Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2026

28. Ukraine

Main findings

Support to agriculture

For the fourth consecutive year, the Ukrainian agricultural sector has been significantly affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with policy responses addressing the ongoing wartime situation. Support to farmers in Ukraine, measured by the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), was volatile over the past three decades, mostly due to fluctuations in Market Price Support (MPS). In recent years, however, PSE fluctuations narrowed around low values, averaging 0.1% of gross farm receipts during 2023-25, well below the OECD average.

Over the past decade, domestic prices for oats, rye, sunflower and milk have been below world reference levels, mainly due to export restrictions for oats, rye and sunflower, while reflecting market-related factors rather than policy intervention in the case of milk. This generates transfers to consumers borne by farmers (negative MPS). In contrast, sugar and pig meat have benefited from tariff protection, resulting in domestic prices higher than world prices and generating transfers to farmers from consumers (MPS). MPS and support for the unconstrained use of variable inputs, including interest-rate subsidies for loans – which represent Ukraine’s most production and trade-distorting measures – account for 40% of transfers to farmers in 2023-25. Other forms of budgetary support primarily consist of agricultural tax benefits, complemented by investment grants and targeted payments to small farmers as well as additional support directed to farmers operating in areas impacted by the war.

Support for general services (General Service Support Estimate, GSSE) has historically been below the average of the countries covered in this report, accounting for 0.8% of the value of agricultural production in 2023-25. Most of this support is allocated to inspection and control, which has increased relative to the value of production in recent years. Yet, public spending on agricultural knowledge and innovation system has declined by more than half relative to the sector’s size, making it one of the lowest across all countries in this report. Expenditure on infrastructure has been relatively stable in absolute terms, with its share dropping to near zero in recent years. Overall, total support to the sector as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has fallen to 0.2% for 2023-25, compared to 0.4% twenty years ago.

Key policy changes in 2025-26

Ukraine undertook a major institutional restructuring in 2025 by merging three ministries to create the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, while simultaneously accelerating efforts to meet the requirements for accession to the European Union. The country advanced EU‑aligned reforms by renovating its agricultural support framework, redefining support concepts and establishing a paying‑agency model with stronger monitoring and transparency. Ukraine also strengthened policy digitalisation via the State Agrarian Register as the mandatory entry point for support. In parallel, EU systems for farm‑level data collection (FSDN) and for managing, monitoring, and controlling agricultural payments (IACS) are being progressively integrated.

Agricultural land demining capacity – in response to explosive‑ordnance contamination caused by the war – expanded substantially in 2025. This has been supported by an increase in certified operators, the scaling‑up of market‑based demining through the fully electronic public procurement platform, updated compensation rules, and the launch of the GRIT digital platform to co‑ordinate and monitor clearance activities.

Trade policy advanced significantly through the entry into force of the upgraded EU-Ukraine trade agreement in October 2025. The signing of a modernised Ukraine-EFTA free trade agreement in April 2025 foresees a further expansion of market access for Ukrainian agro-food products.

Assessment and recommendations

• Maximise gains from expanded market access by prioritising investment in transport, storage, and export infrastructure. While deeper integration with EU and EFTA markets creates major opportunities for Ukraine’s agricultural sector, their full benefits depend on restoring reliable logistics. Scaling up domestic and international financing to rebuild critical infrastructure will be essential to ensure farmers can efficiently access markets and fully capitalise on export potential.

• Complement investments in logistics by strengthening compliance capacity to meet EU and other high‑value market standards. Enabling farmers to benefit from expanded market access will require scaling up inspection and control systems, traceability, and quality assurance, alongside expanded advisory services and improved access to finance to support on‑farm upgrades and compliance.

• Strengthen the efficiency and predictability of trade flows by reducing reliance on export restrictions, diversifying trade partnerships, and gradually reducing domestic protection in sectors such as sugar and pork. Reducing over-reliance on a limited number of markets can strengthen resilience to external shocks, while closer alignment with international market conditions can enhance producers’ competitiveness.

• Use the suspension of traditional support programmes as an opportunity to shift towards a more productive, sustainable and resilient agricultural sector. Efforts should focus on enabling producers to operate in a low-support environment by pursuing trade opportunities and strengthening key enablers such as market intelligence, weather information, and risk-management finance. As resources become available, priority should be given to investments in sustainable productivity growth, particularly innovation and knowledge transfer, guided by the recently adopted Strategy for the Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas in Ukraine until 2030 to ensure clear prioritisation, synergies, and effective monitoring.

