This chapter explores how Moldova’s justice sector is governed and steered through its institutional arrangements, strategic frameworks and co‑ordination mechanisms. It analyses the roles and interlinkages of key institutions, assessing how governance structures enable sector-wide planning and coherence. The chapter also reviews existing policy frameworks and reform strategies, identifying opportunities to improve prioritisation, sequencing and alignment. It concludes by outlining pathways to strengthen strategic management and ensure that governance structures support a shared and results-oriented vision for justice reform.
OECD Justice Review of the Republic of Moldova
3. Governing the justice system in Moldova: Institutions, roles and strategies
Copy link to 3. Governing the justice system in Moldova: Institutions, roles and strategiesAbstract
3.1. Governance structure and institutional landscape
Copy link to 3.1. Governance structure and institutional landscape3.1.1. Constitutional foundations of judicial governance
Moldova’s justice system is anchored in a constitutional framework that enshrines the separation of powers and the rule of law as foundational principles of democratic governance. Article 6 of the 1994 Constitution establishes the separation of powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1. Roles and responsibilities of the different branches of power as defined in Moldova’s 1994 Constitution
Copy link to Box 3.1. Roles and responsibilities of the different branches of power as defined in Moldova’s 1994 ConstitutionLegislative branch
Moldova is a parliamentary republic; therefore, the parliament is the supreme representative body and sole legislative authority of the state (art. 60). The parliament is unicameral and is composed of 101 members elected by proportional representation for a four-year term and who, according to the Constitution, may not be prosecuted or held legally liable for their votes or opinions expressed in the exercise of their mandate (art. 71). Parliament has exclusive authority to enact, modify and abrogate laws. It exercises oversight over the executive through various mechanisms, including approval of the state budget, monitoring governmental activities and holding inquiries and interpellations of ministers. Furthermore, the parliament appoints high-ranking state officials, reinforcing its critical role in shaping Moldova’s democratic governance. It approves the state’s main internal and external policy directions and is the body that declares a state of national emergency; martial law and war; and mobilisation of the armed forces. Parliament declares the holding of referenda; ratifies, terminates, suspends and repeals international treaties, and carries out other powers as provided for by the Constitution and laws (art. 66).
Executive branch
The executive branch is responsible for enforcing the law. The President of the Republic is elected through a direct popular vote by citizens for a maximum of two consecutive mandates of a four-year term (art. 80). As head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces (art. 87), the President represents the state and is the guarantor of national sovereignty and independence, and the nation’s unity and territorial integrity (art. 77). The President promulgates the laws (art. 93) and concludes international treaties on behalf of the Republic of Moldova, which are submitted to the parliament for ratification. She/he grants individual pardons, citizenship and political asylum. The President may suspend acts of government that are contrary to legislation until the delivery of the final judgment of the Constitutional Court (art. 88). Furthermore, the President appoints public officials as stipulated by law, including judges (except for constitutional judges) upon the proposal of the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) (art. 116). She/he appoints or dismisses the Prosecutor General based on the recommendation of the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) (art. 125). The President issues decrees, which are mandatory and enforceable throughout the entire territory of the state (art. 94). The President may dissolve the parliament only if the formation of the government proves impossible or the legislative process is blocked for a period exceeding three months, provided these circumstances are confirmed by the Constitutional Court (art. 85, art. 135).
Headed by the Prime Minister, the government is responsible for implementing national policies and overseeing public administration (art. 96). The government is formed through a collaborative process involving both the President and the parliament (art. 98). After consulting with parliamentary political parties, the President nominates a candidate for Prime Minister, who must secure parliamentary confidence. The Prime Minister directs the executive branch based on a governance programme and list of the members of the government approved by the parliament during the vote of confidence. This programme outlines the proposed policies and initiatives the new government intends to implement. Within the executive, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) co‑ordinates the development of justice policies, oversees legal reforms and ensures the implementation of legal standards across the public sector. The MoJ plays a pivotal role in harmonising Moldova’s justice sector with European Union (EU) norms and international standards, thus enhancing the country's institutional integrity and administrative efficiency. The government's mandate is closely linked to the parliament, terminating upon the validation of a new parliament’s election, the passage of a parliamentary vote of no confidence or the removal of the Prime Minister from office (arts. 103, 106, 106/1).
Judicial branch
The Constitution assigns responsibility for the administration of justice to the judiciary, which is composed of jurisdictional bodies: the Supreme Court of Justice; courts of appeal; first-instance courts (district courts), as well as specialised courts where necessary in accordance with the law (arts. 114-115). Judicial governance is exercised by the SCM (arts. 121/1-123).
The prosecution service (arts. 124-125), while part of the broader justice system, operates as a distinct constitutional institution governed by the SCP (art. 125/1).
The Constitution expressly enshrines the key principles governing the judicial function, including: judicial independence; unity of the judicial system; exclusivity of judicial power (no extraordinary courts may be established); due process and fair trial guarantees; public nature of court proceedings; right to legal defence and to a free and impartial hearing; accessibility of free legal aid for persons of limited means and participation of citizens through representative bodies to safeguard the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence is constitutionally protected and guaranteed by the state (art. 116).
Mechanisms such as the SCM are intended to safeguard judicial independence and insulate the judiciary from undue political or external influence.
A system of checks and balances embedded in the Constitution aims to prevent the concentration of power, ensuring that no branch of government exercises authority beyond its constitutional limits (Box 3.2). These tools are critical to maintaining democratic stability and include both formal instruments and procedural safeguards to promote autonomy and co‑operation across branches. Their effectiveness, however, depends not only on their legal design but responsible institutional practice and independent judicial review.
Box 3.2. Constitutional tools to ensure the balance of powers between branches in Moldova
Copy link to Box 3.2. Constitutional tools to ensure the balance of powers between branches in MoldovaConstitutional control over acts of public authorities: The Constitutional Court of Moldova has the power to review the constitutionality of laws, decrees and parliamentary decisions, and to settle conflicts between state authorities (art. 135). It acts as a guardian of constitutional order and the balance between powers.
Formation of the government: The President nominates the candidate for the position of Prime Minister after consulting parliamentary factions; the parliament appoints the government and approves its programme (art. 98).
President of the Republic’s power to dissolve the parliament: Under specific conditions, the President of the Republic can dissolve the parliament (art. 85). This may occur if the parliament fails to approve a government proposal twice or fails to adopt legislation for 90 days. Dissolution is subject to prior consultation with parliamentary factions and the Constitutional Court's approval on the constitutionality of the grounds for dissolution.
Parliamentary oversight and investigative powers: The parliament exercises control over the government and public administration through mechanisms such as questions, interpellations, hearings and inquiry committees (art. 66). It can request the presence of government members for explanations and investigate any matter of public interest via commissions of inquiry.
Promulgation of laws: The President may return any law to the parliament for reconsideration if objections arise only once; if the parliament maintains its original decision, the President must promulgate the law (art. 93).
Appointment of judges: The President may reject a candidate proposed by the SCM only once; if SCM maintains its original proposal, the President must appoint the judge (art. 116).
Motion of no confidence and government responsibility: The parliament may adopt a motion of no confidence against the government (Cabinet of Ministers) by a majority vote of elected members (art. 106). A motion of censure may be initiated by at least one-quarter of deputies and leads to the government’s dismissal if adopted by the majority of deputies. The Prime Minister can also raise the question of confidence regarding the adoption of a draft law, decision or motion (art. 106¹). Refusal by the parliament to grant confidence results in the government’s resignation.
Approval and amendment of the state budget: The parliament has authority to approve, amend or reject the draft state budget prepared by the government (arts. 131-132). Control over public finance is a significant tool for maintaining balance between branches.
Prior approval of budgetary expenditures: Any legislative initiative or amendment that results in an increase or decrease of budgetary revenues, loans or expenditures must be adopted only with the prior approval of the government (art. 131).
Declaration of presidential vacancy: Parliament can declare the Office of the President vacant for reasons such as resignation, impossibility to exercise duties for more than 60 days due to health reasons, removal through impeachment or death (art. 90). Impeachment for grave violations of the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority and Constitutional Court confirmation.
Impeachment procedures: Parliament can initiate impeachment proceedings against the President for serious constitutional violations (art. 89). The Constitutional Court must validate the charges before the parliament can remove the President by a two-thirds majority.
Source: (Government of the Republic of Moldova, 1994[1]) and Constitutional Court case law: Judgments No. 23/2020; No. 28/2017; No. 24/2017; No. 2/2017; No. 5/2016; No. 32/2015; No. 29/2015; No. 16/2015; No. 29/2013; No. 7/2013; No. 4/2013; No. 30/2013; No. 23/2011; No. 17/2011; No. 22/2011; No. 2/2011; No. 9/1998.
Moldova has progressively strengthened this framework, including through the 2021 Constitutional amendments that reinforced judicial independence and aligned national standards more closely with European standards. These reforms introduced structural and procedural changes intended to insulate the judiciary from political influence and reinforce the autonomy of its governing institutions (see Chapter 4). According to the World Justice Project, Moldova’s score on constraints on government power improved from 0.43 in 2012-2013 to 0.52 in 2025, though it remains below the EU average of 0.74 (Table 3.1 and Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2).
Table 3.1. Moldova's performance in the 2025 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index: The “Constraints on Government Powers” factor’s subcategories
Copy link to Table 3.1. Moldova's performance in the 2025 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index: The “Constraints on Government Powers” factor’s subcategories|
|
2012-2013 score |
2025 score |
||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Moldova |
EU average |
Moldova |
EU average |
|
|
Factor: Constraints on government power |
0.43 (77) |
0.745 |
0.52 (75) |
0.736 |
|
Sub-factors |
||||
|
Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature |
0.53 (67) |
0.77 |
0.64 (40) |
0.72 |
|
Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary |
0.34 (79) |
0.7 |
0.41 (97) |
0.68 |
|
Government powers are effectively limited by independent auditing and review institutions (ombudsperson, Supreme Audit Institutions) |
0.42 (65) |
0.7 |
0.52 (60) |
0.72 |
|
Government officials are sanctioned for misconduct |
0.29 (86) |
0.64 |
0.36 (97) |
0.64 |
|
Government powers are subject to non-governmental checks |
0.50 (71) |
0.79 |
0.56 (73) |
0.71 |
|
Transition of power is subject to the law |
0.53 (66) |
0.87 |
0.6 (75) |
0.82 |
Note: Global ranking positions are indicated in brackets.
