This chapter explores how resources and management practices shape the delivery of justice in Moldova. It explores budgetary and financial management frameworks, infrastructure and human resources, highlighting challenges in recruitment, retention and capacity development. The chapter also analyses court performance and efficiency, as well as digital transformation and data governance, identifying opportunities to modernise service delivery and strengthen evidence-based management across the justice system. Building on the analysis of governance mechanisms presented in Chapter 4, this chapter focuses on the resources and management frameworks that enable justice institutions to operate effectively in practice. In particular, it considers how financial allocations, human resource management and performance monitoring influence the capacity of the justice system to deliver timely, accessible and high-quality justice services.
OECD Justice Review of the Republic of Moldova
Abstract
Sound financial management constitutes a foundational pillar of effective and resilient justice systems. It supports the delivery of judicial decisions as well as the performance of all associated institutional functions, ranging from case management and legal aid to human resource deployment, infrastructure maintenance and digital transformation. Robust financial governance, anchored in transparency, strategic planning and accountability, ensures that justice institutions are able to fulfil their mandates efficiently and respond to changing societal needs in a timely and people-centred manner.
In Moldova, strengthening the financial underpinnings of the justice system is a strategic imperative, particularly in the context of ongoing institutional reform, court consolidation efforts and EU accession objectives. Efficient and predictable financing mechanisms are essential for building public trust, reinforcing judicial independence and achieving long-term justice sector goals.
5.1.1. A sound institutional and legal framework for justice budgeting
Moldova’s justice sector operates within a comprehensive and defined budgetary framework, governed by Law No. 181/2014 on public finance and budgetary-fiscal responsibility. This legal foundation reflects key international principles (OECD, 2025[1]) and provides the structural basis for fiscal policy formulation, strategic planning and the operational management of public resources across all sectors, including justice.
The law establishes the full cycle of budgetary governance, covering institutional arrangements and procedures for budget preparation, execution, reporting, audit and oversight. It also enshrines the principles of fiscal transparency, medium-term sustainability and budgetary discipline. Importantly, it incorporates several elements consistent with OECD good practices on strengthening budget institutions and improving the use of public resources, as reflected in the OECD Spending Better Framework (Box 5.1).
OECD Spending Better Framework provides 10 principles that set out a comprehensive approach to strengthening budget institutions and improving the allocation and use of public resources.
1. Set clear fiscal objectives to anchor fiscal policy and ensure sustainability
2. Use objective economic assumptions to support credible budgeting
3. Develop multi-year expenditure baselines to strengthen medium-term planning
4. Apply top-down expenditure ceilings to guide resource allocation
5. Conduct regular spending reviews to assess existing expenditure and identify opportunities for efficiency and reallocation
6. Support informed spending decisions, including through performance budgeting, evaluation and impact assessments
7. Consider all forms of expenditure, including tax expenditures and fiscal risks
8. Strengthen the role of line ministries in managing resources and delivering results
9. Ensure transparency of budget information to enhance accountability
10. Provide effective budget oversight, including through parliament and independent institutions
Together, these principles support a shift from input-based budgeting toward a more strategic, evidence-based and results-oriented approach to public financial management.
Source: (OECD, 2025[2]).
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) leads the annual budget preparation process, using macroeconomic and fiscal projections to set expenditure ceilings for each sector. These ceilings are updated within the medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) and inform the preparation of sector-specific budgets, including for the justice sector. Annual budget circulars issued by the MoF detail institutional responsibilities and fiscal constraints for the coming year, thus linking macro-level forecasts with institutional planning (Ministry of Finance, Moldova, 2025[3]).
5.1.2. Medium-term budgeting and sectoral expenditure strategies
Medium-term budgeting provides the strategic foundation for aligning fiscal discipline with sectoral planning and performance. Moldova’s MTBF, established by Law No. 181/2014 on Public Finance and Budgetary-Fiscal Responsibility, reflects international good practices and contributes to implementing Principle 2 (Closely align budgets with the medium-term strategic priorities of government) and Principle 6 (Present a comprehensive, accurate and reliable account of the public finances) of the OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance (OECD, 2015[4]). However, there is a timing difference between setting expenditure ceilings and the inflation forecast which undermines the ceilings for the forthcoming budget and reduces the benefit of the MTBF as a framework for annual and medium-term budget planning.
Strategic framework and fiscal anchoring
The MTBF sets expenditure ceilings for each sector based on macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. The framework includes:
Financial data covering the results of the previous two fiscal years;
Revenue forecast outcomes for the current fiscal year;
Macroeconomic projections and fiscal risks;
Sectoral expenditure frameworks over a three-year horizon;
Projections informed by past expenditure performance and strategic development goals.
The MoF leads MTBF preparation, co‑ordinating with line ministries and sectoral institutions (Box 5.2). Annual budget circulars communicate updated ceilings and fiscal rules, guiding institutions in preparing their own budgets within the MTBF envelope. The government approves the MTBF each year and submits it to the parliament for information (Law No. 181/2014).
The development of the MTBF is a complex process requiring contributions from a broad range of public authorities and institutions. An effective co‑ordination and decision-making mechanism is essential to support the process. To facilitate co‑operation among public authorities in the preparation of the MTBF, thematic working groups are established, each tasked with specific components of the framework. Throughout the consultation process, the MoF leads both the MTBF Co‑ordinating Group and the inter‑sectoral working groups, providing technical and organisational support to ensure the efficient conduct of their activities.
Source: Order No. 124 of 21 December 2023 on the approval of the Methodological Framework for the preparation, approval and amendment of the budget.
Source: Order No. 124 of 21 December 2023 on the approval of the Methodological Framework for the preparation, approval and amendment of the budget.
The MTBF combines top-down resource estimates with bottom-up costing of policy commitments to align budget allocations with sectoral priorities. It sets sectoral expenditure ceilings over three years, with the first-year binding and subsequent years indicative, while detailed allocations to budget organisations are defined later through annual budget circulars.
The MTBF for 2025‑2027 was approved by the Government of Moldova through Decision No. 561/2024. It articulates the government’s fiscal policy objectives over a three-year horizon, including public debt and expenditure planning, and serves as a key instrument for aligning budgetary decisions with strategic national and international commitments. The MTBF is anchored in a broad set of policy frameworks, including the government’s Activity Programme, “Prosperous, Secure, European Moldova” (Government of the Republic of Moldova, 2023[5]); Law No. 315/2022; National Action Plan for EU Accession (2024-2027) (Government Decisions No. 829/2023 and No. 45/2024); the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and Agenda (2021-2027) (European Union, 2022[6]); and the National Development Plan for 2025-2027 (Government Decision No. 361/2024).
In line with Moldova’s commitment to fiscal consolidation and more efficient public spending, the 2025‑2027 MTBF places renewed emphasis on expenditure rationalisation across all ministerial sectors. In addition, Moldova has introduced spending reviews on a pilot basis across different sectors, however, these reviews have not been carried out on an annual basis nor systematically integrated into the annual budget process (OECD, 2025[2]). In OECD countries, spending reviews are increasingly used not only to identify savings, but to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of existing expenditure and to inform the reallocation of resources in line with policy priorities. If applied in the justice sector, spending reviews could serve as a tool to support expenditure rationalisation and strategic prioritisation.
Sectoral expenditure strategies and institutional co‑ordination
Sectoral expenditure strategies, including for the justice sector, are key instruments for aligning medium-term budgetary allocations with sector-specific policy priorities. These strategic planning documents provide a structured framework for managing financial resources over a three-year horizon and are reviewed and updated annually to maintain coherence with evolving policy objectives and fiscal constraints.
The core function of sectoral expenditure strategies is to strengthen the link between political and operational priorities, and the allocation of financial resources. They support more effective and efficient use of existing expenditure programmes, enable the re‑allocation of funds toward high-impact initiatives and help ensure fiscal discipline through ex ante financial impact assessments of new policy proposals. Prioritisation decisions are made based on policy relevance, fiscal space and implementation capacity.
In the justice sector, the strategy is developed jointly by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and other relevant institutions responsible for financial management and service delivery. To ensure effective co‑ordination and stakeholder engagement, dedicated sectoral working groups are convened. These groups bring together representatives from key justice institutions and oversight bodies, facilitating consultation, shared ownership and cross-institutional alignment.
The medium-term budgetary framework plays a central role in guiding justice sector financing. It defines sectoral expenditure ceilings, within which sector strategies translate high-level objectives into operational and budgetary plans. The interaction between the MTBF and justice expenditure strategies helps ensure that financial planning reflects national priorities, supports performance-oriented reforms, and contributes to more accountable and sustainable justice service delivery (see Figure 5.2).
Source: Ministry of Finance of Moldova, Order No. 124/2023.
Importantly, sectoral strategies can also serve as a vehicle for embedding people-centred objectives into financial decision-making, such as improving access to justice, addressing the needs of populations or expanding early-resolution and community-based services. This requires that performance frameworks go beyond institutional inputs and outputs to include outcome indicators that reflect user experience, and needs and service quality.
5.1.3. Justice budgeting and governance: Strengthening performance-informed approaches for resilience
Overview and institutional roles
Robust budgeting and financial autonomy are essential pillars of institutional independence in the justice sector, enabling courts, prosecution services and other justice bodies to operate without undue political or administrative interference (see Chapter 4). In Moldova, the budget preparation and execution process is complemented by detailed guidance from the MoF (Order No. 124/2023).
The MoF leads the process through its Directorate for Policy and Budget Synthesis, supported by sector-specific budget units, issuing a circular that sets expenditure ceilings, fiscal constraints and technical guidance for the preparation of draft budgets, thereby linking macroeconomic forecasts with institutional-level planning.
Source: Order No. 124 of 21 December 2023 on the approval of the Methodological Framework for the preparation, approval and amendment of the budget.
The justice sector’s budget process involves multiple actors, each with distinct mandates and responsibilities (Table 5.1).
Each justice institution prepares and submits its draft budget proposal in line with the ceilings and instructions set out in the circular. These proposals are reviewed by the MoF, which conducts bilateral consultations with each institution to refine and consolidate the draft allocations.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Following these negotiations, the MoF compiles the final draft of the state budget and submits it to the government for approval. Once endorsed, the proposed budget is forwarded to the parliament for legislative review and deliberation. Disagreements between autonomous bodies and the government may be resolved by the parliament during the legislative review stage.
In accordance with constitutional provisions, the judiciary follows a separate procedure: the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) and Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) review and endorse the budget proposals for the judiciary and prosecution services, respectively, and submit directly to the parliament for approval1 (Law No. 947/1996 and Law No. 3/2016). Upon adoption, the judicial budget is incorporated into the overall state budget (as part of the Central Consolidated Budget, which covers Central Public Authorities). Additional discussions, typically led by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Budget and Finance, may result in additional revisions before the budget is finalised and adopted.
In practice, the SCM also plays a central operational role in consolidating and reviewing court-level budget proposals, assessing financial plans and expenditure justifications, and co-ordinating within-year adjustment requests submitted by courts.
The annual budget process for justice sector institutions, including the Ministry of Justice and its subordinated bodies, follows a structured, multi-phase procedure:
1. Preparation and submission of budget proposals: The MoJ co‑ordinates internal planning with its subordinated institutions. The process includes issuing guidance documents for budget drafting; receiving draft proposals with justifications from subordinate institutions aligned with expenditure ceilings; reviewing and consulting with institutions on submitted proposals; approving and consolidating institutional budgets; estimating performance indicators and preparing the MoJ’s final proposal for submission to MoF. Submission format includes summary of the proposal; expenditure limits; revenue estimates; expenditure forecasts with performance indicators; capital investment projections and accompanying explanatory note.
2. Review and consultation by the Ministry of Finance: The MoF reviews proposals based on compliance with the annual budget circular; previous years’ execution and performance; projections for the current and subsequent two years; alignment with MTBF and sectoral expenditure strategies. Consultations are conducted between the MoF and line ministries (e.g. MoJ) to resolve outstanding issues, particularly those related to additional resource requests. Discussions focus on strategic priorities and expected outcomes. Unresolved issues are carried forward to be addressed during the government’s examination of the draft budget.
3. Approval by the government: The MoF finalises the draft State Budget Law based on macroeconomic forecasts and inter‑ministerial consultations. The finalised draft is submitted to the government for approval, accompanied by an explanatory note. The government resolves remaining divergences and adopts the draft for submission to Parliament.
4. Parliamentary review and adoption: The draft laws are first examined by relevant parliamentary committees, which issue opinions to the Committee on Budget and Finance. The Committee prepares a report and recommendations, which are presented during plenary sessions. Parliamentary review occurs in two readings:
First reading: General indicators (revenue, expenditure, balance) are approved;
Second reading: Articles of the law are examined and adopted individually or as a whole.
Source: Law No. 181/2014 on Public Finance and Budgetary-Fiscal Responsibility.
The preparation and approval process follows a legally defined calendar (Figure 5.4). However, implementation of this calendar has faced recurring delays. Between 2020 and 2024, the budget circular was consistently issued late, leaving justice institutions with only two to four weeks to prepare submissions. Similarly, the parliament’s review period has been curtailed to two to four weeks, below the six-week period foreseen in the law, limiting opportunities for thorough scrutiny and stakeholder engagement.
Source: Order No. 124 of 21 December 2023 on the approval of the Methodological Framework for the preparation, approval and amendment of the budget.
Court methodology: Linking resources to performance
Court budgeting in Moldova is governed by a dedicated Methodology for Planning Court Budgets, adopted by the SCM (Decision No. 109/3). This methodology establishes a structured, performance-oriented framework that aims to ensure equitable and efficient resource distribution across the judiciary. It forms the basis for sectoral financial planning and feeds directly into the MTBF.2
The methodology requires the SCM to calculate court-level expenditure ceilings based on a formula that multiplies the number and type of adjudicated cases, civil, contravention and criminal by unit costs. A base allocation is also provided to all courts to cover essential operational needs (Box 5.4). These parameters take precedence over the economic article classifications issued by the MoF and the SCM is not permitted to modify them during internal review, provided that submissions conform to the established rules. This formula-based approach aims to ensure that courts handling heavier caseloads receive proportionally greater resources, thereby introducing objectivity, equity and fiscal discipline into judicial budgeting. While this methodology represents an important step toward linking resources to workload, it could be further strengthened by incorporating additional dimensions of performance. In particular, integrating indicators related to case complexity, timeliness and quality of outcomes would help ensure that resource allocation reflects not only the volume of cases, but also the results achieved. At present, the system links resources to activity, but only partially to performance and service quality.
The performance-based budgeting method consists of setting an expenditure ceiling for all cost categories allocated to each court. The ceiling is determined based on the performance indicator "Number of cases adjudicated", using the following formula:
B = K + (CDC × NDC + CDCO × NDCO + CDP × NDP)
where:
B = The total budget (expenditure ceiling)
K = A fixed base amount allocated to all courts regardless of the number of cases handled
CDC = Unit cost of a civil case
NDC = Number of civil cases adjudicated
CDCO = Unit cost of a contravention case
NDCO = Number of contravention cases adjudicated
CDP = Unit cost of a criminal case
NDP = Number of criminal cases adjudicated
Source: SCM (2014), Decision No. 109/3 from 28 January 2014 on the Approval of the Methodology for Planning Court Budgets.
