This chapter draws implications of the study results in the form of three main policy traps missions should “escape” and lays out two scenarios for the future of missions. It then provides specific recommendations for mission practitioners, policy makers and their partners.
Mission‑Oriented Innovation Policies for Net Zero
How Can Countries Implement Missions to Achieve Climate Targets?
Abstract
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the additionality of mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) vis-à-vis more traditional science, technology and innovation (STI) governance and policy frameworks to help countries meet their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction pledges. Building on work conducted by the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy on MOIPs since 2019, the report uses a theory of action to assess missions’ systemic effects. For this purpose, the analysis mobilised a purpose-built database and in-depth case studies of net zero missions and identifies key strengths and weaknesses as well as possible future evolutions of net zero missions.
The analysis shows that most net zero missions produce many of the effects presented in their theory of action. In most cases, they represent a marked improvement over traditional STI policy mixes. They allow the collective development of common objectives and strategic agendas; broader co-ordination of policy plans across administrative, sectoral and disciplinary silos; and higher integration of various support instruments across the different stages of the innovation chain. The practices to achieve these results significantly vary among missions, as they adapt to the specificities of the challenge they tackle and to the national institutional setting in which they are embedded.
However, these achievements will not be sufficient to scale-up and deploy these innovations on a massive scale. At the still early stage of this policy approach, net zero missions remain too focused on technological innovation (the “STI trap”), fall short of having an actual influence on policy beside providing directionality (the “orientation trap”) and are not yet sufficiently leveraging resources apart from the public budget (the “policy trap”):
The STI trap: net zero missions remain led by STI authorities, relying almost exclusively on STI policy interventions and budgets. While sectoral policy and regulatory authorities have a hand in the mission structure of governance, and can share information – and to some extent, influence decisions – they have not yet contributed their own resources and programmes to the mission. To bring about the transformative changes needed to achieve net zero (as opposed to simply reducing overlaps and speeding up technological innovation), net zero missions will require investments of a far greater scale and scope, including by drawing upon the large transition or climate funds available in an increasing number of countries. They will also need to balance, align and accompany the mass deployment of these innovations with solutions to promote social and behavioural changes, which is prerequisite for reducing GHG emissions rapidly and significantly.
The orientation trap: most missions have been successful in setting legitimate and powerful objectives and targets, as well as a widely shared systemic strategic agenda to fulfil their objectives. However, the strategic agenda influence on collective decision making regarding budget allocation and policy implementation is less clear. Because of these difficulties, missions are generally less integrated at the implementation level than at the orientation and co-ordination levels. Several missions have co-constructed shared strategic agendas which are then implemented by the different partners, with only minimal common monitoring and exchange of information.
The policy trap:1 as argued in this report, missions are essentially an extra layer of orientation, co-ordination and – in the best case – integration on top of pre-existing interventions. The bulk of efforts appear in many of them directed at creating policy consistency on these three dimensions, which tend to make them confined to the public sector. However, their implementation will also depend on their ability to mobilise the private sector’s funding and capabilities, as investors, technology providers and users. For the most part, the private sector’s contribution to missions is made via the traditional co-funding of activities at the project level. To succeed in leveraging the level of necessary funds, missions will also need to innovate in the way they are funded, using, for instance, new forms of public-private partnerships, blended finance options and equity financing.
Using the well-known distinction between the first generation of missions focused on technological challenges (e.g., Apollo in the 1960s) and the second generation of missions addressing complex societal challenges, the net zero missions scrutinised in this report clearly belong to the second category. However, they fall short of having the design, notably in terms of ambition, scope and resources, that would enable them to be transformative. The second generation as it appears in this study is mostly populated by missions that have concentrated efforts on some shared agendas, accelerated changes and avoided costly overlaps. The results of this study support a call for a third generation of missions that address the three traps laid out above: they need to enlist public actors and policies beyond the STI realm, deliver and effect changes via joint implementation, and crowd in the missions with private actors’ resources and capabilities (Figure 6.1).
Note: MOIP: mission-oriented innovation policy; STI: science, technology and innovation.
The first major step concerns the overall design of the missions to overcome the important mismatch between their broad scope of objectives and the narrow policy mix for action. Building on initial STI authorities’ funding and stewardship, missions should secure commitments from sectoral funding and policies; this step involves setting clear, measurable and realistic targets and gathering a policy mix of interventions suited to realise these goals, using the mission strategic agenda or theory of change to identify the needed actions (Figure 6.2).
This joint implementation will require sectoral ministries and various public authorities in charge of scaling up and deployment (including ministries of industry, economy and finance) to factor research and innovation more prominently into their agendas. It will also demand that STI public authorities who championed the missions accept to share (and sometimes lose) the leadership of these missions.
In no way should these three observed limitations be considered an argument against this policy approach. The vast majority of missions have been launched recently (95% of net zero missions in the database have been created since 2018) and moved toward implementation at least a year later. The long and iterative work of persuasion and enlisting of new public and private actors beyond the initial “coalition of committed partners” has barely started. At this early stage, as argued in the growing literature on the evaluation of missions and other transformative policies, the results from studies and evaluations are to be used primarily for learning and driving improvements, not for accountability purposes. The mission traps are not a judgement against MOIPs, simply a “waypoint” in their policy trajectory which shows directions for change.
