This chapter presents the main findings on prices, production, consumption, and trade of agricultural and aquatic food commodities covered in the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, as well as developments in key sectoral indicators over the 2026‑2035 period. It summarises a baseline scenario for the next decade based on specific assumptions about macroeconomic conditions, productivity trends, weather, consumer preferences, and agriculture and trade policies. Real international agricultural prices are projected to remain broadly stable, as productivity gains are expected to keep pace with rising demand. Production growth is driven primarily by improvements in productivity. At the same time, rising incomes in middle-income countries are expected to support a gradual shift towards livestock products, with some increase in feed demand. International trade will continue to play a central role in balancing regional supply and demand. In the context of the 2026 Middle East conflict, the chapter also presents a supplementary scenario analysis comparing the baseline outlook for 2026‑2027 with an adverse scenario characterised by a significant slowdown in global economic growth and elevated energy prices. The chapter further analyses trends in gross agricultural income per worker, highlighting both expected improvements and the persistent volatility that characterises farm incomes.
OECD‑FAO Agricultural Outlook 2026‑2035
Abstract
The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook is the result of a collaborative effort of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This year’s report presents a consistent baseline scenario for the evolution of agricultural commodity and fish markets at national, regional, and global levels for the period 2026 to 2035.
The baseline projections are based on structured expert inputs. These projections are influenced by current market conditions as well as assumptions about macroeconomic, demographic, and policy developments as introduced in Section 1.1. The OECD-FAO Aglink-Cosimo model, which links sectors and countries covered in the Outlook, ensures consistency and global equilibrium across all markets. In light of the increased uncertainty surrounding energy and agricultural input costs following the 2026 Middle East conflict, a scenario analysis was conducted using the Aglink-Cosimo model to assess the risks associated with higher energy and fertiliser costs; the results are also presented in this section.
This year, the Outlook has a special focus on agricultural labour productivity, an indicator used as a proxy for gross agricultural income per worker. To better reflect this thematic focus, prices and production are discussed together in section 1.2 of this Trends and Prospects chapter under the heading “Agricultural Commodity Prices, Labour Productivity and Production: Projected evolution to 2035”. A new indicator measuring agricultural labour productivity defined as agricultural gross domestic product divided by the number of agricultural workers is introduced in subsection 1.2.2 and used to analyse potential future income variability and draw some policy inferences.
Figure 1.1 provides information on the current commodity situation. Due to differences in marketing years across commodities, data are presented for either the 2025 calendar year or the 2025/26 marketing year, as appropriate. These figures establish the starting point of the baseline scenario generating 2026‑2035 projections.
Note: All time series are indexed to the 2016‑2025 average (=100). Consumption denotes the quantity of commodities, expressed in primary equivalent terms, acquired by economic agents through market transactions for final and intermediate uses, including losses and waste.
Where reference is made to a specific end use, a qualifying term (such as food consumption or feed consumption) is applied. Price indices are weighted by the average global production value of the past decade as measured at real international prices. More information on market conditions and evolutions by commodity can be found in the commodity snapshot in the Annex and the online commodity chapters.
The baseline scenario generating 2026‑2035 projections incorporates the commodity, policy, and country expertise of the OECD and the FAO, as well as input from collaborating member countries and international commodity bodies. The baseline projections discussed in this section are based on data and policies in place as of December 2025. Box 1.1 outlines the macroeconomic and policy trends expected to influence the evolution of agricultural markets over the next ten years.
A stable economic growth but a slowing pace of global population growth with regional differences
Projections of economic indicators are based on the latest forecasts published by the IMF World Economic Outlook from October 2025, complemented by longer‑term projections from Oxford Economics and the OECD Economic Outlook released in December 2025. Global annual per capita income growth was 1.8% in 2025 and is expected to fall to 1.6% in 2026. Emerging Asian economies are expected to generate the fastest growth (Figure 1.2). Based on the assumptions from the 2024 revision of the UN World Population Prospects, global population growth is projected to grow by 0.8% per year, reaching 8.8 billion by 2035. However, growth will vary significantly across regions, with the fastest increases in sub-Saharan Africa (2.2% p.a.) India will remain the most populous country and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”)’s population will decline slightly.
After high inflation rates in 2022 and 2023 across most countries, rates have been declining globally, in part reflecting falling commodity prices and the lagged effects of tighter monetary policies. Disinflation is expected to continue in 2026, although some exceptions will remain including China, Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa, and India. Over the medium term, inflation rates are expected to decrease further, stabilising at levels below 10% in all countries after 2026.
The global reference oil price used in the Outlook has been set to reflect the conflict in the Persian Gulf in early 2026 and the resulting disruption to trade through the Strait of Hormuz, a key maritime corridor linking Gulf energy producers with global markets. After steadily declining from a peak of USD 101/barrel in 2022 to USD 68/barrel in 2025, oil price is projected to temporarily increase to USD 75/barrel in 2026. The effect is expected to diminish, and overall economic growth should remain largely unaffected over the medium term.
Existing policies are held constant in the baseline
Policies play an important role in agricultural, biofuel, and fisheries markets, and policy reforms usually trigger changes in market structures. The Outlook assumes current policies will remain in place and that no new policies are enacted. Only free trade agreements that have been ratified up to the end of December 2025 are considered in the Outlook.
Projections remain subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly due to geopolitical tensions, energy market volatility, and fluctuations in input costs. Following the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East in the early months of 2026, increased uncertainty surrounding energy and agricultural input costs has added pressure on global agrifood systems. Against this backdrop, several analyses have been conducted to assess how disruptions to energy markets, fertiliser supply chains, and strategic trade routes such as the Strait of Hormuz could affect agrifood systems (FAO, 2026[1]; OECD, 2026[2]).
Using the Aglink-Cosimo partial equilibrium model, this Outlook includes a scenario analysis to examine the risks posed by higher energy and fertiliser costs. The analysis compares a baseline projection for 2026‑2035 with an adverse scenario based on the IMF’s Spring 2026 World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2026[3]). In the adverse scenario, weaker economic growth and higher input costs reduce the performance of the global agrifood system, particularly in 2026‑2027. These factors lead to higher production costs and slower income growth, which together have a stronger negative impact on food security in low‑income countries. The scenario analysis assesses how these macroeconomic changes and higher input costs affect agricultural production, consumption patterns, diet composition, food stocks, and the overall resilience of the food system. The detailed results are presented in Box 1.2.
Compared to the baseline, the adverse scenario leads to a broad weakening of agrifood system performance in 2026‑2027, with impacts transmitted through higher input costs and lower income growth. While higher income countries are largely able to absorb these shocks through trade adjustments and stock use to maintain stable consumption, low-income countries face a systemic deterioration in food security, with significant and multidimensional risks driven by interacting constraints on supply, access, and utilisation. Availability risks stem from fertiliser driven reductions in crop yields and production, which are larger than in any other income group. Access risks arise from slower income growth combined with higher food prices, limiting households’ ability to purchase food and constraining the capacity to increase imports. Diet quality risks emerge from a shift away from nutrient dense animal source foods toward staples, reducing dietary diversity and potentially worsening nutritional outcomes. Stability risks are heightened by declining stocks and greater exposure to external shocks, given limited buffering capacity. These factors reinforce each other: reduced production increases reliance on imports, but constrained purchasing power limits access; at the same time, higher prices force households to adjust diets toward lower cost, less diverse food baskets.