Ceilings for economic costs are generated using linear statistical models that regress historical spending data against case composition over the previous four fiscal years. These forecasts are adjusted for inflation and form the basis for budget projections over the next two fiscal years.
In accordance with national budgeting objectives, courts are also required to apply zero-based budgeting principles within this performance-based framework. Each budget submission must, therefore, be fully justified from the ground up, with expenditure categories tied to recent caseload data – specifically, the final three-quarters of the previous year and the first quarter of the current year. Performance-based allocations are applied to specific budget lines, such as office supplies, publications, telecommunications, equipment repair, training and related services.
However, several categories remain outside the performance-based model, including the complexity of cases and legal needs of people (Government Decision No. 692/2022; (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, n.d.[7]). Moreover, personnel costs are calculated based on the number of approved posts and applicable salary scales, distinguishing between existing and newly proposed positions. Allowances are estimated with reference to expected attrition rates and short-term staffing needs. Capital investments and repairs require project-based justifications, while utility costs and rent are forecast using historical trends adjusted for inflation.
Despite these methodological advances and a structured process, budgeting in the justice sector remains largely input-based and follows a traditional line-item classification system. Expenditures are categorised by economic type, such as salaries, utilities or office equipment rather than by objectives, activities or service outcomes. This limits the ability of justice institutions to systematically link resource allocations with expected performance, measure efficiency or re‑allocate funds based on evolving needs (Government Decision No. 386/2020). Although Moldova has introduced elements of performance-based and zero-based budgeting, these are not yet fully institutionalised across justice sector institutions.
Indeed, there is currently no standardised framework linking financial inputs to outputs or outcomes across courts, prosecution services and oversight bodies. Budget submissions tend to replicate past allocations rather than align with strategic priorities or evolving legal needs. This reflects a broader fragmentation of performance frameworks across justice institutions. The absence of a standardised, sector-wide approach limits comparability and accountability. It also constrains the ability to use performance information to inform resource allocation decisions. As a result, justice institutions face challenges to demonstrate value for money, re‑allocate resources adaptively or assess the impact of spending on justice outcomes.
Several systemic challenges continue to constrain the effective implementation of performance-informed budgeting, not due to the lack of performance information but its limited systematic use in budgetary decision-making, as this is where performance budgeting delivers value. Key challenges include:
Delayed communication of expenditure ceilings compresses institutional planning timelines and undermines the development of evidence-based budget proposals (SCM, n.d.[8]);
Lack of disaggregated ceilings for individual justice entities (e.g. courts, prosecution services, legal aid) limits detailed planning, costing and performance tracking;
Insufficient institutionalisation of performance and programme budgeting despite legal mandates results in continued reliance on input-based classifications that are disconnected from service objectives.
These limitations hinder Moldova’s ability to align financial allocations with user-centred justice reforms, measure performance against policy goals and enhance public accountability (SCM No. 109/3 and Law No. 181/2014). They also weaken the justice sector’s responsiveness to emerging needs and strategic priorities.
Addressing these bottlenecks will be crucial to advancing fiscal transparency, building institutional accountability and supporting a more strategic and people-centred justice system. Moldova’s MTBF provides a sound legal and procedural foundation for multi‑year budgeting. However, its potential will depend on a more systematic application of performance-informed budgeting principles across the justice system, such as those set out in OECD Budgetary Governance Principles (OECD, 2015[4]). A key priority in this regard would be the integration of financial, performance and workload data into a unified analytical framework. Strengthening these linkages would enable more strategic decision-making, allowing institutions to better align resources with priorities, monitor outcomes and respond to emerging pressures. Without such integration, performance information risks remaining descriptive rather than actionable in budgetary decision-making. In parallel, spending reviews could provide a practical mechanism to complement performance-informed budgeting. By systematically analysing selected areas of expenditure, they can help identify inefficiencies, assess the alignment of resources with policy objectives and support evidence-based reallocation decisions. Ensuring that spending reviews are aligned with the budget cycle would be particularly important so that their findings can inform budget preparation and negotiations.
Addressing constraints to institutional autonomy and performance
In Moldova, the legal and constitutional framework recognises various degrees of financial autonomy across justice sector institutions. This principle was strengthened through major reforms in 2013‑2014, which transferred budgetary oversight for courts and the prosecution service from the MoJ to the SCM and the SCP. These entities, alongside the National Council for State Guaranteed Legal Aid (NCSGLA) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), are designated as primary budget holders with individual financial and accounting responsibilities.
Additional safeguards for judicial financial independence are enshrined in Article 121 of the Constitution, which mandates the direct submission of judicial budgets to Parliament, bypassing the executive (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of 29 July 1994).3 The Constitutional Court ruling (Judgement No. 24/2018) reinforced this principle by invalidating earlier provisions that required judicial budgets to pass through the government (Judgement No. 24/2018). Further amendments in 2021 made the SCM’s advisory opinion a mandatory component of any changes to judicial budget proposals.4
Despite these structural protections, the MoJ retains oversight for subordinated institutions, including the National Penitentiary Administration and the Agency for Court Administration and Digitalisation of Justice (ADDJA), as well as responsibilities for the organisation of first instance and appellate courts under Article 55 of the Law on the Organisation of the Judiciary (Law No. 514/1995). The MoJ established the ADDJA, tasked with ensuring the administrative and logistical functioning of courts. This includes planning and executing capital investments, managing court infrastructure, identifying sites and funding for new construction, and standardising secretarial practices across courts (Government Decision No. 748/2024). Day-to-day maintenance, however, remains within the SCM’s remit, leading to a fragmented distribution of responsibilities.
International research and good practices increasingly highlight the importance of delegating budget execution authority to first-level budget users, such as line ministries, and in Moldova’s case, the SCM and SCP (Pot and Šušteršič, 2024[9]). Empowering these institutions to manage their budgets autonomously strengthens the alignment between policy objectives and financial resources and enables institutions to fulfil their mandates more effectively. In practice, Moldova’s justice institutions remain highly dependent on the MoF, which sets annual budget ceilings and retains exclusive authority over disbursements and re‑allocations. While the SCM and SCP prepare budget proposals based on institutional needs and strategic plans, these proposals are advisory in nature. Final allocations are shaped by executive-defined ceilings and fiscal parameters. For example, in 2025, Parliament approved 97.84% of the judiciary’s budget request, reflecting some responsiveness, yet also underscoring dependence on centralised decision making.
A further constraint lies in the limited flexibility justice institutions have during budget execution. Article 60 of the Law on Public Finance and Budgetary-Fiscal Responsibility imposes tight controls on intra-year re‑allocations, particularly for capital investment, personnel or inter-budgetary transfers (Law No. 181/2014). These restrictions apply even to constitutionally autonomous institutions like the SCM, SCP and Constitutional Court. As a result, these bodies are effectively reduced to administrative roles, with little discretion to adapt their budgets to emerging needs once approved.
Redistribution between central public authorities (excluding independent authorities) or different programmes within the same authority is permitted up to a maximum of 10% of the initially approved allocations. Such re-allocations require the formal approval of the government.
Re-allocation between economic categories (e.g. goods, services, equipment) within a single central public authority is allowed with the consent of the MoF. However, this type of redistribution cannot result in an increase in personnel expenditures or changes to allocations for capital investments or inter‑budgetary transfers.
Other forms of redistribution – not falling under the categories above – may be carried out by central public authorities and, where applicable, their subordinate budgetary institutions, provided they remain within the total allocation limits approved in the state budget. These adjustments do not require additional approval from the government or the MoF, as long as they adhere to overall budgetary ceilings.
Source: Article 60, Law No. 181/2014.
This rigidity has tangible consequences. The budget structure for courts and prosecutors is heavily weighted toward personnel costs, which have consistently accounted for approximately 80-85% of total expenditures in recent years.5 Funds that remain unspent, due to delays in hiring or judicial vacancies, for instance, cannot be easily re‑allocated to urgent needs such as surges in caseloads, infrastructure repairs, information and communication technology (ICT) upgrades or training. Budget execution rates for capital investments and digitalisation are particularly low, with some institutions reporting execution levels below 60%, indicating inefficiencies that directly undermine institutional resilience and service delivery.
To enhance financial autonomy and improve resource utilisation, Moldova could consider several targeted measures. One practical step would be the creation of a flexible budget reserve within the SCM’s budget, approved annually by Parliament. Such a reserve could be used to respond to unforeseen needs without requiring formal re-allocation across main budget categories. Its size could be calibrated based on historical re‑allocation needs and grounded in medium-term institutional planning.
In Estonia, the budget of the courts of first and second instance is administered by the Ministry of Justice, according to the principles approved by the Court Administration Council (a collegial body with majority members from the ranks of judges that approves the most important decisions in the area of court administration, e.g. number of judges in each court, appointment of court presidents, etc.). The Supreme Court acts as an independent budget user and holds budget negotiations separately with the Ministry of Finance. The MoJ represents the courts of first and second instance in the budget negotiations with the MoF and adopts the individual budgets of the courts (within the limits of the judicial budget adopted by the parliament). When the individual budgets of the courts are adopted, usually at the beginning of the year after the state budget has been approved by the parliament, the MoJ keeps a small share of the overall judicial budget in a reserve, from where the courts can request additional funding during the budget year for unexpected costs and from where certain central cost items are funded (e.g. ICT costs, costs for training of non-judicial staff, etc.). The size of the reserve has significantly reduced over the last 20-25 years due to organisational changes within the courts (the merger of courts has established bigger judicial institutions, which have bigger budgets with more flexibility for unexpected costs), as well as changes in certain budgeting principles (e.g. funds for vacant judicial positions, which were during earlier years allocated to the judicial budget are now kept by the MoF and only funds for filled judicial posts are made available). Nevertheless, the reserve remains a useful tool, ensuring overall flexibility during the execution of the budget, according to the principles, which have been approved by the Court Administration Council and within the limits of the judicial budget as adopted by the parliament.
Source: Article 43 and Article 41 (2) of the Courts Act of Estonia; Information from the Estonian judiciary; and (Riigikantselei, 2015[10]).
Another potential measure involves consistently budgeting for the salary fund allocated to the 30 reserve judges under Article 21(8) of the Law on the Organisation of the Judiciary even if these positions remain vacant (Law No. 514/1995). Unused funds from these posts could be redirected to support non-judicial staff or short-term operational needs, such as hiring judicial assistants during peak periods, thereby enhancing institutional flexibility in a fiscally sound and legally compliant manner.
More broadly, Moldova’s experience underscores the need to shift from legal guarantees of financial independence to operational mechanisms that enable justice institutions to manage their resources strategically. A rules-based approach to intra-year re‑allocations anchored in institutional autonomy and fiscal prudence could significantly strengthen the justice system’s capacity to deliver responsive, efficient and people-centred services.
5.1.4. Capital investment and infrastructure: Bridging the strategic gap
Robust capital investment and infrastructure enable modern, efficient and accessible justice systems. Appropriate court premises, secure detention facilities and digital infrastructure directly support judicial quality and access to justice, especially in the context of people-centred justice reform. In Moldova, capital investment has increasingly been closely linked to broader justice reform efforts, in particular, initiatives focused on court consolidation and the transition to digital justice. Both have significantly reshaped infrastructure needs and priorities, also in the context of the efficient administration agenda and alignment with EU standards.6 However, implementation challenges, such as fragmented responsibilities, limited institutional capacity and misalignment with broader reforms, continue to undermine progress.
Despite recent reforms,7 capital investment planning in Moldova’s justice sector remains divided across several institutions, undermining strategic coherence and limiting the sector’s ability to prioritise and sequence investments. While the MoJ and ADDJA oversee property management and infrastructure execution, the SCM remains responsible for operational budgeting and strategic needs assessments.8 This division often leads to co‑ordination gaps - particularly when infrastructure investments must support broader justice reforms such as court consolidation, digital justice or judicial map optimisation. In addition, for large-scale investments, such as court construction or penitentiary upgrades, co-ordination with the MoF is required, as it co‑ordinates the capital project pipeline and chairs the Working Group for State Capital Procedures.9
As a result, infrastructure decisions are frequently ad hoc and reactive, disconnected from performance goals or long-term reform trajectories. Capacity constraints in areas such as investment planning, financial forecasting and performance appraisal further weaken execution, contributing to recurring issues, such as delayed implementation, underprepared budgets and reliance on supplementary allocations in late fiscal quarters. The need for a consolidated capital investment framework impedes planning predictability and strategic resource allocation, linked to justice outcomes, equity objectives and user needs. Moldova’s context could better reflect the OECD and EU standards, which emphasise alignment between budgeting, performance frameworks, institutional co-ordination and reform delivery.10
These challenges are particularly visible in the implementation of the judicial map reform (see Chapter 6). While the reform formally reduced the number of courts, infrastructure consolidation has lagged significantly, with most judges continuing to operate from their pre-reform premises.11 The absence of a fully costed implementation roadmap and sustained financing commitments – together with the lack of a multi-year capital investment framework – has undermined the ability to translate structural reform into tangible improvements in service delivery.
Similar challenges are observed in a major detention infrastructure project, namely the long-delayed construction of a new penitentiary in Chișinău, a frequent subject of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings.12 These cases illustrate how limited integrated capital planning undermines Moldova’s ability to meet strategic justice goals, including both domestic reform objectives and international standards.
The implications extend beyond infrastructure delivery. Effective and accountable justice institutions, underpinned by modern infrastructure, are central to meeting EU accession benchmarks and advancing a modern, accessible and people-centred justice system. Despite legal and policy advances, persistent gaps remain between reform commitments and infrastructure implementation. Inadequate institutional capacity and budgetary constraints exacerbate this disconnect, contributing to delayed implementation and underinvestment in essential infrastructure. Without a clear and adequately resourced capital investment strategy, Moldova risks failing to deliver the benefits of judicial reform, particularly those related to accessibility, efficiency and specialisation.
To address these challenges, Moldova could establish a comprehensive, multi‑annual capital investment programme for the justice sector, included but not limited to facilities, digital infrastructure, and equipment, with a view to delivering modern justice services. Capital planning could be anchored in strategic justice priorities, based on clear reform and performance objectives, supported by robust costing and monitoring frameworks, strengthened inter-institutional co-ordination mechanisms, and embedded within the broader MTBF. This could be further supported by strengthening institutional capacity in financial planning and investment appraisal. A more transparent, participatory approach to infrastructure development could also strengthened public trust and support long-term reform sustainability.