• Ensure that digitalisation and governance reforms are effectively prioritised and sequenced to support broader sector transformation goals. While Ukraine is making important progress in strengthening the institutional governance of agricultural support and advancing policy digitalisation – “no regret” reforms that improve policy efficiency, transparency, and administrative effectiveness – these efforts should remain aligned with sectoral challenges and not divert attention from other pressing priorities and broader long-term policy objectives beyond alignment with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. Careful sequencing and prioritisation of no-regret reforms and investments, guided by key strategic objectives of the recently adopted Strategy until 2030, will help ensure balanced and holistic sector development.

Key indicators on agricultural support

Table 28.1. Ukraine: Estimates of support to agriculture

Million USD

	2000-02	2023-25	2023	2024	2025p
Total value of production (at farm gate)	9 619	33 404	32 333	32 298	35 583
of which: share of MPS commodities (%)	86.77	79.31	76.78	79.32	81.82
Total value of consumption (at farm gate)	8 841	23 177	21 872	23 835	23 822
Producer Support Estimate (PSE)	23	21	-377	205	234
Support based on commodity output	-444	-649	-670	-586	-690
Market price support¹	-560	-649	-670	-586	-690
Positive market price support	388	196	255	93	240
Negative market price support	-948	-845	-925	-680	-929
Payments based on output	116	0	0	0	0
Payments based on input use	203	195	214	168	203
Based on variable input use	169	163	196	133	161
with input constraints	0	0	0	0	0
Based on fixed capital formation	31	31	18	34	42
with input constraints	0	0	0	0	0
Based on on-farm services	2	1	0	1	1
with input constraints	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on current A/An/R/I, production required	265	474	78	624	720
Based on Receipts / Income	265	409	78	504	645
Based on Area planted / Animal numbers	0	65	0	120	75
with input constraints	0	33	0	70	30
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production required	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production not required	0	0	0	0	0
With variable payment rates	0	0	0	0	0
with commodity exceptions	0	0	0	0	0
With fixed payment rates	0	0	0	0	0
with commodity exceptions	0	0	0	0	0
Payments based on non-commodity criteria	0	0	0	0	0
Based on long-term resource retirement	0	0	0	0	0
Based on a specific non-commodity output	0	0	0	0	0
Based on other non-commodity criteria	0	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous payments	0	0	0	0	0
Percentage PSE (%)	0.25	0.10	-1.16	0.62	0.64
Producer NPC (coeff.)	0.95	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Producer NAC (coeff.)	1.00	1.00	0.99	1.01	1.01
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)	121	280	257	292	290
Agricultural knowledge and innovation system	51	80	71	84	84
Inspection and control	26	172	153	182	180
Development and maintenance of infrastructure	36	19	24	16	17
Marketing and promotion	1	-0	0	0	0
Cost of public stockholding	1	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous	7	9	9	10	9
Percentage GSSE (% of TSE)	82.48	88.82	.	58.78	55.33
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)	408	685	637	683	734
Transfers to producers from consumers	501	665	662	593	741
Other transfers from consumers	-38	28	-5	98	-7
Transfers to consumers from taxpayers	-0	-0	0	0	0
Excess feed cost	-55	-9	-19	-7	0
Percentage CSE (%)	4.59	2.96	2.91	2.87	3.08
Consumer NPC (coeff.)	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
Consumer NAC (coeff.)	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
Total Support Estimate (TSE)	144	300	-120	497	523
Transfers from consumers	-464	-694	-657	-691	-734
Transfers from taxpayers	646	966	542	1 090	1 265
Budget revenues	-38	28	-5	98	-7
Percentage TSE (% of GDP)	0.38	0.16	-0.07	0.26	0.25
Total Budgetary Support Estimate (TBSE)	705	949	550	1 084	1 213
Percentage TBSE (% of GDP)	1.83	0.50	0.30	0.57	0.58
GDP deflator (2000-02 = 100)	100	3 598	3 167	3 556	4 071
Exchange rate (national currency per USD)	5.38	39.47	36.57	40.15	41.69

.. Not available

Note: p: provisional. NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient. NAC: Nominal Assistance Coefficient.

A/An/R/I: Area planted/Animal numbers/Receipts/Income.