There are already some interesting examples of changes building upon the experience of recent years’ mission pilots. In Germany, the missions of the former High‑Tech Strategy 2025, which were criticised for their weak directionality and loose co‑ordination, will be followed by the “Future Research and Innovation Strategy”. This new strategy is meant to feature dedicated governance structures which would materialise the mission-specific goals, establish milestones and assess their achievement through continuous monitoring, as requested by the advisory High-Tech Forum prior to its dissolution. In Austria, the mission-oriented thematic programmes “Building of Tomorrow”, “Mobility of the Future” and “City of Tomorrow” are the basis upon which four national “Transformative missions” and significant efforts towards European Union missions develop. In Ireland, the Research Ireland’s Challenge Research programmes will benefit from the funding and institutional dynamics of the Irish Recovery and Resilience Plan, expanding and “deepening” their mission-oriented approach within the newly created “National Challenge Fund”. This is expected to be characterised by greater directionality to allow a more consistent and interrelated project portfolio. The Dutch Mission-driven and Top Sectors Policy are also entering a new cycle, following reform to render it more strategic and efficient.
This raises the fundamental question of where to anchor third-generation missions aiming to transform sociotechnical systems to achieve net zero in government structures. How far can MOIPs go in building on the leadership of STI authorities? Have the net zero missions led by STI authorities reached their “glass ceiling”? Should the “I” in MOIPs be dropped to switch from “innovation missions” to “transition missions”? Two scenarios for the future of missions can be distinguished: (i) a scenario of gradual improvement of missions, incrementally enlisting new actors, building trust, learning and attracting higher commitments from public authorities outside the STI realm and higher investments from private actors (Figure 6.3). (ii) A scenario of transfer of mission leadership, from STI actors towards sectoral ministries who ‘own’ the challenges, directly included in their mandate, and have essential intervention tools, resources and legal powers to address them (Figure 6.4).
Other options include central institutions or cross-ministerial platforms taking responsibility of the missions, based on their broader remit and stronger systemic responsibilities across the government structure, a dedicated agency linked to several ministries, a large public-private partnership/platform or an autonomous organisation with foundation status. These may call for institutional innovations. Novel options to steer, govern and possibly manage large systemic missions still need to be designed and experimented on different levels across government structures (Box 6.1).
The net zero mission “STI trap” raises questions of where missions aiming to transform sociotechnical systems to achieve net zero should be anchored in government structures. As a study of the German High-Tech strategy’s missions concluded: “governance structures need to reflect the considerable coordination requirements of the mission-oriented approach, especially in regard to cross-ministerial cooperation. This may imply to move mission responsibility to higher political levels or, alternatively, to delegate the responsibility for missions to one or several agencies” (Roth et al., 2022[1]).
Although this does not apply to all national institutional settings, positioning the mission-oriented innovation policy leadership “above ministries” seems relevant for transformative missions to raise their level of ambition and broaden their systemic scope beyond science, technology and innovation (STI) authorities. For instance, in the European Union “Soil” mission, programmes and stakeholders need to be mobilised far beyond the scope of STI, which raises the question of whether the Horizon Europe research and innovation framework programme is the best location to “host” such ambitious objectives. This option is also more compatible with integrated multiannual budgets originating from different sources (including centralised budgets and “common pots”) across policy fields. It is also important to strengthen high-level political buy-in and citizen ownership of ambitious net zero missions. A few countries with greater experience with this policy approach – such as Sweden, where missions lie within the research and innovation agencies – have tried to “elevate” missions to a higher and broader level of governance, although with mixed results. The French missions (the acceleration strategies), which are led by an autonomous agency attached to the Prime Minister’s Office, with strong support from the president and a dedicated budget covering a broad systemic portfolio of actions over different generations of sociotechnical solutions, offer a different model of institutionalised missions.
An OECD study to support the development of the Norwegian Long-term Plan for Higher Education and Research explored the different options for anchoring national missions, building upon the experience gained in agency-level missions such as Pilot-E (Larrue and Santos, 2022[2]). The options envisaged and debated in the report included: a centre-of-government body, for instance the Prime Minister’s Office or the Cabinet Office, attached to a high-level committee (like the Moonshot Program in Japan, led by the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation, headed by the prime minister and supported by a powerful Cabinet Office); the research ministry (Ministry of Education) with a stronger co‑ordination role, as is the case in Korea, where the powerful Innovation Office within the Ministry of Science and ICT is tasked with STI co-ordination and budgetary negotiations across the government; the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, since this ministry controls many of the policy and regulatory instruments key to achieving a large net zero mission; a large mission-oriented cross-ministerial programme, directly supervised by ministries in a dedicated governance body; a dedicated “mission” agency or a virtual cross-agency platform with some dedicated management and governance bodies that would rely on the staff from the different participating agencies; some large public-private partnerships/consortia to lead and manage some industry-led missions, possibly drawing on existing industry collaborative platforms (the “21 platforms”).
