All three jurisdictions at stake are characterised by the presence of an incumbent online marketplace, with substantial market share and few close competitors. In particular, looking at the seller side of core general online marketplaces, they represent the main viable pathway for sellers to reach consumers within the relevant geographic boundaries. Competition between online marketplaces in these jurisdictions is shaped by the presence of strong indirect network effects, significant economies of scale and barriers to switching and multi-homing. Key players have also undertaken a strategy of vertical and conglomerate expansion, strengthening their platform ecosystems. Across all three jurisdictions, the combination of structural features and strategic conduct has made market entry or expansion in core general online marketplaces increasingly difficult, giving rise to risks of the incumbents’ market positions becoming entrenched. This chapter presents a holistic assessment of the state of competition between online marketplaces in the three countries under review.
Competition Market Study of Online Marketplaces in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania
Abstract
The following chapter presents an assessment of the state of competition between online marketplaces in the three countries under review. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.1. presents market share estimates for the consumer side and seller side of online marketplaces for each of the three countries. In doing so, it provides an overview of the extent of market concentration and a summary of the market position of key players. Section 7.2 analyses the key dimensions of horizontal competition in online marketplaces in the three countries, including barriers to entry. Section 7.3 examines related vertical, conglomerate and ecosystem dimensions of competition, as relevant to online marketplaces in each of the three countries.
Taken together, these different elements will provide a full picture of the functioning of the markets for online marketplaces in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
For each of the three countries in turn, this section presents estimates of market shares on both the consumer side and the seller side, before commenting on the extent of market concentration and summarising the market position of the key players. Annex A describes the methodology used by the OECD to calculate the market shares in detail.
The estimates in this section are based on the relevant competitor sets defined by the OECD in Chapter 6, for both the consumer side and the seller side. In some cases, multiple scenarios are presented to provide a more nuanced picture of the relevant competitive conditions. For simplicity, these estimates and scenarios are referred to as market shares, but they should not be considered as resulting from a formal market definition exercise.
For the purpose of this report, the OECD’s market share estimates are calculated based on user traffic. User traffic represents the best source of comparable data available to the OECD which includes all of the market players from the relevant competitor sets defined in Chapter 6.
More specifically, traffic data captures the extent to which consumers are actively visiting the relevant platforms (incorporating both the number of consumers accessing the platform and the frequency at which they do so). As such, even though this data does not specify the number or value of actual transactions made via these platforms, it serves as a proxy for this information. To improve this approximation, the OECD used the bounce rate of each platform to remove all the website visits which ended after a single page view, leaving only the website’s “engaged visits” which reflect sessions that continue beyond the user’s landing page, providing a more accurate picture of user engagement and a closer approximation to the number of transactions taking place (see Annex A for further detail).
This approach is supported by the OECD’s finding that the relative size of particular companies is consistent between the traffic data used and the limited available revenue data (as presented in Chapter 4).Therefore, the OECD considers it appropriate to use traffic data in this report to provide an indication of the level of concentration in online marketplaces, particularly in the absence of suitably comprehensive alternative.
However, the OECD notes that this approach is most appropriate on the consumer side of online marketplaces, where consumer traffic data can be considered as a reasonable proxy for transactions taking place on the consumer side. On the seller side, analysing traffic data for all platforms which are “open” to locally based sellers may overstate the extent to which these platforms are actually “active” on the seller side within the relevant jurisdiction, especially for very recent entrants.
Finally, market shares are a useful tool for quantifying the structure of markets and assessing the degree of market concentration. However, the picture provided by static market shares is not sufficient alone to assess the intensity of competition with a particular market and other factors must be considered, including the durability of market shares over time and the potential for new entry (OECD, 2022[1]; 2018[2]). As such, the market share estimates are presented in this section as a precursor to the detailed discussion of horizontal competition in online marketplaces, including consideration of barriers to entry, which will follow in Section 7.2.
7.1.1. Poland
Consumer side
First, this section sets out the OECD’s market share estimates for the consumer side of general online marketplaces in Poland, defined above in Section 6.1.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Looking first at core general online marketplaces, the estimates summarised in Table 7.1. show that, in the 12‑month period from January 2025 to December 2025, Allegro accounted for approximately 81% of website traffic from users based in Poland to general online marketplaces, making it by far the leading platform, while Table 7.1 shows that Allegro has retained its leading position over time. According to stakeholders, Allegro’s has benefited from its early entry to the Polish market (relative to Amazon and AliExpress and Temu, discussed further below), high brand recognition and fully localised service offering including Polish-language support and domestic payment solutions. As analysed further in Sections 7.2 and7.3, Allegro benefits from strong indirect network effects (a large and active consumer base attracts a broad pool of sellers, which in turn reinforces consumer engagement and so on) and has strengthened its conglomerate presence through the development of other ancillary services.
In comparison, Amazon which, as discussed in Chapter 4, was launched in 2021, has an estimated share of approximately 6% in the 12‑month period from January 2025 to December 2025, indicating that its take‑up by consumers remains limited. Local stakeholders have noted that Polish consumers, even price‑sensitive consumers who frequently use price comparison tools like Ceneo, tend to remain loyal to Allegro due to familiarity, convenience and integrated service features. Although Amazon is present on Ceneo and participates in deal-driven events such as Prime Day, these do not appear to have been sufficient to meaningfully shift consumer attention, based on the traffic shares presented in this section and stakeholder feedback. Similarly, Empik, which since launching its marketplace in 2017 has continued to expand its services, has maintained a broadly stable market share below 8% struggling to significantly challenge Allegro to date, as shown in Figure 7.1.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions).The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
However, Temu and AliExpress have, over time, gained a growing presence in the Polish market (as discussed in Chapter 4). While their aggregate share of user traffic remains modest (approximately less than 20% in the 12‑month period from January 2025 to December 2025).
Figure 7.2 shows that the growth rate of Temu’s traffic in Poland increased around March-April 2025, as discussed in Box 7.1. In particular, Temu has recently gained increasing traction with its low-cost business model and leveraging aggressive online marketing campaigns. As extensively explained in Chapter 6, relative to Allegro, these platforms offer longer delivery times, less Polish-language support and limited after-sales services. According to local stakeholders, consumers appear to factor in the risks associated with these services, such as limited return policies or poor refund mechanisms and appear to view these platforms more as a form of entertainment or lottery rather than as serious substitutes for Allegro’s full product and service offering.
Temu’s visit volumes in Poland rose notably around March-April 2025. Several developments may help contextualise this increase. Industry reports noted that Temu curtailed spend on certain US ad channels (e.g., Google Shopping) amid tariff pressures, potentially freeing budget for other regions, including Europe. In Poland, advertising-market data indicate Temu ranked as the second-largest digital advertiser in March 2025, reaching nearly 80% of internet users and generating about 3.9 billion ad contacts that month.
Paid-search cost data are broadly consistent with this picture. As shown in Table 7.3, Temu’s cost per paid visit (CPPV) rose from EUR 0.25 in 2023 to EUR 0.37 in 2024, before declining to EUR 0.21 in 2025, broadly in line with pre‑expansion levels. The 2024 peak is consistent with an aggressive acquisition phase in which Temu competed actively for paid-search traffic; the subsequent decline may reflect a shift toward higher-volume, lower-cost channels (including display and social advertising), which aligns with the advertising-market data cited above. A similar pattern can be observed for AliExpress’s entry in the Polish market in 2023.
Note: All spend estimates are sourced from Similarweb. Similarweb produces modelled estimates based on panel data, ISP data and other proprietary signals; figures are not exact measurements and should be interpreted as directional indicators. Monetary values originally reported in USD were converted to EUR using annual average exchange rates.
Traffic quality indicators, however, do not show clear improvement. Pages-per-visit, which measures the average number of pages visitors view on a site within a single session, appears broadly similar when comparing March-June 2024 and March-June 2025. Meanwhile Temu’s bounce rate, the percentage of visitors who leave the website after only viewing one page, is roughly 7% higher year-on-year for the latter period. These patterns are consistent with large‑scale customer acquisition efforts that expand reach and visits, not necessarily with immediate comparable gains in on-site engagement.
Note: This box synthesises external advertising and logistics reporting with web-traffic indicators to provide context; it does not establish causality. Figures refer to traffic from users based in Poland unless otherwise stated.
Source: Similarweb data; Investor’s Business Daily (2025) Temu Cuts U.S. Ad Spending. What Will That Mean For Meta Stock?, https://www.investors.com/news/technology/meta-stock-temu-ad-spending-facebook/; WARC (2025) Temu pulls the plug on US Google Shopping ads as tariffs bite, https://www.warc.com/content/feed/Temu_pulls_the_plug_on_US_Google_shopping_ads_as_tariffs_bite/10503; Adweek (2025) Temu’s US ad spend craters, https://www.adweek.com/media/temus-us-ad-spend-craters/; Financial Times (2025) Temu and Shein slash US ad spending, https://www.ft.com/content/9f98dbfc-4643-4a45-a8d3-9f7863601957; Reuters (2025) Temu, Shein slash digital ads as tariffs end cheap shipping from China, data show, https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/temu-shein-slash-digital-ads-tariffs-end-cheap-shipping-china-data-show-2025-04-16/; Gemius AdReal (2025) Advertising market in Poland, March 2025, https://gemius.com/blog/advertising-market-in-poland-march-2025/.
Temu has also experienced significant growth in app usage, with 7.55 million monthly active users in the period January 2025-December 2025. Over the same period, Allegro had 11.09 million active users.1 However, as shown previously in Figure 6.2, a significantly lower proportion of new users of Temu’s app continued to use the app over time than for Allegro. This suggests that their Allegro’s app user base is more engaged, and uses the app more over time, as compared to Temu.
Under certain, narrow circumstances, other e‑commerce players, including online retailers and specialised online marketplaces, may present a viable alternative for consumers, as explained in Section 6.1. The mapping exercise in Chapter 4 identifies various specialised online marketplaces and online retailers, including Shein and Zalando in the fashion segment. These players may be used by consumers under certain circumstances, i.e. when shopping within these narrow, but popular segments.
However, general online marketplaces such as Allegro may compete more closely with online retailers only in some segments, such as electronics and less so in others, such as fashion. For instance, the fashion segment represents a less than 1% share of sub-domains on Allegro, with similar results seen for other online marketplaces, showing that fashion is not a significant category for Allegro or other online marketplaces.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 6, there is the potential for OCAS platforms to adapt their business model over time to incorporate more similar features to online marketplaces or open up to professional sellers, thereby offering more general retail goods for sale and thus possibly becoming a closer competitive constraint in the long term. In Poland, OLX has around 77 million average monthly visits, compared to Allegro’s 157 million (and 38 million for the second-largest marketplace, Temu), making it a substantial e‑commerce player in the jurisdiction.2 OLX’s service offering has become increasingly sophisticated, introducing features such as integrated payment and shipping options to enhance convenience and trust, although OLX retains its focus on second-hand goods, in contrast with Allegro’s general product offering.
Seller side
This section considers the seller side of general online marketplaces for Poland, defined previously in Chapter 6. As summarised in Table 7.4, this analysis uses the same user traffic data as for the consumer side of general online marketplaces, but limiting the firms to only those in the relevant competitor set identified for the seller side of online marketplaces. Similarly to the consumer side, market shares are first presented for the supply of core marketplaces services and then separately for all other general online marketplace services. While the latter do not currently offer sellers a closely substitutable type of online marketplace service, the market actors included in this broader scenario could provide a potential alternative under certain conditions or for certain categories of sellers (as explained in Chapter 6). Thus, while the focus of the study remains core general online marketplaces, it is necessary to provide both scenarios for a complete, dynamic, analysis of the market.
Finally, to account for recent market developments, namely the opening of Temu’s to Polish sellers at the end of 2025, two additional scenarios are provided for the period November 2025-February 2026, with an adapted sample. As previously mentioned, this likely overstates the extent to which Temu is used by sellers based in Poland given the short timeframe, the characteristics of its service and business model, as well as the existing sellers’ acquisition costs. However, this is provided for completeness.
Allegro is estimated to make up more than 80% of the core general online marketplaces segment for the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Its leading market position has persisted for several years, as also shown for the consumer side. Network effects appear to have a significant impact on the seller side of the market. Given its high consumer traffic and visibility, Allegro represents a critical sales channel to reach Polish consumers, in turn showing its importance to sellers. This is reinforced by analysis of the number of consumers that are uniquely present in Allegro. Out of all Polish consumers who visited any of the top 5 online marketplaces in Poland (Allegro, Temu, AliExpress, Amazon and Empik) over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025, 73.1% visited Allegro’s platform at least once, with 42.3% of Allegro’s users only accessing Allegro and not visiting any rival platform over the entire period.3 Allegro’s comprehensive service offering and vertical integration are likely to increase switching costs on the seller side of the market (see also Section 7.2.3).
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Allegro’s leading position persists also looking at the broader competitors set including all other general online marketplaces open to Polish sellers.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Under both scenarios, on the seller side the evidence shows that Allegro’s market position has endured over time. According to UOKiK, in its prohibition decision adopted at the end of December 2022, Allegro’s market shares on the seller side range from approximately 70% to 90%, depending on the metric used, such as revenue, number of transactions or number of active sellers.4 As confirmed by the data presented above, Allegro continues to hold similarly high market shares several years later.
The entry of Amazon, a major international player which is also designated “gatekeeper” under the DMA (European Commission, 2023[3]), has not meaningfully decreased Allegro’s market shares, with it having an estimated market share of approximately 6%. According to stakeholders, the network effects described above have created a difficult environment for Amazon to build a sufficient user base to effectively challenge Allegro. The importance of network effects could also partially be inferred by analysing the number of consumers that are uniquely present on Amazon as compared to Allegro. Over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025, with 76.6% of Amazon’s users also using Allegro, but only 23.1% of Allegro’s users accessing Amazon in turn.56 This means that, from the sellers’ perspective, the vast majority of Amazon’s user base can also be reached via Allegro’s platform. Indeed, stakeholders report that many sellers using Amazon in Poland are also present on Allegro. Amazon’s more limited offering of seller support services in Poland may also be impeding take up by sellers.
Finally, Table 7.6 provides the market shares for all general online marketplaces (which include the so-called core generale online marketplace and the other general online marketplaces), following the entry of Temu on the seller side of the market in late 2025, as detailed in Chapter 6. While this scenario overestimates the degree to which Polish sellers can currently use Temu as an alternative to a core online marketplace such as Allegro or Amazon, as previously explained, it is relevant to show how Allegro’s position has not been significantly challenged to date, maintaining a 61% market share.
