This chapter provides an overview of the main findings of the report on intergenerational social mobility and child well-being in Israel, placing them in a comparative OECD perspective. It shows that, despite strong demographic dynamism, Israel faces significant challenges related to high poverty, inequality, and disparities across population groups. While upward mobility has improved across generations, it is now slowing and remains constrained by a pronounced “sticky floor”, particularly for disadvantaged groups. Persistent gaps are observed by gender and, more markedly, by ethno-religious background, with Israeli-Arab and Haredi populations facing limited opportunities for upward mobility. The chapter also highlights that Israelis tend to overestimate their own mobility while expressing scepticism about mobility at the societal level, alongside strong support for policies aimed at promoting equal opportunities. Finally, it examines child well-being across multiple dimensions, revealing substantial inequalities in poverty, education, and health outcomes. The analysis underscores that disparities in childhood conditions are a key driver of limited social mobility, making investment in child well-being essential to improving equality of opportunity and long-term socio‑economic outcomes.
Unlocking Opportunities for Children in Israel
Abstract
Israel has one of the youngest populations in the OECD, with children playing a central role in society. With a median age of 29, Israel – alongside Mexico – is one of only two OECD countries below 30, and it has the highest share of under‑15s (28%) in the OECD. Despite a total population similar in size to countries such as Austria, Greece and Switzerland, Israel has roughly twice as many children under 15. The child population is highly diverse: about three‑quarters are Jewish, including a substantial Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community, while nearly one‑quarter are Israeli-Arab, predominantly Muslim, with smaller Druze and Christian minorities.
Enhancing intergenerational socio‑economic mobility remains a significant policy challenge across OECD countries. When individuals’ life chances are heavily influenced by their family background, mobility is low – a condition widely viewed as inequitable. Such limited mobility can hinder economic growth and weaken social cohesion (OECD, 2018[1]; Balestra and Ciani, 2022[2]; Houle, 2019[3]). It signals a failure to provide equal opportunities,1 particularly for children from disadvantaged families, and reflects a misallocation of talent and underutilisation of human capital. The economic consequences are substantial, including lower productivity and reduced output (Clarke et al., 2022[4]).
The Israeli context presents similar challenges. Israel faces high poverty rates and pronounced socio‑economic disparities. It is the eighth most unequal country in terms of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and has the second-highest income poverty rate (OECD, 2023[5]). For those at the bottom of the income distribution, the gap to climb is wider than in most OECD nations. Furthermore, Israeli society is marked by deep ethno-religious divisions, with poor outcomes for the Haredi and Israeli-Arab populations. The intersection of poverty and cultural marginalisation poses a particular threat to social cohesion – especially in a context of limited upward mobility.
Evidence consistently shows that childhood circumstances play a pivotal role in shaping lifetime outcomes. Disparities in family income, parental education, health, and access to opportunities emerge early in life and tend to accumulate over time, influencing children’s development and ultimately affecting their educational attainment, employment prospects, earnings, and overall well-being. Addressing these early-life inequalities and ensuring that all children have the necessary support and resources to thrive is therefore critical – not only for improving individual outcomes, but also for building more dynamic, inclusive, and cohesive societies.
This report examines social mobility trends in Israel, public perceptions and attitudes toward mobility and related policies, and disparities in child well-being that may constrain social mobility in the years to come. It focusses on structural factors that reflect conditions prior to October 2023 and highlight persistent challenges facing Israel. The second chapter assesses Israel’s position relative to other OECD countries on three key dimensions of intergenerational socio‑economic mobility: education, occupation, and earnings. Using internationally comparable data, it examines both absolute mobility (the extent of change in socio‑economic status across generations) and relative mobility (the likelihood of moving up or down the socio‑economic ladder). It also considers variations in mobility by gender and ethno-religious background. The third chapter explores public perceptions of social mobility in Israel, along with attitudes towards policies aimed at promoting it. It compares Israelis’ views on personal and societal mobility with those in other OECD countries and analyses public support for different types of mobility-enhancing policies. The fourth chapter focusses on child well-being in Israel, benchmarking it against OECD peers. Drawing on data from both OECD and domestic sources, it examines disparities in child well-being across population groups. It begins with child poverty and material conditions, and continues with health, education, social and emotional development, concluding with a discussion of adverse childhood experiences and vulnerable children. The remainder of this chapter outlines the main findings, which are explored in greater detail in the chapters that follow.
