlantic Council, 2025[120])
← 6. The penalties prescribed in this code are severe, imposing fines ranging from MLD 300 to 800 conventional units or potentially leading to imprisonment for up to five years. Such criminal liability is a measure to be applied as a last resort.
← 7. According to the International Commission of Jurists, the existence and application of this provision risk exerting undue pressure on judges, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Testimonies collected by the ICJ indicate that some judges have faced criminal prosecution under Article 307 after issuing rulings perceived as unfavourable to the prosecution or contrary to the preferences of powerful political actors. The provision may serve no legitimate purpose in anti-corruption investigations other than to circumvent procedural safeguards.
← 8. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has expressed concern that the provision may serve no legitimate purpose in anti-corruption investigations other than to circumvent procedural safeguards. It emphasises that, where judges are suspected of corruption or of rendering decisions under undue influence, they should be investigated and prosecuted under the relevant criminal offences, through fair, independent and effective procedures that fully respect due process and judicial guarantees.
← 9. SCM, Annual Report for 2023 (available at https://www.csm.md/files/RAPOARTE/2023/CsmRaportAnual2023._pdf.pdf): Pursuant to art. 23 paragraph (1) of the Law on the SCM, the SCM examined five requests of the Acting Prosecutor General, based on art. 307 paragraph (1), art. 326 paragraph (1), art. 326 paragraph (11), art. 326 paragraph (2) letter b) and art. 324 paragraph (3) letter a), art. 325 paragraph (3) letter a1) of the Criminal Code, which had as their object the consent of the SCM to initiate criminal prosecution and carry out criminal prosecution actions against five judges, of which one request was rejected and four requests were admitted, three judges being suspended from office. SCM, Annual Report for 2024 (available at https://www.csm.md/files/RAPOARTE/2024/final_Raport_CSM_2024.pdf): Pursuant to art. 23 paragraph (1) of the Law on the SCM, in 2024 the SCM examined two requests from the Prosecutor General regarding the issuance of the Council's consent to initiate criminal proceedings against two judges from the courts of first instance, one judge being suspected of committing the offense provided for in art. 173 of the Criminal Code and another judge of committing the offense provided for in art. 3521 paragraph (2) of the Criminal Code, the requests being admitted.
← 10. One noteworthy provision is found in art. 21, paragraph (8), which states that if the operational capacity of the Supreme Court of Justice is significantly compromised due to an excess of vacant positions, the SCM is empowered to temporarily assign judges from lower-level courts to the Supreme Court of Justice – provided they fulfil the legal qualifications required for the role.
← 11. In accordance with the stipulations outlined in Article 7, paragraphs (2) and (3) of Law No. 64/2023, enacted on 30 March 2023, the criteria for candidates seeking temporary transfers to fill vacant judgeship positions are as follows:
A minimum of eight years of substantive experience serving as a judge;
An impeccable reputation within the legal community, reflecting high ethical standards and integrity;
A clean disciplinary record, with no sanctions imposed in the preceding two years, highlighting reliability and professionalism;
Demonstration of the professional qualities and skills deemed essential for executing the responsibilities of a Supreme Court judge, which include a profound ability to comprehend and analyse intricate legal scenarios; exhibiting critical thinking and sound judgment, clarity and precision in both written and verbal communication; facilitating effective exchanges of ideas in the courtroom and beyond; strong teamwork capabilities, characterised by respect for colleagues’ viewpoints and a willingness to engage in constructive debate and collaboration; resilience in high-pressure situations, allowing for prompt and efficient task completion, even under demanding circumstances.
← 12. In 2023, the SCJ was reformed to become a court of cassation. Therefore, the number of judges was reduced from 33 to 20, initially projected to comprise 11 career judges and nine professionals drawn from the ranks of lawyers, prosecutors, and academics. By amendments made by Law No. 192 of 10 July 2025, in force from 31 August 2025, the proportion was changed: 13 career judges and 7 from other professions. As of December 2025, there are six vetted judges, one additional vetted judge seconded to the SCM, as well as four judges temporarily transferred from lower courts; appointment of three candidates who passed the vetting is pending.
← 13. In 2023, the SCJ was reformed to become a court of cassation. Therefore, the number of judges was reduced from 33 to 20, initially projected to comprise 11 career judges and nine professionals drawn from the ranks of lawyers, prosecutors, and academics. By amendments made by Law No. 192 of 10 July 2025, in force from 31 August 2025, the proportion was changed: 13 career judges and 7 from other professions. As of December 2025, there are six vetted judges, one additional vetted judge seconded to the SCM, as well as four judges temporarily transferred from lower courts; appointment of three candidates who passed the vetting is pending.
← 14. The following circumstances can lead to removal: submitting a resignation request; receiving a grade of “insufficient” in two consecutive performance evaluations; transferring to another position as stipulated by law; committing a disciplinary offense as defined in the law; a final conviction decision being pronounced; making or participating in a decision without addressing an actual conflict of interest; failing or refusing to declare assets and personal interests; receiving a negative result from the professional integrity test as determined by the disciplinary board; losing citizenship of the Republic of Moldova; being unable to work due to a verified medical condition; reaching the age limit; or establishing a judicial protection measure.
← 15. Judicial members are elected by the General Assembly of Judges who represent all levels of the court system. Meaningful participation of judges from all levels, via the General Assembly of Judges, helps embed judicial expertise in governance processes and foster a sense of ownership and trust within the profession. The non-judicial members are selected openly and transparently by the Committee for Legal Affairs, Immunities and Appointments through a public competition. These candidates are appointed by Parliament and require the approval of three-fifths of the elected deputies. The competition is held before the office of the currently appointed members expires, and the parliament determines how it will be organised. The competition involves reviewing the candidates’ files and conducting public hearings. The Committee for Legal Affairs, Immunities, and Appointments prepares reasoned opinions for each selected candidate and submits these for the parliament's consideration.