This is in line with the developments following the entry of AliExpress, which opened to Polish sellers in late 2024 with a business model similar to Temu’s and has maintained a market share of around 8% since (when looking at all types of marketplaces together). While this might evolve in the future, the entry of these platforms has not presented a meaningful alternative to core online marketplaces for sellers based in Poland so far. As a way of comparison, Table 7.7 provides the market shares for the core general online marketplaces for the same period.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits from users based in Poland, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
7.1.2. Lithuania
Consumer side
This section presents the OECD’s market share estimates for the consumer side of general online marketplaces in Lithuania, defined above in Section 6.1.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Pigu and Varle are the main core general online marketplaces in Lithuania. The OECD’s estimates, as set out in Table 7.8, show that Pigu accounts for approximately 56% of Lithuanian website traffic to core general online marketplaces for the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025, making it the most widely used platform in the country, which has persisted over time (see Figure 7.3). Based on stakeholder feedback, Pigu’s market position has benefited from its close alignment with national market conditions and a limited degree of substitutability with foreign platforms from consumer perspective. Factors such as the extent of network effects are also relevant, with Pigu appearing to benefit significantly from indirect network effects. The strength of network effects, together with brand loyalty and the platform’s integrated logistics solutions, which support fast and convenient delivery for consumers, helps explain Pigu’s popularity as compared to its rivals.
Varle, with an estimated market share of approximately 27% of Lithuanian website traffic to general online marketplaces, is the second-largest platform. While Varle offers additional consumer-oriented features such as instalment payments and loyalty schemes, the overall scale and scope of Varle’s operations remain substantially smaller than those of Pigu (e.g. fulfilment services, cross-border operations).
In line with the analysis presented in Chapter 6, and the approach taken for Poland, Table 7.9 and Figure 7.4 present market shares including all other general online marketplaces, with the addition of platforms like Temu, AliExpress and eBay. Looking at this broader scenario, the picture on the consumer side is more nuanced.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
While not closely substitutable with core general online marketplaces (as analysed in Chapter 6) and representing an alternative purchase channel only for certain categories of consumers and products, this view of the broader picture of all general online marketplaces (including then other general online marketplaces) shows that AliExpress and Temu can be important players for consumers. Looking at these different types of marketplaces together, AliExpress, Pigu and Temu’s market shares in 2025 remain broadly similar, at 28%, 25% and 22% respectively, as shown in Table 7.9.
As previously highlighted, the popularity of Temu and AliExpress amongst consumers in the jurisdiction can be explained by their low-cost low-price business model, which differentiates these platforms from core marketplaces. However, as noted by stakeholders, Lithuanian consumers face persistent frictions when accessing platforms based outside the jurisdiction, including higher shipping costs, slower delivery times, limited availability of certain products and language issues. Moreover, foreign platforms often provide less robust customer service and may not offer the same level of consumer protection, particularly regarding guarantees and return policies. In addition, stakeholders highlighted geopolitical tensions with China, which have disrupted cross-border parcel deliveries and added to the uncertainty associated with foreign e‑commerce channels. These factors further reduce the extent to which most consumers can rely on such platforms as an alternative to core marketplaces, such as Pigu or Varle.
Apart from the entry of the Chinese platforms AliExpress and Temu, stakeholders have suggested that Lithuania does not appear to be a priority area for geographic expansion of other international platforms such as Amazon, given the relatively small size of the Lithuanian market. Consequently, platforms such as Amazon remain accessible only through cross-border versions of their services (e.g. Amazon.de), which lack national-level localisation and entail longer delivery times, fewer payment options and more limited after-sales support. According to stakeholders, while some degree of substitution may exist in geographically adjacent regions, such as with Allegro near the Lithuanian-Polish border, these effects are limited in scope and remain marginal beyond these areas. The relevance of such platforms diminishes quickly where shipping costs and delivery delays increase or language barriers persist.
As discussed in Chapter 6, in certain situations consumers also consider other e‑commerce providers, including general online retailers, which are not open to third-party sellers but offer a comparably wide range of products and services to general online marketplaces. In Lithuania, stakeholders have consistently identified general online retailer Senukai as an alternative to Pigu on the consumer side, with both having similar volumes of website traffic, i.e. average monthly visits of 3.1 million for pigu.lt and 3.3million for senukai.lt from users based in Lithuania during the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025.7 Both Pigu and Senukai are also relatively active in the electronics segment, alongside other specialist retailers which are popular amongst consumers, including RD Electronics and Euronics. However, these specialist retailers do not match the range of products offered by the core general online marketplaces discussed in this section.
Seller side
This section considers the seller side of general online marketplaces in Lithuania, as defined above in Section 6.2. In line with what has been presented for Poland, in addition to the market shares for the supply of core general online marketplaces, this sections also provides a scenario including all other general online marketplace services, which might constitute a potential alternative under certain conditions or for certain categories of sellers (as explained in Chapter 6). Further, following the launch of Temu’s local merchants programme in late 2025 (see also Chapter 4), two additional scenarios are provided for the period November 2025-February 2026, with an adapted competitors set. Even in the case of Lithuania (and Latvia below), this likely overstates the extent to which Temu is used by sellers based in these countries given the short timeframe, the characteristics of its service and business model, as well as the existing sellers’ acquisition costs. However, this is provided for completeness.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
The OECD’s market share estimates, summarised in Table 7.10, show that there are few competitors present, with Pigu and Varle as the primary core general marketplaces operating in Lithuania which are open to locally based sellers (see Section 6.2.4 on the geographic dimension of the market). Here, Pigu’s estimated share of the seller side of online marketplaces is substantial at approximately 68% of traffic for the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025 and Varle covers most of the remaining market at approximately 32%, with very little change over time.
Importantly on the seller side, Pigu has a substantial advantage in terms of logistics, with no other player in Lithuania offers comparable fulfilment and logistics services that can be easily tapped into by local sellers. For sellers seeking to access or multi-home across other online marketplaces, such as Varle, they would need to manage their own warehousing and distribution and/or independently establish partnerships with postal and logistics operators across the country, rather than easily accessing Pigu’s end-to‑end logistics network.
Pigu benefits from indirect network effects, whereby its popularity with consumers on one side of the platform increases its popularity with sellers (and vice versa). Indeed, it represents a major channel available to sellers for reaching Lithuanian consumers (discussed further in Section 7.2.1). Given how consumers use these platforms, it is clear that Pigu is indispensable for sellers to reach a significant proportion of consumers, with Varle representing a much smaller source of unique demand as compared to Pigu.
For the period January 2025-December 2025, Pigu’s leading position persists also looking at the broader competitors set including all other general online marketplaces open to Lithuanian sellers, as shown in Table 7.11.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Finally, Table 7.12 below provides the market shares for all general online marketplaces (i.e. the core general online marketplace and other general online marketplaces) following the entry of Temu on the seller side of the market in late 2025, as detailed in Chapter 6. While this scenario overestimates the degree to which Lithuanian sellers can currently use Temu as an alternative to a core online marketplace such as Pigu or Varle, as previously explained, it is relevant to show how for certain narrow categories of sellers Temu might represent another channel to reach specific types of consumers. As a way of comparison, Table 7.13 provides the market shares for the core general online marketplaces for the same period.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
On the seller side, the majority of the platforms considered on the consumer side are not open to sellers based in Lithuania and evidence suggests that international platforms are not actively targeting sellers in Lithuania (or have just recently started doing so, albeit under different business models). Local stakeholders indicated that these platforms offer limited tailored support or localised services to help smaller firms scale across borders. In contrast, Pigu explicitly positions itself as a regional facilitator of e‑commerce for local sellers, providing support in national languages, tailored logistics solutions and access to locally relevant product segments. There are also no alternative specialist channels which are meaningfully open to local sellers. For instance, in the fashion segment, Shein and Zalando are not widely open to Lithuanian sellers, nor is Senukai or the other electronics retailers described above.
7.1.3. Latvia
Consumer side
This section considers the consumer side of general online marketplaces in Latvia, defined above in Section 6.1 and presents the OECD’s market share estimates.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
The OECD estimates that 220.lv, owned by Pigu, accounts for approximately 72% of Latvian website traffic to core general online marketplaces for the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. 220.lv’s share of website traffic is substantial, with Figure 7.5 showing that this has persisted over time. As such, 220.lv is the clear leader when considering core online marketplaces which cater to consumers looking for a “one‑stop-shop” presenting offers from many sellers, across many retail categories (in terms of product type, quality and price range).
According to stakeholders, 220.lv’s platform is perceived as reliable and user-friendly due to its comprehensive logistics network which enables it to offer fast and convenient delivery in line with consumer preferences, as well as its offering of customer support in the local language. As for Pigu in Lithuania (and Allegro in Poland), 220.lv’s integrated services, including its loyalty programme and customer support, appear to have also increased its popularity amongst users. Pigu’s logistics network extends into Latvia, supporting 220.lv’s operations in the jurisdiction and leveraging local infrastructure including parcel lockers. This contrasts with its main competitors, discussed below, who operate from outside the jurisdiction and are unable to match Pigu’s offering of same‑day or next-day delivery.
Consistent with the approach taken in previous sections, Table 7.15 and Figure 7.6 present market shares inclusive of all other general online marketplaces. As previously explained in detail, platforms such as Temu and AliExpress are differentiated from core online marketplaces such as 220.lv and can offer a degree of alternative to consumers only in some circumstances. However, taking this broader view of the full landscape of general online marketplaces, they hold respectively a 25% and 23% market share, close in size to 220.lv’s 29%. as indicated in Table 7.15.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
While AliExpress has been present in Latvia for a longer period of time, Temu is a relatively new entrant, making its position as the second-largest online marketplace all the more notable, while acknowledging the differences in business model and offering previously highlighted. Notably, AliExpress and Temu entered the general online marketplaces market in Latvia with a distinctive business model and do not appear to have replicated 220.lv’s key features, with limited language support, limited customer service integration and no dedicated delivery infrastructure. However, certain categories of consumers appear willing to consider Temu as an alternative in cases where the products are of significantly low-cost, despite the inconvenience of slower delivery and poorer customer service.
Similar to Lithuania, Senukai (particularly 1a.lv) has been identified by stakeholders as a key alternative for consumers shopping for general goods online, as it is home to a wide range of products and integrated service offerings, similar to that of 220.lv. Comparing 220.lv and Senukai, both have similar levels of user traffic, with average monthly website visits of 1.17 million for 220.lv and 1.15 million across Senukai’s two websites (1a.lv and ksenukai.lv) from users based in Latvia, during the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025.8 In some narrow retail categories like electronics, a number of specialist retailers are active and may compete with 220.lv and Senukai, only within this narrow segment. However, they do not match the broad product offering of these platforms. Indeed, as previously described, Senukai itself remains differentiated from 220.lv as it does not provide consumers with the ability to compare or otherwise consider offers from a wide range of sellers.
Finally, as discussed in previous sections and in the context of the Polish market, it is important to note how OCAS platforms may have the potential to evolve over time to present more of a competitive constraint on online marketplaces in certain circumstances. Stakeholders identified Latvia’s primary OCAS platform, ss.lv, as a significant player in the e‑commerce sector. In the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025, ss.lv generated around 4.49 million average monthly visits from users based in Latvia, compared to 1.17 million for 220.lv,9 although their user bases are more comparable in size, at approximately 615 000 monthly unique visitors for ss.lv and 502 000 monthly unique visitors for 220.lv.10
Unlike OLX in Poland, ss.lv does not seem to have begun adopting features similar to online marketplaces and still operates as a traditional OCAS platform, focussing generally on single classified listings for second-hand goods, without providing payment or delivery services. Ss.lv also hosts ads for real estate and automative listings, giving it much broader coverage than the general goods sold by 220.lv. While the potential competitive constraint provided by OCAS platforms, such as ss.lv, may continue to evolve in the medium-long term, this will depend on ss.lv opening up its service offering to business users, rather than just operating on a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) basis, as well as adopting the additional features intrinsic to online marketplaces as described above.
Seller side
Following the consumer side, this section presents the seller side of general online marketplaces in Latvia, consistent with the definitions in Chapter 6. In line with what has been presented for Poland and Lithuania, in addition to the market shares for the supply of core general online marketplaces, this sections also provides a scenario including all other general online marketplace services. Further, following the launch of Temu’s local merchants programme in late 2025 (see also Chapter 4), two additional scenarios are provided for the period November 2025-February 2026, with an adapted sample. As clarified above, this likely overstates the extent to which Temu is used by sellers based in Latvia given the short timeframe, the characteristics of its service and business model, as well as the existing sellers’ acquisition costs. However, this is provided for completeness.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
The OECD’s market share estimates show that 220.lv represents the primary channel open to sellers based in Latvia (see 6.2.3. on the geographic dimension of the market) and there is no comparable second-tier domestic platform present. Many of the relevant structural and market features, as well as 220.lv’s business conduct, are consistent with the situation described for Lithuania. For instance, 220.lv benefits from indirect network effects, even more so than Pigu in Lithuania, due its position as the primary home for Latvian consumers, that can be accessed by sellers based in Latvia, driving growth on the seller side.
220.lv’s logistics network also provides considerable infrastructure enabling sellers to scale up their operations and reach Latvian consumers. No other player in the Latvian market offers any similar end-to‑end logistics services to sellers, meaning that for sellers to use any other platforms, they must incur the substantial costs involved in setting up their own fulfilment and logistics partnerships.
Other key platforms operating on the consumer side in Latvia are not open to sellers based in Latvia, nor are any other platforms actively targeting sellers in Latvia. While eBay is present in the jurisdiction, it does not appear to highly prioritise its operations in the country and it provides access to a relatively smaller pool of consumers as compared to 220.lv. Moreover, it operates with a different business model as compared to 220.lv, providing few additional services to sellers to support their operations, limiting the closeness of competition between these platforms. Other relevant players on the consumer side, like Senukai are also closed to third-party sellers.
Like Lithuania, Latvia does not appear to be a priority for geographic expansion, particularly on the seller side, likely due to the smaller size of the market. In contrast, 220.lv markets itself explicitly to sellers in the jurisdiction, while also advertising the additional ability for sellers to use the platform to sell across the whole Baltic region, making it increasingly attractive to sellers.
Finally, Table 7.18 below provides the market shares for all general online marketplaces following the entry of Temu on the seller side of the market in late 2025, as detailed in Chapter 6. Looking at the evolution in early 2026 of this broader scenario, Temu and 220.lv have a similar market share at around 40%.
While this scenario overestimates the degree to which Latvian sellers can currently use Temu as an alternative to a core online marketplace such as 220.lv, as previously explained, it is relevant to show how for certain narrow categories of sellers Temu might represent another channel to reach specific types of consumers and thus a potential competitive constraint on 220.lv. As a way of comparison, Table 7.19 provides the market shares for the core general online marketplaces for the same period.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvian users only, traffic from users in Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
7.1.4. Conclusions
The market shares presented for Poland, Lithuania and Latvia and the degree of concentration varies depending on the jurisdiction in question or the side of the market under consideration.
In Poland, Allegro is by far the leading platform on consumer side under every scenario, including when considering all general online marketplaces. No other rivals come close to Allegro’s market position in the jurisdiction, with Allegro also leading in specific retail segments such as electronics.