In broad terms, Israel ranks around the middle among OECD countries in intergenerational socio‑economic mobility. Like many of its OECD peers, Israel has experienced considerable upward absolute mobility across generation born between 1940 and the late 1970s, particularly in terms of education and occupational status. However, this upward trend has begun to slow in more recent generations. Among Israelis born between 1970 and 1979 – those who have largely completed their education and reached occupational maturity – approximately 70% of individuals whose parents lacked tertiary education achieved higher educational levels than their parents. This, however, represents a decline of 6 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the 1960-1969 cohort (76%), see Figure 1.1. Similarly, just over half of those whose parents held non-managerial occupations attained higher-status jobs than their parents.
Distribution of educational attainment, cohort members and cohort members’ parents, respondents and respondents’ parents, by ten‑year birth cohort, Israel
Note: The educational attainment of cohort members’ parents refers to the highest level of education of either parent.
Source: World Bank Global Database on Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/what-is-the-global-database-on-intergenerational-mobility-gdim.
High absolute mobility does not necessarily equate to equality. It is entirely possible for individuals to surpass their parents’ socio‑economic status while still lagging behind their peers. In Israel, relative socio‑economic mobility – the extent to which individuals’ outcomes are influenced by their parents’ status – is relatively low in education and occupational attainment, and roughly on par with the OECD average for earnings.
Across all three areas – education, occupation, and earnings – Israel struggles with a persistent intergenerational “sticky floor”. In education, individuals with low-educated parents are less than one‑quarter as likely to reach high educational levels as those with highly educated parents, compared to an OECD average of about one‑third. In occupational terms, children of manual workers are less than half as likely to become managers or professionals as those with parents in higher-status jobs – similar to the OECD average. In earnings, individuals from the bottom income quartile have only about a one‑in-three chance of reaching the top quartile, a slightly lower rate than the OECD average.
Geography significantly shapes intergenerational mobility in Israel, as it does elsewhere in the OECD. Research by Batz and Krill (2022[6]) shows that, in Israel, children from low-income families who grow up in high-opportunity areas – characterised by lower crime rates, stronger labour markets, better-educated populations, higher earnings, and fewer single‑parent households – have far greater upward mobility than their peers in low-opportunity areas. Crucially, these effects persist even after accounting for ethno-religious background. Among the non-Haredi population, for example, low-income children raised in affluent towns like Ramat HaSharon are nearly three times more likely to become high earners than those raised in less advantaged settings. These findings highlight the need for targeted, place‑based investments to improve opportunity in disadvantaged areas.
Gender patterns in intergenerational mobility are mixed. While Israeli women show strong upward mobility in education, they face significant barriers in earnings mobility. Women with low-earning parents are disproportionately likely to remain at the bottom of the earnings distribution – a reflection of persistent gender inequalities. Key contributing factors include interrupted employment trajectories, large gender gaps in working hours, and underrepresentation in high-paying sectors such as high-tech. These structural challenges constrain women’s earning potential and upward mobility.
Ethno-religious disparities in mobility are more pronounced. Despite meaningful progress, especially in education and to some extent in occupational attainment, Israeli-Arabs continue to face limited opportunities for upward mobility – particularly when starting from the bottom of the socio‑economic ladder. Earnings mobility remains particularly low for Israeli-Arabs, and especially for women within this group. Barriers include lower-quality education, weaker professional networks, geographic and transport disadvantages, and possible discrimination.
Upward mobility is also limited among the Haredi population, though for different reasons. Low mobility in this community is largely driven by the rejection of secular education and an emphasis on religious over economic pursuits. In contrast, the non-Haredi population – especially non-Haredi men – tend to experience stronger upward mobility.
These disparities help explain Israel’s overall mid-range position on intergenerational mobility within the OECD (Heller, 2020[7]). Both Israeli-Arabs and Haredim are sizable minority groups, comprising 21% and 9% of the working-age population, respectively. Israeli-Arabs, in particular, are overrepresented among the socio‑economically disadvantaged. They account for about 45% of low-educated working-age individuals and 42% of 15‑year‑olds with low-educated parents (CBS, 2023[8]; OECD, 2023[9]). As such, the limited mobility within these groups constrains overall national mobility – particularly at the lower end of the socio‑economic distribution.
Ethno-religious disparities in mobility also have broader implications for income inequality and poverty. Research by Batz and Geva (2022[10]) shows that unequal mobility has perpetuated earnings gaps between Israeli-Arabs and the non-Haredi population, and has even widened the gap between Haredim and non-Haredim. Their findings suggest that if all groups experienced equal mobility, these gaps could nearly disappear within two generations.
