Unlocking Opportunities for Children in Israel

Report

5 May 2026

2. Socio‑economic mobility in Israel

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Abstract

This chapter assesses intergenerational socio‑economic mobility in Israel in comparison with other OECD countries, focussing on education, occupation, and earnings. Drawing on internationally comparable data, it examines both absolute mobility (improvements relative to parents) and relative mobility (the influence of family background on outcomes), including differences by gender and ethno-religious groups. The chapter finds that Israel ranks around the middle of OECD countries in overall mobility. While upward absolute mobility has been strong – many individuals achieve higher education and occupational status than their parents – relative mobility remains limited. A persistent “sticky floor” constrains opportunities for those from disadvantaged backgrounds across all three dimensions. The analysis highlights the important role of geography, with better outcomes for children growing up in high-opportunity areas. It also shows mixed gender patterns, with strong educational mobility for women but weaker earnings mobility. Most notably, large disparities exist across ethno-religious groups. Israeli-Arabs and Haredi populations face particularly limited upward mobility, which significantly shapes Israel’s overall performance. The chapter concludes that improving opportunities for these groups is essential for enhancing mobility, reducing inequality, and supporting long-term social and economic outcomes.

2.1. Introduction

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Promoting intergenerational mobility in socio‑economic status is a key challenge for governments in OECD countries. Low intergenerational mobility, where prospects in life are determined largely by family background, is widely seen as unfair and unjust and can potentially undermine economic performance and social cohesion (OECD, 2018[1]; Balestra and Ciani, 2022[2]; Houle, 2019[3]). Low mobility signifies a society that, for whatever reason, is unable to provide children from disadvantaged families with the same opportunities as those from more privileged backgrounds. It reflects talent misallocation and the under-development (or under-use) of human capital, particularly among people from disadvantaged backgrounds. It results in lost productivity and economic output, among other adverse outcomes (Clarke et al., 2022[4]).

Concerns around socio‑economic mobility are particularly important in the Israeli context. Israel is a country characterised by high poverty and wide socio‑economic inequalities. It has the eighth-highest Gini coefficient in the OECD, and the second-highest income poverty rate (OECD, 2023[5]). Being at the bottom in Israel means being further behind and having further to climb than in many other OECD countries. Moreover, Israeli society is strongly stratified along ethno-religious lines, with outcomes particularly poor for the Haredi and Israeli-Arab communities. Blending poverty with cultural differences is likely to be particularly damaging to social cohesion, especially if mobility is also low.

This chapter examines how Israel compares to other OECD countries on three core aspects of intergenerational socio‑economic mobility: education, occupations, and earnings. Built on internationally comparable data from sources such as the World Bank Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility and the European Social Survey, as well as recent studies from inside Israel itself (Gabay-Egozi and Yaish, 2019[6]; Gabay-Egozi and Yaish, 2021[7]; Heller, 2020[8]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]), the chapter explores levels and trends in both absolute mobility – or changes in levels of socio‑economic outcomes across generations – and relative mobility, or changes in positions on the socio‑economic ladder. Sub-group analysis also examines how intergenerational mobility in Israel differs between men and women and across ethno-religious groups.

The key findings from this chapter are as follows:

Overall and in the round, in comparison to other OECD countries, Israel is a mid-range performer on intergenerational socio‑economic mobility.
Similar to many OECD countries, Israel has enjoyed strong upward absolute mobility in education and occupational attainment. Among the most recent cohorts to have completed education and reached occupational “maturity”, about 70% of Israelis with parents without tertiary education attained a level of education greater than their parents. Similarly, just over 50% with non-higher-manager parents attained occupations of higher status than their parents.
However, high absolute mobility does not guarantee equal opportunities; it is possible to be doing better than your parents but still trail your peers. Relative socio‑economic mobility – the degree to which a person’s position on the socio‑economic ladder is shaped by that of their parents – is comparatively low in Israel in both education and occupational attainment and close to the OECD average for earnings.
In all three areas – education, occupations, and earnings – Israel suffers from a stubborn intergenerational “sticky floor”. In education, Israelis with low-educated parents are less than one‑quarter as likely as those with highly-educated parents to attain high education themselves, compared to an OECD average of about a third. For occupational positions, Israelis born to manual-worker parents are less than half as likely as those with manager or professional parents to also become a manager or professional, roughly the same as the OECD average. And for earnings, those with parents in the bottom earnings quartile are only about one‑third as likely as those with top-earnings-quartile parents to make it to the top quartile themselves – a slightly larger gap than on average across the OECD.
Geography plays an important role in shaping intergenerational social mobility in Israel, as it does in other OECD countries. Research by Batz and Krill (2022[10]) shows that in Israel, children from low-income families who grow up in high-opportunity areas – characterised by lower crime, stronger labour market participation, a better-educated and higher-earning population, and a lower share of single‑parent families – have a far better chance of moving up the earnings ladder than other similar children in low-opportunity areas. Importantly, this holds even after controlling for ethno-religious background. Even among Israel’s non-Haredi population, low-income children growing up in prosperous locations like Ramat HaSharon have an almost three‑times higher chance of becoming a high earner than those growing up in less supportive environments. These findings underscore the importance of place‑based intervention and targeting investment towards what would otherwise be “low-opportunity” neighbourhoods.
Gender differences in intergenerational mobility are mixed. While Israeli women enjoy strong mobility in education, their opportunities for high earnings remain limited and they remain subject to a stubborn earnings “sticky floor”: Women with low-earning parents are disproportionately likely to remain at the bottom of the earnings distribution themselves. In Israel, as elsewhere in much of the OECD, women find their mobility limited by structural gender inequalities. Important drivers include life‑cycle employment patterns, relatively large gender differences in working hours, and the continued under-representation of women in the highest paying sectors of the Israeli economy, such as high-tech, all of which limit women’s earnings potential and ability to climb the earnings ladder.
Ethno-religious differences in mobility are clearer. Although they have made important progress, particularly in education but also in occupations, Israeli-Arabs continue to hold comparatively weak prospects for upward mobility, especially when starting at the bottom of the socio‑economic ladder. The “sticky floor” in earnings is particularly strong for Israeli-Arabs, especially Israeli-Arab women. Factors limiting Israeli-Arab mobility include poorer education, weaker networks, geographic segmentation and poorer transport links, and possibly discrimination. For different reasons, upward socio‑economic mobility is also low among the Haredi community, reflecting their rejection of secular education and the prioritisation of spiritual over economic activities. The non-Haredi population, in contrast, enjoy strong mobility, especially non-Haredi men.

This last key finding – relatively weak mobility among the Israeli-Arabs and Haredi communities – is an important factor in explaining Israel’s overall mid-range performance on intergenerational socio‑economic mobility (Heller, 2020[8]). Israeli-Arabs and the Haredim are both large minority groups – they form 21% and 9% of the current working-age population, respectively – and Israeli-Arabs in particular make up a disproportionately large share of those from socio‑economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Approximately 45% of low-educated working-age people in Israel are Israeli-Arabs (CBS, 2023[11]), as are 42% of current 15‑year‑old Israeli students with low-educated parents, according to data from OECD PISA. Weak mobility among these groups thus puts limits on the strength of overall mobility in Israel, especially mobility at the bottom end of the socio‑economic ladder.

Ethno-religious gaps in mobility also carry implications for other social and economic priorities, including income inequality and the distribution of poverty across population groups (see also Chapter 4). Work by Batz and Geva (2022[12]) illustrates how differences in earnings mobility have contributed to the maintenance of earnings gaps between Israeli-Arabs and the non-Haredi population and the growth of earnings gaps between the Haredi and non-Haredi communities. They also show that had each group enjoyed equal mobility, then earnings gaps would have closed “almost completely” within two generations.

