Unlocking Opportunities for Children in Israel

3. Perceptions of social mobility in Israel

Abstract

This chapter examines how people in Israel perceive intergenerational social mobility and how these perceptions shape attitudes towards policies, comparing results with other OECD countries. Drawing on international survey data, it analyses both perceived personal mobility (individual progress relative to parents) and perceived societal mobility (opportunities for others). The chapter shows that, as in many OECD countries, Israelis tend to overestimate their own mobility while expressing scepticism about mobility in society overall. It also highlights that Israelis view success as driven by a combination of individual effort and structural factors, with relatively strong recognition of the role of family background.

Perceptions of discrimination are widespread, particularly among Israeli-Arabs, and a large majority of Israelis support stronger action to promote equal opportunities and reduce inequality. Priority areas include minimum wages, education, and support for disadvantaged groups and regions.

However, despite this support for action, there is limited willingness to back higher taxes, even when aimed at reducing inequality.

3.1. Introduction

Public perceptions of intergenerational social mobility do not always fully match conventional mobility estimates (OECD, 2021[1]). Although there is good evidence that mobility perceptions are at least partially rooted in and responsive to real-world information (Day and Fiske, 2019[2]; OECD, 2021[1]), subjective mobility estimates continue to differ substantially from objectively measured estimates, such as those used in Chapter 2. At the personal level, many people “overestimate” their own mobility, in the sense that they often believe they have attained higher social status than their parents even when objective measures suggest they have not (Kelley and Kelley, 2009[3]; Day and Fiske, 2019[2]). Conversely, when thinking about mobility prospects for people in general (societal intergenerational mobility), many people “underestimate” mobility and are sceptical about opportunities for moving up the social ladder (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[4]; Day and Fiske, 2019[2]; OECD, 2021[1]). Whether these differences represent misperceptions on the part of the public, or whether they reflect important facets of mobility not properly captured by conventional objective measures, remains an open question (OECD, 2021[1]).

Regardless of the cause, mismatches between perceived and objective social mobility matter because perceptions play an important role in shaping social, economic, and political outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011[5]; Day and Fiske, 2019[2]; OECD, 2021[1]). Indeed, for some outcomes, perceived mobility likely matters more than objective mobility (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004[6]; Gugushvili et al., 2022[7]). Personal mobility perceptions can shape physical and mental health (Gugushvili et al., 2021[8]; 2022[7]) and subjective well-being outcomes (Day and Fiske, 2019[2]), for example. Societal mobility perceptions, meanwhile, are thought to play an important role in shaping people’s views about society and preferences for policy intervention (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001[9]; OECD, 2021[1]; 2023[10]). While confidence in a mobile society is important for social cohesion, an overemphasis on individual agency and “hard work” in determining success may undermine support for public policies aimed at expanding opportunity for disadvantaged populations (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[4]; Magni-Berton, 2019[11]; OECD, 2023[10]).

This chapter examines perceptions of social mobility and attitudes towards social mobility-related policies in Israel, and how these compare to other OECD countries. Drawing primarily on comparative data from international surveys, including the European Social Survey (ESS) (ESS ERIC, 2023[12]), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (ISSP, 2022[13]), and the OECD’s Risks That Matter (RTM) survey (OECD, 2023[14]), it explores how Israel compares on both perceived personal- and perceived societal intergenerational mobility, before turning to Israelis’ comparative attitudes and preferences towards social mobility-related policies.

The key findings from this chapter are as follows:

• Similar to many other OECD countries, Israelis often “overestimate” their own personal social mobility, and “underestimate” wider societal mobility. Large numbers of Israelis believe they have moved up the social ladder over their lifetime, including a sizeable share of those with lower occupational attainment than their parents. However, Israelis are more sceptical about wider mobility, with many believing opportunities for upward mobility are limited.

• Israelis firmly believe that success comes from a combination of hard work and circumstances outside of people’s control. While the population in most countries lean more heavily towards one or the other, Israel stands out as having a comparatively large share that believe both are at least part of the explanation, especially when asked to think about why some people end up on low incomes. Indeed, while still valuing effort, comparatively large numbers of Israelis recognise the importance of background factors in shaping life chances and prospects for success, including parental education (41%, compared to an OECD average of 35%) and familial wealth (49%, compared to 34%).

• Many people in Israel feel discriminated against. Over one‑quarter (29%) of Israeli adults consider themselves part of a group discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or language, compared to an OECD average of 6%. Arabic-speakers in Israel are most likely to feel part of a discriminated-against group (54%). More generally, data from the Israel Democracy Institute suggest that many (39%) Israelis believe Israeli-Arab are discriminated in Israel, although rates differ sharply between Jewish (31%) and Israeli-Arab (82%) respondents.

• In both absolute and comparative terms, a large share of Israelis would like to see more action taken on equal opportunities. Eighty-two per cent of working-age Israelis believe that more should be done to “make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead in life” – the fourth highest share in the OECD, and a larger share than might be expected, given levels of both observed and perceived social mobility in Israel. Large numbers of Israelis would also like their government to take more action on income inequality, although the share has fallen slightly in Israel in recent years, possibly as a result of falling trust in government. According to data from the Israel Democracy Institute, the share of Israelis expressing trust in their government has fell from over half (53%) in 2012 to less than one‑fifth (18%) in 2024.

• Israelis have a relatively clear idea of the areas in which they would like to see action on inequality and equal opportunities. Minimum wages are a priority for many, followed closely by action on equal access to education. The latter reflects broader dissatisfaction with inequalities in educational outcomes in Israel, and echoes calls by Israelis for improvements in the education system more generally. Comparatively large numbers of Israelis would also like to see improvements in social benefits and services for low-income households and supports for low-income areas.

