Valerie Frey
More Effective Social Protection for Stronger Economic Growth
Main Findings from the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey
Abstract
Using the 2024 Risks that Matter (RTM) Survey, this chapter looks at respondents’ preferences for government action to address two megatrends – technological change and population ageing. Although technological progress is mostly regarded positively, concerns about tech-related risks in labour markets have sparked demands for social protection, with education and training as priorities. To mitigate the negative implications of population ageing – including for the financing of social protection – a clear majority of respondents support policy measures to boost labour supply among women and underrepresented groups and increase technology use in the workplace to improve efficiency. Fertility measures are less popular.
Technological progress fosters productivity and growth, yet workers are concerned about tech-related and other evolving risks in labour markets. These concerns contribute to relatively high demands for reinforced and new forms of social protection for workers going through the digital transition. Training, in particular, is a priority. When thinking about technological change, 74% of respondents say that they support their national government investing in re‑training opportunities for working-age people, and 72% say they support greater public investment in university education and vocational training opportunities for young people.
A declining working-age share of the population has negative implications for growth, and 65% of respondents, on average across countries, say they are worried about population ageing. A clear majority of respondents support three key policy measures to address population ageing and worker shortages: getting more women and underrepresented groups into the workforce; increasing the use of technology to improve efficiency in the workplace; and encouraging part-time workers to transition to full-time work.
Fertility measures are less popular. 43% of respondents, across countries, say governments should encourage more childbearing to address population ageing. Respondents point to financial insecurity and housing conditions as the top barriers to people having (more) children.
More broadly, social protection helps smooth consumption, can help incentivise employment with the offer of (future) contribution-based benefits, and fosters more equal opportunities. Seven out of ten respondents, on average across the OECD, say their national government should do more to ensure their household’s economic security. This result is consistent across high-, middle‑ and low-income groups, as well as older, middle‑aged and young people.
Even in the face of public budget constraints, people in OECD countries highlight the important role played by social protection in supporting workers through the digital transition and helping to address worker shortages – thereby enabling productivity and growth. There is also widespread agreement, across socio‑economic groups, that social protection is important for ensuring households’ economic security and promoting opportunities.
Technological progress has positive implications for productivity and growth (OECD/APO, 2022[1]). At the same time, there are real and perceived risks associated with technological change (see Chapter 1), and policy commitments supporting the incentives and capabilities of workers and businesses are foundational to growth and productivity (André and Gal, 2024[2]). Across OECD countries, the RTM Survey finds that people see government intervention as going hand in hand with technological progress to reduce risks for workers and enable productivity.
When thinking about new technology in labour markets, respondents to the 2024 RTM Survey are most concerned that the digital transition will require significant skills re‑training for evolving and new jobs (see Chapter 1). These concerns are matched by the public’s policy preferences to support workers affected by digitalisation and technological changes (Figure 2.1 and Annex A). 74% of respondents say that they support their national government investing in re‑training opportunities for working-age people, and 72% say they support their government investing more in university education and vocational training opportunities for young people (while “keeping in mind how much such programmes might cost as well as how [they/their] family might benefit”).
There is also broad support for a range of additional policy measures, such as greater investments in digital infrastructure (e.g. broadband networks) and for reinforcing the accessibility and/or generosity of the safety net – with majorities in over 20 out of 27 OECD countries calling for each of these measures (see Annex A).
Share (%) of respondents who support specified government actions as a response to digitalisation and technological change, RTM‑27 average, 2024
Note: All estimates are unweighted averages across RTM‑27 countries. Respondents were asked “Governments can introduce measures aimed at helping workers and industries cope with the challenges created by digitalisation and technological change, such as outdated skills, skills shortages, and possible job loss. Keeping in mind how much they might cost as well as how you and your family might benefit, to what extent would you oppose or support the government taking the following actions as a response to digitalisation and technological change? (a) Investing more in university education and vocational training opportunities for young people, (b) Investing more in re‑training opportunities for working-age people, (c) Investing more in digital infrastructure, such as the broadband network, (d) Introducing (or increasing) a tax on robots and/or technology companies, (e) Introducing a limit on (or lowering) working hours, (f) Making public benefits and services, such as unemployment benefits or minimum income programmes, more accessible and/or more generous to provide a better safety net for workers facing possible job loss, (g) Introducing a universal and unconditional basic income that covers essential living costs to everyone, regardless of their financial situation, (h) Providing subsidies to firms in industries that are hardest hit by technological change, so as to reduce job losses, (i) Promoting the migration of skilled workers to [country], (j) Promoting the migration of unskilled workers to [country], (k) Prioritising workers from [country] in the hiring process, (l) Introducing trade tariffs to protect domestic industries.” Response items (a) and (l) were randomly rotated. Response options were: “Strongly oppose,” “Oppose,” “Neither support nor oppose,” “Support,” “Strongly support,” and “Can’t choose.” Estimates refer to the combined share of “Support” and “Strongly support.”