As emphasised in past OECD work (OECD, 2018[13]; 2023[14]), demographic trends mean that the importance of improving the integration of, and outcomes for, the Israeli-Arabs and the Haredi populations is likely only to increase in the coming decades. Differences in fertility (see Chapter 4) mean that the Haredi community in particular is set to grow as a proportion of the population. Projections by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics suggest that by 2060, the Haredi community will constitute just under a quarter of the Israeli working-age population, with Israeli-Arabs forming a further quarter (CBS, 2017[15]). Ensuring young people in the Israeli-Arab and Haredi communities have access to the same opportunities as their non-Haredi peers – in education, in the labour market, and in society more widely – is likely to be increasingly important not only for future social mobility but also for tackling poverty, inequality, and a range of other social and economic issues.

2.2. Educational attainment and the transmission of education across generations

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Education plays a central role in shaping and driving social mobility. Often referred to as a potential “great equalizer” in society, education represents one of the few clear pathways through which a child from a disadvantaged background can climb the social ladder. Higher levels of education often translate into higher earnings (OECD, 2023[16]), and evidence from Israel suggests that children from disadvantaged backgrounds receive a substantial boost to lifetime earnings if they attain higher education (Gabay-Egozi and Yaish, 2019[6]). And yet, in many countries, education systems seem to do as much to reinforce social inequalities as they do to close them. Across the OECD, children from less educated families frequently do less well at school and attain lower level qualifications than their peers from more highly educated families (OECD, 2019[17]; 2018[1]).

This section examines intergenerational educational mobility in Israel and how it compares to other OECD countries. Built primarily on comparative data from the World Bank Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM) and original OECD estimates from the European Social Survey (see Box 2.1), it covers both absolute and relative measures of educational mobility and explores both overall mobility and how mobility differs between men and women and across ethno-religious groups. Findings suggest that despite strong absolute mobility, Israel continues to suffer from high intergenerational persistence in education attainment and a stubborn educational “sticky floor”. This “stick floor” is particularly strong for the Israeli-Arab community.

Israel has enjoyed strong upward absolute mobility in education

Like many OECD countries, Israel has made considerable progress in education over the past half-century or so. Reforms including the expansion of higher education in the 1990s have helped drive improvements in education participation and attainment (Shavit and Bronstein, 2011[18]; Bar-Haim, Blank and Rotman, 2018[19]), with the result that younger Israelis have become progressively better educated than older cohorts, and, by extension, their parents (Figure 2.1). Among Israelis born between 1970 and 1979 – the most recent cohort that we can say with confidence had likely “completed” their education at the time of survey (Box 2.1) – the large majority (87%) have attained at least upper secondary education, and as many as 40% have finished tertiary studies. Among their parents, many of whom would have been born in the 1940s and 1950s, only 59% completed at least upper secondary education, and 13% left education with no formal qualifications.

These gains in educational attainment translate into consistently strong upward absolute mobility (Figure 2.2, Panel A). Absolute educational mobility is high in general in OECD countries (OECD, 2018[1]; van der Weide et al., 2021[20]; van der Weide et al., 2024[21]), and for several decades Israel has been among the OECD’s best performers. Across the cohorts born between 1940-1949 and 1970-1979, around 70‑75% of Israelis with non-tertiary-educated parents attained a level of education greater than their parents. These rates are well above the OECD average for the corresponding cohorts, and for the 1960s cohort is among the highest in the OECD.

Israel’s upward absolute mobility rate has slowed slightly for the youngest cohort born between 1970 and 1979 (Figure 2.2, Panel A). Seventy per cent of 1970-1979-born Israelis with non-tertiary educated parents attained a level of education greater than their parents, down 6 percentage points (p.p.) on the 1960-1969 cohort (76%). However, this slowing is in large part a mechanical effect of changes in the composition of parental education: as van der Weide et al. (2021[20]) point out, it becomes increasingly difficult for children to better their parents’ education as parents themselves become progressively better educated. Figure 2.2, Panel B shows that, at a given level of parental education, Israelis in the 1970-1979 cohort remain at least as likely as earlier cohorts to attain a level of education greater than their parents. The difference for the 1970-1979 cohort is that, compared to earlier cohorts, fewer have low-educated parents (see Figure 2.1), where the chances of upward mobility are very high, and many more have upper secondary- or tertiary-educated parents, where options upward educational mobility are more limited or nil.

Figure 2.1. Younger Israelis are better educated than older cohorts
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Distribution of educational attainment, cohort members and cohort members’ parents, respondents and respondents’ parents, by ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Figure 2.2. Israel has enjoyed strong upward absolute mobility in education
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Percentage with educational attainment higher than their parents, population with non-tertiary educated parents, by ten‑year birth cohort

Box 2.1. Measuring intergenerational educational mobility

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This section is built primarily on comparative data from the World Bank Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM) and original OECD estimates using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The GDIM is a worldwide database containing aggregate‑level estimates of intergenerational education mobility (GDIM, 2023[22]). It covers 153 economies for cohorts born between 1940 and 1990. The ESS is cross-national survey conducted across Europe (plus Israel) every two years (ESS ERIC, 2023[23]). The ESS is the same source survey as used by the GDIM in their estimates for Israel, ensuring consistency across estimates. Estimates both in this chapter and the GDIM are limited to ESS rounds 5 to 8 (2010-2016) (pooled) due to the absence of Israel in ESS 2018 and partial participation in ESS 2020.

In line with the GDIM, educational attainment is measured primarily on a 5‑part scale: 1. ISCED 0 (less than primary); 2. ISCED 1 (primary); 3. ISCED 2 (lower secondary); 4. ISCED 3‑4 (upper secondary); and 5. ISCED 5‑8 (tertiary). For some applications, this is simplified into a 3‑part scale: 1. Low (ISCED 0‑2, less than upper secondary); 2. Medium (ISCED 3‑4, upper secondary); and 3. High (ISCED 5‑8, tertiary). Years of schooling are also used as a secondary measure. For respondents, years of schooling is available directly in the ESS microdata. For their parents, it is estimated using the typical duration of the relevant ISCED programmes up to their highest level of educational attainment. For Israel, higher religious education (Yeshiva/Kollel) qualifications are classified as ISCED Level 3 (upper secondary).

Intergenerational mobility in education is captured using both absolute and relative measures. Absolute mobility (changes in socio‑economic attainment across generations) is measured as the percentage of the population that have attained a higher educational qualification than both their parents, conditional on neither parent having tertiary education. Relative mobility (changes in socio‑economic position in relation to others in the population) is measured using two measures of average intergenerational education persistence – the “intergenerational correlation” between respondents’ and their parents’ years of schooling, and the “rank-rank correlation” between respondents’ and their parents’ percentile rankings on the years of schooling distribution – as well as transition matrices across levels of education.

In terms of age, this section looks at mobility among respondents born between 1940-1949 and 1970-1979, only. A major challenge when measuring educational mobility is determining the point at which we can be confident a cohort has reached “educational maturity”, that is, the point at which they have (likely) completed their formal education. This issue is particularly relevant for Israel, as the majority of young people attend compulsory military service at age 18 and bachelor’s graduates are considerably older on average (26.5) than across the OECD as a whole (23.9) (OECD, 2023[24]). Restricting the sample to respondents born at latest in 1979 helps mitigate the issue; the youngest respondents would have been aged between 31 and 37 at time of ESS interview, so most (although potentially not all) of those who would go on to attain tertiary education would already have done so. As an additional mitigation measure, following the GDIM, individuals who are 21 or older, hold an upper-secondary qualification, and are still enrolled in education are treated as having attainted tertiary education.