6.4.1. Make deployment actors, interventions and mechanisms integral to the mission
The issue
This study has provided evidence of the many challenges missions face to enlist actors and raise commitments beyond STI authorities and funding. This “glass ceiling” of missions hinders the missions’ ability to realise their objectives, which in all cases requires much more than R&D. While most missions include market and use considerations more prominently in research and innovation than is the case with traditional STI policies, missions are often too loosely connected to the large pockets of money available for sustainability transitions, for instance in national transition or climate funds. Only a few examples of missions encompass in their scope of co-ordination and sphere of influence the policy instruments and incentives that support scale-up and deployment. This is the case of some of the French acceleration strategies as part of the France 2030 national plan and some US Earthshots that are formally connected to the fund available via the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. As a result, missions are well‑equipped to develop knowledge and innovations that could realise their objectives but lack the interventions to support them in “shaping markets” and going the critical “last mile” of the innovation process.
Possible ways forward
Enabling missions requires engaging the public authorities whose actions are necessary for the diffusion and deployment of new solutions. These include notably the ministries of industry, economy and finance as well as the sectoral ministries in charge of, for instance, energy, environment, transport or health, depending on the competencies under their portfolio. The role of regulatory authorities can also be determinant in setting the adequate framework conditions. Finally, local authorities are also important, be it for setting the environment for demonstrating and testing new solutions, raising public awareness and acceptance, or as first buyers.
Some actions to help missions exit the STI trap are:
Involve the public authorities necessary for the scale-up and deployment of the new solutions from the outset as key partners.
Embed in the missions or formally connect the mission to the support mechanisms and incentives for scaling up and deployment.
Provide missions with high-level political backup and anchor them as key implementation tools in the national agenda and governance framework, such as the net zero agenda and other national whole-of-government transition strategies and plans.
6.4.2. Connect the missions to the broader and higher level national strategic and governance frameworks that are relevant in their challenge area
The issue
In many countries there is a disconnect between MOIP initiatives and the broader national strategic and governance frameworks relevant to their challenge areas. For instance, net zero missions often focus heavily on research and innovation, while national frameworks (sometimes funded through large “transition funds”) prioritise the deployment of existing solutions to achieve short- and medium-term impacts. This disconnect can hinder co-ordinated efforts to scale-up solutions over time and prevent the full exploitation of synergies across different generations of solutions.
Possible ways forward
To bridge this gap, missions should be better integrated – and when possible embedded – into the national strategic and governance frameworks with the support of high-level political authorities, including central governments and treasuries. Some countries that have legislated their net zero targets have already established dedicated governance structures to oversee progress, co-ordinate actions and advise on national strategy in a holistic manner. These frameworks should more explicitly recognise the crucial contributions of relevant missions to ensure mutual benefits and enhance overall coherence. Missions can provide valuable insights on the progress of different approaches, which can inform broader national strategies. At the same time, national priorities should be reflected in the strategic agendas of missions to align them with overarching goals and tap into funding opportunities, particularly in the later stages of development and deployment.
6.5.1. Ensure that missions are supported by strong and well-resourced dedicated teams both at the level of the MOIP initiative and individual missions
The issue
Designing, governing, implementing and learning from missions require specific skills, mindsets, tools and processes that differ in many respects from those found in many public and private organisations. This calls for a dedicated team to manage and accompany this process of change and generate and accumulate some of the needed resources. Several of the cases studied in this report have such team, office or secretariat both at the MOIP level (especially the multi-mission MOIPs) or at the individual mission level (especially the large systemic ones). However, this is not yet systematically the case; these offices might be under-resourced (no dedicated full-time staff) and lack power (to counterbalance the “vertical/thematic/departmental” logics); or the type of skills needed is not yet clearly established, hence the difficulty to appoint the right people.
The various partners, who are most often also involved in other initiatives, cannot be left alone to lead.
Possible ways forward
The missions should be supported by strong, legitimate and well-resourced teams both at the level of the MOIP initiative (a “central secretariat”) and individual mission level (a “mission secretariat”). The tasks these teams should accomplish are manifold:
support mission design, co-ordination and implementation
formalisation and institutionalisation of the mission processes, across missions and over time
develop methodological and management guidelines and tools
support learning and all reflexive activities, including monitoring and evaluation
train mission partners, explain and promote the mission approach
perform proactive and hands-on portfolio management
execute the dedicated mission funding (strategic direction activities)
build and maintain linkages to higher level strategic and governance frameworks.
6.5.2. Mission partners should explore and test new modes of implementation to strategically steer, manage and monitor ambitious systemic missions
The issue
Dealing proactively with systemic missions – especially large ones – proves beyond the capacity of any organisation regardless of the resources and capabilities of the support teams. As a result, missions might end up being either too broad but under a loose co‑ordination umbrella where activities are managed at an arm’s length or narrowly focused technological missions. In either case, the expected systemic effects – which are the essence of missions – will be limited.
