Government at a Glance 2025

Chapter 1. Governing for the green transition

Government at a Glance 2025 looks at how governments are addressing the climate crisis and working to limit the impacts of climate change. It analyses the governance arrangements that public institutions can adopt to ensure that government actions to mitigate or adapt to climate change are as effective as possible. It does so by presenting the latest available OECD evidence on the extent and quality of public governance arrangements in place.

Climate change caused by emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) poses an immediate and escalating threat to our societies. Global temperatures are already increasing due to emissions caused by human activity. Global surface temperatures were 1.09°C higher in 2011–2020 than in 1850-1900 and have increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (IPCC, 2023[1]). Food and water security have decreased in some regions and occurrences of food-, water- and vector-borne diseases have increased, as have extreme heat events (ibid.). The frequency of climate- and weather-related disasters, such as droughts, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, and typhoons, nearly quadrupled from the 1970s to the 2010s. Hydrological disasters such as floods have become 6 times more frequent (FAO, 2021[2]).

Progress is being made in efforts to mitigate climate change and reduce emissions. While emissions remain at a record high, their growth is now being substantially reduced by the deployment of green technology, including in energy production (IEA, 2023[3]). CO2 emissions per capita from energy have been falling in OECD countries since 2005 (OECD, 2023[4]). Many mitigation options are now both technically viable and increasingly cost-effective, including solar and wind energy, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand-side management, improved forest and crop/grassland management, and reduced food waste (IPCC, 2023[1]). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that adopting sustainable consumption practices and technologies could reduce emissions by up to 70% by 2050 (Creutzig et al., 2023[5]).

Despite this progress, the risk of objectively falling short of climate goals remains high. Emissions are unlikely to fall enough to limit global warming to the target of 1.5C (UNEP, 2023[6]). In the near term (2021–2040), global warming will continue to increase, mainly due to increased cumulative GHGs emissions. Moreover, the effects of climate change may not proceed linearly with the level of warming (IPCC, 2023[1]). Many irreversible “tipping points”, such as the loss of ice sheets, glaciers or coral reefs, may be crossed with a higher probability and at much lower levels of warming than previously assumed (OECD, 2022[7]). The path of emissions reductions matters substantially: reducing emissions as soon and as fast as possible gives a better likelihood of reducing irreversible damages.

To bridge the remaining large gaps as soon as possible, governments can increase their leverage to shape global climate outcomes through more effective regulation, taxation as well as spending, and also by leading by example in the way administrations function. A wide array of policy measures, regulatory tools, and public finance instruments are critically important for the collective effort needed to significantly curb emissions. Their role has gained increased attention across the OECD and governments have made progress in integrating climate action into their institutional, regulatory and financial frameworks. The adoption of policies to reduce emissions, and the stringency of these policies, increased steadily across the OECD between 2000-2020 (Nachtigall et al., 2022[8]). Most OECD countries have adopted net zero emissions strategies and more than half have initiated efforts to green their public administrations. As explored below, climate objectives are increasingly embedded at the highest levels of governance. According to the latest available data, 14 of 27 centres of government in OECD member and partner countries co-ordinate climate policy and 13 of 27 monitor climate and environmental policies. Green public finance tools are also gaining traction, with 24 of 36 OECD countries (66%) having introduced at least one green budgeting tool, such as green budget tagging. A significant majority, 35 of 38 OECD and (92%) have introduced Green Public Procurement frameworks.

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that OECD countries are lagging behind in the design of effective governance tools for policy actions in this field (OECD, forthcoming). While most OECD countries have net-zero strategies, only 23 countries and the EU have granted them legal status, limiting their enforceability. In turn, according to the first Global Stocktake, policies implemented by the end of 2020 were insufficient to meet countries Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), indicating an implementation gap as well (OECD, 2024[9]).

These systemic implementation gaps weigh on citizen’s trust in public institutions to navigate complex policy issues. Across the OECD, around 44% of people report having low or no trust in their national government, and many are skeptical about the manner in which their governments deal with large and complex policy issues (OECD, 2024[10]). Around 70% of people across OECD countries indicate that addressing climate change should be a priority for their government, but only an average of 42% are confident their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years (Figure ‎1.1). As explored below, this confidence gap, in addition to having consequences for trust in government, can have real impacts on the effectiveness of climate change policy: if people and businesses have concerns about the credibility, effectiveness or fairness of climate change policy, it is less likely that public institutions will be able to implement in a sustained manner over the long term.

Figure ‎1.1. An average of four in ten are confident their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions

Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?” The “confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of responses across countries.

Source: (OECD, 2024[10]).

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Figure ‎1.2. Governing for the Green Transition Framework

Source: OECD Illustration.

Governments will be critical in determining how successful our societies will be in achieving permanent reductions in emissions and building resilience to the impacts of climate change over the coming decades, and will need to be more effective with the governance tools that enable their policies. Responding to this need, the OECD has developed the “Governing for the Green Transition” framework (Figure ‎1.2). This framework structures the public governance practices and processes necessary to design and implement climate change policy effectively over the long-term. They are grouped under mutually reinforcing three pillars: Commitment – Capabilities – Consensus. Commitment involves structuring public institutions to ensure they are credibly committed to long-term implementation of climate policies. This is important for ensuring that climate change policy is sustained across electoral cycles and is not derailed by other pressing, but more transitory, issues. The second pillar, Capabilities involves building the skills, practices and processes within public institutions to ensure to design and implement climate change policies, using a mix of policy tools effectively. The third pillar, Consensus, involves building broad and lasting public support for climate change policy. This is necessary to ensure businesses and individuals act to reduce emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. It is especially important where climate change policy may involve managing trade-offs or welfare costs across different groups, and positive perceptions of effectiveness and fairness are needed to maintain support.

This chapter presents the OECD’s evidence on the effectiveness in current governance practices for each of these pillars, with Box ‎1.1 providing an overview. There are significant implementation gaps in several of the areas for which detailed data is available. These include many core capabilities: regulation, budgeting and infrastructure governance. In several others, there are knowledge gaps, with no detailed information yet available to systematically assess effectiveness. These include independent oversight of climate policy, public sector skills, citizen engagement, and greening public administration. With limited time remaining to address emissions reduction, it is important that these gaps are addressed urgently by OECD members.

Box ‎1.1. Overview of evidence on Governing for the Green Transition framework

The table below provides an overview of the OECD’s evidence and state of knowledge about the governance practices under each pillar of the Governing for the Green Transition framework. Early Stage indicates that standards for relevant public governance practices are not fully developed, and/or that evidence on the implementation these practices is not sufficient to compare effectively across OECD countries. Developing indicates that public governance practices have been developed and OECD has collected evidence on their implementation, but there aremain significant opportunities for expanding and strengthening. Mature indicates that public governance practices have been developed, OECD has collected evidence on their implementation, and many countries are implementing effectively. While this broad analysis offers an overview of collective progress, the specific application and outcomes may vary from country to country. Nonetheless, it provides a useful reference point for understanding the general state of green governance and identifying areas that could benefit from further attention and refinement.

 

	Early stage	Developing	Mature
	Commitment
Long term strategy		✓
Whole of government co-ordination	✓
Monitoring and measuring outcomes			✓
Independent oversight	✓
Policy innovation and foresight	✓
	Capabilities
Green regulation		✓
Green budgeting		✓
Green taxes & market-based incentives		✓
Green infrastructure		✓
Green procurement		✓
Green public sector skills	✓
	Consensus
Public participation and engagement	✓
Behavioural change	✓
Greening public administration	✓
Managing influence and lobbying		✓
Access to justice	✓

Source: Authors.

Commitment

The first pillar of Governing for the Green transition is Commitment: ensuring that governments are credibly committed to implement long-term policies to reduce emissions and minimise the degree of climate change. Ensuring credible commitment is a central issue which public institutions must address in their governance approach to climate change mitigation. The policy mix required to reduce emissions includes investments, taxes and regulatory compliance, often with upfront costs for people and businesses. This can create an intertemporal trade-off, with climate policies imposing costs for current taxpayers, while benefits accrue over the long-term, primarily to populations in the future. Moreover, governments face many other pressing and immediate issues, which are of direct salience for voters during the current electoral cycle. These compete for priority and resources.

