This chapter presents the results of the assessment of net zero missions’ outputs, which is the first layer of systemic effects. Net zero mission outputs are produced through three main processes: the collective development of a strategic agenda to address a complex societal challenge, the alignment and holistic monitoring of various actors’ plans, and the articulation and management of a portfolio of activities.
Mission‑Oriented Innovation Policies for Net Zero
How Can Countries Implement Missions to Achieve Climate Targets?
Abstract
In direct relation to their design principles, mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) are expected to deliver three policy outputs (see: Figure 3.2) a collectively developed strategic agenda; 2) a dedicated governance structure to co-ordinate actions towards this agenda; and 3) a consistent package of policy and regulatory interventions to implement the mission. This section questions each of these outputs successively. Table 4.1 summarises the results of this analysis.
Note: SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound.
One of the key specificities of MOIPs relative to most traditional policies is their strong directionality: the mission is specifically designed to achieve specific objectives. In principle, all decisions regarding what investments and actions are taken thinking backward from the final objectives to be realised. The injunction for science, technology and innovation (STI) policies to be impact-driven is, of course, not new, but it has been unevenly implemented. Furthermore, the expected impacts have remained vague and often closer to outputs (e.g. publications, patents, excellence) and outcomes (e.g. excellence, innovation) than impacts outside the STI domain (e.g. reduction of emissions, job creation).
4.1.1. A diversity of mission objectives
Even before the formulation of mission objectives, the first stage of mission orientation takes place at the MOIP initiative level and consists in choosing the missions themselves, most often in the form of mission or challenge areas. Countries have used different staged combinations of top-down and bottom-up processes, most often involving a mix of political influence; stakeholder consultation, including citizen for the broadest societal missions; and evidence-based studies.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Moonshot Research and Development Programme, Japan. A Visionary Council was set up in 2019 composed of seven members, industry leaders, renowned academics but also media artists and a writer of science-fiction novels. It was tasked between March and July 2019 with proposing Moonshot areas and potential goals. With support from the Cabinet Office secretariat, the Visionary Council adopted a progressive approach starting from broad societal challenges, opening up to numerous Visions and Goals and finally narrowing-down the number of potential options. It went from 3 ‘Target Areas’, to 13 ‘Visions’ to 25 examples of potential goals. 6 Moonshot goal candidates were finally drafted based on the Council’s proposal and the discussion at the December 2019 international symposium where 6 working groups discussed subsets of goal candidates and scenarios for achieving them. One additional working group addressed cross-sectional issues. These goals were then discussed and validated by the Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation in January 2020. An additional goal in the healthcare area was discussed and validated in July 2020. Extensive consultations with various ministries and agencies took place during the process. The Visionary Council also received about 1 800 comments to online open call for inputs from the general public (Larrue, 2021[1]).
➤The UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) Challenge Fund, United Kingdom. The MOIP includes 23 ‘Challenges’ in four large challenge areas. The challenges were selected through a multistage selection process. 1) A call for expressions of interest was first issued to identify issues linked to the grand challenges that ‘the bidders wished to address but which, in the absence of public money, might not otherwise receive investment’. 2) UKRI selected, against criteria linked to the grand challenge, a shortlist of potential challenges for support. 3) UKRI discussed the shortlisted challenges with officials from the Department and ministers, and the Secretary of State decided on which challenges to approve based on UKRI recommendations. 4) Once the Challenges were approved (in three different waves) the work started in each of them to determine the objectives. For each of Challenge, UKRI was mandated to develop a ‘business case’ included details of the Challenge objectives, the rationale for funding, information on the shortlisted challenges, a target for co-investment and a plan for management, monitoring and evaluation (National Audit Office, United Kingdom, 2021[2]).
Mission objectives vary greatly in their scope, focus and formulation of the expected impact (Table 4.2). Other important variables that differentiate mission objectives are their level of ambition (relative to the state-of-the-art) and clarity.
Note: CSIRO: Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation.
Source: OECD Net Zero Mission Database.
Regardless of the form these objectives take, programme managers claim that the mission approach has allowed them to set clearer and more inclusively developed goals than the usual programmes and schemes developed by their organisations. In other words, the goals are formulated to be more impactful, rather than simply focusing on inputs or immediate outputs. Against this backdrop, all activities are geared towards the desired outcomes. Even in the most research-intensive mission, the intended results are at the heart of the projects and a cornerstone of research activities. Although many of these objectives are not “inspirational” to the general product as it is expected (Mazzucato, 2018[3]), these clearly enunciated objectives act as a “focusing device” and a reference point for interactions between the different actors all along the innovation chain, and across the various involved communities.
4.1.2. A majority of net zero missions have no clear targets at the outset
The objectives of MOIPs can be diverse. Ideally, a mission’s objectives should be translated into concrete and measurable targets (Mazzucato, 2016[4]). However, only approximately 38% of the identified net zero missions (28 missions in 16 initiatives) have established such targets (and 55% of these missions, or 21, have specified greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions reduction targets). In clear contrast with the “mission theory”, many missions are characterised by traditional – sometimes lengthy – descriptions of the objectives, blended in elements of context.1
Three main reasons explain this derogation to one of the main expected features of MOIPs:
• As previously mentioned, many missions start with a broad challenge and set a specific process for developing goals and targets from the bottom up, i.e. by the stakeholders themselves as part of their proposals to tackle the selected challenge. It is often a requirement in project or strategic agenda calls for proposal to specify clear targets with milestones. While this may lead to stronger buy-in from project partners or ecosystem stakeholders to the goals they have set themselves, it falls short of providing a common focal point, which in turn allows scale and synergetic effects between consistent or competing activities. Another key limitation is that the goals set in these initiatives might be less ambitious and transformative, as revealed by an evaluation of the Swedish strategic innovation programmes (Technopolis, 2022[46]).
• Setting clear targets agreed upon by a multiplicity of actors from different policy domains and industry sectors is a daunting task, especially at the start of the mission, when trust has yet to be built between the new partners. The broad challenge area and mission objective is the “best consensus” reached at the launch of the mission.
• While not specifying mission targets, often missions’ objectives refer to their contribution to the 2030 and 2050 national agendas’ targets. However, as they do not translate these net zero targets in their specific technological, thematic or industry areas, their directionality remains limited.
The decision of not setting clear targets is, in some cases, part of the MOIP process, notably in ecosystem-based MOIPs, which aim to empower new ecosystems and incrementally lead them to develop their own transition agenda. However, in several other cases, target setting depends on mission-specific factors, which can raise different technical and political debates. This is evidenced by the fact that in the same MOIPs, some missions have targets while others do not. For instance, among the France 2030 acceleration strategies (AS), the Clean Hydrogen AS has precise targets while the two acceleration strategies in the agriculture and agro-food areas do not, revealing the difficulties in achieving consensus on the best pathways to reduce emissions in these areas between the authorities in charge of industry, environment and agriculture.