3.1.2. Institutional role clarity and co‑ordination
The justice sector of Moldova comprises a broad set of institutions spanning the judiciary, executive, independent oversight bodies and civil society (Figure 3.1, with functional mapping available in Annex 3.A).
Figure 3.1. Overview of the Moldovan justice system and key stakeholders
Copy link to Figure 3.1. Overview of the Moldovan justice system and key stakeholders
Note: Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration (ADJJA), Office for Prevention and Fight Against Money Laundering - Financial Intelligence Unit (OPFML - FIU), Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Moldova’s constitutional framework does not conceive the separation of powers in rigid isolation. Article 6 of the Constitution explicitly provides that these powers are “separated and co‑operate in the exercise of their prerogatives in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”. The Constitutional Court has consistently interpreted this principle in a functional and interactive manner, reinforcing that state institutions must act within their competences in ways that support – not hinder – the constitutional system as a whole. This interpretation has given rise to the principle of constitutional loyalty (principiul loialității constituționale), which obliges institutions to avoid actions that, while formally legal, may obstruct or undermine the effective functioning of other powers. These concepts align Moldova with broader European and international trends: many OECD and EU countries recognise judicially constructed principles of institutional co-operation and loyalty as foundational to democratic governance.
Box 3.3. The Constitutional Court of Moldova’s interpretations of separation of powers, co‑operation and constitutional loyalty
Copy link to Box 3.3. The Constitutional Court of Moldova’s interpretations of separation of powers, co‑operation and constitutional loyaltyThrough its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has clarified the constitutional principles governing the interaction between state authorities and the functioning of the justice system.
Separation and checks and balances. The Court has interpreted Article 6 of the Constitution as requiring both the independence of public authorities and their collaboration in exercising state powers. Distinct institutions perform different constitutional functions but interact through mechanisms of co-operation and reciprocal control (“checks and balances”) that maintain institutional balance and prevent the concentration of power. As the Court noted, the separation of powers “is not rigid or absolute but implies co-operation between powers and reciprocal control”.
Co-operation between constitutional authorities. The Court has underlined that public authorities must exercise their competences in a manner that respects the constitutional roles of other institutions and ensures the proper functioning of the state’s institutional framework.
Constitutional loyalty. In its subsequent case law, the Court has emphasised the principle of constitutional loyalty, according to which public authorities must exercise their powers in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, respecting the roles and competences of other constitutional institutions.
Together, these interpretations articulate a model of democratic governance based on institutional balance, co-operation among authorities and respect for constitutional limits.
Source: Constitutional Court case law: Judgments No. 23/2011; No. 7/2013; No. 2/2017.
These constitutional principles shape the governance architecture of Moldova’s justice system. Their implementation relies on a set of specialised institutions that exercise distinct functions in policy development, judicial governance, prosecution oversight and the administration of justice services.
In Moldova, similar to many countries, justice sector responsibilities are shared across several core institutions, most notably:
The Superior Council of Magistracy is the constitutional body responsible for ensuring the independence and autonomy of the judiciary (Law No. 947/1996). It oversees selection, promotion, evaluation and disciplinary processes for judges and contributes to aspects of court administration, including preparation of the judiciary’s budget and allocation of judicial positions (Law No. 947/1996). While the SCM is responsible for judicial governance and safeguarding judicial independence, the MoJ plays a broader role in justice sector policy development, legislative reform and strategic planning, including aspects related to court infrastructure and sector-wide co-ordination.
The Superior Council of Prosecutors ensures prosecutorial self-governance, mirroring the responsibility of the SCM for the prosecution service.
The Ministry of Justice leads on justice sector reform from the executive side (Government Decision No. 698/2017), preparing draft primary legislation, overseeing strategic planning and managing capital investment projects related to court infrastructure.
The Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration (ADJJA) became operational on 1 January 2025 following the merger of the former Agency for Court Administration and Agency for Legal Information Resources. It is tasked with managing digital systems (e.g. Integrated Case Management System (ICMS), judicial statistics, court infrastructure and training for court staff (i.e. non-judicial staff)) (Government Decisions No. 698/2017 and No. 748/2024). It is also mandated to develop proposals for improving court functioning and administrative efficiency.
Independent oversight institutions play a vital role in rights protection. The People’s Advocate (Ombudsperson) and the Children’s Advocate are constitutionally mandated to monitor human rights protections, receive individual complaints, initiate investigations and propose systemic reforms. They also help people, particularly those in vulnerable situations, navigate available redress mechanisms. The Equality Council is tasked with addressing discrimination and promoting equal treatment across the public and private sectors. Its effectiveness, however, is constrained by limited enforcement powers and resources.
The National Council for State Guaranteed Legal Aid (NCSGLA) administers Moldova’s legal aid system, providing both primary and secondary legal assistance through a decentralised network of regional offices and paralegals. This model helps bridge the gap between formal justice institutions and local communities. While the council has taken steps to respond to growing demand, its efforts are moderated by existing financial and staffing limitations. Despite multiple national programmes, there is scope to strengthen the NCSGLA’s mandate to enhance strategic co‑ordination and better align with related access-to-justice initiatives.
Civil society organisations (CSOs) further complement the system through promoting legal empowerment, supporting vulnerable and underserved groups and providing community-based legal services and public legal education. However, their integration into the justice system’s governance and planning architecture is limited. CSO engagement is often dependent on project-based donor funding and not embedded within a formalised institutional framework. This hinders long-term impact and continuity.
The Constitutional Court also plays a key role in the governance of the justice system. As the sole authority of constitutional jurisdiction, it ensures the supremacy of the Constitution, reviews the constitutionality of laws and other normative acts, and resolves conflicts between public authorities. Although it is not part of the ordinary judiciary, its jurisprudence significantly shapes the functioning of the justice system and the balance of powers between state institutions.
While this multi-institutional architecture reflects efforts to balance judicial independence with executive policy leadership, operational support and other governance values1 (see Chapter 5), with each of these bodies playing a distinct role, the boundaries between them are sometimes unclear or could be better co‑ordinated. For instance, the MoJ is the lead authority for many programmes that incorporate access to justice dimensions, such as those targeting Roma inclusion, child protection or tackling violence against women and girls. In such cases, justice institutions often participate as implementing partners but are not systematically involved in upstream policy design or cross-sector monitoring. Strengthening the systematic involvement of justice institutions in upstream policy design and cross-sector monitoring would help enhance strategic coherence and reinforce accountability for access to justice outcomes in multi-sectoral programmes (see Chapter 6).
The situation is further complicated by the decentralised administration of support services. Human resources and budgeting functions for non‑judicial staff are dispersed across the court system, with limited capacity at the central level. Functions such as the monitoring of judicial practice and public communication are also managed locally, without a unified framework or shared services model (see Chapter 5). As a result, system-wide improvements are difficult to drive. Exploring more centralised or shared-service approaches could help streamline responsibilities, overcome remaining fragmentation and create stronger incentives for performance and innovation across the justice system.
3.1.3. Clearer governance of the judiciary and court administration
The governance of court administration is marked by a relatively decentralised model, with substantial responsibilities allocated to individual courts and only a limited steering role for the SCM. While decentralisation aligns in part with international practice, it also produces fragmentation, duplication of functions and insufficient central co‑ordination, factors that hinder economies of scale and consistent service delivery across the judiciary.
While the SCM holds a constitutional role in safeguarding judicial independence and manages several core administrative responsibilities, such as the budgeting process within the judiciary and the allocation of judicial positions, it operates with limited administrative capacity. The Directorate for Management, Budget and Court Reports within the SCM is composed of only six officials, two of whom handle judicial statistics. This restricts the SCM’s ability to assume a more active and centralised role in overseeing and harmonising court administration functions.
At the same time, individual courts, particularly those of first and second instance, bear the primary responsibility for various support functions. These include budgeting and accounting (with 47 allocated positions), human resources management (42 positions) and the monitoring and generalisation of judicial practice (98 positions). Such extensive decentralisation often results in variable practices and inefficiencies across courts (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2. Distribution of Court Support Staff (2025)
Copy link to Table 3.2. Distribution of Court Support Staff (2025)|
Court Level |
Budgeting & Accounting Staff |
Human Resources Staff |
Case-law Monitoring & Public Relations Staff |
|
District Courts |
39 |
34 |
67 |
|
Courts of Appeal |
8 |
8 |
31 |
|
Total |
47 |
42 |
98 |
Source: Data provided by SCM.
A more balanced model of court administration could benefit from the gradual centralisation of selected support functions within the judiciary. The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) and the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) have recognised that Councils for the Judiciary may assume competences related to court administration and management, especially when this leads to enhanced quality and consistency of justice services (CCJE, 2007[4]).
Introducing shared services, for example, centralised accounting services, as implemented in Moldova’s prosecution system, could generate economies of scale and streamline administrative processes. These models could be adapted for the judiciary to support standardised approaches, improve co‑ordination and relieve the administrative burden currently carried by court presidents and court secretariats.
The role of court presidents in Moldova is largely aligned with international standards, combining both representative and managerial functions (Law No. 514/1995). These include overseeing timely trials, ensuring judicial specialisation, appointing non-judicial staff and supervising the random allocation of cases. However, their ability to address systemic disparities in caseloads, duration of proceedings and resource distribution is limited, leading to variation across courts and few tools to drive system-wide improvement. Their administrative workload could be alleviated by delegating greater responsibility to heads of court secretariats, particularly for managing finances and staff.
