Mexico has achieved a high degree of decentralisation in public services, but the Mexican fiscal federal system has important shortcomings. States and municipalities have become heavily dependent on federal transfers to finance a growing share of public spending. This leaves the burden of raising tax revenues falling almost exclusively on the federal government and reduces incentives for efficient spending and active tax collection at the subnational level. It can also lead to moral hazard and fiscal slippages. The federal government should harden the budget constraint on sub-national governments by limiting further increases in transfers and avoiding extraordinary transfers. Promoting the implementation of stronger fiscal rules, such as rules on deficits and debt ceilings, could also help to harden budget constraints and to ensure greater fiscal discipline. States should be given more taxing powers, if they are to collect a larger share of total revenues. Greater accountability and clarification of spending responsibilities could also contribute to improve the efficiency of spending among states and municipalities.
Improving Fiscal Federal Relations for a Stronger Mexico
Working paper
Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Abstract
In the same series
-
10 November 202675 Pages
-
23 October 202623 Pages
-
30 September 202651 Pages
-
30 September 202663 Pages
-
Working paper
The macroeconomic cost of climate change
4 September 202689 Pages -
17 July 202645 Pages
-
Working paper
Evidence from Costa Rica’s electronics sector
17 July 202635 Pages -
Working paper
Calibrating stochastic debt sustainability analysis models
15 July 202640 Pages
Related publications
-
19 October 2026 -
Working paper
Comparing available options and estimating trends for three OECD case study countries
20 July 202679 Pages