As the selected cases show (Table 4.3), there are different ways to specify the mission targets in terms of reducing GHG emissions. They vary notably with the scope of the mission, which can be focused on one or several industries (e.g., “hard-to-abate sectors”, construction) or technology (e.g. carbon capture, storage and utilisation [CCSU], carbon-removal technologies).2
Note: CSIRO: Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation.
Source: OECD Net Zero Mission Database.
Occasionally, objectives and targets may be merged into a concise mission statement, which, if well crafted, can be both inspirational and clear, detailing an ambitious goal within a specific time frame. Such statements act as recognisable “entry points” for the mission.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Moonshot Goal 5, Moonshot R&D Programme, Japan. The mission aims for the “creation of industry that enables sustainable global food supply by exploiting unused biological resources by 2050.”.
➤ Hydrogen Earthshot™, Energy Earthshots™, United States. The mission has formalised its main objective as the “1 1 1” goal, i.e. the objective of “reducing the cost of clean hydrogen by 80% to USD 1 per 1 kilogram in one decade”.
➤ Soil Mission, Horizon Europe Missions, European Union. The mission’s objective at its inception was to ensure that “75% of soils are healthy by 2030 for healthy food, people, nature and climate”. It has changed to become ‘100 living labs and lighthouses to lead the transition towards healthy soils by 2030’.
4.1.3. Missions set common objectives in uncertain and contested environments
As noted, engaging a diverse array of public and private stakeholders in defining mission objectives is fundamental to Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies (MOIPs). However, this process is not always straightforward and can be marked by contestation, conflicts, and power games. Setting clear objectives and targets requires that the mission partners have come to an agreement not only on what must be achieved but also to a certain extent on a subset of pathways to realise these targets, hence excluding others. This is particularly difficult when dealing with the transition to net zero, since it involves delicate trade-offs and balances between different categories of actors and sectors and possible “phasing out” compensation measures for all those who might be negatively affected by the coming changes.
Although they focus on the contribution of innovation to the transition, net zero missions are, therefore, hardly purely technical and neutral and are formed in a context where many elements of consensus on how to reach the national net zero commitments are still to be realised. Setting clear objectives at the outset is not limited to adopting “good project management practices”. The goals – and when they exist, the targets that accompany them – enshrine the results of negotiations on the objectives. They also reflect hypotheses regarding the evolution of sometimes uncertain variables (e.g. carbon and energy prices, availability of raw materials, geopolitics, capacity to overcome scientific and technological bottlenecks, evolution of users’ perceptions and preferences) that influence these sociotechnical options, and their even more uncertain results on the state of the world. The framing of the possible solutions within a mission is therefore “likely to be a very politically and normatively laden process in which different actors try to lead the innovation system’s focus into the direction that they favour” ( (Hekkert et al., 2020[5]).
A mission is, therefore, not only a technological and economic partnership but a locus of debates, providing a platform for public-private, cross-ministerial and inter-sectoral negotiations. These dialogues become pivotal when decisions about long-term futures – ones that intimately impact people’s well-being – are at stake. Narrowing the lens solely to the scientific and technological ambiguities would overlook the intricate socio-political dimension of missions and underestimate the underpinning power conflicts and disagreements, which are important drivers of their implementation (Wanzenböck et al., 2020[6]). While contemporary innovation systems offer many instances where these negotiations can take place (such as committees, industrial associations and unions), the specific added value of missions is that they make the results of the negotiations readily “actionable”, since they are directly linked to decision and implementation structures.
Direct linkages between the orientation, co-ordination and implementation of STI activities represent significant changes relative to policy practices and processes of traditional fragmented innovation systems. The mission stakeholders in the negotiation can directly refer to the ensuing actions to strengthen their positions. Moreover, the government can tie its financial commitment to the fulfilment of the mission’s objectives, ensuring that the selected path upholds certain societal values that might not always resonate with the singular objectives of corporations or other interest groups.
4.1.4. Strategic policy intelligence is essential to support the development of the mission objectives and strategic agenda
Developing objectives requires substantial information and knowledge to strengthen their underlying hypotheses. However, the absence of a dedicated budget for certain missions means they must lean heavily on the capacity and resources of specific participants during the mission definition stage. This can compromise the acceptability of these objectives, especially when controversial topics are at play.
Time is another critical resource in the development of objectives and targets. This condition is not always realised, since missions can be launched under high political pressure to start functioning as soon as possible. Budget and time not only ensure that the objectives are evidence-based, but also allow them to depart from conservative options driven by incumbents.
Net zero mission case
➤ Clean hydrogen, France 2030 Acceleration Strategies, France. It took more than a year for the French authorities to develop the “clean hydrogen AS”. This time was used to conduct preliminary studies to calibrate and strengthen the legitimacy of the targets; run extensive consultations to assess needs; and issue calls for expressions of interest to identify potential solutions and project partners and negotiate common objectives with them despite a wide diversity of views and interests. As a result, the mission deliberately includes some strong choices that exclude certain options. For example, the strategy focuses only on clean hydrogen for applications where battery storage technologies are ill-suited (hence mainly heavy vehicles), which would be produced with electrolysers plugged into the electricity network. The mission objectives also include clear choices regarding the type, capacity, and distance of the electrolysers to the application site.
The absence of budgets for supporting the development of objectives (left to the poorly evidence-based political debate or to stakeholders themselves) also results in the limited use of dedicated forward-looking support tools. Only a handful of missions harness formal foresight techniques to support objective-setting, despite the advantages in addressing comprehensive sociotechnical challenges.3 In most cases, a mission’s strategic agenda is defined using technology road-mapping techniques rather than a full-fledged foresight exercise.4 This, in part, reflects countries’ limited experience using foresight in policy making. Another reason for the limited use of foresight is the narrow techno-centric scope of many net zero missions.
Some missions have used advanced methods to define their objectives in a forward-looking way, using various design approaches (Vinnova’s pilot missions) or theory of changes (BMK5 national missions).
Net zero mission cases
➤ Vinnova’s pilot missions, Sweden. Vinnova has prototyped two missions to develop, test and formalise a novel design process for missions. The initiative was led by a dedicated strategic design team (about 3 full time equivalent) including design and domain experts and two specific mission teams. The process was also supported by groups of academic researchers. The resulting process involved various top-down and bottom-up steps of consultations and engagement of the concerned ecosystems’ actors (respectively around school food and mobility), from pupils to experts and ministers. Each stage of the design process resulted in an object (Angles, Missions, Prototypes, Demonstrators) and used different event moderation techniques and tools such as Systems Actors workshop, Design Workshops and System Canvas. The resulting process is described precisely in Hill (2022[7]).