5.2.1. Justice workforce profile, planning and management
Improving strategic coherence in human resource management
Human resource management (HRM) in Moldova’s justice sector spans multiple institutions, including the judiciary, prosecution services, legal aid structures, penitentiary and probation systems, and integrity and anti-corruption bodies, such as the National Integrity Authority (NIA) and the National Anti-Corruption Centre (NAC). While each institution exercises internal autonomy over staff recruitment, deployment and management under distinct legal mandates, overall governance is shaped by national legislation on public administration and the civil service.
Despite this legal framework, the justice workforce is managed through largely decentralised and siloed processes. Recruitment, promotion and staff planning systems differ across institutions, resulting in a fragmented approach to workforce management. Co‑ordination is limited by differing institutional mandates and visions regarding justice sector organisation and reform. These misalignments can undermine the coherence of broader reform efforts and limit opportunities to develop an integrated, strategic approach to justice service delivery for both people and businesses.
Human resource governance involves several key actors. The SCM plays a central role in strategic human resource planning13 and budgetary oversight for the courts. The SCP performs a similar function for the prosecution service. The NIJ is responsible for training and admission of judges and prosecutors. The MoJ oversees justice sector policy and supervises a range of legal professionals, including notaries, bailiffs, translators, insolvency administrators, authorised agents to register in the Register of Pledges and mediators. However, there is no central co‑ordinating mechanism or shared human capital strategy to align planning and capacity development across the sector.
Several objectives and actions outlined in Moldova’s Justice Sector Strategy 2022-2025 directly address HRM within the justice system (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2021[11]). The strategy aims to ensure a merit-based and transparent system for the recruitment, promotion and evaluation of judges and prosecutors, including reforming the admission process to the NIJ and eliminating undue influence in career advancement. It further prioritises the strengthening of institutional capacity by addressing staffing shortages, improving management and leadership within courts and prosecutor’s offices, enhancing initial and continuous professional training, and ensuring more equitable distribution of workload. These efforts are complemented by measures to enhance integrity, such as the implementation of extraordinary vetting procedures and increased investment in developing ethical and managerial competencies across the sector.
Imbalanced justice workforce distribution
A people-centred justice system requires a balanced, well-distributed and appropriately skilled workforce. Moldova’s justice sector includes judges, prosecutors, lawyers, legal aid providers and regulated professionals, such as notaries, bailiffs, mediators and translators. However, available data indicate disparities across institutions and professions (Table 5.2).
Note: As of 31 March 2026, the number of occupied positions of judges was 349.
Source: Data provided by SCP and (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 2025[12]).
The number of lawyers in Moldova has increased by over 30% in the last decade, with a marked rise in 2015, followed by relatively minor year-to-year changes. By contrast, the numbers of notaries and bailiffs have remained relatively static. Despite this growth, Moldova’s shrinking population means that per capita availability of legal professionals has improved overall but unevenly (Table 5.3).
Source: Data provided by SCP and (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 2025[12]).
According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 2024 Evaluation Report (based on 2022 data), Moldova surpasses Council of Europe (CoE) medians in terms of prosecutors and court support staff per capita (Table 5.4 and Box 5.7) (CEPEJ, 2024[13]).14
Staffing gaps persist across all court levels, with 161 out of 510 judicial positions vacant (approximately 32%). Vacancies are particularly acute at the appellate level, where 72 of 103 positions remain unfilled, and at the Supreme Court of Justice, where 13 of 20 positions are vacant, while first instance courts, although comparatively better staffed, still face 76 vacancies out of 387 positions.
HR challenges are also observed among non-judicial court personnel, affecting the overall functioning of courts. Across all levels, vacancies remain high among civil servants in court secretariats (e.g. 223 vacancies in first instance courts, 85 in courts of appeal and 75 at the Supreme Court of Justice). Shortages are similarly pronounced among clerks, particularly at the Supreme Court level where more than half of positions are unfilled (54 out of 99). Judicial assistant positions also face notable gaps in courts and courts of appeal (76 and 26 vacancies respectively), further constraining operational capacity.
These personnel gaps are also evident within the SCM and its supporting structures, with 27 out of 73 positions vacant overall (around 37%). While public dignity positions are nearly fully staffed (with only one vacancy among judicial inspectors), shortages are more pronounced within the SCM apparatus, particularly among technical staff, where 7 of 10 positions remain unfilled, alongside 19 vacancies among civil servants (out of 50 positions).
Moreover, the justice workforce remains unevenly distributed across regions. Staffing shortages in rural and underserved areas hinder equal access to justice. This is particularly acute in professions such as legal aid and enforcement officers, where workloads are high and resources limited. Without targeted efforts to attract and retain qualified personnel in these areas, geographic disparities in access and service quality will persist.
Judges
In 2022, Moldova had 14.9 judges per 100 000 inhabitants, slightly below the CoE median of 17.6. This marks an improvement from 2012, when Moldova had 12.4 judges per 100 000 residents. Despite this progress, the gap remains notable, especially given the additional pressure Moldova faces due to judicial vetting and reform processes that have led to a significant number of vacancies in the judiciary. Moldova's comparatively low ratio of judges, coupled with rising caseloads and institutional reforms, suggests an ongoing risk to the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings.
Non-judge staff
In contrast, Moldova has experienced a substantial increase in non-judge court staff, reaching 72.7 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2022, well above the CoE median of 57.9. This reflects a significant rise from 42.5 in 2012 and indicates a positive investment in supporting court operations. Higher levels of non-judge staff may help mitigate the impact of a lower judge-to-population ratio, particularly if deployed strategically to improve court efficiency, digitalisation and case management.
Prosecutors
Moldova has consistently maintained a high number of prosecutors per capita compared to other CoE countries. In 2022, Moldova recorded 23.6 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants, more than double the CoE median of 11.2. This upward trend from 20.9 in 2012 suggests a structurally prosecution-heavy justice model. While this may enhance the state’s capacity to investigate and prosecute criminal offences, it also raises questions about proportionality within the justice system and whether this workforce distribution aligns with Moldova’s evolving criminal policy and workload demands.
Non-prosecutor staff
The number of non-prosecutor staff also rose significantly – from 11.2 in 2012 to 20.6 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2022, exceeding the CoE median of 14.7. This increase likely reflects an effort to modernise and support prosecutorial operations and improve efficiency. However, this growth must be balanced with strategic workforce planning to avoid overstaffing in administrative areas without corresponding gains in productivity or case outcomes.
Lawyers
Moldova remains significantly below the CoE average in terms of the number of lawyers per capita. In 2022, Moldova had 82.3 lawyers per 100 000 inhabitants compared to a CoE median of 155.5. Although this represents a notable increase from 49.2 in 2012, the gap remains wide. This lower density of lawyers may limit access to legal representation, particularly outside urban centres. It may also reflect broader entry barriers or challenges in the professional environment for lawyers, including low remuneration, limited demand and competition from public legal aid services.
Workforce contraction and systemic risks: Trends in judicial and prosecutorial staffing
Over the past decade, Moldova’s judicial workforce has undergone significant shifts, marked by both expansion and contraction. Between 2014 and 2019, the total number of sitting judges steadily increased, peaking at 465. However, this upward trajectory reversed in subsequent years, with the number of judges declining to 358 by 2024, a 23% reduction over five years, and the lowest figure in more than a decade.
This downward trend was strongly influenced by pension reforms introduced in 2021, which adjusted retirement age thresholds and pension calculations. The changes prompted a wave of early retirements as many judges opted to exit the system to preserve more favourable benefits. This attrition was compounded by structural challenges, including comparatively low remuneration, high workloads and perceived threats to judicial independence. Although there was a brief recovery in 2022, it was followed by a sharper decline in 2023 and 2024, with the number of sitting judges falling to a record low of just 358 out of 489 approved positions, leaving approximately 26.8% of posts vacant.
The contraction of judicial capacity has been uneven across levels of the court system (Table 5.5).
District courts, which constitute the backbone of the judiciary, experienced relatively modest changes, rising from 299 judges in 2014 to 350 in 2019 before falling back to 316 in 2025. While this represents a 10% reduction, the stability of district courts stands in contrast to higher-level jurisdictions.
Courts of Appeal have seen a more pronounced decrease. After peaking at 94 judges in 2017 and remaining stable for several years, the number of judges declined sharply from 81 in 2022 to 34 in 2025 representing a reduction of approximately 58% over the three–year period. This reduction has created bottlenecks at the appellate level and placed increasing pressure on remaining personnel, with implications for the timely review of first-instance decisions and the overall flow of cases through the judicial system.
The Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) has experienced the most pronounced reduction in judicial capacity. In 2023, the court was restructured to operate primarily as a court of cassation, reducing the statutory number of judicial posts from 33 to 20. At the same time, resignations linked to the ongoing integrity assessment process significantly reduced the number of sitting judges. As a result, the number of judges declined from a peak of 32 in 2017 to just 7 by 2025.15 While these temporary measures have helped maintain operational continuity, the reduced number of permanent judges places pressure on the court’s ability to perform its cassation function effectively and ensure consistency of case-law (SCM, 2025[15]).
Note: The number of approved judicial posts was increased by the Law No. 192/2025 on the mechanism for adjudicating corruption and corruption-related cases.
Source: Data provided by SCM.
The sharp decline at the appellate and Supreme Court levels is closely linked to the rollout of Moldova’s integrity-based vetting process, designed to strengthen public trust by assessing the ethical and financial conduct of judges and prosecutors. Many judges, particularly at senior levels, resigned pre‑emptively, citing reputational risk and uncertainty surrounding the outcomes (see Chapter 4). As a result, judicial capacity has eroded substantially in higher courts, undermining system efficiency and delaying case resolution.
Emerging pressures in the prosecutorial system
A parallel trend is now emerging in the prosecutorial system. Although the decline in prosecutorial staffing began later, the second and third phases of the vetting process, extending to high-level prosecutors, are now triggering growing attrition. By early 2026, an estimated 30% of prosecutorial positions were unfilled. Pre‑vetting and vetting pass rates have been low and key institutions such as the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office have reported mounting operational constraints due to the limited pool of vetted candidates.
In addition to voluntary exits, institutional hesitancy to recruit into an uncertain environment has constrained new entries. Prosecutors who fail the vetting process risk losing accumulated benefits and pension entitlements, creating incentives for early retirement or avoidance of the profession altogether.
Sustaining functionality during transition
While the vetting process remains central to Moldova’s strategy for rebuilding rule of law institutions, its immediate effects on institutional functionality have been profound. Addressing capacity gaps through accelerated recruitment of vetted professionals, enhanced support to the NIJ and more competitive incentives are essential to safeguarding justice delivery.
Moreover, lessons from other OECD and CoE countries underscore the importance of sequencing integrity reforms alongside workforce planning to avoid institutional paralysis. As of 2024, Moldova’s justice system is at a critical juncture, balancing the long-term objectives of trust and integrity with the short-term imperative of maintaining operational continuity.
According to CEPEJ data, Moldova’s workforce distribution remains broadly aligned with European trends: approximately 73% of judges serve in first instance courts, 22% in appellate courts and 5% in the Supreme Court, similar to averages across CoE Member states (CEPEJ, 2024[13]). However, Moldova’s absolute per capita ratios for both judges and lawyers continue to fall below regional medians, signalling deeper structural challenges in access to justice.
The re‑organisation of the judicial and prosecutorial maps, combined with systemic reshuffling driven by the vetting process, will inevitably lead to transfers, terminations and new appointments. Managing these transitions in a co‑ordinated, people-centred and sustainable manner will be vital to preserving the continuity, accessibility and quality of justice services in Moldova.
Under-utilised mediation workforce: Bridging the gap between training and practice
Since the introduction of a private mediation mechanism in Moldova in 2015, significant efforts have been made to cultivate a professional corps capable of supporting alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Over 1 030 individuals have obtained mediator certification, reflecting initial interest in the profession and aligning with broader justice reforms aimed at promoting more accessible, efficient and people-centred services.16
However, only 257 certified mediators, around one in four, have formally registered to practise, highlighting a significant implementation gap between training and professional engagement. This disconnect suggests underlying barriers in the operationalisation and attractiveness of mediation as a sustainable career pathway.
Several factors contribute to this under-utilisation. First, public demand for mediation remains modest, hampered by low awareness, limited trust in the process and weak referral mechanisms from courts and legal professionals. Without structured incentives or clear benefits for litigants to opt for ADR, mediation continues to be perceived as peripheral rather than integral to justice delivery.
Second, the economic viability of mediation is uncertain. In the absence of steady caseflows or institutional support, many certified mediators, particularly those outside Chișinău, struggle to generate sufficient income (CoE, 2021[16]). Administrative burdens related to registration and compliance may further discourage sustained engagement in the profession.
This underuse of trained mediators has broader implications. It constrains efforts to reduce court congestion, expand access to timely and affordable redress, and provide people-centred resolution pathways. Importantly, it is also a missed opportunity to activate a trained and underemployed segment of the justice workforce. As Moldova seeks to align with OECD principles on access to justice and user-responsive systems, strengthening the mediation profession could play a pivotal role in ensuring a continuum of services adapted to user needs.
Recent reforms to integrate mediation into legal aid schemes are a promising avenue to revitalise the profession and enhance its reach, especially in underserved regions. Bridging the gap between certification and practice will require co‑ordinated interventions, including awareness-raising, financial incentives, better institutional anchoring and support for court-linked mediation models.
5.2.2. Recruitment, retention and career development
Pathways into the judiciary: Access, diversity and strategic gaps
Ensuring a diverse and merit-based entry into the judiciary is essential for building a resilient, representative and people-centred justice system. As recognised by the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence, access to the judicial profession should not be restricted to young law graduates, but open to mid-career professionals with substantial legal experience (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights & Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2010[17]). Moldova has taken steps in this direction by establishing two main access routes: graduation from the NIJ and admission for candidates with at least five years of legal experience (Law No. 544/1995).
Both categories must pass a competitive examination (weighted at 60% of the total score) and undergo interviews by the Selection and Performance Evaluation Board and the SCM, which collectively determine the remaining 40%. Final appointments are made by the President of the Republic.
Emerging challenges in attracting a diverse and adequate pool of judicial candidates
While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, recent data point to growing concerns regarding the shrinking pool of eligible candidates and overall attractiveness of the judicial profession in Moldova. In 2024, the number of applicants per announced vacancy dropped to just 2.3 compared to 5.7 in 2023 (Aurelia Palamarciuc, 2005[18]). This stands in stark contrast to the CoE medians of positions and applicants, which result in an overall ratio of 8.4 candidates per vacancy in 2022 (CEPEJ, 2024[13]). The low application rate may reflect both the diminished appeal of judicial careers and a limited pool of qualified applicants.
A substantial share of successful candidates for judges in 2023-2024 (28-42%) were so-called “candidates with seniority” who did not graduate from NIJ and were often less interested in postings outside the capital (Aurelia Palamarciuc, 2005[18]). According to the SCM, NIJ graduates, while more open to regional deployment, appear to struggle to compete with more experienced candidates for positions in Chișinău and appellate courts, and perform better in competitions for positions located outside of Chișinău. This suggests that the NIJ may face challenges in equipping graduates to compete effectively with senior practitioners, particularly for positions in the capital or more desirable urban centres.