• However, Israelis are comparatively reluctant to support tax increases. Many people in Israel believe the rich are taxed enough already, and opposition to increases remains comparatively high even when it is suggested that the revenues could be used to help those on low incomes. This lack of enthusiasm for tax increases extends to taxes on business and on wealth, as well as on income.

3.2. Perceived social mobility in Israel

Perceived personal social mobility

Perceived personal intergenerational social mobility refers to peoples’ subjective beliefs about their own experience of, or chances for, social mobility. Often this involves a backward-looking comparison between an individual’s perception of their current social status and the social status of their parents.

Perceived personal social mobility does not always fully align with objectively measured mobility (Day and Fiske, 2019[2]). While assessments of personal mobility usually have a grounding in experience, many people still at least partially “misestimate” whether and how they have moved up the social ladder over their lifetime (Kelley and Kelley, 2009[3]; Day and Fiske, 2019[2]). This often involves an “overestimation” of personal mobility, with respondents believing they have attained higher social status than their parents even when conventional objective measures suggest they have not. Factors potentially influencing (mis)perceptions of personal social mobility include the pace of societal economic growth, both recently and since childhood, having supervisory responsibilities at work, and, notably, being a man, with men more likely than women to see themselves as having achieved upward mobility (Kelley and Kelley, 2009[3]; Gugushvili, 2021[15]).

Data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2019 offer one option for exploring perceived personal mobility and comparing perceptions with objective measures. ISSP 2019 asked respondents for a subjective assessment of their position in society both now and in their family when growing up, with perceived mobility measured as the difference between the two (Guillaud, 2013[16]; Steele, 2015[17]). This can be combined with data from the ISSP on parent and respondent occupational attainment to provide an approximate comparison of objective and subjective social mobility.1

In Israel, as in many other OECD countries, many people believe they have moved up the social ladder over their lifetime (Figure 3.1). Overall, just under half (46%) of 35‑ to 64‑year‑olds in Israel believe they hold a higher position in society now than when they were children (upward perceived social mobility), with one‑quarter (25%) believing they hold a lower position (downward perceived social mobility). These perceived mobility rates are similar to the average for OECD countries with available data (43% and 21%, respectively).

Not surprisingly, perceptions of upward mobility are most frequent among those who have experienced upward objective occupational mobility (58% in Israel, and 53% on average across OECD countries), see Figure 3.1. However, considerable numbers continue to express upward perceived mobility even when they have experienced stable or even downward objective occupational mobility. Indeed, in both Israel and across the OECD on average, individuals who have experienced downward objective occupational mobility are more likely to believe they have moved up in society (34% in both cases) than to believe they have moved down (25% in Israel, and 29% on average across OECD countries). One possible implication of these “misperceptions” is that these individuals may be less likely to support redistributive or mobility-supporting policies than would otherwise be rational for people in their position (OECD, 2021[1]).

Perceived societal social mobility

Perceptions of societal-level social mobility are related to, but distinct from, perceptions of mobility at the personal level (Day and Fiske, 2019[2]). Referring to beliefs about prospects for upward or downward mobility for people in general, perceived societal social mobility is often measured using questions to survey respondents about the chances of a child from a given starting position ending up in a given position in the income distribution.

As with personal mobility, subjective estimates of societal social mobility often differ from objective estimates (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001[9]; Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004[6]; Chambers, Swan and Heesacker, 2015[18]; OECD, 2021[1]). In many countries, contrary to personal mobility, people frequently “underestimate” societal social mobility, in the sense that they are more pessimistic about a given individual’s chances of moving up or down the social ladder than objective measures might suggest (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018[4]; OECD, 2021[1]).

Figure 3.1. Upward perceived personal mobility is common in Israel, even among individuals who have moved down the occupational ladder

Distribution of perceived personal intergenerational social mobility, by objective absolute intergenerational occupational mobility, 35‑ to‑64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑20 average, 2019

Note: Perceived personal social mobility is measured based on respondents’ subjective assessment of their position in society now and when growing up, using the questions “In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale which runs from top (10) to bottom (1). Where would you put yourself now on this scale?” and “And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?”. “Downward” mobility refers to a current score at least one point lower than their score when they were growing up, “stable” to two identical scores, and “upward” mobility to a current score at least one point higher than when they were growing up. Objective occupational mobility is measured as in Chapter 2, using a simplified version of the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe‑Portocarero) classification scheme outlined by Ganzeboom and Treiman (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996[19]; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 2003[20]). Parents’ occupation is measured when a child was age 14 to 16. Parental occupational attainment refers to the highest occupation attained by either parent. OECD‑20 average is the unweighted average across the 20 OECD countries with available data.

Source: OECD estimates based on ISSP (2026[21]), International Social Survey Programme 2019, https://issp.org/.

In Israel, as in most other OECD countries, many people believe opportunities for upward mobility are limited (Figure 3.2). The OECD’s Risks That Matter Survey 2020 asked respondents to estimate the percentage of children from households in the bottom 10% of the income distribution that they think will remain in bottom‑10% households when they grow up. The mean response in Israel was 54%, indicating that, on average, Israelis believe just over half of all children from the poorest households will remain in a similarly poor household when older. This is slightly lower than the average estimate for OECD countries (56%), and well below the most pessimistic countries, such as Greece (62%), Chile (63%) and Austria (64%).

This result can be interpreted in a couple of ways. On the one hand, in absolute terms, it suggests that Israelis (like people in many other OECD countries) substantially “overestimate” the strength of intergenerational persistence at the bottom of the income distribution. No data on actual objective bottom 10%-persistence are available for Israel specifically, but numbers from other countries, such as Italy and the United States, suggest that bottom‑10% persistence is unlikely to reach over 50% in even the least mobile OECD countries (OECD, 2021[1]). In Israel, as in other OECD countries, people seem overly pessimistic about the chances of children from poor families moving up the ladder. As discussed in detail in OECD (2021[1]), the extent to which these kinds of overestimates represent bias and true “misperception” remains open to question. It is likely that at least in part, they also reflect definitional differences (for example, respondents may think in terms of wealth rather than income) or the fact that survey respondents may have difficulty envisaging a social group as precise as the “bottom 10%”.