➤ Transition missions, Austria. The strategic agendas in the form of concrete Impact Pathways 2030 were designed for each of the four BMK national missions (climate‑neutral city, energy transition, mobility transition and circular economy) collectively in workshops using electronic tools (such as Mural or Miro) in 2022. These pathways start with the problems to tackle and define the general goals that need to be achieved to tackle them. They are then translated into specific goals, operational STI goals. Respective activities and target groups have been identified to meet the goals as have in some cases expected results and outcomes, and expected impacts. The linkages between these different elements, including when it pertains to different problems areas, were also identified. Moreover, the governance structure needed to implement the impact pathways for the four missions has been set up and a monitoring system including indicators was developed. These Impact Pathways are a reference point for concrete annual STI funding and additional activities for each mission. Moreover, there is an annual review meeting, when each mission team reflects on the progress of the mission based on the defined indicators and additional qualitative information.
➤ CSIRO Missions, Australia. To support the mission definition stage that hinges upon consultations and consensus building among actors pertaining to different disciplines and sectors, CSIRO use dedicated tools, including ‘mission design canvas’ and ‘mission theory of change’. The theory of change focuses mission teams on defining the timebound and specific mission objective and describing impact pathways, i.e., how the innovation system will need to function to achieve the objective. The Mission Design Canvas are used to define the work packages that will be needed to operationalise the impact pathways. They also include what resources and capability will be needed and the sequencing of activities. This framework also helps to ‘surface any dependencies or trade-offs between or within interventions’. (CSIRO, 2023).
4.1.5. The mission-oriented strategic agendas act as collective action frameworks
In several cases, the objectives are not the starting point but rather a first result of the mission itself. Many missions start with broad objectives, priorities or “mission areas”. The first step of the mission is to develop or refine the objectives, most often embedding them in a strategic agenda or road map. The five EU missions,6 for instance, started with five broad mission areas and a mandate for groups of high-level specialists in each area (the mission boards) to first devise a strategy featuring objectives and targets (the mission board reports) then a plan (the implementation plans). These loose directional elements do not really aim to set a clear orientation, but rather incentivise and facilitate the formation of large partnerships, wherein public and private actors jointly set attainable objectives and develop a collective strategy to meet them. This is particularly true of ecosystem-based MOIPs, which start with a call for strategic agendas, followed by the selection and implementation of some of these agendas.
A mission’s initial objectives and targets are almost always accompanied by a strategic agenda to ensure the directionality and consistency of its different activities. These agendas (under different denominations and formats) are key to the expression of top-down and bottom-up dynamics. While governments still play a strong role at the political stage of setting the mission’s objectives and targets, it is almost always the stakeholders who develop the strategic agenda which maps the different pathways towards fulfilling these objectives. What differentiates these mission-oriented strategic agendas from traditional strategies is that they are developed, implemented and monitored in an integrated way, allowing the strategic agenda to become the authoritative framework for action. In several missions, some components of the strategic agendas are directly used to develop the call for proposals; they can also be used on a regular basis to monitor progress on the different activities against the road map and identify gaps in the mission.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Carbon-free Built Environment’, Mission-driven Top Sectors and Innovation Policy, The Netherlands. The implementation of the Dutch “Carbon-free Built Environment” mission is guided by four multiannual mission innovation programmes (MMIPs) covering different sub-areas. The MMIPs include not only the activities to be performed but also the map of public financial resources deployed across the entire innovation chain by different identified actors, from fundamental and applied research to pilots and demonstrators. The call for proposals for the implementation of the mission are directly based on these MMIPs (some calls include copy-pasted text from the initial mission document). Since all the 25 top sectors’ missions have developed such MMIPs, they are also used to identify and strengthen synergies among them.
➤ The EU Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities mission, Horizon Europe Missions, EU. The mission, officially launched in 2021, aims to ‘support, promote and showcase 100 European cities in their systemic transformation towards climate neutrality by 2030 and turn these cities into innovation hubs for all cities, benefiting quality of life and sustainability in Europe by 2050.’ Like for the other four EU missions, the objectives of the EU ‘Cities mission were developed by a Mission Board that was formed in 2019 to help specify and design the mission, and start its implementation. The Mission Boards undertook multiples consultations of stakeholders, citizens as well as national, regional, and local authorities, listening to their expectations and needs through a series of events across EU countries. The Commission together with partners also held citizen engagement events to collect proposals from the public for the five EU missions. Two sessions per mission were organised with 10 different European countries. Citizens could also upload their ideas on a digital platform. As a result of this process, the experts issued their Mission Board report in September 2020. This report provides details on the mission objectives, the different mission’s axes and ways to achieve them. It was complemented in September 2021 by a Mission Board Implementation Plan which provides precise information on the ways to achieve the mission’s objectives. According to interviewees, the mission represents a significant change with regards to other EU Framework Programmes. Firstly, the mission has clear objectives and targets regarding the impact to be achieved by a certain date transcending the Framework Program, while traditionally the programmes are more exploratory, open-ended and limited to a seven-year timeframe. This focus on the expected impacts by 2030 and 2050 results in ‘reverse calendar’ practices, whereby the whole mission is planned backward from these deadlines. Secondly, the mission agenda was developed in an inclusive manner by the Mission Board with significant stakeholder engagement, while traditionally the European Commission sets the objectives with consultations done through official channels (programme committees with EU Member representatives).
➤ CSIRO Missions, Australia. CSIRO missions are developed collectively following an iterative co-design process. Following the internal preparation of the process during about 4 weeks, the first critical stage is called the ‘initial sprint’ and lasts about 6 to 8 weeks. This stage aims to ‘facilitates consensus building among internal stakeholders, validates the mission idea for initial investment and accelerates the mission idea toward launch readiness.’ It includes several steps notably ‘problem exploration’ based on a first brief, ‘system discovery’ to map the system’s key areas, ‘stakeholder engagement’ to improve the problem definition, ‘reframe and refocus’ bases on what has been learned and ensure linkages to CSIRO priorities, ‘mission projects’ and ‘mission roadmap’ to define and prioritise projects, and insert them in pathways to address the problem. This stage ends with the presentation of a mission proposal to CSIRO senior management. (CSIRO, 2023).
