This chapter provides an overview of the scale of Ukraine’s emigration and internal displacement on the eve of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It brings together descriptive statistics on the migration flows of Ukrainians from the country, their stocks in OECD countries, and maps the presence of displaced persons within Ukraine. The chapter further examines the evolution of the massive displacement crisis triggered by the aggression and presents available information on returns that have already taken place. By doing so, it sets the scene for the rest of the report.
Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis
Return, Reintegrate, Reconnect
Abstract
Ukraine’’s migration story is one of both continuity and transformation. Since gaining independence in 1991, the country has experienced several waves of emigration to OECD and other destinations, each shaped by evolving economic opportunities, social change and geopolitical circumstances. By early 2022, these movements had given rise to a diverse and well-established Ukrainian presence abroad, comprising both citizens as well as individuals of ethnic Ukrainian descent with varied experiences and connections to the country.
At the same time, Ukraine’s migration history has not been one of one‑way movement. Over the past three decades, the country has also seen successive periods of return, as citizens and members of the wider Ukrainian diaspora came back for family, professional or personal reasons. On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine was also managing an internal displacement situation within its borders, stemming from the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the military conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Understanding this complex pre‑existing context is essential. It shaped both the mobility patterns that followed the large‑scale aggression and influenced the levels of institutional, community and individual support available to those displaced in Ukraine and abroad. These dynamics continue to influence the integration trajectories of displaced Ukrainians, their perspectives on return, but also the evolving role of Ukraine’s global community in recovery and reconstruction.
Ukraine has largely been a country of emigration since its independence
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the country has undergone several significant and turbulent political, economic and social transformations, which have given rise to several migration episodes both to and from the country (Malynovska, 2018[1]; Fedyuk and Kindler, 2016[2]).
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Ukrainians gained the right to freely leave and return to the country, a right that had previously been denied to citizens of Soviet Ukraine. As a result, between 1991 and 1993, large scale population movements took place between Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. A significant number of individuals of Ukrainian descent returned to Ukraine, including those who had previously been working, studying, or had been forcibly deported to other parts of the Soviet Union. At the same time, emigration to other former Soviet Union republics also occurred.
In addition, emigration driven by ethnic, religious, political, and family reunification factors that had started in the early 1980s continued, particularly to countries such as Israel and Germany. This migration, which had begun a few years before independence, was typically of a permanent nature.
From 1994 to roughly 2004, permanent emigration from Ukraine for political, ethnic, or religious reasons gradually declined, giving way to an era of circular and short-term migration for economic reasons. Border crossings from Ukraine rose from 4.5 million in 1992 to nearly 16 million by the end of the 1990s (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 1998[3]). By the early 2000s, labour migration, including irregular, had become the main form of emigration from Ukraine, with nearly 3 million Ukrainians working abroad on a temporary basis (State Statistics Service of Ukraine; Ukrainian Centre of Social Reforms, 2009[4]). The majority of labour migrants originated from the western parts of the country (Gladun, 2020[5]). The main destination countries during this period were the Russian Federation, the countries of Southern Europe, Poland and Czechia.
The period from 2005 to 2013 was marked by both a relatively low outflow of Ukrainians and low migration intentions (Vorona and Shulga, 2012[6]), reflecting a phase of economic growth and relative political stability in Ukraine. Labour migration from Ukraine slowed, especially in the aftermath of the global economic recession in major destination countries, though circular and short-term labour migration remained a key feature of Ukraine’s mobility patterns (Libanova, 2010[7]). At least 1 million labour migrants returned to Ukraine during this period. Simultaneously, regularisation programmes in several European destination countries enabled earlier migrant waves to transition towards longer-term, quasi-permanent settlement. These programmes also facilitated family reunification, allowing Ukrainian migrants to bring their families to host countries, further shaping the evolving migration landscape.
Late 2013 and 2014 marked the beginning of the deepest political changes since Ukraine’s independence, with the Revolution of Dignity resulting in the ousting of the previous president. These events were followed by a Russia‑induced military crisis in the eastern part of the country in early 2014 and the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation. These developments had profound economic and social consequences, initially resulting in the first major internal displacement crisis, as well as the first outflow of asylum seekers, primarily to European countries. A sizeable outflow of mostly ethnic Russians, along with a non-negligible share of displaced persons, also took place towards the Russian Federation (Malynovska, 2018[1]). During the same time, several policy and regulatory changes in receiving countries began to further facilitate cross-border movements of Ukrainians.
Between 2014 and 2017, the proportion of Ukrainians considering emigration increased (IOM and GFK, 2017[8]) and a growing number of Ukrainians obtained permanent residence status abroad. The number of Ukrainian family reunifications in destination countries also rose, as did the number of Ukrainian students pursuing education abroad, whether as international students or as dependents uniting with parents already employed in EU countries. During this period, labour migration flows to the Russian Federation declined, while migration patterns increasingly shifted towards EU countries, particularly Poland, which emerged as a primary destination for Ukrainian workers. This shift was accompanied by a rise in irregular migration from Ukraine and in the number of Ukrainians participating in assisted return programmes.
In 2017, visa-free travel to the EU for Ukrainians came into force. This major development contributed to increased mobility, initially driven by tourism. In subsequent years, the growing interconnectedness between Ukraine and EU countries facilitated better preparation for both study and labour migration, which continued to expand gradually during this period. In 2021, 8.5% of Ukrainians expressed an intention to go abroad for temporary work, 7.4% intended to emigrate permanently, and 7.1% planned to leave for other reasons not related to lack of prospects (Yakymenko et al., 2021[9]).