Education is highly persistent in Israel

Absolute educational mobility does not in and of itself guarantee the equal opportunities that many of us think about when picturing social mobility. High absolute mobility means that many people are moving up the education ladder, but it does not mean they all have the same chance of reaching the top; relative mobility can be low, even where absolute mobility is high. In many OECD countries, the children of less educated parents are often limited by educational “sticky floors”, whereby even if they attain better education than their parents, they still frequently find themselves trailing their peers and towards the bottom end of the educational distribution for their cohort (OECD, 2018[1]). Conversely, the children of more educated parents often benefit from “sticky ceilings”, by which they are protected from downward mobility and tend to maintain a position towards the top of the education distribution. Put a different way, education tends to be “persistent” across generations, with the children of the highest educated ending up the most highly educated themselves.

Figure 2.3 shows two perspectives on intergenerational persistence in education. Panel A shows the “intergenerational correlation” between respondents’ and their parents’ years of schooling, and Panel B shows the “rank-rank correlation”, or the correlation between respondents’ and their parents’ percentile rankings on the years of schooling distribution. The main difference between the two is that the rank-rank correlation measures solely positional mobility, or the extent to which an individual’s position in the education distribution is independent of their parents’ position, while the “intergenerational correlation” also accounts for structural mobility, or change in the distribution of educational attainment across generations (Jäntti and Jenkins, 2015[25]; Deutscher and Mazumder, 2021[26]). In both cases, a stronger correlation indicates greater intergenerational persistence in education, and a weaker one indicates greater intergenerational mobility.

The message from both measures is that education in Israel is highly persistent across generations. The intergenerational correlation in years of schooling has fallen slightly, as it has in many other OECD countries (OECD, 2018[1]; van der Weide et al., 2021[20]; van der Weide et al., 2024[21]), but remains well above the OECD average and one of the highest in the OECD (Figure 2.3, Panel A). The rank-rank correlation, meanwhile, increases slightly across cohorts, and by the 1970-1979 cohort is the second highest among the 19 OECD countries with comparable data. In both cases Israel trails far behind the OECD’s most mobile countries.

Figure 2.3. Intergenerational persistence in education is high in Israel
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Correlational measures of intergenerational persistence in education, by ten‑year birth cohort, OECD countries

Figure 2.4. Israel has a stubborn educational “sticky floor” and a strong educational “sticky ceiling”
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Percentage attaining low, medium or high education, by parents’ highest educational attainment and ten‑year birth cohort, OECD countries

Behind Israel’s comparatively high educational persistence is a stubborn “sticky floor” at the bottom end of the education distribution, and a strong “sticky ceiling” at the top. Starting at the bottom end, the share of Israelis with low-educated parents who remain low-educated themselves has fallen across cohorts, as it has in many other OECD countries (Figure 2.4, Panel G). Between the (ten‑year) cohorts born in 1940-1949 and 1970-1979, the share remaining low educated halved, from 50% to 25% – rates that are approximately 5‑10 p.p. lower than the OECD average throughout. However, these Israelis still face limited chances of attaining tertiary education (Figure 2.4, Panel A). In the youngest cohort (1970-1979), 17% of Israelis with low-educated parents attained tertiary education – only marginally higher than among older cohorts. Instead, an increasing majority of Israelis with low-educated parents end up with upper secondary education (Figure 2.4, Panel D).

At the top end of the distribution, in Israel as elsewhere, individuals with highly educated parents are disproportionately likely to remain highly educated themselves (Figure 2.4, Panel C). Indeed, in Israel, the percentage of children with highly educated parents attaining high education increases slightly across cohorts, as it does in many OECD countries (Figure 2.4, Panel C). Relatively few Israelis with highly educated parents move “downwards” to attain at most upper secondary education (26% for the 1970-1979 cohort), see Panel F, and almost none (1%) attain less than upper secondary (Panel I). More broadly, across levels of education, the chances of an individual attaining high education remain much higher if at least one of their parents is highly educated (Figure 2.4, Panels A-C). Among the 1970-1979 cohort, respondents with highly educated parents are 1.8 times more likely to attain high education (72%) than those with medium-educated parents (39%), and over 4 times more likely than those with low-educated parents (17%).

Gender differences in educational mobility in Israel are generally small

Patterns of education often differ by sex, and intergenerational mobility in education is no exception. Studies have found that absolute educational mobility tends to be stronger for women (van der Weide et al., 2021[20]; van der Weide et al., 2024[21]), especially among younger cohorts, driven by women’s gains in education over the second half of the last century. Gender differences in relative educational mobility are slightly more mixed. Van der Weide et al. (van der Weide et al., 2021[20]) find no gender gap when looking at the average intergenerational correlation in years of schooling across World Bank High-Income Countries. Others (Schneebaum, Rumplmaier and Altzinger, 2016[27]) find that intergenerational educational persistence tends to be lower (i.e. mobility is often higher) for women than for men.

In Israel, gender differences in overall educational mobility are relatively small (Annex Figure 2.A.1). Absolute mobility (as measured by the percentage with education higher than their parents) is slightly higher for men than for women (Panel A), although that will likely change for younger cohorts given that young women in Israel now strongly outperform young men in education. Educational persistence, as measured by the correlation between respondents’ and their parents’ years of schooling, is slightly higher for women than for men (Panel B) but across most cohorts, the difference is only small.

However, a couple of noteworthy gender differences emerge when exploring educational persistence at the top and at the bottom of the educational distribution (Figure 2.5). One is that the intergenerational “sticky floor” in education appears slightly weaker for women than for men (Figure 2.5, Panels A, D and G). For the cohorts born 1960-1969 and 1970-1979, women with low-educated parents are 5 p.p. more likely than men to attain high education (Panel A). This is consistent with Bar-Haim et al. (2018[19]), who find that educational persistence in Israel has fallen most among women from less-educated backgrounds. Another is that, at the other end of the distribution, the “sticky ceiling” appears at least slightly stronger for women: for the 1970-1979 cohort, women with highly educated parents are 12 p.p. more likely than men with highly educated parents to attain high education themselves; among the slightly older 1960-1969 cohort, the gap is 18 p.p. (Figure 2.5, Panel C). As Gabay-Egozi and Yaish (2021[7]) note, in Israel, highly educated parents seem better at protecting their daughters from downward educational mobility than their sons.

Figure 2.5. Israel’s “sticky floor” in education is slightly weaker, and its “sticky ceiling” is slightly stronger, for women than for men
Copy link to Figure 2.5. Israel’s “sticky floor” in education is slightly weaker, and its “sticky ceiling” is slightly stronger, for women than for men

Percentage attaining low, medium or high education, by parents’ highest educational attainment, sex and ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

The Israeli-Arab community has made strong progress in educational attainment but continues to face a comparatively strong educational sticky floor

Previous work by the OECD has highlighted cultural divisions in education and skills accumulation as a key driver of inequality in Israel (OECD, 2018[13]; 2021[28]). Israel’s education system is segregated along ethno-religious lines, with large differences between streams in educational attainment and skills development (OECD, 2018[13]) (see Chapter 4). Historically, outcomes have been particularly poor for the Israeli-Arab community, with long-run implications for employment and earnings prospects (Gabay-Egozi and Yaish, 2019[6]).

The Israeli-Arab population has made considerable progress in educational attainment in recent decades (Fuchs, 2017[29]), even if attainment rates remain well below those in the Hebrew-speaking majority (Annex Figure 2.A.2). European Social Survey data suggest the share of Israeli-Arabs with at least upper-secondary education doubled between the cohorts born 1940-1949 (23%) and 1960-1969 (50%), and then increased by almost the same again for the cohort born 1970-1979 (69%), see Annex Figure 2.A.2.1 The share with tertiary education increased from 7% to 17% over the same period.