This can create an issue of time inconsistency and credibility in climate change policy. Elected leaders have incentives to focus on shorter-term issues that provide visible outcomes to their electorate. Policies to reduce emissions are at continuous risk of being undermined by pressures to “roll-over” the costs of mitigation to future policymakers (Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski, 2012[11]). Uncertainty over climate change policy has direct effects for mitigation efforts by actors outside government. For example, private investment in decarbonisation technology can be significantly negatively affected by uncertainty about future carbon prices (Blyth et al., 2007[12]; Fuchs, Ströbel and Terstegge, 2024[13]).

To address this, public institutions must construct a governance framework for climate change policy which incorporates “commitment mechanisms”. These can be thought of as institutional arrangements that make it a difficult and time-consuming process to change policy rules in all but emergency situations (Kydland and Prescott, 1977[14]). This section examines how governments can set an effective long-term framework for climate change mitigation policy, incorporating appropriate legal and institutional commitment mechanisms. Issues covered are: 1) Setting long-term strategy and goals, with legal and political backing; 2) Using policy co-ordination and coherence mechanisms to ensure joined up policy across institutions responsible for different aspects of climate change; 3) Establishing independent climate advisory boards to provide independent oversight of climate change policy; 4) Monitoring progress on emissions reduction effectively, to support evidence-based adjustments to policy over time; and 5) Implementing innovative governance approaches, such as mission governance and strategic foresight, to improve policy effectiveness as conditions change.

Long-term Strategy

A first step in credibly committing public institutions to long-term action on climate change is establishing clear long-term policy frameworks and setting overarching goals and interim targets that align with these, (OECD, 2023[4]). Climate-change strategies can support credible commitment by providing a long-term ambition, framework and targets. They may also outline potential trade-offs, the milestones necessary to achieve policy objectives and how the government will prioritise resources and support climate strategies over the long term. Twenty of 24 countries for which data is available (83%) have adopted net zero emissions strategies as of 2022 (Figure ‎1.3). Globally, these commitments now represent 88% of global GHG emissions (OECD, 2024[15]).

Net zero targets have been widely adopted in legislation in OECD countries over the past decade. As of 2022, 23 of 37 OECD countries for which data is available (62%) had placed Net Zero targets into legislation and a further 5 of 37 (13%) had placed them in proposed legislation (Figure ‎1.4). From a commitment perspective, this approach can help to provide long-term assurance that emissions reduction policy will be sustained. Placing Net Zero emissions targets into legislation creates institutional barriers to help prevent backsliding, and also legally commits public institutions to implement them. Moreover, the targets being adopted by OECD countries are generally comprehensive, 31 of 37 countries (84%) have adopted economy wide targets, and a further 31 of 37 have adopted targets covering a wide range of greenhouse gases (i.e. CO2, methane, and others).

To further support commitment, some countries have endorsed long-term climate change strategy by the cabinet or council of ministers. The Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener in the United Kingdom, for example, spells out policies to achieve a decarbonised economy by 2050. The strategy is overseen by the Prime Minister, with the Cabinet Committee on Climate Change. The strategy’s assumptions are regularly updated based on policy performance and technological developments (Kaur et al., 2023[16]). Climate change strategies can also be the basis for co-operation agreements across sectors or between levels of government. An example of co-operative agreements among authorities is Luxembourg’s Climate Pact, an agreement through which local governments commit to climate-related measures, helping to co-ordinate between national and sub-national governments (OECD, 2021[17]).

Figure ‎1.3. Many OECD countries have Net Zero Emissions strategies

Note: Data is for 24 OECD countries implementing green budgeting in 2022. OECD countries which are not implementing green budgeting not included.

Source: OECD Survey on Green Budgeting Practices, 2022.

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Figure ‎1.4. Most OECD countries have placed Net Zero Emissions targets in legislation

Note: No data available for USA.

Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

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Whole of Government Co-ordination

Climate change is a cross-cutting issue, requiring co-ordinated action by different government actors in many areas of policy, such as energy, transportation, agriculture and trade. A “whole-of-government” approach to policy making is required for policy to be credible. Governments can achieve this by situating co-ordination of climate change policy within the Centre of Government (CoG). The CoG consists of the Prime Minister’s and/or President’s offices, and other bodies and institutions supporting cross-government government priorities (OECD, 2023[4]). The CoG can help to set strategic priorities across government and embed climate change policy within prioritisation and planning exercises. For example, France’s Direction Interministerielle de la Transformation Publique (DITP) supports strategic prioritisation on the green transition with whole-of-government plans and annual targets.

OECD’s data on institutional structures in CoGs suggests that there may be weaknesses in taking a “whole-of-government” approach to climate change policy. As of 2023, 44% of OECD countries (12 out of 27) reported that climate action is one of the top priorities for their CoG (OECD, 2023[19]). While this was more than any other policy area, it was not a top priority for many CoGs. Only 14 out of 27 CoGs (51%) were responsible for steering and co-ordinating climate and environmental policies (Figure ‎1.5). A further 14 out of 27 monitored the implementation of the national climate strategy, and 13 of 27 (48%) monitored a selection of climate or environmental projects. These findings suggest there is scope for CoGs to take a more active role in climate change policy in many countries.

Figure ‎1.5. CoG role in climate & environmental policy

Note: n=27; Respondents were asked “What is the centre of government's role with regards to climate and environmental policy?”.

Source: OECD Survey on the Centre of Government (OECD, 2023[19]).

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Multiple institutional arrangements can be used by the CoG to leverage its convening powers. These can include super ministries, a dedicated ministry of environment and/or a co-ordination unit at the centre of government. Some may offer more authority to orient agencies’ financial and technical resources for more effective policy development and planning. They are not mutually exclusive and are often layered to balance their advantages and drawbacks. In each arrangement, the CoG can support and steer policy development without necessarily driving it through a specialised unit in the centre.

CoGs have various tools to engineer collaboration across government on climate change policy (Figure ‎1.6). The most frequent is to use sectoral targets integrated in a cross-government strategy or sectoral strategies reviewed for alignment with climate and environmental objectives (OECD, 2023[19]). Aligning commitments at both sectoral and national levels can be challenging, and countries have adopted different approaches. For example, Scotland is addressing this through a National Planning Framework established by the CoG, while France’s national low-carbon strategy involves co-ordination across stakeholders by the CoG.

Figure ‎1.6. Many OECD countries lack mechanisms for whole-of-government co-ordination for policy coherence

Mechanisms for whole-of-government co-ordination for policy coherence for sustainable development

Note: See also Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5.

Source: (OECD, 2023[20]).

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As a cross-cutting issue, governments also require mechanisms to promote policy coherence between environmental and other policy objectives. This may involve developing mutually supportive policies or managing trade-offs. Most OECD countries for which data is available (15 of 24, 63%) have governance arrangements in place to support communication between ministries and departments and promote cross-sectoral co-ordination (Figure ‎1.6). Practices include inter-ministerial working groups and networks, focal points, councils and interdepartmental commissions. However, many countries may need to develop a more structured approach to ensuring coherence of climate change policy with other national priorities. Most notably, only 3 of 24 countries (13%) have established mandates for mitigating or managing divergences between priorities in different sectors. Only 10 of 24 OECD countries (42%) undertake capacity building for policy coherence.

A key factor limiting improvements towards policy coherence is the absence of institutional mechanisms for detecting and resolving policy conflicts and assessing the impacts of policies. Currently, only 4 out of 24 OECD countries (17%) report using impact assessment tools to assess the transboundary impacts of policies (OECD (2023[20]), see also Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5). This low number is partly due to insufficient data and evidence-based information for assessing these impacts. Only 6 of 24 OECD (25%), report including the impacts of policies in the information provided to Ministers or Parliament. These are important barriers to building credible and effective climate and emissions reduction policy, as consideration of long-term and transboundary impacts is critical. Further information on policy co-ordination is given in Chapter 5.

Monitoring & Measuring Outcomes

Setting national GHG emissions targets, and monitoring emissions of GHGs, is an important commitment mechanism to support the long-term effectiveness of climate policies. Long-term targets, and short-term actions to achieve them, are key anchors for expectations, and for judging the effectiveness of current policy action. As of 2023, all OECD members and accession candidates for which data are available had adopted some form of GHG emissions targets. All had signed up to nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and 33 of 37 OECD countries (86%), and 6 of 7 accession candidates (71%) had set some form of Net Zero targets. However, stringency of Net Zero targets can vary, depending on the year in which countries aim to achieve net zero emissions, the range of sectors their goal targets, and the strength of the institutional arrangements for achieving Net Zero. Taking these factors into account, the average stringency of GHG emissions reduction targets across the OECD in 2023 was estimated at 7.5, measured on a scale of 0-10 (Figure ‎1.7). However, while 31 of 37 countries have target stringency of at least 7.5, a small number of countries lag significantly behind OECD peers in setting targets. Moreover, collectively, the Net Zero targets which have been set by OECD countries continue to fall short of reaching the emissions reductions which are necessary under the Paris Agreement.

