On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nearly 6 million first-generation Ukrainians were already residing abroad, representing roughly 14% of Ukraine’s total population. Nine OECD countries featured among the top 11 destination countries. The majority of Ukrainians in OECD countries were women of working age, with high educational attainment, and employed. Between 2000 and 2021, over 535 000 Ukrainians obtained citizenship of OECD countries, and over 16 000 received refugee status following a positive decision on an asylum application. In addition, several OECD countries had sizeable populations with Ukrainian ancestry.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered one of the fastest and largest displacement crises in recent history. About a quarter of Ukrainians living in the country were forced to flee their homes. While many sought refuge abroad, others were displaced within Ukraine. Over 2022-2025, mass movements of Ukrainians took place across the OECD and neighbouring countries. By mid-2025, Germany had become the largest host country, with 1.22 million displaced Ukrainians, followed by Poland, Czechia, Canada and the United States. Together, these five countries accounted for more than 60% of all displaced Ukrainians in the OECD. In per capita terms, Czechia hosted the largest share of displaced Ukrainians in 2025. More than 4.6 million remained internally displaced.
The Ukrainian state, host countries and many other stakeholders undertook numerous actions to support displaced populations. Most actions within Ukraine were directed towards supporting internally displaced persons (IDPs). In addition, the return and reintegration of Ukrainians displaced abroad, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community, were identified as key priorities for the Ukrainian Government. This priority manifested itself in several State Strategies – legal documents providing a framework for action – and in modifications to mandates of several executive bodies. Many actions built on Ukraine’s earlier pre‑war experience in these areas.
While the necessary conditions for promoting safe returns are not yet in place, by 2025, between 4.1 and 5.8 million Ukrainians had already returned, including a quarter from displacement abroad. The wide variation in estimates stems from differing definitions used by various survey organisations to measure the number of returnees. Most of the returns took place in mid-2022, in a voluntary and spontaneous manner, largely independent of any specific return policies of the Ukrainian state. Since then, returns have declined and shown a certain seasonality.
Moreover, intentions to return are also declining. The security situation and family reunification remain the key factors affecting return intentions. In addition, housing, employment, and access to public services in Ukraine are progressively emerging as other significant considerations shaping both intentions and actual decisions to return. For those who returned from abroad, key enablers of return were being employed in Ukraine on the eve of the aggression and having accommodation in good condition in Ukraine. Conversely, for many of those who have not yet returned, these enabling factors are more likely to be absent. For those who returned from internal displacement, returns were most likely to happen to safer areas, from displacement within the same oblast, among older individuals and those with higher educational attainment, as well as among the self-employed.
The socio‑economic situation of early returnees is quite heterogeneous. Returnees are typically homeowners, particularly in contrast to IDPs, who are more likely to rent their current dwellings. Meanwhile, returnees from internal displacement are more likely to live in damaged housing compared to returnees from abroad, current IDPs, and the non-displaced. Some returnees, similarly to IDPs, face difficulties in proving their current housing arrangements with legally recognised documents. While there is generally good awareness of state programmes to address housing issues, applications can be difficult, especially for women returning from abroad.
Returnees are faring better than the non-displaced and IDPs in terms of employment, though this is likely due to the early returnees’ ability to resume their previous jobs. Despite this, returnees are at a higher risk of informal or temporary employment compared to the non-displaced, and similarly to IDPs.
The majority of returnees do not intend to leave again in the near future. However, their precarious employment outcomes and uneven access to services may undermine their situation.
Future additional returns will depend on numerous factors, including first and foremost the long-term outcomes and terms of settlement of the war of aggression, and the security situation in Ukraine. The overall scale of returns will likely remain limited. If not addressed early, compounding socio‑economic challenges are likely to become additional barriers to further returns.
While Ukraine’s displacement crisis is unprecedented in both scale and character, and no single international example can provide a comprehensive model for managing return at this magnitude, valuable insights can nevertheless be drawn from diverse experiences. These include contexts shaped by armed conflict and natural disasters, as well as experiences of countries of emigration that have sought to foster return, reintegration, or meaningful engagement with their nationals abroad.
These examples show that, first, the basis for large sustainable returns is safety and security. In their absence, it is possible to implement policies that support voluntary and spontaneous returnees in the present and prepare for further repatriation in the future. However, larger repatriation schemes and policies to proactively encourage returns are usually envisaged once a war or conflict has been settled and security guarantees are in place. In addition to multilateral security guarantees, affected countries may also set additional safety and security benchmarks, as a foundation for trustworthy and secure returns. Moreover, safety is not defined solely by the absence of hostilities. The longer the displacement situation continues, the more returnees will need to feel socially accepted, and society must therefore be prepared to reintegrate them.
Second, large‑scale displacements often profoundly reshape the housing landscape. To turn housing into a true enabler of returns, in addition to reconstruction, countries often resort to complementary policies regulating rental markets, expanding affordable social housing, linking reconstruction to employment opportunities, and offering integrated housing, employment and social services solutions.
Third, international practice also underlines the importance of equipping returnees with the skills needed to succeed in a changed economic environment, while ensuring that public services are prepared to absorb those returning and can provide timely access to education, healthcare and other essential services.
To ensure that these efforts are effective and responsive, monitoring and evaluation should closely accompany return and reintegration policies, serving as tools to build trust and strengthen accountability.
Finally, experience from other settings shows that diaspora engagement can make a decisive contribution to recovery when supported by transparent and reliable mechanisms for investment, knowledge transfer and civic participation.
Applying these and other considerations to Ukraine requires careful recognition of the different circumstances and aspirations of displaced populations, placing their interests at the heart of policies. Return and reintegration in Ukraine will be a gradual and uneven process, yet the policy choices made today can lay the foundations for their success, as well as a resilient and inclusive recovery.