Changes in emigration dynamics from Ukraine are also reflected in statistics from OECD countries
Temporary and long-term residence of Ukrainian citizens in OECD countries
Europe
In the early 2000s, Italy, Spain and Portugal were the main destination countries for Ukrainian labour migrants, most of whom were temporary workers. During the same period, Germany received inflows from Ukraine through ethnic resettlement programmes and family reunification channels. By 2013, Ukrainians ranked as the fourth-largest group of third-country nationals in the European Union, based on the total number of residence permits, with employment-related permits being the main category (Eurostat, 2022[10]).
Between 2010 and 2021, Ukrainian migration to the EU continued to grow. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the number of first residence permits issued to Ukrainian citizens over this period, by country, as an estimate of the size of legal immigration flows of Ukrainians into the EU. At its peak in 2021, the total number of first residence permits issued to Ukrainians in the EU stood at 876 000, the highest number of permits issued to any group of third-country nationals in the EU in 2021 (Eurostat, 2022[10]).
Source: Eurostat.
During this period, the ranking of destination countries changed compared to earlier periods. Poland, Czechia, Hungary and the Baltic countries have progressively taken over as key European destinations for Ukrainian labour migrants (gauging by flows), particularly starting from 2014.
An important shift also occurred from predominantly temporary, circular, and short-term migration towards longer-term residence. This trend was particularly evident in Poland. Prior to 2014, most Ukrainians, including those coming for work, did not apply for residence permits in Poland. Instead, they entered and stayed on visas, available free of charge since 2012 for periods of between three months and one year. Many Ukrainians benefited from a simplified employment procedure that allowed temporary work without a permit, worked in sectors exempt from additional documentation requirements, or were employed informally (Brunarska et al., 2016[11]). Furthermore, under the Agreement on Local Border Traffic between Poland and Ukraine, in force since 2009, Ukrainian nationals residing in the border zone did not require visas. As a result, mobility between Ukraine and Poland was very high, while the stock of Ukrainains with longer-term residence in Poland remained relatively low.
Since the escalation of the military conflict initiated by Russia in 2014, and due to significant amendments to Poland’s law on foreigners that same year,1 the number of first residence permits granted to Ukrainian citizens increased sharply, reaching more than 730 000 in 2021 (Figure 2.1). The majority of these permits were issued for employment purposes.
Over the same 2010-2021 period, family reunficiation intensified in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and other EU countries (Figure 2.1). Student migration has also increased significantly, with notable growth observed in Germany and Spain, and a continued upward trend in the United Kingdom. Some other countries, such as Greece and Portugal, recorded a decline in the number of new arrivals from Ukraine.
As a result, by the end of 2021, 1.57 million Ukrianian citizens were legally residing in the EU with residence permits of varying duration, making them the third-largest group of third-country nationals in the EU. Three countries – Poland, Italy and Czechia – hosted the largest numbers of Ukrainians holding valid residence permits. Poland alone accounted for 83.5% of all EU permits issued to Ukrainians in 2021, although two‑thirds of these were valid for less than 12 months. In most other Member States, the majority of first residence permits were issued for a duration of at least 12 months (Eurostat, 2022[10]). The highest share of such permits were recorded in Greece (100%), Estonia (99.5%), Luxembourg (99.5%), Italy (99.4%), Portugal (99.4%), and Czechia (98.2%). In Czechia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and the Slovak Republic, Ukrainians where the largest immigrant community, measured by their share of Ukrainians holding a legal residence permit in the total population of these countries (Eurostat, 2022[10]).
Canada
About 112 000 immigrants from Ukraine arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2016 (Hou and Yan, 2020[12]), and a further 14 000 arrived between 2017 and 2021 (IRCC, 2022[13]; Stick and Hou, 2022[14]). In the first decade following Ukraine’s independence, most of these migrants were attracted by better economic prospects in Canada and had long-term settlement objectives. From 2013-2014 onwards, however, Ukrainians moving to Canada were typically young professionals seeking greater opportunities for professional development in an increasingly globalised labour market. Many later returned to Ukraine or maintained strong ties with Ukraine through regular visits (Ukrainian World Congress, 2022[15]).
Israel
Ukrainian emigration to Israel was typically permanent during the 1990s and 2000s, with the primary objective being long-term settlement. Most migrants arrived under the Law of Return, which enables people of Jewish background and their families to settle in Israel, or through family reunification. Around the late 2000s, many Ukrainians left Israel for other countries such as Canada, while some returned to Ukraine. Between 2014 and 2020, migration from Ukraine to Israel began to rise again, with about 41 000 Ukrainian Jews moving to Israel during this period (Wojnarowicz, 2022[16]).
Türkiye
Throughout the 1990s‑2010s, Türkiye saw a sizeable number of Ukrainian “shuttle traders”2 and temporary labour migrants, including those with irregular status and working in the informal economy (Icduygu, 2013[17]). By early 2022, the number of Ukrainians residing permanently or temporarily in Türkiye had reached around 38 000, with the majority being Ukrainian women married to Turkish citizens (MFA Ukraine, 2023[18]).
United States
The United States witnessed the arrival of about 108 000 Ukrainians between 1992 and 1997 (Rodriguez and Batalova, 2022[19]). In the early years following Ukraine’s independence, the main reasons included refugee resettlement on religious grounds and, to a lesser extent, family-sponsored migration. Immigration from Ukraine slowed towards the turn of the century. Nevertheless, by 2020, an additional 275 000 Ukrainians had obtained lawful permanent resident status (Rodriguez and Batalova, 2022[19]). Since 2015, about half of the new entrants were classified as “immediate family members of U.S. citizens”, while more than 20% entered through the Diversity Visa programme (Wolowyna, 2018[20]).