Moreover, most candidates come from judicial assistant roles, suggesting limited permeability from other legal professions. While judicial assistants may be well prepared, this pattern risks fostering homogeneity in judicial perspectives. Encouraging candidates from broader backgrounds, including academia, legal practice and public administration, would enhance the diversity of needed experience within the judiciary.
Source: Statistics on Moldova provided by the SCM; statistic on CoE median for candidates calculated by authors based on CEPEJ data (CEPEJ, 2024[13]).
This issue is compounded by the fact that Moldova’s judicial system permits entry into the judiciary only through first instance positions. Only judges who have served for the required number of years may apply for posts in the appellate or Supreme Court. While this promotes gradual professional development, it may also deter experienced legal professionals who might otherwise be interested in entering the judiciary at higher levels. The result is a potential over-standardisation of judicial profiles and a reduced inflow of diverse legal perspectives into higher courts.
As of early 2025, 27% of judicial posts have remained vacant: 131 out of 489 approved positions, including 75 vacancies in first instance courts, 46 in second instance courts and 10 in the Supreme Court. This high vacancy rate, coupled with the ongoing integrity vetting process, poses a serious risk to judicial functionality. Even assuming certain measures to rationalise the number of judges, the recruitment process will need to be significantly scaled up to maintain basic institutional performance.
Meeting this challenge will require a multi‑pronged approach. First, the number of judicial competitions must increase, requiring greater resources for the CSEJ and its support staff. Second, if the NIJ continues to serve as a key entry pathway, its capacity and success rate must improve – including stronger practical training, support and outreach to diversify the candidate base. Finally, the judiciary must strengthen its appeal as an employer by addressing key deterrents, such as salary levels, working conditions, public perceptions of judicial independence and prestige.
Promoting a more diverse and competitive judicial recruitment process is essential not only to address the current staffing crisis, but also to advance people-centred justice. A judiciary composed of professionals with a broad range of experiences and perspectives is better positioned to understand and serve the evolving needs of society.
5.2.3. Training and capacity development: Challenges and opportunities in sector-wide training systems
A structured, representative and well-resourced training system is essential to equip justice professionals and public servants with the knowledge, skills and perspectives to deliver effective, fair and people-centred services. In Moldova, the institutional framework for professional development is generally well-established, particularly for judges and prosecutors. However, fragmentation, limited co‑ordination and uneven resourcing continue to undermine the system’s coherence and strategic impact.
Within the judiciary, ongoing professional development is particularly important to ensure that judges, who enter the profession following a full legal education, remain equipped to respond to evolving legal frameworks and societal expectations. In line with recommendations from the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), in-service training would ideally be voluntary and tailored to individual needs (CCJE, 2003[19]). Nonetheless, the CCJE also recognises that mandatory training is justified during periods of major institutional or legal reform, such as Moldova’s current justice transformation and EU accession process.
Judges and prosecutors in Moldova are legally required to complete a minimum of 40 hours of training annually, with sessions provided free of charge during working hours (Laws No. 3/2016, No. 544/1995 and (National Council for State-Guaranteed Legal Aid, 2014[20]). Oversight of participation is shared by the SCM and the SCP (Law No. 152/2006). The NIJ, which leads both initial and continuing professional development, co‑ordinates closely with justice institutions to ensure that its training programmes reflect both institutional priorities and individual needs.
The NIJ’s 2024‑2025 training programme includes courses across all major branches of law – civil, criminal and administrative – as well as cross-cutting topics, such as communication, leadership, case management and human rights. Judges interviewed for this review confirmed that participation levels are high and that training is generally considered relevant and satisfactory. Comparative data from 2022 indicate that judges in Moldova engage in significantly more training than their counterparts in CoE Member states – on average, 6.5 training sessions per judge per year compared to a median of 1.9 and an average of 2.1 across CoE jurisdictions. Feedback collected during interviews with judges confirms that participation is not only high but perceived as relevant and satisfactory.
Note: This indicator is calculated as follows: the number of participants in live trainings is divided by the number of professionals for that category. For example, if the CoE median for judges is 3.9, this means that each judge in Europe participated in an average of 3.9 live trainings. Indeed, this analysis allows a better understanding of the quantity of training per professional if all were trained.
Source: (CEPEJ, 2024[13]).
Despite these strong foundations, stakeholders identified several priority areas for additional capacity building. These include:
Peer dialogue across court levels, including regular roundtables involving judges from the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and district courts to support the consistency and unification of jurisprudence;
Practical training on case management, ideally delivered by experienced judges;
Legislative dialogue mechanisms, such as roundtables with ministry officials involved in drafting new legislation, to enhance understanding of legislative intent and application;
International exposure, including short-term placements (3-4 weeks) in EU Member state courts to learn from European judicial practices.
The NIJ also plays an important role in delivering training beyond the judiciary. It is mandated to train a broader range of legal professionals, including judicial assistants, court clerks, chancery heads, probation officers, judicial inspectors and public lawyers providing legal aid (Law No. 152/2006). While the NIJ does not currently train paralegals (parajuriști), it has been identified as the most appropriate institution to assume this function in the future.
Lawyers in Moldova receive continuous training through a dedicated Training Centre managed by the Union of Lawyers of Moldova. Practicing lawyers must complete 40 hours of training over a two-year period. However, compliance is low - estimated at only 10-15%, due to barriers such as training costs, inconvenient scheduling (often outside work hours) and limited access in regions outside Chișinău
Training for paralegals and public lawyers in the legal aid system is also uneven. Although the National Council for State Guaranteed Legal Aid (NCSGLA) and its partners offer occasional workshops and short courses, these are irregular and depend heavily on donor funding. Paralegals are required to undertake 40 hours of annual training to maintain certification, but insufficient institutional support has hindered the creation of a consistent training pathway.
Across the wider public sector, the State Chancellery is responsible for co‑ordinating civil servant training, with the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) acting as the main implementing body. The IPA provides accredited courses on key topics, such as project management, ethics, anti-corruption, digital transformation and public administration. Civil servants are also subject to a minimum annual training requirement of 40 hours.
Source: Laws No. 1260/2002 and 158/2008; Council of Europe (2021); Support to the Moldovan Bar Association – Needs Assessment; NAMATI (2019[21]), Community Paralegals in Moldova – Research Brief; (CoE, 2020[22]; CoE, 2015[23]).
Despite Moldova’s solid institutional architecture for justice sector training, particularly the role played by the NIJ, the broader training ecosystem remains fragmented. Comprehensive data on training activities delivered outside the NIJ, including those conducted by the MoJ, Superior Councils or through donor-funded projects, is lacking. This absence of a centralised registry or sector-wide training database hinders co‑ordination, makes it difficult to assess participation and outcomes, and limits the integration of training into broader justice reforms. As a result, strategic workforce planning is weakened, skills gaps go unaddressed and opportunities for alignment with performance and service delivery goals are missed.
To address these challenges, Moldova would benefit from a more integrated and co‑ordinated approach to training governance. This could include establishing a centralised registry of training activities and outcomes, improving cross-institutional co‑ordination and developing a sector-wide training strategy. Such a strategy could explicitly link capacity building to justice system performance targets, people-centred service delivery and evolving user needs, thereby maximising the impact of professional development efforts and supporting the long-term success of justice reforms.
5.2.4. Diversity and representation: Addressing imbalances in leadership to strengthen people-centred justice
Promoting a representative leadership within justice institutions is a cornerstone of people-centred justice. It ensures that judicial systems reflect the populations they serve and respond to the diverse needs of users. While Moldova has made progress in achieving women/men parity among justice professionals, imbalances persist in leadership roles.
According to the latest Council of Europe data, women represent 54% of sitting judges and 32% of public prosecutors in Moldova (CoE, 2026[24]), indicating relatively strong participation in the justice workforce. However, the 2024 CEPEJ report (based on 2022 data) offers additional insights, showing that 65% of court presidents and 84% of heads of public prosecution offices are men (CEPEJ, 2024[13]). This imbalance could highlight barriers to career progression for women and suggests a bottleneck in access to decision-making positions.
The share of women among professional judges and prosecutors has increased over the past decade, with rising representation at all court levels. This trend is encouraging, but it has not yet translated into more equitable leadership structures. A key challenge is the absence of disaggregated data on applications, success rates and career trajectories of female justice professionals, which limits the ability to pinpoint where systemic obstacles may lie, whether in application rates, selection procedures, institutional culture or informal networks.
From a people-centred justice perspective, the under-representation of women in leadership is not only a matter of fairness – it has implications for service quality and trust. Diverse leadership fosters more inclusive institutional cultures and representative decision making, enabling justice institutions to better understand and respond to the varied legal needs and justice problems of women, children and marginalised groups. Conversely, limited representation at the top may contribute to blind spots in institutional responses, diminish public confidence and exacerbate perceptions of inequality or bias.
Addressing these imbalances requires a shift from passive to active representation. This entails:
Developing and implementing representative criteria for appointments and promotions;
Ensuring transparency and accountability in career advancement processes;
Creating targeted leadership development programmes for under-represented groups;
Supporting work-life balance and shared family responsibilities through institutional policies;
Building robust systems to collect, monitor and publish disaggregated data across the judicial career cycle.
Efforts to achieve parity must be embedded in broader HRM reform strategies, with a focus on building responsive and competent institutions. Moldova’s justice system stands to benefit from leadership that reflects its social fabric, also to enhance public trust and the effectiveness of justice services.
An efficient court system is a cornerstone of a people-centred justice system. As underscored by the European Commission’s EU Justice Scoreboard and OECD standards, judicial efficiency is essential not only for effectiveness, but accessibility, public trust and the responsible use of resources. Efficiency contributes to justice that is timely and fair, qualities that directly impact user experience and confidence in the rule of law.
5.3.1. Monitoring core indicators: From data to decision making
Efficiency is recognised as one of the three key components of an effective justice system in the EU Justice Scoreboard, alongside quality and independence (European Commission, 2025[25]). It is primarily measured through indicators such as the average duration of proceedings, clearance rates (i.e. the annual ratio of resolved-to-incoming cases), and the size and composition of court backlogs. These indicators are intended to support data-driven policymaking and the timely identification of bottlenecks or systemic delays.
In Moldova, the Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration (ADJJA) and the SCM have institutionalised regular performance monitoring through monthly and annual statistical reporting. These reports reflect an important commitment to transparency and accountability. However, their practical impact is currently limited. Much of the information produced remains descriptive rather than analytical and the process of extracting relevant insights – such as caseload trends, procedural duration and workload imbalances – often requires substantial manual processing. As a result, the data are not consistently transformed into actionable intelligence that can inform strategic planning, resource allocation or reform priorities.
The SCM’s annual reports include data on key efficiency indicators, but several gaps limit their effectiveness. One of the most significant is the aggregation of data on the duration of proceedings without differentiation by type of case – civil, criminal, administrative or contravention. At a minimum, the duration of proceedings for these three principal case categories is monitored separately across EU and CoE jurisdictions as each follows different procedural timelines and complexities. For example, criminal cases tend to have shorter average durations, followed by civil and then administrative cases. Without this level of granularity, decision makers in Moldova lack the information necessary to detect specific challenges within different branches of the judiciary, address emerging bottlenecks or compare Moldova’s performance with that of other countries.
Similarly, while the SCM reports include figures on the total number of “old” cases – those pending for more than two years – this information is presented without contextual analysis. It is not disaggregated by court or case type, nor is it compared against previous years or international benchmarks. This limits its utility for assessing systemic performance, ensuring the right to timely justice or identifying courts that may require additional support. Caseload differences between courts are also recorded, but are not systematically analysed or used to inform remedial action, such as workload redistribution, staff planning or changes to case management strategies.
While Moldova has established the institutional infrastructure to monitor core performance indicators, the value of this monitoring is currently constrained by limited analytical depth and disaggregation. Data are presented in ways that are often too general to support targeted interventions or strategic decision making. Strengthening the analytical use of these indicators – including through case-type differentiation, court-level comparisons, trend analysis and benchmarking – would enhance the justice system’s ability to manage performance, identify areas for reform and ultimately deliver timelier and fair justice services for both people and businesses.
5.3.2. Improving clearance rates and reducing backlogs beyond the first instance
The timeliness of judicial decisions is a fundamental dimension of people-centred justice and a critical determinant of public trust. In Moldova, first instance courts perform relatively well in this regard.
As measured by disposition time (DT),17 the duration of proceedings at the first instance level in Moldovan courts is generally below or comparable to the median among CoE Member states. The estimated disposition time is less than one year in main first-instance categories, aligning with international standards for judicial efficiency.
However, performance deteriorates significantly at higher levels of the judiciary. At both the appeal and Supreme Court levels, disposition times exceed the CoE median, with particularly long delays in specific categories. In 2024, contravention cases at the appeal court level averaged 438 days, while civil and criminal cases at the Supreme Court reached 501 and 863 days, respectively. In 2025, however, disposition time at the Supreme Court declined substantially, to 335 days for civil and 638 for criminal cases.. Nonetheless, delays persist at both courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. Yet, the fact that minor offences (contraventions) take longer to resolve than more complex criminal matters at both first and second instance levels signals inefficiencies in case management and procedural design.
While average performance across first instance courts is reasonable, there are notable outliers. For instance, district courts in Comrat, Criuleni, and Ungheni recorded disposition times for criminal cases exceeding the CoE median, suggesting the need for more targeted oversight and support.
Source: Moldova data provided by the ADJJA from Integrated Case Management System; (CEPEJ, 2024[13]).
Moldova’s clearance rate, defined as the ratio of resolved to incoming cases, is above 100% at the first instance level, indicating that courts are processing more cases than they receive and gradually reducing their backlogs. Clearance rates fall below 100% at both the appeal and Supreme Court levels, contributing to continued backlogs despite some recent improvements. In 2025, civil cases continue to show under‑clearance at appellate level (83% compared to 80% in 2024) and a notable yet partial recovery at the Supreme Court (from 77% to 94%). Criminal cases mark the most significant improvement at the Supreme Court, with the clearance rising sharply from 58% in 2024 to 98% in 2025. Nonetheless, without further corrective measures, these backlogs are likely to increase further and reinforce already lengthy disposition times.
A closer look at backlog composition also reveals significant challenges. According to CEPEJ methodology, cases pending for more than two years are considered “old” and raise concerns regarding the right to a timely trial (CEPEJ, 2023[26]). As of the end of 2024, 10.2% of Moldova’s first instance court backlog consisted of such old cases. Moldova also exceeds the CoE median in the proportion of old civil and administrative cases (11.4% vs 6.1%) and criminal cases (12.5% vs 7.9%). Only in contravention cases does Moldova outperform the CoE median (1.1% vs 4%) (CEPEJ, 2022[27]). The high proportion of aged cases underscores the need for targeted backlog reduction strategies. In some instances, prioritising the resolution of long-standing cases, even at the cost of marginally longer average disposition times, would better align with the principle of timely justice and the protection of individual rights.