These gains in education are reflected in strong upward absolute mobility for Israeli-Arabs (Figure 2.6). The share of Arabic speakers with non-tertiary-educated parents that attained a level of education greater than their parents increased steadily across the covered cohorts, from 60% for those born in 1940-1949 to as high as 84% for the youngest cohort born 1970-1979 (Figure 2.6, Panel A). This is a far higher upward mobility rate than among Hebrew speakers, which itself fell slightly for the youngest cohort, to 64% for those born 1970-1979. However, despite strong overall mobility, Arabic speakers with upper secondary-educated parents (ISCED 3‑4) remain less likely to move up to tertiary education (26%) than their Hebrew-speaking counterparts (42%), see Figure 2.6, Panel B.

Indeed, Israeli-Arabs continue to face a comparatively strong educational “sticky floor”. Gabay-Egozi and Yaish (2019[6]; 2021[7]) examine intergenerational transitions between less-than-tertiary and tertiary education in Israel, finding that, despite progress, Israeli-Arabs with less-than-tertiary-educated parents remain far less likely to attain a tertiary qualification than their Jewish counterparts (2019[6]; 2021[7]). Among those born 1976-1983 – a slightly later birth cohort than examined in the graphics above – Israeli-Arabs with less-than-tertiary-educated parents remain less than half as likely to attain a tertiary qualification as their Mizrachi-Jew and especially Ashkenazi-Jew counterparts (Figure 2.7).

The Haredim are another minority group who often fall behind in education. In line with the community’s rejection of secular values, the Haredi education system prioritises religious studies and offers minimal tuition in secular subjects, including mathematics and science. As a result, those educated in the Haredi system often either do not attend or find it difficult to pass Israel’s upper-secondary (matriculation) exam (the Bagrut) and progress to higher education (Regev, 2017[30]; Cahaner and Malach, 2022[31]). The number of Haredi Jews enrolling in tertiary education has increased in recent years, possibly on account of increased leniency in the admissions process (Regev, 2017[30]). Nonetheless, tertiary attainment rates remain much lower in the Haredi community than among non-Haredi Jews, with rates especially low for Haredi men.

Figure 2.6. Israeli-Arabs enjoy strong absolute mobility in education but are still less likely to make the jump from upper secondary to tertiary education
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Percentage with educational attainment higher than their parents, population with non-tertiary educated parents, by main language spoken at home, Israel

Figure 2.7. Israeli-Arabs with non-tertiary-educated parents are less than half as likely as their Jewish counterparts to attain a tertiary degree
Copy link to Figure 2.7. Israeli-Arabs with non-tertiary-educated parents are less than half as likely as their Jewish counterparts to attain a tertiary degree

Percentage attaining tertiary qualifications, population with non-tertiary-educated parents, by sub-population and birth cohort

Box 2.2. OECD PISA results provide no evidence to suggest that educational mobility in Israel is likely to rise

Copy link to Box 2.2. OECD PISA results provide no evidence to suggest that educational mobility in Israel is likely to rise

A major limitation of studies of intergenerational educational mobility is that they are inherently backward-looking. Researchers, mindful of life‑cycle bias, can only be confident in patterns of parent-child educational mobility once members of a cohort have likely “completed” their education in their mid-to-late 20s (or potentially later, in the case of Israel). Add to this the delays involved with collecting and analysing data – especially internationally comparable data – and data on mobility do not typically become available until 20 years or more after a cohort first entered the public education system. The effects of policy changes today may not show up in observed mobility for another couple of decades.

However, educational performance among young people currently in education may provide clues as to the future direction of intergenerational mobility. Results from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) may be particularly useful in this regard since they provide learning assessments that are comparable both across countries and over time.

Results from OECD PISA provide no evidence to suggest that educational mobility is likely to strengthen, or that the educational “sticky floor” is likely to weaken, in Israel in the coming years. Israel’s gap in educational performance between students with high- and low-educated parents is one of the largest in the OECD (Figure 2.8), especially in reading. This is despite PISA likely underestimating socio‑economic gaps in education performance in Israel due to non-participation of many Haredi boy students who do not study PISA’s core subjects of mathematics and science (OECD, 2018[13]). Of particular concern is the continuing poor performance of Arabic-speaking students, who are disproportionately likely to be PISA “low achievers” and rarely achieve PISA “top performer” status (OECD, 2018[13]) (see Chapter 4).

Figure 2.8. Israel’s gap in educational performance between students with high- and low-educated parents remains one of the largest in the OECD
Copy link to Figure 2.8. Israel’s gap in educational performance between students with high- and low-educated parents remains one of the largest in the OECD

Score point difference in average PISA performance between students with high- and low-educated parents, 15‑year‑old students, 2009-2012, OECD countries

2.3. Occupational attainment and the transmission of occupational status across generations

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Occupational attainment, like educational attainment, plays an important role in shaping where an individual fits into society. An individual’s occupational (or “class”) position is defined by their employment status, contract type, and degree of authority, control, and autonomy at work, among other factors. It is reflected not just in their earnings but also in their income stability, financial security, and the development of earnings over the life course (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006[32]; Yaish and Kraus, 2020[33]). As with education, these occupational positions are frequently passed from generation to generation, with a child’s occupational attainment heavily associated with that of their parents (OECD, 2018[1]).

This section examines intergenerational occupational mobility in Israel from a comparative perspective. Drawing predominantly on OECD estimates using data from the European Social Survey (see Box 2.3), it explores occupational mobility both at the country level and by gender and ethno-religious group. As with education, findings suggest that while Israel has enjoyed healthy absolute occupational mobility, intergenerational persistence remains strong. Members of the Israeli-Arab community again enjoy less upward mobility.

Upward occupational mobility is high in Israel, as it is in many OECD countries

Israel’s occupational structure has changed substantially over the past half-century or so. As in many other OECD countries (OECD, 2018[1]), Israel’s share of managerial and professional workers has expanded steadily, with corresponding declines in the shares employed in manual and routine non-manual occupations (Figure 2.9). These developments are visible when comparing occupational attainment across cohorts: between those born in the 1940s and in the 1970s, the share of Israelis employed in managerial or professional occupations (higher or lower) increased by 8 p.p., from 37% to 45%. They are even clearer, however, when comparing each cohort’s occupational attainment with that of their parents: within each cohort, the share in (higher or lower) managerial or professional occupations is consistently 20‑25 p.p. greater than the corresponding share among their parents.

The expansion of Israel’s managerial and professional class has helped create “room at the top” and steady opportunities for upward intergenerational occupational mobility. Across the covered cohorts, just over half (52‑54%) of Israelis with non-higher-manager parents attained occupations of higher status than their parents – a rate effectively identical to the OECD average throughout (Figure 2.10, Panel A). This steady rate of upward overall mobility has been supported by increases across cohorts in the likelihood of outperforming parents for those with parents in medium- (i.e. routine non-manual workers, etc.) or higher-status (i.e. lower managerial and professional workers) occupations (Figure 2.10, Panel B).

Figure 2.9. Israel’s managerial and professional occupations have expanded substantially
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Distribution of occupational attainment, cohort members and cohort members’ parents, by ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Figure 2.10. Half of Israelis reach higher status occupations than their parents
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Percentage with occupational attainment higher than their parents, population with non-higher manager parents, by ten‑year birth cohort

Box 2.3. Measuring intergenerational occupational mobility

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This section is built primarily on OECD estimates using comparative data from the European Social Survey (ESS) – the same cross-national survey used by the Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM) and for the OECD’s original estimates of educational mobility in the previous section.