In Lithuania, Pigu has a particularly prominent position as relates to core general online marketplaces, with Varle as main competitor, despite the significant difference in market share. When considering also all other general online marketplaces, which might represent an alternative only for certain categories of consumers and purchases, Pigu, Temu and AliExpress hold together around three‑quarters of the market, with similar market shares.
In Latvia, 220.lv (owned by Pigu) is the leading core online marketplace for consumers, facing few challengers in this segment. Similar to the situation for Lithuania, when considering a broader range of marketplaces, while remaining the leading platform in 2025 it is more closely matched by online marketplaces Temu and AliExpress, and online retailer Senukai.
In all three jurisdictions, the seller side of core general online marketplaces is highly concentrated. The leading platforms in each country, Allegro, Pigu and 220.lv, represent the main viable pathway for sellers to reach consumers within the relevant geographic boundaries. In no jurisdiction has the market position of these key players been substantially challenged by new entrants or any other comparable players, such as Amazon which entered the Polish market in 2021. However, considering the broader scenario including all other types of online marketplaces, following Temu’s entry on the seller side of the market the situation has evolved. While in Poland Allegro remains by far the leading platform, in Lithuania and Latvia Temu’s market share has reached that of the incumbent. This has to be interpreted with caution, as currently Temu’s business model can represent an alternative only for a narrow category of sellers and the market shares included here for completeness can provide mainly an indication of potential competition, if the conditions emerge.
As highlighted throughout this section, there are a range of contributing factors to the state of competition in online marketplaces, including the extent of indirect network effects, the role of vertical integration especially in logistics and other services, and a high degree of brand awareness and trust. Another relevant factor concerns the level of seller acquisition costs. For entrant or smaller platforms, attracting a critical mass of active sellers typically requires significant marketing expenditure, onboarding support and commercial incentives. These costs may constitute a substantial barrier to expansion, particularly in smaller national markets such as Lithuania and Latvia, thereby reinforcing the position of incumbent platforms. In light of this, and building on the market shares presented in this section, Section 7.2 analyses in more depth the nature of competition between online marketplaces across the three jurisdictions, including identifying further the factors contributing to and perpetuating the degree of concentration in all three jurisdictions.
All three jurisdictions are characterised by the presence of a large incumbent platform in core general online marketplaces, with substantial market share and few close competitors. The environment for core general online marketplaces, which provide the ability to transact across many retail categories (in terms of product type, quality and price range), is generally concentrated. This is particularly the case on the seller side, with the leading platforms in each country, Allegro and Pigu (pigu.lt and 220.lv), representing the main viable pathway for sellers to reach consumers within the relevant geographic boundaries. Other online marketplaces players like Temu, which operate with a substantially different business model, are growing in popularity amongst consumers, but remain differentiated from core general online marketplaces on both the consumer and seller side.
In Poland, on the consumer side, Allegro has an 81% share of traffic for core general online marketplaces, and still maintains a very strong traffic share of 64% when considering all general online marketplaces. On the seller side, its share of traffic varies between 60% and 81% depending on the scenario considered. Its market position is strong and appears unlikely to change in the short to medium term.
In Lithuania, competitive pressure on Pigu is limited on the seller side, where it has a 68% share of traffic in 2025, broadly in line with its share of 56% on the consumer side for core general online marketplaces (with domestic rival Varle having a 27% share). Looking at all other general online marketplaces on the consumer side, Pigu holds a 25% share of traffic, similar to competitors Temu (22%) and AliExpress (28%), which might represent an alternative for specific categories of consumers and purchases.
In Latvia, 220.lv’s share of traffic for core general online marketplaces is high at 72% on the consumer side and 100% on the seller side. Looking more generally at all other online marketplaces, 220.lv’s share of traffic is 29%, alongside Temu and AliExpress (25% and 23%) on the consumer side. On the seller side, following Temu’s entry in late 2025, 220.lv still holds around 50% of the market, with Temu following with a 36% market share. This scenario is offered mainly for completeness, given the low degree of substitutability between the two types of platforms.
This section assesses in detail the key dimensions of horizontal competition in online marketplaces in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. While market shares are a useful tool for understanding the degree of concentration within online marketplaces, the closeness of competition between different online marketplaces must also be considered, alongside analysis of key market characteristics, structural factors and barriers to entry, to provide a full picture of the state of competition in online marketplaces. This includes consideration of competition both in a static and dynamic sense, which is particularly relevant in the case of digital markets.
As such, the assessment focusses on the particular market characteristics, structural factors and barriers to entry which scholars, experts and competition authorities have identified as the most significant to competition in online marketplaces: network effects, economies of scale, switching costs and multi-homing and vertical integration. Each characteristic is assessed together across the three countries, for both the consumer side and the seller side as relevant. Finally, the section concludes with an overall assessment of the state of horizontal competition in the three countries. This assessment will be complemented by the discussion in Section 7.3 of vertical, conglomerate and ecosystem dimensions of competition, including the role of data, and in Section 7.4 of the risks of reduced market contestability, entrenchment and tipping.
7.2.1. Network effects
First, this section examines network effects, which are a critical feature of platform markets. When applied to digital platforms, the presence of network effects means that the value of a platform to users increases as the number of users (i.e. in case of online marketplaces, consumers or sellers) grows. Direct network effects occur when an increase in the number of users on the same side of the platform (e.g. more consumers) leads to a greater value for each individual user on that same side, while, for multi-sided platforms, indirect network effects arise when an increase in the number of participants on one side of the platform makes the platform more attractive for participants on another side of the platform (OECD, 2022[4]).
Network effects, particularly indirect effects, are generally considered to be a core aspect of the business model of online marketplaces (see, for instance (ACCC, 2022[5]; European Commission, 2022[6]; Shelanski, Knox and Dhilla, 2017[7])). As more consumers use an online marketplace, it becomes more appealing for sellers and vice versa, thereby enhancing the platform’s overall value for both sides.
Stakeholders have identified the importance of indirect network effects in underpinning the market position of the leading platforms identified in Section 7.1, particularly highlighting the extent to which the substantial concentration of consumers on the platforms drives take‑up by sellers and raises entry barriers for rivals. In Poland, Allegro’s large customer base and the corresponding network effects were cited as a substantial reason why it had been difficult for other players to challenge Allegro’s market position.
The extent of multi-homing by users (discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.3) can influence the extent to which network effects function as a barrier to competition. That said, providing sellers with access to unique consumer demand is evidently a key competitive advantage for the leading platforms in each of the three jurisdictions. In the six‑month period April to September 2025, 42.7% of users based in Poland who visited Allegro during the period did not visit any of the other top 5 online marketplaces in Poland (Temu, AliExpress, Amazon and Empik) during the same period,11 as illustrated in the diagram on the right in Figure 7.7. However, Figure 7.7. shows the impact of Temu’s entry on this proportion, with 58.5% of the visitors to the same 5 online marketplaces in Poland being exclusive to Allegro in the corresponding six‑month period in 2023 (with Temu entering Poland in mid-2023). However, Temu has only recently opened to Polish sellers as a potential channel to reach Polish consumers.
Note: Audience Overlap shows the extent to which total unique visitors are shared between up to five individual websites over the specified period. Importantly, circle size is not an indication of website reach – rather, it is an illustration of the extent to which the various audiences overlap. This metric is presented for users based in Poland over the specified time periods.
Source: SimilarWeb data.
Similarly, in Lithuania, 65.1% of Pigu’s visitors over the six‑month period April to September 2025 did not visit Varle, the main alternative on the seller side, during the same period. In contrast, only 38.2% of Varle’s visitors were exclusive to the platform, with 61.8% also accessing Pigu.12 In Latvia the picture is starker, with no meaningful alternative online marketplaces available for sellers to access Latvian consumers. This means that sellers face a strong incentive to use these platforms to reach critical numbers of consumers within the jurisdiction. While Temu has gained significant traffic amongst Lithuanian and Latvian consumers, it has only recently started to open to Lithuania and Latvian sellers and thus presenting a possible alternative pathway for some of them.
Some direct network effects may also be present as relates to online marketplaces. For instance, the more consumers using the platform, the greater the ability of the platform to collect data on consumer preferences and improve the shopping experience for other consumers (ACCC, 2022[5]). Pigu has noted the relevance of direct network effects, citing its strategy to increasingly use consumer data collected on the platform to better understand its users’ needs and offer more personalised services (PHH Group, 2025[8]).
To illustrate the presence of direct and indirect network effects in the online marketplace markets of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, the evolution of both sides of these platforms can be examined over a multi-year period. The analysis confirms a consistent and significant increase in the number of users on both the demand and supply sides, particularly in the period following the COVID‑19 pandemic. While this growth may also be explained by factors other than the presence of network effects, it is consistent with stakeholder feedback highlighting the significant importance of network effects, and the contribution to the market positions of the leading platforms on both the seller and consumer sides.
Pigu, has seen a steady increase in the number of sellers operating its platforms since the launch of its online marketplaces in 2019. In 2019, over 600 sellers registered to join Pigu’s marketplaces in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (Made in Vilnius, 2019[9]). This included more than 400 sellers in Lithuania and approximately 100 sellers in Latvia. As of 2023, there were over 4 000 sellers using Pigu’s marketplaces across the four countries where it operates (Delfi, 2023[10]). These trends were accompanied by a rise in the number of transactions completed on the platform, with the number of orders fulfilled increasing from 1.1 million in 2021 to 3 million in 2023 and a marked increase in marketplace revenue from EUR40 million to EUR 105 million over the same period (Delfi, 2024[11]). In addition to the well-known dynamics around how online marketplaces operate, this concurrent and sustained growth on both sides of the market can further support the conclusion that indirect network effects were particularly present and progressively reinforced Pigu’s position in the Lithuanian and Latvian online marketplace markets.
A similar pattern was observed in the Polish market. The number of sellers active on Allegro increased significantly over the period, reaching approximately 163 000 in 2024 – up 10% from the previous year with substantially more than the 128 000 sellers using the platform in 2020.13 The number of buyers using the platform expanded at a steady rate of about 3% per year, from approximately 13 million in 2020 to 15 million in 2024, following a significant 14% increase from 2019 to 2020 aligning with the COVID‑19 pandemic.14 Marketplace revenue also exhibited a robust upward trend over the same period, increasing from PLN 2 099.7 million in 2019 to PLN 7 400.6 million in 2024; as did the number of items sold, from 954.4 million in 2021 to 1 297.8 million in 2024.15 These parallel increases across both sides of the market suggest that direct and indirect network effects were actively at play and likely contributed to Allegro’s strong market position, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID‑19 pandemic, which, as described in Chapter 4, have accelerated adoption and reinforced platform dynamics.
The range of evidence described above suggests that network effects, particularly indirect network effects, have contributed to shaping market dynamics in the online marketplace sector across Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. The parallel growth on both sides of the market appears to have enhanced the attractiveness and utility of the leading platforms over time. These dynamics may have progressively strengthened the competitive position of key players such as Pigu and Allegro, potentially raising barriers to entry by increasing threshold for effective market entry and expansion by alternative providers, given the need to successfully enter concurrently, attracting both consumers and sellers.
7.2.2. Economies of scale
Building on the analysis of network effects, the presence of economies of scale is also relevant to assessing horizontal competition in online marketplaces. Economies of scale arise when an increase in the volume of activity reduces the average cost per unit, thereby gaining efficiency advantages over smaller or new entrants. These cost advantages may be derived from various sources, including technological infrastructure, marketing, logistics or customer service. In digital platform markets, scale economies may be particularly significant due to the high fixed costs and low marginal costs associated with maintaining and expanding platform operations. Where present, economies of scale may act as a barrier to entry and expansion, reinforcing the position of incumbent platforms and contributing to entrenchment of market power, discussed further in Section 7.3 below (OECD, 2022[1]; 2021[12]).
In the context of online marketplaces, economies of scale may manifest through a variety of operational efficiencies that increase as the platform grows. For instance, larger platforms can spread fixed costs – such as those related to setting up the platform, technology development and cybersecurity – over a greater volume of transactions, thereby lowering per-transaction costs. Moreover, scale may reduce customer acquisition costs, as platforms with a well-established brand and larger user base typically benefit from greater visibility and user trust, which is then reinforced by the presence of network effects.
Logistics and fulfilment operations may also benefit from scale, as higher volumes enable more efficient route planning, better negotiating power with delivery providers, internalisation of logistics services or higher warehouse utilisation. These efficiencies strengthen the competitive position of large incumbent platforms and may constitute a structural barrier to entry or expansion for smaller or new marketplace operators.
Pigu, which operates in both Lithuania and Latvia, likely benefits from economies of scale that may place it at a competitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller or emerging rivals. First, the fact that Pigu operates across multiple markets, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and more recently Finland, through a unified digital infrastructure indicates that the company can leverage cross-border efficiencies.16 Notably, more than 90% of third-party sellers active on the platform sell across the Baltic countries using a single seller interface (PHH Group, 2024[13]), which reduces duplication of services and lowers marginal costs. By contrast, other domestic platforms, such as Varle, would likely need to undertake significant investments to scale their operations to a comparable level, including upgrading digital, logistical and marketing capacities.
Secondly, market interviews further support this analysis. For instance, Latvian stakeholders have noted that global platforms such as Amazon have shown limited interest in entering the market with full operations, thereby allowing local players to maintain their positions without needing to substantially alter or expand their service offerings. While this may reflect limited market size, it also suggests that existing platforms have already reached a degree of scale which can contribute to deterring new entrants, particularly those without a clear path to achieving similar efficiencies. In light of these scale considerations, it is notable that, to replicate Pigu’s level of service and market penetration, firms would need to undertake significant investments in local infrastructure, language adaptation, consumer trust mechanisms, advertising and logistics integration.
In Poland, the scale advantages enjoyed by Allegro are even more apparent. As the largest platform with a well-established user base and integrated logistics and payments infrastructure, Allegro is likely to be able to operate and expand its services to additional users without incurring proportionate increases in costs. Competing platforms would need to make considerable upfront investments, not only in technological infrastructure but also in service localisation, marketing and fulfilment capabilities, to approach a comparable level of service, which may not always be feasible or profitable, particularly in light of consumer habits and Allegro’s strong brand recognition. Moreover, potential new entrants would require such a significant initial scale of “mass” switching to their platform (or substantial user multi-homing) to build the scale required in order to compete. This is made difficult by Allegro’s advantages, described above, including the extent of network effects and user lock in.
At the same time, global players like Amazon provide an illustrative benchmark for how economies of scale can be leveraged across geographic markets.17 While Amazon’s position in Poland remains relatively limited at present, its global operations showcase how extensive infrastructure and technological capabilities can reduce unit costs and enhance competitive positioning. Amazon’s ability to offer sophisticated fulfilment, marketing and technological tools to third-party sellers illustrates the strategic advantage conferred by scale. Such advantages not only allow Amazon to maintain a presence in Poland, but might also contribute to position it as a potential long-term competitive constraint, albeit currently a weak one, on Allegro.