Citizenship acquisition by Ukrainian nationals in OECD countries
Reflecting longer-term migration trends, OECD countries have seen a steady increase in the number of Ukrainian nationals acquiring citizenship. Between 2000 and 2021, an average of 24 000 Ukrainians obtained the nationality of an OECD country each year, totalling 535 321 individuals over the period (Figure 2.2). The United States was by far the largest OECD country granting citizenship to Ukrainians, with more than 201 000 Ukrainians becoming American citizens between 2000 and 2021. In Europe, Germany accounted for the largest number, with nearly 75 000 Ukrainians acquiring German citizenship over the same period (Figure 2.3).
Persons
Note: Data available for AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHL, CRI, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, KOR, LVA, LTU, LUX, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, USA.
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
The acquisition of nationality is determined by the specific regulations of each destination country but generally reflects migration inflows from at least five to ten years earlier. For example, in Italy, most citizenship acquisitions took place during the 2010-2021 period. Citizenship acquisition is also typically associated with intentions of long-term or permanent settlement.
Persons
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
Asylum seeking by Ukrainians in OECD countries
Following the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol by Russia, as well as the beginning of the military conflict in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, a considerable number of Ukrainians sought international protection.
Starting from 2014, the number of asylum applications from Ukrainian citizens has significantly increased across all OECD countries, with a peak of 25 000 recorded in 2015 (Figure 2.4). The vast majority of applications were lodged in EU countries, notably Italy and Germany. Outside the EU, Israel, the United States and Canada also received a sizeable number of applicants (Figure 2.5).
Persons
Note: Data available for AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHL, COL, CRI, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, ISL, IRL, ISR, ITA, JPN, KOR, LVA, LTU, LUX, MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, USA.
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
Only a relatively small share of asylum applications resulted in positive decisions. For example, in the EU, between 2013 and 2021, the average recognition rate (positive decisions as a share of all decisions) stood at 19.0% at first instance and 9.5% at final instance (Eurostat, 2022[10]). The highest first-instance recognition rates during 2013-2021 were recorded in Portugal (78.4%), Estonia (61.3%), Malta (54.3%), the Slovak Republic (50.0%) and Italy (46.3%). In total, between 2013 and 2021, 16 100 positive decisions were issued to Ukrainian asulym seekers in the EU (Eurostat, 2022[10]).
Persons
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
Emigration had resulted in a significant Ukrainian presence in OECD countries
As a result of these processes, by 2020, the number of Ukrainian first-generation emigrants3 stood at almost 6 million (State Migration Service of Ukraine, 2021[21]), which represented roughly 14% of Ukraine’s total population. By 2020 and 2021, nine OECD countries were among the world’s top 11 destinations for first-generation Ukrainians. These included, in descending order: Poland, the United States, Germany, Israel, Italy, Czechia, Spain, Hungary, and Canada.4 Together, these countries hosted nearly 2.24 million Ukrainians in 2020. Poland overtook the United States as the leading OECD host country by 2020 (Figure 2.6).
Persons
Note: The OECD Database of Immigrants in the OECD Countries (DIOC) is a unique source of data on the stocks of first-generation migrants in the OECD destination countries. It provides valuable information on the number and evolution of the stocks of migrants, as well as their characteristics. One caveat, however, is that the OECD countries do not statistically define immigrants in a standardised way. Some countries have traditionally focussed on producing data on foreign residents (i.e.: Japan, South Korea), whilst others refer to the foreign-born population (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). For this reason, great care should be exercised when comparing the stocks of Ukrainians across destination countries (OECD, 2022[22]). For more details on DIOC methodology, see https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/database-on-immigrants-in-oecd-and-non-oecd-countries.html.
Source: DIOC. For Germany, the source is United Nations Population Division.
In addition to these Ukrainian-born individuals, many countries also hosted second-generation Ukrainians and persons of Ukrainian descent. In some countries, such as Canada, Israel and the United States, these diasporas were well-established and long-standing, composed of individuals whose ancestors had migrated as early as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Box 2.1). In the Baltic countries, many Ukrainians had moved there while these states and Ukraine were still part of the former Soviet Union.
Ukrainian migration has a long history that began well before the country’s independence in 1991, with scholars identifying several major pre‑independence migration waves (Fedyuk and Kindler, 2016[2]). The first major migration occurred between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before the First World War, it is estimated that over 400 000 Ukrainians moved to the United States, and over 170 000 to Canada. The fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire led to additional mass movements from Western Ukraine to North America, but also to Argentina and Brazil (Lopukh, 2006[23]; Bachynsky, 1994[24]).
The next major wave of emigration took place between the two World Wars, when Ukraine lost the war for independence and faced Sovietisation and collectivisation. During the Second World War and in its aftermath, Ukraine experienced large‑scale political emigration, forced deportations, and population displacements (Malynovska, 2018[1]). An estimated 80 000 emigrated to the United States between 1947 and 1955 (Rodriguez and Batalova, 2022[19]). The 1950s and 1960s were characterised mainly by the socialist mobilisation projects aimed at constructing infrastructure and developing the territories of Russia, Kazakhstan, and other Soviet republics, which led to many Ukrainians relocating to other parts of the Soviet Union.
From the 1970s onwards, the Soviet Government began authorising Jewish emigration. Nearly 81 000 Jews and their family members left Ukraine during the 1970s, and more than 100 000 departed between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The main destinations were Israel, the United States and Germany, which operated programmes for Jewish asylum seekers from the countries of the Soviet bloc. Germany also implemented programmes for the repatriation of ethnic Germans (Malynovska, 2018[1]). As a result, by 1991, Ukraine had developed a significant global diaspora, which continued to evolve following Ukraine’s independence, as discussed above.
Canada
According to the 2016 Canadian Census, about 1.36 million people, or close to 4% of the Canadian population, reported at least one of their ethnic or cultural origins as Ukrainian (Stick and Hou, 2022[14]). This includes about 20% of respondents who reported Ukrainian as their only ethnic or cultural origin (covering both first-generation and second-generation individuals, citizens and non-citizens of Canada), 29% who reported one other ethnic origin in addition to Ukrainian, and 51% who reported two or more other ethnic origins. The most common additional origin being British, Polish, German and other European, as well as Canadian. About 2% of respondents with Ukrainian ethnic origins spoke mainly Ukrainian at home (Stick and Hou, 2022[14]).