← 16. The law includes provisions on the selection requirements, competition for entry into the judiciary, incompatibilities and prohibitions, selection criteria and appointment process. The details of the selection process are regulated in Law No. 147/2023 which establishes the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board for judges under the SCM. This board is a specialised body of the SCM composed of five judges and four members of civil society.
← 17. The National Integrity Authority verifies the accuracy of the candidates’ asset and interest declarations, which are included in the list of required documents to be submitted on the SCM Candidates Register. The National Anti-Corruption Centre verifies the candidates’ professional integrity. The candidate’s professional integrity record must not show any negative results from the professional integrity test in the last five years. This would violate the obligation provided for in art.7 paragraph (2) letter a) of the Law on the Assessment of Institutional Integrity No. 325 of 23 December 2013 (for persons who, until submitting documents for the admission competition, worked in public entities that fall under the scope of the institutional integrity assessment). Once the competition and integrity checks are completed, the SCM scores candidates according to “criteria based on merit, taking into account the professional training, integrity, capacity and efficiency of candidates.”
← 18. The President may reject the SCM’s submission only once and must provide a justification. If the SCM maintains its submission with a two‑thirds majority, the President is then obliged to appoint the judge.
← 19. It should be noted that the 2022 situation refers to the transitional period following constitutional arrangements removing the five-year appointment term. These amendments did not automatically guarantee judges life tenure until retirement age. During this period, the President's rationale for rejecting certain candidates was not made public; instead, it was conveyed through a brief letter listing the names declined. As the SCM did not re submit these names, the responsibility for issuing appointment decrees effectively remained with the President. However, this practice occurred prior to the launch of the vetting process, which has since influenced the selection and confirmation of judicial candidates
← 20. Data provided by SCM.
← 21. Article 20 - if re‑submitted.
← 22. Apart from the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for Judges and the advisory work of the Commission on Ethics and Professional Conduct, some institutional practices also contribute to the development and consolidation of ethical and deontological standards within the Moldovan judiciary. Notably, the reports of the Vetting Commissions, the decisions of the SCM, and the case law of the SCJ play are relevant in setting a higher standard of ethics and deontology for judges in this context (SCJ, 2024[118]).
← 23. The periodicity, procedure and criteria for evaluating the performance of judges are outlined in the law.
← 24. As regulated in art. 6 (4) of the Law on Selection and Performance Appraisal of Judges. However, the Regulation on the Selection and Evaluation of Judges (adopted by the SCM) stipulates that the repeated evaluation should take place between 6 and 12 months from the initial evaluation, i.e. the sub‑legal act does not seem to be aligned with the law (Superior Council of Magistracy, Extract No. 212/8 of 5 March 2013 from the Decision of the Superior Council of Magistracy No. 212/8 of 5 March 2013 on the approval of the Regulation on the evaluation criteria, indicators and procedure for the evaluation of judges’ performance).
← 25. These include situations where a judge deliberately or through manifest gross negligence issues a judicial act that results in the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution or international human rights treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a party.
← 26. Subsequent amendments further clarified specific disciplinary offences and eliminated others, sharpening the criteria for liability in misconduct and the status of specialised entities previously under the purview of the SCM. Additionally, the law clarified that the initial phase of the disciplinary procedure involves a thorough verification of the complaint, followed by an investigation into the judge’s conduct.
← 27. Art. 4(3)). Sanctions may be imposed only where the disciplinary body establishes that the judge acted intentionally or with gross negligence (art. 36(11)).
← 28. The process (for certain categories of both judges and prosecutors) is co-funded by the EU and the Netherlands, including the salaries of international members, two Secretariats, and the enhancing of SCM and SCP capacity in relation to their role in the vetting process.
← 29. At the time of drafting this report, Moldovan authorities had completed the pre‑vetting process. The vetting process continues, progressing gradually for candidates to the Supreme Court of Justice, judges of the Courts of Appeal, followed by the launch of vetting for presidents and vice-presidents of first instance courts. Vetting of specialised prosecutors for organised crime and chief prosecutors within the General Prosecutor’s Office, and specialised anti‑corruption prosecutors continues.
← 30. In 2023, it held competitions for 33 vacancies in first instance courts, followed by another 22 vacancies in 2024. It also transferred judges to fill vacancies resulting from judges' resignations in 2023. In November 2023, a new judge was appointed to the Constitutional Court. In 2024, five judges were appointed to the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) and the President of the Republic appointed 38 judges to district courts. Currently, the SCM has announced competitions to fill all vacant positions at the SCJ, the Chișinău Court of Appeal and the Bălți Court of Appeal. Additionally, the SCM has approved the dismissal of 49 judges at their own request. As of March 2026, the Board is fully operational.
← 31. Under the law, judges subject to vetting could choose to resign within 20 days of notification to retain their special social guarantees, including pension rights. If they were to fail the vetting, they would lose special social guarantees, including special pension.
← 32. Article 7(6).
← 33. Based on CEPEJ 2024 evaluation cycle using 2022 data.
← 34. Information integrity is defined as the result of an information environment that promotes access to accurate, reliable, evidence-based, and plural information sources and that enable individuals to be exposed to plural and diverse ideas, make informed choices, and better exercise their rights (OECD, 2024[115]).