This example does not preclude Allegro from benefiting from similar efficiencies on a national level. Indeed, Allegro’s longstanding presence and local specialisation may allow it to achieve economies of scale that are highly tailored to the Polish market, particularly in areas such as logistics and consumer trust. Moreover, Allegro is building cross-border scale by expanding across the Central European region, including into Czechia, the Slovak Republic and Hungary, albeit on a smaller scale than Amazon’s cross-border operations.
Overall, the ability of incumbent platforms to capitalise on economies of scale appears to constitute a material factor in shaping competitive conditions in online marketplace markets across Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. These dynamics may reinforce the position of established players and raise barriers to entry or expansion for new platforms.
7.2.3. Switching costs and multi-homing
Following on from network effects, the next factor to be examined in this analysis is the extent of switching costs and the prevalence of multi-homing. These factors are highly relevant to assessing competition in online marketplaces, as high switching costs and low levels of multi-homing can constitute a significant barrier to entry and increase the likelihood of a single platform becoming entrenched.
Switching costs are the costs incurred by consumers or sellers to change between platforms. Further, when a platform offers an ecosystem of core and related services that increase user dependency (discussed further in Section 7.3 below), this can in turn reduce the incentives or ability of users to switch to competing platforms).
Multi-homing refers to the practice whereby consumers or sellers use more than one platform simultaneously. This takes different forms on the seller side and the consumer side. On the consumer side, multi-homing refers to the practice of buyers using more than one online marketplace or indeed other sales channels, to search for, compare and purchase products.18 On the seller side, multi-homing occurs when a seller uses more than one online marketplace or other alternative sales channels (such as via their own online shop or as a wholesaler to an online retailer), to reach consumers and conduct transactions.19
Consumer side
On the consumer side, while consumers do face some switching costs and barriers to multi-homing, such as the need to register on multiple platforms, manage separate user accounts and adapt to different interfaces, these costs are generally relatively low. In many cases, creating a new account is relatively quick and basic platform functionalities (e.g. searching for products, placing orders, making payments) are consistent across providers, especially for digitally literate users. The use of price comparison websites, which are particularly popular in the region, also supports multi-homing by consumers. As such, consumer behaviour suggests that price and product availability remain important drivers of platform choice and encourage platform switching or multi-homing when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs, for certain groups of consumers. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, some consumers will value the ability to transact across many retail categories in one place, and switching or multi-homing will be inhibited by the frictions involved in buying multiple different products across multiple different websites and sales channels, in comparison to buying the same set of products from one online marketplace.
Moreover, the combination of integrated services offered by Allegro and Pigu such as loyalty programmes, preferential delivery options, and discounts may still foster increased reliance on the leading platforms among frequent users. Allegro’s loyalty programme, Allegro Smart is a paid subscription service costing PLN 14.99 per month or PLN 59.90 per year. Once consumers have paid for such a subscription, this may make them more likely to use Allegro as their default shopping platform and to increase the size of their orders via the platform, in order to maximise their benefits from the free delivery services which they have already paid for (also in light of Allegro’s other advantages, such as its access to an extensive base of sellers). In Lithuania and Latvia, Pigu operates a VIP loyalty scheme under which customers who spend over EUR 600 in at least three separate orders within a 12‑month period are automatically granted access to additional benefits, such as priority service when collecting orders from Pigu stores, free or discounted delivery options, exclusive discount codes and an extended returns period. Such features may contribute to habitual purchasing behaviour and increase consumer reliance on the platform over time.
To illustrate the above points, available data shows that Allegro and Pigu appears to benefit from significant consumer loyalty in practice. Over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025, 87% of visitors based in Poland to Allegro’s platform were returning users, compared to 66% for AliExpress, 65% for Amazon and 64% for Temu.20 In Lithuania, over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025, Pigu had slightly more returning visitors as compared to Varle (71% for Pigu and 65% for Varle.lt).21 In Latvia, where there is no alternative local online marketplace, consumer behaviour can be assessed by comparing 220.lv to the general online retailer 1a.lv, which presents a viable alternative on the consumer side. 69% of visitors to 220.lv over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025were returning, in contrast with 59% for 1a.lv.22 The amount of direct traffic received by each of the platforms also suggests a higher degree of habitual shopping on Allegro and Pigu, compared to their close alternatives, as it indicates that these consumers directly navigate to these websites to start their shopping journey. Over the same 12‑month period, Allegro received 7 times the amount of direct traffic compared to AliExpress, 4 times as much when compared to Temu and 12 times that of Amazon.23 In Lithuania, Pigu had 2.25 times the amount of direct traffic as compared to Varle,24 and in 220.lv also had 3.5 times the amount of direct traffic compared to 1a.lv.25 This suggests that the use of these platforms is part of consumers’ habitual shopping behaviour.
Using data from SimilarWeb, it is possible to observe the extent which consumers visit multiple platforms over a longer 12‑month time frame, which can serve as a proxy for consumers’ propensity to multi-home over the course of multiple purchases) or a shorter single‑day time frame, suggesting the extent to which consumers shop around on different platforms when making a single purchase (see Annex A for a more detailed explanation). However, note that this data is limited to whether consumers visit the websites in question and do not capture whether there is an actual transaction or the frequency at which they visit the various websites. Considered alongside the other evidence in this section, this data can be used to provide an indication of the direction of overall multi-homing trends, even if it may under or overestimate its magnitude.
Looking first at the longer 12‑month time frame in Poland, while Allegro remains the primary platform for most users, a significant portion of consumers visit alternative marketplaces such as Temu, AliExpress or Amazon.pl. As mentioned in Section 7.1, 42.3% of Allegro’s users based in Poland did not visit any of the other top 5 Polish online marketplaces in the 12‑month period from January 2025 to December 2025.26 Of the 57.7% of Allegro users who did visit at least one other platform, over half of these only accessed one other platform from the four.27 55.9% of Temu’s audience, 73.6% of AliExpress’s audience, 76.6% of Amazon’s audience and 71.1% of Empik’s audience also visited Allegro during the same period.
Consumers can also multi-home across alternative sales channels or platforms, although these may serve as complements rather than substitutes. For instance, as described above, many consumers in Poland use the OCAS platform OLX, which has complementary functions to Allegro with its focus on second-hand goods. In the 12‑month period from January 2025 to December 2025, 37.3% of visitors to Allegro also visited OLX, with the remaining 62.7 exclusive to Allegro.28
Overall, the pattern of multi-homing described above demonstrates the strong position of Allegro as the default and central option for many consumers, although other platforms may be used by certain consumers under particular circumstances.
In Lithuania and Latvia, it is also possible to take a broader view on the consumer side, looking at consumer multi-homing across large, general online marketplaces and retailers. In Lithuania, looking at the total group of consumers who visited any of Pigu, Senukai and Varle (the three largest Lithuanian general online marketplaces and retailers), 40.8% of Pigu’s users exclusively visited Pigu’s platform, with 41.2% doing so for Senukai and 24.1% for Varle, while 19% of the total group of users visited all three platforms in the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025.29 In Latvia, looking at the number of consumers who visit Pigu’s 220.lv and the online retailer Senukai’s websites 1a.lv and Ksenukai.lv, 59.3% of visitors to 220.lv the same 12‑month period exclusively visit its platform without ever visiting either 1a.lv or ksenukai.lv.30 This is illustrated in Figure 7.8. for both Lithuania and Latvia. While some multi-homing occurs, the high percentage of users that are exclusive to Pigu, particularly in Latvia, demonstrates its importance to consumers in these countries.
Note: Audience Overlap shows the extent to which unique visitors are shared between up to five individual websites over the specified period. Importantly, circle size is not an indication of website reach – rather, it is an illustration of the extent to which the various audiences overlap. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Lithuania or Latvia, it is presented for worldwide visitors to websites with a.lt or.lv domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Lithuania or Latvia).
Source: SimilarWeb data.
Then, it is relevant to consider data covering a shorter same‑day time frame, to assess the likelihood that consumers multi-home across multiple different general online marketplaces when making a single purchase. This evidence also helps to understand the closeness of competition between different online marketplaces in each jurisdiction, highlighting the high degree of differentiation between the key players.
The analysis of consumer switching and multi-homing presented in this section should be read in conjunction with the cross-browsing evidence presented in Chapter 6, which examines the consumer’s side of the market and the closeness of competition between different types of platforms. In particular, Chapter 6 highlights how certain platform features can shape consumer behaviour over time by reinforcing reliance on a limited number of platforms.
While the data presented above does not speak directly to the presence of barriers to switching or multi-homing on the consumer side, it is useful as an illustration of the extent to which consumers are able to undertake both of these activities in practice (of which one factor influencing this will be the height of such barriers).
Seller side
On the seller side, sellers face notable costs and practical barriers when attempting to switch or expand to other marketplaces. These include the time and resources required to learn the operational mechanics of different platforms, reconfigure product listings, integrate with new logistical systems and establish new support channels with platform operators. Moreover, maintaining multiple logistics chains to supply different online marketplaces can be costly and complex for sellers. This can include the duplication of costs required in maintaining multiple warehouses and delivery partners, as well as the cost of integrated software solutions for real-time inventory management. Sellers can also become increasingly locked-in to a particular platform in light of their investment in building their profile of ratings and reviews on the platform, which cannot be moved to alternative platforms.
For many sellers, the expected commercial benefits of multi-homing do not offset these costs, particularly when competing platforms deliver lower sales volumes or thinner margins due to weaker consumer reach and may not provide sellers with access to new groups of consumers that they are not otherwise accessing through the dominant platform.
As such, sellers’ decisions may be affected by the added value of operating via a new platform or sales channel, in terms of the number of additional, different consumers that they would be able to reach via that channel. For example, a seller operating on Allegro may be less likely to expand their operations onto Amazon.pl, if they know that most users of Amazon.pl are already present on Allegro and they would thus incur in additional costs without necessarily reaching additional consumers as a result, although the strength of these incentives may vary based on the specific deal offered by Amazon, including in terms of fees.
Additional barriers include language limitations. When local sellers consider expanding to foreign platforms, they may face challenges in navigating platforms that operate primarily in English or other foreign languages. While automated translation tools exist, they do not fully eliminate this barrier for sellers, who bear the legal responsibility of providing accurate product information in compliance with consumer protection rules. Automatic translations can therefore fall short of ensuring the necessary precision and legal certainty for business users.
The available evidence on multi-homing suggests that while most sellers remain highly concentrated on the incumbent platforms, some degree of multi-homing exists for a proportion of sellers active on alternative platforms. This possibly reflects a need for sellers to remain active on the incumbent platform to reach the broadest consumer audience, even when already operating through a competitor. In Poland, stakeholder feedback suggests that a substantial proportion of merchants are active exclusively on Allegro or treat it as their main platform. In Lithuania, available information suggests that many of Varle’s sellers are also already present on Pigu and the reverse is unlikely to be the case. In Latvia, sellers do not have the ability to multi-home on a platform with a comparable audience and service offering.
By contrast, international platforms are either closed to local sellers or continue to rely primarily on foreign sellers, with limited penetration among locally based merchants. According to stakeholders, Amazon’s launch in Poland did not result in a significant shift in seller dynamics and platforms like AliExpress and Temu, while operating under different business models, have focussed on direct cross-border sales thus far, starting to establish local seller ecosystems only in late 2025. As a result, currently domestic sellers remain highly concentrated on Allegro and Pigu and multi-homing frictions persist.
While sellers have started listing products on Amazon.pl, they generally do not abandon Allegro altogether. Instead, they maintain a presence on both platforms. In this context, it is interesting to note comments from one stakeholder who reported that, even though Allegro has recently increased its commission fees, sellers continue to view it as an indispensable sales channel (and therefore do not switch to alternatives such as Amazon). This reinforces the view that Allegro’s established market position and access to a large consumer base continue to outweigh concerns about pricing and fee structures.
Relatedly, the presence of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses31 may further constrain sellers’ freedom when multi-homing across platforms, increasing barriers to entry for new entrants. For example, price parity obligations may prevent sellers from offering more competitive prices on alternative platforms or on their own online stores, while selection parity clauses may restrict sellers from presenting a broader product range elsewhere. Such restrictions may reinforce the exclusivity of sellers’ relationship with key platforms and make it difficult for new entrants to attract sellers to their platforms by offering lower fees as these savings cannot be passed on to consumers. As discussed further in Chapter 8, some form of MFNs are used by both Allegro in Poland and Pigu in Lithuania and Latvia.
7.2.4. Vertical integration
As alluded to above, the extent of vertical integration by incumbent platforms is highly relevant to assessing horizontal competition and the degree of contestability in online marketplaces. This is because vertically integrated services can be highly relevant to platforms’ offerings on both the seller and consumer side, which influence their choices between rival online marketplaces. Moreover, platforms may be able to leverage their position in other vertically related markets to advantage their business over other online marketplaces. Other issues arising from platforms’ vertical and conglomerate expansions and ecosystems will be considered further in Section 7.3 below.
Vertical integration refers to the expansion of a firm’s operations along the supply chain, typically through the acquisition or development of upstream or downstream businesses that support or complement its core activity. In the context of online marketplaces, vertical integration often entails internalising functions in related markets including logistics and payments services or in supporting markets such as advertising (described in more detail in Chapter 2). For hybrid marketplaces, vertical integration may also include the operation of their own retail business alongside their online marketplace services.
Vertical integration may enhance operational efficiency and improve user experience. However, vertically integrated platforms may have the ability and incentive to foreclose rival service providers in upstream or downstream markets. This can increase entry barriers and strengthen incumbents’ market positions by limiting rivals’ access to essential services or by making alternative platforms less attractive. When a dominant marketplace integrates with key service providers, particularly those operating in adjacent markets such as logistics or price comparison services, this may further entrench its position and reduce the scope for effective competition. Vertical integration may also raise entry barriers by requiring multi-level entry, whereby new platforms may be forced to enter several markets at once, rather than just the core market, to compete with the incumbents effectively.
Pigu shows a moderate level of vertical integration across its operations in both Lithuania and Latvia. Pigu has developed its own fulfillment capabilities, offering warehousing and delivery services for sellers through its FBP network, operating across the Baltic region. These services are presented as optional, but sellers seeking access to faster delivery or higher visibility on the platform may be incentivised to use them. Pigu also operates its own branded pick-up lockers and physical stores, reinforcing its position as a hybrid online‑offline player. While these integrations improve logistical efficiency, they may also limit the ability of third-party logistics providers to compete on equal terms and create dependencies for sellers using the platform. This is because, as sellers are increasingly integrated with Pigu’s fulfilment infrastructure, they may be restricted in their ability to multi-home across other online marketplaces. As a hybrid marketplace, which evolved from an online retail business, Pigu also sells its own retail goods via its platform, as explained in Chapter 4.