1. Market Price Support (MPS) is net of producer levies and excess feed cost. MPS commodities for Ukraine are: wheat, maize, rye, barley, oats, sunflower, sugar, potatoes, milk, beef and veal, pig meat, poultry and eggs.

Source: OECD (2026), “Producer and Consumer Support Estimates”, OECD Agricultural policy monitoring (database), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.

Policy landscape

Main policy instruments

The agricultural sector in Ukraine receives support through agricultural taxation arrangements, budgetary allocations, market regulations, and trade policies. The current policy framework is outlined in the Strategy for the Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas in Ukraine until 2030, introduced in November 2024, together with its corresponding Operational Plan of Measures for Implementation in 2025‑2027.

Tax concessions to agricultural producers

Agricultural producers are eligible for the Single Tax Regime, a flat rate tax of 0.95% of the normative value of farmland, introduced in 1995 and subsequently adjusted based on the general consumer price index. This Single Tax regroups and replaces several previous taxes, including the profit tax, the land tax for land used in agricultural production, and the special water-use fee. This reduces the overall tax burden for eligible farmers, namely those whose agricultural production accounts for at least 75% of their total output. Additionally, a minimum tax liability regime, introduced in 2022, requires that producers’ and landowners’ combined tax and social security payments amount to at least 5% of the normative land value annually.

Budgetary support

Budgetary support for agriculture includes partial compensation for agricultural machinery and equipment costs (reimbursement of eligible purchase expenditures), matching grants (investment co-financing), interest rate subsidies and loan guarantees, along with area- and animal-based payments granted under specific conditions. The composition of support measures varies across agricultural sub‑sectors:

• The livestock sector receives support through grants for smallholders, reimbursements for the construction and reconstruction of animal farms and buildings, and per-head payments for cows to agricultural enterprises and for young cattle to rural households. Livestock producers are also eligible for partial compensation for the purchase of breeding animals, semen, and embryos, except in 2025, when this programme was temporarily suspended.

• The crop sector benefits from grants for smallholders, subsidies for cultivated land located in warfare-affected zones, and reimbursements for on-farm investments in domestically produced machinery.

• Processing facilities, as well as newly established vineyards, horticultural operations and greenhouses can access dedicated matching-grant schemes, which were recently extended to cotton production.

• Across all sectors, producers may also access two major financing programmes: interest‑rate compensation provided under the “Affordable 5‑7‑9” programme (which offers loans at preferential interest rates of 5%, 7% or 9% depending on borrower characteristics and loan conditions), and partial credit guarantees provided through the Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (PCGF).

• New programmes have emerged in response to the war, including cost‑sharing for irrigation rehabilitation, the wartime smallholder subsidy programme based on land area and livestock numbers, and targeted support for farmers located in warfare-affected areas.

In addition, several policy measures have been implemented to clear agricultural lands of unexploded ordnance resulting from the war, which has rendered large areas unsafe for cultivation and poses significant risks to local populations, with approximately 132 000 square kilometres estimated to be contaminated as of February 2026. These measures include developing a market for agricultural land demining services, whereby the government covers the demining costs for private service providers participating in public auctions. Another programme reimburses up to 80% of the demining costs directly incurred by farmers who decide to clear their own plots. The National Mine Action Authority, supported by international partners, coordinates these efforts under the Action Plan for the demining of agricultural land, launched in 2023.

Consumer support measures

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian Government has capped retail markups at 10% for a range of socially significant products, including wheat flour, pasteurised milk, bread, chicken eggs, poultry, and refined sunflower oil, excluding organic products. In addition, a maximum payment term of 10 days has been introduced for these and several other selected domestically produced goods to improve liquidity for commodity producers.

Sustainability and climate policies

Ukraine’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) for 2030 includes a target to reduce GHG emissions by 65% compared to 1990 levels, raise the share of renewable energy to at least 27% of gross final energy consumption, and diversify energy sources. In addition, the National Climate Strategy approved in 2024 aims to promote low carbon development, renewable energy expansion, and climate‑resilient food production by 2035.

Agricultural land market regulations

Since 1 January 2024, individual Ukrainian citizens and eligible Ukrainian legal entities may acquire up to 10 000 hectares of agricultural land. Private land (37 million ha or 87% of total farmland) can be both sold or leased independently, whereas communal land (12%) and state land (1%) may only be leased through auctions on the electronic public procurement platform “Prozorro.Sales”, which is intended to ensure a fair lease price. Foreigners currently do not have the right to acquire ownership of agricultural land in Ukraine.