This supplementary analysis contrasts the Spring 2026 IMF World Economic Outlook “Adverse Scenario” (IMF, 2026[3]) with the baseline presented for the period 2026‑2027. The “Adverse Scenario” is characterised by a significant slowdown in global economic growth and energy prices elevated about 33% above baseline levels in 2026 and around 10% in 2027, which increase production costs across agricultural systems. As a result, real fertiliser prices are projected to rise above baseline levels by 29% in 2026 and 17% in 2027. These developments translate into reduced fertiliser use, weaker demand growth, and adjustments in production, trade, and consumption patterns across all regions.
Real global reference prices increase across all major commodities, reflecting higher production costs, particularly for energy, fertilisers, and feed, combined with persistently inelastic food demand. While price increases are already projected for 2026, they strengthen further in 2027, indicating a continued pass through of elevated input costs into market prices. The effect is broad based, affecting both crops and livestock products, and underscores how limited demand responsiveness amplifies cost driven price pressures in global food markets (Figure 1.3).
While the magnitude of the effects varies by income group, the scenario broadly projects lower agricultural output, tighter food markets, and increasing pressures on food security, with the most pronounced effects in low-income countries.
Macroeconomic and input cost transmission
Relative to the baseline, the scenario implies a marked slowdown in economic activity. This affects agrifood systems through two principal channels: reduced demand growth and higher production costs. Elevated energy prices increase fertiliser costs, reducing its use across all income groups, though to varying degrees (Figure 1.4 panel a). Fertiliser use declines markedly in both low‑income countries (5.1% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027) and lower middle‑income countries (4.3% and 2.8%). In upper middle‑ and high‑income countries, reductions are smaller (around 2% or less), reflecting greater resilience and adjustment capacity.
Production impacts: Concentration of losses in crops
Across income groups, the adverse scenario reduces cereal production most sharply in low‑income countries, where output declines by about 2.3% in 2026 and 1.7% in 2027 (Figure 1.4 panel b). These losses reflect strong yield reductions linked to lower fertiliser use. In lower middle‑income countries, declines are smaller, generally around 1‑2%, due to higher baseline input efficiency. Upper middle‑ and high‑income countries experience only marginal reductions, of less than 1%. Overall, the results highlight a clear asymmetry, with low‑income countries bearing the largest cereal production losses under the adverse scenario.
Trade adjustments: Uneven capacity to buffer shocks
Trade plays a central role in offsetting domestic supply shocks, but the capacity to rely on external markets varies significantly by income group. In low-income countries, reduced crop production leads to an increase in net imports of staple foods (e.g. cereals net imports rise by +3.5% in 2026 and +1.1% in 2027), while weaker income growth constrains the ability to finance imports amid rising international commodity prices. As a result, trade only partially compensates for domestic shortfalls. In lower middle-income countries, the adjustment is more effective. Net imports of cereals increase more strongly (+7% and +5%), supported by rising import volumes and greater purchasing capacity. Upper middle-income countries and high-income countries also adjust through trade, but with greater resilience, rebalancing supply and demand without major domestic disruptions.
Consumption and diet composition: Divergence across income groups
The scenario leads to declining or stagnating food consumption across all income groups, but the nature of the adjustment differs markedly. In low-income countries, reduced income growth and higher food prices drive broad consumption declines, with larger reductions in per capita consumption of animal source foods (0.8% and 1.4%) than in staple (e.g. cereals 0.7% and 1.1%), pointing to a shift toward cheaper diets.
In lower middle-income countries, consumption remains relatively resilient, with staple food consumption broadly stable and only moderate declines in animal-source products in 2027. In upper middle-income countries and high-income countries, consumption levels remain largely unchanged with no significant dietary shift, underscoring the role of income levels in buffering price shocks and maintaining dietary quality.
Real basic food expenditure per capita falls in poorer countries, as income losses and higher prices force households to reduce consumption volumes and shift toward cheaper food baskets (Figure 1.5). In contrast, households in richer countries absorb the shock more easily, maintaining consumption despite lower real incomes, reflecting greater resilience.
Stocks and system resilience
Stock levels decline across all income groups in the scenario, reflecting efforts to smooth supply and demand imbalances. However, the implications differ. In low-income countries, stock drawdowns (around 3% to 4%) reduce already limited buffers, increasing vulnerability to further shocks. In contrast, upper middle-income countries and high-income countries use stocks more effectively to stabilise markets, with similar or larger drawdowns (up to 4%) but without compromising food availability.
Another important source of uncertainty relates to sanitary and phytosanitary risks, particularly animal disease outbreaks. These events can significantly disrupt trade in animal products by triggering import restrictions, export bans, and precautionary domestic measures that may persist over many years. Outbreaks such as avian influenza or African swine fever can lead to sudden supply shortages in affected regions and reshape global trade patterns. While the immediate impacts are production losses, these shocks can increase price volatility and place more pressure on food systems.
1.2.1. Continued long-term decline in real global agricultural commodity prices hinges on sustained investments into productivity improvements
Agricultural commodity markets remain inherently uncertain given their dependency on natural production conditions, macroeconomic and policy developments and geopolitical tensions. A volatile supply is met by an increasingly price inelastic global food demand, especially in upper middle- and high-income countries, where even small supply disruptions can trigger disproportionately large price responses. Near term risks to commodity price stability remain elevated due to the 2026 Middle East conflict, which has disrupted energy and fertiliser trade through the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, international commodity price projections for 2026 in the Outlook reflect heightened uncertainty and high input cost pressures.
In the later years of the projection period, international agricultural commodity price projections reflect underlying structural factors and are anchored in long-term trends. Real international agricultural commodity prices are projected to remain broadly stable at or below current levels over the next decade, consistent with assumptions of ongoing productivity improvements and normal weather conditions1, which lower the marginal cost of production for most agricultural commodities (Figure 1.6). This does not preclude variability around these projected price paths, as historical experience demonstrates that episodes of volatility and temporary price spikes can interrupt longer term trends. Such variability is illustrated by the repeated price spikes shown in Figure 1.6, associated with a range of shocks, from the oil crises of the 1970s and the global financial and food crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s, to the recent pandemic and geopolitical conflicts.
The global reference price for beef and veal reached a four-decade high in 2025 and is expected to remain elevated in the near-term as limited animal inventories and herd rebuilding constrain supply growth. Strong underlying demand further supports prices, reflecting population growth, rising incomes and a sustained preference for animal‑source foods in many emerging and high‑income markets. This is particularly evident in major beef exporting countries such as Brazil, Canada and the United States, where herd rebuilding is projected to begin in the early years of the Outlook period following earlier liquidation cycles linked to drought conditions and weak profitability. Real beef and veal prices are projected to peak during 2026 before declining over the medium-term as herd rebuilding progresses and supply growth gradually catches up with demand.
It is important to recognise that the transmission of price signals between international markets and local producers and consumers varies widely across countries. Factors such as transport and logistics costs, exchange rate movements, trade policies, and the degree of integration of domestic markets into global value chains all shape whether – and to what extent –price signals are passed between markets. For example, high transport costs can dampen price transmission between different markets, while fluctuations in the value of local currencies can either amplify or offset international price signals.
While current disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are expected to translate into higher input costs for farmers worldwide and, with a lag, into higher global agricultural commodity prices, the immediate effects of the conflict are likely to be felt primarily in domestic food markets. These effects are expected to materialise through higher transportation and processing costs, increased demand pressure from biofuel markets, and potential tightening of monetary policies should countries raise key interest rates to contain inflation. The most immediate impacts are likely to be observed in fertiliser- and grain-importing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North Africa. Understanding these transmission channels is critical for policymakers seeking to stabilise local food prices and safeguard food security in the context of the current conflict.