Possible ways forward
New modes of implementation relying on effective partnerships can be instrumental in proactively managing large systemic missions. A mission portfolio can be divided into a consistent group of activities (e.g. thematic or local sub-portfolio) managed by platforms or other types of decentralised support structures. These platforms can manage their respective set of activities, promoting the expected synergies within their portfolio and ensuring their consistency with and contribution to the overall mission. This type of relay structure helps combine flexibility and integration.
6.5.3. Missions should be granted enhanced flexibility to take decisions, fund activities and take actions as needed to realise their objectives
The issue
Although most missions are pilots in practice, their experimental status is not formally acknowledged. They are therefore not granted any specific conditions to operate. In the vast majority of cases, missions operate in unchanged framework conditions and mobilise existing funding instruments. The specific modes of co-ordination and implementation that govern the mission build upon and must comply with the established administrative rules and mechanisms that frame traditional STI policies. These conditions have been designed to provide the best environment for interventions that are neutral (non-directional or simply thematic) and fragmented. However, they are quite remote from what is needed for missions to co-construct objectives and strategic agendas, set the collective decision-making rules and processes for the needed policy coherence, and jointly implement and monitor a diverse mix of interventions to realise the common objectives.
Possible ways forward
Missions need strategic flexibility to operate as required to realise their strategic agenda. This should apply notably to the way they allocate funding. New options must be developed and tested as alternatives to the sole recourse to competitive-based instruments such as calls for proposals managed at arm’s length. These are not adapted to the directionality of missions, which can require direct intervention and longer term partnership between the funder and some public or private organisations with specific capabilities, resources or infrastructure (or able to develop them). Flexibility is also needed with regards to the funding time frame (multiannual needed), size (for larger, multi-partner projects) and scope (combined funding of different activities, beyond R&D), administrative rules (allowing risk-taking and, hence, failure) and reporting obligations (based on trust and less static, permitting changes of direction). These selected features are at the core of the mission approach, yet traditional support schemes fall short of offering them. In certain cases, creating these conditions will require creating new instruments rather than mere adjustments to existing ones. Yet only a few missions have led to the creation of new instruments. One example is the case of the Dutch Mission-Driven and Top Sector Policy, which led to the creation of a specific funding instrument (MOOI, for mission-oriented research, development and innovation), which encourages multidisciplinary consortia to create proposals that combine various technological and non-technological sub-solutions (rather than focusing on individual technologies as is usually the case), including also activities concerning the commercialisation and societal acceptance of the projects (Janssen, 2020[3]).
6.5.4. Establish dedicated multiannual funding for missions to strategically support them from design to implementation and evaluation
The issue
The analysis of many MOIP initiatives has revealed that numerous missions lack dedicated public funding and rely almost entirely on funds committed by each participating public authority, sometimes on an annual basis. This reliance makes any common mission activity contingent on the agreement and goodwill of these partners, leading to uncertainties, rigidities and increased bureaucratic burden, including for those performing research and innovation. Additionally, decentralised funding of the mission diminishes the mission teams’ or offices’ legitimacy and power. Most importantly, it increases the fragmentation of the portfolio, hence reducing the possibility of reaping the systemic effects of the mission (for instance, preventing management at the level of the entire portfolio). Several mission managers have reported difficulties overcoming the vertical forces within departments and organisations that drive partners’ decisions. Even committed partners tend to prioritise their own organisation’s incentives, mandates and decision-making mechanisms, which may not always align with the mission’s common goals.
Possible ways forward
In addition to the resources committed by mission partners, a central, multiannual funding stream specifically attached to the mission is crucial. Such funding can incentivise partners to allocate resources to specific mission activities, help persuade internal stakeholders (not least the hierarchy of the persons directly involved in the mission) and attract additional resources, including co-funding.
These mission funds are also important to fill potential portfolio gaps and directly fund some strategic activities in the portfolio that are beyond (or in between) the partners’ areas of interest. This implies that the mission funds should not only cover the operational costs of a mission team but also allow direct intervention and support of external activities (e.g. commissioning specific research and studies; issuing a call for proposals). Finally, dedicated mission funding is critical to allow reflexive activities and enable learning and improvement.
Design and experiment new innovative funding mechanisms to increase private engagement in and commitment to the missions
The issue
The analysis conducted for this report has shown that very few innovative financial models and funding instruments have been used in net zero missions and that, in most cases, private funding is raised via classic project cost-sharing rules. As missions progress and their focus moves toward deployment and scale-up, crowding in investment from outside of government and securing private sector engagement will become increasingly important. This evolution requires more buy-in from the private sector, since reaching many mission goals requires companies to adopt the MOIP-generated solutions or change their behaviours.