Trade policies

Import tariffs are in place for most agricultural products, with applied Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs for agricultural products averaging 9.1%, above the average for non-agricultural products of 3.6% (WTO, 2025[1]). Most import tariffs are ad valorem, with the exception of raw cane sugar, which has a global tariff rate quota. Since there is usually excess sugar supply in the Ukrainian market, this quota has only been used in 2011 and 2021. Export duties are applied to some oilseeds, live animals, and raw hides (WTO, 2024[2]). Government-defined minimum export prices apply to major exported products such as grains (including wheat, maize, barley, oats and rye) and oilseeds (sunflower, soybean and rapeseed).

To boost its export volumes and diversify its trade, Ukraine has expanded its network of regional trade agreements (RTAs) since 1995 and is now a party to 19 such agreements. While the initial partners of its RTAs in the 1990s were primarily countries from the region (Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia), more recent agreements have included members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 2012, the European Union and Canada in 2017, and Israel and the United Kingdom in 2021 (WTO, 2024[2]).

Under its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Ukraine provides preferential tariff treatment to agricultural products that meet origin requirements, with applied tariff rates being significantly lower than the Most Favoured Nation tariff rate for most agricultural goods. Ukraine offers preferential market access through tariff quotas with duty-free in-quota rates in its FTAs with Canada, the European Union, and North Macedonia (WTO, 2024[2]).

Following the application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union in January 2016, Ukraine’s trade relations shifted significantly. Russia subsequently suspended the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) free trade agreement with Ukraine, and imposed a ban on imports of Ukrainian agro-food products. In response, Ukraine implemented a ban on imports from Russia. This ban now covers 46 agricultural product groups, including meat and meat by-products, fish, milk and dairy products, tea, coffee, grain, baby foods, beer, vodka and cigarettes. Ukraine had also abolished zero import duty rates for goods from Russia. Both measures remained in place through the end of 2026.

Some restrictions on exports are made through mechanisms such as bans, quotas, minimum export prices and licensing mechanisms for specific products. For example, to prevent shortages in domestic markets during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war, the government implemented temporary bans on exports of several agricultural products (e.g. buckwheat between April and July 2020, and live bovine animals, beef, rye, oats, and millet in 2023). Additionally, export quotas were imposed on certain goods, such as sugar from July to September 2023, and export licensing requirements were enforced for products including cattle, beef, chicken, eggs, rye, buckwheat, wheat, millet, maize, sugar, and sunflower oil throughout 2023 (WTO, 2024[2]).

In addition, annual memoranda of understanding between the government and key stakeholders in the grains markets outline maximum export volumes. Although they are not binding, these agreements aim to prevent the introduction of export restrictions, ensure food security, and provide stability and predictability for market participants (WTO, 2024[2]).

Recent policy developments

Domestic policy developments in 2025-26

Three overlapping priorities

In 2025, agricultural policy in Ukraine was shaped by three overlapping priorities: advancing EU integration, maintaining wartime support for producers, and adapting to institutional restructuring. The government merged the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food with the Ministries of Economy and Environment to establish the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MEEA). At the same time, Ukraine intensified its EU‑accession efforts, with the Ministry leading legislative screenings between June and September 2025 for Chapter 11 (Agriculture and Rural Development) and Chapter 12 (Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy) of the EU acquis communautaire under the EU accession negotiating framework.

Budgetary support

From 2025, registration in the State Agrarian Register (SAR) became compulsory for most agricultural support programmes. The SAR functions as Ukraine’s unified digital platform for administering agricultural support and improving the transparency, targeting and monitoring of beneficiaries.

The subsidy programme for cultivated land in warfare zones, supporting more than 3 000 crop farmers across eight frontline and borderline regions, was simplified. The previous two‑tier system was replaced with a single flat payment of UAH 1 000 (USD 25) per hectare for both active and potential warfare areas.

The matching‑grant programme for horticulture and greenhouse development was suspended in April 2025 due to budget shortages, with the intention to resume the programme in 2026 with renewed funding. A new area-based subsidy for cotton production was also launched in 2025, providing UAH 10 000 (USD 250) per hectare. The subsidy for cow breeding and livestock farm reconstruction was partially revived in 2025 through a new capital‑cost compensation mechanism providing 25% reimbursement for the construction and renovation of livestock facilities, although uptake remained limited due to the late launch and funding uncertainties.