Reporting on GHG emissions levels is necessary for ensuring long-term oversight and effectiveness of emissions reductions policies. All OECD members and accession partners for which data are available reported GHG emissions in 2023. However, the quality, completeness and transparency of reporting varies substantively. Overall, on a scale of 0-10, the average stringency of GHG emissions reporting across the OECD in 2023 was estimated at 7.0 (Figure ‎1.7). Most OECD countries varied between scores of 6 and 10. Finland, Austria, Spain and Switzerland notably all scored 10, meeting all criteria which the OECD used to examine the stringency of emissions reporting. However, a number of OECD countries had significant gaps in tracking their GHG emissions, with scores below 3.5. This hinders the ability of governments to commit to long-term climate action, by limiting their ability to monitor the effectiveness of policy. It is highly important that public institutions maintain effective monitoring emissions levels and use this to improve future policy.

Figure ‎1.7. Most countries have set GHG emissions reductions targets & reporting mechanisms, 2023

Note: All data for Emissions reporting is estimated based on recent year for which data is available. Data not available for USA and Brazil. Score for Emissions Reporting aggregates several measures: whether GHG emissions accounting following the System of Environmental Economic Accounting; Countries’ submissions of GHG Inventories based on UNFCCC Annual Inventory Review Reports; harmonised score of the transparency and completeness of Biennial reports or Biennial Update Reports adopting the methodology of (Weikmans and Gupta, 2021[21]); and Submissions of 5 key documents under the UNFCCC enhance transparency on emissions data and countries’ climate action. Please see metadata for OECD Climate actions and policies measurement framework for more details.

Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), section “GHG emissions data and reporting”, accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

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Independent Oversight

Establishing independent authorities to provide oversight and review of climate policy can help to ensure long-term commitment and credibility (Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski, 2012[11]). Independent Climate Advisory Bodies (ICABs) are independent councils delegated by governments to assess a country’s climate performance and/or advise on its climate policies. As of 2023, 19 of 37 OECD countries (51%) had established ICABs (Figure ‎1.8). Of these, 17 were established in law, potentially providing stronger assurance on their existence and functions over the long-term. This was a large increase since 2013, when only 5 of 37 OECD countries (13%) had ICABS in place, of which 4 were established in law. This trend reflects growing recognition of the role of independent and science-based oversight in reinforcing commitment to emission reduction targets. ICABs roles in climate governance can include independent reviews of the assumptions, models and emissions trajectories underlying government emission reduction policies, advising on targets, and in some cases, producing independent analysis or emissions trajectories assessments of progress, and impact assessments (Averchenkova and Lazaro, 2020[22]).

Nonetheless, only half of OECD countries had established an ICAB as of 2023. In addition, no detailed data comparing the roles and powers of ICABs is currently available. This is a significant gap in assessing how effective the governance of climate policy is across OECD countries and limits the ability to establish best practices for the operation of ICABs. There is currently no standardised framework for establishing such bodies, and there are significant differences in their legal mandates, authority and scope of work across countries. For example, the UK’s Climate Change Council can make proposals for the carbon budget (Box ‎1.2), while France's Council for Climate (HCC) cannot, and can only react to the carbon budget decided by the government. There is space to further advance in sharing experiences and generating comparative evidence on the effective design and role of ICABs.

Box ‎1.2. The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Committee

One of the most prominent success stories of ICABs is the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Committee (CCC) created under the Climate Change Act of 2008, the world’s first strategic climate framework legislation. The CCC, fully embedded in the UK’s policymaking, provides independent advice on emission targets and progress monitoring. Notably, this nonpartisan expert panel elaborates the UK’s legally binding carbon budgets, setting five-year caps on greenhouse gas emissions. These budgets have driven key mitigation policies including the phase-out of coal-fired power plants, the expansion of renewable energy and stricter energy efficiency standards. The CCC also publishes annual reports assessing government policies, monitoring key indicators and providing recommendations to address potential gaps. To ensure accountability, the government must respond to these findings in a report to Parliament by October 15 of each year (Gransaull, Rhodes and Fairbrother, 2023[23]). The CCC has long emphasized the importance of embedding climate action in government action, encouraging cross-government policies. The independence, evidence-based approach and statutory nature of the CCC shield it from political cycles, ensuring policy continuity across political administrations. The CCC was the first of its kind and paved the way to the creation of similar bodies in other OECD countries.

Figure ‎1.8. Only half of OECD countries have an Independent Climate Advisory Body

Note: Data is for 2023. Data not available for USA.

Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

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Policy Innovation & Foresight

Climate change mitigation is complicated by interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders, and is unlikely to be addressed solely through the linear approach of a single strategy (Lazarus, 2009[24]; Rittel and Webber, 1973[25]). While maintaining long-term commitment, policymakers and public servants will also need to innovate and adapt policy implementation as political, social and technological conditions change over time. For example, approximately 35% of the CO2 emission reductions needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070 rely on technologies currently at the prototype or demonstration phase, and 40% on technologies that have not yet been commercially deployed in mass-market applications (IEA, 2025[26]). Policymakers may benefit by utilising a “mission governance” perspective on climate change policy, that is a far-reaching vision with transformative aspirations, seeking to set specific, ambitious, long-term, time-bound, and cross-sectoral objectives to address wicked problems (OECD, 2025[27]).

Strategic foresight can also support a country’s long-term climate strategy by helping governments identify the long-term, complex challenges that lie ahead. This can be done by exploring potential futures through techniques such as horizon scanning, megatrends analysis, modelling, scenario planning, visioning and back casting. In the context of climate change, strategic forecasts can be used to identify future climate impacts or anticipate and plan for future developments that may impact a country’s ability to deliver on its climate goals (OECD, 2023[4]). The application of foresight and future scenarios by the centre remains limited, with only 35% of surveyed OECD centres utilising these tools (OECD, 2023[19]).

Capabilities

The second pillar of Governing for the Green transition is Capabilities. These are the skills and competences which public institutions need to master in order to competently implement long-term policies to reduce emissions. Climate change is a cross-sectoral issue, requiring changes in areas including energy production, transport, infrastructure, agriculture, land and resource use, and individual choices to lower the amount emissions. Government must utilise a range of policy instruments to drive emissions reduction across these different areas. These include regulatory instruments (such as technology or performance standards), economic instruments (such as carbon taxes and green subsidies), and public investment and consumption instruments (like public procurement and investment) (OECD, 2024[28]). Governments must be able to utilise the full range of instruments capably and effectively, across regulation, budgeting, procurement and infrastructure management. They also require appropriate skills among public servants. This section reviews the extent to which governments in OECD countries can utilise these instruments effectively to mitigate climate change.

Green Regulation

Regulation can promote climate change mitigation and adaptation and encourage green innovation. To achieve these outcomes, public institutions should use tools and approaches designed to improve the quality of regulations, particularly for high-emission sectors. Regulatory impact assessment can help to identify likely climate impacts, feasible alternatives, and trade-offs of different policy options. Currently, 35 OECD members require an impact assessment as part of regulatory design. Of these, 28 countries (80%) systematically assess environmental impacts for all or major regulations. This has increased slightly from 25 a decade ago. However, while a majority of OECD countries systematically assess impacts of new laws and regulations on the environment, only half (14 of 28) extend these reviews to cover specific issues such as greenhouse gas emissions (OECD, 2024[29]). More systematic and granular assessments environmental impact assessments are needed.

Regular ex post review is also essential for ensuring that existing regulations support national and international climate policy goals and improving regulations to respond to evolving challenges and opportunities. Ex post evaluation remains an underdeveloped practice among OECD countries, in particular the evaluation of environmental impacts. Only 3 out of 38 OECD countries (8%) require ex post evaluations to assess whether existing regulations align with environmental sustainability goals for all or for major primary laws (Figure ‎1.9, see also Figure 8.19 in Chapter 8). Furthermore, while 25 OECD countries conduct principles-based reviews (i.e. the use of a principle, such as administrative burdens or effect of regulation on competition, as an initial filter to identify which regulations warrant review or potential reform), 7 out of 38 OECD countries (18%) have undertaken a principle-based review to assess the impacts of existing regulations on environmental sustainability in recent years (see Online Figure J.5.5, see also (OECD, 2025[30])). It is important that governments increase efforts to ensure that regulations stay fit-for-purpose amidst changes in the climate and advances in technology. This means reviewing regulations regularly and adjusted continuously, creating a feedback loop.