Clarifying the governance structure of court administration, strengthening the SCM’s strategic and operational capacities, and introducing a shared services model could contribute to improved performance, resource efficiency and overall coherence in Moldova’s judiciary.
Box 3.4. Modernisation of staffing and case management
Copy link to Box 3.4. Modernisation of staffing and case managementFlying brigades of judges in the Netherlands
To address significant case backlogs in overburdened jurisdictions, a dedicated task force, often referred to as a “flying brigade”, composed of judges and court staff was created in the Netherlands. This team assists municipal and civil divisions of courts with high caseloads by preparing draft decisions and supporting case processing, thereby freeing up local courts to focus on hearings and pending decisions. In addition, courts may re‑assign cases to less busy jurisdictions to balance workloads. Complementary to this, courts can encourage voluntary redeployment or transfer of judges from less burdened to overburdened courts, either temporarily or permanently. Such measures may include incentives, such as salary bonuses or cost compensation, to facilitate participation. Importantly, these measures must respect the principle of judicial immovability and ensure that judicial independence is not compromised.
Pilot project on Civil Case Management Teams at the 11th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, United States
The 11th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida implemented the Civil Case Management Teams (CCMT) Pilot Project to improve efficiency and reduce delays in civil cases. Each team consisted of a judge, case manager, judicial assistant and bailiff, with clearly defined responsibilities. Judges focused on hearings, case management conferences and substantive rulings. Case managers, who have legal expertise, reviewed cases, drafted management plans and recommended rulings to address emerging issues. Judicial assistants handled scheduling, monitored compliance with court orders and prepared documents, while bailiffs managed case intake, assigned tracks and prepared courtrooms. This structured approach led to shorter case durations, higher closure rates and reduced time to disposition, even though the number of case events increased. A key element of the initiative was the development of a methodology to evaluate its impact by comparing cases processed under the pilot.
Management training for court presidents in Israel
In Israel, the role of court presidents was officially extended in 2017 to include senior management responsibilities, requiring them to demonstrate strong analytical, leadership and inter‑personal skills for managing courts, evaluating performance and engaging in long-term planning. To support this transition, the Israeli Centre for Judicial Education and Training developed a management and leadership programme for judges in senior positions. The programme focuses on building leadership capabilities and other essential skills needed for effective court administration. Its curriculum includes training on strategic planning, performance evaluation and team management, ensuring that court presidents are equipped to fulfil their expanded responsibilities while maintaining judicial excellence.
Source: (OECD, 2023[5]).
3.2. Strategic vision and sectoral policy planning
Copy link to 3.2. Strategic vision and sectoral policy planningEffective justice sector reform in Moldova is grounded in a dynamic and evolving strategic framework that reflects both national development goals and international commitments, including EU accession. This framework includes overarching national strategies that embed justice priorities in broader governance and development plans, and sector-specific strategies that guide reform implementation within the justice system.
3.2.1. National vision and strategies
The strategic framework for the development of the justice sector is informed by national strategic documents and policy proposals.
Justice sector priorities are prominently featured in Moldova’s core national strategies. The National Development Strategy, European Moldova 2030 (Law No. 315/2022) outlines 10 strategic priorities, including the development of a fair, incorruptible and independent justice system aligned with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. It sets the direction for: i) developing extra‑judicial dispute resolution mechanisms; ii) promoting the rule of law and ensuring equal access to justice for all (in particular, vulnerable and underserved groups (SDG 16.3, SDG 5.2); and iii) significantly reducing corruption in all its forms (SDG 16.5) and building a transparent and accountable justice system.
Placing people at the centre of access to justice policy and reform is a critical enabler of other development priorities, such as improving quality of life and strengthening demographic resilience. This is operationalised through the National Development Plan 2024-2026 and dedicated sectoral strategies, many of which focus on restoring public trust in public institutions, including the judiciary. The Strategy for Ensuring the Independence and Integrity of the Justice Sector 2022-2025 has been central to these efforts, setting out strategic directions across several aspects of the justice sector. The next iteration of the justice sector strategy, expected to follow the expiry of the 2022-2025 strategy, will need to align closely with the European Moldova 2030 strategic framework and EU accession requirements. It will also need to ensure coherence with Moldova’s broader governance, rule of law and socio-economic objectives.
EU accession and the evolving strategic landscape
Moldova’s strategic priorities have been significantly shaped by its EU accession process, particularly following the granting of candidate status in June 2022. The scope and complexity of justice reform have expanded to reflect EU integration requirements, especially under Chapter 23’s Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24’s Justice, Freedom and Security. Together, they form the core of Cluster 1 Fundamentals in the EU’s enlargement methodology. These chapters are considered critical and must be addressed early in the negotiation process.
In this context, Moldova has adopted several high-level planning instruments, including:
The National Programme for the Accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union 2025-2029 (NAP): Approved in May 2025 (Government Decision No. 306/2025), the NAP serves as the central framework for aligning national policies with the EU acquis. It covers the full scope of accession requirements and is subject to annual revision to reflect progress and evolving negotiations.
The Rule of Law Roadmap: Adopted in May 2025 (Government Decision No. 275/2025), this roadmap outlines Moldova’s reform commitments under Chapters 23 and 24, in line with the EU Negotiating Framework. It includes concrete actions and timelines for establishing a transparent, citizen-centred justice system underpinned by professionalism and integrity; ensuring equitable and efficient access to public services for all individuals; strengthening the institutional capacity to prevent and combat corruption, money laundering and organised crime, and to recover criminal assets; promoting the use of ADR mechanisms to reduce the time and cost of resolving legal disputes; enhancing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies and mechanisms for international judicial co‑operation, particularly in investigating cross-border crimes and managing civil legal matters; modernising systems for cross-border flow management, as well as migration and asylum procedures, in line with EU standards. The roadmap functions both as a strategic planning tool and a monitoring mechanism for Moldova’s opening benchmarks under Cluster 1. It sets out concrete actions, deadlines and lead institutions, thereby ensuring coherent implementation of justice sector reforms through 2027.
Complementary strategies supporting justice reform
Justice sector reforms are further supported by complementary national strategies in areas such as anti‑corruption, digital transformation, public administration and human rights. These strategies form part of Moldova’s broader governance and rule of law agenda and align closely with its public administration reform agenda:
National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme 2024-2028 focuses on corruption prevention, ethics in the public sector and fostering a culture of integrity – key underpinnings of judicial accountability and transparency (Parliament Decision No. 442/2023).
National Asset Recovery Programme 2023-2027 strengthens mechanisms for identifying, freezing, confiscating and recovering criminal assets (Parliament Decision No. 342/2022).
Digital Transformation Strategy 2023-2030 advances e-justice through digital platforms, data interoperability and modernisation of judicial infrastructure (Government Decision No. 650/2023).
National Human Rights Action Plan 2023-2027 reinforces access to justice and protection of vulnerable and underserved groups, in line with international human rights standards (Government Decision No. 164/2024).
National Programme for Ensuring Equality between Women and Men 2023-2027 supports justice-related equality outcomes, including tackling violence against women and girls, and discrimination in legal proceedings (Government Decision No. 203/2023).
Public Administration Reform Strategy 2023-2030 enhances institutional co‑ordination, policy planning and service delivery efficiency, including in agencies and services that interact closely with the justice system (Government Decision No. 126/2023).
Together, these documents reflect a growing emphasis on integrated and people-centred governance. Their effective implementation requires sustained collaboration across justice institutions, sectoral bodies and public authorities from initial strategy development through to implementation and evaluation.
3.2.2. Sectoral vision and justice strategy
Strategy for Ensuring the Independence and Integrity of the Justice Sector (2022-2025)
The Justice Sector Strategy (JSS) 2022-2025 was the cornerstone of Moldova’s sector-specific reform agenda. Approved by Law No. 211/2021 in 2022, the JSS provided a comprehensive and country-owned roadmap for strengthening the independence, accountability and performance of the justice system, aligning with donor engagement and supporting Moldova’s commitments under the EU accession process.
Structured around three strategic directions, the JSS established a co‑ordinated framework for reforms:
Independence, accountability and integrity of justice sector actors
Access to justice and quality of justice
Efficient and modern administration of the justice sector.
The JSS 2022-2025 articulated a vision for Moldova’s justice system rooted in the principles of rule of law. It highlighted judicial independence and integrity as the foundation for impartial decision making and fair administration of justice. It underscored accountability and transparency across all justice sector actors, ensuring that the exercise of judicial power is subject to oversight and guided by ethical standards. The strategy promoted a service-oriented approach that prioritises access, quality and responsiveness, particularly for children, ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities. It also put forward restorative justice approaches focused on social re‑integration, conflict resolution and protection of fundamental rights over punitive measures. A strong emphasis was placed on digitalisation, institutional co‑ordination and data-driven management as enablers of more effective, timely and equitable justice outcomes.
Figure 3.2. Overview of the Strategy for Ensuring Independence and Integrity in the Justice Sector 2022-2025
Copy link to Figure 3.2. Overview of the Strategy for Ensuring Independence and Integrity in the Justice Sector 2022-2025Strategic development process and challenges
The development and implementation of the JSS followed a complex, multi-stage process shaped by political shifts and institutional dynamics. Successive changes in government between strategies delayed definition of a new vision and consensus-building around reform priorities.
Different perspectives between the executive and judicial self-governing bodies, particularly around integrity verification, judicial selection and evaluation, affected both the pace and content of the strategy. While civil society and international partners remained actively engaged, some judicial actors remained cautious, reflecting the continued need for dialogue and trust-building across institutions.
Justice Sector Strategy Action Plan
The JSS was supported by a comprehensive action plan, translating the three strategic priorities into actionable reforms. The plan set out:
Eleven strategic objectives and 49 specific objectives, broken down into over 156 individual actions, each with defined timelines, indicators and responsible institutions;
Activities encompassing legislative reform, institutional restructuring, digitalisation, professional training and performance monitoring;
Cross-cutting thematic priorities such as anti‑corruption and the rights of vulnerable and underserved groups.