Demographic trends only underscore the urgency of addressing these disparities. As highlighted in previous OECD reports (OECD, 2018[11]; 2023[12]), improving the integration and outcomes of Israeli-Arabs and Haredim will become increasingly important in the coming decades. Fertility trends suggest that the Haredi population will grow substantially: by 2060, projections indicate that nearly half of Israel’s working-age population will be either Haredi or Israeli-Arab (CBS, 2017[13]). Ensuring that young people in these communities have equitable access to quality education, labour market opportunities, and broader societal participation is critical – not just for improving social mobility, but also for addressing poverty, reducing inequality, and securing long-term social and economic cohesion.
Public perceptions of intergenerational social mobility may diverge from conventional, objective estimates (OECD, 2021[14]). While research shows that these perceptions are partially grounded in real-world experiences and responsive to contextual information (Day and Fiske, 2019[15]; OECD, 2021[14]), subjective assessments can differ from objective statistical measures. At the individual level, many people tend to overestimate their own mobility, believing they have achieved higher social status than their parents – even when objective indicators suggest otherwise (Kelley and Kelley, 2009[16]; Day and Fiske, 2019[15]). By contrast, when evaluating society as a whole, people often underestimate overall mobility, expressing scepticism about the general likelihood of moving up the social ladder (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[17]; Day and Fiske, 2019[15]; OECD, 2021[14]). Whether these mismatches reflect public misperceptions or reveal limitations in conventional measures of mobility remains an open and important question (OECD, 2021[14]).
Regardless of the cause, the gap between perceived and actual mobility has real consequences, as perceptions significantly influence a range of social, economic, and political behaviours (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[18]; Day and Fiske, 2019[15]; OECD, 2021[14]). In fact, for certain outcomes, what people believe about mobility may matter more than what is objectively true (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004[19]; Gugushvili et al., 2022[20]). Perceptions of personal mobility can affect mental and physical health (Gugushvili et al., 2022[20]; Gugushvili et al., 2021[21]), as well as overall life satisfaction and subjective well-being outcomes (Day and Fiske, 2019[15]). Meanwhile, beliefs about societal mobility help shape people’s attitudes toward fairness, trust in institutions, and support for redistribution or policy interventions (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001[22]; OECD, 2021[14]; OECD, 2023[23]). While confidence in a mobile society can foster social cohesion, an overemphasis on individual effort and meritocracy may weaken public support for policies designed to enhance opportunities for disadvantaged groups (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[17]; Magni-Berton, 2019[24]; OECD, 2023[23]).
As in many OECD countries, Israelis tend to overestimate their own social mobility while underestimating mobility across society as a whole. Many believe they have climbed the social ladder during their lifetime – even among those whose occupational status is lower than that of their parents. At the same time, Israelis express scepticism about broader mobility trends, with a widespread belief that opportunities for upward mobility are limited.
Israeli views on the drivers of success reflect a nuanced perspective. Unlike in many countries where people lean heavily toward either personal effort or structural factors, Israelis are more likely to see both as important. In particular, when asked why some people end up with low incomes, many Israelis cite a mix of hard work and circumstances beyond individual control. Recognition of background influences is relatively high: 41% of Israelis identify parental education as a key factor (vs. 35% OECD average) and 49% cite family wealth (vs. 34%), see Figure 1.2.
Percentage responding “Essential” or “Very important” to the question: “In your country, nowadays, how important do you think each of the following factors is for an individual to get ahead in life?”, by item, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑27 average, 2022
Note: Response options for each item were: 1. Essential; 2. Very important; 3. Fairly important; 4. Not very important; 5. Not important at all; and 6. Can’t choose. Data refer to the combined share choosing “1. Essential” and “2. Very important”. “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across the 27 OECD countries with available data.
Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.
Experiences of discrimination are widespread, however. Nearly one in three (29%) Israeli adults report feeling part of a group that faces discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, or language – substantially higher than the OECD average of 6%. Arabic-speakers are particularly affected, with 54% identifying as part of a discriminated-against group. Broader public perception supports this: data from the Israel Democracy Institute show that 39% of all Israelis believe Israeli-Arabs face discrimination, though this view is held by 82% of Israeli-Arabs compared to just 31% of Jewish respondents.