On the other hand, from a comparative perspective, Israel’s cross-national ranking (just below the OECD average) largely matches how it ranks on actual observed mobility (Chapter 2). As documented in OECD (2021[1]), even if people frequently misperceive levels of mobility and persistence, cross-national differences in perceived mobility often correlate well with certain objective measures of intergenerational mobility, such as intergenerational father-son earnings elasticities (Figure 3.3). In this specific case, the relative strength of perceived bottom‑10% persistence in Israel aligns with its mid-range performance in objectively measured earnings mobility (Chapter 2).

Figure 3.2. In Israel, as in other OECD countries, people believe that children from poor families have limited opportunities to move up the income ladder

Average perceived probability that children coming from the poorest households (bottom 10%) in terms of income will remain in a poor household (bottom 10%) once they become adults, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, OECD countries, 2020

Note: Data refer to the mean average answers to the question “In your country, out of 100 children coming from the poorest 10% of households in terms of income, how many do you think will still be living in a poor household (the poorest 10%) once they become adults? Please note that we refer to the poorest in terms of post-tax and benefit income".

Source: OECD (2021[1]), Does Inequality Matter?: How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility, https://doi.org/10.1787/3023ed40-en, based on data from the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2020.

Figure 3.3. The relative strength of perceived social mobility in Israel matches its mid-range performance in objectively measured earnings mobility

Scatterplot between the intergenerational father-son earnings elasticity and the average perceived probability that a child coming from the poorest 10% of households will remain in the poorest 10% once they become an adult, OECD countries

Note: Intergenerational earnings elasticity estimates are based on a cohort of men born approximately 1960-1980 (1975 for Israel), with both their and their fathers' earnings measured at around ages 30-50 (for Israel, age 35 to 39 for children and 41-50 on average for their parents). Note that for some countries, the estimated elasticity differs from that shown earlier in Chapter 2 due to differences in the reference cohort group. Average perceived probability data refer to the mean average answers to the question “In your country, out of 100 children coming from the poorest 10% of households in terms of income, how many do you think will still be living in a poor household (the poorest 10%) once they become adults? Please note that we refer to the poorest in terms of post-tax and benefit income." among respondents age 18 to 64 years old.

Source: OECD (2021[1]), Does Inequality Matter?: How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility, https://doi.org/10.1787/3023ed40-en, based on data from the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2020, and Heller (2020[22]), “Intergenerational Mobility in Israel”, https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/research/Pages/mechkar_134.aspx, for Israel.

Box 3.1. Comparatively large numbers of Israelis feel part of a discriminated-against group

Discrimination likely plays an important role in shaping social mobility in Israel. As discussed in depth in Chapter 2 of this report, there is a strong ethno-religious angle to Israeli intergenerational persistence and mobility, with discrimination thought to be one driving factor. Heller (2020[23]), for instance, finds that earnings persistence is substantially higher among Israeli-Arabs than Israeli-Jews even after controlling for geographic location, schooling quality, and educational achievement, and points to labour market segmentation (within which discrimination is one element) as one likely reason why. Gordon, Flug and Portal (2022[24]) suggest something similar, alongside possible unmeasured differences in human capital.

Perceptions data illustrate the comparative breadth of felt discrimination in Israel. Data from the European Social Survey show that Israel has an exceptionally large share of the population that feels part of a discriminated-against group: Over one‑quarter (29%) of Israeli adults consider themselves part of a group discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or language, compared to an average across covered OECD countries of 6% (Figure 3.4). The next highest rate, in Latvia, is 12%. Arabic-speakers in Israel are most likely to feel part of a discriminated-against group: 54% consider themselves part of a group discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or language, compared to 17% among Hebrew-speakers. Data collected by the Israel Democracy Institute suggest that 39% of all Israelis believe that Israeli-Arab citizens are discriminated against when compared to Jewish citizens, although rates differ sharply between Jewish (31%) and Israeli-Arab (82%) respondents (Hermann et al., 2024[25]).

Many Israelis also want more to be done on discrimination. In comparative terms, Israel stands out as having a particularly large share that wants action on religion- or belief-based discrimination: According to data from OECD Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module, 43% of 18‑ to 64‑year‑old Israelis believe that efforts to tackle religion- or belief-based discrimination have “not gone far enough”, the highest share among 27 OECD countries with available data and well above the average (27%).¹ Large numbers of Israelis also want action on discrimination based on ethnicity (49%), social class (48%), and place of residence (45%).

Figure 3.4. Many Israelis report being part of a group discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or language

Percentage that report being part of a group discriminated against on the basis of ethnic group, colour or race, nationality, religion, or language, 15+ year-olds, by language spoken at home (Israel only), OECD countries, 2020

Note: Respondents were asked “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?” and “On what grounds is your group discriminated against?”. Responses were coded as 1. Colour or race, 2. Nationality, 3. Religion, 4. Language, 5. Ethnic group, 6. Age, 7. Gender, 8. Sexuality. 9. Disability, or 10. Other. Data refer to the percentage with responses coded as at least one of 1‑5. “ISR: Hebrew” and “ISR: Arabic” refer to those choosing Hebrew and Arabic respectively as response when asked for their language spoken at home. OECD‑25 refers to the unweighted average across the 25 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 10 (2020), https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.

1. OECD estimates based on OECD Risks That Matter 2022 question “Do you think that efforts made in [country] to fight discrimination against the following grounds have gone too far or not far enough? Religion or belief”. Calculated percentages refer to 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds. The unweighted average across the 27‑covered OECD countries is 27%.