The action plan adopted a multi-level approach, integrating legal, institutional, procedural and capacity-building interventions to address immediate gaps while supporting long-term transformation. Its implementation contributed to advancing Moldova’s national justice objectives and EU integration benchmarks under Cluster 1.
Monitoring, evaluation and lessons learned from the Justice Sector Strategy
Implementation of Moldova’s JSS 2022-2025 and its accompanying action plan was supported by a structured and participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework designed to ensure transparency and foster institutional accountability and evidence-based policymaking. The framework sought to ensure consistent, transparent monitoring of action plan implementation, regular progress tracking and assessment of risks and challenges.
Monitoring architecture and institutional roles
Oversight was ensured through a multi-stakeholder monitoring group, co‑ordinated by the MoJ, supported by a clear mandate and formalised M&E methodology. The monitoring group included 25 members representing key justice sector institutions, civil society organisations and international partners. The monitoring architecture was complemented by clearly defined institutional responsibilities, designated focal points, a centralised secretariat of the monitoring group, leadership co‑ordination mechanisms and parliamentary scrutiny (Box 3.5).
Box 3.5. Monitoring architecture of the Justice Sector Strategy
Copy link to Box 3.5. Monitoring architecture of the Justice Sector StrategyThe broader institutional framework for monitoring the strategy included:
Implementing institutions, as designated in the action plan, are responsible for mainstreaming relevant actions into their annual operational plans and budgeting processes.
Institutional focal points appointed by internal decree serve as liaison officers. They co‑ordinate with the secretariat of the monitoring group to ensure timely data collection and to submit institutional progress reports.
The secretariat of the monitoring group is housed within the ministry’s public policy co‑ordination unit and supported by technical consultants. It also liaises with the parliament’s standing committee on legal issues, appointments and immunities.
The Forum of Decision-Makers, composed of the heads of key justice institutions (e.g. judiciary, prosecution, legal professions, mediation council), provides high-level strategic guidance and helps resolve cross-institutional co‑ordination issues. The Minister of Finance may be invited to participate when financial matters are at stake.
The parliament’s standing committee on legal issues holds annual hearings to review implementation progress. It receives the monitoring group’s reports and considers alternative reports from civil society, contributing to parliamentary oversight and broader democratic accountability.
Source: Law No. 211/2021; Order No. 47/2022; Order No. 144/2022.
Figure 3.3. Mechanisms for Justice Sector Strategy monitoring
Copy link to Figure 3.3. Mechanisms for Justice Sector Strategy monitoring
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Monitoring methodology and reporting cycles
The monitoring methodology relied on a common framework, allowing for a consistent assessment of progress across institutions over time. It included standardised performance indicators (achieved, partially achieved or not achieved), categories of measures (time-bound, ongoing or long-term), defined verification sources and a harmonised reporting template.
Semi-annual and annual progress reports2 provided a transparent public record and insights into reform progress, highlighting achievements, challenges and institutional co‑ordination efforts (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2024[7]).
Findings from monitoring reports (2022-2025)
Findings from monitoring reports indicate a gradual improvement in implementation over the strategy period. At the same time, reports point out uneven progress across strategic directions:
2022: Of the 156 actions in the action plan, 82 (54%) had been initiated. Among these, 39% were fully achieved, 44% partially achieved and 17% not achieved (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2022[8]).
2023: Out of 91 actions assessed, which included outstanding actions from 2022 and progress made on the implementation of actions with a longer deadline, 52% were achieved, 27% in progress, 9% partially achieved and 12% not achieved (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2023[9]).
2024: The report assessed 72 actions, including new, outstanding and longer-term actions. It found that 65% were fully implemented, 24% in progress and 11% not initiated. While there are fewer uninitiated actions, planning and co‑ordination need to be strengthened to reduce delays and maintain momentum (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2025[10]).
2025: The monitoring report covered 64 actions, including those due in 2025, outstanding actions from previous years and actions of a continuous nature. It found that 69% were fully implemented, 23% were in progress and 8% were not implemented. The report points out continued implementation challenges in structurally complex or politically sensitive reforms (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2026[11]).
In early 2026, the MoJ was in the process of developing an internal end-of-term report on the implementation of the JSS.
Civil society monitoring and shadow reporting
The JSS encouraged independent oversight through civil society. The shadow reporting3 played a complementary role and provided a more nuanced assessment of both the quality and depth of implementation. The first assessment confirmed overall progress, but highlighted qualitative shortcomings in a significant share of completed actions, including shortcomings and challenges in design, legislative compliance and transparency4 (IPRE, 2024[12]). The report for the period between 1 January 2022 and 31 December 2023 found that:
Out of the total of 81 actions to be carried out in the reporting period, 20 (24.6%) were implemented without constraints, 9 (11.1%) were carried out with minor gaps, 16 (19.7%) were carried out with significant shortfalls, 24 (29.6%) were ongoing and 12 (14.8%) were uninitiated/unimplemented.
Out of the 45 continuous actions, 21 (46.6%) were implemented without constraints, 1 (2.2%) was implemented with minor gaps, 12 (26.6%) were implemented with substantial gaps, 6 (13.3%) were ongoing and 5 (11.1%) were uninitiated/unimplemented.
Towards the next justice sector strategy
With the conclusion of the JSS 2022-2025, Moldova has entered a transition phase toward a new strategic framework for the justice sector, ensuring a coherent and continuous strategic planning process. The Ministry of Justice is currently preparing a final report assessing the level of implementation of the Strategy. In addition, an independent end-of-term evaluation of the JSS is currently being conducted by the OECD. It seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of results, institutional learning and alignment with international standards. These activities were preceded by capacity-building workshops to discuss the methodological guidance document, strengthen the knowledge base of justice stakeholders and embed a culture of evaluation.
Together with official monitoring data and shadow monitoring, international and national partners’ assessments and recommendations, including those presented in this Review, evaluation findings are intended to inform the development and prioritisation of the forthcoming justice sector strategy.
The MoJ has developed and received government approval for the Concept of the Programme for the Development of the Justice Sector for 2027-2031. The new strategy will build on the reforms initiated under the 2022-2025 strategy, while stipulating a set of new sectoral priorities focused on EU accession requirements under Chapter 23. The current concept for the programme shows a continued focus on objectives such as judicial independence, integrity, accountability and improved access to justice, including for underserved groups. In terms of concrete measures, the current concept aims at the strengthening of the capacities of judicial self‑governance and prosecutorial bodies, the completion of vetting processes, strengthening functional evaluation and disciplinary mechanisms, more efficient and quality justice services, effective anti-corruption mechanisms, enhancing the enforcement of judicial decisions, increasing the use of ADR mechanisms, advancing the digitalisation of the justice sector and the improvement of the criminal and penitentiary systems in line with human rights standards (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2026[13]; Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2026[14]). Apart from this, the MoJ has also created a working group comprising a core group of drafters and bringing together key stakeholders, including experts from institutions, NGOs, and development partners. This group is tasked with preparing the initial draft, which will next be discussed with a broader range of stakeholders, including justice system actors, civil society and the EU.
Given the new strategy’s strategic importance for Moldova’s EU accession process, ensuring clarity of vision, strong alignment with EU acquis and requirements, robust planning and strong national ownership will be particularly important. The strategy will serve not only as a national roadmap for justice reform but also a key instrument supporting Moldova’s EU accession ambitions and its engagement with the EU enlargement process.
3.3. Co-ordination and planning mechanisms in the justice sector
Copy link to 3.3. Co-ordination and planning mechanisms in the justice sectorEffective co‑ordination across institutions and levels of government advances coherent justice reforms. It ensures alignment with Moldova’s strategic priorities and delivery of people-centred services. Implementing a whole-of-sector justice services approach depends not only on institutional presence but also on the capacity of actors to work collaboratively across traditional boundaries. Co‑ordination is both a governance challenge and a foundational enabler of integrated service delivery.
In Moldova, horizontal and vertical co‑ordination mechanisms have evolved as part of broader public administration reforms. These mechanisms are designed to foster cross-sectoral coherence, reduce institutional fragmentation and promote evidence-informed policymaking. Yet, challenges remain in translating planning structures into operational co‑ordination.
Horizontal co‑ordination mechanisms involve public institutions operating at the same level of government, primarily at the central level. Inter‑ministerial co‑ordination is generally carried out through a combination of ad hoc and standing structures, including working groups, task forces and thematic co‑ordination councils convened by the State Chancellery and line ministries. Sector-specific councils, such as those dedicated to justice reform, anti-corruption and e‑governance, help foster collaboration among ministries and agencies with cross-cutting mandates. In many of these forums, civil society organisations are invited to participate, particularly in the context of justice reforms and transparency-related initiatives.
Vertical co‑ordination mechanisms aim to align national strategies with subnational implementation. They include structured engagement with local governments through platforms such as the Congress of Local Authorities of Moldova and dedicated consultative mechanisms that facilitate dialogue between central authorities and local public administrations. Regional and municipal co‑ordination councils also contribute to ensuring that national policy objectives are effectively translated into local-level implementation.
Despite these mechanisms, multiple assessments and strategic documents, including the Public Administration Reform Strategy 2023-2030 (Government Decision No. 126/2023), indicate there are challenges in achieving effective co‑ordination. These include siloed approaches to policymaking, insufficient data sharing, overlapping institutional mandates and irregular stakeholder engagement. These issues often result in fragmented implementation and reduced accountability.
The government of Moldova has undertaken reforms to reinforce co‑ordination architecture. In 2024, the role of the State Chancellery was strengthened to enhance its leadership in inter‑ministerial co‑ordination. Efforts were also launched to streamline decision making, minimise duplication across co‑ordination bodies and clarify the mandates and reporting lines of inter‑institutional platforms. These reforms seek to embed more consistent collaboration and integrated planning across Moldova’s public administration, including the justice sector.