In Poland, Allegro exhibits a higher degree of vertical integration. Over the past few years, the platform has expanded into several ancillary markets. Notably and as already discussed, Allegro has acquired Ceneo, the largest price comparison website in Poland, allowing it to control a key consumer discovery channel and potentially influence traffic flow between competitors and partnered with InPost, the country’s largest logistics company, while also developing its own logistics infrastructure through the acquisition of X-press Couriers and the deployment of proprietary lockers, strengthening its control over last-mile delivery.
These integrations create a comprehensive ecosystem that combines marketplace functionality with price comparison and logistics (as well as other conglomerate expansions, discussed further in Section 7.3), all of which can reinforce Allegro’s dominant position in the core market by strengthening its ecosystem. Sellers may become dependent on Allegro’s vertically integrated tools and infrastructure to ensure visibility and competitive performance. At the same time, these integrations may make it more difficult for new or smaller platforms to compete on an equal footing without offering similar ancillary services. Allegro also increasingly offers its own retail goods for sale via its online platform. The potential effects on competition deriving from the creation and strengthening of such ecosystem, as well as from foreclosure risks, will be addressed in more detail in Section 7.3 below.
In conclusion, vertical integration is more pronounced in Poland than in Lithuania or Latvia. Allegro has developed or acquired a range of services in ancillary markets, giving rise to foreclosure risks that may deter entry and limit competition. In contrast, Pigu’s vertical integration remains largely confined to logistical services and hybrid retail infrastructure, although foreclosure risks may still arise. Section 7.3 below will consider in more detail the ecosystems of Allegro and Pigu, including the extent to which the platforms’ ecosystem strategies may entrench their market power.
7.2.5. Conclusions
As described in Section 7.1, there is a high degree of concentration in core general online marketplaces in each of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia on the seller side, with some degree of concentration also on the consumer side. In each case, these jurisdictions are characterised by the presence of one incumbent online marketplace which faces limited competitive constraints (to different degrees depending on the jurisdiction). Moreover, as shown in Section 7.2, the presence of strong indirect network effects, significant economies of scale, moderate switching costs and limitations on user multi-homing and varying levels of vertical integration from the leading players, are highly relevant factors affecting the state of competition in online marketplaces.
In Poland, Allegro’s high market shares, strong network effects, significant economies of scale and limited competition indicate that, unless significant structural changes occur, its position is unlikely to be challenged in the short to medium term. On the seller side, its position as the primary channel for reaching Polish consumers, its vertically integrated service offering and high switching costs hinder effective competition. On the consumer side, Allegro’s localisation strategy and brand trust translate into limited willingness to switch, with Allegro remaining the default platform for consumers. Allegro’s strong position is not simply a function of early market entry, but the result of structural features and strategic conduct that have created high barriers to entry and made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult. Despite Amazon’s significant investments in the Polish market, its limited competitive impact illustrates the challenges of contesting a structurally advantaged incumbent.
The combination of relatively high market shares, limited competition and the presence of barriers to entry and expansion suggests that competitive pressure on Pigu is limited in both Lithuania and Latvia, in core general online marketplaces and on the sellers side in particular. Pigu’s advantages include its integrated suite of services including end-to‑end logistics and its alignment with national consumer and seller preferences. Together, these factors, reinforced by key market features described in Section 7.2, generate barriers to entry and expansion for rival platforms and limit the effective substitutability of alternative options on both sides. This indicates a market that may not be sufficiently contestable, even in the presence of nominal cross-border alternatives looking at the broader scenario of all general online marketplaces, currently operating under different business models.
As such, the evidence and analysis presented in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, point to a reduced level of effective competition in core general online marketplaces, suggesting a durable competitive advantage for Allegro and Pigu that is difficult for competitors to overcome.
Competition between online marketplaces in these jurisdictions is shaped by the presence of strong network indirect effects. Allegro and Pigu’s position as the primary channel for reaching local consumers means they are “must have” channels for sellers in the three jurisdictions (albeit to varying degrees), with potential new entrants facing high barriers to entry due to the need to enter concurrently on both sides of the market (attracting both consumers and sellers).
Significant economies of scale have also contributed to the strong positions of these leading platforms. In Poland, the scale advantages enjoyed by Allegro are highly apparent while, in the context of small national markets such as Lithuania and Latvia, it is possible that incumbents may have reached a degree of scale sufficient to hinder new entrants in the same core market, although the situation as relates to Temu is continuing to evolve.
On the consumer side, the use of these leading platforms is part of consumers’ habitual shopping behaviour in light of their high brand trust, comprehensive product offerings and localisation strategies, while switching costs are heightened by the loyalty programmes and other related services offered by the platforms. These dynamics are highly advanced in Poland and emerging in Lithuania and Latvia.
Meanwhile, sellers face barriers to multi-homing and switching arising from the costs involved in integrating across multiple platforms. These costs are more significant for sellers that use the incumbent platform’s logistics services or financial services. In practice, most sellers remain highly concentrated on the incumbent platforms, possibly reflecting their need to remain active on the incumbent platform to reach the broadest consumer audience, while some degree of multi-homing exists for a proportion of sellers active on alternative platforms
Vertical integration by the leading platforms, most developed in the case of Allegro, also raises entry barriers for new entrants, who need to match the platforms’ full service offerings in order to compete effectively.
Building on the identification of vertical integration as a key dimension of competition in online marketplaces, this section expands on this analysis by holistically assessing key vertical, conglomerate and ecosystem dimensions of competition, as relevant to online marketplaces in each of the three countries.
While this analysis continues to form part of the assessment of the state of competition in online marketplaces, the conclusions in the previous section as related to the structure of the market and the strong market positions of particular platforms, means that it will inevitably focus on the Allegro in Poland and Pigu in Latvia and Lithuania. Here, Pigu’s business strategies are assessed together across the two countries, not based on an assertion of identical competitive market conditions or competitor sets within each respective geographic market, but rather to illustrate Pigu’s overarching vertical and conglomerate expansions and the ensuing development of its ecosystem.
As such, this section examines how Allegro and Pigu, as the leading platforms operating in the region, have expanded the scope of their activities across other ancillary markets, the vertical or conglomerate issues which may arise as a result of this expansion, and the extent to which these platforms’ expanding ecosystems may give rise to durable competitive advantages that reduce contestability both within and beyond the core marketplace. In particular, this section considers, in detail, the platforms’ logistics infrastructure, payments systems integration, other consumer-facing services, geographic expansion and data accumulation.
Notably, both Allegro and Pigu are both vertically integrated hybrid marketplaces, which sell their own products alongside those of the sellers who use their platforms, competing directly with them in downstream retail markets. Although this issue will be touched upon in this section, it will be considered separately and in detail as part of Chapter 8 on platforms’ interactions with sellers, due to its significant importance as part of this relationship.
7.3.1. Competitive impact of logistics integration
The first element to be considered is Allegro and Pigu’s vertical integration in logistics services.
As summarised in Chapter 4, Allegro operates its own fulfilment service for sellers and its own directly managed delivery programme, including parcel lockers. Similarly, Pigu owns and operates its own fulfilment services, including warehouse and distribution infrastructure and has a small network of parcel lockers in Vilnius.
Such vertical integration can produce efficiencies. For instance, Allegro has stated that the development of its own parcel locker network and delivery services has given it more control over its deliveries and allows for it to lower its average costs of delivery as scale increases (Reuters, 2025[14]). From the perspective of sellers, integrated logistics services lower operational burdens and offer convenience, particularly when shipping options are seamlessly connected to the marketplace’s interface, fulfilment workflows and return management systems. Such functionalities may be particularly valuable for smaller or newer sellers, who may lack the resources or scale to develop their own logistics operations.
However, this vertical expansion may also have an impact on competition. For instance, Allegro and Pigu could use preferential pricing, promotions, ranking algorithms or seller terms to incentivise sellers to rely on its own fulfilment services, thereby increasing switching costs and raising barriers to entry for rival marketplaces. Potential entrants would need to offer comparable logistics services, including fulfilment and warehousing, to attract sellers who rely on Allegro and Pigu’s comprehensive logistics services. This also has an impact on the likelihood of sellers to multi-home, as sellers who rely on leading platforms’ logistics services may be less likely to inefficiently acquire duplicative logistics services from an alternative marketplace or third-party logistics provider.
Further, as highlighted in Chapter 5, access to sufficient parcel locker capacity is a necessity for online marketplaces. This depends heavily on access to physical space. In order to compete effectively, logistics providers need to be able to deploy their APMs in high-value, space‑limited locations, such as supermarkets, petrol stations and car parks, which are highly valued by consumers. In turn, access to these logistics networks is essential for online marketplaces – either through partnering with logistics providers or, if vertically integrated, deploying their own APMs in prime locations.
The degree to which logistics providers and online marketplaces can gain exclusive access to high value spaces (for example, providers of parcel lockers entering exclusive agreements with particular supermarket chains or online marketplaces partnering exclusively with particular delivery service providers) will limit the ability for alternative logistics and delivery providers or online marketplaces to compete by denying them the scale necessary to meet their users’ needs.
This is more likely to be a concern in markets where competition is more limited, as may be the case in Poland where parcel delivery services are more concentrated than in Lithuania or Latvia. As set out in Chapter 4, InPost has a much larger network of APMs than its closest rivals. Allegro and InPost have a seven‑year partnership agreement running to 2027, although this is not exclusive and, as identified previously, Allegro is increasingly competing with InPost in logistics (Reuters, 2025[14]). In Lithuania and Latvia, there are more players active in logistics, with 6 key providers of parcel delivery services in each jurisdiction and Pigu partnering with 3 of these operators in each jurisdiction, alongside its own small network of parcel lockers. As such, the ability and incentive for particular logistics providers or online marketplaces to secure exclusive access to space may vary across the three jurisdictions.
Concerns may also arise if platforms’ preferencing of their own logistics services leads to foreclosure risks in downstream logistics markets, depriving rivals in logistics markets of the scale necessary to compete. Sellers relying on Allegro or Pigu’s consumer reach may find it harder to opt for alternative logistics partners either alongside or instead of Allegro and Pigu’s own fulfilment services. This is because alternative logistics providers may offer reduced functionality or integrate less well with the incumbents’ platforms as compared to their own vertically integrated services, or because the incumbents offer certain promotions and incentives to sellers using their logistics services. As such, this may raise entry barriers for alternative logistics providers who may not be able to compete on the merits in terms of price or quality, due to being disadvantaged by the tying of platforms’ logistics and marketplace services. This is in addition to other structural barriers to entry in the sector, including the importance of network effects. impacting competition in downstream logistics markets.
Allegro and Pigu’s expansions into logistics have implications that extend beyond the issues discussed above. While these capabilities bring clear efficiency gains, they also serve to progressively reinforce Allegro and Pigu’s platform ecosystems, as discussed further in Section 7.3.5. By integrating logistics directly into the platform experience, Allegro and Pigu may reduce operational burdens for sellers, thereby strengthening user loyalty and reducing incentives to multi-home. However, these logistics services are only available to businesses that sell through Allegro and Pigu’s marketplaces. This means that in order to access the benefits of their end-to‑end logistics systems (including cross-border reach, fast shipping and streamlined fulfilment), sellers must participate in the platform. As a result, Allegro and Pigu’s logistics infrastructure becomes not just a value‑added service but it effectively ties access to a critical enabling service (fulfilment and delivery) to the use of the platform itself.
In the case of Pigu, its cross-border logistics network enhances its role as a regional e‑commerce enabler and may increase platform dependence for sellers targeting multiple national markets. This positions FBP not merely as a service but as a critical piece of regional e‑commerce infrastructure, potentially reinforcing Pigu’s position and making multi-homing or switching to rival platforms more difficult for sellers targeting multiple national markets.
From the consumer side, fast and low-cost delivery is a key driver of platform choice. Allegro and Pigu’s ability to guarantee such delivery conditions strengthens consumer loyalty, particularly in a context where expectations around delivery speed and reliability are increasingly standardised. Moreover, these logistics arrangements support Allegro and Pigu’s ability to offer free or discounted delivery as part of their loyalty programmes, further driving consumer loyalty.
Taken together, these dynamics illustrate how logistics integration, while not inherently anticompetitive, and indeed potentially pro‑competitive and efficient, may raise concerns when implemented by a platform with a strong market position. By strengthening lock-in effects, raising barriers to entry for new platforms and potentially distorting competition in neighbouring markets, Allegro and Pigu’s expansions into logistics, in combination with other factors discuss in this report, may serve not only to entrench its position in the core market for online marketplace, but also to extend its influence across additional layers of the e‑commerce value chain. These risks are further amplified by the data advantages (see also Section 7.2.4) and network effects that characterise large digital platforms.
7.3.2. Advantages and risks arising from payments services integration
Secondly, this section analyses Allegro’s pursuit of vertical integration in payment services and its broader impact on competition, which may also be a potential area of expansion for Pigu.
Allegro has expanded into the provision of payment services through a broad and growing suite of proprietary and partner-based solutions, as described in Chapter 4. On the consumer side, Allegro offers a variety of embedded financing options to increase purchasing flexibility and improve the shopping experience, including Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) services such as Allegro Pay an interest-free instalment offering available and a cashback programme. On the seller side, Allegro supports liquidity and operational efficiency through services such as Allegro Pay Business, which ensures immediate payouts to merchants even when customers opt for deferred payment options and Allegro Merchant Finance, which offers loans directly to sellers. While not as expansive as Allegro’s service offering, Pigu also offers consumer credit products that allow customers to pay in instalments over periods of up to 24 months, in partnership with InBank. These services can be beneficial for both sellers and consumers, and may lead to increased efficiencies and innovation on the seller side, as well as enhanced convenience and consumer trust on the consumer side.
For online marketplaces with a strong market position, embedding financial services serves to expand the platforms’ ecosystem and could possibly increase the likelihood of user lock-in, increase platform stickiness and enhance monetisation potential per customer, discussed further in Section 7.3.5.
From a competition perspective, this type of vertical integration creates several important effects. On the seller side, Allegro’s vertical integration increases the reliance of certain sellers on Allegro. If sellers use Allegro’s financial services, they may become less willing or less able to sell on other platforms due to increased switching costs, even if those platforms offer lower fees or better visibility. This is because leaving Allegro would not just mean losing sales, but also losing access to the financial tools they to depend on.
On the consumer side, consumers may have an increased risk of lock in arising not from any single feature but from the complementarity between financial services and the broader platform ecosystems. The cumulative effect is a high switching cost environment for consumers. For instance, once accustomed to using Allegro’s credit products and relying on a single interface for order fulfilment, communication and after-sales support, consumers may become less likely to explore alternatives, even where nominally lower prices or differentiated offerings exist elsewhere. This dynamic may limit the contestability of the market and may reduce the responsiveness of consumers to the offers of new entrants or other market players, increasing in turn sellers’ reliance on the platform. Additionally, vertical integration between online marketplaces and payments services may give rise to foreclosure risks, to the extent that a vertically integrated online marketplace with a large consumer base directs significant traffic to its own financial products, denying access to such customers for its rivals. For instance, alternative BNPL services, which indeed may be preferred by consumers, may face difficulties building sufficient scale and competing effectively if they are unable to access a large source of consumer demand.