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Dramatic gains in life expectancy are perhaps the greatest social achievement of OECD countries in the past century. Yet population ageing – the combination of longer life expectancy and declining fertility – presents challenges in many countries (OECD, 2024[3]; OECD, 2024[4]; OECD, 2023[5]). The OECD average total fertility rate (TFR) dropped from 3.3 children per woman in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022, far below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to keep population levels stable, while life expectancy also increased substantially (OECD, 2024[3]). In practice, this means that the number of active workers is declining in many OECD countries while the number of older people grows. The average OECD old-age to working-age ratio stood at 31 people aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age (20 to 64 years old) in 2024. This rate is projected to more than double to 66 by 2082 (Figure 2.2).
Population ageing has negative implications for economic growth (André, Gal and Schief, 2024[6]; OECD, 2025 (forthcoming)[7]). Absent an increase in employment and productivity trends beyond OECD baseline projections, almost all OECD countries will see their annual growth decline in the coming decades due to population ageing. The OECD estimates that the projected contraction in the share of employed persons in the total population will correspond with a reduction in GDP per capita growth by almost two‑thirds in the OECD area, falling from 1.0% per year in 2006-2019 to 0.6% per year on average over the period 2024‑60. Taken together, GDP per capita is projected to be 14% smaller by 2060 than what would have been expected if the same growth rate of the 2006-2019 continued through 2060 (OECD, 2025 (forthcoming)[7]). Population ageing also complicates the sustainability of social protection systems, as fewer worker contributions make it harder for governments to finance programmes like public pensions and long-term care (OECD, 2024[3]).
Old-age to working-age ratio (%), OECD average, 1952 to 2082 (projected from 2024)
Note: The demographic old age to working age ratio is defined as the number of individuals aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age defined as those aged between 20 and 64.
Source: OECD (2023[5]), based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition.
People are concerned about population ageing. On average across countries, 65% of RTM respondents say they are somewhat or very concerned about population ageing beyond the next ten years (Figure 2.3). The share expressing concern about population ageing is a majority in 25 of the 27 surveyed countries, with rates highest in Korea (85%), Portugal (80%), and Spain (77%), where populations are indeed ageing relatively quickly. Denmark (46%) and Israel (48%) are the only two countries where a majority of respondents do not express concern, though a high share still do.
Share (%) of respondents who are somewhat or very concerned about population ageing beyond the next ten years, 2024
Note: RTM‑27 is an unweighted average. Respondents were asked “Looking beyond the next ten years, how concerned are you about population ageing.” Response options were: “Not at all concerned,” “Not so concerned,” “Somewhat concerned,” “Very concerned,” and “Can’t choose / Not applicable.” The figure refers to the share of respondents who are “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned.”
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Women are more concerned about population ageing than men (67% versus 62%) and older people are more concerned than younger people (68% of those aged 50‑64 years, compared to 64% of those aged 30‑49 years, and 61% of those aged 18‑29 years). Higher concern among women may reflect that women are doubly hit by inadequate public provision of long-term care services. Not only could women face the brunt of any increased (unpaid) care demands driven by population ageing (OECD, 2024[3]), but women are also more likely to live into old age and outlive their spouses, making them more likely to need access to long-term care services (Frey, Alajääskö and Thomas, 2024[8]).
In light of these concerns, including the negative implications for growth, a majority of respondents, on average across countries, support three policy measures to address population ageing and worker shortages (Figure 2.4):
getting more women and underrepresented groups into the workforce,
increasing the use of technology to improve efficiency in the workplace, and
encouraging part-time workers to transition to full-time work.