The Affordable Loans 5‑7‑9% programme’s working‑capital financing component was extended through March 2027 to help maintain liquidity in the sector. Complementing these measures, the Partial Credit Guarantee Fund targeting farms under 500 ha was expanded in 2025, increasing its guarantee coverage from 50% to 80% of loan amounts and extending eligibility to family farms.

In response to the 2025 vegetable price spike, the government expanded matching grants for the construction of fruit and vegetable cold storage facilities. For 2026, co‑financing is set up to 30% of costs (50% in warfare areas), with the aim of reducing the estimated 340 000 tonne storage gap, defined as the difference between estimated needs and actual storage capacity. Also in 2026, the government expanded irrigation support: for the first time, Water User Organizations now have access to sprinkler‑irrigation cost‑sharing funds. The government also adopted a long‑term irrigation strategy to 2050 to address water shortages in rain‑fed agriculture.

Demining of agricultural land

Public efforts in demining was significantly expanded in 2025, including a sharp increase in certified mine‑action operators; a major upscaling of the market‑based agricultural demining programme via government procurement Prozorro auctions; substantial new government funding for reimbursement of humanitarian demining; continued major clearance efforts by Ministry of Defence units; major new international financial commitments; and the launch in December 2025 of the GRIT national digital platform to support data-driven planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of demining activities through integrated datasets and digital land‑mapping technologies.

Compensation rules for the demining of agricultural land were revised in 2025 to broaden eligible beneficiaries and tighten ineligibility criteria. At the same time, new procedures were introduced for analysing soil after explosive‑ordnance clearance to ensure safe agricultural reuse and a formalised process was established to assess lands receiving local tax benefits due to explosive‑ordnance contamination risks, including rules for documentation, territorial limitations, and appeal mechanisms.

Institutional and legislative changes

Ukraine has been reforming its agricultural support framework through a new law that redefined:

• state‑support concepts (e.g. paying agency, active producer, risky farming zone)

• support instruments (e.g. investments, co‑operation, credit tools)

• governance, by introducing a paying‑agency model with enhanced monitoring, sanctions, and data transparency.

The state also advanced digitalisation of agricultural policy by establishing the State Agrarian Register (SAR) as the mandatory entry point for support. In parallel, it initiated the phased integration of EU systems for farm‑level sustainability data collection (FSDN) and for managing, monitoring, and controlling agricultural payments (IACS).

The e‑Beekeeping service of the MEEA was launched in 2025 to improve co‑ordination between farmers and beekeepers during vegetation and plant‑protection‑product application periods. In the same year, industrial hemp production was simplified through a shift to a declaration‑based system, allowing producers to operate without prior authorisation.

Agri-environmental policies

In 2025, Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) processes for climate policy action were restarted, and an Operational Plan was approved to mandate the development of climate‑adaptation action plans across multiple sectors – such as water management, biodiversity, forestry, and agriculture and soils – which may indirectly influence agricultural land use.

Ukraine submitted its Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement in October 2025 – setting a 2035 emissions‑reduction target of more than 65% below 1990 levels. It also adopted an Emissions Trading System Action Plan, initiating alignment with the corresponding EU Directive and extending potential compliance requirements to large agri‑industrial processors.

Trade policy developments in 2025-26

Over 2025-26, Ukraine adjusted its trade policy in response to evolving market conditions and its deepening trade integration with the EU, combining export restrictions with gradual liberalisation. At the end of 2025, Ukraine extended export licensing requirements for wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower seeds to five neighbouring EU countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) and introduced a new quota for sugar exported to EU countries. In addition, the Export Support Mechanism, which conditions exports on VAT registration and minimum export prices, was prolonged in 2025. That same year, due to higher harvests and lower early‑season exports, the government refrained from signing its usual non‑binding memorandum with grain traders for the first time since 2011, a document that typically outlines indicative export limits to support food security and market stability.

A new 10% export tariff on rapeseed and soybeans was introduced in 2025 for non‑producer exporters, with a gradual reduction scheduled from 2030 onward, while the long‑standing export duty on sunflower seeds – set at 10% since 1999 –has been set at 0% for exports to EU countries from 2026 (but remain unchanged for other destinations). A dedicated export quota for sugar intended exclusively for shipments to EU Member States was introduced in 2026.