➤ INNO-CCUS, Innomissions, Denmark. Following broadly the approach used by Sweden to select its Strategic Innovation Programmes, the Danish Innomissions started with a ‘Call for roadmaps’ thought which all relevant stakeholders are encouraged to come together to contribute their expertise and propose a realistic and robust strategy to achieve the objectives of broadly define challenges. Roadmaps describe challenges and gaps within the mission, strongholds and potential and sketch key activities and relevant work stream themes for future partnerships. They develop a holistic perspective, covering the entire value chain and all components of the innovation system (from research to investment, education, legislations, etc.). They define expected short-, mid- and long-term impacts. As a result of this call, the Innovation Fund Denmark’s Board of Directors selected six roadmaps out of the 12 that were submitted. The roadmaps were developed by wide range of actors. The Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) roadmap for instance was the result of a collaborative effort between six universities, three Research & Technology Organisations (RTOs), clusters and other stakeholders including regulatory authorities, industry, and non-governmental organisations. These roadmaps were then used to guide applications to the ‘Call for partnerships’. Consortia were asked to submit action plans to realise the roadmaps.
➤ The Alchemist, Korea. The programme sets themes and supports a series of projects under each theme through a stage-gated approach – starting with six projects in year one of a theme, three projects in year two. The Alchemist has set 19 themes so far. To set the themes, KEIT conducts desk research on the current state of technologies, and then what the future societal challenges will be. It also uses its big data platform to explore quantitative trends behind technologies, and a public platform where citizens can submit their ideas. In addition, KEIT conducts a survey of top industry leaders and academics from the National Academy of Engineering, and other academics. This work culminates in 20-30 draft themes. These draft themes are presented to the Alchemist Programme’s Grand Challenge Committee, which consists of experts from science and technology, as well as humanities and social sciences, like science fiction writers, to help embed some futures thinking into the programme. Thematic working groups are created for each candidate theme to inform this work. The Grand Challenges Committee then selects 10-20 themes. Once the challenge themes are selected, a working group of industry and academic experts then oversees each theme and decides what projects to fund. Each theme has an accompanying brief that provides directionality by identifying several priority technology areas, and then how it envisions the innovations developed will improve society in the future. For instance, the Sustainable Beyond Plastics theme identifies bioplastics, new organic/inorganic materials, recycled plastic, and recycling technology as some related technologies. It then sets out its vision for the future as a “post-oil sustainable plastic economy and society, improving the functions of existing plastics. A society where material circulation of new plastics and composite materials based on innovative alternative renewable resources is possible”. The briefs for each theme also include more technical analysis with regards to technical limitations, the innovativeness of the theme, prospects for creating new markets, expected timelines for the innovations to have societal impact, the global competitiveness in the technology areas, how Korea can secure global leadership in the field, the potential social impact, and technological differentiation (OECD, Forthcoming[8]).
While strategic agendas are never binding and there is no “stick”, peer pressure among the mission partners in the broad governance bodies can exert a significant influence on possible opportunistic behaviours by the different partners.
An underlying condition for the effectiveness and legitimacy of strategic agendas is that they should be both directional and flexible. They must be a “living document” that evolves regularly to adapt to new internal and external conditions. In this regard, some missions, such as the Danish Green CCSU mission or the Japanese Moonshots, have established procedures to revise their strategic agendas annually.
4.1.6. Missions’ net zero objectives interact with a broader set of objectives
The objective of combatting climate change in net zero missions is always intertwined with other objectives, most often environmental and economic objectives and, in some specific cases, health or security goals (Table 4.4).
Source: OECD Net Zero Mission Database.
By definition, all net zero missions aim to tackle climate change by reducing GHG emissions. In addition to mitigating climate change, 70% of them have economic objectives (e.g. creating jobs) and 55% wider environmental objectives (Figure 4.1).
Note: Each net zero mission can be relevant to multiple objective groups.
Source: OECD Net Zero Mission Database.
As shown in Annex C, some missions have translated their economic objectives into targets. Furthermore, while not always officially emphasised, strengthening national competitiveness and creating new jobs always feature among the missions’ objectives, if only informally.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Develop safe, networked and clean mobility, High-Tech Strategy 2025, Germany. During the 2017-21 legislative period the mission aimed to “Make Germany into the leading supplier and market for electromobility”.
➤ Low-cost carbon dioxide (CO2)-free hydrogen production facilities, The Alchemist, Korea. The mission that aims to “develop fundamental technologies and processes for mass-producing cost-effective and eco-friendly hydrogen in order to secure the leading position of Korea in global market in hydrogen car production and energy production.
➤ Clean Hydrogen mission, France 2030 Acceleration Strategies, France. Beside its target in terms of installed electrolysis capacity, the French Clean Hydrogen mission added the goal to ‘build an industrial sector that creates jobs and guarantees our technological mastery, in particular by creating 50,000 to 150,000 jobs in the country’.
These diverse objectives primarily reflect the multifaceted and systemic nature of societal challenges. This diversity is also intrinsically linked to the mission process. To encompass a broader spectrum of policy sectors, early mission advocates must negotiate and evolve the mission objectives, incorporating additional goals and targets. As argued in Chapter 2, one of the intrinsic “how-to conundrums” of missions consists in balancing a broad range of partners on one side and directionality and consistency on the other. The resulting bargaining between different policy sectors creates a risk of diluting the mission by adding multiple objectives or making these objectives wide and vague to accommodate all partners’ interests.
4.1.7. Missions often lack high-level political support
The “inspirational” nature of their missions, as well as their potential societal impact, can, in principle, justify and attract higher level support in the political and administrative sphere. It is often claimed that missions are political, due to their directional nature. First, their normative goals, which in principle have more to do with societal ends than means and therefore have a stronger impact on people’s life and well-being, are de facto political. Second, these goals raise a higher level of social contestation and can, therefore, be contested by some actors, which facilitates a politicisation of MOIPs compared to traditional policies (Wittmann et al., 2021[9]).
The political dimension of missions originates primarily from their direct connection to societal impacts and, therefore, citizens and politicians’ mandates. In a sense, the mission makes explicit the link between citizens’ lives and the needed research and innovation activities and the policies that support them. As explained by an interviewee, “the mission framework makes the activities, even when they involve advanced scientific and technological developments, much more accessible to policy maker and citizen, as their objectives talk directly to people’s issues”.
The political support for a mission is difficult to assess. However, mission managers claim that it is often too low or only declaratory, not effective nor translated into concrete acts. They are hardly referred to by high-level politicians and policy makers. Notable exceptions exist, however, such as Austria's EU missions and certain national transition missions, which receive direct ministerial support. These cases illustrate the potential of missions when they have active, high-level backing that translates into real resources and political commitment.
Reducing GHG emissions, like other intricate societal challenges, requires extensive cross-sectoral co-ordination. Policy fragmentation greatly hinders innovation systems’ capacity to respond adequately to wicked societal challenges, such as those included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (OECD, 2019[10]). Against this backdrop, net zero missions ensure the cross-sectoral alignment of policy makers’ plans.