3.3.1. Whole-of-government mechanisms and horizontal co‑ordination
The government of Moldova has established a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to support whole-of-government co‑ordination and policy coherence. Centre-of-government functions are clearly assigned to key institutions, with the State Chancellery playing a central role in co‑ordinating strategic planning, policy development and quality control across government, supported by the MoJ and Ministry of Finance (Box 3.6).
At the strategic level, the Inter‑Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning (CIPS) is the primary platform for aligning strategic priorities with Moldova’s development and EU integration goals. Chaired by the Prime Minister and supported by the State Chancellery’s Directorate for Strategic Planning, CIPS oversees the preparation of key strategic documents, including the National Development Plan, the NAP and the government’s Annual Work Plan. Despite its central role, SIGMA/OECD has noted that greater consistency is still needed across these planning instruments (OECD, 2023[15]).
This framework seeks to ensure that justice strategies, plans and allocations are consistent with overarching government planning instruments and to determine how the justice reform agenda is formulated, aligned with EU accession objectives and integrated into government-wide planning. The MoJ is expected to translate justice-specific reforms into strategic objectives that are coherent with national development priorities and EU requirements. This co-ordination function is also critical for ensuring that strategic priorities are effectively translated into budgetary allocations and that resources are directed toward the most impactful justice reforms.
Box 3.6. Key roles of the Inter‑Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning in Moldova
Copy link to Box 3.6. Key roles of the Inter‑Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning in MoldovaThe Inter‑Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning ensures the coherence, prioritisation and alignment of Moldova’s strategic development efforts, particularly in the context of EU accession.
CIPS’s key roles:
Strategic co‑ordination: Aligns national, sectoral and financial planning frameworks, including the National Development Strategy (NDS), NAP, National Development Plan (NDP) and Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF), to ensure consistency across public policies.
Policy coherence: Reviews and advises on draft strategies, programmes and sectoral action plans to maintain alignment with Moldova’s overarching development priorities and EU integration objectives.
Monitoring and evaluation: Oversees monitoring of the implementation of major strategic documents, assesses progress and recommends adjustments where necessary.
Preparation for EU accession: Guides the planning, preparation and updating of the National Accession Programme to ensure effective alignment with EU standards and negotiation processes.
Resource prioritisation: Supports the linkage between strategic planning and financial planning by ensuring that key priorities are adequately reflected in the MTBF and annual budgets.
CIPS is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the following permanent members: Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economic Development and Digitalisation, Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry, Deputy Prime Minister for European integration, Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Minister of Energy, Minister of Labour and Social Protection, Secretary General of the Government. The State Chancellery acts as the secretariat of CIPS, co‑ordinating its activities and ensuring technical support for meetings and follow-up actions.
Source: Government Decision No. 1070/2023 on the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning.
At the operational level, the Secretary General of the Government chairs co-ordination meetings with the general secretaries of ministries to support policy coherence and legal consistency at the technical level (Meetings of General Secretaries of Ministries). This formal mechanism was established under Government Decision No. 610/2018 approving the Rules of Procedure of the Government (arts. 180-188) and meets at least weekly. The meetings provide a platform for reviewing draft legislation and planning documents, addressing unresolved inter-institutional comments or overlapping mandates, monitoring implementation of government priorities and harmonising legislative proposals ahead of parliamentary consideration.
The mechanism appears to be well institutionalised in practice. During 2025, 73 meetings of the secretaries general were organised (50 ordinary and 23 extraordinary meetings), during which 790 draft acts were examined. Agendas, examined documents, minutes and transcripts are publicly available on the government website, contributing to transparency and traceability of the co-ordination process.
The meetings support interministerial co-ordination across sectors, including in areas relevant to justice reform that require inputs from multiple institutions and agencies. However, recent changes to the organisation of ministries introduced by Government Decision No. 284/2025 may affect the future role of secretaries general in policy co-ordination. In particular, the 2025 reorganisation of ministries places policy functions under the direct management of political appointees, notably state secretaries, and partly under the co-ordination of deputy secretaries general. Combined with the transfer of several support and administrative functions under the direct authority of ministers, this may significantly reduce the operational influence of secretaries general within ministries and weaken their role in ministerial policy processes, despite their continued formal responsibility for co-ordinating the ministerial apparatus and interministerial co-ordination mechanisms.
Box 3.7. Key functions of the meetings of the Secretaries General in Moldova
Copy link to Box 3.7. Key functions of the meetings of the Secretaries General in MoldovaThe Meetings of the Secretaries General of ministries serve to improve cross-government operational and strategic co‑ordination across Moldova’s central public administration. Their core functions include:
Inter‑ministerial co‑ordination: Facilitating the preparation, consultation and alignment of draft legislative and policy acts across ministries prior to submission to government decision-making procedures.
Quality assurance and legal compliance: Reviewing draft acts to ensure they meet legal and procedural requirements related to public consultation, justification, legal expertise and inter‑institutional endorsement.
Resolution of procedural issues: Addressing delayed or contested draft acts, including those with objections raised by the State Chancellery, Ministry of Finance or MoJ.
Support for strategic planning and legislative prioritisation: Discussing items such as the government’s legislative priorities, implementation of the Prime Minister’s directives and preparation of parliamentary agendas.
Monitoring implementation: Tracking the fulfilment of tasks and legislative commitments outlined in normative acts, government decisions or strategic plans.
The State Chancellery ensures the organisation and technical support of these meetings, which contribute to enhancing cross-government co‑ordination, legislative discipline and the effective implementation of Moldova’s reform and EU integration agenda.
Source: Government Decision No. 610/2018 on the approval of the Regulations of the Government.
3.3.2. Vertical co‑ordination and central-local alignment
Local governments in Moldova play a limited but important role in delivering justice-related services, primarily in areas that intersect with administrative justice, public order and citizen access to basic legal services. Their responsibilities include maintaining civil status records (births, marriages, deaths), facilitating access to primary legal aid in partnership with the NCSGLA, supporting community policing initiatives and participating in social re‑integration programmes for former detainees. In some jurisdictions, local authorities also contribute to informal dispute resolution mechanisms and engage in public awareness campaigns related to rights and access to justice. The government’s partnerships with local authorities for delivering community-based services, such as community centres or social re‑integration programmes, illustrate potential models that could be expanded into the justice sector.
However, the capacity of local governments to effectively perform these functions is hampered by structural and financial constraints. Chief among these is limited fiscal resources and dependence on central government transfers, which are often unpredictable and not specifically earmarked for justice-related functions. Approximately 70% of local government revenues originate from central transfers, while locally generated revenues account for less than 10% of total local budgets (UNDP Moldova, 2019[16]). This dependency undermines local financial autonomy and restricts the ability of municipalities to tailor justice-related services to local needs.
The current intergovernmental fiscal system would need a transparent and equitable allocation formula to avoid disparities in funding across localities (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Facility, 2023[17]). Some local governments receive fewer resources than others, affecting their ability to maintain core services, including those linked to justice and public safety. Furthermore, centralised control over tax policy and administration leaves local governments with minimal discretion over revenue generation. Local authorities have limited control over tax bases or rates, which further restricts their capacity to respond to evolving community needs or invest in infrastructure that supports access to justice (InfoTag, 2024[18]; Untila, 2023[19]).
These structural limitations affect both the efficiency and the responsiveness of local service provision. In practice, they tend to hinder the delivery of core justice services close to people, such as legal advice, community-based support and frontline victim assistance. These gaps may disproportionally affect groups with intersecting disadvantages, who often rely on accessible, timely and trusted support services delivered close to them, as these overlapping factors often magnify the barriers they face in navigating fragmented or unfamiliar justice pathways (see Chapter 6). Fragmented responsibilities, insufficient resources and capacities as well as limited institutional channels for co-ordination with central institutions can prevent local authorities from fully developing a more integrated, people-centred justice system. Strengthening vertical co‑ordination between central and local authorities through clearer mandates, equitable financing, capacity-building support and more considerate planning processes is essential. These measures could help both improve justice outcomes at the local level and reduce territorial disparities in access to justice.
The government’s partnerships with local authorities in delivering community-based services, such as community centres and social re‑integration programmes, illustrate potential models that could be expanded into the justice sector.
3.3.3. Co-ordination mechanisms for policy planning and development
Over the past decade, Moldova's justice sector has taken significant steps toward institutionalising wide-ranging co‑ordination and consultation mechanisms. These mechanisms involve not only governmental institutions but civil society organisations, professional associations, academia and international partners. Such inclusive approaches are essential for enhancing transparency, strengthening public trust and building consensus around justice sector reforms.
The MoJ plays a central role in facilitating consultations during the development of legal reforms, strategic documents and public policies. Draft laws and strategic documents are regularly published for public comment on the ministry’s official website. The MoJ also convenes technical working groups and task forces early in the design process to involve stakeholders. For instance, the development of the Justice Sector Strategy 2022-2025 included broad-based consultations with justice sector institutions, civil society and legal professionals, contributing to a shared vision and prioritisation of reform areas.
Several structured mechanisms have emerged to support participatory and engaging policymaking and co‑ordinated implementation. The Monitoring Group for the Justice Sector Strategy brings together government representatives, civil society and development partners. This group meets semi-annually and annually to assess progress, discuss implementation challenges and propose course corrections. It also serves as a space for multi‑stakeholder accountability and evidence-based dialogue.
Parliament also plays a role in participatory policy development. The Standing Committee on Legal Issues, Appointments and Immunities regularly holds public hearings on justice reforms, often inviting input from civil society organisations, which may submit alternative reports or position papers to influence legislative debates.