The highest policy priority – favoured by 66% of respondents – is for measures to support the greater participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the labour market. Over 70% of respondents call for more women and underrepresented groups to work in Spain, Greece, Chile, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal and Israel.
63%, on average, support measures to increase the use of technology to improve efficiencies in the workplace, and 56% call for part-time workers to transition to full-time work. To note, this goal is not unrelated to that of supporting the greater participation of women in the labour market. Women, and particularly mothers of dependent children, have high rates of part-time work relative to fathers and people without dependent children (OECD, 2024[3]).
Share (%) of respondents who support specified responses to population ageing, by country, 2024
Note: RTM‑27 is an unweighted average. Respondents were asked “Population ageing may lead to worker shortages in the coming years. To what degree do you oppose or support the following measures to address worker shortages in your country? (a) Encouraging longer working lives, (b) Encouraging people to have more children, (c) Increasing migration to bring more workers into the country, (d) Supporting the greater participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the labour market, (e) Increasing the use of technology to improve efficiencies in the workplace, (f) Encouraging part-time workers to transition to full-time hours.” Response items (a) through (f) were randomly rotated. Response options were: “Strongly oppose,” “Oppose,” “Neither support nor oppose,” “Support,” “Strongly support,” and “Can’t choose.” Estimates refers to the combined share of “Support” and “Strongly support.”
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Around 43% of respondents, on average, say governments should address population ageing (and likely worker shortages) by encouraging people to have more children. Yet childbearing is, of course, a deeply personal choice with lifelong implications.
When asked how important specific factors are for determining young people’s fertility choices, 88% of respondents, on average, pointed to the financial situation of younger people, and 87% pointed to housing conditions as barriers to having a(nother) child (Figure 2.5). This aligns with research findings that socio‑economic conditions are making it harder for people (who wish to) to have children (OECD, 2024[4]). The associated policy prescriptions – improving economic security and improving the availability of good-quality and affordable housing – are neither straightforward nor inexpensive. Finding a suitable partner is the third most oft-cited barrier.
Share (%) of respondents who believe selected social and economic reasons contribute to lower fertility, by country, 2024
Note: RTM‑27 is an unweighted average. Respondents were asked “In [country], how important do you think each of the following factors are for young people considering having a (or another) child? (a) Their financial situation, (b) Their housing conditions, (c) Having a suitable partner, (d) The availability of affordable childcare, (e) The availability of well-paid parental leave, (f) The ways in which parenthood interferes with other goals in life (e.g. career advancement, leisure and travel activities, etc.), (g) Their concern about the environment/climate change.” Response options for each of the items were: “Not at all,” “Very little,” “Somewhat,” “To a great extent,” and “Can’t choose.” Response items (a) through (g) were randomly rotated. The figure refers to the share of respondents who think the item matters “somewhat” or “to a great extent” for each of the items. For clarity of presentation, Israel’s response to “Concern about the environment/climate change” – a value of 32% – has been removed from the figure.
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Putting aside the role of social programmes in supporting workers through technological change and addressing worker shortages, social protection helps smooth consumption and fosters more equal opportunities. Contributory social security can also act as an incentive to get workers into employment by incentivizing jobs with future benefits conditioned on contributions (see, for example, Jones and Wilcher (2024[9]), Liebman and Luttmer (2012[10]), Liebman, Luttmer and Seif (2009[11]), Thévenon and Solaz (2013[12])).
Since the initial survey wave in 2018, the RTM Survey has consistently found that around 70% of respondents support social programmes to ensure economic security. In 2024, 72% of respondents, on average, say their national government should be doing more (or much more) to ensure their economic security and well-being. This ranges from 90% in Chile to 53% in Denmark, which has consistently appeared at the bottom of the ranking for this question – likely reflecting Denmark’s already substantial commitment to a comprehensive welfare state.
Share (%) of respondents according to perceptions on whether government should be doing more or less to secure their economic and social well-being, by country, 2024
Note: RTM‑27 is an unweighted average. Respondents were asked “Do you think the government should be doing less, about the same, or more to ensure your economic and social security and well-being?” Response options were: “Government should be doing much less,” “Government should be doing less,” “Government should be doing about the same as now,” “Government should be doing more,” “Government should be doing much more,” and “Can’t choose.”