4.2.1. Missions gather a broader range of policy sectors around common objectives but cross-government coordination beyond the STI policy area remains difficult
In-depth fieldwork for 17 net zero mission case studies shows that almost all involved a significantly expanded scope of co-ordination between different public policy actors. These missions gather around the table not only public authorities in charge of research and business innovation, but also relevant sectoral ministries and agencies with authority on the relevant needed reforms, demand support policies and other essential framework conditions for the transition. This allows taking more informed and holistic decisions.
This co-ordination primarily takes place in dedicated governance bodies with various advisory, decision-making or monitoring roles. In the larger MOIP initiatives, these groups are replicated at different levels (political, strategic and operational).7
Net zero mission case
➤EU Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities mission, Horizon Europe Missions, EU. The five EU Horizon Europe missions have introduced new coordination practices within the European Commission. At the highest level, there is a Project Group of Commissioners that meet two or three times per year to supervise and discuss the execution of the five missions. Each mission is led by two high level managers from the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and another Directorate-General of the European Commission. The EU Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities mission (Cities Mission) is co-led by two high-level managers from the Directorate-General for Environment and the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. Besides the leadership, several groups and committees – notably the” mission owners’ groups” at working and director levels – co-ordinate actions between the twelve Directorates-General more or less directly involved in the mission. This is said to have significantly reduced the number of overlaps between different directorates’ activities related to cities. The mission’s mode of governance is new, as climate neutrality has traditionally been addressed by different parts of the European Commission (transport, energy, urban planning, etc.). The Cities Mission provides a legitimate authority at the systemic level (a “climate neutrality interlocutor”). The mission also supports a cross-sectoral approach within each of the selected 112 cities, which are asked to co-develop a “Climate City Contract” (CCC) with the different stakeholders. These contracts include an overall net-zero transition plan across all sectors (energy, buildings, waste management, transport, industry and AFOLU), together with related investment plans. This holistic approach is an essential component of the common guidelines and requirements that cities must follow in developing these contracts. The CCCs embed and officialise the systemic dimension for each city participating in the mission.
STI public authorities in charge of research or business innovation policy have initiated the bulk of the MOIP initiatives with net zero missions and act as the “champions” of mission-oriented policies in their respective national systems.
Out of the 30 MOIP initiatives included in this study, 21 are directly led by public bodies with authorities on research and innovation policies (Figure 4.2). They are also essential in the missions that are co-led by STI and sectoral authorities, such as the Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology’s transition missions in Austria. Within the “super ministry” in charge of climate, environment, energy, mobility, innovation and technology, the department in charge of innovation leads and supports the four missions, with the involvement of the relevant sectoral departments (e.g., energy). Out of the three MOIP initiatives led by central government organisations, two are under the responsibility of the Japanese high-level committee in charge of the STI policies (the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation). The remaining initiative (the French acceleration strategies) are led by a dedicated institution under the Prime Minister Office in charge of France 2030, the large investment and recovery plan that “aims to transform the national economy through innovation”.8
Note: COG: centre of government.
Source: OECD Net Zero Mission Database.
4.2.2. Cross-sectoral co-ordination faces many costs and challenges
Holistic co-ordination has been acknowledged as a key weakness of national innovation systems for decades. All OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy point to the core issue of co-ordination between public authorities in charge of research and those responsible for business innovation. The upswing in societal challenges has made this issue even more acute, as the scope of the needed co-ordination includes other sectoral policy and regulatory administrations with closely related mandates (the “challenge owners”).
While MOIP is seen as a possible response to this new imperative, in many countries it occurs in a context where previous challenges related to the functioning of the innovation system and economic growth remain unresolved. As emphasised by Whitman et al. (2021) and Arnold et al. (2018[11]) traditional unsolved challenges of co-ordination and political leadership that have been debated for decades are still relevant in the context of MOIPs.
This study shows that cross-sectoral co-ordination is not only one of the main expected added values of MOIPs, but also one of the main practical challenges. This is confirmed by a recent survey of mission practitioners and stakeholders, who rank “silo effects” as the highest risk for a mission’s success (OECD and DDC, 2022[12]).
Managing broad missions demands numerous meetings to take collective decisions involving a wide set of actors in different parts of the government on a diverse set of issues. It is, therefore, necessary to strike a “sustainable” balance between the benefits of co‑ordination on the one hand and transaction costs on the other. Although most net zero missions are still recent, some have already readjusted this balance based on experience.
Net zero mission case
➤ Mission-driven Top Sectors and Innovation Policy, The Netherlands. The Dutch 25 missions are characterised for their detailed governance, coordinating various actors across different challenge areas and levels (high-level/political and operational), in several governance bodies (e.g. mission teams, top sector teams, programme advisory groups to support MMIPs and transversal teams across several missions) (Janssen, 2020[13]). Several actors involved in this policy have pointed to a growing “mission fatigue” owing to the high number of meetings of these bodies. The policy is now being reformed to simplify this governance structure and increase its efficiency.
In cross-sectoral co-ordination, getting diverse actors to the negotiation table is just the beginning. The subsequent challenge is ensuring each representative – particularly those from sectoral departments – actively participates, disseminates information, and potentially commits interventions and funding for the mission. Missions compete for time and resources in administrations that would not normally be involved in such activities, as they are not traditionally considered central to their sectoral mandate. Some of these actors, who act not only as contact points but also as “ambassadors” for the mission within their administration, struggle to engage the leaders of related programmes and activities in the mission and convince them to commit resources.
4.3.1. Missions combine different types of public interventions but fall short of supporting scale-up and deployment
As shown in Figure 4.2, a mission involves a portfolio of policy and regulatory measures which, in almost all cases, predate it. The mission integrates existing interventions in a coherent bundle to meet specific objectives. The different interventions can be categorised into six different types (Figure 4.4).
Note: STI: science, technology and innovation.
Although net zero missions vary greatly in terms of scale and scope, they always combine several of these interventions under a common strategic and governance framework. Grants for research and innovation activities remain one of the main policy instruments for channelling mission funding to project partners. They are, however, accompanied by a wealth of other measures designed to support (among others) specific projects, competence or excellence centres, regulatory reforms, competitions and prizes, demonstration sites, training or communication, and awareness-raising activities. For example, the UK industry decarbonisation missions dedicate specific actions to skill strengthening. The Danish CCSU mission performs studies to better understand and shape public acceptance of these technologies. Several missions, such as the Finnish Growth Engine “Green E2”, support the emergence of new ecosystems around the mission, which constitute “interest groups” that help promote the necessary regulatory reforms.