Following the approach used in the OECD’s 2018 report A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility (OECD, 2018[1]), occupational attainment is measured using a simplified version of the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe‑Portocarero) classification scheme outlined by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996[34]) (2003[35]). In its full form, the scheme classifies (ISCO 88‑coded) occupations into 11 categories, as follows: 1. Higher Managerial and Professional Workers; 2. Lower Managerial and Professional Workers; 3. Routine Clerical Work; 4. Routine Service and Sales Work; 5. Small Self Employed with Employees; 6. Small Self Employed without Employees; 7. Manual Supervisors; 8. Skilled Manual Workers; 9. Semi and Unskilled Manual Workers; 10. Agricultural Labour; and 11. Self-employed farmers. This is simplified by combining categories 3‑7 and 11, which are seen as broadly equivalent with respect to social class, and by folding category 10 (agricultural labour) into category 9, producing the following 5‑part classification: 1. Higher managerial and professional workers; 2. Lower managerial and professional workers; 3. Routine non-manual workers, manual supervisors, self-employed (with or without employees, including self-employed farmers); 4. Skilled manual workers; and 5. Semi- and unskilled manual workers (including agricultural labourers). In some applications (e.g. Figure 2.11), this classification is simplified further into a 3‑part classification by combining categories 1 and 2 (Managerial and professional workers (higher and lower)) and categories 4 and 5 (Manual workers (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, including agricultural labourers)). In all cases, an additional category is used for respondents who have never had a paid job or whose parents were not in paid work during the reference period.

Absolute mobility is measured using a hierarchical notion of occupational attainment, with occupations in category 1 (Higher managerial and professional workers) representing the highest possible occupational attainment, and those in category 5 (Semi- and unskilled manual workers (including agricultural labourers)) the lowest. Upward absolute mobility is calculated as the percentage of the population that have attained a higher status occupation than both their parents, conditional on neither parent being a higher managerial or professional worker. Relative mobility and occupational persistence are explored by comparing occupational attainment within and between those with a given level of parental occupational attainment.

As with educational attainment, this section examines occupational mobility among those born between 1940-1949 and 1970-1979, only. Just as for education, the need for respondents to have (likely) reached “occupational maturity” prevents an examination of mobility among the European Social Survey’s younger cohorts. The timing of career trajectories likely differs across countries but evidence from the United Kingdom, for instance, suggests that many do not reach career maturity until around their mid‑30s (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2011[36]).

Occupational persistence seems to have hardened in recent decades

As with education, absolute mobility in occupations is important but does not guarantee all have opportunities to make it to high-status positions. Moving up does not always mean having the opportunity to make it to the top. Indeed, in Israel, as in several other OECD countries (OECD, 2018[1]), there is evidence to suggest that occupational persistence across generations has if anything strengthened rather than weakened in recent decades.

Starting at the top of the occupational ladder, Figure 2.11 suggests that Israel’s occupational “sticky ceiling” – the extent to which the children of parents with the highest status occupations attain high-status occupations themselves – seems to have hardened (Figure 2.11, Panels C, F and I). Between the cohort born in the 1940s and those born in the 1970s, the percentage of individuals with manager- or professional parents who themselves become managers or professionals increases by 10 p.p., from 59% to 69% (Figure 2.11, Panel C). Israel is not the only OECD country to see an increasing share of the children of managers end up as managers themselves, but the pace of increase is greater in Israel than in many other countries. As a result, between the 1940-1949 and 1970-1979 cohorts, Israel shifts from enjoying a comparatively loose “sticky ceiling” in occupations to one similar to the OECD average.

At the other end of the occupational ladder, Israel’s occupational “sticky floor” has remained largely static (Figure 2.11, Panels A, D and G). Between the cohorts born 1940-1949 and 1970‑1979, the percentage of individuals with manual-worker parents that go on to become managers or professionals remained effectively stable at about 30‑35% (Figure 2.11, Panels A). In other words, despite the expansion of the managerial and professional occupations, a child born to manual workers in Israel in the 1970s is only roughly as likely to make it to a managerial or professional position as one born to manual workers in the 1940s. At the same time, the percentage of individuals with manual-worker parents who remain manual workers also remained steady at 27‑28% (Figure 2.11, Panel G). Trends are similar in several other OECD countries, albeit with the strength of the occupational “sticky floor” consistently slightly weaker in Israel than on average elsewhere in the OECD (Figure 2.11, Panels A, D and G).

Gender differences in overall occupational mobility are small, but men with manual-worker parents are more likely than women to remain manual workers themselves

Israel is a mixed performer on gender equality in employment (OECD, 2022[37]). On the one hand, except for in the Israeli-Arab community (see below), gender employment gaps are relatively narrow, and women’s access to senior positions is above average for the OECD (2022[37]). On the other, the gender pay gap remains large, due mostly to differences in working hours and women’s under-representation in the highest-paying fields, such as the high-tech sector (Fuchs, 2016[38]; Debowy, Esptein and Weiss, 2023[39]; OECD, 2023[14]).

Gender differences in occupational mobility in Israel are only small overall (Annex Figure 2.A.3). Absolute mobility (measured by the percentage with higher status occupations than their parents) is effectively equal for men and women across cohorts. Indeed, for Israelis born 1970-1979, the shares of men and women with occupational attainment higher than their parents are almost identical (52% for men, and 53% for women).

Figure 2.11. An increasing share of the children of managers end up as managers themselves, while the chances of the child of a manual worker becoming a manager remain relatively low
Copy link to Figure 2.11. An increasing share of the children of managers end up as managers themselves, while the chances of the child of a manual worker becoming a manager remain relatively low

Occupational attainment by parents’ occupational attainment and ten‑year birth cohort, OECD countries

Figure 2.12. Men with manual-worker parents are more likely to remain as manual workers, and women with managerial-worker parents more likely to remain as managers
Copy link to Figure 2.12. Men with manual-worker parents are more likely to remain as manual workers, and women with managerial-worker parents more likely to remain as managers

Occupational attainment for respondents with manual-worker (skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled) and managerial-worker (higher or lower) parents, by sex and ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

However, there are some differences between men and women in the “stickiness” and extent to which they follow their parents into manual- and managerial-type occupations (Figure 2.12). At the bottom end of the occupational ladder, reflecting occupational segregation and gender differences in manual-sector employment, women with manual-worker parents are substantially less likely than men with manual-worker parents to remain manual workers themselves (Figure 2.12, Panel A): for the 1970-1979 cohort, just 13% of women with manual-worker parents stay as manual workers, compared to 41% of men. Even when combined with those reporting they have never had a paid job (16% for women, compared to 6% for men), the total share of women with manual-worker parents with “low” occupational attainment (29%) remains much smaller than the equivalent share for men (47%). Instead, women with manual-worker parents are substantially more likely to make their way into routine non-manual roles (or similar) (38%, compared to 22% among men with manual-worker parents).

At the top end, in broad terms, the “sticky ceiling” in managerial-type employment seems to be at least slightly stronger for women than men (Figure 2.12, Panel B). For the 1970-1979 cohort, 73% of women with manager parents also end up as managers themselves, compared to 64% of men. Correspondingly, women with manager parents are less likely than their male counterparts to move downwards to a manual-worker position (2%, compared to 11% for men), and are slightly less likely to report never having had a paid job (2%, compared to 5% for men). However, despite being more likely to remain in managerial-type employment, women in Israel continue to experience a large gender gap in earnings and to find it extremely difficult to access top earnings (see Section 3.629).

Arabic-speakers remain less upwardly mobile than Hebrew-speakers

Israel’s labour market is characterised by large disparities along ethno-religious lines (OECD, 2023[14]). Outcomes are particularly poor for the Israeli-Arab community, who struggle to access jobs in higher-paying areas, such as Israel’s high-tech sector, and instead often find their opportunities limited to low-skill, low-productivity occupations. Indeed, Arabic-speakers are less than half as likely as Hebrew-speakers to be working as managers or professionals, and more than twice as likely to be manual workers (Annex Figure 2.A.4). Reasons include poorer skills, weaker networks, geographic segmentation and poorer transport links, and possibly discrimination (Fuchs, 2017[29]; Kasir and Yashiv, 2020[40]; Yaish and Gabay-Egozi, 2021[41]; OECD, 2023[14]).