The dynamics highlighted above illustrate how vertical integration in payments services can enhance user lock-in to online marketplaces’ platform ecosystems, which potentially giving rise to foreclosure risks. Such services may provide substantial benefits to consumers and represent a meaningful aspect of the platforms value proposition, however concerns may arise in the longer term to the extent that they increase switching costs and raise barriers to entry for rivals. These effects are compounded when considering the cumulative impact of the other services offered as part of the ecosystem, discussed further below. At this point in time, these dynamics are more relevant for Allegro, which offers a comprehensive suite of financial services, as compared to Pigu.32
7.3.3. Expansion into other consumer-facing services
In addition to offering financial services to consumers, Allegro has also expanded its ecosystem into several other consumer-facing services, including through strategic acquisitions. This mode of expansion allows Allegro to deepen user engagement and reinforce the position of its core online marketplace service, while potentially giving rise to foreclosure risks. Two illustrative cases are its acquisitions of the leading CSS in Poland, Ceneo and the major online ticketing platform eBilet.pl. While these services operate in different markets, both contribute, albeit in distinct ways, to Allegro’s ability to attract and retain users.
The acquisition of Ceneo offers Allegro a powerful tool to influence consumer decision making and traffic flows across platforms. This relationship creates the potential for self-preferencing, whereby Ceneo may subtly favour listings on Allegro, whether through higher rankings, more prominent display, or biased affiliate link structures, at the expense of competing platforms. Foreclosure risks may arise to the extent that Ceneo has market power and can direct traffic to Allegro, at the expense of rival online marketplaces and e‑commerce businesses, or exclude its rivals from the platform, distorting competition on the merits. Additional customer foreclosure risks could arise to the extent that Allegro, with its strong position in online marketplaces, could cease to integrate with rival services, denying them necessary scale.
Ceneo is by far the leading Polish CSS, with approximately 90% of traffic to CSS platforms by users based in Poland going to Ceneo (this analysis includes direct visits to CSS platforms by users based in Poland, including visits to shopping.google.com, but does not include Google Shopping results which appear via Google Search results which cannot be clearly extracted).33 Referral traffic is most relevant for price sensitive customers, who are more likely to use CSS platforms to compare offers from different platforms, potentially opening up competition with rival online marketplaces and other retailers and helping drive beneficial network effects for such platforms. In practice, Ceneo sent approximately 22.64% of its outgoing referral traffic to Allegro, compared to an average of 2.97% to the other websites in its top 10 for outgoing traffic.34 Looking from the other direction, 22.48% of Allegro’s incoming referral traffic came from Ceneo, over the same period.35 While noting that Allegro’s dimension and quantity and popularity of its listings, have a role to play in the numbers above, this integration shows the potential for Ceneo to channel demand directly to the Allegro platform, raising barriers to entry for rivals and making Allegro’s services even more attractive for sellers seeking visibility and conversion.
Furthermore, Allegro’s access to data generated by Ceneo (such as click-through rates and comparative pricing dynamics) may allow it to refine its pricing strategies, identify consumer trends ahead of rivals and optimise seller recommendations. Given the central role of Ceneo in Poland’s e‑commerce ecosystem, this integration is difficult for smaller players to replicate and creates an advantage that may reduce inter-platform competition and raises barrier entries for rivals seeking to enter or compete in online marketplace services.
Second, Allegro’s conglomerate acquisition of eBilet.pl, serves a different but complementary function within its ecosystem. While online ticketing does not directly overlap with the sale of physical goods, it is notable that it offers Allegro a potential new channel to increase consumer engagement, cross-sell, and gather behavioural data on user preferences and purchase patterns. By integrating ticketing services into the Allegro platform, the company could potentially strengthen user stickiness and increase the frequency of consumer interactions, in turn boosting retention and traffic across the entire ecosystem. Over time, this could help Allegro build more complete consumer profiles, deliver better-targeted ads and expand the range of incentives tied to the Allegro Smart! loyalty programme.
The presence of such effects is support by evidence that substantial amounts of consumer traffic stays within Allegro’s ecosystem of consumer-facing services. Most of Allegro’s incoming referral traffic in Poland comes from firms within its ecosystem: 22.48% from Ceneo and 5.57% from Allegro Lokalnie (OCAS service operated by Allegro), in the period January 2025 to December 2025.36 Most of Allegro’s outgoing traffic also stays within its ecosystem, with 27.26% going to Allegro Lokalnie over the same period. As suggested by these results, there is high overlap and cross-browsing between users based in Poland of the platforms within Allegro’s ecosystem. A considerable portion of users of these other websites also visited Allegro on the same day at any point in the period January 2025 to December 2025: 81.33% of Allegro Lokalnie’s users visited Allegro (compared to 40.17% of users of the leading OCAS platform OLX), 59.61% of Ceneo’s users also went to Allegro, and 23.13% did so from eBilet.pl.37
Allegro’s operations in both of these consumer-facing services reflects a broader strategy of ecosystem strengthening, discussed further in Section 7.3.5 below, through control of supporting services that either direct consumer traffic (as with Ceneo) or increase platform engagement (as with eBilet). While these markets are different in nature from core logistics or payments, they contribute to the same competitive dynamic: by increasing the breadth, complexity and interdependence of its services, Allegro raises the barriers for rivals to compete on equal terms. This integrated ecosystem makes Allegro more valuable to both consumers and sellers, but also more difficult to replicate or substitute for rivals in the core online marketplace market.
7.3.4. Implications of geographic expansion
Both Allegro and Pigu have also expanded their operations geographically, including via significant acquisitions.
As mentioned previously, Allegro has acquired the Mall Group and WE|DO to establish a presence in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Czechia, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. These acquisitions provided Allegro with a foothold in neighbouring Central and Eastern European markets, although while these operations currently remain distinct from Allegro.pl. Pigu’s expansion across the Baltic region has also followed an acquisition-driven strategy, allowing the company to quickly establish a strong presence in all three national markets. Through its early acquisition of Latvia’s 220.lv and Estonia’s kaup24.ee, Pigu gained access to pre‑existing consumer bases, seller networks, logistics infrastructure and brand recognition. These acquisitions were subsequently consolidated under a unified regional brand and operating model, creating what is effectively a single integrated platform serving the entire Baltic region.
Such geographic expansion may, by increasing the group’s overall scale, enhance Allegro and Pigu’s bargaining power in logistics and procurement, allowing them to offer lower delivery costs or better fulfilment terms to consumers and sellers, which may enhance their ability to compete. Moreover, this expansion may allow Allegro and Pigu to consolidate logistics, marketing, technological development and data analytics capabilities across the group, which reduces average costs and increases service quality. As such, shared investment in such systems may generate efficiencies that strengthen their performance relative to less integrated rivals. In this sense, geographic expansion acts as a horizontal lever, reinforcing Allegro and Pigu’s advantages in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, even if Allegro’s foreign operations remain separately branded or operated.
To the extent that the platforms’ operations are integrated across borders, which appears more prevalent for Pigu than Allegro, this cross-border integration may also enable the platform to provide consumers with access to a broader assortment of products and choice via the addition of a larger and more diverse seller base, reinforcing consumer loyalty and driving demand and, in turn, making the platform more attractive for sellers. For sellers, if the platform can now offer access not just to domestic consumers but to a broader regional user base, this may increase the profitability of the channel relative to local alternatives, potentially increasing seller dependence on the platform. As such, indirect network effects, where the value of the platform increases with participation on both sides of the market, may be amplified by Allegro and Pigu’s regional scale and be difficult for domestic competitors to replicate.
Finally, the resulting asymmetry in reach, scale and capabilities raises entry barriers for potential newcomers. A new entrant in Lithuania, for instance, would not only need to compete with Pigu’s local offering, but also with the added scale and user value that Pigu is able to derive from its regional presence. These dynamics may deter entry altogether or weaken the competitive impact of such entry, thereby reducing external constraints on Allegro and Pigu’s behaviour.
In this light, Allegro and Pigu’s acquisition-led geographic expansion might constitute a further mechanism for reinforcing their respective market position in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
7.3.5. Data accumulation across platform ecosystems
Allegro and Pigu’s vertical and conglomerate expansion described above gives rise to significant data advantages, constituting an economy of scope in the core market of online marketplaces and strengthening their overall platform ecosystems, discussed further in Section 7.3.6. below.
Allegro’s ability to entrench its market position can be further reinforced by the potential to accumulate, combine, and strategically deploy large volumes of user and transactional data generated across its expanding ecosystem. The integration of services such as logistics (One Fulfillment by Allegro), payments (Allegro Pay and PayU), CSS (Ceneo) and ticketing (eBilet.pl) gives the platform access to a broad and granular dataset, spanning consumer browsing and purchase behaviour, price sensitivity, shipping preferences and seller reliability. The unique breadth and interconnectedness of this data across services can confer a significant competitive asset that might difficult to replicate by rivals operating in more narrowly defined segments.
In particular, Allegro collects personal data through both direct registration and third-party login services (e.g. Google, Facebook), including personal details (names, email addresses and profile pictures).38 It can track user behaviour (views, clicks, purchases and preferences) to personalise content and advertising via a recommendation system.39 Allegro shares user data with other service providers (e.g. delivery, payment, insurance) strictly for platform-related operations.40 While sellers can only access data that are transaction related, Allegro produces complete platform-wide analytics and may commercialise aggregated, anonymised insights. Users can choose to avoid tracking (used to provide personalised services), ensuring that only basic functionalities and non-targeted content are provided in such cases.41
Publicly disclosed terms and conditions and privacy policies indicate that Allegro reserves broad rights to collect and process data generated through platform usage, for purposes such as service enhancement, fraud detection and personalised recommendations. However, information about the extent to which data is shared across subsidiaries or used to inform commercial strategy is not publicly available. In particular, it is unclear whether Allegro leverages this data to favour its own services (see also Chapter 8 below) or to design dynamic pricing and promotional tools that rival platforms cannot match due to their more limited visibility into buyer-seller interactions.
Similarly, Pigu’s potential to consolidate its position in the Baltic online marketplace segment is further supported by its ability to collect, integrate and utilise substantial amounts of data generated across its vertically integrated services. Through its dual role as both a direct retailer and a third-party marketplace operator (complemented by its fulfilment, payment and logistics capabilities), Pigu accumulates a wide spectrum of information covering consumer preferences, browsing habits, delivery patterns and seller behaviour. This comprehensive and cross-functional data environment constitutes a valuable competitive asset, particularly when compared to smaller or more narrowly specialised platforms.
Available information suggests that Pigu collects a wide range of user data through its e‑commerce platform, including personal details (e.g. name, email, phone), transaction details (products ordered, payment, delivery) and behavioural data (browsing activity, preferences, device information).42 Users may provide optional demographic data and participate in loyalty programmes like “Pigu Club”.43 Pigu also collects technical data during account registration and use, along with data generated by specific features such as wish lists and location-based services.44 This data is used for service delivery, customer support, personalised marketing and analytics.45 The personalisation is crucially driven by the level of user consent.46 Also, Pigu facilitates the transfer of necessary buyer data to sellers for order fulfillment.47 Additionally, Pigu employs video surveillance in physical locations and shares some limited buyer data with sellers for order fulfillment under defined privacy obligations.48
According to its terms of use and public disclosures, Pigu reserves broad discretion to collect and process platform-generated data for purposes such as improving services, detecting fraud and tailoring recommendations. However, Pigu does not provide public information about the extent to which these data are shared internally across business units or used to inform competitive decision making. In particular, a lack of clarity persists around whether Pigu uses aggregated insights to support its own retail operations or to design advantages (e.g. promotional mechanisms, dynamic pricing tools) not available to third-party sellers or external advertisers.
For both Allegro and Pigu, in their capacity as hybrid online marketplaces, concerns may arise from asymmetric access to data between these marketplaces and their third-party sellers (see also Chapter 8). While Allegro and Pigu collect and centralises data across all marketplace interactions, individual sellers are typically limited to insights from their own transactions, with little visibility into broader market trends, buyer journeys or competitor performance. This imbalance may enable Allegro and Pigu to design advertising and pricing tools that are more effective than those accessible to sellers, or to prioritise certain sellers over others based on behavioural data. These risks how Allegro and Pigu’s data advantages not only strengthens its ecosystem at a conglomerate level, but also concentrates control over commercial intelligence within the platform operator itself.
More broadly, this cross-service data accumulation raises concerns from a horizontal or conglomerate perspective, particularly when such information is used to refine Allegro and Pigu’s core marketplace strategies. For instance, access to CSS-level clickstream data may allow Allegro to detect emerging consumer interest in specific products before competitors. Payment and fulfilment data can provide real-time insights into seller performance and delivery reliability, enabling Allegro to optimise search rankings, boost high-performing sellers or target advertising campaigns with exceptional precision. Access to browsing and purchasing patterns across categories may enable Allegro and Pigu to identify rising demand trends early, giving it a first-mover advantage over independent sellers in terms of its ability to swiftly offer products that meet consumer needs. Similarly, internal data on fulfilment and transaction quality could inform product placement, search visibility and advertising prioritisation, reinforcing the platform’s ability to promote high-performing listings or sellers in a way that smaller players may struggle to replicate.
These feedback loops deepen Allegro and Pigu’s competitive advantage: the more users interact with the platform’s ecosystem, the more valuable and predictive the data becomes, which in turn enables further optimisation and user acquisition. Over time, this creates a self-reinforcing cycle that increases user and seller dependency, raising barriers for competing marketplaces that lack access to similarly diversified data inputs. As the scope and quality of data increasingly determine competitive outcomes in digital markets, transparency around the purposes, scope and sharing of data, particularly across business units, becomes critical.
European Commission, Amazon (Cases AT.40 462 & AT.40 703) – 20 December 2022
Why data use was a concern: Access to non-public seller data gave Amazon a structural advantage, allowing it to optimise pricing, product selection and stock management in ways independent sellers could not, potentially distorting competition.
Amazon made legally binding commitments to stop using non-public data from third-party sellers (sales, inventory, performance metrics, visit data) to inform its own retail operations.
Amazon must apply non-discriminatory criteria for the “Buy Box” allocation and display alternative offers when relevant, ensuring fairer consumer choice.
On Prime, Amazon must allow sellers to negotiate delivery carriers independently and cannot exploit Prime‑related data for its own logistics advantage.
These commitments are enforceable, with fines up to 10% of global turnover or 5% per day in case of non-compliance.
United Kingdom (CMA), Amazon (Case 51 184) – 3 November 2023
Why data use was a concern: Amazon’s access to sensitive seller metrics (sales, performance, inventory) could enable it to compete unfairly with third-party sellers, using insights they cannot access.
Amazon committed to not using non-public seller data for its own retail decisions.
It must apply objective, non-discriminatory criteria in the Buy Box allocation.