Empowered and enabled economic regulators can also make a significant contribution to the green transition and decarbonisation of network sectors. Economic regulators are permanent bodies which operate at “arms-length” or independently of central government, partly in order to ensure that long-term decisions on sectors can be adequately considered alongside near-term considerations. In many countries, economic regulators are responsible for overseeing firms in network sectors which are critical to emissions reduction, such as energy and transport. However, at present, the OECD assesses that many regulators do not have the necessary tools and governance arrangements in place to contribute effectively to implementing emissions reduction policy (OECD, 2024[31]).

Figure ‎1.9. Ex post evaluation of impacts of regulations on environmental sustainability is underdeveloped

Note: shows data for the question “Are ex post evaluations required to assess consistency with national or international environmental sustainability goals?” Data are based on 38 OECD Members. See also Figure 8.19 in Chapter 8.

Source: (OECD, 2024[29]).

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Figure ‎1.10. Few regulators have objectives on environmental sustainability defined in legislation

Share of regulators with objectives relating to environmental sustainability in legislation

Note: Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). See also Figure 8.12 in Chapter 8.

Source: (OECD, 2024[31]).

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Figure ‎1.11. Many regulators in energy, water and air transport have legal powers on environmental sustainability

Share of regulators with the legal power to consider environmental sustainability in regulatory decision making

Note: Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). See also Figure 8.13 in Chapter 8.

Source: (OECD, 2024[31]).

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Economic regulators do not always have an appropriate mandate, with clear objectives and relevant powers, to support carbon mitigation efforts. There is also no standard approach to defining the role of economic regulators in the green transition. Currently, only 41% of economic regulators have explicit objectives defined in legislation relating to environmental sustainability (Figure ‎1.10, see also Figure 8.12 in Chapter 8). Even where objectives have been set, regulators do not always have a clear mandate and are not always supported by relevant legal powers to pursue these objectives. Currently, across all sectors, only 58% of economic regulators have legal powers to consider environmental sustainability in decision making (Figure ‎1.11, see also Figure 8.13 in Chapter 8). This rises to 86% in the energy sector but stands at only 30% in rail transport and 29% in e-communications. Amongst regulators with relevant powers, GHG reduction and decarbonisation are the areas most considered within their decisions, with two thirds of economic regulators considering these issues (see Figure 8.14 in Chapter 8, also (OECD[31]) 2024).

A broadened remit to cover climate change mitigation issues will require regulators to balance multiple objectives and may increase the complexity of their tasks. It is important that economic regulators become part of a more co-operative and co-ordinated approach across government. This is an area with significant room for improvement, as 60% of regulators lack formal co-ordination mechanisms for environmental sustainability issues (see Online Figure J.5.2 in Chapter 8). Guidance is needed to establish approaches for manging competing priorities, through co-ordination. Defined quantitative targets can also support regulators in providing surety on their goals and help co-ordinate action. This can also be improved substantively across the OECD. At present, only 56% of regulators have quantitative targets defined for their sector, and only 31% overall use such targets in their decision making (see Online Figure J.5.3 in Chapter 8).

Regulators also require access to sector data, and capacity to use this data, to support action on climate change and ensure decision-makers are appropriately informed. Regulators must be empowered to collect and manage relevant data for their sector, in order to be able to consider climate change issues in decision making. Currently, only 44% of regulators have powers to collect data on the environmental sustainability of their objectives (see Figure 8.15 in Chapter 8). For those regulators with the power to collect data, close to one third do not systematically do so, sometimes due to powers being too narrowly defined (OECD, 2024[31]). One of the reasons for limited data collection may be that 80% of regulators are not required to assess the impact of decision making on environmental sustainability (see Figure 8.16 in Chapter 8).

Supporting climate change mitigation will also require new skills and tools to support regulatory delivery, and an appropriate organisational culture. Currently, close to half of regulators (50%) have not hired, nor plan to hire staff with expertise in environmental sustainability, nor do they plan to make use of external professionals (see Figure 8.17 in Chapter 8). More information on regulation and green responsibilities of regulators is covered in Chapter 8 “Regulation”.

Green taxes & market-based mechanisms

Governments can use market-based instruments, such as taxes on the emission of GHGs to lower emissions and encourage greening of economic activity activities. By putting a price on GHG emissions, governments can both mobilise public revenues and steer the economy towards lower emissions. Market based instruments encompass both explicit mechanisms, such as carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS), and implicit instruments, such as fuel excise taxes (OECD, 2016[32]). Most OECD countries apply either a carbon tax or an ETS to each of four energy-intensive sectors: transport, buildings, electricity production and industry (Figure ‎1.12). However, the stringency of these mechanisms varies, both in terms of the price applied, and the range of GHGs which are included. Moreover, a large share of emissions are not covered by carbon taxes or ETSs. In 2023, 58% of GHG emissions were not subject to a carbon price in 72 countries accounting for 80% of global emissions (OECD, 2024[33]).

Carbon taxes offer advantages in providing certainty on emissions prices, ease of administration and revenue mobilisation (OECD, 2024[33]). ETS schemes offer greater flexibility and design adaptability. Both carbon taxes and ETS may face political resistance due to concerns over their fairness. As such, the governance framework for carbon pricing should ideally address distributional impacts. One route is to recycle carbon tax revenues by using it to finance climate and energy projects. For example, Japan issues “green transition bonds” financed by carbon tax revenues to finance industrial decarbonisation (Cárdenas Monar, 2024[34]). Reinvesting carbon tax revenues to close the climate finance gap can significantly improve their public support and help improve trust in the government’s capacity to manage these funds effectively (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser, 2018[35]).

Public acceptance is also driven by progressiveness of the tax. Governments can recycle tax revenues to provide targeted transfers to low-income households or subsidies for low-carbon alternatives that these households would be likely to use, such as public transport (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser, 2018[35]). For example, Austria provides a EUR 110 annual cash transfer to all residents, funded by the carbon tax. Reductions in other taxes to offset revenue gained from the carbon tax, or cut on taxes on low-emission sectors, can also foster public support. In addition, public communication to provide clear, simple and transparent information on the tax mechanism is important. Public support for carbon taxes is stronger when their functioning and distributional outcomes are explained (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[36]).

The governance of carbon taxes needs to address carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when foreign emissions increase because of the introduction or intensification of domestic climate policies (OECD/Climate Club, 2024[37]). Growing attention has been drawn to Border Carbon Adjustments, which are mechanisms to put a price on the import of goods associated with GHG emissions abroad. For example, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), scheduled for a definitive entry into force in 2026, will put a price on the carbon embedded in the imports into the EU of certain goods, such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen produced in non-EU countries (European Commission, 2025[38]).

Figure ‎1.12. Most OECD countries have emissions trading schemes or carbon taxes, 2023

Policy Stringency Scores, from 0 (minimum) to 10 (maximum)

Note: Stringency scores reflect a combination of the level of the emissions prices applied and the range of emissions which are covered. For more information see metadata for OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework data. No data for USA.

Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

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Green Budgeting

Public expenditure represents on average about 43.3% of GDP in OECD countries. Ensuring that public expenditure is aligned with climate goals and strategies is an important capability for public institutions in addressing climate change. The budget is the instrument for prioritising public expenditure and making sure that public spending is aligned with government’s objectives and commitments. The budget process plays a critical role in ensuring efficient public spending on climate change and in evaluating government’s actions.

OECD countries have made significant progress in introducing green budgeting. As of 2022, 24 out of 36 countries OECD countries (66%) had introduced at least one green budgeting instrument, compared to 14 countries in 2020 (OECD, 2024[15]). OECD countries have also strengthened institutional arrangements for green budgeting, and broadened the methods and tools used. However, there remains substantial room for improvement in implementing green budgeting practices. Assessed on a scale from 0 (not implementing) to 1 (high level of green budgeting practices), the average score across the OECD for quality of green budgeting was assessed at 0.49 for 2022 (Figure ‎1.13). Issues affecting the quality of green budgeting include insufficient resources to develop green budgeting approaches; a lack of relevant knowledge or expertise on how to integrate climate and environmental considerations into the budget process; and limited data on the impact of climate change and environmental sustainability for reporting requirements within budget processes (OECD, 2024[15]).