To address remaining gaps in engagement and co‑ordination, the MoJ has taken steps to strengthen and formalise dialogue and inter-institutional co-operation through the creation of dedicated platforms, including the Consultative Council of the MoJ, the Anti‑Corruption Platform (Box 3.8 and Box 3.9), and, more recently, the Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of the Justice Sector Digitalisation (Box 3.10). These mechanisms aim to formalise and institutionalise dialogue between stakeholders and government, helping to ensure that reform agendas are informed by diverse perspectives and that implementation challenges can be addressed collectively.
Box 3.8. Consultative Council of the Ministry of Justice
Copy link to Box 3.8. Consultative Council of the Ministry of JusticeThe Consultative Council was established by the MoJ to support inclusive, transparent and evidence-based decision making in the justice sector. It serves as a structured platform for dialogue and co-ordination among justice sector stakeholders, especially in the context of Moldova’s reform agenda and EU integration commitments.
Key roles
Advises the MoJ on the development, implementation and monitoring of justice sector policies and reforms;
Provides expert input on draft legislation, sector strategies and reform initiatives;
Facilitates dialogue and consensus-building among justice institutions, legal professionals, civil society and international partners;
Supports monitoring and evaluation of justice reforms, including those linked to Moldova’s EU accession process;
Promotes transparency, accountability and evidence-based policymaking in the justice sector.
Composition
MoJ representatives (Chair: Minister of Justice or designee);
Judicial authorities (e.g. SCM, Supreme Court of Justice);
Prosecutorial authorities (e.g. SCP, Prosecutor General’s Office);
Legal professions (e.g. Union of Lawyers of Moldova, Notary Chamber, Union of Bailiffs);
Anti-corruption and integrity bodies (e.g. National Integrity Authority);
Civil society organisations and research institutes active in the justice field;
Academic institutions and independent experts;
International partners and donors (as observers).
Box 3.9. Anti‑Corruption Platform
Copy link to Box 3.9. Anti‑Corruption PlatformTo enhance transparency, integrity and co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts, the MoJ established the Anti-Corruption Platform. This forum promotes dialogue and consultation around key initiatives under the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIAS) and supports Moldova’s alignment with international standards and EU accession commitments.
Main roles
Facilitates dialogue and co-ordination on anti-corruption initiatives among government institutions, civil society and international partners;
Advises on legislative and institutional reforms to strengthen the prevention, detection and sanctioning of corruption;
Monitors and supports the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti‑Corruption Strategy and related action plans;
Promotes transparency, ethics and accountability in public administration and the justice sector;
Engages stakeholders and raises public awareness in the fight against corruption.
Composition
MoJ officials (Chair: Minister of Justice or designee);
Representatives of anti‑corruption institutions (e.g. National Anti‑Corruption Centre, National Integrity Authority, Prosecutor General’s Office);
Judiciary and prosecutorial bodies (e.g. SCM, SCP);
Civil society organisations and investigative media representatives;
Private sector organisations and business associations;
International partners and development agencies (as observers).
Box 3.10. Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation
Copy link to Box 3.10. Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector DigitalisationIn 2025, the MoJ established the Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation to strengthen co-ordination of digital reforms across the justice sector. The council was created by Order of the Minister of Justice No. 262/2025 with its first meeting held in September 2025.
The council serves as a multi-institutional platform bringing together representatives of justice institutions, professional bodies and digital governance authorities. Its mission is to support the strategic co-ordination of digital transformation initiatives and ensure their alignment with national priorities, EU integration requirements and international standards.
The council performs several functions, including:
proposing strategic directions for the digital transformation of the justice sector;
co-ordinating digitalisation initiatives across justice institutions and avoiding duplication of information systems;
promoting interoperability between justice sector information systems and national digital government platforms;
identifying obstacles to digital transformation and proposing solutions;
supporting the alignment of digital reforms with EU standards on data protection, cybersecurity and electronic identification.
The council also provides a platform for dialogue among justice institutions, digital governance bodies and professional organisations, helping to ensure that digitalisation initiatives are implemented in a coherent and co-ordinated manner.
Source: Ministry of Justice, Order No. 262/2025 on the establishment of the Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation.
Despite this progress, co-ordination and consultation practices remain uneven across institutions and policy areas. Stakeholder feedback reveals persistent issues of artificial or last-minute consultations, particularly on politically sensitive topics, and inconsistent practices across justice institutions. Engagement often remains limited to the provision of information or reactive feedback rather than genuine co‑creation of solutions. As a result, policy coherence is uneven and public participation could be seen as formalistic.
This reflects broader challenges with open government and civic engagement in Moldova. The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government underlines the importance of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in all phases of the policy cycle from problem identification and design to implementation and evaluation through methods such as open consultations, participatory budgeting, civic monitoring and deliberative engagement (OECD, 2017[23]).
In Moldova, the 1994 Constitution (arts. 38 and 39) affirms the right of citizens to participate in public affairs. The Law on Transparency in the Decision-Making Process (No. 239/2008) and the Law on Access to Information of Public Interest (No. 148/2023) provide a basic legal framework for public participation and information access.
Moldova’s recent Open Government Action Plans and the Civil Society Development Programme (2024-2027) seek to improve civic engagement and co-operation with civil society (Government Decision No. 845/2023 and Government Order No. 158/2023). Several formal platforms for dialogue and consultation have been established across branches of government (Box 3.11). Assessments by international organisations and civil society monitoring reports indicate that several barriers continue to limit the effectiveness of multistakeholder co-ordination (Government Disposition No. 237-d/2024; European Commission (2024[24]; 2025[25]); GRECO (2024[26]); OECD/SIGMA (2023[27])):
Short consultation timelines often limit stakeholders’ ability to provide substantive input.
Participation typically occurs late in the policy cycle, after key policy directions have already been defined.
Participation remains uneven across groups, with marginalised communities – including ethnic minorities, rural populations and youth - often underrepresented.
Consultation outcomes are not systematically linked to decision-making, reducing the perceived impact of civil society contributions.
In the justice sector, structured engagement with citizens and non-state actors remains limited. While civil society representatives participate in bodies such as the SCM and the SCP, broader and more systematic involvement of non‑governmental organisations, professional associations or private actors in the design, delivery or evaluation of justice services could be further strengthened.
Box 3.11. Platforms for co‑operation with civil society in Moldova
Copy link to Box 3.11. Platforms for co‑operation with civil society in MoldovaAt the parliamentary level:
Since 2005, Moldova has introduced the document Concept of Co‑operation between the parliament and civil society, which lays down formal mechanisms for engagement, including expert councils, public hearings, consultations, annual conferences and ad-hoc meetings.
In 2023, Parliament formalised the Platform of Dialogue and Civic Participation through Decision No. 149/2023, establishing additional structured mechanisms for public participation.
Civil society representatives regularly participate in the legislative process by offering expertise in various fields (legal, economic, security) and taking part in consultations and public hearings organised by parliamentary committees.
Parliament organises an Annual Conference with civil society to assess the co‑operation and to present a report on transparency in decision-making.
At the government (ministerial) level:
Until 2016, a National Participation Council (NPC) served as a permanent consultative body with civil society representatives. It was discontinued but replaced by digital consultation tools.
The Particip.gov.md platform enables public consultations on legislative and normative acts online. Ministries also maintain dedicated “decisional transparency” sections on their websites.
In 2023-2024, the government established Permanent Consultative Platforms (PCPs) within ministries to ensure continuous dialogue with civil society. By mid-2024, 8 out of 14 ministries had established such platforms.
The Te-consult (“I consult you”) Network was launched to train civil servants on public consultations and build institutional capacity.
Other multi-level platforms:
Moldova also engages civil society through the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, the EU-Moldova Civil Society Platform and the EU Internal Advisory Group (DAG).
CSO representatives are involved in policymaking bodies, such as the SCM, SCP, Pre-Vetting Commission and Council for Integrity.
Source: Information based on the Moldovan authorities’ responses to the OECD questionnaire on participatory mechanisms.
The institutional architecture and governance arrangements of the justice sector are important factors for its effectiveness. In parallel, effectiveness also depends on the ability of judicial governance institutions to uphold core judicial values - including independence, integrity, accountability and transparency - and to operationalise them through governance mechanisms and professional standards within Moldova’s judiciary (see Chapter 4).
3.3.4. Evidence-based and sectoral policy planning
Strategic decision-making and co‑ordination in the justice sector depend on a robust, coherent and timely evidence base. In Moldova, challenges due to fragmented data systems, inconsistencies in data quality, limited analytical capacity and insufficient integration of user perspectives remain (World Bank, 2023[28]).
As highlighted throughout this report, data collection and analysis remain largely siloed across institutions, impeding a co‑ordinated, sector-wide approach. The ICMS, managed by the ADJJA, is the central platform for case processing and judicial data (Agency for Court Administration, 2023[29]). Despite its technical role and potential, the ICMS is not fully leveraged for performance management, resource planning or policy development. Meanwhile, the SCM compiles separate datasets to track court performance,5 often relying on manually collected information due to concerns over ICMS data quality (European Commission, 2023[30]; Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2024[7]). While data infrastructure issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the present section highlights that the underlying challenge is not only technical but strategic: without a unified data governance framework and clearly defined roles, Moldova cannot fully implement evidence-based planning and monitoring practices aligned with OECD recommendations.
In parallel, people-centred policy development could be better highlighted. Moldova does not regularly conduct legal needs and justice problems surveys, user satisfaction assessments or experience-based evaluations to guide the design and delivery of justice services. Most institutions report only on activity-based indicators, such as number of cases processed or outreach events conducted, without systematically assessing the quality, accessibility or impact of services on users. Key performance indicators (KPIs), where they exist, are often disconnected from broader access to justice outcomes.
While some external evaluations, particularly those conducted under EU or OECD programmes, have provided important insights, they remain episodic and donor-driven. A more sustainable model would involve institutionalising regular, independent and participatory evaluation processes across the justice sector.
Building an effective, responsive and people-centred justice system requires moving beyond institutional input metrics and legal compliance. It demands a co‑ordinated approach to data governance and shared performance frameworks, and systematic engagement with the needs and experiences of users. Strengthening these pillars will be key to translating Moldova’s reform strategies into meaningful change on the ground.