An important rationale for integrating complementary instruments is to provide continuous support across the different stages of the innovation chain, from R&D to market deployment.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Pilot E, Norway. In Pilot-E, the three agencies in charge of research and research-based innovation (Research Council of Norway), innovation and demonstration (Innovation Norway), and early-market deployment of energy technologies (Enova) have teamed up to provide a one-stop-shop for sustainable energy projects, such as green ships. Each of them mobilises its interventions to support the projects that are jointly selected to deliver the needed solutions, notably in the area of net zero or low carbon maritime transportation. The main instruments are the Research Council of Norway’s Innovation Projects to support R&D, Innovation Norway’s Environmental Technology Scheme to test solutions before commercialisation and Enova’s implementation grants to support market deployment (including via public procurement for innovation).
The external evaluation of Pilot-E performed in 2020 concluded that this combination of instruments along the innovation chain using a funnel approach is a ‘relevant solution to respond to the need for better coordination of measures aimed at energy and environmental technology’. This improved coordination scheme ‘has good potential for fulfilling the scheme's objective of getting new solutions onto the market faster’, which is line with the expected results of this type ‘acceleration mission’ (Larrue, 2021[14]; Menon Economics, 2020[15]).
➤ Moonshot R&D Programme, Japan. In each of its seven Moonshot goals, the Moonshot R&D Programme implements a portfolio approach to manage the high risk of failure of projects. The main idea is to create an R&D portfolio system as a package of projects for each Moonshot Goal and evaluate the possibility of achieving a goal at the level of this package, not at the level of each individual project. Between 3 and 13 projects were selected for each of the seven goals. This strategy is reflected in the design of the programme. A Programme Director is appointed specifically at the level of each of the Moonshot goal and is tasked with the development and implementation of a Portfolio Plan. Programme Directors are asked to choose projects that try out different paths and methods to meet their respective Moonshot goals.
➤ Viable Cities, SIP, Sweden. The Viable Cities Strategic Innovation Programme (SIP) adopted a portfolio approach to achieve a systems view of the climate transition and help steer all needed innovation activities towards the common goal of climate neutrality. The portfolio is co-developed by each of the nine Member cities and their external partners. It not conceptualised as a mere list of projects but includes everything seen as relevant to the mission and also specific the challenges, needs, barriers or future options. Further aspects may feature investment plans, learning and people. Viable Cities defines seven dimensions of portfolios that portfolio managers should consider: 1/ Portfolio (co)-ownership: who oversees and owns the overall portfolio as well as its component parts. 2/ Portfolio logic: what drives portfolio activities. 3/Portfolio elements: what activities are part of the portfolio. 4/ Nature of relations between elements: how objectives, teams, and activities are linked. 5/ Leverage mechanisms: how objectives, teams, or activities in the portfolio can be strengthened or transitioned. 6/ Categories of impact: what outcomes the portfolio approach targets (e.g., a greater number of innovation activities, or better alignment between efforts). 7/ Portfolio-building practices: how better portfolio coordination and collaboration can be supported (Hanson and Bleckenwegner, 9 June 2021[16]; OECD, 2022[17]).
Although they integrate a broader set of policy instruments, very few missions currently include instruments to support the mass deployment of the newly developed solutions. The French Clean Hydrogen Acceleration Strategy is an exception in that respect. In most other initiatives, the scale-up and deployment support instruments are located outside the mission and are, therefore, not systematically co-ordinated with other interventions, notably STI instruments.
Net zero mission case
➤ Clean Hydrogen mission, France 2030 Acceleration Strategies, France. The French Clean Hydrogen Acceleration Strategy (AS) launched in 2020 has a budget of 3.4 billion euros for the period 2020-2023, with a further 7 billion euros planned up to 2030. With such a significant budget (the highest of all net zero missions in the database), the mission covers all aspects of setting up a hydrogen value chain (Technology readiness level [TRL] 1 to 9), from research to production, skills infrastructure, and markets. SA also aims to develop key technologies and key components through pilot projects for different types of uses and markets. An essential and unique added value of AS is that it also integrates scale-up instruments in the form of price-based deployment support mechanisms designed to compensate for the extra cost of decarbonized hydrogen compared with conventional hydrogen. To coordinate and manage this wide portfolio, the Clean Hydrogen AS – like all other ASs – has its own interministerial governance structure and a central coordinator attached to a public body under the Prime Minister Office. The coordinator's role is to support the coordination between the community of public and private mission partners and monitor all actions implemented against the collectively developed 10-year strategic agenda (Larrue, 2023[18]).
Another insightful case is DOE’s energy Earthshots™. While these missions aim to achieve science and technology breakthroughs, several of them are co-ordinated with deployment targets and support mechanisms anchored ‘outside’ the formal scope of the mission.
➤ Energy Earthshots™, United States. The Earthshots™ offer an extensive policy mix that ranges from fundamental research to development and demonstration. A range of support schemes and funding sources are mobilised, such as Energy Earthshot Research Centers, a variety of challenge prize approaches as well as diverse type of technical assistance, such as capacity building through educational resources, training, and on-call assistance from technical experts and researchers at the DOE's national labs. Despite this broad policy mix, these missions remain focused on science and technology bottlenecks, as shown by their target formalised in terms of technical or costs performance. However, there are several examples of how the Energy Earthshots™ are complemented by related deployment targets. For example, the Clean Fuels and Products Shot is bolstered by the Sustainable Aviation Fuel Grand Challenge's deployment target. Floating Offshore Wind Shot has a second target led by the US Department of the Interior – it is a specific deployment target. The Earthshots™ also work closely with the other organisations responsible for delivering funding under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act, which offer additional support for deployment and infrastructure investments. For instance, the Hydrogen Shot has complementary programmes through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (Hydrogen Hubs and Hydrogen Demand Side Programs). The Inflation Reduction Act also creates a new Hydrogen Production Tax Credit to incentivise the domestic production of clean hydrogen, which will make this emerging low-carbon fuel source more cost-competitive. These initiatives all will advance the Hydrogen Shot and help bring the technologies it develops to market.
An important distinction between missions is not only the range of these instruments but their level of integration, i.e., the extent to which decisions regarding their implementation follow the commonly developed strategic agenda and are collectively monitored. Some missions can be loosely integrated, with the mission acting as a common heading for all relevant activities under its remit. As shown in Figure 2.4, this was the case for the missions under the former German “High-tech” Strategy (2009-21), which Wittman et al. (2020[19]) categorised as “umbrella missions”.
4.3.2. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks have yet to be adapted to mission-oriented innovation policies
It is clear from interviews and a dedicated study commissioned by the Mission Action Lab to an external consultant (Arnold, 2022[20]) that in most mission cases there is still an important mismatch between the specificity of the mission approach and existing monitoring and evaluation rules and practices. Even in agencies having developed an innovative approach that differs significantly from traditional programmes, monitoring and evaluation remains traditional, paying little attention to the directional and systemic dimension of missions. There is a widely shared perception that new methodologies, processes and practices are needed to evaluate these policies, but no clear idea yet as to what these should be.