Figure ‎1.13. Green budgeting is now widespread, but there is room for improvement

OECD Green budgeting index 2022

Note: Index ranges from 0 (not implementing) to 1 (high level of green budgeting practices). Data for Costa Rica and Slovenia are not available.

Source: (OECD, 2024[15]).

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The aspect of green budgeting in which OECD countries perform most poorly on average is Accountability and Transparency. Only 40% of surveyed OECD countries have implemented oversight mechanisms for green objectives or reporting by an independent body such as an independent fiscal institution, climate advisory body or council, or auditor general. 30% of surveyed OECD countries had oversight mechanisms to monitor compliance with green reporting requirements, 20% for monitoring green investment and spending targets, 10% for costing the fiscal impact of green initiatives, and 10% for costing the wider impacts of green initiatives (OECD, 2024[15]). As methods and tools for green budgeting become both more complex, and more integrated into budgeting, it is important that independent fiscal institutions increase their technical capabilities to provide oversight of their usage (Cameron, Lelong and von Trapp, 2022[39]). More information on budgeting practices in OECD countries, including the roles and effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions, is given in Chapter 9 on “Budgeting”.

OECD countries also have significant room to improve in the Methods and Tools used for green budgeting. Tools such as Environmental Impact Assessment, used in 75% of countries, and green budget tagging, used in 55% of countries, are now widespread (OECD, 2024[15]). However, it is important that governments move beyond green budgeting tagging, which simply marks expenditures as being positive, negative or neutral for the environment (OECD, 2024[40]), and towards directly assessing and measuring the impact of budget proposals on emissions. This is especially important because climate impacts are often a secondary purpose of other expenditure, or an unintended effect of other expenditures. For example, subsidies supporting poorer households to pay for fuel or heating also have a negative impact on emissions, by increasing fossil fuel use. Several OECD countries have started to review tax expenditures and subsidies that are harmful to the environment.

The most advanced countries are now taking action to estimate the cost of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Net Zero Emissions goals, and to ensure that their climate change strategies and actions plans are correctly reflected in the medium-term budget frameworks and annual budgets. Several have begun assessing the impact of budget proposals on emissions and using models to assess and compare different policy options, estimating their budgetary cost, social equity impacts and emissions reduction impacts. For example, Korea aims to analyse the impact of national budgets on emissions reduction, reflect the findings on budget preparation, and evaluate whether budgets have been properly executed and objectives reached. Denmark assesses the effects of different proposals for green tax reform on non-energy-related emissions from agriculture and forestry. Other next generation green budgeting tools include investing in modeling to understand the multi-dimensional links between climate change, climate policies, public finances and budgets, tax revenues, and costing climate change commitments (OECD, 2024[40]).

Green Infrastructure

Meeting the Paris Agreement in a way that supports the Sustainable Development Goals requires an estimated EUR 6.7 trillion of infrastructure investment per year until 2030 (Bhattacharya et al., 2024[41]). The international community is currently falling short of meeting this goal (OECD, 2022[42]), making it critically important that countries direct funding towards investments that will most effectively and efficiently reduce emissions and catalyse investment from the private sector. There is significant room for improvement in green infrastructure practices across OECD member countries. OECD data on member countries refers to the implementation of appropriate methods and practices to develop green infrastructure gives an average score across the OECD in 2023 was 0.52, on a scale from 0 to 1 (Figure ‎1.14).

A first step for lifting the contribution of green infrastructure to the climate transition is to ensure that countries are utilising planning and policy settings to signal their intention to invest in green infrastructure and to specify the conditions that need to be met to deliver and operate infrastructure that meets green standards. Having a clear strategic intent is important given the long-lead times required to deliver major physical assets and the many decades they can be in operation. Because decisions about infrastructure can significantly impact people, long-term planning gives stakeholders and citizens sufficient certainty needed to make decisions within their lives. In addition, most major infrastructure investments around the world involve participation from the private sector, who depend on having a steady, predictable and reliable pipeline of projects to give them the confidence to invest in the necessary people, plant and equipment (OECD, 2023[43]). For this reason, it is promising to note that all 33 OECD countries with data available have a national strategy or policy document that aims to improve resilience of infrastructure, setting out the government’s strategic intent for resilient infrastructure investment. However, only 13 out of 32 (41%) have set requirements for infrastructure resilience (OECD, forthcoming[44]). In addition, within the transport sector, generally one of the highest emitting sectors, 72% of OECD countries (21 out of 29) have mechanisms to ensure that transport infrastructure strategies and plans contribute to nationally determined contributions (NDCs), net-zero strategies, long-term low emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) or other overarching climate change strategy on mitigation (OECD, 2023[45]).

Figure ‎1.14. Governments can improve on delivering environmentally sustainable infrastructure

OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGI) 2023, Part V: Deliver environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure

Note: Data for Australia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway and Türkiye are not available. Data for Belgium are based on responses from Flanders only. Belgium (Flanders) does not have complete data for this indicator. Only the sub-pillars with complete data are included (scores for Belgium, Flanders, are not included in the OECD average).

Source: (OECD, 2023[46]).

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As part of the climate transition, it is important that countries pay due consideration to climate-related costs and benefits of different options over the total life of the investment, alongside the economic, social and other environmental impacts (OECD, 2020[47]). Incorporating climate-related costs and benefits into project selection, such as carbon emissions and climate-risk protection measures, provides a clear understanding of the total impacts of investments on climate goals. This is particularly important given large-scale investments like infrastructure have great potential to either reduce or lock-in emissions or low levels of resilience (Meckling et al., 2022[48]). Traditional tools and mechanisms to appraise and prioritise infrastructure projects, such as cost-benefit analysis, can be ill-equipped to factor in environmental and climate aspects. This is due to the difficulty of estimating the environmental costs and benefits of infrastructure and translating them into monetary values. Moreover, cause-effect relationships are not straightforward and there is lot of uncertainty about the consequences and effects of changing climate conditions and extreme weather events (OECD, 2023[49]). Box ‎1.3 shows examples of how some countries have successfully quantified these considerations.

Box ‎1.3. Incorporating climate considerations into green infrastructure planning

Quantifying the price of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland

Like a growing number of countries, Ireland has quantified the emissions impact of an investment proposal by prescribing a schedule of values based on the estimated marginal cost society will incur to reach specific climate targets. These values are integrated with Ireland’s standard project appraisal methodology, cost-benefit analysis (CBA). This helps the Government to have an overview of the expected climate impacts of an investment proposal before agreeing to financing the project. In cases where emissions are not considered relevant, significant, or practicable for inclusion, public bodies should describe how this conclusion was reached.

Measuring the benefits of resilience in New Zealand

New Zealand is prone to climate-related risks, such as storms, flooding and coastal erosion. To help identify transport projects with greater resilience, New Zealand monetises the benefits of resilience by quantifying the financial impact of reinstating transport assets before and after an investment in resilient transport infrastructure. Incorporating the long-term cost savings of having more resilient transport infrastructure into the investment decision helps strengthen the case for investing in climate-resilience. This approach also factors in a wider range of costs and impacts, including: user costs (diversion, waiting times; other direct costs (loss of life, injury, repair and reinstatement) and; indirect impacts (wider economic benefits).

Source: (Percoco et al., 2023[50]; New Zealand Transport Agency, 2020[51]).

OECD member countries could also do more to implement methods that identify and prioritise green infrastructure. For instance, only 69% of OECD countries for which data is available (20 out of 29) provide infrastructure guidelines for climate change adaptation and 66% (19 countries) for climate change mitigation (OECD, 2023[46]). In the transport sector, only 63% (17 of 27) of OECD countries surveyed require a climate impact assessment to estimate potential emissions and only 44% (12 of 27) systematically use results to select or prioritise transport projects (OECD, 2023[46]). In addition, only 35% (9 out of 26) in transport systematically use climate resilience criteria in project selection and prioritisation (OECD, 2023[46]). Less than half of OECD countries (12 out of 26, 46%) require climate change adaptation measures to be integrated into the design of transport infrastructure projects (OECD, 2023[46]). Finally, less than half (14 out of 31, 45%) evaluate the costs and benefits of disaster resilience in infrastructure projects, and only 32% (10 countries) use these results in project selection.

Green Public Procurement

Governments are major purchasers of goods and services, with public procurement representing 13% of GDP on average across the OECD (OECD, 2023[46]). Procurement processes can directly lower carbon emissions by systematically opting for greener goods and services. By prioritising climate friendly products and services, governments can also stimulate the market for green technologies and signal the importance of investing in green technologies to the private sector. For instance, governments can mandate the inclusion of green criteria in public contracts and provide suppliers with the assurance to invest in green technologies by clearly communicating their medium to long-term green investment plans (Addison et al., 2024[52]).