3.4. Pathways to support reforms
Copy link to 3.4. Pathways to support reformsThere are pathways and policy levers that can continue to strengthen governance for a sound and trusted justice sector in Moldova.
1. Continue to clarify roles and responsibilities to improve coherence and efficiency in the judiciary. This could include:
Revising, where appropriate, roles and responsibilities across justice institutions to enhance the SCM’s leadership in the judiciary’s efficient functioning;
Exploring re-allocating selected court administration functions (e.g. collection and analysis of judicial statistics) from the executive to the SCM to reduce duplication and better link data (e.g. workload) to management decisions;
Exploring sustainable models for a court administration service, including centralising, partially or in full, administrative support functions (e.g. budgeting, human resources, procurement) at the SCM level to strengthen its capacity, improve efficiency and achieve economies of scale.
2. Strengthen inter‑institutional, cross-sectoral and vertical co‑ordination. This could include:
Establishing a permanent co-ordination mechanism on access to justice that brings together key justice and non-justice institutions under the leadership of the MoJ, including, among others, the NCSGLA, Equality Council, Ombudsoffice, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, Ministry of Interior, National Institute of Justice, Police Academy and civil society, to strengthen coherent policy implementation and service delivery;
Institutionalising permanent national and local co-ordination platforms for service design and delivery involving justice, social protection, health, education and law enforcement actors;
Ensuring these structures have clear mandates, decision-making authority and dedicated resources to support integrated, responsive and efficient justice services;
Clarifying and formalising institutional roles and responsibilities across programmes and strategies that intersect with justice functions, especially where justice institutions are not the lead entity, but have key delivery or oversight functions;
Improving vertical co-ordination between central and local authorities for the broader delivery of justice services through clearer mandates, equitable financing, targeted capacity-building support and inclusive, participatory planning processes;
Expanding transparency and public engagement, including systematising participatory processes in justice reform initiatives, engaging civil society in monitoring and evaluation, and promoting transparency through regular performance reporting by justice institutions to the public and other public institutions.
3. Advance evidence-based justice policy with a view to designing and implementing a comprehensive, responsive and integrated policy on people-centred justice. A stronger evidence base would support not only better policy design, but also the more systematic use of performance information and expenditure reviews to assess the effectiveness of spending and inform future resource allocation decisions. This could include:
Developing and implementing a measurement framework and co-ordinated justice data strategy that promotes the collection and management of both administrative and people-centred justice data, by gathering standardised, regularly updated and disaggregated data for an agreed set of people-centred variables across all justice institutions and through surveys;
Consolidating and modernising justice information systems to enable service providers and policymakers to rely on them for evidence-based decision making, monitoring and evaluation. These systems would support performance tracking, assessment of service-delivery effectiveness, value for money, and the identification of user needs and emerging trends;
Strengthening disaggregated data collection and exchange by investing in interoperable technologies and improving the seamless integration of information systems. Justice-related data could be disaggregated by relevant demographic, geographic and socio-economic variables to better identify barriers to access and differences in justice experiences and outcomes;
Enhancing the use of justice statistics for policymaking and resource prioritisation by, for instance, re‑engaging the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in compiling and disaggregating data across a range of data sources. This could include supporting the regular conduct of legal needs and justice problems surveys or other research to better understand demand for justice services, especially among vulnerable populations.
Legislation (Primary and Secondary)
Copy link to Legislation (Primary and Secondary)Constitution 1994: Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/145723.
Government Decision No. 306 of 28 May 2025 on the approval of the National Programme for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union for the years 2025-2029, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/152627.
Government Decision No. 284 of 14 May 2025 on the regulation of the organization and functioning of the specialized central public administration authorities, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150840.
Government Decision No. 275 of 14 May 2025 on the Roadmap on ‘The Rule of Law’ (benchmark in the process of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/148501.
Government Disposition No. 237-d of 23 December 2024 on the amendment of Government Disposition No. 158 d/2023 regarding priority areas and commitments for open government for the years 2023–2025, https://www.gov.md/sites/default/files/users-media/media-16/18-02-1508_26.12.2024.pdf.
Government Decision No. 748 of 28 November 2024 on the Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration, https://www.justice.gov.md/ro/content/anunt-privind-modificarea-carului-normativ-ca-urmare-crearii-agentiei-digitalizare-justitie.
Government Decision No. 164 of 6 March 2024 on the approval of the National Programme on Ensuring Respect for Human Rights for 2024-2027, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/142723.
Government Decision No. 1070/2023 on the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning, https://gov.md/sites/default/files/media/documents/sedinte-de-guvern/2025-12/NU-939-CS-2025_0.pdf.
Government Decision No. 845 of 1 November 2023 on the approval of the Programme for the Development of Civil Society Organisations for 2024–2027, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/141016.
Government Decision No. 650 of 6 September 2023 on the approval of the Digital Transformation Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2023-2030, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/139408.
Government Decision No. 203 of 12 April 2023 on the approval of the Programme for the Promotion and Ensuring of Equality between Women and Men in the Republic of Moldova for 2023-2027, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/137409.
Government Decision No. 126 of 15 March 2023 on the approval of the Public Administration Reform Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2023-2030, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/140474.
Government Decision No. 610 of 3 July 2018 on the approval of the Regulations of the Government, https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=108903.
Government Decision No. 698 of 30 August 2017 about the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Justice, https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=100412.
Judgment No. 23 of 6 August 2020 on the interpretation of articles 89, 91 and 98 paragraph (1) of the Constitution, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/122835.
Judgment No. 28 of 17 October 2017 on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 98 paragraph (6) in conjunction with Articles 1, 56, 91, 135 and 140 of the Constitution (failure to fulfil constitutional obligations by the President), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/91912.
Judgment No. 24 of 27 July 2017 on the control of the constitutionality of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova No. 105-VIII of 28 March 2017 on the holding of a republican consultative referendum on issues of national interest (republican consultative referendum), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/100378.
Judgment No. 2 of 24 January 2017 on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 98 paragraph (6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (co-decision on government reshuffle), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/100539.
Judgment No. 5 of 2 March 2016 on the interpretation of Article 106¹ paragraph (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (engaging the Government in liability), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/92695.
Judgment No. 32 of 29 December 2015 on the review of the constitutionality of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova No. 1877-VII of 21 December 2015 on the nomination of the candidate for the position of Prime Minister, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/90413.
Judgment No. 29 of 24 November 2015 on the interpretation of Article 85, paragraph (1) and paragraph (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (dissolution of the Parliament), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/91587.
Judgment No. 16 of 17 June 2015 on the interpretation of Article 101, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Constitution (effects of the resignation of the Prime Minister), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/96466.
Judgment No. 30 of 1 October 2013 on the interpretation of Article 85 para. (1) and para. (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (dissolution of the Parliament) (Notification no. 22b/2013), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/16106.
Judgment No. 29 of 23 September 2013 on the review of the constitutionality of Parliament's Decision No. 3 of 15 February 2013 on the commission of inquiry into the “Pădurea Domnească” case (competence of parliamentary commissions of inquiry), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/16105.
Judgment No. 7 of 18 May 2013 on the control of the constitutionality of some provisions of Law No. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 on the Government, as amended by Laws No. 107 and No. 110 of May 3, 2013, and the Decrees of the President of the Republic of Moldova No. 634-VII and No. 635-VII of May 16, 2013 and the Government Decision No. 364 of May 16, 2013, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/15901.
Judgment No. 4 of 22 April 2013 on the control of the constitutionality of the Decrees of the President of the Republic of Moldova No. 534-VII of March 8, 2013 on the resignation of the Government, in the part related to the maintenance in office of the Prime Minister-dismissed by motion of censure (for suspicions of corruption) from March 8, 2013 until the formation of the new Government, and No. 584-VII of April 10, 2013 on the designation of the candidate for the position of Prime Minister, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/929.
Judgment No. 23 of 9 November 2011 on the interpretation of Article 116 paragraph (4) of the Constitution, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/8395.
Judgment No. 22 of 25 October 2011 on the control of the constitutionality of the provisions of Article IX, points 2, 3, 5 and 7 of Law No. 48 of 26 March 2011 on the amendment and completion of certain legislative acts and Article 20 letters a), b), d), f) and l) of the Law on the State Budget for 2011 No. 52 of 31 March 2011, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/16066.
Judgment No. 17 of 20 September 2011 on the interpretation of the provisions of art.78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/14132.
Judgment No. 2 of 8 February 2011 on the interpretation of art.90 par. (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/891.
Judgment No. 9 of 26 February 1998 on the interpretation of certain provisions of art. 93 par. (2) of the Constitution, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/16719.
Law No. 148 of 9 June 2023 on Access to Information of Public Interest, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/137908.
Law No. 315 of 17 November 2022 on the approval of the National Development Strategy “European Moldova 2030,” https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=146458.
Law No. 211 of 6 December 2021 on the approval of the Strategy on ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for the years 2022–2025, Annex No.1, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/129241.
Law No. 239 of 13 November 2008 on Transparency in the Decision-Making Process, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/106638.
Law No. 947 of 19 July 1996 on the Superior Council of Magistracy, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/120592.
Law No. 514 of 6 July 1995 on Judicial Organisation, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150443.
Order No. 262 of 15 August 2025 on the establishment of the Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150460.
Order No. 158 of 3 November 2023 on priority areas and commitments for open government for 2023–2025, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/146526.
Order No. 144 of 8 June 2022 on the establishment of the mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Strategy on ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for the years 2022-2025 and the Action Plan, https://www.justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/ attachments/metodologia_de_monitorizare.pdf.
Order No. 47 of 22 February 2022 on the establishment of the monitoring group for the implementation of the Strategy on ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for the years 2022-2025 and the Action Plan, https://www.justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/ ordin_grupul_de_monitorizare.pdf.