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Notably, the belief that government should help ensure economic security is widely shared across groups. High-, middle‑ and low-income groups share this expectation for government, as do different age groups. An exception is the gender gap in perceptions in the role of government: 75% of women, on average across OECD countries, say government should do more to ensure their economic security, compared to only 69% of men. This gender gap is statistically significantly different at the 5% level in 14 of the 27 countries participating in the RTM Survey, with gaps of around 13 percentage points or more in Finland, the Netherlands and Slovenia. This likely reflects women’s higher assessments of economic and social risks, as well as gender gaps embedded in social protection systems (Frey, Alajääskö and Thomas, 2024[8]).
Share (%) of respondents who agree that government should be doing more to secure their economic and social well-being, by gender, by income, by age, RTM‑27 average, 2024
Note: All estimates are unweighted averages across RTM‑27 countries. See Figure 2.6. Respondents are classified according to their household’s equivalised disposable income in 2023 into three categories: low income (1st through 3rd decile), middle income (4th through 7th decile) and high income (8th through 10th decile). Thresholds for household equivalised disposable income deciles were defined at the national level using the most recently available data (typically 2021 or 2022) and inflated to 2023.
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
Calls for government to do more are reflected in the relatively low share of people who think cash benefits and services provided by the government would get them through financial troubles (Figure 2.8). In the 2024 RTM Survey, just over one‑third of respondents say they can count on government (37%). Relying on family and friends, working more for pay, and applying for a loan were more commonly cited solutions for financial trouble in most countries.
Share (%) of respondents who are somewhat or very confident about selected sources of support in the event of financial trouble, by country, 2024
Note: RTM‑27 is an unweighted average. Respondents were asked: “If you and your household were to experience financial trouble (such as not enough income or savings to pay the bills), how confident are you that: (a) You and/or another adult in your household could work more to bring in more money, (b) A friend or family member would be able and willing to help out, (c) Cash benefits and services provided by government would sufficiently support you through financial difficulties, (d) Cash benefits and services provided by charity or non-profit institutions would sufficiently support you through financial difficulties and (e) You and/or another adult in your household would apply for a loan or take on (more) debt from a bank or financial institution.” Response options for each of the items were: “Not at all confident,” “Not so confident,” “Somewhat confident,” “Very confident,” and “Can’t choose.” Response items (a) through (e) were randomly rotated. Risks ranked by share (%) of respondents who are somewhat or very confident.
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html).
References
[2] André, C. and P. Gal (2024), “Reviving productivity growth: A review of policies”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1822, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/61244acd-en.
[6] André, C., P. Gal and M. Schief (2024), “Enhancing productivity and growth in an ageing society: Key mechanisms and policy options”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1807, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/605b0787-en.
[8] Frey, V., L. Alajääskö and J. Thomas (2024), “Gendered perceptions of social protection across OECD countries”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 311, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f3e002c2-en.
[9] Jones, K. and B. Wilcher (2024), “Reducing maternal labor market detachment: A role for paid family leave”, Labour Economics, Vol. 87, p. 102478, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2023.102478.
[10] Liebman, J. and E. Luttmer (2012), “The Perception of Social Security Incentives for Labor Supply and Retirement: The Median Voter Knows More Than You’d Think”, Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 26/1, pp. 1-42, https://doi.org/10.1086/665501.
[11] Liebman, J., E. Luttmer and D. Seif (2009), “Labor supply responses to marginal Social Security benefits: Evidence from discontinuities”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93/11-12, pp. 1208-1223, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.006.
[3] OECD (2024), Megatrends and the Future of Social Protection, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6c9202e8-en.
[4] OECD (2024), Society at a Glance 2024: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/918d8db3-en.
[5] OECD (2023), Pensions at a Glance 2023: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/678055dd-en.
[7] OECD (2025 (forthcoming)), OECD Employment Outlook 2025: Can We Get Through the Demographic Crunch?, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/194a947b-en.
[1] OECD/APO (2022), Identifying the Main Drivers of Productivity Growth: A Literature Review, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/00435b80-en.
[12] Thévenon, O. and A. Solaz (2013), “Labour Market Effects of Parental Leave Policies in OECD Countries”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 141, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb6hw1wjf-en.