Perceived determinants of social and economic success

An alternative approach for capturing perceptions of social mobility involves exploring people’s views on the determinants of (or barriers to) social and economic success. Typically built on responses to questions about the factors important for “getting ahead in life” or for explaining low or high income, this approach provides a more qualitative picture of beliefs around opportunities for moving up and down the social ladder. Previous work has often focussed on respondents’ beliefs about the importance of “effort” or “hard work”, which has been used as a proxy for the perceived strength of meritocracy and, in turn, prospects for mobility (Mijs, 2021[26]; Mijs et al., 2022[27]). Others concentrate on the perceived importance of factors relating to socio‑economic background, which can be seen as reflecting a recognition of intergenerational persistence (Magni-Berton, 2019[11]; OECD, 2021[1]).

The Opportunities module in OECD Risks That Matter 2022 provides one source of comparative data on the perceived determinants of social and economic success (OECD, 2023[10]). The Opportunities module asked people for their thoughts on what matters most for getting ahead in life, with possible response options covering socio‑economic background and endowments (i.e. coming from a wealthy family; having well-educated parents; being born in the country where a person lives; the neighbourhood, town or territory where a person grew up, and a person’s health status or disability), individual characteristics (i.e. a person’s ethnicity, skin colour or language, religion, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity), and “working hard” (Figure 3.5).

Results suggest that Israelis believe success usually comes from a combination of hard work and factors outside of people’s control. On the one hand, many Israelis believe in the importance of hard work: 59% consider hard work as essential or very important for getting ahead in life, a rate slightly higher than the OECD average (54%), see Figure 3.5, Panel A. At the same time, however, very few (6%) believe that hard work is the only essential or very important factor, with most (53%) stating that both hard work and at least one other factor are key to success (Figure 3.5, Panel B). As many as 27% of Israelis believe that other factors are more important than hard work for success.

Indeed, comparatively large numbers of Israelis recognise the importance of demographic and socio‑economic background in shaping prospects for success. Compared to other OECD countries, a relatively high share of Israelis believe that the place where a person grew up (40%), having well-educated parents (41%), and coming from a wealthy family (49%) are essential or very important for getting ahead in life (Figure 3.5, Panel A). As many as 23% of Israelis say that religion is essential or very important, a rate more than twice the OECD average (11%). Separate data from ISSP 2019 suggest that a large share (60%) of Israelis also consider “knowing the right people” as essential or very important for getting ahead in life – well above the average for available OECD countries (43%).2

Figure 3.5. Many Israelis believe success comes from a combination of hard work and factors outside of peoples’ control

Note: Response options for each item were: 1. Essential; 2. Very important; 3. Fairly important; 4. Not very important; 5. Not important at all; and 6. Can’t choose. Data refer to the combined share choosing “1. Essential” and “2. Very important”. “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across the 27 OECD countries with available data.

Source: Panel A: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm; Panel B: OECD (2023[10]), “Hard work, privilege or luck? Exploring people’s views of what matters most to get ahead in life”, https://doi.org/10.1787/e1903ab2-en.

Israelis’ recognition that both hard work and other factors matter is clearest when they are asked to think about people on low incomes. In separate questions, Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module also asked respondents whether having low and high income is due to effort, due to circumstances beyond the individual’s control, or due to a combination of both. While people in most countries lean more heavily towards one or the other, Israel stands out as having a comparatively large share that believe both are at least part of the explanation, especially for low income (Figure 3.6, Panel A). Fifty-seven per cent of Israelis consider (lack of) effort at least part of the reason for low income – the third highest share among covered OECD countries, after Canada (58%) and the United States (61%). At the same time, 87% believe that circumstances are at least part of the reason, too – again the third highest share in the OECD, in this case after Greece and Chile (both 88%). No other OECD country combines such large shares choosing both. When asked to think about high income, a slightly lower share (70%) pick circumstances as at least part of the reason, and a slightly higher share (73%) choose (strong) effort (Figure 3.6, Panel B).

Figure 3.6. Israelis firmly believe that both effort and the right circumstances are important for shaping outcomes

Note: Panel A: Respondents were asked the question: “In your opinion, if in your country a working-age person’s income is low, which is most often the reason?”, with the response options: “1. Lack of effort”, “2. Circumstances beyond that person's control”, “3. Both” and “4. Can’t choose”. Data on the x-axis refer to the percentage choosing either 1 (“Lack of effort”) or 3 (“Both”); data on the y-axis refer to the percentage choosing either 2 (“Circumstances...”) or 3 (“Both”). Panel B: Respondents were asked the question: “In your opinion, if in your country a working-age person’s income is high, which is most often the reason?”, with the response options: “1. Strong effort”, “2. Circumstances beyond that person's control”, “3. Both” and “4. Can’t choose”. Data on the x-axis refer to the percentage choosing either 1 (“Strong effort...”) or 3 (“Both”); data on the y-axis refer to the percentage choosing either 2 (“Circumstances...”) or 3 (“Both”). “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across OECD countries with available data.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Perceived drivers of success are not always the same across social groups. Older people tend to attach greater importance to hard work, for instance, while people who identify as part of a minority ascribe more importance to individual characteristics, such as sex, sexual orientation, and ethnicity (OECD, 2023[10]). Differences in perceptions across income groups are still debated, with some studies finding people on low incomes are less likely to believe in the efficacy of hard work, and others that hard work is seen as important regardless of income (see OECD (2023[10])).

In Israel, education is one factor that seems to be associated with beliefs about the determinants of success, albeit in sometimes contradictory ways. When asked to think about reasons for low income, high-educated Israeli respondents (62%) are almost twice as likely as low-educated respondents (33%) to say low effort is at least part of the explanation, either by itself or in combination with circumstances beyond control (Annex Figure 3.A.2, Panel A). This is a far stronger social gradient than on average in OECD countries. Conversely, however, when asked for their thoughts on what matters for getting ahead in life, it is low-educated Israelis who are most likely to identify working hard as important (68%, compared to 59% among medium- and high-educated Israelis), see Annex Figure 3.A.3; phrasing seems to matter. Education is also strongly associated with beliefs among Israelis about the importance of religion for getting ahead in life (Annex Figure 3.A.3), with low-educated respondents (46%) more than twice as likely as those with high education (20%) to consider a person’s religion as essential or very important. Whether it is education itself shaping this association, or factors associated with education, such as ethno-religious status, needs further investigation.