Parliament Decision No. 442 of 28 December 2023 on the approval of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028 and the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/141920.
Parliament Decision No. 342 of 15 December 2022 on the approval of the National Programme for the Recovery of Criminal Assets for 2023–2027 and the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Programme for the Recovery of Criminal Assets for 2023–2027, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/135063.
References
[29] Agency for Court Administration (2023), Statistical Reports, https://old.aaij.justice.gov.md/en-tech/report-type/rapoarte-statistice (accessed on 4 August 2025).
[4] CCJE (2007), Opinion No. 10 to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Council for the Judiciary at the Service of Society, Consultative Council of European Judges, https://rm.coe.int/168074779b (accessed on 13 February 2026).
[17] Eastern Partnership Civil Society Facility (2023), Local Budgets: What Do Citizens Want?, https://eapcivilsociety.eu/news/civil-society-news/localcorrespondent-opinion-local-budgets-what-do-citizens-want.html (accessed on 13 February 2026).
[25] European Commission (2025), Republic of Moldova 2025 Report, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0758.
[24] European Commission (2024), Republic of Moldova 2024 Report, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024SC0698.
[30] European Commission (2023), Enlargement Report: Moldova, Chapter 23 & Cluster 1 Fundamentals, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_698%20Moldova%20report.pdf.
[1] Government of the Republic of Moldova (1994), Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.constcourt.md/public/files/file/Actele%20Curtii/acte_en/MDA_Constitution_EN.pdf.
[26] GRECO (2024), Evaluation Report: Republic of Moldova, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aec9a5.
[18] InfoTag (2024), Penitentiary No. 13: A Legacy of Overcrowding and ECtHR Condemnations.
[12] IPRE (2024), Shadow Monitoring Report No. 1 - Strategy for Ensuring the Independence and Integrity of the Justice Sector for the Years 2022 – 2025, https://ipre.md/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Raport-alternativ-de-monitorizare-nr.-1_GEJ_03.05.2024_ENG_final.pdf.
[13] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2026), Announcement on the initiation of the process for drafting the Programme for the Development of the Justice Sector for 2027–2031, https://justice.gov.md/ro/content/anunt-privind-initierea-procesului-de-elaborare-proiectului-programului-pentru-dezvoltarea.
[14] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2026), Concept of the Programme for the Development of the Justice Sector for 2027–2031, https://justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/conceptul_noului_document_de_politici_in_sectorul_justitiei.pdf.
[11] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2026), Summary of the 2025 monitoring report on the implementation of measures set out in the Action Plan for the Strategy to ensure the independence and integrity of the justice sector (2022–2025), https://justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/raport_de_monitorizare_pentru_anul_2025.pdf.
[21] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2025), Anti-corruption platform, https://www.justice.gov.md/ro/advanced-page-type/platforma-anticoruptie.
[10] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2025), Summary of the Monitoring Report on the degree of achievement for 2024 of the measures in the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for 2022-2025, https://justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/raport_de_monitorizare_pentru_anul_2024.pdf.
[7] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2024), Justice sector strategy, https://justice.gov.md/ro/content/mecanismul-de-monitorizare-strategiei-sectorului-justitiei22 (accessed on 5 August 2025).
[22] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2023), “Launch of the Anticorruption Platform at the Ministry of Justice”, https://www.justice.gov.md/ro/content/lansarea-platformei-anticoruptie-la-ministerul-justitiei (accessed on 12 March 2026).
[9] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2023), Summary of the Monitoring Report on the degree of achievement for 2023 of the measures in the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for 2022-2025, https://justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/proiect_raport_saiisj_2023_anual_final.pdf.
[20] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2023), The Advisory Council of the Ministry of Justice has been launched, https://justice.gov.md/ro/content/fost-lansat-consiliul-consultativ-al-ministerului-justitiei (accessed on 12 March 2026).
[8] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2022), Summary of the Monitoring Report on the degree of achievement for 2022 of the measures in the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for 2022-2025, https://justice.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/raport_2022_implementarea_planului_de_actiuni_al_saiisj.pdf.
[6] Ministry of Justice, Moldova (2021), Strategy for Ensuring Independence and Integrity in the Justice Sector 2022-2025, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=129241&lang=ro.
[5] OECD (2023), Modernising Staffing and Court Management Practices in Ireland: Towards a More Responsive and Resilient Justice System, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8a5c52d0-en.
[15] OECD (2023), Public administration in the Republic of Moldova: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration, SIGMA Monitoring Reports, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0bbe9e93-en.
[23] OECD (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Open Government”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0438, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.
[27] OECD/SIGMA (2023), Public administration in the Republic of Moldova, https://www.sigmaweb.org/content/dam/sigma/en/publications/reports/2023/10/public-administration-in-the-republic-of-moldova_4a6a0732/0bbe9e93-en.pdf.
[16] UNDP Moldova (2019), Public Finance for Development in Moldova: Local Finances and Local Self-Governance, Joint Integrated Local Development Programme (JILDP), https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/md/finante-eng.pdf.
[19] Untila, S. (2023), 30% fewer places and 40% more expensive. The new prison in Chișinău, currently being redesigned, https://newsmaker.md/ro/cu-30-mai-putine-locuri-si-cu-40-mai-scump-noul-penitenciar-din-chisinau-in-etapa-de-reproiectare.
[3] World Bank (2025), WJP Rule of Law Index: Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers, https://data360.worldbank.org/en/indicator/WJP_ROL_FAC_1 (accessed on 20 February 2026).
[28] World Bank (2023), Digital Justice Assessment: Moldova.
[2] World Justice Project (2025), Rule of Law Index 2025, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2025.pdf (accessed on 22 December 2025).
Annex 3.A. Roles of justice institutions
Copy link to Annex 3.A. Roles of justice institutions|
Institution |
Brief description of role in justice system |
|---|---|
|
JUDICIARY |
|
|
Courts |
|
|
Prosecution Service |
|
|
Anti‑Corruption Prosecution Office (APO) |
|
|
Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organised Crime and Special Cases (PCCOCS) |
|
|
Superior Council of Magistracy |
|
|
Judicial Inspection |
|
|
Superior Council of Prosecutors |
|
|
Inspection of the Prosecutors |
|
|
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) |
|
|
THE EXECUTIVE |
|
|
President of the Republic |
|
|
Government |
|
|
Ministry of Justice |
|
|
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection |
|
|
Ministry of Internal Affairs |
|
|
Ministry of Finance |
|
|
Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration |
|
|
National Council for State Guaranteed Legal Aid |
|
|
Mediation Council |
|
|
Law enforcement |
|
|
National Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence |
|
|
Intellectual Property Agency |
|
|
Office for Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering (Financial Intelligence Unit) |
|
|
Public Services Agency (PSA) |
|
|
THE LEGISLATIVE |
|
|
Parliament |
|
|
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES |
|
|
Constitutional Court |
|
|
People’s Advocate (Ombudsperson) |
|
|
Court of Accounts |
|
|
Union of Lawyers of the Republic of Moldova (Bar Association) |
|
|
Notary Chamber |
|
|
Bailiffs Union |
|
|
Competition Council |
|
|
Equality Council |
|
|
National Integrity Agency |
|
|
National Anti-Corruption Centre (NAC) |
|
|
Central Electoral Commission |
|
1. High-level corruption crimes committed by the President of the State, deputies, prime-minister, judges, prosecutors, members of the Superior Council of Magistracy and Superior Council of Prosecutors as well as the head of the National Anticorruption Centre and Security and Intelligence Service.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. See preamble to the Law on Reorganisation of the Courts: the objective of the judicial reform is “to ensure the quality of the judicial act, the efficiency of the judicial system, the fair distribution of tasks between the courts, the efficient use of public funds, as well as in order to create the premises for the specialisation of judges”.
← 2. Since implementation began in 2022, 12 official monitoring reports have been produced (8 semi-annual and 4 annual), covering activities for 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025.
← 3. In 2023, the Justice Expert Group, in collaboration with #Justice4Moldova experts from the Institute for European Policies and Reforms, published the first independent monitoring report covering the period 2022‑2023. A second iteration of the shadow report was planned for 2025 to assess continued implementation.
← 4. According to the Shadow Monitoring Report No. 1 (2022-2023), the main achievements included: (1) adoption of extensive legislative reforms strengthening the independence of the judiciary and prosecution bodies, including new frameworks on judge/prosecutor selection, evaluation, disciplinary responsibility, and the reform of the Supreme Court of Justice; (2) initiation and partial implementation of extraordinary vetting mechanisms; (3) improvements in transparency through modernised institutional websites, creation of information centres in several courts, and publication of communication policies; (4) enhancements to access to justice such as legislative amendments for victims’ protection, expansion of video‑conferencing, specialised legal aid, and electronic monitoring; (5) significant progress in legal education and training (6) progress in digitalisation through piloting of the e‑File system and expansion of video‑conferencing infrastructure. The main challenges were: (1) repeated delays in adopting key secondary regulations for judge/prosecutor evaluation, integrity verification, and board functioning; (2) incomplete or inconsistent implementation of integrity mechanisms, including insufficient data on asset verification for SCM/SCP members; (3) lack of a unified communication strategy and insufficient establishment of litigant information centres nationwide; (4) significant delays in reforms affecting legal professions, including notaries, interpreters, mediators, judicial executors, and lawyers; (5) delayed or uninitiated legislative actions regarding recovery of judicial costs, monitoring of debtor assets, progressive execution of penalties, and victim compensation; (6) persistent competence conflicts between SC and SCM on the approval and elaboration of judicial documents; (7) delayed regulation of judicial police, case complexity criteria, and revision of court presidents' competencies; and (8) major lags in updating the regulatory framework for the Integrated Case Management Programme, creating e‑Execution and e‑Retention systems, and ensuring full digital interoperability across justice institutions.
← 5. Based on a comparison of the two datasets, no major differences were identified by the OECD.