The challenges Israeli-Arabs face in the labour market are reflected in their occupational mobility rates. Despite progress, upward absolute mobility is consistently much lower among Arabic-speakers than Hebrew-speakers (Figure 2.13, Panel A). Indeed, even among those born 1970-1979, Arabic-speakers remain approximately 10 p.p. less likely as Hebrew-speakers to be upwardly mobile, down from about 30 p.p. for those born 1940-1949. One major reason for lower overall mobility is inactivity among Israeli-Arab women, especially among those that are more religious (Miaari, Khattab and Sabbah-Karkabi, 2023[42]). Traditional gender roles remain prevalent in the Israeli-Arab community and, combined with poorer job opportunities and poorer family supports (e.g. early childhood education and care), this results in a relatively large (if declining) share of Arabic-speaking women who report never having had a paid job (Figure 2.13, Panel B). However, upward mobility rates are also comparatively low among Israeli-Arab men: among the 1970-1979 cohort, 49% of Arabic-speaking men with non-higher-manager parents attain higher status occupations than their parents (Figure 2.13, Panel B), compared to 58% among Hebrew-speakers overall (Figure 2.13, Panel A).

Figure 2.13. Arabic-speakers are less likely to move up the occupational ladder
Copy link to Figure 2.13. Arabic-speakers are less likely to move up the occupational ladder

Percentage with occupational attainment higher than (upwardly mobile), the same as (stable), or lower than (downwardly mobile) their parents, by ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Israeli-Arabs are not the only minority group that are poorly integrated into the Israeli labour market outcomes. Despite recent progress (Regev, 2017[30]), outcomes remain poor for Haredim, reflecting differences in the value placed on work relative to spiritual activities. Employment rates are low (especially for Haredi men), part-time employment is common, and wages are far lower than among the non-Haredi population (Fuchs and Weiss, 2018[43]; OECD, 2023[14]). Similar to Israeli-Arabs, the Haredim are also heavily under-represented in Israel’s highest-paying sectors, including high-tech (Fuchs and Weiss, 2018[43]), although thanks to special education tracks, highly-educated Haredi men are over-represented in professional services such as law, accounting and insurance (Kalev et al., 2024[44]). Data on intergenerational occupational mobility among the Haredim are unfortunately not available.2 However, given their comparatively weak labour market outcomes – as well as their weaker earnings mobility – upward occupational mobility between generations has likely been relatively limited among Haredim when compared to other groups in Israel.

2.4. Earnings mobility and the transmission of earnings levels across generations

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This section turns to intergenerational earnings mobility and the transmission of earnings levels from one generation to the next. While earnings themselves are often correlated with educational and occupational attainment, intergenerational mobility in earnings can and often does differ from mobility in education and occupations (Björklund and Jäntti, 2000[45]; Yaish and Kraus, 2020[33]). Over-time changes in the earnings premiums attached to education and occupation are one possible reason, as are changes in wage structures and earnings dispersion. Another potential reason is that parents may be able to influence their children’s earnings in ways (e.g. job referrals, nepotism) that are not fully captured by educational or occupational position classifications (Björklund and Jäntti, 2000[45]; Corak and Piraino, 2011[46]).

Based on the latest estimates for Israel from the Israeli research literature (see Box 2.4), together with comparable OECD estimates for other OECD Members, this section examines intergenerational earnings mobility in Israel from a comparative perspective. It again covers overall mobility and differences in mobility by sex and ethno-religious group. Findings point to a level of average earnings mobility in Israel that is similar to the OECD average, but with a “sticky floor” that is comparatively strong. This earnings “sticky floor” is particularly strong for women and members of the Israeli-Arab community.

Box 2.4. Research into intergenerational earnings mobility in Israel

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Research into intergenerational earnings mobility was for many years relatively scarce in Israel, especially in comparison to some other OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom (Blanden et al., 2004[47]; Blanden et al., 2014[48]) and the United States (Chetty et al., 2014[49]; Chetty et al., 2017[50]).

One major reason for the scarcity of studies was the long-time lack of suitable reliable data linking parent and child earnings (Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). As touched on in Box 2.5, datasets with reliable information on parent and child earnings are often difficult to collect. Some early studies on earnings mobility in Israel looked to overcome this issue by constructing novel intergenerational datasets. Both Beenstock (2004[51]; 2008[52]) and Frish and Zussman (2009[53]), for example, used data based on matched records from the 1983 and 1995 Population and Housing Censuses, complemented in Frish and Zussman’s case with additional information from education registers. However, these studies have limitations, stemming in part from the characteristics of their datasets. These include a sample covering the Jewish population only (Frish and Zussmann, 2009[53]) and the measurement of child earnings at an age (20s to early‑30s) prior to the (typical) establishment of permanent income (Beenstock, 2008[52]).

A series of recently released administrative datasets have helped researchers overcome the limitations of earlier studies. These datasets include a linked parent-child file produced by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics using data from various government agencies, including the tax agency (Aloni and Krill, 2021[54]; Batz and Krill, 2022[10]; Batz and Geva, 2022[12]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]), and a similarly linked parent-child file based on information held by Israel’s National Insurance Institute (Heller, 2020[8]).

These more recent studies produce findings that are substantively different to earlier attempts. In particular, while several early studies find earnings mobility to be comparatively high in Israel (Beenstock, 2008[52]; Frish and Zussmann, 2009[53]), those based on linked administrative data more often find a lower degree of mobility (Heller, 2020[8]; Batz and Krill, 2022[10]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]), with Israel a mid-range (rather than leading) performer relative to other OECD countries (Heller, 2020[8]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). It is these more recent estimates that form the backbone of this section.

Israel is a mid-range performer on intergenerational earnings mobility

In comparison to other OECD countries, Israel is an overall mid-range performer on earnings mobility. Work by Oren Heller (2020[8]) suggests that Israel’s intergenerational father-son earnings elasticity – a common summary measure of earnings mobility or, more accurately, earnings persistence across generations – stands at approximately 0.32 (Figure 2.14). This is similar to the average for OECD countries with comparable data (0.33). Israel’s elasticity is lower than in countries such as Ireland (0.38) and especially Chile (0.52), but substantially higher than in some of the OECD’s most income‑mobile countries, like the Netherlands (0.20).

Figure 2.14. Israel’s father-son earnings elasticity is similar to the OECD average
Copy link to Figure 2.14. Israel’s father-son earnings elasticity is similar to the OECD average

Intergenerational father-son earnings elasticity, 1970‑1979 birth cohort, OECD countries

At the top end of the earnings distribution, Israel has a “sticky ceiling” in earnings comparable to many other OECD countries. Estimates by Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]), based on a cohort born 1977-1983, suggest that 40% of sons with fathers who were in the top quartile (25%) of the earnings distribution end up in the top earnings quartile themselves (Figure 2.15). This is a slightly lower share than the average across OECD countries with comparable data (42%), and comparable to the shares in countries such as Denmark (40%), France (40%) and Italy (41%). Only 16% of sons with fathers in the top earnings quartile fall into the bottom earnings quartile, a share that is again similar to the OECD average (16%).

At the bottom end, Israel’s “sticky floor” in earnings is relatively strong in comparison to many other OECD countries (2022[9]). Gordon, Flug and Portal estimate that 36% of sons born to fathers in the bottom quartile (25%) of the earnings distribution remain in the bottom quartile themselves. This is larger than the average for OECD countries with comparable data (31%), and much higher than in some of the OECD’s best performers, like Denmark, Portugal and the United Kingdom, where the share remaining in the bottom quartile is around or less than 25%. Only 14% make it to the top earnings quartile – lower than the OECD average (17%), and far lower than the 40% among sons with fathers from the top quartile (Figure 2.15).