Israel
Ukrainian emigration to Israel was marked by large‑scale voluntary resettlement between the 1970s and the 1990s. Over time, many Ukrainians later moved from Israel to other countries, such as Canada, while some returned to Ukraine in the late 2000s. Between 2014 and 2020, migration from Ukraine to Israel began to grow again, with about 41 000 Ukrainian Jews moving to Israel. As a result, by 2022, approximately 5 to 7% of Israel’s population had Ukrainian origin, equating to roughly 500 000 to 700 000 individuals, with an additional 200 000 Ukrainian citizens eligible for Israeli citizenship (Wojnarowicz, 2022[16]).
United States
The total number of Ukrainian-born persons in the United States, including naturalised citizens, lawful permanent residents, temporary migrants such as foreign students, humanitarian migrants such as refugees and asylees, and unauthorised migrants rose from 240 690 in 2010 to 390 151 in 2020.1 At the same time, the number of individuals with Ukrainian ancestry (defined as a person’s self-identification of their ancestry or ethnic origin and including descent, roots, heritage, or place of birth of the person or their ancestors), whether born abroad or in the United States, with one or several ancestries, stood at 716 780 in the mid‑1980s, rising to 1 015 209 in 2020. This growth reflects the long-standing history of Ukrainian immigration to the country (Jenkins et al., 2022[25]).
1. Based on Database of Immigrants in the OECD Countries (DIOC), with American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS), Census Bureau, as the original source. This does not include children born abroad to US citizen parents.
Prior to 2022, Ukrainians in the OECD were already predominantly female, working-age, highly educated, and employed
On the eve of the large‑scale external displacement crisis that began in 2022 as a result of Russia’s invasion, the profiles of Ukrainians living in OECD countries were highly heterogeneous. Still, several common patterns can be identified.
In the vast majority of countries, the share of female first-generation Ukrainian immigrants was higher than that of men (Figure 2.7). The share of women exceeded 70% in Switzerland, Greece, Italy and Türkiye. The only two countries where the proportion of women was lower than that of men were Czechia (47%) and Estonia (46%). These differences across countries largely reflect pre‑existing patterns of labour migration, particularly the sectoral distribution of employment characterised by gender imbalances. This includes the predominance of women in the care sector in countries such as Greece (Nikolova and Maroufof, 2016[26]) and Italy (Vianello, 2016[27]), and of men in the construction sector in countries such as Portugal5 (Fonseca and Pereira, 2016[28]).
Source: DIOC.
Also reflecting previous labour migration patterns, most first-generation immigrants from Ukraine were of prime working age (25‑64) across most OECD countries for which data are available (Figure 2.8). In 2020‑2021, the average share of Ukrainians aged 25 to 64 across 30 OECD countries was 65.3%.6 This share exceeded 80% in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, Colombia and Switzerland.
In 2020‑2021, Denmark, Finland, Austria, and particularly Belgium had a higher share of younger Ukrainians aged 15 to 24 compared to other countries. This reflected earlier family reunification processes and an increase in student migration.
The largest shares of Ukrainian children, as a proportion of the total Ukrainian migrant population, were recorded in Belgium (26%) and Germany (19.7%). In some countries, particularly in Europe, the share of children among Ukrainians was relatively small, reflecting earlier labour migration patterns and the prevalence of transnational families, where migrants’ relatives remained in Ukraine and worked in other EU countries (Leontiyeva, 2016[29]; Banfi and Boccagni, 2013[30]).
Source: DIOC.
The proportion of older Ukrainian-born individuals was highest in the three Baltic countries, where nearly one‑third of the Ukrainian-born population belonged to this age group. This pattern reflected shared historical ties and long-standing mobility trends dating back to the Soviet era.
Ukrainian first-generation immigrants showed a wide range of educational attainment levels (Figure 2.9). On average, 33.5% had an upper-secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary level of education, while 39.7% had completed higher education. In 12 countries, including Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the United States, Israel, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand and Denmark, the share of Ukrainians with higher education exceeded 50%. In Canada and Colombia, it reached more than 70%.
In most OECD countries with available data, the majority of Ukrainians were economically active. The share of those employed within the Ukrainian immigrant population aged 15 and above stood at over 60% in Germany, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Austria and Portugal, reaching a record high of 77.9% in Israel (Figure 2.11). The employment, however, did not always match their educational profiles. In several European countries, a significant share of Ukrainians were overqualified for their jobs and worked in low-skilled or semi-skilled, lower-paid positions despite their generally high levels of education (Fedyuk and Kindler, 2016[2]). By contrast, in the United States, almost half of Ukrainians were employed in management, business, science, and arts occupations (Rodriguez and Batalova, 2022[19]).
In terms of duration of stay, two main groups can be distinguished. The first and largest group consisted of Ukrainian-born individuals who had lived in their country of destination for more than ten years. On average, 55% of Ukrainians across 30 OECD countries with available data fell into this group. The highest shares of long-term residents were found in Lithuania (86.2%), Latvia (85.9%), Israel (84.7%), the United States (77.3%), and Australia (76.5%).
The second largest group comprised recent Ukrainian immigrants who had lived in their country of destination for five years or less. On average, 30.9% of Ukrainians were in this group. The largest shares of recent arrivals were observed in Hungary (67.6%), Belgium (56.7%), Switzerland (56.2%), Finland (54.3%), Germany (51.8%), Denmark (50.2%), and Poland (49.1%). The share of Ukrainians with five to ten years of residence was the smallest across most countries.