In a context of flat or declining real agricultural commodity prices, improvements in land and herd productivity – such as higher crop yields, improved livestock marketing rates and increased carcass weights – as well as the ability to manage rising input costs, will be critical to translating farmers’ decisions and natural resources into higher production and ultimately sustainable net farm incomes. Continued investments in biotechnology, mechanisation and precision agriculture are therefore fundamental to achieving the productivity gains underpinning the projected trends in real agricultural commodity prices. In the absence of such investments, marginal farm operations may struggle to achieve the necessary productivity improvements, undermining farm incomes, increasing pressure on farming households and accelerating farm exit.
Assuming a continued transition towards more intensive production systems in low- and middle-income economies, the projections indicate that around 73% of global crop production growth will be driven by yield improvements, with a further 9% attributable to land use intensification. Similarly, a substantial share of growth in livestock and fish production is expected to stem from productivity gains, although herd expansion is also projected to contribute. Gradual adoption of improved seed and animal breeding techniques, better feeding and farm management practices, increased use of fertilisers and other chemical inputs, and enhanced access to veterinary services are expected to increase land and herd productivity over time, particularly in low- and middle-income countries.
Figure 1.4 presents the average annual change in yields for selected commodities across four country groups distinguished by income levels. Yields are defined as total production divided by area harvested for crops and by livestock inventory for animal products. Stronger yield growth is projected for cereals and dairy in low-income countries, and for beef, cereals and dairy in lower middle-income countries, with annual growth rates ranging from 1 to 3% over the next decade. However, these gains generally start from a low productivity base, and achieving sustained yield improvements remains challenging, particularly in low-income countries, where recurring adverse growing conditions and animal diseases have constrained yields in recent years. In higher income countries, yield growth is expected to remain at or below 0.5% p.a. for most commodities, except for dairy in upper middle-income countries, where yields are projected to grow by around 1.0% p.a. over the next decade. Farmers in higher income countries already operate close to their technological frontier, making further gains increasingly difficult and costly to achieve.
Despite the projected stronger productivity growth in many low- and middle-income countries, land and herd productivity levels are expected to remain below their technical potential, with significant disparities relative to high-income countries persisting over the medium term. While these gaps can be partly explained by differences in agro-ecological conditions, the limited access to finance, modern farming technologies, skilled labour and advanced agronomic inputs, they keep farmers in these regions operating significantly below their technological frontier. Meeting future food demand without further expansion of herd sizes and croplands, and consequently the sector’s environmental footprint, will therefore require narrowing existing technology gaps on currently cultivated land and reared herds, more broadly through the sustainable intensification of agricultural systems.
1.2.2. Thematic focus: developments in agricultural labour productivity and income variability
To achieve long-term food security and nutrition, food systems face the challenge of delivering three outcomes in synergy: healthier diets, viable livelihoods for farmers and rural communities, and sustainable resource use. This thematic section addresses the social dimension of this challenge, an important area supported by the work of both organisations delivering this Outlook. Box 1.2 describes a recent OECD initiative to support livelihoods to enhance agriculture’s attractiveness to new farmers. Given the multidimensional nature of social issues in agriculture and the limitations of relevant data, it is important to clearly delimit the scope of what can realistically be reported in the Outlook. Accordingly, this section focuses on farm labour productivity, using a newly developed indicator.
Labour productivity generally refers to the amount of economic value generated per worker over a given period of time. For this Outlook, agricultural labour productivity is calculated by dividing the sector’s real GDP by the total number of agricultural workers. Agricultural GDP projections are derived by extending input-output components from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a global general equilibrium modelling framework used to represent the structure of the world economy, with relevant behavioural and market variables from the Aglink-Cosimo model. Agricultural employment data are sourced from ILOSTAT, the International Labour Organization’s global database of labour statistics which compiles data from national labour force surveys, official statistical sources, and modelled estimates. In ILOSTAT, employment refers to a headcount measure of persons engaged in work for at least one hour during a reference period, consistent with the international definition of employment; it is therefore not adjusted for hours worked or converted into full-time equivalents. Forward‑looking employment estimates are produced using a statistical approach that captures how employment evolves with changes in rural population (size driver) from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 2025 and per‑capita income projections (structural‑change driver) from the IMF and Oxford Economics.
The constructed agricultural labour productivity is a gross measure of value added per worker and does not distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers. As a result, it may mask important compositional differences in the workforce and may not necessarily translate into net farm income or household welfare. Increases in labour productivity often reflect reduced labour input per hectare due to mechanisation and capital deepening. However, such gains also entail higher capital costs, including investment expenditures, depreciation, and debt servicing, which are not netted out in GDP‑based productivity measures. Moreover, this indicator does not account for the role of agricultural supports, which can significantly influence farm income independently of productivity levels. In highly mechanised agricultural systems, productivity gains are therefore closely linked to the substitution of labour with machinery, shifting returns from labour to capital. Under certain conditions, this substitution may increase financial vulnerability, particularly when high capital costs coincide with price downturns or rising input costs. Instances of farm exit and bankruptcy linked to excessive or poorly timed capital investment underscore the importance of interpreting labour productivity as an indicator of structural transformation rather than as a direct measure for household income.
The Global Forum on Agriculture (GFA) is an annual platform for international dialogue on agricultural policy which brings together farmers, policymakers and experts. In 2025 it focused on enhancing agriculture’s attractiveness to new farmers. The aging farming population (Figure 1.8), variable skill sets, market shocks and environmental pressures challenge the sector’s future. New entrants are more likely to adopt modern technologies and bring innovation and new skills (Campi et al., 2024[4]), which can help overcome the challenges food systems face. However, barriers such as inadequate access to land, finance, social and advisory services, bureaucratic complexities and knowledge gaps hamper their entry. Young people, women and Indigenous Peoples may face even bigger hurdles (Dabkienė, 2025[5]; Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2021[6]; Coopmans et al., 2021[7]). Fluctuating farm income levels can also deter new farmers, alongside rising risks due to increasing extreme or volatile weather patterns, the expected lower quality of life and the demanding nature of work.
Note: In countries where the indicators are missing in 2000 or in 2023, the nearest available year is shown.
Source: (OECD, 2025[2]) based on data from FAOSTAT Employment indicators: Agriculture and agrifood systems
GFA 2025 discussed several ways to attract new farmers. Improving farmers’ income and the sector’s profitability by boosting innovation for sustainable productivity growth is key. Policies need to go beyond fiscal support, facilitating access to land, credit and advisory services, promoting agricultural training and education, cultivating peer support networks and mentoring, and reducing administrative burden. As perceptions of farming often rely on outdated clichés, there is a need for a new, inspiring narrative, showing the innovation and entrepreneurial opportunities in agriculture. Progress towards social sustainability needs coordinated policy action beyond agriculture and farm income to include education, social, tax, pension and labour policy. As entry and exit are linked, policies supporting retirement and succession planning matter. Improving well-being in rural areas, ensuring access to health care, education and cultural services, providing adequate social insurance, child, elderly and disability care, and enhancing working conditions are key to for making farming an attractive career.