While SCM reports the number and share of old cases, these data are not used as a key performance indicator and do not appear to inform court-level performance assessments, human resource planning or workload balancing.
Source: Moldova data provided by the ADJJA from Integrated Case Management System. CoE median from the (CEPEJ, 2024[13]).
5.3.3. Balancing judicial workload and resource allocation
The equitable allocation of judicial resources is central to the performance and integrity of any justice system. Disparities in caseloads across courts can result in inefficiencies, excessive delays and unequal access to justice, undermining the principle of fairness that lies at the heart of people-centred justice. In Moldova, imbalances in the distribution of judges across first and second instance courts have contributed to wide variations in judicial workload, backlogs and service quality.
Moldova has developed a case weighting system to support more equitable workload distribution and evidence-based resource planning. This system assigns effort-based weights (on a scale of 1 to 10) to different categories of criminal, civil, administrative and contravention cases. However, it is not operationalised in practice. Concerns exist regarding the accuracy and granularity of the weights. In reality, the effort required to process different case types likely exceeds the tenfold range suggested by the current scale.
Further undermining the system’s utility is the outdated case categorisation framework upon which the weights are based. For example, in 2024, 32% of contravention cases and 13% of criminal cases were classified as “other newly emerged categories”. This over‑reliance on generic categories limits the capacity of the judiciary to analyse trends, monitor performance and allocate resources effectively. Without accurate categorisation, both the weighting system and broader case management tools lose their value.
As a result, Moldova currently conducts caseload and workload analysis by treating all cases as equivalent in weight. While this approach can still provide a rough basis for identifying disparities in resource needs – assuming a relatively uniform case mix across courts, it does not allow for nuanced comparisons or tailored support to courts with heavier or more complex dockets.
To help address these challenges, the SCM introduced a mechanism, requiring court presidents to develop internal backlog‑reduction plans. These plans focus in particular on the prioritisation of cases pending for more than 24 and 36 months and are to be accompanied by semi‑annual reporting on progress and the reasons for delays. Judges are also required to provide periodic updates on the status of cases that have been pending for an extended period.
The transparency of progress in backlog reduction has been further strengthened by the publication of a semi-annual court performance map, providing an overview of courts’ performance in reducing backlog. In addition, backlog management efficiency has also been incorporated as a criterion in the evaluation of court presidents (Moldpres, 2026[28]; Moldova1, 2025[29]).
Further improvement of the accuracy and implementation of case weighting and categorisation systems would enable more effective management of judicial workload and support evidence-based policymaking. In the meantime, greater emphasis could be placed on using disaggregated backlog data and performance indicators to guide resource allocation, judicial deployment and system-wide reforms.
There are 387 judicial posts allocated to the 14 Moldovan district courts, but due to vacancies only 316 judges were in office in 2025. If all judicial positions were filled, Moldova would have 16.06 judges per 100 000 inhabitants, but due to vacancies, the current number of actual judges per 100 000 (13.12) is slightly below the CoE median (14.07) (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 2025[30]; CEPEJ, 2024[13]). However, there is no “correct” ratio for the number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants because the number of judges in each judiciary depends on several factors (number of cases entering the judiciary, number of support staff, the court procedure, etc.). There is also no correlation between a higher number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants and the main efficiency criteria, such as disposition time or clearance rate.
In this context, challenges in workload management are closely linked to broader resourcing constraints, including vacancies, distribution of judges and the availability of analytical tools to guide allocation. Improving the accuracy and implementation of case weighting and categorisation systems would support more effective and evidence-based resource planning. In the interim, greater use of disaggregated backlog data and performance indicators could help inform judicial deployment, prioritisation and system-wide reforms, ensuring that available resources are used as efficiently and equitably as possible.
First instance courts
Between 2022 and 2024, judges at the first instance level in Moldova resolved, on average, 712 cases annually: 744 cases in 2022, 771 in 2023 and 623 in 2024. Approximately 50% of these were civil and administrative matters, 35% criminal and 15% contravention cases. However, this average masks disparities between courts. In 2024, the number of cases resolved per judge ranged from 511 in Orhei District Court to 839 in Comrat. Differences in workload based on incoming cases were more pronounced, from 627 cases per judge in Orhei to 1 252 in Comrat.18
These variations are driven primarily by an unequal allocation of judicial posts, compounded by a fragmented court infrastructure comprising 39 geographic locations. The disparities are more significant when examined at the courthouse level: for example, judges in Taraclia resolved 275 cases in 2024, while those in Ceadîr-Lunga handled 1 268. Notably, several high-workload courts (e.g. Bălți, Edineț, Drochia) have managed to maintain below-average backlogs, demonstrating that high caseloads can remain manageable – provided resources are used efficiently.
Yet the current distribution of judicial posts does not appear to be aligned with actual workload. In 2024, the SCM increased judicial positions in 10 district courts.19 However, only four of these (Cahul, Chișinău, Comrat and Drochia) had workloads above the national average. The remaining six received additional judges despite having below-average caseloads. Meanwhile, high-demand courts such as Bălți and Edineț received no additional posts. This means that, of the 13 additional judicial posts allocated to district courts, 7 were allocated to courts where the workload was below average, thereby further increasing the workload differences between courts. Bălți and Edinet district courts, that have above average workload per judicial post were not allocated additional posts.
Source: Caseload statistics: Moldova data provided by the ADJJA from Integrated Case Management System; number of judges: based on the data from the annual report of the SCM for 2024.
A more effective and data-driven approach would allocate judicial posts based on incoming caseload per judge, adjusted for courts with accumulated backlogs. A model developed for this review demonstrates how a more proportional distribution of judges, reflecting recent caseload data and backlog levels, could significantly reduce disparities while improving overall efficiency. Under this scenario:
The maximum incoming caseload per judge would be 545 cases, about 20% below the national average in 2024 and over 30% below the three-year average.
Total judicial posts at district court level would be reduced from the current level to 282 - 15 fewer judges, while maintaining or improving service standards.
Workload differences across district courts would be reduced to within 14%, compared to 85% in 2024.20
A more effective and data-driven approach would allocate judicial posts based on incoming caseload per judge, adjusted for courts with accumulated backlogs. A model developed for this review demonstrates how a more proportional distribution of judges, reflecting recent caseload data and backlog levels, could significantly reduce disparities while improving overall efficiency. Under this scenario:
The maximum incoming caseload per judge would be 545 cases, about 20% below the national average in 2024 and over 30% below the three-year average.
Total judicial posts at district court level would be reduced from the current level to 282 - 15 fewer judges, while maintaining or improving service standards.
Workload differences across district courts would be reduced to within 14%, compared to 85% in 2024.21
This model could be implemented progressively, prioritising the filling of vacancies in the most overburdened courts and supporting voluntary transfers for judges seeking relocation.
Source: Source for caseload statistics is the data provided by the ADJJA from the Integrated Case Management System. The number of judges is based on the data from the annual report of the SCM for 2024.
Second instance courts
Appeal courts in Moldova also face marked imbalances in caseload and judicial workload. In 2024, approximately 20% of civil and administrative cases and 28% of criminal and contravention cases were appealed from first instance courts. Despite a structural re‑organisation of the appellate system in 2024, which consolidated appeal courts into three regional jurisdictions (North, Centre, South), these disparities persist.
The Centre Appeal Court, in particular, faces an unsustainable workload. It handles nearly twice as many cases per judge as the South Appeal Court (formerly Cahul and Comrat). This imbalance is reflected in significantly longer disposition times, particularly for criminal and contravention matters. Unfortunately, the re‑organisation of this court in late 2024 did not address this issue: the South Appeal Court retained the total number of judicial posts from its two predecessor courts, while the Centre Appeal Court received no increase in staffing despite its higher caseload.
As with district courts, a re‑alignment of judicial posts based on actual resource needs could improve both performance and equity. A proposed re‑allocation model would:
Limit caseload differences among the three courts to less than 3%.
Cap the highest workload at 464 incoming cases per judge, 50% below the national average number of resolved cases in 2024 and within a manageable range based on recent experience.
Require the transfer of two judicial positions from the North Appeal Court and six from the South Appeal Court to the Centre Appeal Court.
As these positions are currently vacant, implementation could begin immediately by prioritising recruitment into the Centre Appeal Court.
Source: Caseload statistics by the ADJJA from the Integrated Case Management System. The number of judges is based on the data from the annual report of the SCM for 2024.
Judicial specialisation: Balancing expertise, flexibility and system efficiency
Moving towards flexible specialisation
Judicial specialisation can contribute significantly to the quality of decisions, consistency of jurisprudence and efficiency of case handling (CCJE, 2012[31]). By enabling judges to deepen their expertise in specific areas of law, specialisation helps reduce procedural errors, streamline hearings and reinforce trust in the legal system. However, specialisation must be carefully designed and implemented to avoid rigidities, imbalances in workload or the fragmentation of judicial competencies.
In Moldova, specialisation is currently implemented primarily along a basic division between civil and criminal cases, with contraventions typically grouped with criminal matters. In a limited number of larger courthouses, such as Rîșcani in Chișinău, there is more targeted specialisation, particularly in administrative disputes. In most locations, however, specialisation tends to be narrow and static. Judges are often assigned exclusively to one or two case categories, regardless of annual fluctuations in incoming caseloads. This rigid model can create workload disparities, limit judicial versatility and discourage broader professional development.
A more flexible model of specialisation would allow judges to concentrate a substantial portion of their time (e.g. 50-70%) on specific case categories, while retaining a share of their caseload in other areas. This approach would promote workload balance across judges, even when specialised case types vary in volume. It would also preserve generalist competencies, which are particularly important in smaller courts where 100% specialisation is impractical due to lower volumes and requirements for random case allocation.
Implementing such a model in Moldova would require key updates to the Integrated Case Management System (ICMS), including functionality to allocate cases according to updated case weights. It would also depend on a revised and more accurate weighting system that better reflects the time and complexity associated with different case categories.
The Administrative Court of Slovenia has just over 30 judges, spread over four locations, with 20 located at the central unit of the Court in Ljubljana. The Law on Administrative Disputes only provides for a rudimentary form of specialisation, stipulating that some specifically listed types of cases (asylum, competition and taxation) be processed at the court’s central unit. Some laws regulating individual, relatively narrow, legal fields contain similar provisions (e.g. the Law on Electronic Communication) and the general Law on Courts authorises the presidents of the courts to establish internal departments specialising in individual legal fields (e.g. civil, criminal, enforcement etc.).
Despite this slim legislative and personnel basis, three internal departments were created at the central unit of the Court, based on a decree of the president. Each of the departments specialises in a legal field that covers one of the (previously mentioned) types of cases, which have to be processed at the central unit of the Court, but, in reality, the rules for specialisation are formulated in a considerably wider manner. They can roughly be described as human rights, economic relations and environment, and public finance. The cases are distributed among the departments following a pre‑determined list containing well over 100 types of cases. The rest of the case types (which constitute the majority in the actual quantity of cases) are considered “general” and distributed among all the judges, regardless of their specialisation.
Every judge at the central unit is assigned to one of the departments, according to the yearly work schedule. Re‑assignments to other departments are possible but rare. The right of parties to a lawfully assigned (“natural”) judge is guarded by a separate case distribution system for each legal field and “general” cases, as well as by publication of the work schedule. Experience has shown that, despite the modest resources and effort required for this system to function, the results are excellent, providing most of the benefits expected of judicial specialisation (efficiency, coherent court practice, respect/trust of specialised professionals in the respective field, etc.). The system is well-liked by the judges and efficient, flexible and adaptable to new circumstances, as demonstrated by the recent and unprecedented influx of asylum cases.
Source: Information from the Slovenian judiciary. (Ligi, T. et al., 2024[32]).
Investigative judges: Addressing risks of over-isolation
One specific area of specialisation that requires closer attention is the role of investigative judges, particularly in smaller courts. Moldova’s legal framework rightly requires that the judge who authorises investigative measures should not preside over the corresponding trial, a safeguard against arbitrariness and to uphold impartiality. However, the current model, where each courthouse has one main investigative judge (and one substitute), appointed for three years (Law No. 514/1995), creates practical challenges.
Such long-term, individualised assignments can lead to an over-concentration of discretion in a single judge, limit peer oversight and erode trial-related competencies. This structure risks the kind of compartmentalisation and isolation that the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) has warned against in its guidance on judicial specialisation (CCJE, 2012[31]).
To address this, Moldova could consider reducing the length of investigative judge appointments (e.g. to one year), introducing regular rotation and allowing investigative judges to operate across the full jurisdiction of the district court rather than just a single courthouse. This would expand the available pool of eligible judges, increase flexibility and promote consistency, while preserving the necessary safeguards of impartiality.
Specialisation on administrative disputes
Administrative justice is another area where Moldova could expand judicial specialisation in line with European trends. Each year, between 6 000 and 6 500 administrative cases are filed in district courts. These are currently adjudicated by civil judges. This aligns Moldova closer to countries such as Denmark and Norway, where administrative justice is integrated into the general judicial system. Across Europe, specialisation in administrative justice is increasingly the norm. According to the 2024 CEPEJ report (based on 2022 data), 30 out of 44 reporting CoE jurisdictions have established specialised first instance administrative courts. Most EU Member states have either a separate administrative jurisdiction at the highest court level (e.g. Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands) or dedicated chambers within unified courts (e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Spain, Slovakia) (Observatory for Institutional and Legal Changes of the University of Limoges, 2007[33]). The SCM and the MoJ are exploring measures to strengthen specialisation within the judiciary, including proposals for dedicated chambers or judges trained in administrative law.
Moldova has a strong starting point for developing a specialised administrative justice track. The Rîșcani courthouse already handles a substantial volume of administrative cases and could serve as the foundation for a specialised administrative jurisdiction. Based on existing caseloads and complexity levels, approximately 25 judges could specialise in administrative law across the district courts.
5.3.4. Reducing judicial workload through procedural and institutional innovation
Reducing unnecessary judicial workload is key to ensuring the efficient and sustainable functioning of the justice system. In Moldova, where judicial salaries remain constrained and increasing staff levels fiscally challenging, structural innovations – both procedural and institutional – can offer viable paths to enhancing system-wide efficiency without compromising access to justice. Drawing on international practice, Moldova could consider several reforms to streamline proceedings, refocus judicial resources on complex and contested matters and empower non-judicial actors to handle routine or non-contentious cases.
Automating procedures for uncontested small-value civil claims
In 2024, nearly half (46%) of all incoming civil cases in Moldova's first instance courts were related to debt collection. Of these, around 64%, equivalent to 30% of all civil cases, concerned small claims not exceeding 10 average salaries (approximately MDL 150 000 or EUR 7 600).22 These cases often stem from unpaid utility bills or other routine financial obligations, where the facts are rarely disputed.