Box 3.2. Income‑based differences in education opportunities are seen as unjust by many Israelis

One limitation of the data used in this section is that they say little about people’s normative beliefs around social mobility – what they think is right or wrong, or just or unjust. The question used to measure perceived societal mobility asked people for their views on children’s chances of remaining in a bottom‑10% household, not what they’d like these chances to be. Similarly, the questions on the perceived determinants of success, as framed, provide information on the factors that respondents believe are important, which may not be the same as those they believe should be important in determining success.

ISSP 2019 provides one question that taps into respondents’ normative beliefs on one key mechanism behind intergenerational persistence – that children from advantaged backgrounds often have access to better education than children from disadvantaged backgrounds. The survey asked respondents whether they think it is “just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with higher incomes can buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes?” (ISSP, 2018[28]). Views differ substantially across countries, with the shares considering it wrong ranging from just over 30% in Japan to 77% in France and 78% in Germany (Figure 3.7).

In Israel, a reasonable majority disagree with the rich being able to buy better education for their children than the poor. Fifty-nine per cent of Israeli adults believe it is wrong or definitely wrong, with only 16% considering it right. In both cases, these rates are similar to the average across OECD countries (60% and 18%, respectively).

Figure 3.7. Most Israelis consider it is wrong that the rich can buy better education for their children than the poor

Distribution of responses to the question: “Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes?”, 18+ year-olds, OECD countries, 2019

Note: Response options were: 1. Very unjust, definitely wrong; 2. Somewhat unjust, wrong; 3. Neither just nor unjust, mixed feelings; 4. Somewhat just, right; 5. Very just, definitely right; 6. Can’t choose. “OECD‑20” refers to the unweighted average across the 20 OECD countries with available data.

Source: OECD estimates based on International Social Survey Programme 2019, https://issp.org/.

3.3. Attitudes and preferences towards social mobility policy in Israel

Many Israelis want more to be done to promote equal opportunities…

A large majority of Israelis think that more should be done to ensure equal opportunities in life. OECD Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module asked people for their thoughts on how much should be done to “make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead in life” (Figure 3.8). Eighty-two per cent of 18‑ to 64‑year‑old Israelis responded that at least a little more should be done – the fourth highest share among covered OECD countries, and well above the OECD average (65%).

Figure 3.8. A large majority of Israelis think that more should be done to ensure equal opportunities in life

Distribution of responses to the question “How much should be done to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead in life?”, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑27 average, 2022

Note: Distribution of responses to the question “How much should be done to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead in life?”, 18‑ to‑64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑27 average, 2022.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

From a comparative perspective, this level of demand for action on equal opportunities is higher than might be expected for Israel given its mid-range performance in both objective and subjectively measured mobility (see section 10345021.0). Calls for action on equal opportunities tend to be higher in countries with greater objectively measured intergenerational persistence (Figure 3.9, Panel A), and especially in countries with greater perceived intergenerational persistence (Figure 3.9, Panel B). The most frequent calls tend to be found in countries with much higher (perceived) persistence than Israel, such as Chile and Mexico. One possible reason for Israel’s unexpectedly strong demand for action is the comparatively strong emphasis Israelis place on circumstances beyond control in shaping outcomes (see section 10345021.0).

Figure 3.9. Demand for action on equal opportunities is higher than might be expected in Israel, given both objective and subjectively measured mobility

Note: Panel A: Intergenerational earnings elasticity estimates are based on a cohort of men born approximately 1960-1980 (1975 for Israel), with both their and their fathers’ earnings measured at around ages 30‑50 (for Israel, age 35 to 39 for children and 41‑50 on average for their parents). Note that for some countries, the estimated elasticity differs from that shown earlier in Chapter 2 due to differences in the reference cohort group. Panel B: Perceived bottom 10% income persistence refers to the mean average answers to the question “In your country, out of 100 children coming from the poorest 10% of households in terms of income, how many do you think will still be living in a poor household (the poorest 10%) once they become adults? Please note that we refer to the poorest in terms of post-tax and benefit income." among respondents age 18 to 64 years old. For both panels, "More should be done to ensure equal opportunities" refers to the percentage of 18- to 64-year-olds responding "A little more" or "Much more" to the question “How much should be done to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead in life?”. “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across OECD countries with available data.

Source: OECD (2021[1]), Does Inequality Matter?: How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility, https://doi.org/10.1787/3023ed40-en, based on data from the OECD Risks That Matter survey 2020 and Heller (2020[22]), “Intergenerational Mobility in Israel”, https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/research/Pages/mechkar_134.aspx and OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

…and more to be done to tackle income inequality

Concerns about social mobility often go hand in hand with concerns about inequality, particularly income inequality (OECD, 2021[1]). Evidence summarised by the so-called “Great Gatsby Curve” (Corak, 2013[29]; Corak, 2006[30]), suggests that inequality hampers social mobility, possibly because it limits the ability of disadvantaged families to match the investments made by better-off families in their children’s education and skill development (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2019[31]).

Data from various sources suggests that concerns about income inequality are common in OECD countries (OECD, 2021[1]). The exact level of concern differs between surveys and with question-wording but across countries, with just a few exceptions, a majority of people think differences in income are too large (or similar) and that the government should take action to reduce these differences (Annex Table 3.A.1). As with equal opportunities, demands for action are most frequent in countries where (perceived) income inequality is high, like Chile and Mexico, and least frequent in countries where (perceived) income differences are small, like Denmark (OECD, 2021[1]).