As mentioned above, a key task of evaluating missions should be – in addition to traditional STI policy evaluation at the level of each instrument – assessing its “second-order additionality” (see Missions combine different types of public interventions but fall short of supporting scale-up and deployment). This additionality depends on different types of systemic effects, in particular focusing effects, alignment effects and integration effects (Box 4.1).
To consider the specificities of missions in their evaluation, it is necessary to define their (expected) systemic effects. In essence, the systemic effects of missions pertain to three main groups of effects in relation to the three building blocks of mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs): 1) orientation; 2) co-ordination; and 3) integration.
Focusing effects: missions focus different actors, programmes and activities on the same objectives, more or less following the same strategic agendas they have collectively developed. These focusing effects can result in:
greater legitimacy and higher visibility of the collective efforts
greater scale (including critical mass effect) and scope (broader coverage of the problem-solution space)
a higher level of engagement (due to risk sharing, mission inspiration and legitimacy, a more inclusive approach, etc.)
higher ambition (more ambitious goals associated with collective action).
Alignment effects: These effects correspond to the benefits drawn from the co-ordination of the plans of the different public and private actors across administrative mandates and (industry and service) sectors to reach the common objectives they have defined. This alignment allows reaping different system benefits:
reduction of unnecessary overlaps and duplications
budget scale effects
gathering of skills, strategic policy intelligence and information
a better connection between public and private actors, leading to a higher leverage effects and greater effectiveness of public action.
Integration effects: Missions allow the integration of different activities and policy interventions (in a broad sense, i.e. including supply and demand-side instruments, financial and technical support, and reforms) to pursue the common objectives. This integration brings different system benefits:
greater range and higher performance of solutions due to the combination of different components of a systems innovation (e.g. from charging infrastructure or the provision of green energy supply to the vehicle and the battery in the case of electric vehicles)
more effective and efficient public support relying on the exploitation of synergies between different instruments and the reduction of conflicts and overlaps
acceleration of solution development when the mission co-ordinates the policy interventions across the different stages of the innovation chain
more thorough scanning and testing of different potential options (co-ordinated exploration of the problem-solution space).
To date, very few MOIPs have been evaluated and they rely to a large extent on traditional evaluation frameworks which overlook the systemic effects in the implementation of missions. The directionality of missions is also most often neglected, as confirmed by Haddad, Wise and Arnold (2023[22]) when comparing three evaluations of Swedish programmes (including two featuring in the OECD Net Zero Mission Database: Challenge-Driven Innovation and strategic innovation programmes). The authors emphasise that the evaluation approach remains rather “neutral” and process-oriented and hardly accounts for the purposeful and goal-specific nature of missions. Several other MOIPs are approaching the evaluation stage and mission teams, academics and analysts in many organisations, including the OECD, are searching for new methods and processes to capture their added value. Yet, some evaluation questions and criteria speak to the systemic dimension of missions, and they already provide some interesting insights regarding the added value of this policy approach and challenges in its implementation.
Net zero mission cases
➤ Mission-driven Top Sectors and Innovation Policy, A carbon-free built environment by 2050’, in the Net Zero Mission Database. There has been no evaluation of the policy nor of any of its 25 missions yet, but a study was commissioned to an academic expert in 2020 by the lead ministry two years after the launch of the MOIP. The so-called ‘post-commencement analysis’ focused notably on the governance of the policy. It relied on interviews and desk review, and an in-depth mission case study (Janssen, 2020[13]).
➤ Pilot-E, Norway. Pilot E have been evaluated in 2020 – hence four years after its launch – by external consultants. It uses using a traditional STI programme evaluation method and framework but investigate some more specific issues such as the presence of system failures (define as ‘market failures that cannot be corrected by the underlying arrangements individually’), the need for a better coordination of measures across the innovation chain to support commercialisation and whether the initiative has led to larger and more ambitious that the underlying schemes from the three agencies. The evaluation was informed by desk review, interviews and an online survey of beneficiaries (Menon Economics, 2020).
➤ UKRI Challenge Funds, UK. The National Audit Office performed an audit of the Challenge Fund in 2021. This exercise is at the level of the MOIP initiative (Challenge Fund) not at the level of the missions (the 23 Challenges). The audit put the emphasis on the management of the initiative and did not address coordination issues. It examines the overarching question of whether it has been set up in a way likely to optimise value for money. It relied on interviews and desk review. The National Audit Office also organised ‘discovery and design’ sessions with UKRI and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy to build an early understanding of the challenges faced in implementing the initiative. This audit will be complemented by baseline, interim and final impact evaluation of each of the 23 challenges (NAO, 2020).
➤ SIP, Sweden. The 17 SIPs (missions) have been evaluated every three years according to a stage-gate approach. The six-year evaluation is the most recent and complete. It comprised several components undertaken by an external consultancy company: an individual evaluation of each SIP in its sixth year (by batches depending on their starting dates); Meta-evaluations of the evaluations undertaken in 2019, 2020 and 2021; A final meta-evaluation and policy learning review of the whole programme in 2023. All evaluations were informed by desk review and interviews, expert review of SIP activities, project portfolios, and sample project applications and a bibliometric analysis of the publications produced by the SIPs. The evaluation included a policy learning exercise using the transition conceptual framework. identified functions associated with creating Technological Innovation Systems plus a handful of other functions associated in the literature with transitions management and strategic niche management. It assessed the performance and potential of each SIP against a set of 15 functions associated with creating and transitioning Technological Innovation Systems. Although this was an exploratory and modest exercise, the consultants argue that it ‘allowed the strengths, weaknesses, and potential of the SIP instrument in connection with future missions-like policies to be explored in ways that would have been impossible without it’. They conclude that ‘it would have been useful to devote more effort to the systemic analysis’ (Technopolis, 2022; Arnold, 2022).
➤Horizon Europe missions, EU. A first assessment of the EU mission initiative and its five missions were performed in 2023 by external consultants and complemented by a European Commission self-assessment. The consultants performed interviews (around 13 per mission), an online survey and mission-specific policy workshops. The mission evaluation components were traditional: goal and objectives; selection process of each EU Mission; governance structures and functioning arrangements; progress towards the fulfilment of the objectives; and budget and funding arrangements. However, the underpinning assessment criteria took into account several key dimensions of missions: the presence of measurable goals; the relevance of the mission strategic agenda (the Implementation Plan); the added value compared to existing EU initiatives in the mission areas; the buy-in and support of several DGs (with concrete evidence of this support notably in terms of budget and alignment of policies); the articulation of different funds and programmes (European Commission, 2023[23]; 2021[24]). In its Communication ‘EU Missions two years on: assessment of progress and way forward’ (COM(2023) 457 final), the Commission concluded that “Experience with two years of implementation of five EU Missions has confirmed that the mission-based approach as an instrument of Horizon Europe incentivises the engagement of broad and enthusiastic communities of stakeholders. Through its ability to promote experimentation, coordination and scaling of deployment, the EU Mission instrument can play a pivotal role in necessary societal transitions across multiple domains.” It also states that “Nevertheless, experience has also shown that to fully deliver on its potential, the Mission instrument needs to address a few remaining challenges, notably regarding public awareness, governance and its ability to leverage other sources of funding, including private funding.”