Figure ‎1.15. Most OECD countries have green public procurement (GPP) frameworks in place

GPP frameworks in place, and time of most recent update, 2022

Note: Figure presents three different questions: (1) “Is there an active national policy or strategic framework on GPP?”, (2) “In what year was the national policy or strategic framework on GPP last been revised?” and (3) “Is the national policy or strategic GPP framework (or public procurement more broadly) mentioned in national commitments on climate action such as strategies to reach net zero or nationally determined contributions (NDCs)?”. Mexico and Hungary are excluded as they indicated they did not have an active GPP framework at the time of the survey (end 2022). Hungary adopted a GPP strategy (2022-2027) in December 2022, after the closure of the data cycle for this questionnaire. Canada updated its national strategy on public procurement in 2024, after the closure of the survey.

Source: (OECD, 2022[53]).

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32 of 34 OECD countries for which data is available (94%) have adopted green public procurement (GPP) policies or frameworks (Figure ‎1.15). These either establish the mandatory use of green requirements in public tenders, or incremental targets, such as the percentage of goods and services subject to green strategies. For example, Italy has developed “minimum environmental criteria” for 18 product categories that are mandatory for all contracting authorities across government and for all public tenders, regardless of the contract’s value (OECD, 2024[54]). 

However, effective implementation of GPP policies will require stronger engagement with markets, better procurement planning, and wider signalling of upcoming green investment opportunities to suppliers. Currently, 50% of OECD and accession countries do not signal future GPP opportunities in their procurement plans (OECD, 2022[53]). This gap in communication and preparation can hinder private sector readiness to meet green procurement demands. There is a clear need for enhanced guidance and the creation of multi-stakeholder platforms that can improve supplier engagement and ensure successful GPP implementation (OECD, 2024[54]). In addition, implementing systems for monitoring and reporting the environmental impact of procurement activities helps track progress and ensure accountability. Regular reports can highlight achievements and areas for improvement, driving continuous enhancement of green procurement practices (OECD, 2024[54]). Still, in 2024, only 3 out of 29 OECD countries (9%) that have KPIs for the public procurement system report measuring its impact on the environment (OECD, forthcoming[55]).

Training programmes and resources to build the skills and knowledge for green procurement is also necessary, as it often entails more complex procurement techniques, such as environmental criteria or life-cycle costing (OECD, 2022[56]). An important area of capability-building relates to the procurement of green technologies, such as renewable energy sources. For example, the European federation of citizen energy co-operatives REScoop.eu is a network that represents 2 250 European energy communities and 1.5 million citizens that participate in renewable energy or energy efficiency projects. REScoop.eu has developed procurement guidance for municipalities collaborating with energy communities that reviews the main steps of the procurement process and offers concrete examples of renewable energy procurements and concessions (Rescoop.eu, 2023[57]).

Green Public Sector Skills

The capacity of the public sector workforce to design, lead, and implement green policies is integral to the ability of public institutions to mitigate climate change and adapt to its impacts. Many public servants work in roles that directly affect climate initiatives, while others can also use green skills and awareness to contribute to mainstreaming green initiatives. Relevant skills include climate-related policy design knowledge, data analysis, strategic foresight and planning, and scientific and technical knowledge. Many countries are up-skilling public employees on green issues (OECD, 2025[58]). Public sector leadership skills are also vital. It is important that managers are equipped to understand the issues, and lead initiatives and teams through the green transition, navigating scientific complexity and long-term impacts. This challenge will also require diplomacy and political aptitude for building and maintaining relationships with stakeholders and developing broad buy-in.

OECD does not currently have systematic data on the extent to which green skills are being embedded in the public sector. This is an important area for further development by OECD members to help assess their ability to implement climate change policies and identify good practice. Countries that have begun training and upskilling for the green transition are finding a need for a multi-faceted approach and considerable planning to understand their skills needs and roll out training plans. For example, Canada is developing a catalogue of training products and services, and mechanisms for capacity-sharing in professional development. This work is aimed at endowing the public service broadly with the green skills required across government decision making and processes.

Consensus

The final pillar of Governing for the Green transition is Consensus. This pillar examines how to build a governance framework for climate change policy that enables broad social acceptance of government’s goals and implementation choices. Reducing emissions is a “whole of society” transition, requiring changes in technology and consumption patterns from businesses and individuals as well as government. The policies to bring about these large-scale changes will require broad public support in order to be sustained and bring about results. The most important drivers of public support for climate policies are the perceived effectiveness of the policies in reducing emissions, and their perceived fairness, in terms of impacts on one’s own household and on lower-income households (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[36]; Bergquist et al., 2022[59]). Trust in public institutions implementing a policy is also highly important.

The first key aspect of building consensus relates to fairness of process, that is, ensuring that all climate change policies are demonstrated as being made in the public interest. Governments currently face a credibility gap in this area. Many people living in OECD countries voice scepticism about their government’s ability to tackle complex policy issues with trade-offs across different groups in society and generations (OECD, 2024[10]). Many also have concerns that their public institutions do not always act in the public interest when developing policy. For example, fewer than one in three people in OECD countries find it likely that the government would refuse a corporation’s demand if it went against the public interest (OECD, 2024[10]). In democratic countries there is a positive association between higher level of perceived corruption and weaker citizen advocacy for climate action, possibly explained by political resignation - the belief that nothing may change regardless of efforts (Rafaty, 2018[60]). Among the most effective levers for improving trust in the fairness of climate change policy is to implement citizen-government interface processes that help ensure the public have a voice in policymaking, and for public institutions to communicate the evidence used to arrive at decisions (OECD, 2024[10]).

A further key aspect of building consensus relates to the economic impacts of climate change policies across different groups in society. In some cases, policies to implement the green transition may have transitory costs or impacts. For example, carbon taxes can lead to increases in energy costs, which are felt more heavily by lower income households, where spending on energy for heating and transport takes up a bigger proportion of total income (OECD, 2024[61]). Employment in industries producing traditional energy sources, such as coal and oil extraction, may shrink as jobs move towards green industries (ibid.). These transitional costs may have a variety of differential impacts by region, gender, age and other characteristics. The governance framework for the green transition must carefully consider and manage how any impacts can be distributed fairly (and may supplement climate policy with labour or welfare policy where needed to help prevent negative impacts).

In addition, countries will be in a better position to steer societies through the green transition if people improve confidence in governments capacity to handle the green transition and for developing consensus for action (OECD, 2024[10]; OECD, 2024[62]). Climate action relies on the willingness of people to embrace change, such as through behavioural changes such as using lower-emission forms of transportation or accepting new, low emissions infrastructure in their communities. Early and effective public engagement can help address people’s concerns and ensure that new, low-emissions infrastructure is delivered at the necessary pace and scale, with less resistance and fewer delays. However, a common barrier for developing new low emissions infrastructure can be that the benefits accrue to citizens located elsewhere or to future generations, but that the costs and risks are predominately borne by present generations living in close proximity to the infrastructure. For this reason, some countries are exploring how green infrastructure can be delivered fairly, taking into account the needs of citizens (Addison et al., 2024[52]; OECD, 2025[63]) (see Box ‎1.4).

The consensus pillar examines and identifies governance mechanisms which can help governments to work towards broad social acceptance of the modalities and policy choices used to implement emissions reduction and climate change mitigation policy. It covers: 1) Public engagement, to increase the public’s voice in the policymaking process, and to ensure complexities and trade-offs are identified and resolved; 2) Managing influencing and lobbying practices, to ensure that all groups have the opportunity to input, but that policy decisions are not made to benefit any special interest groups; 3) Access to Justice, to support conflict resolution and ensure public and private institutions can be held to account on their responsibilities for reducing emissions; 4) Behavioural change work, to help society to voluntarily adopt greener practices, and finally 5) Greening public administration, or how public institutions can lead the way and build credibility by reducing their own waste and emissions.

Box ‎1.4. Addressing the inequities of climate action

Presenting financial benefits to affected parties (United Kingdom)

The United Kingdom has recognised that while new renewable electricity developments may help reduce emissions for the benefit of future generations at-large, certain local communities may have to live with the noise, visual and construction impacts of new renewable developments in the present day. This can lead local people today to object to new low emissions infrastructure, resulting in time delays and additional costs as developers consider amending their plans to appease local concerns.