In both absolute and comparative terms, large numbers of Israelis would like the government to take more action on income inequality. In line with its relatively high level of inequality, Israel consistently ranks among the top half of OECD countries for the share of people who both believe that income differences are too high and that think the government should be doing more to tackle income differences (Annex Table 3.A.1). For example, data from ISSP 2019 suggest that four‑fifths (79%) of Israelis consider the current distribution of income unfair, with a similar number thinking differences in income are too large. According to data from the ESS, almost three‑quarters (73%) of Israeli adults believe the government should take action to reduce differences in income.

Demand for government action on inequality has fallen slightly in Israel in recent years. Evidence from the ESS indicates that the share of Israelis that would like the government to take action on inequality peaked at just under 85% in 2012, before settling at around 70‑75% (Figure 3.10). One possible reason is that Israel has made some progress on inequality, with measured income inequality declining through the 2010s, in part due to measures to promote labour participation and increases in the minimum wage (OECD, 2020[32]; 2023[33]). However, comparatively few Israelis themselves believe that the government has been successful at tackling income inequality: 83% of Israelis believe that the government has been unsuccessful in “reducing the differences in income between people with high incomes and people with low incomes” – the highest share among OECD countries with available data (Annex Figure 3.A.4).

Another possible explanation is a declining level of trust in government. Although contested (Peyton, 2020[34]), there is some evidence to suggest that lower trust in government can reduce support for redistributive programmes (Kuziemko et al., 2015[35]): the public may be less enthusiastic about asking government to redistribute income if they do not trust them to distribute it well. In Israel, trust in both the government and the Knesset has declined sharply since the early 2010s. Data collected by the Israel Democracy Institute show that the share of Israelis that express “quite a lot” or “very much” trust in the government has fallen from a high of 57% in 2012 to as low as 18% in 2024, and in the Knesset from 53% in 2012 to 13% in 2024 (Hermann et al., 2024[25]). Notably, trust in local government remains far higher (53%), indicating that for many Israelis, issues relating to trust in government are mostly specific to central government.

Figure 3.10. Demand for action on inequality in Israel peaked in 2012 but remains fairly high

Percentage that agree (or agree strongly) with the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, 15+ year-olds, OECD countries, 2002-2020

Note: Respondents were asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that… The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Response options were “Agree strongly”, “Agree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Disagree”, and “Disagree strongly”. The OECD‑15 average refers to the unweighted average across the 15 OECD countries with data available for all 10 waves of the ESS.

Source: OECD estimates based the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 1‑10 (2002-2020), https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.

Minimum wages and equal access to education are the policy priorities for many Israelis

Israelis have a relatively clear idea of the areas in which they would like to see action on inequality and equal opportunities (Figure 3.11). OECD Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module asked people to choose four priority actions that the government could take to reduce inequality and promote equal opportunities. The question does not refer to budget limits or other constraints, so responses can be read as reflecting first-order preferences.

Figure 3.11. Many Israelis choose minimum wages and equal access to education as their priority actions for tackling inequality and promoting equal opportunities

Percentage choosing each action as one of their top four actions for reducing economic inequality and/or fostering equal opportunities, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑27 average, 2022

Note: Respondents were asked “Which of the following actions – promoted by all levels of government – do you think are the most important in order to reduce economic inequality and/or foster equal opportunities in [country]? Please select up to 4 actions”. Data refer to the share choosing each action as one of their four choices. Actions are sorted according to the share in Israel choosing each. “OECD‑27” average refers to the unweighted average across the 27 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Minimum wages are the priority for many people in Israel, as they are for many across the OECD (Figure 3.11). Fifty-five per cent of 18‑ to 64‑year‑old Israelis picked increasing the minimum wage as one of their top four priorities – a rate higher than the average for covered OECD countries (45%). Not surprisingly, support for increased minimum wages is most common among Israelis with lower levels of education (Annex Figure 3.A.5, Panel A) and particularly with lower incomes (Annex Figure 3.A.5, Panel B), but remains relatively high even among those in more advantaged positions. Well-designed minimum wages can help tackle earnings inequality (Autor, Manning and Smith, 2016[36]; Engbom and Moser, 2022[37]) and may contribute to longer-term mobility if recipients invest the additional income in education, healthcare, or other mobility-boosting resources. In Israel, as mentioned above, real terms increases to minimum wages during the 2010s contributed to decreases in income inequality (OECD, 2020[32]). However, in the last few years, the value of Israel’s minimum wage has fallen relative to the average wage, due largely to a nominal freeze during the COVID‑19 pandemic (OECD, 2023[38]). This may be one factor behind the large share of Israelis opting for minimum wages as one of their priority areas.

Access to education is another important action area for many Israelis (Figure 3.11). Just under half (48%) of 18‑ to 64‑year‑old Israelis chose improving equal access to education as one of the top four priorities – substantially above the average for covered OECD countries (35%). As discussed in depth in OECD (2018[39]) and OECD (2018[40]), a well-functioning education system that provides equal learning opportunities for all children is central to social mobility. In Israel, demand for action on equal access to education reflects broader dissatisfaction with inequalities in educational outcomes (Box 3.3) and echoes calls for improvements in the education system more generally. Indeed, separate data from OECD Risks That Matter 2022 suggests that as many as 79% of Israelis would like the government to spend more on education services and supports, in many cases (40%) even if it comes at the cost of a 2‑percentage points (p.p.) increase in their taxes and social contributions (OECD, 2023[41]). Calls for action on access to education are particularly frequent among Israelis with high education (54%), see Annex Figure 3.A.5, Panel A, possibly reflecting stronger beliefs in the value of education among those that have progressed through the system themselves.