Farmer testimonials at GFA 2025 (Szuda and Antón, 2025[8]) highlighted that the sector’s transformation is already underway. New entrants already bring innovation and entrepreneurial skills, and digitalisation attracts new talent. While family succession remains important, an increasing share of entrants come from non-agricultural families or transition into farming after non-agricultural employment, although this trend is not uniform across countries. Emerging “mixed livelihoods” combining farming and non-farming activities have been observed in some contexts, with reported potential to diversify income sources, buffer against income fluctuation and open new opportunities.
Source: (OECD, 2025[9])
The highest levels of GDP per agricultural worker are found in high‑income countries of North America, Western Europe, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). These countries benefit from high land‑to‑labour ratios, capital‑intensive production systems, and widespread adoption of technology. Major middle‑income countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East and Central Asia occupy an intermediate position, reflecting their transition towards highly commercialised, capital‑intensive systems. At the lower end of the distribution, low‑income countries in sub‑Saharan Africa and South Asia continue to face structural constraints, including the persistence of smallholder systems with limited market integration, low capital endowment, and heavy dependence on a narrow range of staple crops or extensive livestock; conditions that are insufficient to lift rural households out of poverty. Nevertheless, several of these countries are experiencing notable improvements in agricultural labour productivity, reflecting an ongoing transition from subsistence‑oriented agriculture toward more commercial production systems.
Agricultural labour productivity exhibits the widest cross‑country differences of any economic sector, making it a central factor in understanding global income inequality (Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh, 2014[10]). In the base period, real agricultural GDP per sectoral worker in high‑income countries is estimated at just over USD 21 000, compared with just under USD 1 000 in low‑income countries (Figure 1.9). These gaps underscore the deep structural heterogeneity that continues to characterise global agricultural systems.
Over the next decade, agricultural labour productivity is projected to continue rising across all income groups, though at markedly different speeds. Lower middle-income countries are expected to record the fastest growth, with agricultural labour productivity projected to increase by nearly 30% by 2035, followed by upper middle-income countries (19%) and low-income countries (17%). These trends reflect ongoing structural transformation and gradual increases in capital use across these country groups. In contrast, growth in high-income countries is expected to slow substantially, with average output per worker increasing by just over 5% by 2035. Despite these improvements, absolute differences between income groups remain large, and the gap between high- and low-income countries, while narrowing slightly, continues to reflect long standing structural differences.
Assumed improvements in crop yields, livestock marketing rates, and carcass weights play a role in shaping projected labour productivity developments across income groups. These technical indicators represent the primary channels through which biological potential and managerial decisions are transformed into marketable output and, ultimately, income per worker. High‑income countries have already achieved high land productivity and well‑optimised livestock systems, including marketing strategies that maximise returns to capital and minimise labour bottlenecks, leaving limited room for further gains. Middle‑income countries, by contrast, are experiencing rapid improvements in land and herd productivity as they transition toward fully commercial, more capital‑intensive production systems. In low‑income countries, progress remains constrained by limited input use and mechanisation, managerial challenges, and high exposure to climate and market shocks. Marketing decisions, for example, are often reactive rather than strategic, with animals sold under duress due to drought or immediate financial need, rather than at optimal slaughter weights or favourable prices. This adversarial link between household income stress and livestock management undermines the contribution of livestock to stable farm income and limits gains in labour productivity.
Improvements in crop yields, marketing rates, and carcass weights alone are insufficient to sustainably raise agricultural labour productivity. In low‑ and middle‑income countries, where rural households typically have abundant labour and few alternative employment opportunities, a narrow focus on returns per unit of land or animal risks overlooking the income and welfare of the labour engaged in production. By contrast, in high‑income countries, agricultural labour is relatively scarce and often costly, as rural households depend less on farming and have greater access to off‑farm employment. In this context, the efficient use of labour becomes a binding constraint. More broadly, across all income groups, total household income depends not only on operational returns but also on labour productivity and opportunities in the wider labour market. Rural households often have abundant labour and limited capital and hence farmers’ incomes depend more directly on how efficiently their labour is used, including the scope for off‑farm employment, than on biological gains alone. More broadly, shifts toward capital‑intensive agriculture are typically driven by economy‑wide development that raises labour costs and agricultural income growth tends to follow overall economic transformation rather than lead it. Thus, while technical productivity improvements remain important, policies that enable farmers to enhance labour efficiency – through mechanisation and automation, improved managerial decision‑making, risk‑mitigation tools, and opportunities for off‑farm work – provide a more reliable pathway to income growth and are ultimately more decisive for lifting rural households out of poverty.
At the same time, caution is warranted, as mechanisation-driven labour displacement in agriculture can generate transitional employment pressures and welfare risks where non-agricultural job creation does not keep pace, particularly when displaced labour is absorbed mainly into low-productivity or precarious informal activities. Although labour has gradually shifted out of agriculture in many low- and lower-income countries, it has often moved into low-productivity or precarious informal employment rather than into higher-productivity sectors, thereby limiting aggregate productivity gains (Deudibe et al., 2020[11]; Mensah et al., 2022[12]). In some cases, such dynamics may also reflect policy choices and political developments that actively promote structural change in agriculture, for example through support to mechanisation or input use, without being matched by sufficient job creation and productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors. Since conditions vary widely across countries, depending on market access, non-farm opportunities, infrastructure, and institutions, labour reallocation alone is unlikely to deliver broad-based income growth by 2035. Raising agricultural productivity itself must therefore remain central to structural transformation strategies in these contexts (Gollin, 2023[13]).
Recent analytical work also suggests that productivity growth alone is unlikely to deliver inclusive rural transformation. A broader agrifood systems perspective is needed, one that considers the diversity of employment opportunities beyond primary agriculture, the resilience of rural livelihoods, and the quality of jobs created along food value chains. New FAO-led evidence shows that agrifood systems account for a large and heterogeneous share of employment globally, underscoring the importance of combining farm productivity gains with inclusive non-farm job creation, stronger rural-urban linkages, and policies that support resilience under climate, demographic, and social change (Davis et al., 2024[14]; Schneider et al., 2024[15]; Davis et al., 2026[16]).
Figure 1.10 shows the share of agriculture in total GDP on the horizontal axis and agricultural labour productivity (agricultural GDP per worker) on the vertical axis, with bubble size representing the overall size of agricultural GDP. The chart reveals a very clear structural pattern: countries with a larger agricultural share, especially low- and lower middle-income countries, tend to exhibit much lower labour productivity. In these countries, agriculture employs a large share of resources and contributes a sizeable portion of national value added yet each agricultural worker generates relatively little value. This contrasts sharply with high-income countries on the left, where agriculture represents only a small share of GDP but productivity per worker is high. Upper middle-income countries sit between these poles and trace a gradual shift over time toward lower agricultural GDP shares and higher productivity, consistent with ongoing structural and technological transformation.
The Outlook shows that low-income countries continue to rely on agriculture (around one-fifth of GDP in the base period, slightly lower by 2035) with output per worker at just under real USD 1 100 by 2035, underscoring slow progress in poverty reduction and continued vulnerability to shocks in natural and economic conditions. Lower middle-income countries are projected to register strong productivity gains to 2035 while becoming relatively less reliant on agriculture (around one-tenth of GDP by 2035), indicating significant scope for catch up as investment, technology adoption and market integration deepen. Nevertheless, average agricultural labour productivity reaches only about USD 2 700 per worker in these countries, indicating that substantial gaps also persist and that further improvements will be needed.
Note: The size of the bubbles presents total agricultural GDP. Agricultural labour productivity is computed as agricultural labour GDP over number of workers in agriculture.
Source: OECD-FAO calculations based on ILO (ILOSTAT database).
