The civil service is expected to uphold core values such as legality, integrity, fairness and merit, and operate without undue influence or interference in their management of people. The bodies that oversee the effective functioning of the civil service system and ensure adherence to these values are therefore essential. These institutions carry out key policy-setting, advisory, investigative and enforcement roles. Central human resource management (HRM) bodies typically fulfil the policy-setting and advisory functions, helping to co-ordinate public employment practices and transformations across ministries. Investigative functions – typically performed by merit or disciplinary boards – create accountability by obliging ministries to provide information, clarify, explain or justify conduct or employment decisions (OECD, 2020). Finally, enforcement functions – typically performed by administrative tribunals and some disciplinary boards encourage compliance and deter misconduct through the threat of disciplinary action or penalties. There is no one single approach to overseeing civil services and countries vary both in the number of oversight institutions (Figure 14.3) and their functions (Figure 14.2).
Most OECD countries (30 out of 35, 86%) have a central HRM body, the majority of which (28 out of 30, 93%) operate in an advisory capacity. The next most common are non-judicial entities (25 out of 35, 71%) and special judicial or administrative tribunals (22 out of 35, 63%). Standalone merit protection boards or other merit-related oversight institutions are not common (9 out of 35, 26%) even though widespread delegation of recruitment activities to ministries could enable different interpretations of rules and processes to emerge. In some countries which lack such a body, responsibility for merit protection lies with other relevant authorities. In Chile, for example, the Comptroller General of the Republic carries out merit protection functions while in Sweden the National Board of Appeals, a judicial or administrative tribunal, also reviews appeals against employment decisions. Similarly, few OECD countries (8 out of 35, 23%) have an independent civil service commission although these are more common in countries with parliamentary systems based on the UK model. Such commissions typically operate beyond an advisory capacity, but also have investigative and, in some cases, enforcement powers. Regardless of approach, upholding shared values and protecting against undue influence requires institutions to have the power to investigate and, at times, to intervene (OECD, 2020). Across OECD countries, oversight powers are generally quite strong with 31 out of 35 countries (89%) having at least one institution with investigative functions and 28 (80%) with enforcement functions (Figure 14.2).
The leadership arrangements of oversight institutions are crucial to their effectiveness, as they can significantly influence both their independence and their functionality. Political appointments of heads – by parliament, ministers or the prime minister – are common across OECD countries, occurring in 30 out of 35 countries (86%). However, the extent of political appointments varies within countries (Figure 14.3).
The length of appointments is one way to balance political alignment with the long-term independence of such institutions In OECD countries where political appointments are prevalent, it is rare for the heads of oversight institutions to hold permanent positions (Figure 14.3). Heads of civil service commissions, which often perform a wide range of functions, and non-judicial entities rarely have permanent appointments. In contrast, such appointments are more common in special judicial or administrative tribunals.