There is strong public support for greater action to promote equal opportunities. A striking 82% of working-age Israelis believe more should be done to ensure everyone has an equal chance to get ahead – ranking fourth highest in the OECD. This is notable given both the levels of actual mobility and prevailing scepticism about societal mobility in Israel. Many also favour more government action on income inequality, although support has declined slightly in recent years, possibly reflecting falling trust in public institutions. Trust in government has dropped sharply – from 53% in 2012 to just 18% in 2024, according to the Israel Democracy Institute.
Israelis are clear about the areas where they would welcome action. Top priorities include raising the minimum wage and ensuring equal access to education – reflecting growing concern about educational disparities and broader dissatisfaction with the education system. Many also support strengthening social benefits and services for low-income households and targeted support for disadvantaged areas.
However, support for tax increases remains limited. A significant portion of the Israeli public believes that high-income earners already pay enough in taxes. Resistance to tax hikes persists even when revenues are earmarked for reducing inequality or supporting low-income groups. This resistance extends to taxes on businesses, wealth, and personal income.
Child well-being plays a vital role in shaping social mobility. Childhood is a formative stage of life, during which experiences, learning, emotions, and environments deeply influence a person’s development and future outcomes. It is during these early years that children begin to acquire the cognitive and non-cognitive skills that underpin success in the labour market, health, relationships, and broader well-being throughout life. However, not all children grow up in environments that support healthy development or prepare them adequately for adulthood. To thrive, children need consistent support from their families, schools, and communities. Without such support, disparities in childhood well-being can solidify into long-term disadvantages that persist throughout life.
Child well-being is inherently multifaceted and multidimensional (OECD, 2021[25]). It encompasses not only material resources and living conditions but also how children feel, think, and relate to others. The OECD Child Well-being Measurement Framework adopts a holistic “ecological” approach, focussing on four interconnected domains of child well-being: material conditions, physical health, cognitive and educational development, and social and emotional well-being. These domains are deeply interrelated, with strengths or deficits in one area often influencing outcomes in the others (OECD, 2021[25]). Chapter 3 draws on available international data to assess child well-being in Israel across all these dimensions.
High child poverty, particularly among Haredi and Israeli-Arab communities, is a major concern in Israel. At 20%, Israel’s child income poverty rate is significantly above the OECD average of 12%, placing it among the highest in the OECD (Figure 1.3). Children from Haredi and Israeli-Arab communities are especially vulnerable: data from Israel’s National Insurance Institute indicate that nearly half of children in these groups live in relative income poverty.
Child (0‑ to 17‑year‑old) relative income poverty rates, OECD countries, 2022 or latest available year
Note: The income poverty rate is the percentage of the population with an equivalised disposable household income below the poverty line, defined as half the median equivalised disposable household income of the total population. Data for Iceland refer to 2017, for Denmark to 2019, for Australia and Germany to 2020, for Japan and Switzerland to 2021, and for Costa Rica and the United States to 2023. OECD IDD data for Israel are based on the CBS Household Expenditure Survey, while data from the Israeli National Insurance Institute are based on administrative data. Among other differences, the two are based on different methods for calculating equivalence scales. Data for all countries are based on income only and do not account for intra- and inter-country differences in wealth and in in-kind benefit receipt (e.g. public health and education services). Differences in wealth and in in-kind benefit receipt can have important effects on the distribution of resources across households (Alfandari, 2022[26]).
Source: OECD (2023[5]), Income Distribution Database, https://www.oecd.org/social/income‑distribution-database.htm; Endeweld, et al. (2023[27]), Poverty and Income Inequality – 2021, https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/Poverty_Report/Documents/oni2021-e.pdf.
Importantly, poverty persists even among children whose parents are employed. Among children under age four with two working parents, 39% of Haredi and 21% of Israeli-Arab children still live in poverty, compared to just 4% of non-Haredi Jewish children in similar households. Reflecting this exposure, Israeli-Arab children typically have fewer material resources and are more likely to live in overcrowded conditions.
Israel’s tax and transfer system does relatively little to mitigate child poverty. The gap between pre‑ and post-tax child poverty rates is just 3 p.p. (25% vs. 22%), far below the OECD average of 7 points. In countries with similar pre‑tax poverty rates, like France or Ireland, social transfers reduce poverty by 15‑17 points. Israeli tax and transfer policy is more than twice as effective at tackling poverty among non-Haredi households than among Israeli-Arab households. Household size is one reason why tax and transfer policy is more effective for some population groups than for others, especially for the Haredim: the large size of many Haredi households means that benefits and transfers often have to split between a greater number of people.