These patterns have clear implications for policymakers and international development partners: in lower income countries where agriculture remains the backbone of the economy, raising agricultural labour productivity is one of the most powerful levers to accelerate poverty reduction and strengthen food security. Achieving this will require a package of productivity enhancing measures such as improved access to investment capital to mechanise production, quality inputs and advisory services, better rural infrastructure and logistics, and more resilient production systems, complemented by expanded opportunities for off farm employment. Together, these actions can support agrifood system transformation and help ensure that productivity gains translate into higher incomes and significant reductions in hunger and poverty.
The baseline projections presented in this Outlook reflect the interplay of fundamental supply and demand factors under expected weather and yield trends, and specific macroeconomic and policy assumptions. While the Outlook is based on the best information available, there is an unavoidable degree of uncertainty attached to the projections and underlying assumptions, which eventually results in variability around the baseline projection. Swings in prices and costs are inherent in agriculture, leading to income instability which discourages investment and entry of new, younger farmers essential to achieve higher productivity. Exogenous shocks including extreme weather events, energy price hikes, livestock disease outbreaks, trade policy shifts, geopolitical developments and conflict add to this instability.
To assess how such variability may affect outcomes over the next ten years, a statistical exercise was conducted using observed fluctuations in gross agricultural income per worker between 2000 and 2025, at both country and regional levels. This historical variability, reflecting the combined effect of various simultaneous shocks to income drivers, was then projected forward for the 2026‑2035 period. Figure 1.11 presents the results using boxplot distributions, illustrating the potential dispersion of income outcomes across country income groups. Each box represents the interquartile range of real gross agricultural income per worker normalised by the average (25th to 75th percentiles), encompassing 50% of observations around the median. The horizontal lines, also called whiskers, extend from the upper quartile to the 95th percentile and from the lower quartile to the 5th percentile, excluding outliers. The median corresponds to the Outlook baseline projections at the income group level.
The analysis indicates that variability is more pronounced in low-income countries compared to other country. If historical variability were to persist over the projection period, at the global level there would be a 25% probability that income per worker falls more than 12% below baseline levels in every year to 2035. In low-income countries, this potential decline could exceed 20%, surpassing the projected 17% baseline increase. This implies roughly a one-in-four probability that incomes could fall below current levels by 2035, highlighting these countries’ greater vulnerability to economic volatility.
Given the inherent volatility of agricultural incomes, productivity-enhancing investments will need to strengthen resilience to reduce risks and attract new entrants into modernised production systems. Policies should therefore support resilience and diversification strategies that mitigate downside risks while enabling farmers to benefit from favourable market conditions. Governments should invest on an enabling environment that promotes stakeholders’ awareness and co‑operation for resilience: investing on knowledge and information that allow farmers manage their risks; facilitating the development of market tools to transfer risks such as insurance and futures markets; focusing government support on infrequent but catastrophic events.
Note: The boxes show the interquartile range of real gross agricultural income per worker around the median normalised by the average (25th percentiles and 75th percentiles) while the lines extending from the boxes indicate the 5th percentiles and 95th percentiles.
Source: OECD-FAO calculations based on ILO (ILOSTAT database).
1.2.3. Global agricultural production growth led by livestock and middle‑income countries
Over the next decade, the gross value of agricultural production (in constant USD) for commodities covered in the Outlook is projected to increase by 13.3%, reaching USD 4.01 trillion by 2035. Livestock production is expected to lead this growth, expanding by 15.1%, followed by crops (12.5%) and fish and other aquatic foods (11.0%). Middle‑income countries in the Asia-Pacific, sub‑Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean regions are projected to remain the primary sources of global agricultural expansion (Figure 1.12), accounting for 80.3% of global output growth, up from 78.4% in the previous decade. These projected trends in low- and middle-income economies reflect ongoing agricultural development and greater scope for productivity gains.
The Asia Pacific region is expected to contribute an estimated 57.5% of additional global output by 2035. India is projected to lead production growth in the region and globally, accounting for 25.6% of the global increase, with the milk sector driving the momentum. Despite a reduced contribution relative to the previous decade, China will still account for a substantial share of global agricultural production growth (13.9%, compared with 20.9% previously), supported in part by expanding beef output. In sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural production is expected to expand significantly, increasing its share of additional global output to 15.6%, up from 11.2% in the previous decade. Growth is expected across both crop and livestock sectors, supported by gradual improvements in land and herd productivity, as well as expansion of livestock herds and cultivated areas. Southeast Asia’s contribution is also projected to rise markedly, from 6.5% in the previous decade to 10.4% in 2035. A sizeable share of global production growth (12.7%) is expected from the Latin America and Caribbean region, although its relative contribution is expected to be moderate. By contrast, production prospects in the industrialised regions of North America and Europe and Central Asia are expected to remain limited due to resource constraints and regulatory factors. Growth in the Europe and Central Asia region will be largely driven by countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
The share of livestock in total agricultural production is projected to increase by about 1% globally, driven primarily by rising shares in middle-income countries in South and Southeast Asia and the Near East and North Africa. Growing domestic demand for animal source foods, reflecting population growth and rising incomes in these regions, is expected to stimulate increased investment in livestock production systems. This expansion is accompanied by a projected increase of 13.5% in global feed protein use, reflecting both higher livestock output and continued intensification of production systems. Even in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, where the livestock share of total production is projected to remain broadly stable, strong overall growth in agricultural output is expected to include higher absolute levels of livestock production over the next decade.
1.2.4. Rising global agricultural and fish production, along with a shift towards higher animal production, is set to increase agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
Agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) account for approximately 22% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions. These emissions are broadly evenly divided between direct on farm emissions – primarily methane and nitrous oxide – and indirect CO₂ emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) associated with agricultural expansion. The Outlook focuses exclusively on direct emissions from on-farm production, which are based on historical data from FAOSTAT and projected following the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Tier 1 methodology. This approach applies standard emission factors to key activity data, including livestock numbers, synthetic fertiliser application, and rice cultivation area. While higher tier methodologies that account for management practices and production systems would yield more precise estimates, their application is beyond the scope of this Outlook.
Using this basic approach, the Outlook shows that the projected overall expansion of global agricultural and fish production, partly driven by growth in animal herds and cropland, particularly in middle-income countries, will increase direct GHG emissions by 6.5% over the next decade. Most of the increase is expected to occur in South and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where ruminant herds are expanding (Figure 1.13). By 2035, direct agricultural GHG emissions in South and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are projected to rise by 7.0% and 16.0%, respectively. In contrast, emissions in the Europe and Central Asia region are projected to decline by 0.9% over the next ten years, representing a continuation, albeit at a slower pace, of the reductions observed over the previous decade (3.4%), reflecting the continued implementation of environmental and climate policies in the region and structural changes in the sector.
Sub-Saharan Africa has a population more than three times larger than that of North America and currently holds over three times the beef cattle herd. However, its productivity, measured as output per animal, remains low, at roughly one tenth of the level observed in North America. Given the global nature of GHG emissions, prioritising low ruminant productivity regions for mitigation efforts could, in principle, yield substantial benefits by reducing the number of animals required to produce the same or greater quantities of animal source foods, thereby lowering methane emissions from enteric fermentation and manure management. However, ruminant production systems in the region are largely pastoralists who make efficient use of scarce and highly variable resources and play a critical role in supporting biodiversity, providing food and livelihoods, and reducing emissions through the sustainable management of rangelands. By strategically moving herds in response to seasonal conditions and forage availability, pastoralists enable vegetation recovery, maintain animal health, and reduce pressure on fragile soils and water resources, while also conserving indigenous livestock breeds adapted to harsh environments.