Sellers can negotiate Prime delivery rates independently, without being forced to use Amazon-approved carriers.
An independent trustee monitors compliance.
European Commission, Meta / Facebook Marketplace (Case AT.40 684) – 14 November 2024
Why data use was a concern: Meta held dominant positions in personal social networks and online display advertising and exploited both, automatically giving all Facebook users access to Marketplace and using third-party advertisers’ data exclusively to benefit its own competing service.
Meta was fined EUR 797.72 million for two abuses of dominant position: tying Facebook Marketplace to the Facebook social network, giving it a distribution advantage rivals could not match; and imposing unfair trading conditions on other classified-ad providers by leveraging their advertising data to boost Marketplace.
The Commission ordered Meta to cease both practices immediately. Meta announced its intention to appeal.
Sources: European Commission (2022) Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Amazon barring it from using marketplace seller data and ensuring equal access to Buy Box and Prime, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7777; UK Competition and Markets Authority (2022) Investigation into Amazon’s Marketplace, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-amazons-marketplace, European Commission (2024) Commission fines Meta EUR 797.72 million over abusive practices benefitting Facebook Marketplace, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5801.
7.3.6. Risks to competition from expanding ecosystems
This section sets out the ecosystem dimensions of competition in online marketplaces and the risks to competition from platforms’ ecosystem expansion and strengthening. This builds on and brings together the analysis in the sections above, which outline the various elements of vertical and conglomerate expansion by Allegro and Pigu, expanding on the potential risks which may arise from the enhancement of their ecosystems.
Looking first at Poland, Allegro, through its integrated ecosystem, directly controls key operational layers and enhances its offering to both sellers and consumers. By developing its own logistics arm and leveraging strategic partnerships, Allegro provides unparalleled delivery speed and cost-effectiveness. This makes its platform not only exceptionally attractive to sellers, but also a key gateway to reach Polish consumers, deeply integrating them into its systems and raising their switching costs. For consumers, this translates to superior delivery options that rival platforms struggle to match, thereby contributing to increased user loyalty. Similarly, Allegro’s suite of financial services offer crucial liquidity and flexible payment options for both buyers and sellers. This may contribute to a financial dependency among users, making it costly and disruptive for them to multi-home.
Beyond vertical integration, Allegro’s expansion into other consumer-facing services, like Ceneo for price comparison and eBilet for ticketing, and its geographic expansion into the Central and Eastern European markets, serve to further broaden and solidify its ecosystem. These moves are likely to enhance user engagement, provide additional channels for traffic direction and potentially contribute to a vast data advantage. Further, this continuous accumulation and leveraging of cross-service data gives Allegro the ability to optimise its offerings and target users with unmatched precision, creating powerful feedback loops that reinforce its competitive edge.
While to a different degree, in Lithuania and Latvia, Pigu’s control over logistics infrastructure, payment services and integration and its regional acquisitions, which underpin its cross-border expansion across the Baltic region, may reduce the ability of users, especially to multi-home or switch to alternative platforms, raising barriers to entry for rivals.
Similar to Allegro, Pigu may also substantially benefit from the advantages accruing from its accumulation and combination of data across its ecosystem. The cross-leveraging of such data raises potential concerns from both horizontal and conglomerate perspectives, particularly when the insights are employed to optimise Pigu’s commercial strategy or expand its influence in close services. Moreover, access to privileged information may lower the risk associated with entering new vertical or geographic markets, giving Pigu a strategic edge in expanding its ecosystem beyond its current footprint.
This ecosystem expansion and the accompanying lock-in effects, may in turn consolidate the Allegro and Pigu’s power as relates to their core service, namely the online marketplace services which originally enabled their growth through ecosystem integration and service bundling. In this respect, their strength does not derive solely from their position in the initial market but from the way that position is shielded and reinforced through expansion into complementary functions.
A second, closely connected dynamic may follow, which is the use of power in the core market to limit competition in ancillary services. As highlighted above (and discussed further in Chapter 8), these platforms may use their control over user interfaces, search algorithms, ranking systems or contractual terms to favour its own services, or impose technical or commercial conditions that reduce the visibility or attractiveness of competing offers. They may also be in a position to commercially sensitive data collected from business users operating on the core platform to develop or optimise competing offerings in related segments. In this way, market power acquired and secured in the core market can be used strategically to gain or reinforce an advantage in the surrounding ecosystem.
This leads to risks of the development of a closed and self-reinforcing digital ecosystem in which users are subject to high switching costs and are incentivised or effectively constrained, to remain within a single platform or service provider. In this situation, consumers and sellers become increasingly reliant on the platform’s interconnection and bundling of multiple complementary services. This interdependence reduces the incentives or ability to multi-home or switch, ultimately resulting in a self-reinforcing environment that insulates the platform from competitive pressure and enhances its ability to shape market outcomes unilaterally. Moreover, this could have the effect of reducing competition to the ecosystem level, meaning that competition within product markets within is severely limited. This highlights the risks that cumulative deployment of multiple, interconnected services within a single platform environment may not only reinforce dominance in the core marketplace but also create structural barriers to competition across adjacent markets.
7.3.7. Conclusions
Taken together, Allegro’s vertical integration into critical e‑commerce functions, including logistics and payments, its acquisitions and geographic expansion, and the economics of scope generated from its ability to accumulate and combine data – heightening foreclosure risks in the core and related markets and entrench Allegro’s position within its core online marketplace market by significantly expanding its ecosystem.
Looking in turn at Pigu’s operations, many of its practices reflect legitimate commercial strategies commonly adopted by online marketplaces to enhance service quality, convenience and seller support. However, several of these integrations give rise to substantial foreclosure risks, and their cumulative effect may progressively strengthen Pigu’s ecosystem and it entrench its position as the default core marketplace for both consumers and sellers in Lithuania and Latvia.
The consequences of Allegro and Pigu’s expansions are two‑fold, as described above. The immediate and already observable effect, albeit to different degrees as clarified throughout the report, is the substantial strengthening of Allegro and Pigu’s strong position within their core online marketplace markets. By offering a seamless, integrated experience that includes logistics, payments, and other close services, these platforms create significant lock-in effects for both sellers and final consumers, making it increasingly difficult for new entrants or smaller platforms to effectively compete on equal terms. This raises competition concerns related to market foreclosure and reduced contestability.
Furthermore, this integrated ecosystem strategy creates the distinct possibility (a potential future outcome rather than an already fully realised state) that Allegro and Pigu could leverage their strong position in the core market into the ancillary markets where they have expanded within their ecosystem. Specifically, there is a risk that Allegro and Pigu could block or discourage potential competitors from entering or expanding in these markets. This has broader implications for consumer welfare. In a more open and competitive market, other platforms might have entered with lower prices, a wider variety of products, or more innovative services. In this way, even if Allegro and Pigu’s current offer may have lowered costs and contributed to convenience for users, it may prevent the emergence of even better options in the future.
While these developments may not raise immediate concerns under competition law when assessed in isolation, they can, over time, give rise to exclusionary dynamics that increase barriers to entry and expansion, especially for smaller or less vertically integrated competitors. As such, the risk of market entrenchment deserves particular attention and may constitute a source of competition concern, and the extent to which these dynamics affect market contestability warrants careful and ongoing monitoring.
Allegro and Pigu have both undertaken a strategy of vertical and conglomerate expansion into critical e‑commerce functions, as well as related consumer-facing services in the case of Allegro, while also expanding the geographic scope of their operations. This enables them to benefit from significant economics of scope generated from their ability to accumulate and combine data across their ecosystems.
First, this ecosystem expansion contributes to the consolidation of Allegro and Pigu’s power as relates to their core online marketplace services. In this way, their strength does not derive solely from their position in the core market but from the way that position is shielded and reinforced through expansion into complementary functions.
In particular, access to sufficient parcel delivery and locker capacity is essential for online marketplaces. Concerns may arise if such access is tied up by incumbents via existing partnerships or exclusivity agreements, denying rivals the scale necessary to meet their users’ needs, although the likelihood of this occurring varies across jurisdictions.
Second, this situation means that Allegro and Pigu have the ability to leverage their strong position in the core market into the ancillary markets where they have expanded their ecosystems, giving risk to foreclosure risks for potential competitors and raising barriers to entry.
Bringing together the analysis in the sections above, the online marketplaces sector in each of the three jurisdictions is characterised by a high degree of concentration and high barriers to entry, with a combination of structural features and strategic conduct by the leading platforms creating substantial challenges for market entry or expansion by rivals. As described above, the positions of the leading platforms have been reinforced by the expansion of their ecosystems into other activities across multiple dimensions.
Here, it is relevant to expand on the concept of entrenchment, understood as a behavioural and dynamic process through which dominant platforms seek to preserve, reinforce or extend their market power over time. This may include both legitimate competitive behaviour and potentially anticompetitive practices, such as self-preferencing, tying, bundling or the exploitative use of commercially sensitive data. Entrenched market power is typically characterised by persistently high market shares, which in online marketplaces is facilitated by a combination of factors, including strong network effects, limited user multi-homing, high switching costs, control over key gateways or data and a proven ability to impose conditions on business users or shape market dynamics unilaterally.
There is growing evidence that certain structural and behavioural features of platform markets allow dominant platforms to consolidate their position over time. Entrenchment mechanisms (such as, the integration of adjacent services, the accumulation and cross-use of data and the control over key access points for business users and end users) may create self-reinforcing advantages that hinder contestability, not necessarily through overt exclusionary conduct, but by shaping market conditions in ways that reduce rivals’ ability to compete on the merits. In this way, entrenchment describes a situation where market power has become particularly resilient and self-reinforcing.
In the Polish case, Allegro holds a firmly established position as the leading online marketplace, which has endured over time, as shown in Figure 7.9. This illustrates how the interplay between vertical expansion, integration into close services, strategic acquisitions and data accumulation may give rise to conduct-based entrenchment. These dynamics occur not in isolation but as part of a broader strategy through which Allegro may reduce contestability and reinforce its market power across intermediation and related digital services.
Note: As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian or Latvian users only, traffic from users in Lithuania and Latvia was estimated by taking the share of website traffic from Lithuania or Latvia for each website and using this to weight the number of total visits to the website. These estimates have been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement and platform transactions). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback and using the SimilarWeb platform, with the aim of capturing the majority of firms in the relevant competitor set. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
Source: OECD calculations based on SimilarWeb data.
As in Poland, the leading general online marketplace in Lithuania and Latvia, Pigu, has also adopted strategies that contribute to the entrenchment of its market position. This includes practices that could reinforce Pigu’s position vis-à-vis actual or potential rivals, either by raising barriers to entry and expansion, limiting multi-homing or fostering dependencies among sellers and consumers. This occurs through the development of proprietary logistics infrastructure, integration of value‑added services (such as fulfilment or consumer financing) and broader efforts to expand the platform’s ecosystem. While many of these strategies may fall within the boundaries of legitimate competition, their cumulative effect could nevertheless limit effective competition over time.
In this way, online marketplaces may entrench their position by expanding beyond their core intermediation function into a range of ancillary services, such as logistics, payment processing, advertising or data analytics. This type of expansion is not inherently problematic; it can reflect legitimate business development and innovation. However, when undertaken by platforms with existing market power, it may give rise to dynamics that reduce the openness and contestability of the market. The expansion into ancillary services enables the development of a broader digital ecosystem, i.e. a structure in which multiple services are technically and operationally integrated, and where infrastructure, user data and reputational assets are shared across services. The resulting ecosystem can significantly increase the costs of switching to alternative providers, both for consumers and for business users and may reduce incentives or practical ability to multi-home across competing platforms. Moreover, such integration can give rise to a situation where rivals that do not operate across the same set of services are placed at a competitive disadvantage, either because they cannot replicate the same offering or because they face barriers to access key inputs, such as delivery networks or visibility in search rankings. Once the platform’s position in the core market is sufficiently stable (often supported, as already mentioned, by high and persistent market shares, network effects and user dependence), it may become a source of leverage for expansion into other markets.
These two mechanisms, ecosystem-driven reinforcement of the core market and leveraging of the core market’s position to strengthen the ecosystem, are mutually reinforcing. They may give rise to a self-reinforcing cycle in which the platform becomes increasingly insulated from competitive pressure, not only in its original line of business but across the broader range of services it controls. Over time, this dynamic can lead to the creation of a “walled garden”, i.e. a closed or highly controlled environment where users and business partners face significant barriers to exit and where new entrants or smaller rivals struggle to gain access to the market or to scale their activities. This gradual consolidation of power across both core and closed markets lies at the heart of the entrenchment theory of harm examined in this chapter.
In the cases of Allegro in Poland and Pigu in Lithuania and Latvia, the strategies described above raises material risks that these platforms may become entrenched, for the reasons outlined above. These strategies may not constitute unlawful conduct per se, but they can progressively reduce market contestability. This risk is particularly acute in the three countries under review due to several structural features: small national markets, strong network effects, limitations on consumer and seller multi-homing and the early dominance of local incumbents. In such settings, even modest strategic advantages, such as faster fulfilment or economics of scale, can compound over time, creating durable market positions that are resistant to disruption. In turn, these dynamics can discourage entry and expansion by smaller or less vertically integrated rivals, ultimately reducing the range of viable alternatives for both sellers and consumers.
The risk of entrenchment is not theoretical: the observed conduct of Allegro and Pigu already reflects many of the elements associated with such closed ecosystems. While these developments may stem from legitimate business objectives, their cumulative effect may be to entrench dominance and reduce competition over time. These concerns are particularly relevant for policymakers and enforcement bodies in light of the potential long-term consequences for innovation, consumer choice and market dynamism.
Moreover, digital markets, and particularly online intermediation services, are prone to a heightened risk of reduced market contestability which can ultimately lead to the market “tipping” into monopoly (OECD, 2024[15]; OECD, 2022[1]), or developing monopoly-like characteristics, ceasing to be contestable in the short, medium or even the longer term (Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, 2025[16])). Tipping is especially prevalent in markets shaped by strong network effects, and is also commonly associated with the other factors analysed above: lock-in, multi-homing, economies of scale and vertical integration. It reflects a situation in which the accumulation of users around one platform or provider amplifies the platform’s attractiveness to both current and potential users. This leads to a self-reinforcing cycle, where popularity breeds further adoption, gradually displacing or marginalising rival services. In this process, a potentially competitive market evolves into one characterised by entrenched dominance, where re‑entry or expansion by competitors becomes significantly more difficult.
Tipping can be distinguished from entrenchment as explained below. Tipping generally results from market structure and dynamics, and implies a threshold wherein the market is considered to have tipped. In contrast, entrenchment is characterised by persistently high market shares, can occur to varying degrees of intensity, and typically arises from businesses’ strategic conduct, which could include exclusionary conduct aimed at shielding a dominant position from competitive threats. In certain cases, a strategy of entrenchment could contribute to the circumstances under which a particular market is found to have tipped.