For this reason, the United Kingdom’s National Infrastructure Commission has recommended that the Government develop a framework of direct benefits for local communities and individuals hosting nationally significant infrastructure which delivers few local benefits, which could include socialising costs through utility bills or public expenditure to locally impacted communities.

Giving citizens a financial stake in local renewable energy development (European Union)

The European Commission has developed ‘’energy communities’’, which enable local communities to join forces and act as a single entity to access all suitable energy markets and compete with market actors to invest in clean energy for the local community. This can contribute to increasing public acceptance of renewable energy projects and make it easier to attract private investments in the clean energy transition. Energy communities can drive the energy transition locally and directly benefit from better energy efficiency, lower bills, reduced energy poverty and more local green job opportunities. The European Commission provides support to energy communities through various initiatives such as:

• The Energy Communities Facility, with the aim to assist at least 140 energy communities across Europe in developing and implementing viable business plans.

• the Energy Communities Repository, which supported energy communities in 2022-2024 via technical assistance, knowledge repository, developing financial concepts and other training. The Rural Energy Community Advisory Hub assisted citizens, rural actors and local authorities in setting up energy communities. The Interreg Programme under the European Cohesion Policy, supports the establishment and co-operation of cross-border energy communities across the EU.

Source: (National Infrastructure Commission, 2023[64]; European Commission, n.d.[65]).

Public Participation & Engagement

Public participation processes have the potential to build greater public ownership, support and effective engagement with climate change policy, and also encourage citizens to take direct action by altering their own behaviours (OECD, 2025[66]). There are benefits and opportunities of involving citizens at each stage of the policy cycle, from priority setting to monitoring and evaluation. To enable effective public participation in climate change policy, it is important that governments enable access to information and open data; institute public consultations and deliberative mechanisms; and undertake public communication throughout the policy cycle (OECD, 2024[62]). OECD has collected some evidence on this, but systematic standards for relevant public governance practices are not currently in place.

Access to information on climate change policy and outcomes enables the public to make informed decisions on climate change, monitor public action, and hold government accountable. As of 2025, 37 of the 38 OECD countries have adopted Access to Information laws (OECD, 2022[67]). However, challenges remain to ensure access to environmental information. Some countries have taken steps to strengthen their legislation, such as Chile which included a clear definition of environmental information in its framework environmental law (OECD, 2025[66]). Ensuring that the legal framework addresses the issue of environmental information held by private entities is particularly relevant to monitoring emissions (Etemire, 2012[68]).

Figure ‎1.16. Availability of open data on environmental issues varies substantially

Note: The categories of high value datasets are determined by the OECD and primarily based on the G8 Open Data Charter. Data is considered available if they are machine-readable, free of charge, and provided with an open license. Data is not available for Hungary and the United States.

Source: OECD illustration, utilising selected data from the 2023 OURdata Index, see (OECD, 2023[69]).

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Access to open data on environmental issues varies substantially across the OECD. Relevant datasets include those on land ownership and use, natural risk zones, agriculture, forestry, meteorological data, air pollution, and transportation (OECD, 2023[69]). Scored on a scale from 0-100, the average availability of the most relevant datasets is 56 (Figure ‎1.16). Meteorological data is typically the least available. Many OECD countries could improve substantially in releasing high-value datasets on environmental issues as open data to the public (i.e. machine-readable, free, and available under an open license). More information on open data is presented in Chapter 7 “Digital Government and Innovation”.

Governments are developing various ways to engage the public and stakeholders in the development of climate and emissions reduction policies. France, Portugal and Spain have implemented “green” participatory budgeting at municipal level (OECD, 2025[66]). Deliberative mini-publics (DMBs), involving randomly selected citizens in learning and deliberations with experts, have taken place with the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate and the UK’s Climate Assembly (Willis, Curato and Smith, 2022[70]). Costa Rica, Ireland and Peru have established permanent consultative bodies on climate issues. Other countries are using “civic tech” to broaden public consultation, and aggregate large numbers of contributions. While complete data on public and stakeholder consultation processes is lacking internationally, evidence suggests that climate policy issues are increasingly addressed in deliberative processes, such as citizen assemblies: 60 out of 148 deliberative processes recorded in OECD countries between 2021 and 2023 focused on environmental issues (41%) (Figure ‎1.17, see also Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6).

Ensuring effective public engagement requires attention to groups which may be more impacted by climate change or climate policy. Notably, women are disproportionately impacted by climate-related disasters and displacement (UNEP, 2023[71]), but have been historically underrepresented in climate policy processes such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (OECD, 2021[72]). Gender considerations are frequently overlooked in environmental policy, with only 57% of OECD countries incorporating gender practices into their environmental policies (ibid). Policy processes must also adequately represent the views of young people, who will experience more of the effects of future climate change, and those living in areas more greatly exposed to negative impacts. More information on gender and youth representation is given in Chapter 13 “Public Employment and Representation”. The interests of indigenous populations must also be represented in policy processes, ensuring their continued access to resources and the protection of their cultural and traditional practices. Finally, environmental policies should also reflect the perspectives of migrants, refugees and displaced populations who often face higher vulnerability to environmental degradation and climate-related disasters.

Figure ‎1.17. Environment is the most common issue in deliberative processes

Number of times a policy issue was addressed through a deliberative process, 2021-23

Note: Data for OECD countries is based on 22 OECD countries and the European Union for which data was available between January 2021 and September 2023.

Source: OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, 2023. See also Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6.

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Behavioural Change

Behavioural science helps policymakers design clearer, more accessible policies that align with public values, fostering trust and co-operation between citizens and governments. By identifying the factors that drive or hinder sustainable behaviour, governments can design solutions that encourage voluntary change by businesses and individuals. Insights into decision-making patterns and cognitive biases enable policies to better reflect human behaviours, increasing the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes (OECD, 2024[73]) This approach bridges the gap between the intent of climate strategies and their real-world effectiveness by tailoring participation and communication strategies to citizens’ needs and leveraging social norms to mobilise public engagement (OECD, 2024[74]; OECD, 2025[75]). In addition, strengthening public communication is an important tool for governments to explain government choices, build public support for action, and encourage behavioural change (OECD, 2021[76]; OECD, 2023[77]).

One example of this approach is Canada’s Program of Applied Research on Climate Action (PARCA). PARCA examines how Canadians perceive and act on climate issues. These insights inform the development and testing of behaviourally informed solutions, enhancing both the implementation and effectiveness of climate policies. It addresses real-world challenges such as misinformation and the adoption of emerging technologies like heat pumps, translating ambitious climate goals into meaningful, actionable outcomes (Impact Canada, 2024[78]). Through PARCA, the Government of Canada is building a data-driven understanding of the drivers of acceptability of environmental policies and programmes and design reforms and related communications in a way that addresses those drivers.

Greening Public Administration

Greening public administration, which involves reducing waste and emissions from the public sector, contributes directly to achieving climate goals, and allows governments to demonstrate leadership promoting a broader green shift across society, and to build consensus with business and the public on emissions reduction policies. A number of OECD countries have acknowledged the importance of greening their public administrations, by integrating greening elements into their government-wide greening strategies, public administration reform plans or national climate and/or sustainability policies (Box ‎1.5). For example, Canada is committed to making its government operations net-zero by 2050 and enhancing its climate resilience by 2035. Some OECD countries have also set specific emission reduction targets for their public sector. France, for example, aims to achieve a 22% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2027, a 25% reduction in the energy consumption of state buildings and conserve 3.3 million cubic metres of water. Despite significant ambition in this area, more detailed data is required to accurately compare activities to green public administration across countries.

Box ‎1.5. Greening Public Administration

Promoting greening within the existing public building stock

To decarbonise and promote greening within existing public buildings, OECD governments are seeking ways to improve energy efficiency, phase out fossil fuels, promote renewable energy sources, reduce resource consumption, upgrade heating systems and other. Germany promotes energy conservation in public buildings by optimising heating systems, reducing in-person activities during winter holidays, recommending needs-based light control and encouraging energy-efficient behaviour among public servants (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, n.d.[79]). Switzerland invites public service providers and institutional investors to commit to individual efficiency and renewable energy goals by both 2026 and 2030 (Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, 2021[80]). Finland aims to improve energy efficiency of its public property by 1% each year (Ministry of Finance, n.d.[81]). New Zealand as an immediate priority is considering phasing out coal-fired boilers in the public sector, aiming to remove the largest and most active ones by the end of 2025 (Ministry for the Environment, 2023[82]).