In 2025, Ukraine moved through three different trade regimes with the EU: the EU’s less restrictive autonomous trade measures (ATMs), in place since 2022, ended in June 2025 when pre‑war tariff‑rate quotas where temporarily reinstated; the upgraded trade agreement then entered into force in October 2025 and expanded market access.

In April 2025, Ukraine and the EFTA countries signed a modernised version of their 2012 free trade agreement, expanding market access and reducing import restrictions in both directions. This includes the elimination of certain tariffs and increases in quotas for a wide range of Ukrainian agri-food product, including grains, poultry meat, sugar and eggs. EFTA countries will also benefit from improved market access for some of their agricultural products such as cheese, yoghurt and chocolate, while geographical indications for agricultural products will be better recognised between the trade partners.

Policy context

Key economic and agricultural statistics

Agriculture plays a substantial role in the Ukrainian economy, in large part because Ukraine has a relatively large area of fertile arable land. The importance of agriculture in the economy has declined over time but remains a key sector representing 7.1% of the GDP, 14.1% of employment, and almost 60% of total exports in 2024 (Table 28.2).

Ukraine’s economy recorded growth of 2.9% in 2024 (Figure 28.3), although Ukraine’s GDP remains below pre-war levels. GDP growth is expected to have slowed in 2025, reflecting a widening trade deficit – driven by weak agri-food and mineral exports and a sharp increase in industrial imports – along with higher budget spending on defence, security and social protection as well as disruptions to local value chains, linked to damage to energy infrastructure. At the same time, a decline in annual inflation to 6.8% in 2024 was achieved through monetary policy measures and a limited depreciation of the hryvnia against the US dollar. Inflation is expected to have increased in 2025 amid a widening budget deficit and cost shocks. Meanwhile, substantial external financial support, including a EUR 90 billion EU package and an IMF Extended Fund Facility of USD 8.1 billion, contributed to cushioning macroeconomic shocks and rebuilding reserves.

Weather conditions in 2025 were not very favourable for agricultural production in Ukraine. While climatic conditions during the winter and spring were mild for winter crops formation, a severe summer drought reduced harvest of spring crops such as corn, sunflower and soybeans. In particular, sunflower yields reached a 10-year low. Moreover, a cold and rainy autumn delayed the harvesting of spring crops and led to a deterioration in their quality.

Table 28.2. Ukraine: Contextual indicators

	Ukraine		International comparison
	2000*	2024*	2000*	2024*
Economic context			Share in total of all countries
GDP (billion USD in PPPs)	210	657	0.5%	0.4%
Population (million)	50	38	1.1%	0.7%
Land area (thousand km2)	579	579	0.7%	0.7%
Agricultural area (AA) (thousand ha)	41 406	41 311	1.4%	1.4%
			All countries1
Population density (inhabitants/km2)	86	65	52	64
GDP per capita (USD in PPPs)	4 228	18 550	9 508	31 740
Trade as % of GDP	44.1	29.4	12.3	15.0
Agriculture in the economy			All countries1
Agriculture in GDP (%)	14.0	7.1	3.0	3.6
Agriculture share in employment (%)	18.3	14.1	-	-
Agro-food exports (% of total exports)	10.1	59.3	6.4	8.3
Agro-food imports (% of total imports)	6.1	9.4	6.1	7.5
Characteristics of the agricultural sector			All countries1
Crop in total agricultural production (%)	59.3	76.9	62.1	60.4
Livestock in total agricultural production (%)	40.7	23.1	37.9	39.6
Share of arable land in AA (%)	78.6	79.7	33.0	34.0

Note: *or closest available year.

1. Average of all countries covered in this report.

Sources: OECD statistical databases; International Labour Organisation (ILO); UN Comtrade; World Bank, WDI; FAO database and national data.

Ukraine is among the world’s leading exporters of agricultural commodities, in particular grain products (wheat, barley and maize) and vegetable oils (rapeseed and sunflower). Exports of agro-food products grew steadily from 2015 to 2021, reaching a high of USD 26.7 billion before the war (Figure 28.4). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, exports declined in 2022 and 2023, but subsequently recovered to USD 24.7 billion in 2024, supported by the full restoration of deep-water port operations in the Odesa region. Most agro-food exports are primary and processed products used by industry. European Union countries remain the primary destination for Ukrainian exports, accounting for around half of total agro-food exports in 2025.