Note: ISCED levels correspond to the following: 0/1/2: less than primary, primary, and lower secondary; 3/4: upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary; 5/6/7/8: short-cycle tertiary, bachelor’s or equivalent, master’s or equivalent, doctoral or equivalent.
Source: DIOC.
Note: Care should be exercised not to interpret the share of unemployed as unemployment rate; as in this Figure, the base is total population aged 15+ including inactive; rather than total labour force (only economically active population).
Source: DIOC.
This dynamic has created a layered migration landscape in certain countries, where older waves of migration have coexist with more recent arrivals. The situation in Germany illustrates this particularly well: 41.5% of Ukrainian-born population belonged to earlier migration waves, 51.8% represented recent arrivals, and only 6.7% fell into the category of medium-term migrants.
Source: DIOC.
Ukraine was already in the midst of challenging internal displacement situation
Alongside external migration, Ukraine had been experiencing internal displacement since 2014. This began with the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, followed by the start of military aggression in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Later that year, the Russian Federation occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, provoking a new and more intense wave of internal displacement.
The first registrations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) took place in 2014. By 1 January 2015, 940 854 people had registered as IDPs from the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol. Seven years after, on the eve of the Russia’s full-scale aggression in February 2022, 1 478 135 IDPs were still registered in Ukraine (Figure 2.12). Out of those, 60% of IDPs were women and 52% were elderly. Most IDPs had remained within their oblast of origin or had moved to a neighbouring oblast (Figure 2.13).
The actual number of individuals experiencing displacement, however, was difficult to establish. Some IDPs were reluctant to register due to administrative burdens or fear of stigmatisation, especially because registration was recorded in internal identity documents (Mikheieva and Kuznetsova, 2023[31]). In this sense, the actual number of IDPs could be significantly higher. At the same time, some people living in areas not controlled by the Government of Ukraine registered as IDPs in government-controlled areas to access benefits, while continuing to move between the two. In such cases, registration figures may have overstated the number of IDPs, at least in some locations (Volosevych and Kostiuchenko, 2017[32]).
Millions, data as of 1 January of respective year
Source: Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine.
Note: The grey colour indicates that no data is available.
Source: Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine.
Prior to 2022, Ukraine already had a certain experience of tackling the issues of return
In the three decades since independence, Ukraine has experienced several waves of return migration, involving both its citizens and individuals of Ukrainian descent (whether ethnic or territorial). Three distinct periods and corresponding categories of returnees can be identified.
The first category includes those who returned to Ukraine in the early 1990s following independence and the opening of borders. Between 1991 and 1992 alone, over 1 million individuals returned to Ukraine as permanent residents (Malynovska, 2006[33]). This flow continued thereafter, though at a sharply declining rate: for example, in 2004, only 38 600 additional individuals resettled in Ukraine. The vast majority of these returns were repatriations from other former Soviet republics, mainly the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. They comprised individuals and their descendants who had previously been deported or forcibly relocated from Ukraine, as well as those who had left for work or study within the Soviet Union. Among them were ethnic Ukrainians, but also Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks. A smaller group also returned from Central European countries, primarily military personnel and their families (Malynovska, 2006[33]).
The second wave consisted mainly of Ukrainian labour migrants returning in the 2000s. Following a major wave of temporary labour migration in the late 1990s and early 2000s, at least 1 million individuals with recent migration experience were recorded in Ukraine in 2007 (European Training Foundation, 2008[34]). By 2010, 37.5% of returning Ukrainians had moved back after completing their migration objective, typically related to earning and saving money, or after receiving a more promising opportunity in Ukraine. Around 2.5% returned to start their own business or another project, and about 5% returned upon retirement. For the remaining 55%, the return was prompted by disappointment, limited integration, hardships encountered in host countries, or deportation orders (Kupets, 2011[35]).
Partly in response to these developments, several pilot initiatives promoting reintegration of Ukrainian labour migrants and their families were launched, in some cases in co‑operation with host countries, for instance, Greece (Nikolova and Maroufof, 2016[26]). However, the demand for such services remained limited.
The third category and wave of returnees includes Ukrainian migrants who received an order to leave their host country, typically due to irregular migration status or following a rejected asylum application. Over 2014 and 2021, approximately 197 000 such orders were issued to Ukrainians by EU countries, and around 140 000 individuals returned following an order to leave (Eurostat, 2025[36]; European Parliament, 2024[37]).
These return movements have not only influenced Ukraine’s overall migration dynamics but have also shaped public discourse, policy development, and societal attitudes towards returnees well before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Notably, the question of return and reintegration of Ukrainian labour migrants and forced returnees, as well as building relations with growing Ukrainian communities abroad, began to feature prominently in Ukrainian public debate and policy discussions from the early 2000s, as explored in the next chapter.
The large‑scale, unprovoked aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, triggered one of the largest and fastest displacement crises in recent history. Approximately one‑quarter of Ukraine’s population was forced to leave their homes. While many sought refuge abroad, others were displaced within Ukraine, facing severe humanitarian challenges.
Daily outflows from Ukraine were exceptionally high during the first days of the full-scale invasion, peaking at over 200 000 border crossings from Ukraine on 6 March 2022 (OECD, 2022[22]). The majority of those fleeing initially entered Poland, which recorded more than 6 million border crossings from Ukraine between February and September 2022. Over the same period, 1.3 million people entered Hungary, 1.2 million entered Romania, 780 000 entered the Slovak Republic and 600 000 crossed into Moldova (OECD, 2022[22]; UNHCR, 2025[38]). A significant share of displaced Ukrainians later continued onward migration to other destination countries.
Outflows from Ukraine progressively declined from the third quarter of 2022 onwards, and cross-border movements began to occur in both directions. Nevertheless, outflows from Ukraine continued to exceed inflows throughout 2024 and the first half of 2025 (UNHCR, 2025[39]).