Efforts to reduce ruminant livestock emissions in the region should recognise these realities and avoid narrowly framed intensification pathways that rely on increased water use and external feed inputs, which may introduce new environmental and livelihood risks. Instead, sustainable and culturally sensitive improvements to pastoralist systems, such as better animal health, reduced losses, improved grazing management, and enhanced access to education, services, and markets, can raise productivity per animal while strengthening ecosystem resilience. Such approaches can improve rural livelihoods and reduce emissions without undermining the ecological functions of rangelands. At the same time, addressing agricultural emissions requires a balanced approach that considers not only production-side efficiency in low-income regions but also high levels of livestock products consumption in industrialised economies, which are contributing significantly to global agricultural GHG emissions.
Ruminant and other livestock production are projected to account for 76.6% of the global increase in direct agricultural GHG emissions, while application of synthetic fertilisers, another significant source of emissions due to nitrous oxide from fertiliser application, are expected to contribute 22.7%. The Outlook does not include GHG emissions associated with fertiliser production; accounting for these upstream emissions would approximately double the reported environmental footprint of fertiliser use. Rice cultivation represents another major source of direct agricultural GHG emissions, as irrigated paddy systems emit substantial amounts of methane. However, the projected growth in rice production is expected to be driven largely by yield improvements rather than an expansion of paddy areas, thereby limiting additional emissions from rice cultivation.
Given that production growth will largely be driven by productivity improvements rather than expansions in cultivated land and livestock herds, the carbon intensity of agricultural production is projected to decline across all regions over the coming decade. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to experience the most substantial decreases in GHG emissions intensity, the emissions produced per unit of output or activity, despite increasing levels of direct GHG emissions. This is because emissions reductions are generally easier to achieve in production systems with high initial emission intensities than in regions with higher yields where marginal opportunities for additional emissions reductions are more limited.
It is important to recognise that while direct GHG emissions constitute a key component of the environmental footprint of AFOLU, they represent only one dimension of the sector’s overall sustainability performance. A more comprehensive assessment of agri-environmental outcomes would require consideration of additional factors, including impacts on water resources, soil health and biodiversity, as well as the sector’s capacity for carbon sequestration and its contribution to environmental resilience. The sector is also highly exposed to extreme weather effects, particularly temperature and precipitation patterns which affect natural resources, productivity, and livelihoods. This is particularly important for vulnerable smallholders, for whom resilience is central to sustaining production and livelihoods. Building more resilient production systems will depend not only on technological change, but also on the adoption of practical coping strategies, including agroecological approaches, climate-smart agriculture, crop diversification, water harvesting, improved seed systems, community seed banks, and the use of indigenous and traditional knowledge. Risk management instruments and insurance mechanisms play an important role in strengthening adaptive capacity and reducing vulnerability to shocks.
1.3.1. Middle- and low-income economies underpin rising consumption of agricultural commodities
Over the coming decade, the value of overall consumption of agricultural commodities and fish products is projected to grow by 12.5%. This increase will be driven almost entirely by middle- and low-income countries where population growth expands total demand while, rising incomes, and rapid urbanisation are reshaping consumption patterns (Figure 1.14). Lower middle-income countries, particularly India and countries in Southeast Asia, will play a leading role, contributing an estimated 39% of global consumption growth by 2035, up from 32% in the previous decade. In contrast, China’s contribution is expected to decline sharply to 13%, reflecting saturated per-capita food demand and a shrinking population.
As diets evolve in these regions, demand for food is shifting beyond staples toward more livestock and fish-based products. Growing domestic production of these commodities is expected to significantly boost demand for feed crops. As a result, a growing share of staple crops and oilseeds will be used for animal feed rather than direct human consumption. Nevertheless, food remains the primary use of agricultural commodities, accounting for roughly 42% of total consumption. In lower middle-income countries annual growth in feed demand will be the fastest, with 2.8% p.a. over the next decade. Feed demand growth in upper middle-income countries will be less pronounced compared to the previous decade because of stagnating livestock production.
Low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, will also see strong demand growth, driven primarily by rapid population increases. However, consumption patterns in these regions will remain dominated by staple foods with feed demand growing only modestly relative to food demand, highlighting ongoing food security challenges.
Inefficiencies across the food supply chain remain a critical issue. In middle-income regions, limited access to technology, cold storage, and efficient transportation lead to significant food losses. In high-income countries, food waste is more closely linked to strict marketing standards, food safety practices, and consumer behavior.
1.3.2. As incomes grow, dietary patterns are expected to further diversify in middle-income countries over the next decade
Rising incomes and stable food prices due to expanding production are projected to lead to continued dietary diversification in middle-income countries over the next decade. Across all income groups, diets are expected to become more energy- and protein-rich, with the strongest changes occurring in lower and upper middle-income countries (Figure 1.15), where livestock products contribute significantly to these developments. In lower middle-income countries, diets are projected to continue evolving toward higher overall energy content and more diversified sources of nutrients, with a growing role of animal-source foods, while in upper middle-income countries these changes will gradually slow as diets approach more established patterns. In low-income countries, progress in improving the adequacy and diversity of diets will remain limited, constrained by modest gains in purchasing power. Meanwhile, in high-income countries, diets are expected to remain broadly unchanged in both composition and overall content.
As incomes rise, dietary patterns in low- and middle-income countries are shifting toward higher consumption of animal-source foods, including meat, dairy, and fish. This transition reflects both improving purchasing power and changing consumer preferences. In contrast, high-income countries are not expected to experience significant dietary shifts in the near term. Meat consumption remains broadly stable, with little evidence of a substantial move toward plant-based alternatives. Although such products are becoming more widely available, they still account for only a small share of total consumption. Recent declines in meat consumption, where observed, have been driven primarily by price fluctuations rather than lasting changes in consumer preferences. However, over the longer term, more noticeable shifts in dietary patterns may emerge as younger generations may adopt different food preferences.
While these projections point to continued average consumption growth, they largely reflect aggregate developments and may mask important distributional challenges, particularly in urban and peri-urban settings. A growing share of the population in low- and middle-income countries depends on market purchases for food and is therefore highly exposed to changes in food prices. In these contexts, households often rely on a limited set of staple foods and may face constraints in adjusting consumption patterns when prices rise. Projected increases in import dependence for basic food commodities in some regions, combined with rapidly expanding urban populations, may further heighten exposure to price volatility and external supply disruptions. As a result, increases in food prices can translate more directly into reduced food affordability and increased vulnerability for low-income urban households. Strengthening food security in these settings will therefore require greater attention to food affordability, including the role of price dynamics, market integration, and social protection systems.
1.3.3. Growing feed use is underpinned by herd expansions and increasing intensification of livestock and aquaculture production systems especially in middle-income countries
Global livestock production is projected to continue growing faster than herd sizes over the coming decade, reflecting improvements in productivity, particularly in lower middle-income countries. Expanding herds combined with more intensive feeding practices are expected to drive a 13.5% increase in global feed protein consumption. Feed efficiency is improving in most regions as animal protein output grows faster than feed input. In low-income countries, the transition from backyard production systems that are mostly based on scraps and waste to commercial operations using compound feed results in a higher measured feed per unit of output (Figure 1.16).
Note: The size of the bubbles refers to the non-ruminant production (pig meat, poultry and eggs) in total protein during the base period 2023‑2025.