Further down the list, comparatively large numbers of Israelis choose social benefits and services for low-income households (36%) and supports for low-income areas (33%) as their priority actions. Both are substantially more common choices in Israel than on average in OECD countries (26% and 22%, respectively). Demand for action on social benefits echoes wider dissatisfaction with benefit provision in Israel: Israelis are more likely than respondents in all other countries covered by OECD Risks That Matter to say that it would be difficult to access public benefits if they needed them, in part because they believe they process would be long and complicated, with large numbers also expressing dissatisfaction with the levels of income support given (OECD, 2023[41]). Not surprisingly, support for action on social benefits is more frequent among Israelis with bottom- (41%) and middle‑quintile incomes (42%) than top-quintile incomes (22%), see Annex Figure 3.A.5, Panel B. Calls for improvements in support for low-income areas are potentially grounded in an understanding of the high degree of geographic inequality and the extent to which place of residence shapes life chances in Israel (Batz and Krill, 2022[42]), and are relatively stable across the income distribution (Annex Figure 3.A.5, Panel B).

Comparatively few Israelis support tax increases

While there remains scope for improvement, Israel has a comparatively well-balanced tax mix (OECD, 2020[32]). Its personal income tax system is relatively progressive, especially following adjustments in 2017 that shifted the burden towards high-income earners. While the overall tax burden on labour remains comparatively low, Israel now has a top marginal income tax rate (50%) that is well above the OECD average (42.5%), and a top-rate threshold comparable to other OECD countries with similar top rates (OECD, 2020[32]; 2023[43]). Corporate tax rates are moderate (OECD, 2023[44]) and much of its revenue arrives through less-distortionary consumption taxes (OECD, 2020[32]).

In this context, Israelis are comparatively reluctant to support (further) tax increases. On income, many people in Israel believe the rich are taxed enough already. According to data from ISSP 2019, 41% of Israelis believe that taxes for those on high incomes are already too high, just under twice the average for covered OECD countries (22%), and a further 21% think they are “about right” (Figure 3.13). Israelis’ comparative hesitancy to increase taxes on high-earners largely holds even when it is suggested that the revenues could be used to help those on low incomes: data from OECD Risks That Matter suggests that about one‑quarter (26%) of 18‑ to 64‑year‑old Israelis think that the government should not “tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor” – a moderate rate in absolute terms, but one that is higher than in all covered OECD countries other than Finland, Estonia and Denmark (Annex Figure 3.A.6).

Box 3.3. Many Israelis are unhappy with inequalities in education outcomes

Educational inequality lies at the heart of issues around social mobility in Israel. As outlined in Chapter 2 of this report, Israel suffers from strong intergenerational persistence in education in Israel and has a particularly stubborn educational “sticky floor”. Lying behind this persistence is a comparatively high degree of inequality in education generally. Evidence from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) suggests that Israel has one of the largest gaps between top-performing and low-achieving children in the OECD (OECD, 2023[45]). These gaps are related in large part to Israel’s segregated education system and differences in performance across Israel’s ethno-religious groups (see Chapter 4).

The Israeli public are well aware of, and unhappy with, this level of inequality in education (Figure 3.12). OECD Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module asked people for their thoughts on a list of inequalities, including inequality in educational outcomes. In Israel, as many as 65% of 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds feel that differences in educational outcomes between children are too high or far too high. This is the second-highest rate among the 27 covered OECD countries, and far higher than the OECD average (42%). As in many other OECD countries, concerns about inequality in education are higher among Israelis with high education (71%) than medium (58%) and low education (55%).¹

Figure 3.12. Large numbers of Israelis believe that inequality in education outcomes is too high

Distribution of responses to the question “Thinking about different types of inequality, please indicate whether you think that each of the following is too high or too low… Differences in educational outcomes for children”, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, OECD countries, 2022

Note: “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across the 27 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

1. OECD estimates based on the same question used in Figure 2.12. Calculated percentages refer to 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds. Low education corresponds to a highest level of educational attainment below upper-secondary level, medium education to a highest level of educational attainment at upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary level, and high education a highest level of educational attainment at tertiary level. The unweighted averages across the 27‑covered OECD countries are 36% for those with low education, 41% for those with medium education, and 45% for those with high education.

In a similar vein, Israelis are also relatively unenthusiastic about increasing taxes on business and on wealth. Data from OECD Risks That Matter’s Opportunities module, shown earlier in Figure 3.11, suggests comparatively few Israelis (13%) would prioritise increasing corporate taxes as a means of reducing inequality and promoting equal opportunities, and very few (7%) put (re‑)introducing inheritance, gift and estate taxes towards the top of their list. Indeed, Israel is one of several OECD countries to have abolished their inheritance or estate taxes within the last few decades, having repealed its inheritance tax in 1980 (OECD, 2021[46]).

Figure 3.13. Many Israelis believe the rich are taxed enough already

Distribution of responses to the question “Generally, how would you describe taxes today for those with high incomes?”, 18+ year-olds, OECD countries, 2019

Note: Data for the United Kingdom refer to Great Britain only. “OECD‑20” refers to the unweighted average across the 20 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based on International Social Survey Programme 2019, https://issp.org/.

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Annex 3.A. Additional tables and figures

Annex Table 3.A.1. Large numbers of Israelis would like the government to take more action on income inequality

Percentages agreeing with various statements relating to the level of, or preferences for future action on, income inequality, OECD countries

Note: Colour-coding represents country rankings on the given measure, with the lightest blue represents countries in the bottom quarter, and the darkest countries in the top quarter. The OECD average refers to the unweighted average across countries with data for the given measure. Column 1: Data refer to the share of 18+ year-olds responding “Agree” or “Strongly agree” when asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Differences in income in [COUNTRY] are too large”. Column 2: Data refer to the share of 18+ year-olds responding “Unfair” or “Very unfair” when asked “How fair or unfair do you think the income distribution is in [COUNTRY]?”. Column 3: Data refer to the share of 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds responding “Too high” or “Far too high” when asked “Thinking about different types of inequality, please indicate whether you think that each of the following is too high or too low in [country]. Differences in income”. Column 4: Data refer to the share of 18+ year-olds. responding “Agree” or “Strongly agree” when asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes”. Column 5: Data refer to the share of 15+ year-olds responding “Agree” or “Strongly agree” when asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that… The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Column 6: Data refer to the share of 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds responding “More” or “Much more” when asked “Governments can reduce income differences between the rich and the poor by collecting taxes and providing social benefits. In your country, do you think the government should do more or less to reduce income differences?”.

