Malicious software, or malware for short, has become a critical security threat to all who rely on the Internet for their daily business, whether they are large organisations or home users. While originating in criminal behaviour, the magnitude and impact of the malware threat are also influenced by the decisions and behaviour of legitimate market players such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), software vendors, e-commerce companies, hardware manufacturers, registrars and, last but not least, end users. This working paper reports on qualitative empirical research into the incentives of market players when dealing with malware. The results indicate a number of market-based incentive mechanisms that contribute to enhanced security but also other instances in which decentralised actions may lead to sub-optimal outcomes - i.e. where significant externalities emerge.
Economics of Malware
Security Decisions, Incentives and Externalities
Working paper
Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Abstract
In the same series
-
29 April 202643 Pages
-
14 April 202674 Pages
-
3 April 202657 Pages
-
4 March 202682 Pages
-
19 February 202682 Pages
-
30 January 202672 Pages
-
22 January 202688 Pages
-
Working paper
Insights from new data sources and AI‑assisted methods
26 November 202562 Pages
Related publications
-
Policy paper
Insights from country experiences
2 December 202529 Pages -
20 June 202449 Pages
-
Policy paper20 June 202459 Pages
-
Policy paper6 May 202420 Pages