Ukraine’s total factor productivity (TFP) has improved significantly, rising from negative levels in the 1990s to a positive growth rate of 1.1% over the period 2014-23, exceeding the global average (Figure 28.5). Over the same period, the use of intermediate inputs and primary factors continued to decline. As a result, overall output growth remained slightly negative, at around -0.5%, and well below the global average.

Although agriculture’s contribution to the Ukrainian economy has declined, its share of national GHG emissions increased from 8.3% in 1991-2000 to 14.2% in 2014-23 (Table 28.3). Over the same period, the nitrogen balance per hectare dropped sharply to levels far below the OECD average (6.8 kg/ha), likely due to the war’s impact on fertiliser availability and prices. The phosphorus balance became negative (‑3.6 kg/ha), raising concerns about the long-term sustainability of soil fertility. Since the onset of the war, soil health has become a critical challenge, with large areas of agricultural land rendered unusable due to contamination from chemicals and landmines.

Table 28.3. Ukraine: Productivity and environmental indicators

	Ukraine		International comparison
	1991-2000	2014-23	1991-2000	2014-23
			World
TFP annual growth rate (%)	-0.3%	1.1%	1.8%	0.8%
			OECD average
Environmental indicators	2000*	2024*	2000*	2024*
Nitrogen balance, kg/ha	23.9	6.8	32.3	29.0
Phosphorus balance, kg/ha	2.6	-3.6	3.3	2.3
Agriculture share of total energy use (%)	2.1	4.3	1.7	2.0
Agriculture share of GHG emissions (%)	8.3	14.2	8.7	10.3
Share of irrigated land in AA (%)	1.3	0.2	-	-
Share of agriculture in water abstractions (%)	36.8	28.4	46.1	47.7
Water stress indicator	..	..	..	..

Note: * or closest available year.

Sources: USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Productivity database; OECD statistical databases; FAO database and national data.

Historical trends in agricultural policies

Prior to the 1990s, Ukraine’s economy, including agriculture, was centrally planned as part of the Soviet Union. The state administered prices and state enterprises controlled the production and marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs as well as the processing and distribution of food. The first reforms initiating a transition towards a market-based economy began at the end of the 1980s. A limited right to private production was established for land leased from collective farms or individuals, enabling the establishment of private family farms (von Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2008[3]).

However, Ukraine went through an economic crisis in the early 1990s, involving significant economic contraction and inflation that impacted the agricultural sector and resulted in substantial reductions in agricultural output and productivity. Consequently, several trade and price liberalisation policy reforms were reversed in the mid-1990s. Renewed reforms in agribusiness privatisation and collective farm restructuring intensified only after macroeconomic stabilisation in the 2000s (OECD/The World Bank, 2004[4]). While prior to the 1990s, the state owned all land,1 today about three-quarters of agricultural land is private property (StateGeoCadastre, 2017[5]).2

In 2005, the State Agrarian Fund was established as a state-owned public joint stock company (reorganised in 2013). Its initial mandate was to regulate grain prices through intervention purchases, to store grain in state-owned silos and sell it to bakeries to guarantee bread prices, and to provide loans to grain producers. The fund progressively became involved in other activities, such as state purchases and sales of a broad range of agricultural and food products; forward contracts; flour processing and wholesaling; and sales of fuel and mineral fertilisers to producers (OECD, 2015[6]). Starting in 2016, no state funds were allocated to the Agrarian Fund for the purchase of grain, and since 2020 the activities of the Agrarian Fund are excluded from the law that provides support to agriculture. In 2023, the Agrarian Fund was transferred from the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine to the State Property Fund.

Prior to the large-scale military aggression of Russia, two key events helped shape agricultural policies today in Ukraine. First, in 2008, Ukraine became a member of the WTO, setting its agricultural bound tariffs at an average of 10.8%, expanding its export opportunities, and contributing to changes in the system of state support for agriculture. Second, in 2014, the European Union and Ukraine signed the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as part of their Association Agreement. The DCFTA formally entered into force in September 2017 and involves tariff reductions and duty-free import quotas to facilitate trade between Ukraine and the European Union, including in agricultural and food products.

Other free trade agreements (FTAs) in which Ukraine is engaged include the FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in force since June 2012; the multilateral FTA with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in force since August 2012; bilateral agreements with all CIS members; and the Canada-Ukraine FTA, in force since August 2017.3 FTAs with Israel and the United Kingdom entered into force in January 2021. In February 2022, Ukraine and Türkiye signed a new FTA that is expected to enter into force in 2024. Since 2022, Ukraine has initiated the withdrawal from several CIS agreements, encompassing economic co-operation, trade, customs, among others.