Source: OECD estimates based on the International Social Survey Programme 2019, https://issp.org/, the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2020 and the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm, and the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 10 (2020), https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.

Annex Figure 3.A.1. Many Israelis believe they have moved up the occupational ladder, even when a comparison of occupational attainment suggest they might not have

Distribution of responses to the question “Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t have one now). If you compare this job to the job your father had when you were <^{14, 15, 16}>, would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was)...”, by absolute intergenerational occupational mobility, 35‑ to‑64‑year‑olds, Israel and OECD‑28 average, 2009

Note: Absolute occupation mobility is measured as in Chapter 2, using a simplified version of the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe‑Portocarero) classification scheme outlined by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The statuses considered are: 1. Higher managerial and professional workers; 2. Lower managerial and professional workers; 3. Routine non-manual workers, manual supervisors, self-employed (with or without employees, including self-employed farmers); 4. Skilled manual workers; and 5. Semi- and unskilled manual workers (including agricultural labourers); plus an additional category (6.) for respondents who have never had a paid job/whose parents were not in paid work during the reference period. Parents’ occupation is measured when a child was age 14 to 16. Parental occupational attainment refers to the highest occupation attained by either parent. OECD‑28 average is the unweighted average across the 28 OECD countries with available data.

Source: OECD estimates based on International Social Survey Programme 2009, https://issp.org/.

Annex Figure 3.A.2. In Israel, education is one factor strongly associated with belief in the importance of hard work

Note: Panel A: Response options were: 1. Lack of effort; 2. Circumstances beyond that person’s control; 3. Both; and 4. Can’t choose. Panel B: Response options were: 1. Strong effort; 2. Circumstances beyond that person’s control; 3. Both; and 4. Can’t choose. Low education corresponds to a highest level of educational attainment below upper-secondary level, medium education to a highest level of educational attainment at upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary level, and high education a highest level of educational attainment at tertiary level.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Annex Figure 3.A.3. Views on the importance of religion for life chances differ strongly with education

Percentage responding “Essential” or “Very important” to the question: “In your country, nowadays, how important do you think each of the following factors is for an individual to get ahead in life?”, by item, by educational attainment, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, Israel, 2022

Note: Response options for each item were: 1. Essential; 2. Very important; 3. Fairly important; 4. Not very important; 5. Not important at all; and 6. Can’t choose. Data refer to the combined share choosing “1. Essential” and “2. Very important”. Low education corresponds to a highest level of educational attainment below upper-secondary level, medium education to a highest level of educational attainment at upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary level, and high education a highest level of educational attainment at tertiary level.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Annex Figure 3.A.4. Many Israelis believe the government has been unsuccessful at reducing income inequality

Distribution of responses to the question “How successful do you think the government is nowadays in reducing the differences in income between people with high incomes and people with low incomes?”, 18+ year-olds, OECD countries, 2019

Note: Data for the United Kingdom refer to Great Britain only. “OECD‑20” refers to the unweighted average across the 20 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based on International Social Survey Programme 2019, https://issp.org/.

Annex Figure 3.A.5. Israelis’ priority policy actions differ with education and income

Percentage choosing each action as one of their top four actions for reducing economic inequality and/or fostering equal opportunities, 18‑ to 64‑year‑olds, Israel, 2022

Note: Respondents were asked “Which of the following actions – promoted by all levels of government – do you think are the most important in order to reduce economic inequality and/or foster equal opportunities in [country]? Please select up to 4 actions.” Data refer to the share choosing each action as one of their four choices. Actions are sorted according to the share in Israel choosing each. Panel A: Low education corresponds to a highest level of educational attainment below upper-secondary level, medium education to a highest level of educational attainment at upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary level, and high education a highest level of educational attainment at tertiary level. Panel B: “Bottom income quintile” refers to an equivalised disposable household income in the first quintile (bottom 20%) of the national income distribution, “middle income quintile” to an equivalised disposable household income in the third quintile (middle 20%) of the distribution, and “top income quintile” to an equivalised disposable household income in the fifth quintile (top 20%) of the distribution.

Source: OECD estimates based on the Opportunities module of the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Annex Figure 3.A.6. Israelis are comparatively hesitant to support tax increases on the rich, even when it is suggested that the revenues could be used to support the poor

Distribution of responses to the question “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor?”, 18‑ to‑64‑year‑olds, OECD countries, 2022

Note: “OECD‑27” refers to the unweighted average across the 27 covered OECD countries.

Source: OECD estimates based on the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2022, http://oe.cd/rtm.

Notes

← 1.  Various issues, including potential definitional differences, mean this is an imperfect comparison. For example, ISSP 2019s questions on subjective social position ask respondents for their assessment of their position in society generally, rather than with respect to occupation specifically. As a result, respondents’ responses may be influenced by other aspects of socio‑economic status (e.g. education, income, wealth, etc.) above and beyond occupation. In earlier rounds (e.g. 2009) the ISSP provided a more directly comparable question, asking respondents “Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t have one now). If you compare this job to the job your father had when you were <^{14, 15, 16}>, would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was)...”. Conclusions from this alternative question are largely similar to those from Figure 3.1 (see Annex Figure 3.A.1).

← 2.  OECD estimates based on the ISSP 2019 question “Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in life... Knowing the right people”. Calculated percentages refer to 18+ year-olds.