A review of the five most valuable evaluations of MOIPs including net zero missions against the three types of effects presented above shows that missions did deliver some of their expected effects in terms of directionality, cross-sectoral scope and co‑ordination, and a broader portfolio of instruments and activities. Even more important at this early pilot stage of the MOIP approach where the formative dimension of evaluations is essential are the limitations identified and options for learning and improvement provided by these exercises (see Table 4.5 and Annex E). Overall, they clearly illustrate the potential benefits and difficulties of complementing well-established organisational and sectoral dynamics by a mission framework that enables the steering, co‑ordination and integration of activities across silos.
Source: Annex D
Most of these evaluation exercises were conducted after only two or three years of implementation and were not fully fledged evaluations (apart from the Pilot-E and SIP ones). They mostly served as exploratory studies and early assessments. These results should, therefore, be taken as food for thought rather than definitive judgements. More and more elaborated evaluation cases will need to be developed in the coming years.
Significant efforts are ongoing to design evaluation frameworks suited to capture missions’ specific design features and effects, led by academic and mission practitioners.9 Elzinga et al. (2023[25]), for instance, propose several mission evaluation steps, including an assessment of the mission’s contribution to a well-defined set of innovation system functions. These functions are drawn from earlier work on innovation systems and the transition literature.10
The OECD Mission Action Lab has developed a self-assessment framework based on the mission design principles framework (OECD, 2023[26]). This framework was applied in a pilot exercise conducted in Austria to support the co-ordination and implementation of EU missions in the country (Box 4.2).
In co-operation with Austrian authorities, the mission design principles framework has been further developed into a self-assessment tool and tested in the national context. Austria provides one of the most elaborated efforts not only to mobilise and co-ordinate the relevant community of actors around the five European Union (EU) missions, but also to make them national missions in their own right (see Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research, Austria (2022[27])). Besides the development and real-condition testing of the tool, this Mission Action Lab exercise aimed to provide Austrian actors involved in each mission with: a map to assess their current position – a self-assessment of their progress in the mission design and implementation “journey” using a framework developed specifically by the OECD to analyse missions; and a compass to show the way forward based on the identified gaps.
The tool consists of assessing the extent to which the different mission communities feel their mission complies with each design principle and what actions need to be taken to improve it in this particular dimension. For instance, the tool asks whether the mission is guided by clear and well-informed orientations, is legitimate, etc. A first step consisted in designing an assessment survey sent to the members of each of the five mission action groups and the “EU Missions Working Group” in charge of central support and monitoring. Each design principle is informed by a few questions. To better guide action, each question distinguished between the assessment (how the mission performs on the design principle?) and needs (what would need to be improved?) dimensions. The comparisons at design principles or building block level revealed marked profiles that were very effective to support informed discussions in subsequent workshops in each mission area (Figure 4.5). Discussions during these workshops focused on understanding the reasons for the contrasted results and building consensus on actions going forward in the concrete implementation of the mission. A final all-missions roundtable complemented the process. The conclusions of this self-assessment exercise were synthetised in a final report that included overarching and mission-specific recommendations.
Notes: EU: European Union. Share of survey respondents that agree or strongly agree with the following statements regarding the mission.
Source: OECD (2023[26]).
References
[20] Arnold, E. (2022), “How should we evaluate mission policies? Some lessons from theory and practice”, Mission Action Lab, Technopolis, unpublished.
[11] Arnold, E. et al. (2018), How Should We Evaluate Complex Programmes for Innovation and Socio-technical Transitions?, Technopolis.
[25] Elzinga, R. et al. (2023), “Assessing mission-specific innovation systems: Towards an analytical framework”, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, Vol. 48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2023.100745.
[23] European Commission (2023), EU Missions Two Years On: Assessment of Progress and Way Forward, COM(2023) 457 final, European Commission, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/api/files/COM(2023)457?ersIds=090166e5fee45eb1.
[24] European Commission (2021), Assessment Criteria for EU Missions, European Commission, Brussels, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-03/ec_rtd_assessment-criteria-missions.pdf.
[28] European Commission (2021), “Foresight in support of the EU missions”, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/foresight-support-eu-missions-2021-10-21_en (accessed on 8 October 2022).
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[22] Haddad, C., E. Wise and E. Arnold (2023), When Theory Meets Practice in Transformative Innovation Policy Evaluation: Experiences from Sweden, EU-SPRI 2023 Conference, 14-16 June, Brighton, United Kingdom.
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← 1. Many objectives in the Net Zero Mission Database are extracts or reconstructions based on this type of text available in official documents and on official websites.
← 2. See Annex C for a complete list of net zero mission targets.
← 3. For instance, the European Commission engaged in a multi-year foresight analysis in five mission areas to strengthen reflexivity in the policy preparation process of the EU mission (European Commission, 2021[28]).
← 4. Technological roadmapping is a normative tool that makes detailed projections about future technological developments and their socio-economic impacts. On the other hand, foresight is a “systemic” exercise that analyses the long-term impacts of STI developments to contribute to “better-informed policy decisions” (Pietrobelli and Puppato, 2016[30]).
← 5. Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology (Austria).
← 6. “Adaptation to Climate Change”: support at least 150 European regions and communities to become climate-resilient by 2030; “Cancer”: work with Europe’s “Beating Cancer Plan” to improve the lives of more than 3 million people by 2030 through prevention, cure and solutions to live longer and better; “Restore Our Ocean and Waters by 2030”; “100 Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities by 2030”; “A Soil Deal for Europe: 100 living labs and lighthouses to lead the transition towards healthy soils by 2030”.
← 7. See Larrue (2021) for an analysis of the different mission co-ordination structures.
← 9. For a review of some of the tools and framework development for mission evaluation see Wittmann, Yorulmaz and Hufnagl (2021[29]).
← 10. The so-called mission-specific innovation system functions are: programming functions (providing problem directionality, providing solution directionality, co-ordinating the transition), innovation performance functions (knowledge development and diffusion, etc.) and destabilisation performance functions (unlearning, market destabilisation, etc.).