From 1999 to 2016, the state provided significant support based on an agriculture-specific VAT regime. Agricultural producers accumulated in special bank accounts the VAT due on their primary and processed products. The accumulated funds could be used by farmers to cover VAT on purchased inputs, with the residual available for any other production purpose. From 2014 to 2016, this mechanism provided 90% of total state support. In 2017, the Development Subsidy partially replaced this source of support, before the support was phased out altogether in 2018. Other domestic policy measures notably comprised input subsidies, tax concessions, price controls, import tariffs, non-tariff trade regulation, minimum purchase prices, direct state purchases, and preferential loans (Table 28.2).

The farmland market in Ukraine has passed several stages of reform since the country’s independence in 1991: transformation of Soviet collective farms into cooperatives (1991-1994); distribution of land shares among members of the cooperatives (1994-2001); implementation of a moratorium banning the purchase and sale of land, while leasing for cultivation remained permitted (2002-2021); launch of the agricultural land market for individual citizens, with a purchase limit of up to 100 ha (2021-2024); and opening of the land market to legal entities, allowing purchases of up to 10 000 ha by Ukrainian individual citizens as well as Ukrainian legal entities, including companies, banks and territorial communities (since 2024). Foreigners remain prohibited from purchasing agricultural land in Ukraine.

Table 28.4. Ukraine: Agricultural policy trends

Period	Framework	Changes in agricultural policies
Prior to 1990s	Planned economy	Planned agricultural production, state administered prices State controlled value chain and agricultural trade, including marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs
1990-2000	Transition economy: gradual reforms towards market economy, interrupted by deep economic crisis in the early 1990s	Increased import tariffs for agricultural and processed food products Land reform to allow private ownership Gradual dismantling of centralised marketing schemes Reversal of reforms during economic crisis
2000-2022	Renewed reforms towards an open economy	Reduction of agricultural tariffs following WTO accession Export taxes and quotas for main exported products, successively eliminated or replaced by MoUs State Agrarian Fund (price controls, production controls, marketing, loans, etc.) with market interventions through minimum reference prices and state food purchases successively reduced Sugar production quotas until 2018 Various subsidies for inputs, interest support and tax concessions
2022-present	Period of martial law due to large-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation	Reallocation of agricultural support funds to security and defence Suspension of traditional support programmes Introduction of temporary measures applicable during period of martial law, including tax breaks, food security measures, and simplified regulatory requirements

Due to the negative MPS only partly offset by transfers to producers through tax concessions and other measures, support to agricultural producers was negative for most of the 1990s. While the level continued to fluctuate over the recent decade, it has been closer to zero (Figure 28.7). With little budgetary support to general services or consumers, total support to the sector remained small for most of the past 25 years.

References

[6] OECD (2015), Sector competitiveness strategy for Ukraine - Phase III. Review of Agricultural Investment Policies of Ukraine, OECD Eurasia Competitiveness Programme, https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/eastern-partners/Agricultural_Investment_Policies_Ukraine_ENG.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2023).

[4] OECD/The World Bank (2004), Achieving Ukraine’s Agricultural Potential: Stimulating Agricultural Growth and Improving Rural Life, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264055841-en.

[5] StateGeoCadastre (2017), Review of the State of Land Relations in Ukraine, https://land.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Land-Review-Monthly_3_final-1.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2023).

[3] von Cramon-Taubadel, S. et al. (2008), “Ukraine”, in Anderson, K. and J. Swinnen (eds.), Distortions to agricultural incentives in Europe’s transition economies, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

[1] WTO (2025), World Tariff Profiles 2025, WTO ITC UNCTAD, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world_tariff_profiles25_e.htm (accessed on 13 March 2026).

[2] WTO (2024), Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s467_e.pdf.

Notes

← 1.  Article 3 of the Land Code of the Ukrainian SSR, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2874%D0%B0-07/ed19920101#Text.

← 2.  More recent estimates suggest that the share of private property in agricultural land is even higher, at 80%: Mykola Solsky (People’s Deputy, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy), “It’s all about the land”, 2 April 2020, https://www.epravda.com/ua/columns/2020/04/2/658911/.

← 3.  Other members and associate members of the CIS are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.