Although Moldova’s Civil Procedure Code provides for simplified handling of such claims, the process remains judge-led and initiated through traditional submissions. By contrast, several EU Member states have adopted fully or semi-automated procedures for handling uncontested small-value claims. In these systems, judicial involvement is only triggered if the defendant contests the claim. Otherwise, after a fixed response period, a payment order is automatically generated and becomes enforceable.
Some advanced systems allow frequent institutional claimants, such as utilities or telecom providers, to integrate their internal ICT systems with court platforms, enabling batch submissions in data format rather than documents. Automated checks by the court system verify admissibility, notify defendants and issue enforceable payment orders in the absence of a defence.
Introducing a similar digital payment order mechanism in Moldova could reduce judicial workload by up to 30% of civil caseloads, while improving legal certainty and ease of doing business. As the economy grows, such claims are expected to increase in volume, making early investment in automation both timely and cost-effective.23
At higher levels, administrative specialisation would also be justified. In 2024, nearly 4 000 administrative cases were filed with appellate courts, representing approximately 20% of all civil and administrative appeals, and 1 500 were submitted to the Supreme Court, representing around 30% of such matters. Dedicated administrative chambers at the appellate and Supreme Court levels would reflect the volume and legal complexity of these cases, improve consistency of jurisprudence and align Moldova with EU and CoE practice.
United Kingdom – Money Claim Online
Scope: Claims of up to GBP 100 000 against up to two defendants for monetary disputes.
Key features:
Online platform: Allows claimants to file claims electronically via the HM Courts & Tribunals Service website.
Separate channel for bulk claims: Companies connected to County Court Business Centre can submit their claims as data in XML format.
Defendant responses: Defendants can respond online by acknowledging service, admitting the claim or filing a defence.
Judgment: If the defendant does not respond, the claimant can request a default judgment online.
Limitations: Not suitable for claims involving personal injury, tenancy disputes or where the claimant or defendant is under 18.
Advantages:
Streamlines the process for straightforward monetary claims.
Reduces the need for paper forms and in-person court visits.
Germany – Mahnverfahren
Scope: Uncontested monetary claims, regardless of amount.
Key features:
Initiation: Creditor files an application for a payment order (Mahnbescheid) with the central payment order court (Amtsgericht).
Automation: Highly automated process with minimal judicial involvement.
No evidence required initially: No need to submit evidence unless the debtor contests the claim.
Enforceability: If the debtor does not object within two weeks, the creditor can request an enforcement order (Vollstreckungsbescheid), which is equivalent to a court judgment.
Advantages:
Cost-effective and swift resolution for uncontested claims.
Reduces court workload by filtering out uncontested cases.
Romania – Small claims procedure
Scope: Low‑value civil disputes resolved through a simplified small claims procedure under the Romanian Civil Procedure Code. Initially limited to RON 10 000, later increased to RON 50 000.
Key features:
Initiation: Claimants submit standardised forms approved by the MoJ, enabling simplified filing for low‑value disputes.
Written procedure: Proceedings are conducted primarily in writing; hearings are held only when deemed necessary by the court.
Digitalisation: Claims may be filed electronically using qualified electronic signatures. Courts accept scanned documents via e‑mail or e‑filing platforms, with digital practices significantly strengthened during the pandemic.
Cross‑border option: Romania participates in the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) for cross‑border disputes of up to EUR 5 000, enabling harmonised enforcement throughout EU Member states.
Excludes complex matters, such as family law and tenancy disputes.
Advantages:
Simpler resolution of low‑value disputes due to streamlined procedures.
Reduced administrative burden on courts through standardised forms and digital filing.
Rethinking adjudication in routine or administrative cases
Approximately 8% of all first instance civil cases in 2024 fell under the category of “search and forced delivery of the debtor”, making it the second most common category after debt collection claims. Under Articles 72 and 73 of the Enforcement Code No. 443/2004, a court order is required in such cases, given that enforcement involves the use of police powers. While court oversight is justified in cases involving intrusive or coercive measures, the frequency and routine nature of such proceedings raise questions about proportionality and judicial economy.
To reduce the burden on courts and enforcement institutions, Moldova could consider granting wider search powers to bailiffs, subject to appropriate safeguards, or reviewing the procedural steps that currently require the personal appearance of the debtor. Adjustments to the legal framework could enable a more efficient enforcement process, preserve judicial oversight for exceptional cases and ensure that court intervention is proportionate to the complexity and legal sensitivity of the matter.
Another 3% of civil cases involve requests for the “establishment of facts that have legal value”. These are typically uncontested applications submitted to confirm events or statuses with legal implications, such as kinship, ownership, succession or the status of being politically repressed. Article 281 of the Civil Procedure Code provides a non-exhaustive list of such scenarios in which the court is competent to establish legal consequences (Code No. 225/2003).
However, not all such matters necessarily require judicial determination. For example:
Acceptance of succession could be managed by notaries, as is common in many European jurisdictions.
Recognition of political repression or wartime detention could be assessed by competent administrative bodies with access to relevant archives and documentation.
In such cases, courts could retain a residual function, ensuring the right to appeal or review decisions made by notaries or public authorities. This two-tier model would preserve access to justice and legal remedies, while relieving courts of routine administrative tasks that do not require judicial discretion.
Importantly, further disaggregation of case categories within Moldova’s ICMS would be necessary to fully assess the impact of such reforms on overall caseloads and court operations. Nonetheless, even partial delegation of these matters could contribute to a more efficient and user-responsive civil justice system.
5.3.5. Simplifying court procedures to improve efficiency and focus judicial time
Beyond rethinking the types of cases requiring adjudication, Moldova’s justice system can benefit from streamlining how proceedings are conducted in cases that remain under the courts' jurisdiction. Several procedural innovations, already employed across OECD and CoE Member states, could increase judicial efficiency, reduce delays and support a more people-centred and cost-effective approach to justice delivery.
More flexibility in determining the need for court hearings
According to data published by the former Agency for Court Administration (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, n.d.[37]), Moldovan courts held 450 301 hearings in 2024, averaging 1.8 hearings per resolved case. However, as many cases (e.g. small claims and certain contraventions) are settled without hearings, the actual number of hearings per eligible case is likely well above two. This indicates a significant portion of judges' time is consumed by preparing for and conducting hearings.
Yet many of these hearings may be unnecessary. In civil and administrative cases, for example, if a party fails to appear or the matter could be resolved on the basis of written submissions, a hearing may not be the most effective use of judicial resources. Reports from 2024 reveal that 14% of scheduled hearings did not take place, while 23% were postponed and 13% interrupted, highlighting inefficiencies and missed opportunities for procedural streamlining.
Currently, under the Civil Procedure Code, written proceedings are prescribed only for small claims procedures. However, Moldova’s Code of Administrative Procedure also allows courts, in certain circumstances, to decide cases without an oral hearing when the parties do not request one or when the case can be resolved on the basis of written submissions (Code No. 116/2018). Moldova could consider extending the use of written procedures to additional categories of cases, for example uncontested civil matters, certain document-based applications (such as confirmation of legal facts), or appellate cases where the parties do not request an oral hearing. Greater procedural flexibility would reduce scheduling bottlenecks, allow parties to avoid unnecessary travel or delays and help judges manage their workload more effectively.
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Germany
German civil procedure is founded on the principle of orality according to Paragraph 128(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) but contains several provisions enabling decisions without an oral hearing which can potentially be applied to any category of civil cases. In this context, German courts may decide a case entirely based on written submissions when both parties consent. In such cases, the court sets deadlines for briefs and announces the date on which the decision will be delivered according to Paragraph 128(2) of the ZPO. In addition, while most necessary evidence is taken orally in line with the orality principle, the ZPO expressly allows courts to order the written examination of witnesses according to Paragraph 377(3) of the ZPO.
Written-first approach at the Appellate level, Finland
Finland offers a complementary model that emphasises a written‑first architecture at the appellate level while still allowing written handling in first‑instance matters under some conditions. Although Finnish oral hearings are generally considered part of Finish civil procedures, the appeal procedure is in principle conducted in writing, with an oral main hearing held only if a party requests one and the court of appeal finds it necessary. In parallel, at first instance, undisputed (summary) civil cases are processed in a written procedure by the district courts, and even in contested matters the court may continue preparation in writing where both parties consent and no witness hearing is needed.
Drafting full judgment only in case of appeal/request for full judgment
Under Moldova’s current legal framework, first instance civil and administrative courts are only required to draft fully reasoned judgments if a party requests it or the case is appealed (Codes No. 225/2003 and No. 116/2018). This is a sensible approach, particularly given that only 20% of civil and administrative judgments and 28% of criminal and contravention decisions are appealed.
However, this practice is not yet extended to criminal or contravention proceedings, where fully reasoned judgments must be drafted in every case. Allowing the same streamlined approach in these areas, i.e. requiring full reasoning only in the event of appeal or upon request, could significantly reduce time spent by judges on detailed drafting for unchallenged cases.24
Simplified proceedings in criminal cases
Moldova’s Criminal Procedure Code already provides for simplified mechanisms, including plea bargaining (arts. 504-509) and adjudication based solely on evidence gathered during the investigation phase (art. 364¹). These procedures help reduce the need for full trials in cases where facts are uncontested.
However, uptake of these mechanisms could be improved. To encourage their use, Moldova could consider aligning with practices in other countries where benefits for the defendant are offered in exchange for procedural efficiency, such as sentence reductions for early admissions of guilt or acceptance of evidence-based resolution. This would reduce resource burdens on prosecutors and judges without significantly diminishing the deterrent or punitive impact of sanctions.
Revisiting appeal panel composition
In Moldova, all appeal cases, whether they concern substantive judgments or procedural orders, are currently reviewed by a panel of three judges. This uniform approach is not common in other European systems, where many appeals concerning procedural or less complex issues (e.g. conclusions or interim decisions) are handled by a single judge.
Introducing differentiated review tracks at the appellate level could help optimise the use of judicial capacity. For example, in civil and administrative matters, appeals against procedural decisions or in small claims could be assigned to a single judge. This would free judicial panels to focus on complex or sensitive appeals and reduce backlogs at the appellate level.
Note: In Austria, the ZPO refers to the Civil Procedure Code, while the StPO (Strafprozessordnung) refers to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Delegating procedural tasks to non-judicial staff
Moldova benefits from a comparatively strong ratio of non-judicial staff supporting each judge. With 2.23 non-judge staff per judge, above the CoE median of 1.56, there is significant untapped potential to enhance judicial efficiency through better utilisation of these roles. Each judge is typically supported by both a judicial assistant and a registrar, who contribute to case preparation, hearing management and drafting support. However, judicial assistants currently have no authority to sign procedural orders or decisions, even in cases involving non-contentious matters. This reflects a common practice in many judicial systems, but it also limits the scope for workload redistribution.
In some EU countries, narrowly defined procedural responsibilities have been delegated to judicial assistants to improve efficiency without undermining judicial oversight. Estonia offers a notable example: judicial assistants may sign procedural orders that cannot be appealed, such as requests for corrections, decisions to initiate proceedings following formal review or scheduling-related orders (e.g. setting or extending deadlines). These functions remain under the general supervision of the presiding judge, but they significantly reduce the burden of routine procedural management.
Such delegation arrangements also serve a dual purpose: they support judicial workload management, while offering career development opportunities for assistants, particularly those aspiring to judicial appointments. This approach can increase staff motivation, reduce burnout and contribute to institutional capacity building.
For Moldova, the adoption of a similar approach would require a careful review of the capacity, legal training and readiness of judicial assistants, as well as the development of clear protocols for oversight and quality assurance. While not a substitute for broader structural reforms, the targeted delegation of non-appealable procedural tasks represents a pragmatic opportunity to optimise internal court operations and better leverage existing human resources.
5.4.1. Digital infrastructure and tools in the justice system
Over the past decade, Moldova has made considerable progress in digitalising its justice system,25 supported by sustained investments in infrastructure and technology. Key developments include the deployment of the ICMS, digital audio recording of hearings, online publication of court judgments and the availability of tools to support remote participation. According to the CEPEJ ICT Deployment Index, Moldova outperforms the CoE median across all three branches – administrative, civil and criminal – demonstrating its strong foundational infrastructure in comparative terms. Digitalisation efforts will be guided by the Action Plan for the Digital Transformation Programme of the Justice Sector 2025-2030 that was presented to the Council for the Digitalisation of Justice and scheduled for public consultation. In addition, digital transformation is identified as a strategic objective for the upcoming justice sector policy document, focusing on both regulatory and operational measures.
The ICMS supports essential judicial functions, such as case registration, electronic document upload, automated (random) case assignment and interconnection with key external registries, including those of the tax administration, population and business entities. These functionalities facilitate improved procedural efficiency, transparency and accessibility. Moldova also stands out for its systematic use of videoconferencing in hearings involving detainees, an approach that reduces logistical burdens and improves access without compromising procedural guarantees.26 This practice, while not fully captured by international indicators, illustrates a pragmatic and cost-effective use of digital tools.
To improve communication and information flows between courts and procedural participants, Moldova is currently piloting the e-Judicial File information system across all courts. At this stage, the system is used by lawyers. It allows users to submit applications and evidence electronically, pay state fees through the governmental electronic payment service, receive procedural notifications, consult hearing schedules, access case materials, minutes and audio recordings, and upload documents for examination during hearings. According to the authorities, in 2026, access to the system is expected to be expanded to other professions and users, including prosecutors, administrators, court bailiffs, judicial experts, mediators, notaries, translators and interpreters.
5.4.2. Governance of digital reforms and end-user involvement
Effective digital justice systems require technological infrastructure as well as governance frameworks that enable strategic oversight, cross-sector co-ordination and meaningful engagement of end-users. In Moldova, the absence of a centralised ICT governance body within the justice sector hampers digital cohesion. While the MoJ plays a nominal co-ordinating role, it needs robust institutional capacity to lead sector-wide transformation.
In response to co-ordination challenges, the MoJ established in 2025 the Consultative Council for the Co-ordination of Justice Sector Digitalisation, a multi-institutional platform that brings together justice institutions, professional bodies and digital governance authorities to support alignment of digital initiatives and promote interoperability of justice information systems (Order No. 262/2025). The Council held its first meeting in September 2025, marking a shift from ad hoc co-ordination toward a more institutionalised governance framework for digital reforms.
Despite these achievements, several technical and systemic limitations continue to hinder the full realisation of Moldova’s digital justice potential. The ICMS, for instance, does not adapt to mid-year judicial appointments or changes in court composition, resulting in unbalanced caseloads, delays in urgent matters and the need for manual workarounds by court leadership. Additionally, the system’s statistical reporting tools are not designed with end-users in mind, requiring manual processing to produce data that are usable for decision making or performance monitoring.