Possible ways forward
New funding models should be experimented with, such as different types of public-private partnerships, blended finance options and equity financing for “mission corporation”. Given the wide scope of many missions, specific funding agreements could be secured directly with the relevant sectors. This has been done notably in the context of the Dutch Mission-Driven and Top Sector Policy. The Knowledge and Innovation Covenant in the health and care area described precisely the financial commitments of all health and care public and private partners to the five missions in this area and the expected deliverables in return, as specified in the mission-specific agenda.2 In the United Kingdom, the Sector Deals set the financial commitment of the different missions related to specific Industrial Strategy Challenge Funds. For instance, the Aerospace Sector Deal passed in 2019 included a commitment of the government and the sector to provide up to GBP 125 million each to support R&D conducted in the Future Flight Challenge Fund.3 This agreement included several other mutual commitments (including, for instance, on gender issues) and was managed and reviewed by an Aerospace Growth Partnership which met twice a year.
6.5.5. Mission partners should invest in the development of the needed capabilities, tools and methods for the proactive management of the portfolio of mission activities
The issue
Investigations of missions have shown that most missions barely undertake portfolio management. They either manage individual projects and activities selected using the sole traditional criteria of relevance and effectiveness or use static portfolio management practices, involving (ex post) tagging and mapping of existing relevant activities. This prevents them from reaping the benefits of mission systemic effects. The reasons for this situation are manifold:
mission portfolio management requires acquiring a different set of skills than those present in many research and innovation agencies which have for decades placed the priority on the efficient disbursement of funds
mission portfolio management also demands more human resources, dedicating more time to support the various teams
most agencies’ structures, rules and support instruments have been fine-tuned to manage on a project basis with limited consideration for the overall portfolio.
Notably, a number of missions still rely uniquely on competitive calls for proposal for designing their portfolio. While the mission’s strategic agenda might be used to develop the terms of reference of the call for proposals, this approach is not sufficient to steer applicants in the direction needed to realise the mission. The portfolio design involves a number of iterative interactions to align what is “needed and feasible” and a certain power of the mission manager to push in certain directions that may be less desirable by applicants (notably in the case of more uncertain and risky activities, different from the existing portfolio, which is precisely what the mission might require).
Possible ways forward
Organisations involved in missions, notably agencies, should progressively implement (ex ante) proactive mission portfolio management practices to drive key decisions concerning what activities to select, initiate, mobilise, fund, reorient, monitor or terminate in relation to the objectives of the mission (and the associated mission strategic agenda, theory of change, impact pathway or roadmap). Another key dimension of proactive mission portfolio management consists of promoting interlinkages and exchanges between the different complementary projects and activities within the portfolio. These organisations must therefore engage in significant reforms involving:
The acquisition of new skills. The portfolio managers must be more proactive, outcome-focused and strategic, with deep and broad knowledge of their thematic areas.
Additional resources dedicated to developing new tools (including portfolio visualisation software)
A change in the funding rules, including, for instance, the development of new criteria for selecting activities, accounting for the portfolio consistency fit of any project).
Change of instruments (or addition of new ones) to increase the strategic flexibility of mission managers, for instance providing them with the possibility of direct funding and commissioning of certain activities, and more interactions with potential applicants ahead of and during calls for proposals.
For a more detailed discussion and recommendations on mission portfolio management, see OECD (2024 MPM).
6.5.6. Develop new methods and processes for monitoring and evaluating missions based on a clear theory of action and a developmental approach
The issue
The few monitoring and evaluation activities around missions have been carried out using traditional approaches. MOIPs have several features that make these traditional approaches unfit for evaluating them. First, missions are systemic initiatives. While the need for a systemic approach to public policy evaluation is well acknowledged (OECD, 2022), established methodologies and practices fall short of capturing the comprehensive benefits these missions are expected to offer at system level, which stem from integrating diverse knowledge, skills, interventions and funding streams across sectors. Capturing these “systemic effects”, which is critical for doing justice to missions at a critical moment of the life cycle of this policy approach, requires the development of new processes, methodologies and tools (Wise et al., 2022). The most promising initiatives in this respect can be found in academic work, but these remain rather conceptual and have not yet been applied in real evaluation cases. Second, missions are evolving entities, with unclear and evolving boundaries. They typically start with broad goals that are gradually refined through negotiations, increasing trust among partners and the involvement of new stakeholders. This ongoing evolution makes evaluation challenging, as both the objectives and structure of the mission change over time. Evaluators need to assess not only the outcomes but also the mission’s evolution in terms of design, governance and implementation processes.
Possible ways forward
This requires a developmental evaluation approach that tracks alignment with the mission’s purpose, emphasising adaptation and learning among policy makers and partners. The specificity of missions involves a developmental approach which is adapted for the evaluation of complex and dynamic systems. In such approaches, evaluators do not operate at arm’s length from the mission they evaluate but instead act alongside the missions and provide tools for supporting their effective design and implementation, in particular during the pilot stage. They are engaged (“embedded”) in the intervention to be evaluated on a more continuous and longer term basis, participating through continuous interactions with the mission partners in the collection of data, framing of issues, testing of options and provision of feedback for the mission design and implementation. An important part of their assessment should be the extent to which and how the mission becomes a “real” mission as it deploys its activities and learns (i.e. the process by which the “mission-readiness level” increases). The evaluation should, therefore, consider not only the effects of the mission but also how it evolves in terms of design, governance and processes (objective-setting, funding, portfolio management, etc.); and whether these observed evolutions are relevant to what was expected and motivated the adoption of a mission approach, as well as the reasons for any observed gap. As missions progress, summative evaluations can be added to measure progress toward final goals.