Health outcomes for children are generally positive but marked by inequality. Israel performs well on key health indicators: infant mortality (2.8 per 1 000 live births in 2021) is below the OECD average (4.0), and adolescent obesity rates (23%) are in line with the OECD (22%). However, large disparities remain. Israeli-Arab children have an infant mortality rate nearly three times higher than their Jewish peers (5.0 vs. 1.8 per 1 000). Obesity rates are also higher, particularly among Israeli-Arab boys (32% vs. 25% for Jewish boys in grades 7‑12).
Early childhood education (ECEC) participation is high but faces structural challenges. ECEC is compulsory and free for ages 3‑5, with near-universal enrolment. Participation for children under 3 stands at 57% – above the OECD average (36%) – but remains lower among disadvantaged groups, especially Israeli-Arabs. This is partly due to lower maternal employment and limited access to subsidies, which are often linked to parental work. Only around 6% of ECEC subsidies go to Israeli-Arab families. Despite recent efforts, including a new five‑year plan by the Ministry of Education, challenges persist – particularly in staffing shortages and affordability for lower-income households.
Educational performance is a key area of concern, especially for Israeli-Arab children. Israel ranks below the OECD average in international student assessments at both primary and secondary levels. Educational inequalities are among the widest in the OECD. In the OECD’s PISA assessment, over half of Arabic-speaking students are low performers in reading, math, and science. This translates into lower graduation and university eligibility rates: only 50% of Arab-system students meet university entrance standards, compared to 75% in non-Haredi Jewish schools. Haredi students face even greater challenges – just 10% meet these criteria. These disparities carry into early adulthood: in 2022, 45% of Israeli-Arab women and 31% of men aged 18‑24 were NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training), compared to 13% and 17% of their Jewish peers.
Despite these challenges, Israeli children report high levels of subjective well-being. In international surveys, Israeli adolescents are among the most satisfied in the OECD. In the 2021-2022 HBSC survey, 43% of Israeli adolescents reported high life satisfaction – the highest share among OECD countries – even among those from lower socio‑economic backgrounds (41%). However, concerns around mental health are rising, especially for adolescent girls. In 2021-2022, over two‑thirds of girls reported multiple psychosomatic complaints (e.g. headaches, stomach aches, sleep problems), up from half in earlier survey waves (2013-2014 and 2017-2018). These symptoms often reflect underlying mental health issues and can impede day-to-day functioning.
The overarching finding of this chapter is that child well-being in Israel varies significantly across population groups, with children from Haredi and especially Israeli-Arab communities consistently lagging behind their peers in the non-Haredi Jewish majority across nearly all well-being dimensions. These disparities matter – not only for children’s current quality of life, but also for their future prospects. As highlighted in past OECD work (OECD, 2018[1]; Clarke et al., 2024[28]) and throughout this chapter, poor childhood well-being undermines development and limits long-term opportunities. Children who grow up in poverty or face socio‑economic disadvantage tend to achieve lower educational outcomes and face reduced earnings and employment prospects in adulthood. Similarly, poor health and weak social and emotional development – often linked to socio‑economic hardship – can have lasting negative effects on educational attainment, labour market participation, and overall life outcomes. As such, the lower levels of well-being observed among Haredi and Israeli-Arab children are likely key contributors to the limited social mobility seen in these communities, and to Israel’s relatively modest levels of intergenerational mobility more broadly. Promoting child well-being across all groups – regardless of ethno-religious background – is therefore critical to building a more mobile and equitable society.
References
[19] Alesina, A., R. Di Tella and R. MacCulloch (2004), “Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different?”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 88/9-10, pp. 2009-2042, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.006.
[18] Alesina, A. and P. Giuliano (2011), “Preferences for Redistribution”, Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1/4, pp. 93-131, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00004-8.
[22] Alesina, A., E. Glaeser and B. Sacerdote (2001), “Why Doesn’t the US Have a European-Style Welfare System?”, NBER Working Papers, https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/8524.html (accessed on 23 March 2026).
[17] Alesina, A., S. Stantcheva and E. Teso (2018), “Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution”, American Economic Review, Vol. 108/2, pp. 521-54, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20162015.
[26] Alfandari, Y. (2022), The Impact of Social Transfers in Kind (STIK), in Education and Health on Gender Inequality.
[2] Balestra, C. and . Ciani (2022), “Current challenges to social mobility and equality of opportunity”, OECD Papers on Well-being and Inequalities, No. 10, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a749ffbb-en.