In 2023, 40% of respondents interviewed at border crossings reported departing Ukraine for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion. This figure fell to 27% in 2024 and 8% in the first quarter of 2025. In 2025, 10% of respondents indicated that they had been internally displaced before leaving Ukraine (UNHCR, 2025[39]).
The enactment of legislation in August 2025 permitting men aged 18‑22 to leave Ukraine has resulted in a noticeable new increase in departures. By late 2025, however, it remains premature to determine whether these movements represent permanent migration or short-term visits.The profile and distribution of externally displaced Ukrainians continue to evolve.
By September 2022, more than 4.5 million displaced Ukrainians (see also Box 2.2) had been recorded across the EU and other OECD countries, with the majority (4 million) registered under temporary protection or similar national protection schemes (OECD, 2022[22]). By June 2025, this figure had risen to 5.1 million, of whom 4.5 million resided in the EU. According to the Surveys with Arriving Migrants from Ukraine (SAM – UKR), by mid-2025, 20% of displaced Ukrainians in surveyed European countries had left Ukraine after 2022 (EUAA, 2025[40]).
In the early period following the onset of full-scale invasion, many international observers referred to Ukrainians leaving their homes as refugees, a term commonly used to describe people who have fled their country to escape conflict, violence or persecution and have sought safety in another state. In international law, however, the 1951 Refugee Convention provides a narrower definition, recognising as refugees only those with a well-founded fear of persecution on specific grounds such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Regional legal instruments in Africa and Latin America have expanded this definition, but generally refugee status remains a specific and relatively limited form of international protection.
The vast majority of Ukrainians who fled abroad have benefitted from temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in host countries rather than refugee status. Only a small proportion applied for asylum, and not all applicants have received formal recognition as refugees.
To encompass both Ukrainians displaced within the country and those displaced abroad, the broader term displaced persons is used. To distinguish between the two groups, externally displaced refers to those who have fled Ukraine and sought protection abroad, regardless of their legal status (for example, asylum seekers, refugees, or beneficiaries of temporary protection), while internally displaced refers to those displaced within Ukraine’s borders.
In this report, the term displaced persons is used as an overarching concept. Where differentiation is required, the report refers to externally displaced persons (EDPs) and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Between 2022 and 2025, the distribution of Ukrainians displaced by the war of aggression changed substantially across OECD countries (Figure 2.14). Initially, Poland was the main receiving country in absolute terms, with 1.38 million Ukrainians registered for temporary protection by September 2022. It was followed by Germany, with about 1 million, and Czechia, with more than 400 000 beneficiaries of temporary protection at that time. In 2023, Germany overtook Poland as the main host country.
Note: These figures reflect individuals displaced from Ukraine, including those who have been granted refugee status, temporary protection or similar statuses, or other forms of stay (from 24 February 2022). The figure for Canada includes only those who have arrived under the CUAET programme. For the United States, these figures combine both U4U (240 000) and Temporary Protected Status (50 000). Countries are ordered by the number of displaced Ukrainians as of September 2022.
Source: OECD (2022[22]), International Migration Outlook 2022, https://doi.org/10.1787/30fe16d2-en; OECD (2023[41]), International Migration Outlook 2023, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en; OECD (2024[42]), International Migration Outlook 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/50b0353e-en; OECD (2025[43]), International Migration Outlook 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en.
Between 2024 and 2025, the largest absolute increases in the number of Ukrainians displaced by the war of aggression were recorded in Germany (+48 050), Spain (+36 970) and Poland (+36 675). During the same period, other countries, including Israel, Latvia, Türkiye, Sweden and the United States, registered decreases in the number of displaced Ukrainians holding legal statuses linked to displacement. These decreases may, to some extent, reflect transitions to other residence permits and reduced visibility in official statistics, rather than necessarily indicating returns or onward movements.
By mid-2025, Germany remained the largest host country, with 1.22 million displaced Ukrainians, followed by Poland (994 000), Czechia (374 000), Canada (298 000) and the United States (290 000). Together, these five countries accounted for more than 60% of all displaced Ukrainians in the OECD (OECD, 2025[43]).
In per capita terms, in 2025, Czechia hosted the largest share of displaced Ukrainians (34.5 displaced persons per 1 000 inhabitants), followed by Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania also ranked among the top host countries relative to population size (Figure 2.15).
Absolute numbers and per thousand of total population
Source: OECD (2025[43]), International Migration Outlook 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en.
From the onset of the war of aggression, OECD countries acted rapidly by activate various emergency mechanisms and Ukraine‑specific protection schemes to facilitate the large inflow of displaced persons (OECD, 2022[22]). In most countries that introduced such frameworks, the entry and registration of displaced Ukrainians took place under these mechanisms. However, as countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States have closed their programmes, displaced Ukrainians arriving later have had to rely on alternative entry pathways as well.
Many host countries, particularly within the EU, have also observed a rise in the number of Ukrainians lodging asylum applications. Overall, however, the number of asulym applications remains small compared to registrations under temporary and similar protection statuses. Nevertheless, asylum applications reached over 28 000 in the EU+7 countries in 2022. While a decline was recorded in 2023, the number of applications has been rising again since (Figure 2.16). In the first half of 2025, almost 80% of all applications were lodged in France and Poland. Across the EU+, the recognition rate for Ukrainian asylum seekers stands at around 73% in 2024 and in the first half of 2025 (EUAA, 2025[40]) – a significant increase from 19% observed between 2013 and 2021 (Eurostat, 2022[10]).
Note: EU+ refers to the Member States of the European Union together with four associated Schengen countries, namely Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
Source: Early Warning and Preparedness System data of the European Union Agency for Asylum, as of 6 August 2025.