A crucial tool for such developmental evaluation is the “mission theory of action”. This tool is specifically developed to track the specific mission processes and the systemic effects they are expected to generate to tackle a specific challenge. It describes how the mission is designed and set up to achieve the mission. It maps the chains of causality that connect the way missions are designed and governed to the impact they are expected to produce. Rather than only focusing on the substantive dimension of missions (is the mission being realised and the selected challenge solved?), mission theories of action track the key processes that lie at the heart of the MOIP approach and allow assessing whether they unfold as expected and produce their “systemic effects” (i.e. is the adopted approach effective to tackle the selected challenge?). For a more detailed discussion of mission monitoring and evaluation and more detailed recommendations see OECD (2024 M&E).
Overall, there is a need to better recognise the current pilot nature of missions and their need for reflexive learning. This implies increased efforts in the mapping and sharing of good practices and challenges, supported by conceptual and action-research tools (such as the mission theory of action). This involves the mission partners working closely with researchers to develop new methods and tools.4 This reflects more generally the new type of iterative and continuous linkages needed between policy makers and knowledge providers involved in transformative innovation policies, including missions (EuSPRI, 2024[4]).
6.6.1. Mission partners should dedicate significant time and effort to the earlier stage of the mission, notably the preparation stage
The issue
Missions are often rushed through to be launched as soon as possible, in a context of urgency and under high political and administrative pressure due to their visibility, sensitivity and the importance of the challenges they are tackling. The difficulty of, and therefore the time needed for, setting a mission in institutional and organisations’ conditions often ill-suited for this policy approach is underestimated, resulting hence in a lack of time as well as human and financial resources during that period. However, this period is certainly the most crucial for the success of the mission. Experience clearly shows that the design stage is essential and requires time, notably to build consensus, convince, build trust, consult stakeholders, explore options (including ones that are not obvious) and substantiate them with robust strategic policy intelligence (including foresight if needed), set the governance structure, and secure partners’ early commitments.
Possible ways forward
It is essential to institutionalise the mission preparatory stage and dedicate the necessary time and resources to perform a number of essential tasks:
make explicit and align the respective expectations and strategies of the committed partners around a common challenge
scan the existing environment and rally new actors with necessary complementary assets (policy interventions, authority and mandate, skills) around this challenge
engage in problem framing and, if possible at this stage, develop a mission statement or objectives that reflect the most ambitious commitments possible, in consultation with a wide array of experts and stakeholders
partners should design the mission (scope, governance, funding mechanisms, division of leadership and labour, etc.) in direct relation to the challenge at stake.
These co-design activities require building a certain level of trust between the partners, which cannot be hastened.
Investing the necessary time and resources in the preparation of these initiatives is particularly difficult. These are not yet missions at this stage and remain in “stealth mode”. Furthermore, there are only few committed partners enrolled at this early stage to commit resources. A possible solution is to institutionalise the process for the definition, selection and final endorsement of missions, using a stage-gate approach for a gradual and increased investment as the soon-to-be mission passes pre-defined “mission-readiness milestones” and progresses through the steps. Such a process can be designed as part of an existing MOIP initiative to launch new missions as is the case for CSIRO missions. Outside an existing initiative, like in Norway, this process can be commissioned by a high-level political or policy authority to a mandated group (Box 6.2).
An organisation like Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has formalised a co‑design process prior to officially launching a mission. This process can take one to two years depending on the level of complexity and consensus around a particular challenge. It involves several steps, including at the core a “Sprint process” that involves problem exploration, system mapping, early stakeholder engagement to inform preliminary problem framing, direct interactions for iterative problem reframing and focusing, identifying and defining projects addressing key areas and, finally, the development of a roadmap including implementation pathways. The resulting mission proposal is submitted to CSIRO’s top decision makers.
Norway has appointed a cross-sectoral “operational group” to develop each of the two national missions announced in the Long-term Plan for Research and Higher Education 2023-2032 endorsed by parliament in February 2023. Both groups had a mandate with a clear calendar. For instance, the operational group in charge of preparing the mission on the social inclusion of children and young people was composed of representatives of nine organisations (mainly agencies) which had to work against the following ten-month timeline during the so-called “design phase”:
June 2023: Propose a plan to increase the involvement, mobilisation and sense of ownership of all relevant sectors and actors (including children and young people) to concretise the mission and increase commitment and legitimacy. Consult with all relevant stakeholders (via various meetings and through an online portal). Co-ordinate this process with the concurrent development of a related higher level strategic document (“white paper”) on social welfare policy by an interdepartmental group of ministries.