Moreover, while the judiciary is relatively well equipped, digital transformation across the justice sector remains fragmented. Other actors, including prosecution offices, police, legal aid services, bailiffs, notarial and mediation services, often operate on separate platforms with limited interoperability. Even though national tools such as MConnect (for data exchange) and MCloud (for shared hosting) are available, their use is uneven and integration is needed. This results in duplicative procedures, inconsistent user experiences and administrative inefficiencies. Recently, digital tools extended to notarial services with the approval of the Concept for the e‑Notary Information System (Government Decision No. 534/2025), seeking to improve notarial workflows, reduce processing times and remove geographical barriers through the provision of online services.
Although electronic submission of civil claims is technically possible in Moldova, its use remains limited, in part because the service is restricted to licensed advocates and requires login credentials that are not linked to any national digital identity system. This makes the registration process cumbersome and discourages broader uptake. Similarly, while lawyers can access digital case files, the lack of a unified e‑identity system hampers seamless user experience and scalability.
To improve communication and information flows between courts and procedural participations, Moldova is currently piloting the e-Judicial File information system across all courts. At this stage, the system is currently used by lawyers. It allows users to submit applications and evidence electronically, pay state fees through the governmental electronic payment service, receive procedural notifications, consult hearing schedules, access case materials, minutes and audio recordings, and upload documents for examination during hearings. According to the authorities, in 2026, access to the system is expected to be expanded to other professions and users, including prosecutors, administrators, court bailiffs, judicial experts, mediators, notaries, translators and interpreters.
Moldova’s experience reflects broader trends observed across OECD and Council of Europe countries, where the availability of digital tools does not always translate into effective use or integrated service delivery. Fragmented governance, inconsistent adoption and the need for sustained investment, especially in user-centred design and data infrastructure, continue to limit impact. As OECD evidence shows, digitalisation efforts yield the greatest benefits when embedded within a strategic framework for sector-wide interoperability, supported by strong leadership, institutional co‑ordination and end-user engagement.
The case of the automated enforcement information system illustrates the risks of fragmented governance. Disagreements between the MoJ and the Union of Bailiffs resulted in the parallel development of incompatible systems, undermining the goal of unified enforcement management (CoE, 2021[40]). Insufficient coherence is further compounded by overlapping initiatives, inconsistent standards and under-utilised infrastructure, especially in smaller institutions with limited capacity.
User feedback suggests that, while court professionals are generally satisfied with ICMS, certain shortcomings, such as the inability to adapt case assignment logic to new appointments or configure online access to documents in line with procedural safeguards, reveal gaps in end-user engagement. The sector could better involve justice professionals and citizens in the design, testing and refinement of digital tools.
Moreover, Moldova’s justice digitalisation remains heavily dependent on donor funding. In 2022, only 1.9% of the total court budget was allocated to ICT, compared to the CoE median of 3.3%. While donor-funded development (often covering 40% or more of digital investment) has accelerated innovation, it has also led to an overemphasis on maintenance (66% of ICT spending), limiting the space for long-term strategic upgrades. This calls for a shift toward sustainable domestic financing and capacity building to ensure the continuity and relevance of digital justice tools.
5.4.3. Data quality, interoperability and strategic use
An integrated and strategically used justice data ecosystem is essential for effective governance, performance monitoring and evidence-based reform. Yet in Moldova, the current landscape is marked by fragmentation, duplication and under-utilisation of data, which weakens institutional accountability and undermines efforts to deliver co-ordinated, people-centred justice services.
Fragmentation and duplication in data collection and analysis
One of the key structural challenges lies in disjointed responsibilities for data collection and use. The ADJJA manages the ICMS, which is designed to centralise case-related data. However, the agency's role remains largely technical and the ICMS is not consistently leveraged for deeper analysis, policy development or strategic planning.
Meanwhile, the SCM conducts its own court performance reporting by collecting data directly from courts, often through parallel or manual systems. This dual-track approach contributes to overlapping reporting burdens, inconsistent datasets and missed opportunities for comprehensive sector-wide analysis.
The institutional split between data producers and users undermines the potential of digital infrastructure. For interoperability and strategic use to become a reality, Moldova will need to strengthen both vertical and horizontal data linkages. This includes aligning ICMS with other justice and administrative registries, improving data quality control mechanisms and enhancing the analytical capacity within ADJJA and SCM.
To strengthen the justice data system in Moldova, the government is introducing the new JUSTAT Information System, designed as a dedicated IT solution for collection and analysis of statistical data from the judicial system, including key performance indicators (Government Decision No. 743/2025). This system aims to improve the availability of standardised judicial statistics and reduce reliance on fragmented or manual data collection, ultimately supporting evidence-based decision-making.
Impact on users and institutional accountability
The fragmentation of data systems has a direct and disproportionate impact on users of the justice system, particularly those facing complex or intersectional legal issues. Individuals must often navigate multiple institutions, each with its own data systems, procedures and timelines, to resolve a single issue. This leads to delays, redundancies and inefficiencies, and hinders the system’s ability to provide joined-up services.
At the institutional level, the lack of shared and interoperable data limits Moldova’s capacity to monitor justice outcomes, identify service gaps and evaluate the impact of reforms. Without common data standards or interoperability protocols, cross-institutional collaboration remains ad hoc and reactive (Government of the Republic of Moldova, 2023[41]). Real-time data to support decision making or early warning mechanisms is rarely available and disaggregated data, critical for understanding the experiences of vulnerable and underserved groups, are often missing or inconsistently captured. While progress has been made in expanding digital tools, Moldova would benefit from the development of a consolidated, sector-wide data strategy. This strategy would define clear institutional responsibilities, promote interoperability and ensure the systematic use of disaggregated data for decision making, performance monitoring and reform evaluation across the entire justice sector.
Structural and governance challenges
Recognising these challenges, Moldova’s Justice Sector Strategy 2022-2025 sets out the objective of developing integrated information systems and strengthening inter-institutional data sharing (Ministry of Justice, Moldova, 2021[11]). However, realising this vision requires more than technical upgrades. It demands structural and governance reforms to establish harmonised data standards, unified interoperability frameworks and legally grounded mandates for data exchange, all while ensuring robust data protection and cybersecurity (World Bank, 2023[42]).
One of the key barriers is the absence of strong, centralised digital governance within the justice sector. While the MoJ provides strategic leadership, it lacks the institutional mandate and technical capacity to co-ordinate digital transformation across the sector. This has led to parallel efforts and inconsistencies (e.g. Union of Bailiffs’ platform).
In addition, many digital systems within the justice sector operate on outdated infrastructure, with limited interoperability and insecure hosting environments, posing risks to data integrity and long-term viability.
Institutional capacity and change management
Beyond technological and structural barriers, institutional and human capacity constraints further slow digital transformation. Many justice institutions lack specialised ICT or data analysis staff, limiting their ability to manage and strategically use digital tools. Overcoming these challenges will require investment both in infrastructure and software and in capacity development, technical support and change management.
Strong leadership and a culture of shared responsibility are crucial going forward. Justice sector actors must move beyond siloed thinking and embrace the strategic value of a co-ordinated, evidence-informed approach to digital transformation (IPRE, 2024[43]).
From data systems to people-centred justice
Improving the quality and interoperability of justice data is not just a technical goal; it is essential for delivering people-centred justice services. A robust data ecosystem enables institutions to deliver more accessible, co-ordinated and tailored services, reduce administrative burdens and support vulnerable and underserved people more effectively (Government Decision No. 650/2023). Reliable, real-time data also strengthen strategic planning and resource allocation, enhance transparency and reinforce public trust.
For Moldova, overcoming data silos and building a modern, interoperable justice information infrastructure is critical to realising the goals set out in the Justice Sector Strategy. It also provides the foundation for achieving the broader vision of accountable and user-responsive justice outlined across this review.
5.4.4. Operationalising open justice through digitalisation
Building on Moldova’s efforts to strengthen transparency and open justice (see Chapter 4), digital technologies play a central role in operationalising access to judicial information and improving the efficiency of judicial processes. Moldova has made important strides in this regard, particularly through the online publication of judicial decisions, availability of court schedules and remote access to hearings. Lawyers can consult case files electronically and court audio recordings are accessible to the public, signalling a growing commitment to open justice.
Moldova has also developed key digital tools that support both transparency and the functioning of the justice system. The National Courts Portal serves as a unified gateway to court information, providing access to hearing schedules, judicial decisions, summonses and selected case law. By consolidating information from multiple courts into a single interface, it improves accessibility and usability for both legal professionals and the general public, while facilitating communication between citizens and judicial institutions. Courts also publish hearing schedules and summons notices online, enabling parties and the public to follow proceedings and access practical information in a timely manner. The ICMS plays a central role in managing judicial processes. It supports the tracking of cases throughout their lifecycle and enables the collection of data on judicial performance.
The effectiveness of digital justice tools depends on the existence of clear operational protocols governing access to information. Moldova would benefit from developing consistent rules on the timing and conditions for the publication of court documents, ensuring that transparency does not inadvertently compromise legal protections or the effectiveness of judicial measures. Digitalisation also raises questions of accessibility for all. While digital tools have expanded access for legal professionals, access for the general public remains uneven. Expanding user-friendly platforms, strengthening digital identity systems and ensuring accessibility for vulnerable groups will be important to ensure that digital justice contributes to people-centred outcomes. Complementary investments in legal literacy and public awareness can further support the effective use of digital tools.
Moreover, Moldova would benefit from the development of clear and consistent protocols on the publication and timing of access to court documents and further invest in public legal education on how to effectively use digital justice tools. It could help close digital divides and foster greater civic engagement with the justice system.
Case allocation
The case management system used in the Estonian judiciary (KIS) enables the allocation of cases to judges manually, as well as automatically. Manual allocation is to be used under exceptional circumstances, e.g. when a case needs to be allocated to a specific judge for merger of cases. Cases can be allocated automatically either according to case weights (which have been developed with the involvement of judges and approved by the Court Administration Council) or without them (i.e. each case is considered the same as any other). When the case allocation is done according to case weights, the number of cases (caseload) allocated to different judges of the same court can differ, but workload is the same. The system also enables allocating cases based on different models of specialisation (full specialisation on certain categories or partial specialisation, whereby a certain share of cases is allocated from among the categories that the judge has not specialised in). As the system can take case weight into account when allocating cases, it is able to ensure equal workloads even in case of specialisation of judges. Finally, the case allocation functionality can be reset at any moment during the calendar year, i.e. when a new judge takes office or returns from a long absence, in order to cater for any changes in the number of judges. The system also enables allocation of cases to judges so that the allocation is not reflected in the overall calculation of caseload/workload. This can be useful when a certain number of cases needs to be allocated to a new judge as a “starting package”.
Delivery and retrieval of documents
Communication with parties is predominantly electronic and takes place through the Open E-File Portal (AET). Use of AET is mandatory for advocates. They have access to the portal with their digital identity. The portal enables submission of claims and all other documents. In addition, the portal is used for delivery of documents sent by the court. The court clerk can decide for each document which participant has access to which document of the case and which participant needs to confirm delivery (e.g. when needed for calculation of procedural deadlines). E-mail notifications are sent, as well, to notify that the court has made a document available in AET. When the document has not been picked up from the portal for a certain number of days, the rest of the portal becomes no longer functional for the user. For advocates, this effectively means that they cannot communicate with the court anymore and cannot do their work. This functionality was added to limit options for advocates who wish to delay procedures, for example, by deliberately not receiving certain documents from the court.
Portal for statistics
All statistics are generated based on KIS and the key data available in real-time (effectively with one-day delay) in the portal for court statistics. The key data include number of incoming and resolved cases, clearance rate, disposition time and most frequent categories of cases.
Source: Information from the Estonian judiciary.
Based on these findings, potential pathways and policy levers that could reinforce Moldova’s management of the justice sector’s resources and performance for effective justice delivery include:
1. Strengthen budgeting and financial management. This could include:
Improving justice sector financial planning by strengthening inter-institutional co-ordination including with the Ministry of Finance, developing a unified financial management framework and reinforcing credibility, accuracy and reliability of the medium-term budgetary framework to support strategic planning and financial capacity across the sector;
Strengthening financial management in the justice sector by establishing a centralised budget‑monitoring system that promotes co-ordination across institutions and enhances transparency through accessible, disaggregated financial data and simplified reporting, as well as a more active role for the SCM in resource allocation;
Advancing performance-informed, participatory and needs-based budgeting by introducing disaggregated budget ceilings and outcome-based indicators aligned with institutional mandates and service delivery objectives. This could involve stronger engagement between the Ministry of Finance and justice sector institutions on budget performance, improving the quality of performance indicators and the prioritisation of budget proposals. Measures could also include allocating court budgets based on objective workload analyses to better reflect actual resource needs and reduce disparities in funding across jurisdictions, while supporting a more equitable, efficient and responsive justice system;
Strengthening judiciary budgetary management and performance by advancing system-wide strategic planning, developing meaningful performance indicators, and implementing robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks respecting judicial independence and enabling the judiciary to carry out its constitutional mandate. Measures could include incorporating case complexity and incoming case volume into court budgeting formulas, linking staffing budgets to workload indicators, improving transparency and accountability through integrated judicial statistics and cost analyses, and gradually expanding performance-based budgeting to cover capital investment and HR planning;
Introducing regular spending reviews or targeted expenditure reviews in the justice sector to assess whether resources are aligned with strategic priorities, identify efficiency gains and support the reallocation of funding toward higher-impact services and reform priorities;
Improving and consolidating capital investment planning in the justice sector by developing a national capital investment strategy for the justice sector anchored in a multi-year budget framework. This could be accompanied by targeted efforts to enhance the execution capacity of key institutions, such as the SCM and ADJJA, for effective delivery and mobilising donor support for infrastructure modernisation. Beyond planning, this would require building a new set of institutional capacities, specialised skill sets and a more enabling operating environment.
2. Improve HR and institutional capacity. This could include:
Implementing a sector-wide strategic workforce planning framework covering courts, prosecution services, legal aid and the penitentiary system. This could include forward-looking projections of staffing needs by role, institution and location aligned with reform milestones, such as court re-organisation and the implementation of judicial vetting;
Developing and operationalising a shared human capital strategy, including civil servants and judicial staff, to support real-time, evidence-based staffing decisions across the justice sector;
Enhancing HR data collection and analytics capacity, including institutional capabilities in forecasting, workforce planning and strategic staffing allocation;
Continuing to address the current and anticipated high number of judicial vacancies, particularly in high-workload courts, by ensuring a sufficient pool of qualified candidates. This could include measures to attract and retain talent from within the judiciary, as well as from other experienced legal professions, in order to mitigate delays, reduce case backlogs and preserve access to timely justice during and after the vetting process;
Ensuring judges’ salaries are consistently maintained at a level that ensures the attractiveness of a judicial career among top legal professionals and is proportional to the salaries of comparable positions within the executive and legislative branches;
Strengthening the continuous training ecosystem for civil servants and justice professionals by establishing a co-ordinated, adequately resourced and accountable training system that is accessible and based on identified needs;
Establishing structured career development pathways and sound performance-based incentives to attract and retain qualified administrative and support staff across justice institutions;
Promoting balanced representation within the justice system through institutionalised policies, leadership commitment and regular monitoring of progress across judicial roles and hierarchies.