Figure 2.15. Israel’s “sticky ceiling” in earnings is similar to the OECD average, but its “sticky floor” is comparatively strong
Copy link to Figure 2.15. Israel’s “sticky ceiling” in earnings is similar to the OECD average, but its “sticky floor” is comparatively strong

Percentage in the top and bottom quartiles of the earnings distribution, sons, by father’s position in the father earnings distribution, OECD countries

Box 2.5. Measuring intergenerational earnings mobility

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Earnings mobility is in some ways the most difficult aspect of intergenerational socio‑economic mobility to study. First and foremost is the issue of the availability of data itself. Datasets with reliable information on the earnings of both parents and their children are not easy to collect, in part because it is difficult for adults to accurately report their parents’ earnings when they were young (Yaish and Kraus, 2020[33]). This prevents the use of retrospective survey questions, such as those used in the European Social Survey to gather information on parental education or occupation. In their place, researchers most often turn to long-term longitudinal studies, which are both time consuming and expensive to run, or linked administrative datasets, which until recently were comparatively rare. Beyond data availability, there are also a range of technical issues that can have important effects on the level and reliability of estimates. These issues include measuring earnings for a long enough period and at the right point in life to avoid life‑cycle bias and accurately capture long-term (“permanent”) earnings (OECD, 2018[1]).

This section is built on estimates from the Israeli research literature combined where possible with results from the OECD’s 2018 report A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility (2018[1]) for other OECD Members. These OECD estimates are themselves based on information from a variety of sources, including longitudinal studies (e.g. the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and synthetic panels based on the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (OECD, 2018[1]). The data for Israel come from a growing literature rooted in a series of recently released linked parent-child administrative datasets. The section makes particularly heavy use of studies by Oren Heller (2020[8]) from Israel’s National Insurance Institute, and by Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) from the Israeli Democracy Institute.

Earnings mobility is captured in this section through relative measures. These include the “intergenerational earnings elasticity”, or the estimated beta coefficient when children’s (log) earnings are regressed on their parents’ (log) earnings, and transition matrices between placement in quartiles of the parent and child earnings distributions. In both cases, results are based primarily on men’s earnings, that is, on the link between the earnings of fathers and sons. This is because, historically, it has been harder to reliably produce comparable estimates for women due to their lower labour force participation and greater selection in employment. Section 3.629 presents estimates for Israeli men and women separately. As noted in the text, these estimates do not correct for women’s greater selection in employment and should be interpreted with some caution. It should also be noted that “earnings” generally refer to market labour earnings only and do not reflect access to other monetary (e.g. social transfers) and non-monetary (e.g. home ownerships) resources, which differ between men and women and across Israel’s ethno-religious groups.

Women are far more likely than men to be stuck at the bottom of the earnings distribution

Gender differences in earnings mobility are large in Israel (Heller, 2020[8]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). In contrast to both educational and occupational mobility, where “sticky floors” seem at least slightly stronger for men than for women, the “sticky floor” in earnings appears substantially stronger for women (Figure 2.16). Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) estimate that among Israelis with parents in the bottom earnings quartile, 48% of women remain in the bottom quartile themselves, compared to 28% of men. As few as 7% of women with bottom-earnings-quartile parents make it to the top quartile. By contrast, at the top end of the earnings distribution, the “sticky ceiling” in earnings seems stronger for men (Figure 2.16). An estimated 54% of men with parents in the top earnings quartile remain in the top quartile themselves, compared to 25% of women. Moreover, these estimates are unadjusted for the greater selection of women into employment. Importantly, as it is lower-skilled women with weaker earnings potential who are most likely to select out of employment and therefore drop of out the earnings dataset, these estimates may even overestimate women’s actual earnings mobility. The “true” gender earnings mobility gap in Israel may then be even larger.

Figure 2.16. The “sticky floor” in earnings is far stronger for women, and the “sticky ceiling” far stronger for men
Copy link to Figure 2.16. The “sticky floor” in earnings is far stronger for women, and the “sticky ceiling” far stronger for men

Percentage in the top and bottom quartiles of the earnings distribution, by sex and parents’ position in the parent earnings distribution, 1977-1983 cohort, Israel

The large gender gap in earnings mobility echoes and reflects Israel’s comparatively large gender pay gap. In addition to factors common across countries like occupational segregation and gender differences in life‑cycle employment patterns, researchers have attributed Israel’s wide pay gap to relatively large gender differences in working hours and the continued under-representation of women in the highest-paying positions and highest-paying sectors of the Israeli economy, including high-tech (Fuchs, 2016[38]; Debowy, Esptein and Weiss, 2023[39]; OECD, 2023[14]). Similar factors are likely driving the gender gap in earnings mobility. Heller (2020[8]) suggests that women may more often prioritise factors other than pay when choosing their career, limiting their chances to climb to (or remain at) the top of the earnings ladder. This has similarities to the workplace flexibility explanation for the gender pay gap, which suggests that women often earn less than men because they tend to choose jobs with greater flexibility and predictable hours and pay for that flexibility through lower wages (Goldin, 2014[55]). Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) add to this the observation that women on average work fewer hours than men, again limiting their chances of rising to the top of the earnings distribution.

Box 2.6. Social mobility among the children of migrants from the former Soviet Union

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One complication when studying social mobility in Israel is that it is a comparatively young country with a population composed in large part of migrant groups who arrived in the country only within the last two or three generations. As is common for migrant populations (OECD/European Commission, 2023[56]), many of those moving to Israel encountered labour market frictions on first arrival, including language barriers and skills mismatch (Aloni and Krill, 2021[54]). This potentially widens the scope for upward mobility among second- and third-generation migrants, who frequently benefit from improved integration and assimilation.

Of particular relevance to this report is the group of migrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) who arrived in Israel in the late 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 lifted restrictions on emigration and allowed large numbers of Jews to migrate to Israel unrestricted. Close to 1 million arrived in the space of the next decade, equivalent to about 20% of the Israeli population in 1989 (Cohen-Goldner, Eckstein and Weiss, 2015[57]). These migrants were on average better educated than their Israeli-born counterparts but frequently struggled to earn similar wages for a number of years after arrival (Cohen-Goldner, Eckstein and Weiss, 2015[57]).

How did the group of migrants arriving from the Soviet Union perform on social mobility? Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) extend their earnings mobility analysis to cover differences among non-Haredi Jews by place of origin. Their findings are mixed.

Figure 2.17. At an individual level, a non-Haredi child with a Soviet Union background has no greater chance of escaping low earnings than others whose family migrated from elsewhere
Copy link to Figure 2.17. At an individual level, a non-Haredi child with a Soviet Union background has no greater chance of escaping low earnings than others whose family migrated from elsewhere

Percentage in the top and bottom quartiles of the earnings distribution, by place of origin and parents’ position in the parent earnings distribution, non-Haredi Jews, 1977-1983 cohort, Israel

On the one hand, at an individual level, they find that earnings mobility is no higher for children with an FSU background than for other non-Haredi Jews whose family migrated from elsewhere (Figure 2.17). Indeed, at the bottom end of the earnings distribution, they estimate that a child born to migrants from the FSU has a higher chance of remaining in the bottom earnings quartile (30%) than a child with an Ashkenazi (Europe or North America) background (25%), and a roughly equal chance compared to those with Mizrahi (Asian or African, 31%) background or mixed backgrounds (29%) (Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). A given child with from a low-earning FSU background has no greater chance of escaping low earnings than any other non-Haredi Jew with a low-earning background.

On the other hand, as a group and compared to their parents, Gordon, Flug and Portal find that children with an FSU background have made considerable progress up the earnings distribution. They find that while their parents achieved an average position of just under the fifth decile on the Israeli earnings distribution, children with an FSU background find themselves on average just under the sixth earnings decile (Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). Indeed, they find a level of convergence in earnings levels across non-Haredi Jews with different migrant backgrounds. This convergence is likely due to regression to the mean – even if their individual chances of earnings mobility are no different from other non-Haredi Jews, the disproportionate share of children with an FSU background starting towards the bottom of the earnings distribution means that a disproportionate share are likely to move upwards over their lifetime.