November 2023: Perform a stocktaking of knowledge and experiences relevant to the mission and identify knowledge gaps. Map the set of existing programmes and instruments that are relevant to the mission, outline a possible process for combining these in new ways to achieve the mission’s goals and lay out the budgetary implications.
February 2024: Propose time-bound goals, sub-goals and scoping of the mission; propose the design, governance and modes of implementation of the mission after the design phase.
The final proposal was approved by the government in March 2024.
Source: CSIRO (2023[5]).
6.6.2. Establish formal and flexible linkages between missions and relevant upstream research programmes to ensure that the mission is aware of and open to relevant new scientific advances and breakthrough innovations
The issue
Due to their directional character, in public debates missions are still too often seen as opposed to and competing with upstream (“free”, “investigator-led”) research. The focus is, therefore, too often on striking the right balance between both rather than on establishing linkages to maximise their complementarities.
Possible ways forward
While missions are geared towards innovation and deployment, linkages with upstream research activities (including in social sciences and humanities) are essential to generate and explore novel solutions, unravel longer term issues and opportunities that had not been factored into the strategic agendas, and conduct advanced measurements and metrology services. Smart and agile connections should be established between upstream research and missions. To preserve their exploratory character, relevant upstream research activities can be managed at arm’s length in sub-programmes embedded within the mission. The US Earthshots™, for instance, include Energy Earthshot research centers to develop solutions for the scientific challenges faced by Department of Energy’s Energy Earthshots™ and are expected to become “centres of innovation” serving them. Earthshots are also supported by small research teams focused on use-inspired fundamental research addressing knowledge gaps that are limiting their achievement. Another model consists in operating upstream research outside the mission but connected to it via “smart gateways”. For instance, most French France 2030 Acceleration Strategies are supported by dedicated priority research programmes and equipment (PEPRs). While these programmes have their own agenda and funding, they are formally linked to the Stratégies d’Accélération (SA) they support by an interface enabling mutual benefits from both the PEPR and the SA (see Section 5.1.3).
6.6.3. Make the missions more outcome-focused to combine high levels of ambition, effectiveness and efficiency
The issue
Missions have been criticised for being too top-down and directive which would stifle the creativity and entrepreneurial spirit necessary for innovation. However, the analysis of missions demonstrates that most missions are still largely bottom-up. Their objectives are often broad; their target, if any, non-measurable; and their strategic agenda and roadmap remain indicative and are not systematically used to monitor the progress of their portfolio of activities. Starting with broad mission areas and developing strategic agendas that try to satisfy all demands from national and sectoral groups of interest in a bottom-up way has led to missions appearing to some key actors as overly complex, broad and intangible. The lack of directionality also significantly limits the systemic effects expected from missions and increases co-ordination costs. It is one of the main challenges in defining the mission goals and targets to set the appropriate levels of directionality (how precise, directive should the goals be?) and ambition (how high should the goals be relative to the current state of the art?).
Possible ways forward
The missions should be focused, targeted towards a limited set of concrete objectives with clear targets and timelines, including intermediate milestones. While missions should be broad enough to enable system change (not just single technological innovations), they cannot be “the tool for everything”. They should remain strategically focused and not try to encompass all potential issues in a broad area. Also, missions are expected to make the transition actionable but are not an open-ended transition policy. They should be bounded in time and scope. It is essential to re-establish missions as an instrument with systemic and ambitious goals but on a forcibly limited and realistic scope. Importantly, it should be made clear that this does not imply a reduction in the societal ambitions of the missions, which calls for an important role for public authorities to ensure that a high level of transformative ambition is preserved despite possible attempts of “mission capture” by incumbents. Public authorities are also instrumental in setting an appropriate process composed of different stages of top-down and bottom-up inputs to the agenda setting.
Enhancing the pragmatism of missions also involves being able to secure quick wins while still aiming for the longer term and more comprehensive realisation of the final objectives. This is important to maintain momentum and rally new partners.
Finally, designing pragmatic, actionable missions requires balancing the expected costs and benefits of missions. While broad co-ordination along several dimensions (for instance, sectors and missions) can produce different types of systemic effects, it can also rapidly translate into significant transaction costs, complexity, rigidity and, hence, “mission fatigue”. The broadest and strongest form of co-ordination is not adequate for all missions. Based on a shared understanding of the costs and benefits of each mission (in its particular national and challenge contexts), partners should fine-tune the different types and intensities of co-ordination. The use of a mission theory of action during the preparatory stage can prove instrumental to form this shared understanding.
Mission-oriented policy has gained interest in recent years, and there has been a lot of learning about its implementation in the last five years. However, there is still much to be understood to take net zero missions to the next level and overcome the three traps that have been identified. OECD work on mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs), along with a detailed review of the literature on missions, has highlighted several areas where knowledge gaps exist:
How to make missions truly systemic and expand beyond the realm of science, technology and innovation (STI) actors, policies and funding? This issue encompasses questions such as where to anchor missions in national innovation systems, what kind of incentives could promote such joint endeavours involving STI and sectoral public authorities, and what should be the supporting mechanisms and processes (not least budgetary ones). This question is closely related to the key issue of the mission scope: while it is clear that a broad cross-sectoral collaborative approach is critical to achieve net zero, little is known about what the boundaries of net zero missions should be. The fundamental and somewhat provocative question raised by the STI trap is whether the “I” in MOIPs should, in some cases, be dropped and become “mission-oriented policy for the transition”, irrespective of the innovation content. This is, to a large extent, a political question, but more research on mission dynamics and limitations is needed to inform this debate.