The profile of externally displaced Ukrainians has shifted over time. The martial law in effect since 24 February 2022 prohibits most adult men aged 18 to 60 from leaving the country. As a result, the initial outflows from Ukraine were comprised mainly of women, children and, to a lesser extent, elderly. In 2022, in virtually all host countries, at least 70% of displaced Ukrainian adults were women, while, on average, about a third were minors, while just around 4‑6% were aged 65 and over (OECD, 2023[44]). The share of adult men, however, has increased over time (EUAA, 2025[40]), both because some women have returned to Ukraine and some men have since left Ukraine to live abroad.
Approximately two‑thirds of those displaced in 2022 had completed tertiary education, with more than 40% of responding adults holding a Master’s degree or higher (OECD, 2023[45]). The educational attainment of displaced Ukrainians therefore considerably exceeds that of other refugee groups in the OECD, as well as that of the general populations of Ukraine and most host countries (OECD, 2024[46]).
Displaced Ukrainians have integrated relatively well into the labour markets of receiving countries and, overall, perform better than other refugees groups. In 2024, Poland (78%), Lithuania (72%), and the United Kingdom (69%) recorded the highest employment rates, while Czechia, Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands also reported rates close to or exceeding 60%. Nevertheless, outcomes continue to vary considerably between countries. In Spain (17%), Latvia (33%) and Norway (31%), employment rates remain comparatively low. In Switzerland, despite a significant increase, fewer than one in three displaced Ukrainians were in employment in 2024. In Austria, employment rates more than doubled between 2022 and 2024, albeit from low initial levels. Between 2023 and 2024, the United States recorded the largest year-on-year increase, with a 21 percentage point (p.p.) rise in employment rates among recent Ukrainian arrivals. Numerous factors explain these differences, including different integration policies adopted by host countries (EMN/OECD, 2024[47]).
Percentages of the labour force
Note: For countries marked with an asterisk (*), survey data rather than administrative data have been used. Employment rates for 2022 and 2023 are in most cases from the September of respective years.
Source: OECD (2025[43]), International Migration Outlook 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en.
In many countries, however, Ukrainians face skills mismatches and are often employed in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, frequently under less favourable working conditions (IMPACT Initiatives, 2025[48]). Language barriers and childcare responsibilities remain among the main obstacles to accessing employment, and to securing better-quality jobs in particular. The most recent round of the Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS) in ten European countries8 found that, although the employment levels have improved and the financial vulnerability of displaced Ukrainians has decreased over the past year, one in five still lives with an income below the poverty line (UNHCR et al., 2025[49]). However, experiences vary between countries, with poverty rates among Ukrainian EDPs reaching 51% in Latvia (compared to 15% among Latvians), 41% in Lithuania (compared to 13% among Lithuanians), and 38% in the Slovak Republic (compared to 10% among Slovaks).
Certain household profiles face particularly high risks of poverty (UNHCR et al., 2025[49]). Almost half of individuals living with an older adult (65+) reported an equivalised disposable income below the poverty threshold. Among those living with household members with disabilities or with mental health and psychosocial support needs, the average shares across the countries stood at 41% and 27% respectively.
The SEIS survey also found that housing expenses were considerably higher for displaced Ukrainians than for host country nationals, with accommodation costs representing an estimated 17% of disposable income for host country nationals (including mortgage payments), compared with 32% for displaced Ukrainians (UNHCR et al., 2025[49]). This implies that the latter have much less of their income remaining for other needs. The findings further indicate that higher poverty levels among Ukrainians are associated with poorer living conditions, more limited healthcare coverage, skipping meals, and greater frequency of children being out of school.
The number of internally displaced persons in Ukraine has surged since 2022
The war of aggression has led to a sharp increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). During 2022, their number more than tripled, rising from 1.48 million registered IDPs on 1 January 2022 to 4.85 million a year later. Between 2024 and 2025, the number of registered IDPs decreased by 5.8%, reaching 4.64 million (Figure 2.15. ). The actual number of IDPs is considered to be lower than the official figure, by some estimates around 950 000 individuals (IOM, 2025[50]), since many do not deregister after returning home or moving abroad (KSE Institute, 2025[51]).
The oblasts of Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine recorded the largest increases in IDP numbers compared with previous years. Nonetheless, as of 2025, 1.3 million IDPs were located in eastern Ukraine. Five oblasts, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Kyiv, together with the City of Kyiv, accounted for half of all IDPs in 2025. Women represented almost 60% of the internally displaced population that year.
Millions, as of 1 January of each respective year
Source: Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine.
Thousands, data as of 1 January of respective year
Source: Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine.
Some displaced Ukrainians have already returned despite continuing outflows
Amid the mass displacement caused by the invasion, a substantial number of displaced persons had returned to Ukraine by 2025, primarily to their places of habitual residence, either temporarily or permanently, even as new displacements continued to occur. Although estimates vary, often because of different definitions of what constituted return (Box 2.3), evidence suggests that the main wave of returns occurred in late spring and summer 2022, following the Armed Forces of Ukraine pushback of the Russian army and the liberation of parts of Ukrainian territory.
Ukraine currently has no formal legal or statistical definition of a returnee, whether referring to those returning after internal or external displacement or following voluntary migration. In its absence, various organisations collecting data on returns have adopted their own operational criteria for statistical purposes.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines “returnees” as individuals who have returned to their habitual place of residence after a period of displacement of minimum two weeks since February 2022, whether from abroad or from within Ukraine (IOM, 2025[52]). The current definition does not specify whether it encompasses both permanent and temporary returns.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a “refugee returnee” as “a former refugee who has returned from a host country to their country of origin or former habitual residence, spontaneously or in an organised fashion, with the intention of remaining there permanently and who is yet to be fully integrated” (UNHCR, 2024[53]). In this context, the term “refugee” is used to refer to persons forcibly displaced abroad.