1.3.4. Emerging economies lead the expansion in biofuel use of primary agricultural commodities
Agricultural commodities are used beyond traditional food and feed purposes, with biofuels representing the most widespread non-food application. The value of global biofuel use is projected to grow at an average 1.3% p.a., driven by rising demand for transport fuel and supportive domestic policies. Most of this growth is expected to occur in middle-income countries, notably Brazil and India for ethanol and Indonesia for biodiesel. In the United States, a shift toward renewable biodiesels over the next decade is likely to influence demand for vegetable oils and waste-based feedstocks.
Biofuel production relies on a variety of agricultural feedstocks, with maize dominating ethanol production and vegetable oils largely used for biodiesel. The share of biofuel in total use of agricultural commodities is expected to increase by 13.6% over the next ten years. Beyond biofuels, agricultural commodities are increasingly used for other non-food purposes, a share projected to grow by 26.0% over the projection period. These uses include industrial products, raw materials and electric energy generation, with demand patterns varying by feedstock and income level (Figure 1.17). While waste and dedicated energy crops are seen as having future potential, for example in sustainable aviation fuels, they are expected to remain niche sources over the medium term due to limited availability.
Beyond liquid biofuels, a growing number of countries are promoting the use of agricultural biomass in a wider range of bio-based products, industrial applications and circular value chains. Agricultural commodities are increasingly integrated into diversified bio-based industries. In the European Union, the renewed Bioeconomy Strategy (2025) identifies agricultural biomass as a key domestic resource for higher value-added applications, including bio-based materials, chemicals and biorefineries, while also emphasising a food-first principle and the importance of strengthening the use of secondary feedstocks, such as residues and by-products. These directions aim to strengthen linkages between farmers and industrial value chains. Similarly, Canada supports the development of bioplastics, biopharmaceuticals and other non-food applications, alongside investments in biofuel production capacity, notably through expanding canola crushing to meet rising demand for renewable diesel.
Several countries highlight the importance of residue valorisation and bio-based inputs as complementary pathways. In Brazil, bioeconomy policies have encouraged the use of agricultural and fisheries by-products to produce fuels, biomaterials and high-value compounds while also fostering the expansion of bio-inputs such as bio-fertilisers and biological nitrogen fixation in crop production. In the fisheries sector, a large share of processed output is now converted into products such as fishmeal, oils and bioactive ingredients, illustrating the scale of circular approaches. Other countries, such as Switzerland, prioritise the use of waste and residues for biogas and bioenergy, reflecting sustainability constraints on the use of primary crops.
1.4.1. Trade flows between surplus and deficit regions are projected to grow
Global agri-food trade has expanded significantly over recent decades, particularly following the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (1995) and China’s accession to the WTO (2001). The share of global agricultural production that is traded increased from 16% in 2000 to 22‑23% today. Since 2019, this share has stabilised and is expected to remain broadly unchanged over the next decade as the impact of previous trade liberalization diminishes.
Figure 1.18 shows that export patterns are projected to remain concentrated, with Latin America maintaining its position as the world's primary exporter. This trend is largely influenced by Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. North America is projected to remain the second-largest exporter, with exports stabilising below their 2020 peak. The Europe and Central Asia region, which became a net exporter in 2014 following productivity gains and investment, particularly in the Black Sea region, is also expected to expand its trade surplus.
At the same time, net imports are rising in regions with rapid population growth and expanding middle classes. South and Southeast Asia have shifted from being net exporters to being net importers due to increasing food demand notably in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, and coupled with the declining palm oil exports of the region. Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase net imports of basic food commodities by 55% by 2035 while the Near East and North Africa region is expected to see a 34% rise, reflecting strong population growth and limited domestic production capacity. In contrast, the net import position of developed countries and East Asia is expected to ease, largely due to slower demand growth in China.
Persistent surpluses and deficits mean regions are structurally linked through trade. Trade can offset local supply shortfalls to reduce variability in prices while the location of production in regions with a comparative advantage can lead to lower price levels. Trade also allows consumers access to a wider range of commodities beyond what can be produced domestically. However, trade also carries important systemic risks, including pressure on foreign exchange reserves and increased exposure to exchange rate shocks. Moreover, disruptions in major exporting countries due to adverse weather events or trade policy shifts can quickly transmit to importing countries.
1.4.2. Trade plays a key role in ensuring food security and farmer livelihoods
Despite periodic major disruptions, including COVID-19, geopolitical conflicts, and trade tensions, agri-food trade has proven highly resilient. It remains essential for balancing global food deficits and surpluses, stabilising prices, allowing the location of production in regions with comparative advantage, and providing consumers access to off-season and geographically diverse food items. With production often geographically separated from regions where demand is growing fastest, a well-functioning, rules-based trading system remains critical for global food security and rural livelihoods.
Figure 1.19 shows the share of exports in total production, and the share of imports in total consumption for selected regions. These indicators reveal important differences in the role of trade between regions.
Major producing regions such as North America, and Latin America and the Caribbean, exported 28% and 44% of their domestic production in calorie equivalents in 2023‑25, respectively. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this share has increased since the previous decade but is projected to stabilise. A substantial increase in the share of exports in domestic production is also projected in Europe and Central Asia, from 23% in 2013‑15 to 31% in 2035 (Figure 1.19, panel a). However, even large net exporting regions import a share of domestic consumption. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, imports account for about 22% of total consumption for commodities covered in the Outlook (Figure 1.19, panel b). This estimate includes intra-regional trade, which is significant in the region.
In Near East and North Africa, where population is growing strongly but where limited resources are an obstacle to production expansion, imports play a significant role in complementing domestic food and feed production. The share of imports in total consumption in calorie equivalent of agricultural commodities is expected to increase to reach 72% over the next decade. In sub-Saharan Africa, the share of imports in total consumption is lower, at 20% in 2023‑25, but is expected to reach 22% by 2035 as the fast-growing domestic consumption will be increasingly met by global supplies (Figure 1.19, panel b).
1.4.3. Investments are needed in market access for countries, especially low- income countries, to capitalise on growing market opportunities.
Projected production and consumption levels in low-income countries remain constrained by limited access to agri-food markets, preventing farmers from capitalising on local and global growth opportunities that could be unlocked through targeted public investment in infrastructure and technology. Figure 1.20 highlights important differences across regions in terms of trade intensity and market access, showing that countries with stronger connectivity tend to have higher levels of trade participation and more dynamic agri-food sectors.
In Figure 1.20, trade intensity is measured as the ratio of total trade (imports plus exports) to overall market size, defined as the sum of production and total domestic use. This captures the degree to which a country is integrated into global agri-food markets. Countries with higher trade intensity are more actively engaged in international exchange, either as exporters or importers or both.
Market access is proxied by the World Bank’s logistic performance index (LPI) (World Bank, 2023[17]), which provides a comprehensive and internationally comparable measure of a country’s logistics environment. The LPI captures key dimensions such as the quality of transport infrastructure, efficiency of customs procedures, reliability of supply chains, and ease of arranging shipments. This proxy for market access directly reflects the ability to move goods within and across borders and offers recent data with broad global coverage.
Sub-Saharan Africa is situated in the lower range of both trade intensity and logistics performance. This reflects structural barriers such as inadequate transport networks, limited storage capacity, and weak trade facilitation systems, all of which increase transaction costs and reduce competitiveness. As a result, farmers in these regions often remain disconnected from high-value markets, limiting their ability to respond to growing demand. These structural constraints also limit the region’s ability to import food during supply shortfalls and restrict farmers’ access to imported intermediate inputs such as feed, fertilisers, seeds, and energy that are essential for production. Targeted public investments are needed to improve connectivity and allow producers in low-income countries to better access markets and strengthen their role in global agri-food systems.