[10] Batz, K. and A. Geva (2022), “Gaps between population groups in an intergenerational perspective (פערים בין קבוצות האוכלוסייה בראי בין- דורי) (In Hebrew)”, Weekly Economic Review, State of Israel Ministry of Finance.
[6] Batz, K. and Z. Krill (2022), “The relationship between place of residence and intergenerational mobility in earnings (הקשר בין מקום המגורים והמוביליות הבין דורית בשכר) (In Hebrew)”, Weekly Economic Review, State of Israel Ministry of Finance.
[8] CBS (2023), Statistical Abstract of Israel 2023: No. 74, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
[13] CBS (2017), Projections of Israel Population until 2065, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2017/Projections-of-Israel-Population-until-2065.aspx#losExcelos.
[28] Clarke, C. et al. (2024), “What are the economic costs of childhood socio-economic disadvantage? Evidence from a pathway analysis for 27 European countries”, Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 22/2, pp. 473-494, https://doi.org/10.1007/S10888-023-09603-8/METRICS.
[4] Clarke, C. et al. (2022), “The Economic Costs of Childhood Socio-economic Disadvantage in European OECD Countries”, OECD Papers on Well-being and Inequalities, No. 09, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8c0c66b9-en.
[15] Day, M. and S. Fiske (2019), “Understanding the nature and consequences of social mobility beliefs”, The Social Psychology of Inequality, pp. 365-380, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28856-3_23.
[27] Endeweld, M. et al. (2023), Poverty and Income Inequality - 2021, The National Insurance Institute, https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/Poverty_Report/Documents/oni2021-e.pdf.
[21] Gugushvili, A. et al. (2021), “Socioeconomic position, social mobility, and health selection effects on allostatic load in the United States”, PLOS ONE, Vol. 16/8, p. e0254414, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254414.
[20] Gugushvili, A. et al. (2022), “Does perceived social mobility affect health? Evidence from a fixed effects approach”, Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 294, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114705.
[7] Heller, O. (2020), “Intergenerational Mobility in Israel (ניידות בין דורית בישראל) (In Hebrew)”, Discussion Paper, No. 134, State of Israel National Insurance Institute, https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/research/Pages/mechkar_134.aspx.
[3] Houle, C. (2019), “Social Mobility and Political Instability”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63/1, pp. 85-111.
[16] Kelley, S. and C. Kelley (2009), “Subjective social mobility : Data from thirty nations”, in Haller, M., R. Jowell and T. Smith (eds.), The International Social Survey Programme 1984-2009, Routledge, London, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203880050-9.
[24] Magni-Berton, R. (2019), “Is Perceived Equal Opportunity Corrosive for Support for Equal Outcomes? Individual-Based Evidence”, Social Justice Research, Vol. 32/4, pp. 403-430, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-019-00337-5.
[29] OECD (2025), To Have and Have Not – How to Bridge the Gap in Opportunities, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dec143ad-en.
[23] OECD (2023), “Hard work, privilege or luck? Exploring people’s views of what matters most to get ahead in life”, OECD Policy Insights on Well-being, Inclusion and Equal Opportunity, No. 12, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e1903ab2-en.
[12] OECD (2023), OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/901365a6-en.
[5] OECD (2023), “OECD Income (IDD) and Wealth (WDD) Distribution Databases”, https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm.
[9] OECD (2023), PISA 2022 Results (Volume II): Learning During – and From – Disruption, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a97db61c-en.
[14] OECD (2021), Does Inequality Matter? : How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3023ed40-en.
[25] OECD (2021), Measuring What Matters for Child Well-being and Policies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e82fded1-en.
[1] OECD (2018), A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301085-en.
[11] OECD (2018), OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-isr-2018-en.
← 1. Equal opportunity refers to a fair and level playing field where individuals have the same chances to succeed, regardless of their background, race, gender, or socio‑economic status. Social mobility, on the other hand, is the actual movement of individuals or groups within a social hierarchy – typically measured by changes in income, education, or occupation across generations. While equal opportunity is about access, social mobility is about outcomes. A society can claim to offer equal opportunity, but if social mobility remains low, it suggests that structural barriers still limit people’s ability to improve their life circumstances. Defining equal opportunity in practice involves addressing key challenges, such as identifying how different circumstances influence individuals’ choices and outcomes. It also requires distinguishing between “fair” effects – where individuals retain responsibility for their actions – and “unfair” effects – where outcomes are shaped by advantages or disadvantages beyond their control. This concept is closely linked to personal agency, the impact of circumstances, and individual responsibility (OECD, 2025[29]).