For avoidance of doubt, tipping does not entail the presence of anticompetitive conduct. It is primarily a structural outcome that may occur even in the absence of unlawful behaviour. In some cases, the relevant firm may have undertaken a significant innovation or early investment in superior services. However, concerns may arise if a highly concentrated market emerges through tipping, especially where competitive pressure is not sustained by market entry or expansion. Further, it can lead to a situation in which dominance may be sustained through exclusionary practices. For instance, online marketplaces may also reinforce tipping through business practices that increase user stickiness or limit rivals’ access to key inputs – such as data, logistics infrastructure or payment systems.
Consistent with the literature referenced above, this report identifies a situation in which the strong market positions of leading firms, combined with the presence of network effects and other factors analysed above, indicates a high risk that tipping dynamics have occurred or will occur. Based on the evidence considered in this report, and summarised in this conclusion, it is likely that this has occurred in Poland, and could occur in Lithuania and Latvia.
The findings above on entrenchment and tipping risks indicate a lack of effective competition in core general online marketplaces in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia and suggest a durable competitive advantage for Allegro and Pigu that might be difficult for new entrants to overcome.
Across all three jurisdictions, the combination of structural features and strategic conduct has made market entry or expansion by rivals increasingly difficult in the core market. This points to a situation where the risk of tipping should be taken under consideration. It is likely that this has occurred in Poland, based on the evidence considered in this report, while there are risks that this situation could evolve in Lithuania and Latvia, particular given the height of barriers to entry on the seller side for core general online marketplaces.
The risks of Allegro and Pigu’s market positions becoming entrenched are to be appraised taking together these platforms’ expanding ecosystems and the presence of several key structural features: small national markets, strong network effects, multi-homing and switching frictions and the early positioning of local incumbents. In the Polish case, Allegro holds a firmly established position as the leading online marketplace, which has endured over time. Pigu, as the leading core general online marketplace in Lithuania and Latvia, has also adopted strategies that might contribute to the entrenchment of its market position.
References
[5] ACCC (2022), Digital platform services inquiry interim report No. 4 – General online retail marketplaces, https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/DPB%20-%20DPSI%20-%20March%202022%20-%20Full%20interim%20report%20-%2031%20March%202022.pdf.
[16] Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (2025), Market tipping: Guidance for competition assessments, https://konkurrencejura.dk/afgoerelser/market-tipping.
[11] Delfi (2024), Pigu.lt reduces commissions for sellers, https://www.delfi.lt/en/business/pigult-reduces-commissions-for-sellers-96348975.
[10] Delfi (2023), The first product sold on the Pigu.lt Marketplace in Finland is a backpack, https://www.delfi.lt/en/business/the-first-product-sold-on-the-pigult-marketplace-in-finland-is-a-backpack-93407615.
[3] European Commission (2023), Gatekeepers Portal, https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers_en.
[6] European Commission (2022), Commission Decision - Cases AT.40462 (Amazon Marketplace) and AT.40703 (Amazon Buy Box).
[9] Made in Vilnius (2019), At “Pigu.lt” e. more than half a thousand traders joined the marketplace, https://madeinvilnius.lt/en/business/Vilnius-market/more-than-half-a-thousand-merchants-have-joined-cheap-LT-e-marketplaces/.
[15] OECD (2024), “Monopolisation, moat building and entrenchment strategies”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 308, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/777faed3-en.
[4] OECD (2022), OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age, https://doi.org/10.1787/c8c1841b-en.
[1] OECD (2022), “The Evolving Concept of Market Power in the Digital Economy”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 278, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2cfcb4a8-en.
[12] OECD (2021), “Abuse of dominance in Digital Markets”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 256, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4c36b455-en.
[2] OECD (2018), “Market Concentration”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 213, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7231c298-en.
[17] OECD (2018), Market Studies Guide for Competition Authorities, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7381b582-en.
[8] PHH Group (2025), PHH Group is Changing: Customers Will Find Relevant Products Even Faster, https://phhgroup.eu/news/phh-group-is-changing-customers-will-find-relevant-products-even-faster/158.
[13] PHH Group (2024), Pigu.lt Marketplace after 5 years: spectacular growth and trust of customers, https://phhgroup.eu/news/pigu.lt-marketplace-after-5-years-spectacular-growth-and-trust-of-customers/142.
[14] Reuters (2025), E-commerce firm Allegro plans to add 2,500 parcel lockers in Poland in 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/e-commerce-firm-allegro-plans-add-2500-parcel-lockers-poland-2025-2025-03-13/.
[7] Shelanski, H., S. Knox and A. Dhilla (2017), Network Effects and Efficiencies in Multisided Markets, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)40/FINAL/en/pdf.
← 1. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. The figure includes both users from Android and IOS devices.
← 2. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025.
← 3. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period.
← 5. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period.
← 6. Similarly, 71.1% of Empik’s users also visited Allegro, but only 25.4% of Allegro’s users accessing Empik in turn.
← 7. Based on data from SimilarWeb for the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Lithuanian users only, these estimates were calculated by taking the monthly share of traffic to the website from Lithuania and using this to weight the monthly worldwide website visits to the website.
← 8. Based on data from SimilarWeb for the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvia users only, these estimates were calculated by taking the monthly share of traffic to the website from Latvia and using this to weight the monthly worldwide visits to the website.
← 9. Based on data from SimilarWeb for the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. As SimilarWeb does not have the functionality to filter its data for Latvia users only, these estimates were calculated by taking the monthly share of traffic to the website from Latvia and using this to weight the monthly worldwide visits to the website.
← 10. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025-December 2025. Monthly unique visitors is the number of distinct individuals visiting the website at least once during the month (regardless of whether they visit the site once or a number of times), summed across desktop and mobile web. While this metric cannot be limited to users based in Latvia, websites with a.lv domain generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Latvia.
← 11. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the six‑month period April to September 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period.
← 12. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the six‑month period April to September 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Lithuania, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lt domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Lithuania). It is not possible to include other marketplaces, such as aliexpress.com, temu.com and ebay.com in this analysis, as only a small percentage of their worldwide users originate from Lithuania.
← 13. Allegro financial results presentations, Q4 2020 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/7544955c-e185-4dd2-bd74-defe3241c4f3) and Q4 2024 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/227ecd13-14d4-4b42-8002-ce9cb9dde0cb).
← 14. Allegro financial results presentations: Q4 2020 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/7544955c-e185-4dd2-bd74-defe3241c4f3), Q4 2021 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/b8ce14ad-a3d9-4a2c-bc64-d24137a8c087), Q4 2022 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/dd4aa256-e511-4dad-9407-99a354f90788), Q4 2023 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/75d859b1-e115-41d5-be23-9bbabf0ef5b5) and Q4 2024 (https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/227ecd13-14d4-4b42-8002-ce9cb9dde0cb).
← 15. Allegro financial data for Q4 2024, see https://about.allegro.eu/financial-results.
← 16. While expansion into other geographic areas could technically be considered an economy of scope, since it constitutes expansion into new national markets, for the purpose of this section it is useful to analyse as an economy of scale. This is because, despite the different national boundaries, the product market is the same. Given the nature of online marketplaces’ digital operations, and the proximity of the related geographic markets, Pigu has the ability to harness scale effects across borders.
← 17. As above, while this can technically be considered an economy of scope, it is helpful to analyse from the perspective of scale economies in this context.
← 18. Consumers may be inclined to multi-home when they can easily compare offers across platforms and access similar price levels, assortments, delivery times, and service quality without incurring notable costs. These costs may include the corresponding search costs, as well as the time and effort needed to create and manage multiple user accounts, adapt to different payment systems, or become familiar with varied platform interfaces and features.
← 19. Sellers generally have an incentive to multi-home if doing so allows them to access a broader customer base or achieve equivalent commercial outcomes (e.g. profit margins, sales volumes) on alternative platforms or via alternative sales channels, without incurring significant costs to set up across multiple platforms. Factors influencing the ability and willingness of sellers to multi-home include the structure of platform fees (e.g. registration or commission fees), logistical integration (e.g. fulfilment and delivery services), and the effort required to manage multiple seller interfaces or sales channels.
← 20. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Returning users are visitors which have already visited the website at least once within the previous three months.
← 21. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Returning users are visitors which have already visited the website at least once within the previous three months. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Lithuania, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a lt domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Lithuania). It is not possible to include other marketplaces, such as aliexpress.com, temu.com and ebay.com in this analysis, as only a small percentage of their worldwide users originate from Lithuania.
← 22. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Returning users are visitors which have already visited the website at least once within the previous three months. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Latvia, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lv domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Latvia). It is not possible to include other marketplaces, such as aliexpress.com, temu.com and ebay.com in this analysis, as only a small percentage of their worldwide users originate from Latvia.
← 23. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Direct traffic is website traffic that comes from users directly entering the URL, using a bookmark, or clicking a saved link. 82.69% of Allegro’s Polish website traffic came from direct website visits or organic search traffic (as compared to paid search traffic, referrals or other advertising), compared to a figure of 65.48% for Amazon.pl, in the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025.
← 24. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Direct traffic is website traffic that comes from users directly entering the URL, using a bookmark, or clicking a saved link. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Lithuania, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lt domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Lithuania). 79.60% of pigu.lt’s traffic in the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025came from direct website visits or organic search traffic (as compared to paid search traffic, referrals or other advertising).
← 25. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Direct traffic is website traffic that comes from users directly entering the URL, using a bookmark, or clicking a saved link. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Latvia, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lv domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Latvia). 80.57% of 220.lv’s traffic in the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025 came from direct website visits or organic search traffic (as compared to paid search traffic, referrals or other advertising).
← 26. Allegro, Temu, AliExpress, Amazon and Empik.
← 27. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period.
← 28. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period.
← 29. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Lithuania, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lt domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Lithuania). It is not possible to include other marketplaces, such as aliexpress.com, temu.com and ebay.com in this analysis, as only a small percentage of their worldwide users originate from Lithuania.
← 30. Based on data from SimilarWeb for worldwide users over the 12‑month period January 2025 to December 2025. Audience overlap shows the total unique visitors for up to five individual websites and the extent to which these audiences are shared between them over the specified period. As this metric cannot be limited to users based in Latvia, the OECD analysed the behaviour of worldwide users, looking only at websites with a.lv domain (which generally had around 90% of their total traffic originating from Latvia). It is not possible to include other marketplaces, such as aliexpress.com, temu.com and ebay.com in this analysis, as only a small percentage of their worldwide users originate from Latvia.
← 31. In the context of online marketplaces, Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses, also known as parity clauses, are contractual provisions that require a seller to offer the same or better terms (such as prices, availability, or product selection) on the contracting platform as on any other sales channel, including other platforms or the seller’s own online store. These clauses can be classified as wide (covering all other channels) or narrow (covering only the seller’s direct channels). MFNs can limit price competition and restrict platform entry or expansion by making it harder for rival platforms to attract sellers through better commercial conditions, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a4d20f2b-4857-4609-8f8b-06879d2bda96.
← 32. However, this may be an area of potential expansion for Pigu, who has partnered with InBank to offer consumer credit products that allow customers to pay in instalments over periods of up to 24 months.
← 33. This estimate has been calculated based on monthly website visits, after removing all visits which ended after a single page view (leaving only the website’s “engaged visits”, to provide a more accurate approximation of user engagement). The firms included in this analysis were identified based on stakeholder feedback, the SimilarWeb platform and desktop research, with the aim of capturing all of the relevant CSS in Poland. However, it is possible that some minor market participants may not have been identified, and therefore that these estimates could slightly overstate the actual traffic shares.
← 34. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the period January 2025 to December 2025. Referral traffic is traffic sent from one website to another, through a direct link.
← 35. Ibid.
← 36. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the period January 2025 to December 2025. Referral traffic is traffic sent from one website to another, through a direct link.
← 37. Based on data from SimilarWeb for users based in Poland over the period January 2025 to December 2025. Cross-browsing behaviour shows the share of visitors to a given website (website A) who also visited another specified website (website B) on the same day at any point during the specific period.
← 38. Allegro’s privacy policy states that: “[…] through third-party authentication services.. we obtain your Personal Data only in the form of your full name or login, email address, and profile picture […]”, https://about.allegro.eu/static-files/e37a88b1-1fa3-4117-8ebd-3ab6dd1a2774.
← 39. Article 23.1 of Allegro’s privacy policy states that: “The Company uses a Recommendation System for Offers, classifieds and Products, which adjusts the Offer and Classified Ad displayed on the interface taking into account User behaviour (the “Recommendation System”). The Recommendation System takes into account the following factors: Details about the Offer: Offer title, Offer price, Offer category, number of times the Offer has been viewed, number of times the Offer has been co-viewed with other Offers, number of times the Offer has been purchased, number of times the Offer has been co-purchased with other Offers.”
← 40. As far as marketing activities are concerned, Allegro’s privacy policy states: “Your Personal Data, including Personal Data collected by means of cookies and other similar technologies, are then processed by the Company and third parties for marketing purposes.”
← 41. Article 23.5 of Allegro’s privacy policy states that if consent to personalisation is not given, best-selling products are selected, also, withdrawal is possible at any time.
← 42. As foreseen by Clauses 3.1.1‑3.1.2 of Pigu’s rules for the purchase and sale of goods, https://pigu.lt/en/t/rules.
← 43. As stated in Section 1 of Pigu’s privacy policy: “Data that is generated when you use certain Pigu.lt services or features: e.g. when you save items to the “Wish List”, select and save the city (for the purpose of seeing the nearest pick-up points).”, https://pigu.lt/en/t/privacy-policy.
← 44. As provided by Section 1 of Pigu’s privacy policy: “Technical data: IP address, session ID, browser used, device type, resolution.”
← 45. Section 2, paragraph 2.5 of Pigu’s privacy policy, regarding analytics and statistics for the analysis, development and improvement of performance, states the following: “We want to make the use of Pigu.lt website and/or mobile application as simple and convenient as possible […]”
← 46. Section 2, paragraph 2.5 of Pigu’s privacy policy regarding analytics and statistics for the analysis, development and improvement of performance, further states: “Therefore, in order to develop and improve our activities, we constantly analyse how Clients use Pigu.lt website, mobile application and Pigu.lt services and process the following data.”
← 47. The rules for the purchase and sale of goods in the e‑shop Pigu.lt provides the following: “The Buyer’s Personal Data will also be transferred to the Seller from whom the Buyer purchases the Goods and such Personal Data will be processed in accordance with the procedure established by the Seller specified in the order, as well as in compliance with the security obligations assumed between UAB “Pigu” and the Seller under the contract regarding ensuring the security of personal data.”, https://pigu.lt/ru/gdpr.
← 48. Section 2, paragraph 2.6 of Pigu’s privacy policy, regarding information on the processing of video camera surveillance data, states that: “Video surveillance cameras are installed inside and outside the Pigu.lt pick-up centres-stores, which capture and record the image entering the cameras’ field of vision.”