Note: Trade intensity is calculated as the sum of export and import over the sum of production and consumption in each region, all measured in constant 2014‑2016 United States dollars. The World Bank Logistic Performance Index refers to the 2023 survey (1 low, and 5 high). The size of the bubbles represents total trade (export plus import) measured in constant 2014‑2016 United States dollars.
In contrast, regions with strong logistics systems, such as major exporting regions of North America and Developed and East Asia, exhibit higher trade intensity and deeper integration into global markets. This integration supports both the efficient movement of surplus production to external markets and reliable access to imported food and production inputs, leaving these countries better positioned to stabilise supply, respond to shocks, and capture value from international trade.
While poor infrastructure, gaps in technology, and other structural constraints generally limit farmers in low- and middle-income countries from connecting with local, regional and global markets, these barriers are often unevenly distributed within rural communities. Women farmers, in particular, frequently face additional challenges in accessing land, inputs, finance, and markets. Recent empirical work documents persistent differences in agricultural labour productivity between women and men across African countries, while new global estimates show that women account for a substantial share of agrifood systems employment but remain disproportionately concentrated in more vulnerable forms of work (Piedrahita, Costa and Mane, 2025[18]; Costa et al., 2026[19]). The International Year of the Woman Farmer 2026 is an opportunity to highlight these constraints and raise awareness of the role of women in agri-food systems, as discussed in Box 1.4.
The fivefold expansion of global food and agricultural trade between 2000 and 2022 has increased employment and income opportunities across agrifood systems where women contribute substantially through production, processing, and trade activities that support households, communities and economies. Globally, agrifood systems employ 36% of working women and 38% of working men; in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia the shares for women rise to 66% and 71% respectively (FAO, 2023[20]). The United Nations declared 2026 as the International Year of the Woman Farmer. According to the FAO dedicated webpage (https://www.fao.org/woman-farmer-2026/en) “the Year spotlights the essential roles women play across agrifood systems, from production to trade”, and their contribution “to food security, nutrition and economic resilience”.
Participation of women and men across agrifood value chains remains uneven among producers, workers, traders, and enterprises. In many countries, women-led agribusinesses engage in local and domestic markets, trading lower-value products rather than higher-value products traded internationally. Similarly, participation in agrifood trade remains low among many small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and many of the underlying constraints affect both women- and men-led enterprises, especially in developing countries. High compliance costs, complex standards, limited access to market information, logistics and support services could reduce the likelihood of SME’s entering export markets or moving into higher-value segments.
Women engaged in wage employment in agriculture earn 82 cents for every dollar earned by men. Equal opportunity for women and men to participate in agriculture and trade may contribute, over time, to gains in economic efficiency and food security. For example, closing productivity and wage gaps in agrifood systems could increase global gross domestic products by around 1%, and reduce the number of food-insecure people by about 45 million (FAO, 2023[20]).
From an outlook perspective, these gains are supportive of achieving the projected growth. The expansion of agricultural production, trade, and value addition envisaged in the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook assumes continued improvements in productivity, market integration, and supply side capacity, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Realising these projections will require actions to removing barriers that constrain the productive potential of women farmers and traders.
Business development services, vocational training, and export promotion programmes can strengthen the capacity of firms, both women-led and men-led enterprises, to participate in trade. Tailored capacity development can further support compliance with international standards, stronger market linkages, and adaptation to changing market conditions. Effective progress requires coordinated action across sectoral policies and relevant institutions, backed by robust legal frameworks and institutional accountability.
Source: (FAO, 2025[21]).
References
[6] Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2021), What we heard report: Indigenous agriculture and agri-food in Canada: Perspectives, experiences and opportunities for the future, https://agriculture.canada.ca/en/indigenous-peoples/what-we-heard-report-indigenous-agriculture-and-agri-food-canada.
[4] Campi, M. et al. (2024), “The evolving profile of new entrants in agriculture and the role of digital technologies”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 209, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d15ea067-en.
[7] Coopmans, I. et al. (2021), “Understanding farm generational renewal and its influencing factors in Europe”, Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 86, pp. 398-409, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.06.023.
[19] Costa, V. et al. (2026), “Global estimates of women’s and men’s employment in agrifood systems from 2000 to 2021”, Global Food Security, Vol. 48, p. 100904, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2026.100904.
[5] Dabkienė, V. (2025), “Gender, Women’s Barriers and Innovation in Agriculture: A Systemic Literature Review”, European Countryside, Vol. 17/1, pp. 1-26, https://doi.org/10.2478/euco-2025-0001.
[14] Davis, B. et al. (2024), “Whither the agricultural productivity-led model? Reconsidering resilient and inclusive rural transformation in the context of agrifood systems”, Global Food Security, Vol. 43, p. 100812, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2024.100812.
[16] Davis, B. et al. (2026), “A new estimate for global and country-level employment in agrifood systems”, World Development, Vol. 203, p. 107296, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2025.107296.
[11] Deudibe, G. et al. (2020), Structural Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.1596/33327.
[1] FAO (2026), Global Agrifood Implications of the 2026 Conflict in the Middle East, https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd8875en.
[21] FAO (2025), Advancing women’s participation in agrifood trade through inclusive policy, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/496e9c89-1551-445d-bcd7-1039acf67b54/content.
[20] FAO (2023), The status of women in agrifood systems, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc5343en.
[13] Gollin, D. (2023), “Agricultural productivity and structural transformation: evidence and questions for African development”, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 51/4, pp. 375-396, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2023.2280638.
[10] Gollin, D., D. Lagakos and M. Waugh (2014), “Agricultural Productivity Differences across Countries”, American Economic Review, Vol. 104/5, pp. 165-170, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.165.
[3] IMF (2026), World Economic Outlook: Global Economy in the Shadow of War, https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2026/april/english/text.pdf.
[12] Mensah, E. et al. (2022), “Structural Change, Productivity Growth and Labour Market Turbulence in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 32/3, pp. 175-208, https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejac010.
[2] OECD (2026), The impact of the conflict in the Middle East on agricultural markets, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3324cfee-en.
[9] OECD (2025), OECD Global Forum on Agriculture - Summary, https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2025/10/oecd-global-forum-on-agriculture.html (accessed on 2026).
[18] Piedrahita, N., V. Costa and E. Mane (2025), “Gender gap in agricultural labour productivity: A comparison across African countries”, Global Food Security, Vol. 46, p. 100872, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2025.100872.
[15] Schneider, K. et al. (2024), “Resilient and inclusive rural transformation in sub-Saharan Africa under climate, demographic, and social change: Challenges and opportunities for income growth and job creation”, Global Food Security, Vol. 43, p. 100815, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2024.100815.
[8] Szuda, Á. and J. Antón (2025), Who will feed the future? Four policy steps to secure the next generation of farmers, https://www.oecd.org/en/blogs/2025/11/who-will-feed-the-future-four-policy-steps-to-secure-the-next-generation-of-farmers.html.
[17] World Bank (2023), Logistics Performance Index, https://lpi.worldbank.org/.
← 1. Normal weather is defined as the set of baseline meteorological conditions used in the Outlook, derived from recent climatological averages of key variables such as temperature and precipitation over a multi‑decadal reference period, and applied to represent typical growing conditions in the absence of weather shocks.