3. Enhance the performance and efficiency of courts by promoting procedural and institutional innovation, reinforcing evidence-based decision making and monitoring mechanisms, increasing judicial specialisation and further simplifying selected procedures. This could include:
Adopting and operationalising a data-driven approach to management that supports both workload balancing and broader managerial decision making. This could cover developing case-weighting models, using disaggregated performance indicators (e.g. share of old cases, time to disposition, clearance rates) and applying strategic staffing to ensure equitable workload distribution across courts. Strengthening the use of judicial statistics could also support decisions on case allocation, court specialisation and resource planning;
Enhancing judicial specialisation across different areas of law, including the establishment or reinforcement of specialisation in administrative disputes;
Exploring the practice of specialisation throughout the justice chains to enhance expertise, consistency and efficiency in handling specific types of cases among all actors involved in the case;
Developing automated procedures for small uncontested civil claims to reduce workload and increase efficiency;
Delegating resolution of minor civil/contravention cases to notaries and delegating some frequently appearing contravention cases (e.g. contraventions related to parental obligations or traffic violations involving licence suspension) to competent administrative authorities as the first instance;
Exploring procedural simplifications, such as use of single judges in appeals, abbreviated decisions and expanded roles for judicial assistants;
Building the institutional and professional capacity of court support staff to handle administrative responsibilities, thereby enabling judges to devote their attention to complex judicial functions.
4. Accelerate digital transformation and strengthen data governance. This could include:
Developing and implementing an integrated digital justice strategy, with clearly defined leadership, inter-institutional co-ordination mechanisms, and robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks to guide implementation and track progress;
Ensuring responsive and user-driven design of the ICMS by establishing structured consultation processes with all levels of the judiciary, including judges, clerks, judicial assistants and SCM officials, to ensure the system responds to evolving judicial and operational needs;
Increasing domestic investment in court ICT systems to reduce reliance on external donors and ensure long-term sustainability, including regular system upgrades, maintenance and capacity building;
Prioritising ongoing development of the ICMS, including strengthening interoperability with other national registries and justice sector case management systems, while improving data quality, accessibility and transparency;
Establishing a permanent, fully integrated digital justice interoperability framework to enable seamless exchange of data and end-to-end digital processing of judicial proceedings, including:
Implementing a national justice interoperability platform that integrates data and workflows across judicial and administrative systems;
Establishing a national-level digital leadership hub with responsibility for co‑ordinating the implementation, maintenance and evolution of the interoperability framework.
Code No. 116 of 19 July 2018, Administrative Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/141520
Code No. 218 of 24 October 2008, Contravention Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/154054
Code No. 443 of 24 December 2004, Enforcement Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/15157
Code No. 225 of 30 May 2003, Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/134478
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova of 29 July 1994, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/145723
Government Decision No. 743 of 3 December 2025 on the approval of the Concept of the "JUSTAT" Information System, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/151827
Government Decision No. 534 of 26 August 2025 on the approval of the Concept of the e-Notary Information System, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150570
Government Decision No. 561 of 7 August 2024 on the approval of the Medium‑Term Budgetary Framework (2025–2027), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/144721
Government Decision No. 535 of 24 July 2024 on the amendment of Government Decision No. 684/2022 for the approval of the Regulation on public capital investment projects, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/144331
Government Decision No. 748 of 6 July 2024 on the Agency for Digitalisation in Justice and Judicial Administration, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/145852
Government Decision No. 361 of 29 May 2024, on the approval of the National Development Plan for 2025-2027, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/143540
Government Decision No. 45 of 24 January 2024 regarding the amendment of Government Decision 829 of 27 October 2023 on the approval of the National Action Plan for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union for the years 2024 – 2027, https://www.mf.gov.md/sites/default/files/PNA_Hot%C4%83r%C3%A2rea%20Guvernului%2045.pdf
Government Decision No. 829 of 27 October 2023 on the approval of the National Action Plan for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union for the years 2024 – 2027, https://www.mf.gov.md/sites/default/files/PNA_Hot%C4%83r%C3%A2rea%20Guvernului%20829.pdf
Government Decision No. 650 of 6 September 2023 on the approval of the Digital Transformation Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2023-2030, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/139408
Government Decision No. 692 of 5 October 2022 on the approval of the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (2023-2025), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/140463
Government Decision No. 684 of 29 September 2022 for the approval of the Regulation on Public Capital Investment projects, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/144348
Government Decision No. 386 of 17 June 2020 on the Planning, Development, Approval, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Policy Documents, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/147314
Judgement No. 24 of 2 October 2018 on the review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 328 of 23 December 2013 on the remuneration of judges and prosecutors, and of a phrase contained in Article 131(1) of Law No. 544 of 20 July 1995 on the status of judges, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/112498
Law No. 241 of 10 July 2025 on amending some normative acts (evaluation of the performance of judges and prosecutors), https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150133
Law No. 192 of 10 July 2025 on the mechanism for adjudicating corruption and corruption-related cases, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/149827
Law No. 147 of 9 June 2023 on the selection and evaluation of judges’ performance, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150155
Law No. 315 of 17 November 2022 on the approval of the National Development Strategy “European Moldova 2030”, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf_act/134582
Law No. 76 of 21 April 2016 on the Reorganisation of Courts, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/93527
Law No. 3 of 25 February 2016 on the Prosecution Office, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/120703
Law No. 181 of 25 July 2014 on Public Finance and Budgetary-Fiscal Responsibility, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/142656
Law No. 158 of 4 July 2008 on Civil Service and Status of Civil Service, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/139408
Law No. 152 of 8 June 2006 on the National Institute of Justice, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/132887
Law No. 1260 of 19 July 2002 on the lawyers’ profession, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/110164
Law No. 947 of 19 July 1996 on the Superior Council of Magistracy, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/152535
Law No. 544 of 20 July 1995 on the Status of Judges, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/152532
Law No. 514 of 6 July 1995 on the Organisation of the Judiciary, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/124908
Order No. 262 of 15 August 2025 on the Council for the Co-ordination of the Digitalisation of the Justice Sector, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/150460
Order No. 124 of 21 December 2023 on the approval of the Methodological Framework for the preparation, approval and amendment of the budget, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/141146
Parliament Decision No. 21 of 3 March 2017 on the approval of the Plan for the construction of new buildings and/or the renovation of existing buildings, necessary for the proper functioning of the court system, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/98551
SCM Decision No. 408-31 of 22 July 2025 on the approval of the Human Resources Strategy of the judicial system of the Republic of Moldova, https://www.csm.md/files/Hotaririle/2025/31/408-31.pdf
SCM Decision No. 109/3 of 28 January 2014 on the approval of the Methodology for Planning the Budgets of Courts, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/84497
Superior Council of Magistracy, Extract No. 212/8 of 5 March 2013 from the Decision of the Superior Council of Magistracy No. 212/8 of 5 March 2013 on the approval of the Regulation on the evaluation criteria, indicators and procedure for the evaluation of judges’ performance, https://www.legis.md/cautare/downloadpdf/145991
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[44] SCM (n.d.), Annual Reports, Superior Council of Magistracy, https://www.csm.md/ro/activitatea/rapoarte-anuale.html (accessed on 13 February 2026).
[8] SCM (n.d.), SCM annual reports, Superior Council of Magistracy, https://www.csm.md/ro/activitatea/rapoarte-anuale.html.
[42] World Bank (2023), Digital Justice Assessment: Moldova, unpublished report.
← 1. The constitutional basis of judicial financial autonomy is discussed further in the subsection “Addressing constraints to institutional autonomy and performance”.
← 2. This approach is broadly consistent with OECD work on performance budgeting, which emphasises the importance of linking resource allocation to measurable outputs and outcomes, while recognising the need to balance simplicity, data availability and policy relevance. (OECD, 2025[2]; OECD, forthcoming[47]).
← 3. This principle was upheld in Constitutional Court Judgment No. 24/2018, which declared unconstitutional an amendment requiring courts to submit their budgets via the government. Further, the 2021 Constitutional amendments made it mandatory to obtain the SCM’s advisory opinion when preparing, approving or amending court budgets.
← 4. Article 121 stipulates that court budgets are approved by Parliament and incorporated into the state budget. The Constitutional Court affirmed the importance of direct submission of court budgets in a Judgment No. 24/2018, declaring unconstitutional a legislative amendment that would have required court budgets to be submitted via the government.
← 5. Analysis of annual reports of the Superior Council of Magistracy and General Prosecutor’s Office (SCM, n.d.[44]; General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Moldova, n.d.[45]).
← 6. For example, the Strategy for Ensuring the Independence and Integrity of the Justice Sector 2022-2025 recognised infrastructure modernisation as a key priority under Strategic Objective 3: “Efficient and Modern Administration of the Justice Sector, which includes objectives to ensure that judicial institutions operate in premises meeting EU standards and are supported by robust digitalisation solutions.”
← 7. Recent reforms have strengthened Moldova’s capital investment framework (Government Decisions No. 684/2022 and No. 535/2024). These include the adoption of new public investment management (PIM) regulations, operationalisation of the Single Project Pipeline (SPP), updated project appraisal guidelines and the creation of the Inter ministerial Committee for Strategic Planning (CIPS). Together, these measures aim to improve investment efficiency, enhance transparency and better align capital spending with national development and sector-specific priorities.
← 8. Specifically, the MoJ, through its subordinated Agency for Court Administration and Digitalisation of Justice, holds the main responsibility for co-ordinating infrastructure development. The ADDJA manages state-owned judicial assets, oversees capital repairs and works to standardise administrative practices across court secretariats. The SCM, which oversees judicial administration, plays a complementary role by identifying infrastructure needs and justifying investment proposals, particularly in relation to court performance and judicial functioning.
← 9. The MoF’s Public Investment Division co‑ordinates the capital project pipeline and chairs the Working Group for State Capital Procedures. Strategic projects are selected through the Single Project Pipeline (SPP) and incorporated into the MTBF following appraisal and prioritisation. Projects must be uploaded to the government’s Register of Capital Investment Projects (SIRPIC) for tracking and co‑ordination.
← 10. E.g. OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance, effective public investment management depends on aligning budgeting with performance frameworks, ensuring co-ordination across institutions and strengthening implementation capacity (OECD, 2015[4]).
← 11. The reform aimed to streamline the judiciary by reducing the number of courts from 44 to 15, with the current structure comprising 14 courts following subsequent adjustments. Law No. 76/2016 on court reorganisation established a 10-year implementation plan (2017-2027) for consolidating court infrastructure, supported by a construction roadmap adopted under Parliament Decision No. 21/2017. As of early 2026, 39 court offices remain operational (14 main courts and 25 secondary branches). Only one new courthouse, in Ungheni, merging with the Nisporeni Court, has been completed to date. Recent legislative amendments (Law No. 241/2025) have extended the deadline for completing the judicial map infrastructure programme from 2027 to 2035.
← 12. Penitentiary No. 13 in Chișinău, built in the 19th century, has long been criticised for sub‑standard conditions and overcrowding. The ECtHR has issued numerous rulings against Moldova citing inhumane treatment of detainees linked to this facility (ECtHR, 2022). In response, the government approved plans in 2011 to construct a modern detention centre aligned with European standards. The project, co‑financed through a EUR 71.7 million loan from the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), is strategically significant for Moldova’s compliance with international human rights obligations. However, despite its urgency, the project has experienced repeated delays. Originally intended for earlier implementation, construction is now scheduled to begin in 2026, with completion projected for end-2028 (CEB, 2024). The delays reflect broader challenges in Moldova’s public investment management system, including administrative bottlenecks, insufficient inter-institutional co‑ordination and weaknesses in project planning and readiness.
← 13. The Superior Council of Magistracy’s Strategic Plan for 2025-2029 includes a dedicated chapter on human resources. However, it was considered necessary to develop a separate and more detailed human resources strategy. Accordingly, a dedicated SCM’s Human Resources Strategy was approved in July 2025 (SCM Decision No. No. 408-31/2025 and (CoE, 2025[46]).
← 14. While comparative data from the CoE can provide useful context, the median number of judges per capita is not intended as a benchmark or target. Judicial workforce needs vary significantly by country and must be assessed in light of national conditions, case complexity and internal system efficiency. In Moldova’s case, rather than concluding that the overall number of judges is insufficient, it is essential to first address structural inefficiencies and uneven workloads across courts. Only then can a clear, evidence-based assessment be made regarding the optimal size and distribution of the judiciary.
← 15. As of late 2025, six vetted judges were serving at the SCJ, while one additional vetted judge was seconded to the Superior Council of Magistracy. To support the court’s functioning, four judges from lower courts were temporarily transferred to the SCJ, although these temporary assignments do not count toward the 20 approved permanent positions.
← 16. Response of the Ministry of Justice to OECD Questionnaire.
← 17. Disposition Time (DT) reveals the theoretical time needed for a pending case to be resolved, considering the current pace of work. It is reached by dividing the number of pending cases at the end of a particular period by the number of resolved cases within that period and then multiplying the result by 365 to express it in days. More pending than resolved cases will lead to a DT higher than 365 days (one year) and vice versa.
← 18. The caseload per judge was even higher in Causeni but Causeni DC was merged with Anenii Noi DC in 2024. As the workload in Anenii Noi was below average because of this, the average workload of the new combined DC was lowered.
← 19. In 2024, the number of judicial posts was increased in Cahul (1 judge), Chișinău (1 judge), Cimișlia (1 judge), Comrat (2 judges), Criuleni (1 judge), Drochia (2 judges), Hîncești (1 judge), Soroca (2 judges), Strășeni (1 judge) and Ungheni (1 judge). This was done at the expense of decreasing the number of judicial posts at Supreme Court.
← 20. 434 incoming cases per judicial post in Criuleni vs 805 in Causeni.
← 21. 434 incoming cases per judicial post in Criuleni vs 805 in Causeni.
← 22. The threshold for small claims procedure foreseen in Art 276² of the Civil Procedure Code No. 225/2003.
← 23. For example, when the money claim procedure was introduced in Estonia in 2006-2007, these cases constituted approximately 25% of all civil cases; in 2024 they constituted 57%.
← 24. The Estonian Criminal Procedure Code contains a similar – shortened – procedure and foresees the reduction of the sentence by one-third, for example, if the defendant agrees to the application of this procedure instead of the full trial.
← 25. As the recent World Bank report “Moldova: Digital Justice Assessment” provides an overview of the different ICT systems and registries maintained by the Ministry of Justice and used in the wider justice system, this section focuses mainly on the use of ICT in courts.
← 26. In 2025, approximately 15,495 court hearings were conducted via videoconference, Further technical consolidates has taken place, the ADJJA started a transition from the TrueConf application to the Zoom platform as a standard solution for remote hearings.