Improving resilience of public services in Canada

Through its Greening Government Strategy, the Government of Canada pledged to strengthen climate resilience of its critical activities and services, thus minimising disruptions and managing financial risks related to climate change impacts (Government of Canada, 2024[83]). All departments in Canada are mandated to conduct regular climate risks assessments (at least every 5 years) and minimise identified risks. Canada further aims to equip public servants with the necessary guidance, tools and training to enhance their own climate resilience. Canada views a climate-resilient workforce a beneficial outcome of its greening government activities, as it will bolster business continuity of public administration in the face of large-scale disruptions.

France’s Green Tech Initiative

In 2020, France established the Green Tech initiative, which seeks to reduce the environmental footprint of digital technologies when delivering public sector operations and services. The initiative looks to achieve eco-responsible public services through 20 actions to adapt government operations to the environmental needs of the future, as well as specific provisions on the environmental consequences of digital technologies in the public sector. The initiative includes a strategic roadmap with specific goals and activities around: Developing awareness of the digital environmental footprint in the public sector, including measurement frameworks and data collection; Reducing the environmental footprint of digital technology in the public sector, for example through responsible digital procurement, and eco-design of digital services; and increased awareness, support, training in responsible digital actions and uses; and using digital technology to help achieve ecological and solidarity goals, promoting electrical and electronic equipment waste management and circular economy.

Source: (OECD, forthcoming[84]).

Managing Influence & Lobbying

Building public consensus on climate change policy requires that governments demonstrate that policy is made fairly, with the public interest at the forefront, and not to the benefit of any special groups or interests. Delivering emissions reduction and sustainability targets requires government to work with a broad range of external actors. Integrity frameworks must manage this engagement effectively, to reduce any risk that policy is captured by narrow interests and is less able to meet governments’ climate goals. With regard to climate change, oil and gas companies spend far more on influence activities than environmental advocacy groups and clean energy firms (Resimic, 2022[85]; Slowicek, 2022[86]; McCarthy, 2019[87]), increasing the risk of the overrepresentation of narrow interests. Misleading lobbying and campaigns can raise doubt, influence public opinion and reduce regulatory pressure to curb carbon emissions (Conway and Oreskes, 2010[88]; Supran and Oreskes, 2017[89]; Influence Map, 2022[90]) .

OECD data indicates a range of shortcomings in OECD countries’ integrity frameworks (OECD, 2024[91]), which create risks of less effective climate policy. Of 33 OECD countries, only 17 (52%) have defined lobbying in legislation, and only 13 (39%) have defined and proportionate sanctions in place for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying (ibid.). Furthermore, while 17 out of 33 OECD countries (52%) have a lobbying register in place, most do not provide sufficient transparency to help interested parties meaningfully understand who is influencing what policies and how. For instance, only 8 countries’ registers contain information about the legislation or regulation targeted by lobbying. Governments can strengthen lobbying and influence disclosure requirements to include information on the objective of lobbying activities, its beneficiaries, the actors and decisions targeted, and the practices used. They can also require industry associations to make policy makers aware if they represent minority views among their members and encourage companies to ensure consistency between their influence activity and their publicly stated goals. Governments may include objectives for mitigating corruption risks in the green transition in their national anti-corruption strategies to safeguard green policymaking and public investments.

Public institutions can also work to avoid any conflicts of interest in external input to climate initiatives from advisory bodies and expert groups. Private sector and non-government representatives in these groups often have direct access to policymaking without being subject to rules on engagement with outside organisations. This can increase conflict of interest and revolving door risks. Members of these groups may, consciously or not, favour the interests of their company or industry, increasing the risk that policy is not made in the public interest (Conway and Hermann, 2021[92]; OECD, 2022[93]). To ensure these groups support effective policy while mitigating risks of undue influence, countries need to implement rules that promote transparency, integrity and inclusiveness in advisory and expert groups, such as procedural rules, standards of conduct and rules on conflict of interest (OECD, 2024[94]). Broader mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest can also help to mitigate these risks. However, OECD countries have adopted 77% of OECD criteria for regulations on conflicts of interest, but have only implemented 42% of OECD criteria on conflict-of-interest management on average (Figure ‎1.18).

Climate change policy can also be influenced by revolving doors. However, 23 of 33 OECD countries (70%) do not track whether former ministers move into sectors which they previously regulated, and 24 of 33 (73%) do not track this information for former senior civil servants (Figure ‎1.19). It is important that governments review integrity frameworks and related strategies to mitigate these threats. More information on public integrity issues is provided in Chapter 12 “Integrity”.

Figure ‎1.18. Strength of regulations on conflict of interest and their implementation varies

Note: Data not provided or collected: Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary and New Zealand for regulation and practice, and Slovenia for practice.

Source: OECD (2024[91]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators.

Statlink

Figure ‎1.19. Countries tracking office holders’ movement into sectors they formerly regulated

Note: Inner circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for ministers is tracked. The outer circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for top-officials is tracked. Countries marked with an asterisk (*) have mandatory cooling-off periods for public officials.

Source: OECD (2024[91]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators.

Statlink

Access to Justice

Justice systems can reinforce public support for climate policies by ensuring that citizens can hold public institutions and private entities accountable for their environmental commitments. This is essential for the credibility of these policies and to prevent them from being undermined by non-compliance. This is an emerging area, and systematic evidence on the effectiveness of implementation remains at an early stage. However, some positive trends are emerging.

The number of environmental courts and tribunals (ECTs) has risen from 350 in 2009 to 2 115 across at least 44 countries in 2021 (UNEP, 2021[95]). The number of climate change litigation cases has also expanded in recent years, with more than 2 600 cases recorded globally. In 2023, at least 230 climate litigation cases were filed globally, a 20% increase from 2022. There was a 70% success rate in cases targeting misleading corporate claims (Higham and Setzer, 2024[96]). As efforts to combat and manage climate change intensify, it is important that public institutions continue to invest in environmental courts and tribunals, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and administrative justice procedures to ensure the swift and fair handling of climate-related cases. Countries such as Belgium, Australia, and Sweden have led efforts in establishing specialised courts or chambers (OECD, 2024[97]), while New Zealand has incorporated ADR frameworks to enhance efficiency and accessibility (Government of New Zealand, 2024[98]).

The justice system also plays a role in improving climate policies over time, through monitoring and refining regulatory frameworks. Accessible and responsive mechanisms, such as complaints mechanisms, administrative justice procedures, and ombudspersons, enable individuals and communities to raise concerns about unintended impacts of climate policies, without having to resort to conventional legal avenues (ENOC, 2022[99]). They also help to ensure the green transition is carried out fairly, by providing people and businesses with avenues to raise concerns, seek redress, and resolve disputes related to the impact of environmental policies and regulations (OECD, 2024[100]; ENOC, 2022[101]). This can help to prevent the escalation of conflicts that might arise from the perceived or actual impacts of green initiatives, such as land use changes, pollution controls, or regulatory shifts. They can also help to build trust between stakeholders by providing a neutral ground where grievances are addressed, fostering a sense of inclusion and fairness in the green transition (UNEP, 2019[102]).

It is important that justice institutions be accessible, inclusive, and responsive to all those affected by climate change, including specific groups such as indigenous communities, women, and youth. Indigenous peoples in particular require legal avenues to protect land rights and support sustainable resource management. Strengthening these communities' access to justice can build broader social consensus and engagement in climate policies. In some cases, non-profit organisations are filling this role, by providing financial and institutional support to help affected communities to engage in legal processes, such as Environmental Dispute Resolution Fund in Canada (EDRF, 2024[103]). Governments may consider how to better support access to justice for groups most affected by climate change.

Note on related OECD work

The chapter builds on past work under the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative (RDI), including the OECD Action Plan on Governing Green, which identified three key areas to advance the governing green agenda: steering and building consensus, using the right tools, and leading by example (OECD, 2022[104]; OECD, 2022[105]). The “Governing for the Green transition” policy framework presents an updated and simplified version. This chapter also complements the OECD’s NetZero+ project, which gathers and synthesizes the climate-related work of over 20 OECD thematic committees to provide analysis and recommendations for driving a rapid transition to net-zero emissions (OECD, 2024[106]). This chapter is closely supported by the forthcoming OECD NetZero+ paper “Governing Green Transition: Public Governance Arrangements for the Green Transition”, which also presents the “Governing for the Green transition” framework, and provides further guidance for practitioners and public servants working on green governance issues (OECD, 2025[63]).

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