How to practically integrate various interventions in a mission? It is essential to provide the pragmatic tools to make different interventions work synergistically while preserving the specificities that make them effective in performing their respective functions. This entails notably improving portfolio management and developing specific tools (including visualisation tools, collective design tools, etc.) and systems (including IT budgetary and reporting systems).
How to monitor and evaluate the specific costs and effects of missions? As revealed by the review of existing mission evaluations, methods and processes for assessing these systemic policies are only emerging and there is still a lot of work ahead to further develop, test and harmonise them.
What changes in the public sector governance and capabilities do MOIPs require to be successful and can these changes be promoted? The MOIP approach challenges public sector structures (e.g. governance, roles and responsibilities of different organisations), processes (e.g. budgetary, human resource management), skills (e.g. for portfolio project management) and mindsets (e.g. system thinking, impact-led, future orientation). Many organisations have engaged in this policy approach without having made any internal reforms, which limits the transformative potential of missions. Besides structure, skills can also be a significant limiting factor. It is currently not clear which skills are needed to operate missions, notably in the dedicated mission support teams/offices (at MOIP initiative and mission levels) and among mission partners. Some bodies of knowledge and practice seem relevant to mission practices, for instance on outcome-based management or system thinking, but there is still no integrated curricula to rely upon. This has yet to be developed and put into action in specific training modules.
What should the linkages be between net zero missions and the broad and high-level national governance and policy framework for net zero? Net zero missions cannot be all-encompassing and in most cases are focused on particular sources of emissions (agriculture, transport, etc.), technological domains (hydrogen; carbon capture, utilisation and storage) or geographical areas (e.g. cities). There is, therefore, a need to co‑ordinate these missions among themselves and with all other activities relevant to achieving each country’s net zero commitment. Several countries – in particular those which have translated their net zero targets into law – have set up a dedicated governance structure to lead the progress reporting and review processes and co-ordinate and/or advise on actions on a national and holistic level. A better understanding of how these frameworks operate and how they provide and use information from and for the net zero missions (especially the broad systemic ones) would be instrumental to understand the nested structure of systemic approaches contributing in a consistent way to the achievement of net zero objectives.
References
[5] CSIRO (2023), “Mandate for operational group”, web page, https://www.forskningsradet.no/forskningspolitikk-strategi/ltp/ungt-utanforskap/mandat-operativ-gruppe.
[4] EuSPRI (2024), Towards New Types of Linkages Between Science Policy Researchers, Stakeholders and Policymakers, European Forum for Studies of Policies for Research and Innovation, https://euspri-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SAB-Note-January-2024.pdf.
[3] Janssen, M. (2020), Post-commencement Analysis of the Dutch ’Mission-oriented Topsector and Innovation Policy’ Strategy, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands, https://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/Post-commencement%20analysis%20of%20the%20Dutch%20Mission-oriented%20Topsector%20and%20Innovation%20Policy.pdf.
[2] Larrue, P. and R. Santos (2022), “Towards a new stage in Norway’s science, technology and innovation system: Improving the long-term plan for research and higher education”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 133, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ce07b7c3-en.
[1] Roth, F. et al. (2022), “Putting mission-oriented innovation policies to work: A case study of the German High-Tech Strategy 2025”, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Papers Innovation Systems and Policy Analysis, No. 75, https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/isi/dokumente/cci/innovation-systems-policy-analysis/2022/discussionpaper_75_2022.pdf.
← 1. The argument of the missions’ “policy trap” was first proposed by Matthias Weber (Head of Center for Innovation Systems & Policy at the Austrian Institute of Technology) at the first meeting of the European Mission Forum (EMIN) on 25 January 2023. EMIN was created as part of the EU‑funded TRAnsnational cooperation on the MIssions approach project (see: https://www.trami5missions.eu).
← 2. The Convenant 2023-2023 is available at: www.health-holland.com/sites/default/files/downloads/kennis-en-innovatieconvenant-2020-2023-gezondheid-en-zorg.pdf.
← 3. The Aerospace Sector Deal is available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c10e9a040f0b60c8d6019b0/aerospace-sector-deal-web.pdf.
← 4. This is already happening in several mission initiatives. Vinnova is working with the University College London’s Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, the Transformative Innovation Policy Consortium, and the OECD Mission Action Lab. The Austrian EU missions have developed a mission monitoring demonstrator with the OECD Mission Action Lab; the German High-Tech Strategy 2025 with the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation; and the Mission-Driven and Top Sectors Policy with Utrecht University’s Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development.