Ethno-religious gaps in earnings mobility are large

Gaps in intergenerational earnings mobility between ethno-religious groups are also large.

In line with their weaker educational and occupational mobility (see sections 3.629 and 3.629), as well as their poorer labour outcomes more generally, Israeli-Arabs tend to experience weaker earnings mobility than the (non-Haredi) Jewish population (Aloni and Krill, 2021[54]; Heller, 2020[8]; Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). Indeed, both Heller (Heller, 2020[8]) and Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) find that average earnings persistence is about 50% higher for Israeli-Arabs than for non-Haredi Jews. Israeli-Arabs continue to experience weaker earnings mobility even after controlling for educational attainment, school quality, and locality (Heller, 2020[8]).

Israeli-Arabs’ disadvantage in earnings mobility is well illustrated by the earnings prospects of those born at the bottom of the earnings distribution (Figure 2.18). Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[9]) estimate that almost half (47%) of Muslim Israeli-Arabs, and over one‑third (36%) of Christian Israeli-Arabs, born to parents in the bottom earnings quartile remain in the bottom quartile themselves. This compares to 30% for non-Haredi Jews. Only a small minority of Israeli-Arabs are able to climb to the top of the distribution: just 7% in the case of Muslim Israeli-Arabs, and 11% for Christian Israeli-Arabs, compared to 18% for non-Haredi Jews. Israeli-Arab women, especially Muslim Israeli-Arab women, face particularly poor prospects: 67% of Muslim Israeli-Arab women with parents in the bottom earnings quartile remain in the bottom quartile themselves, compared to 35% of Muslim Israeli-Arab, and only 3% make it to the top earnings quartile.

As might be expected given their occupational outcomes, earnings mobility also differs for the Haredim. Average intergenerational earnings persistence is in fact very low (i.e. mobility is very high) among the Haredi population – but this is driven by much of the community having earnings outcomes that are equally poor, rather than equally good, regardless of background (Heller, 2020[8]). High part-time rates and low earnings mean that downward earnings mobility is very common for the Haredim: as many 40% of Haredi Jews with parents in the top earnings quartile move to the bottom earnings quartile (Gordon, Flug and Portal, 2022[9]). Conversely, upward mobility is rare: just 6% of Haredi Jews with parents in the bottom earnings quartile move up to the top, with 50% remaining in the bottom quartile themselves (Figure 2.18).

In contrast, the non-Haredi population – or more accurately, non-Haredi men – enjoy strong earnings prospects even when born to families at the bottom of the earnings distribution (Figure 2.18). Just 20% of non-Haredi men with parents in the bottom earnings quartile remain in the bottom quartile themselves, with 27% climbing to the top earnings quartile. Unsurprisingly given the large overall gender gap (section 3.629), outcomes are considerably weaker for non-Haredi women: 40% of non-Haredi women with parents in the bottom earnings quartile remain in the bottom quartile themselves, and 9% make it to the top quartile.

Figure 2.18. Muslim Israeli-Arabs face a strong “sticky floor” in earnings, especially Muslim Israeli-Arab women
Copy link to Figure 2.18. Muslim Israeli-Arabs face a strong “sticky floor” in earnings, especially Muslim Israeli-Arab women

Distribution of positions in the earnings distribution, respondents with parents in the first (bottom) earnings quartile, by sex and ethno-religious group, 1977-1983 cohort, Israel

Box 2.7. The role of geography in intergenerational mobility in Israel

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Geography can play an important role in shaping intergenerational social mobility. Drawing on large‑scale administrative data, seminal work by Raj Chetty and colleagues (Chetty et al., 2014[58]) illustrates how in the United States, the neighbourhood in which children grow up can act as a strong determinant of their outcomes as adults. Children from low-income families who grow up in high-opportunity areas – characterised by low poverty, low crime, and strong schools – earn significantly more as adults, while those from low-opportunity have far weaker chances of upward mobility.

Geography may be similarly important for mobility in Israel. Adopting an approach similar to Chetty (2014[58]), Batz and Krill (2022[10]) use earnings data for over 400 000 individuals born between 1979-1983 to examine how place of residence in childhood can effect life chances in the form of adult earnings. Their findings reveal significant geographic differences in the chances of upward mobility in Israel: similar to Chetty, they find children from low-earning families who grew up in areas with lower crime, stronger labour market participation, a better-educated and higher-earning population, and a lower share of single‑parent families, among other characteristics, go on to receive higher earnings as adults.

Importantly, Batz and Krill (2022[10]) find that geographic disparities in mobility are visible in Israel even after controlling for ethno-religious background. Gaps in mobility between Israel’s main population groups – particularly between non-Haredi Jews, Haredi Jews and Israeli-Arabs – are well-known (see above), as is the geographic segmentation of these population groups. Accordingly, Batz and Krill base much of their paper on a sub-sample covering the non-Haredi population only. Even among this comparatively advantaged population group, Batz and Krill find large differences in mobility between neighbourhoods. For example, concentrating on those with parents in the bottom earnings quintile, they find that children born in Ramat HaSharon – an affluent city in central Israel, bordering Tel Aviv – have a 28% chance of making it to the top earnings quintile once they grow up, compared to only 10% from children growing up in Safed – a town in Israel’s Norther District, father from the country’s main commercial centres.

Both Chetty’s work on the United States and Batz and Krill’s work on Israel have important implications for policy. While neither discount the importance of providing support to low-income families themselves, both highlight the potential of place‑based intervention and targeting investment towards what would otherwise be “low-opportunity” neighbourhoods. In Israel, given the geographic segmentation of population groups, investing in disadvantaged areas could additionally help narrow ethno-religious gaps in mobility.

References

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Annex 2.A. Additional figures

Copy link to Annex 2.A. Additional figures

Annex Figure 2.A.1. Gender differences in headline measures of educational mobility are only small
Copy link to Annex Figure 2.A.1. Gender differences in headline measures of educational mobility are only small

Headline measures of absolute and positional (relative) mobility, by sex and ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Annex Figure 2.A.2. Arabic-speakers have made strong gains in educational attainment
Copy link to Annex Figure 2.A.2. Arabic-speakers have made strong gains in educational attainment

Distribution of educational attainment, respondents and respondents’ parents, by main language spoken at home, by ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Annex Figure 2.A.3. Gender differences in absolute occupational mobility are small
Copy link to Annex Figure 2.A.3. Gender differences in absolute occupational mobility are small

Percentage with occupational attainment higher than their parents, population with non-higher manager parents, by sex and ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Annex Figure 2.A.4. Occupational attainment is much lower among Arabic-speakers than among Hebrew-speakers
Copy link to Annex Figure 2.A.4. Occupational attainment is much lower among Arabic-speakers than among Hebrew-speakers

Distribution of occupational attainment, respondents and respondents’ parents, by main language spoken at home and ten‑year birth cohort, Israel

Notes

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← 1. The Israeli-Arab population are identified using the ESS question on the main language spoken by respondents at home (“What language or languages do you speak most often at home?”). This allows for the Israeli sample to be divided into those identifying as primarily Hebrew speakers (69% of the raw sample), those who identify as primarily Arabic speakers (18%), and those who state they most often speak another language (e.g. English, Russian) at home (13% of the raw sample). Unfortunately, it is not possible to isolate respondents belonging to other minorities nor to distinguish between Jewish sub-populations (e.g. Israel’s Haredi population) using the ESS data.

← 2. It is not possible to identify the Haredi population in the European Social Survey data used in this chapter and, to our knowledge, no existing studies look at intergenerational occupational mobility among the Haredim specifically.

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