The IMPACT Initiatives definition considers returnees to be individuals who “were refugees from Ukraine for a period longer than one month and have since returned either to their home settlement or elsewhere in Ukraine”. Here too, the term “refugee” is used as a synonym to forcibly displaced abroad (IMPACT, 2024[54]).
Because of these differing definitions, statistical data from these sources are not directly comparable.
According to the IOM, as of April 2025 an estimated 4.1 million returnees (as defined in Box 2.3) were recorded in Ukraine (Figure 2.19). The majority returned from internal displacement, particularly from another oblast (47.9%), while 25.1% returned from abroad. Around 40% of all returnees came back already in 2022 (IOM, 2025[52]). Since then, new returns have continued, although at a slower and declining rate. The observed decline in the total number of returnees (Figure 2.19) can be explained by new displacement, including moves abroad, as well as by the fact that some returns have been of temporary nature. For example, in January 2023, only 80% of returnees indicated that they were planning to remain in their homes and 15% have been in their homes for one month or less (IOM, 2023[55]).
UNHCR estimates the number of returnees to be higher, at 5.8 million as of early 2025 (UNHCR, 2025[56]). Among those returning from abroad and surveyed in July and August 2024, 51% had returned between May and December 2022, and an additional 40% during the first half of 2023. Nine per cent returned in 2024 (UNHCR, 2024[53]).
According to IMPACT, as of early 2024, 81% of returnees from abroad had gone back to their home settlements, while 19% had moved to another settlement in Ukraine (IMPACT, 2024[54]). By August 2024, more than one‑quarter of all surveyed returnees were living in frontline areas,9 and 5% were residing in frontline areas where active hostilities were still taking place (IMPACT Initiatives, 2024[57]).
This wide range of estimates underscores the need for Ukraine to have a clearer definition (at least for statistical purposes) of who can be considered a returnee.
In addition, many displaced persons have undertaken short-term visits back home, both from internal displacement or from abroad (Figure 2.20). The main reasons for these visits include seeing family members, retrieving documents, checking on property and assessing the overall situation (UNHCR, 2023[58]). According to the UNHCR’s Regional Intentions Surveys conducted in spring 2023 (UNHCR, 2023[59]), nearly 40% of Ukrainians displaced in Europe had visited Ukraine at least once since their initial displacement. Such visits can help maintain family and community ties, provide an opportunity to assess the situation on the ground, and may facilitate more sustainable returns in the future when conditions improve.
As of 2025, however, international organisations do not promote returns to Ukraine given the ongoing security concerns caused by Russia’s continued aggression. UNHCR has called on host countries not to forcibly return anyone to Ukraine. Individuals who decide to return do so only on their own initiative. Yet it remains the responsibility of the international community to help ensure that these returns are informed, voluntary, and carried out in conditions of safety and dignity. The existence of voluntary returns should not obscure the broader reality that the vast majority of those displaced from Ukraine continue to face conditions warranting international protection (UNHCR, 2023[60]).
Thousands
Source: OECD Secretariat computations based on IOM (2025[61]), General Population Surveys / Ukraine Returns Reports, Rounds 4‑20.
Source: OECD Secretariat compilation based on the UNHCR (2023[59]), Regional Intentions Surveys 4th Round, April-May 2023.
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As percentage of all permits granted to Urkainian citizens
Source: Eurostat.
← 1. In Poland, a new Act on Foreigners of May 2014 introduced a number of significant changes that relaxed the conditions of stay for foreigners, such as extending the duration of temporary residence permits from two to three years; extending the duration of student residence permits, and allowing graduates of Polish high schools to stay for up to one year to seek work in Poland; granting a one‑month job search period to foreign workers upon job loss; introducing an entitlement to legalise stay in Poland on humanitarian grounds; and simplifying access to permanent residence permits for persons of Polish descent or a valid Polish Charter (OECD, 2014[64]). All of these factors were important pull factors for Ukrainians (Brunarska et al., 2016[11]).
← 2. A “shuttle trader” (known in Ukrainian as челнок) refers to individuals who, during the 1990s economic transition, engaged in small-scale cross-border trade, mostly informal, by repeatedly travelling (“shuttling”) between Ukraine and neighbouring countries to purchase consumer goods – such as clothing, electronics, and household items – for resale in local markets.
← 3. Individuals born in Ukraine but living outside of Ukraine, including those who had moved before Ukraine’s independence and regardless of their status.
← 4. The Russian Federation remained the leading host country throughout 1991-2021, with 3 268 263 first-generation Ukrainians living there in 2020 (UN Population Division, 2025[62]). Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan also featured in the list of top 10 host countries throughout the period.
← 5. In Portugal, Ukrainian migration was much more gender-segregated in the early periods. For example, in 2000, 81% of Ukrainian migrants to Portugal were male (Fonseca and Pereira, 2016[28]), in contrast to 53% by 2020. This decline in the share of men is attributed to the departure of men (either back to Ukraine or to other countries), notably following the crisis in the construction sector in the aftermath of the global economic recession, as well as the more recent migration of Ukrainian women to Portugal. Similarly, in Spain, Ukrainian migration shifted from being male‑dominated in the early 2000s to being female‑dominated migration in the 2010s (Stanek, Hosnedlová and Brey, 2016[63]).
← 6. Here and further in this section: weighted average, accounting for the total size of the Ukrainian-born population in each of the 30 OECD countries with available data.
← 7. In this context, EU+ refers to EU Member States plus four associated Schengen countries: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
← 8. The Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS) is conducted in ten countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic off Moldova, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
← 9. Defined here as temporarily or partly occupied oblasts, and oblasts with past, present, or possible active hostilities, as per the Ministry of Reintegration’s instruction “On Approval of the List of Territories in which Military Operations are (were) Conducted or Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation”, first published on 22 December 2022 and updated on 17 August 2024.